G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.
so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF
BAIL PROCEEDINGS. Respondent judge is correct in
appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he
hearing of an application for bail should be summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence
for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for
or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself
to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential
to the purpose of the hearing."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO
PROCEDURE IN CANCELLATION OF BAIL. Although the
proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for
an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued
to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing
hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied
by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings
since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837
without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court
may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the
cancellation of the bail. The grant of bail was made
without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of
right, as in this case, the prosecution must be given the
opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of
guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him,
the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an
application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is
evidence to prove the charge. Bare allegations of partiality
entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and
procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and
the cancellation of the same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES. The Constitution commands that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a
speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a
derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right
to due process of law. The rule on the disqualification of
judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of
due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON
PART OF JUDGE. "It is now beyond dispute that due
process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is
the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at
would be the application of the law to the facts as found by
a judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality
of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the
benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain
and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have
erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion
that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" is an
imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the
conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts
of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper
dispensation of justice.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR INHIBITION, AND PETITION CHALLENGING
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. Hence, if the trial
judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule
137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless
of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by
this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before
the trial court or a petition before either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the
trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive
the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise,
by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, although
the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the
trial.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE NOT PRESUMED. While bias
and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have
been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, the
established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to person and do equal right to the
poor and the rich.
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING HEARING OF CASE AFTER
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND
DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND THE MOTION
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE OUTSIDE
METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. In the case at
hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules
and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the
trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation.
Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent
judge did not suspend hearing the case during the
pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the
judge is partial.
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE OF OVERRULING PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF A
PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY THEREON,
NOT PROOF OF BIAS; REASON. The first of these allegedly
"palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by
respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's
objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo
Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends
that respondent judge should not have admitted the
extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did
not take the witness stand to affirm the statements
contained in the document presented by the prosecution.
Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to
bolster the evidence for the prosecution. This contention is
without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled
petitioner's objection to the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v.
Pearanda, it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions
between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient
ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the
ground of bias and manifest partiality." If petitioner
disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the
admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in
case a judgment of conviction is rendered. To conclude,
however, that respondent judge, by overruling the
objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to
strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless
because there was no evidence given to support this
conclusion, but also premature because at that stage, the
judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of
the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely
ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that "the
offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness'
statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential
strength" is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least,
an overreaction.
9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE CANCELLATION OF BAIL
PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO
ALLOW PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO PRESENT ANYMORE
WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS; REASON. The other
supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's
partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning
the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's
bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses
had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the
defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of
bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow
petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The
reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1)
the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and
different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court
need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses
from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the
counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2)
witnesses as borne out by the record of the case . . .
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper
appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before
him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to
limit the number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of
the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination
as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies
a full exercise of judicial discretion." If the trial judge
believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him
to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their
opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority
to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any
case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail
proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the respondent
judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the
prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for
resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented
was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER
ALLOWING PETITIONER'S ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT
NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY. Petitioner, in this
Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the
Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced
by his Order dated July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed
petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a
preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a
divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991
Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is
not necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we
held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the menacing language or behaviour before the courts." The
pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not
erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or
occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of having materiality to the case."
malice on the part of the judge against that particular
litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . .
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. To be sure,
." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a
the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in
members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the
this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge
interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this
on the ground of bias or partiality.
privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice.
Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the
ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. In the case at hand, the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more
Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial
the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and
proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying
court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful
to reset the scheduled hearings, but to suspend the trial of or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or
the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with
before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the
proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay Court's attention to the issues involved. The language
the disposition of a particular issue . . . Before this Court, vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but
petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
various orders of respondent judge in connection with the not offensive."
single murder case pending against him. Apart from the
present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087,
14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY,
petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions
OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS LANGUAGE TOWARD A
docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
JUDGE. Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration,
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining
counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer
order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in
malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly erroneous
abeyance. The murder case involving only one accused, the
assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated:
petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the
"Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings,
proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be
contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt
gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the
to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense. . ." The trial
information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or
judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy
December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of
rush to do petitioner in . . ." In the Urgent Motion filed by
four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes
petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is
have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and
alleged to have: (a) "generated belief of his being under
twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being
contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated
contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored
attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns,
suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the
proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's
needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation
liberty only after a full trial of the facts." . . . In light of
can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the
the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the
present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall
inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members
hearings.
of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of
the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS. The Rules of Court commands
members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
RESOLUTION
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers."
Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A ROMERO, J p:
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying petitioner's
Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution
promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the
following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order
dated September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion
for Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's Order dated
September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly
those wherein respondent Judge participated, is in order to
arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis
the petitioner.
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along
Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. After conducting an
investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified
petitioner Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission
of the crime. On July 8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by
two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station. He was arrested and booked for the shooting of
Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal.
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July
9, 1991.
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed
with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion praying for
petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary
investigation. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro
interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the
Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12, 1991, approved
the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order
granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal to
conduct a preliminary investigation.
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio
issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the July 12, 1991
Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender
within 48 hours from notice; (c) cancelled the July 16, 1991
Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus questioning the July 17, 1991
Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner
filed before the trial court a motion to suspend all the
proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed
before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by
respondent judge. 4
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner, the respondent
judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued
detention at the CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall
have properly determined the place where accused should
be detained."
On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation
wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting that custody
of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an
investigation for illegal possession of firearms involving
petitioner.
On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an
Order 8 granting the NBI temporary custody of petitioner
subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to
be accorded his constitutional rights during the
investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted
only during office hours and petitioner is to be returned to
the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c)
the NBI should report to the trial court the status of the
investigation.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the
trial court praying that the Order dated July 29, 1991 be
nullified and recalled.
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10
praying that it be granted full custody of petitioner pending
the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of
firearms.
An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1,
1991 setting for hearing the issue concerning the proper
venue of petitioner's detention.
After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court
issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991 ordering the
CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not
later than August 5, 1991 so that a commitment order for
his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued.
The Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial Warden
of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner
was issued on August 5, 1991.
On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation
14 praying that respondent judge inhibit himself from
hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent
judge in his Order dated September 4, 1991. 15
On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila
which was denied by respondent judge on September 17,
1991. 16
Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his
refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not Guilty" was entered
for him by the trial court. 17
In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24,
1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals the petition filed
by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial
court.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
consolidated decision dismissing the two petitions.
However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6
vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a decision reversing the, CA
decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of
petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial
court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for
cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to
this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101837, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February
27, 1992 finding probable cause to charge petitioner with
the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a
motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set
the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the merits.
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the
Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the Department of
Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA,
G.R. SP No. 27738) and finally to this Court (G.R. No.
105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.
On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before this Court
seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated
September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for
Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991
denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to the Court
of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division)
rendered a decision dismissing the petition. As to the
denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of
Appeals held in part:
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is
not inclined to strike down the denial of petitioner's motion
for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent judge absent any clear showing of such
grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner
in support of his motion for recusation are conclusions
based on his own fears and are therefore speculations than
anything else.
In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as
urged by the petitioner, there must be allegation and proof
that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that
he might be, by the "barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs.
Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is
such allegation in the petition, the Court has however
found no proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the
petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been
unduly influenced by the alleged publicity.
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of
the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio vs. Andal, 175
SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21
SCRA 160, it said:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision,
have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not
licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a
speculative approval to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court
to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply
because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain
against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as
yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality.
He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No
act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice.
Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge,
not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before
him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a
charge made before trial that a party 'will not be given a
fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is
not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's
legal obligation under his oath to administer justice
without respect to person and to equal right to the poor
and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself
then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter
of conscience." 18
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial
of petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer
Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following
pronouncement:
"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of
petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and transfer
venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the
respondent court was correct in denying petitioner's
motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice is
vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 4 of the Constitution. Neither the respondent
court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's
motion for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner
in support of this issue were all decided by the Supreme
Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the
provision on transfer of venue was first adopted, hence not
applicable to the instant case." 19
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision
having been denied, 20 a petition under Rule 45 was filed
before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1992, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent
People of the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the
allegations contained, issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by
the OSG, issued a Resolution denying the Petition on the
ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its assailed decision.
On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for
Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner reiterates
his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself
from the case.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading
captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory
injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the
Order of the trial court dated December 9, 1992 denying
petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation
of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears
that after the presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the
prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial court
considered the question concerning the cancellation of
petitioner's bail ripe for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But
the trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9, 1992
which, among other things, denied the Motion. In the
Urgent Motion filed with this Court on December 16, 1992,
petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing
respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his
defense evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail
issue . . ." 24
On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25
issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining
respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and
directing him to allow petitioner to present his last
witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO
confirmed in another Resolution issued by the Court on
January 11, 1993. 26
On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in
this Motion for Reconsideration no longer raises the
question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for
Reconsideration is predicated on what petitioner alleges
are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the
prosecution, on one hand, and hostility against petitioner,
on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only
consider the allegations and issues raised in this Motion for
Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the
OSG.
Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial
court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of the Rules of
Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a
speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied)
This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more
fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the
disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the
requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute that
due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby
there is the legitimate expectation that the decision
arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts
as found by a judge who does not play favorites." 30
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although
required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also
designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and
more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's
faith in the institutions they have erected when they
adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by the
citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public
business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and
uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of
justice.
While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by
petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the
voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1,
par. 2, 34 the established rule is that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare
allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice.
36 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if
weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath
of office to administer justice without respect to person
and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court,
petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on the part of
respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing
with the trial during the pendency of this petition stating
that:
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation
pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend the hearings.
Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon
hearings which, in the context of his questioned fairness
and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make
official a pre-determined verdict of guilt." 38
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his
counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by the judge
before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed.
Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting
as above provided, the party objecting to his competency
may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating
the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in
accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies
the motion for disqualification and rules favorably on his
competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official
duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the
case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of
being called upon to account for his dereliction. Although
this case was decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of
Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the procedure laid
down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v. Moreno
should not likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed
pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, in
Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the
procedure prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial "Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when,
judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule 137, without benefit of preliminary investigation, petitioner's
sec. 1, par. 2, thus: arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost
a year was peremptorily ordered which this Court
reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding
February 1992) the unchastened trial judge let out yet
with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it is within her
with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly
sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own
and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional
competency, to either proceed with the trial or refrain
prejudgment of petitioner's culpability." 46
from acting on the case until determination of the issue of
her disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 43 orders" was that issued by respondent judge on August 14,
1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of
an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the
Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for
prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge
inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he shall
should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of
proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either
Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand
the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a
to affirm the statements contained in the document
motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition
presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that
before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the
challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for
prosecution.
inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to
proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of
filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the
in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial. trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to the
admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof
of bias. In Jandionco v. Pearanda, 47 it was held that
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance
"[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case
with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he
and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and
proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the
for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact
judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case
manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the
during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim
judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the
that the judge is partial. This Court has not, in connection
evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of
with the petition, issued a temporary restraining order
conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that
(TRO) enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the
respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by
case. The TRO which this Court issued on December 29,
petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the
1992 after the petition was denied and pending this Motion
prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because there
for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from
was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also
resolving the question on the cancellation of bail until the
premature because at that stage, the judge was not yet
last witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not
appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece
restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary,
of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its
the judge was ordered to hear petitioner's last witness in
admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and
the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his
admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement
duty to continue trying the case and there was no order
suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength"
from this Court not to do so, respondent judge committed
49 is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an
no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued
overreaction.
hearing the case during the pendency of the petition before
this Court.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the
judge's partiality occurred during one of the hearings
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that
concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of
since the issuance of the Court Resolution dated September
petitioner's bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11)
23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening
witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two
events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution on one
(2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the
hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand."
cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and
45 Petitioner alleges:
refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore
witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his
ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is
summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2)
the court need not receive exactly the same number of
witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and
(3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to
two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case.
50
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of
the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an application for
bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the
court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing." 51
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge
were not for an application for bail but to cancel that
which was issued to petitioner, the principles and
procedure governing hearings on an application for bail
were correctly applied by respondent judge in the
cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued
by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any
lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the
Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the
bail. 52 The grant of bail was made without prejudice
because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case,
the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove
that there is a strong evidence of guilt. 53 In the
cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was
confronted with the same issue as in an application for
bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to
convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail.
Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the
hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of
the same.
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper
appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before
him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to
limit the number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of
the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination
as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies
a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 If the trial judge In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by
believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him petitioner must be viewed in the light of his lawyers' many
to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent
opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight
to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61
case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all
proceedings. prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for
the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a
particular issue:
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling
on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's
motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated
by bias or prejudice.
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration,
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
restates his argument in the Petition that the respondent
judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17,
1991 55 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment 3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified
and Transfer Venue Outside
respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a
preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous
Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of Metro Manila August 22, 1991
partiality. In People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous
rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
Luciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that
"[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled
against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not 6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part
of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an
7. Motion to Suspend Action on
unusual occurrence in our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact
that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied
and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates Formal Offer of Evidence and on
against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of
bias or partiality. 59
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of
disqualification of judges, not only in safeguarding the 8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning
for the judiciary the people's confidence, an element so Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
essential in the effective administration of justice. The rule
should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's
personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice. "While We Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3)
are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with petitions assailing various orders of respondent judge in
motions for disqualification's, We cannot, however, connection with the single murder case pending against
tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, him. Apart from the present petition which is docketed as
seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2)
other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424.
plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his
In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary
Court does not approve the tactic of some litigants of filing
restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial
of baseless motion for disqualification of the judge as a
court held in abeyance.
means of delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a
more friendly judge." 60
The murder case involving only one accused, the
petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the
proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be
gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the
information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or
December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of
four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes
have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and
twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being
conducted.
When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts
to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and
his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless
protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only
be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion
for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the
case, including the transcript of stenographic notes, and
considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and
prevailing jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the
Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the Court
of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the
respondent judge's Order which denied petitioner's Motion
for Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end
to petitioner's obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his
principal case by dwelling on incidental matters. The
motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied with
finality.
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation,
the Solicitor General prays that Attys. Raymundo A.
Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be
disciplinarily dealt with by this Court for allegedly using
abusive and intemperate language against respondent
judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court.
Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for
petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence"
62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions.
Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel,
citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's
baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be
heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were
also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner
in . . ." 64
In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16,
1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (1) "generated
belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's
bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case
law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear
before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render
judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the Footnotes
facts." 65
1. Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o of Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Quirino D. Abad
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of Santos Jr.
justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of
conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility which
2. Records, Vol. 1, p. 36.
states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." 3. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 103-104.
Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
4. Records, Vol. 1, p. 105.
behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule,
Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge
motives not supported by the record or having materiality 5. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 113-114.
to the case."
6. Records, Vol. 1, p. 117.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to
7. Records, Vol. 1, p. 118.
advance the interests of their clients, to use strong
language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our
courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by 8. Records, Vol. 1, p. 1Z3.
members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
9. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 125-128.
more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our
judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability.
"Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, 10. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 136-137.
in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements,
disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of
this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may 11. Records, Vol. 1, p. 138.
come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in
calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The 12. Records, Vol. 1, p. 141.
language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
13. Records, Vol. 1, p. 170.
illuminating but not offensive." 67
In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as 14. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 172-179.
the inherent power and authority of this Court to cite
members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we 15. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 255-257.
are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's
lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
16. Records, Vol. 1, p. 263.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo 17. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 211-212.
A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern 18. CA Decision (CA - G.R. SP No. 26305, March 9, 1992),
WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 143-144.
language will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this Resolution be attached to their records.
19. Id., p. 8; Rollo, p. 144.
SO ORDERED.
20. CA Resolution (CA - G.R. SP No. 26305, June 26, 1992);
Rollo, pp. 147-148.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.
21. The pleading is captioned "Supplemental Petition
and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the trial judge's
inhibition)."
22. Rollo, pp. 227-231.
23. The full text of the Order is as follows:
"ORDER
After hearing the arguments of the defense and that of the
prosecution and after taking into consideration, as pointed
out earlier by the Court that it has already heard enough
from the evidence submitted by prosecution and defense,
the Court feels that the motion for cancellation of bail is
ripe for resolution, and in view thereof, the instant motion
to reopen proceedings is hereby DENIED.
As far as the motion of prosecution to consider the incident
on the cancellation of bail submitted for resolution on the
basis of the evidence thus far presented by the prosecution
and defense, and to consider the defense to have waived
its right to file its formal offer of evidence, in the interest
of substantial justice and for humanitarian reason, the said
motion is DENIED and defense is given up to Monday within
which to file its formal offer of evidence, copy furnished
the counsel for the prosecution, who upon receipt is given
two days within which to file its comment/opposition
thereto, with or without which, the incident on the formal
offer of evidence shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
The parties are given five (5) days from receipt of the
Court's ruling on the formal offer of evidence by defense
within which to file their simultaneous memoranda, with or
without which, the incident on the cancellation of bail shall
be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED."
24. Petitioner's Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory
injunction), p. 1; Rollo, p. 220.
25. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was on leave while the
ponente dissented. During the deliberations on petitioner's
Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory injunction), the
ponente expressed the following reasons for her dissent to
the Resolution: (1) the trial court's Order of December 16,
1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen and Present
Last Witness is not the subject of the present petition and
cannot be dealt with here; the instant petition concerns
the Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court's
Order dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion
for Recusation and Order dated September 17, 1991
denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila; and (2) petitioner
failed to show that his last witness could not have been
presented before the trial court considered the
cancellation for bail proceedings submitted for resolution.
26. Infra, note 44.
27. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for
Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p. 3; Rollo,
p. 200.
28. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
29. Constitution, Art. III, sections 1 and 14 (1).
Art. III, sec. 1 provides:
"Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Art. III, sec. 14 (1) provides:
"Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law."
30. Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34756-59, March 31,
1973, 50 SCRA 18, 23.
31. "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." (Gutierrez
v. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 249,
254).
32. Offutt v. United States, 99 L Ed 11, 16 (1954).
33. The terms inhibition and disqualification are used
interchangeably in this Resolution. See Del Castillo v.
Javelona, supra, note 40, for the view that there is no need
to make a fine distinction between inhibition and
disqualification because they may mean the same thing and
bring about the same result.
34. People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 74799, March 28, 1988, 159
SCRA 315; People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 44712, October 28,
1991, 203 SCRA 171.
35. Beltran v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30868, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 158; Aparicio v. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93,
July 25, 1989, 175 SCRA 569.
36. Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, infra, note 52.
37. Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18,
1967, 21 SCRA 161.
38. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for
Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p. 2; Rollo,
p. 199.
39. The Motion for Recusation was filed by the Law Firm of
Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit composed of Attys. Raymundo
A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, on
behalf of petitioner. On October 3, 1991, the Law Firm of
Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit withdrew its appearance before
the trial court as counsel for petitioner. Atty. Carlos Z.
Ambrosio took over for a while but in May 27, 1992, Atty.
Prospero A. Cresini substituted Atty. Ambrosio. In this
present Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is
represented by the Law Firm of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit
again.
40. People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286 (1949).
41. The Court in an obiter dictum in Geotina v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. L-26310, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 66, stated
that Rule 137, sec. 2 applies to par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1.
42. G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 124 SCRA 124.
43. Id., at 134-135.
44. On January 11, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution
confirming and clarifying the TRO issued on December 29,
1992, thus:
"Acting on the urgent motion for the issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction filed by counsel for
petitioner, this Court, in issuing the temporary restraining
order directed the trial court to allow petitioner to present
his last witness provided that he shall be heard in only one
hearing, after which the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. The trial court shall immediately
rule thereon without waiting for further instruction from
this Court.
The Court hereby CONFIRMS the temporary restraining
order issued on December 29, 1992."
45. Supra, note 27. 62. Rollo, p. 200.

46. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for 63. Rollo, p. 201.

Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p. 2; Rollo,
p. 199.
64. Rollo, p. 207.

47. G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 725.
65. Rollo, p. 221.

48. Id, at 731.

66. Rule 138, sec. 20(b).

49. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for

Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p. 3; Rollo,
p. 200.
50. TSN, September 28, 1992, pp. 3-4.
51. Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55, 62 (1946).
52. Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837,
February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 162.
67. Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979,
June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 445 citing Perkins v. Perkins,
57 Phil. 223, 226; Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724;
Medina v. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151, 157; In re Franco, 67 Phil.
312, 316; People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 579-580, 583; In
re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 601-602; People v. Venturanza, 98
Phil. 211, 217; De Joya v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
99 Phil. 907, 915-916; Sison v. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29,
1959; Paragas v. Cruz (Resolution), L-24433, July 30, 1965.

53. People v. Calo, Jr., G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186
SCRA 620.

54. Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756,

770 (1946).

55. Supra, note 2.

56. G.R. No. L-8188, February 13, 1961, 1 SCRA 414.

57. Cf., Heirs of Julio Rosas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 91406, July
31, 1990, 188 SCRA 236.

58. Adm. Case No. 181-J, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 176,
183-184.

59. Rosello v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46274, L-

46549, December 14, 1988, 168 SCRA 459.

60. People v. Serrano, G.R. No. L-44712, October 28, 1991,

203 SCRA 171, 186-187.

61. As of the writing of this Resolution, petitioner has filed

five (5) written motions to reset hearings dated September
26, 1991, May 13, 1992, June 11, 1992, January 7, 1992 and
February 16, 1993. These do not include petitioners' oral
motions for postponement.