ith each passing year, improvement in the under- standing of fire and its behavior enables designers bette design fie alarm systems to achieve specific ‘objectives and levels of performance rathcr than compliance with minimum prescriptive standard, Yet no performance- ‘based or objective-riemted desig is complete without an ex- plicit quantitative assessment of the vel of confidence one can have that the fire alarm system will perform as intended. All ‘computational methods that have heen developed 1 assess this parameter are predicated upon an inspection, testing. and maine tenance program at specified regular and predictable times ‘throughout the life ofthe system. Consequently, without a thor- ‘ough understanding of the impuct the inspection, testing, and smatotenance pograt has on the mission clfestvenews of the Bie ‘alarm system. one cannot use a performance-based. abjectve- foriented design approach. ‘This chaper Firs develops the concepts of reliability anly- sis and prediction that form the foundation upon which all in- ‘specton, testing, and muintcnanee programs shoul he hase. then revicws the types of electric components from which fie alan systems are constructed. These wo backround areas fort the basis for inspection, testing. and musntenance requirements {fo fire alarm systems, components and scheduling. Further, de- ‘sign coocepts are applied wo the household fie alam system. Fi ‘ally, this chapteraddrewsesciteaiy of ispecton, esting. al ‘maintenance onthe miston-effectivencss ofthe system, ‘This chapter is specifically limite to inspection, testing, ‘and maintenance of fire alarm systems. These ar the electronic ‘and electrical systems that are designed (1) to sens a ire tans ‘mit tha information to a contol unit of seme type, nd ative ‘personne! warnings, whether for persons occupying the site or at ‘a emote location; and (2) for remedial response such asthe dis- ‘charge of extinguishing systems and activation of devices de- signed to enhance the compartmentation of the fe ‘Thischopter does not cover maintenance of specifi emia response systems, Inspection, testing, and mainenance of these ‘Join M. Chain, PE. saninepeadent ire proeton constant nd ‘einer wih LM. Chin Conan In, Oakland, New Sere systems are addressed in NFPA 11, Standard for Low: Expansion Foam: NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Diacide Einguishng So ‘tems; NFPA IZA, Standard om Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing ‘Systems: NFPA 13, Standand forthe Installation of Sprinkler Sys- ‘tems; NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fied Systems for Fre Provecion: NFPA 6, Standard for the Insuallation of Foam: ater Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems: NFPA 17, Stan dard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems: NFPA. 20, Stand for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Pro- tection: NFPA 25 Standant forthe Inspection, Testing. a Mai tenance of Witer Based Fire Protection Systems: and NFPA 2001, ‘Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems. RELIABILITY ‘Murphy's law is familiar anything that an go wrong will 20 ‘eong. His an inescapable ft hat any "rater wil ser failure of one of is constituent components at some moment during its devin hiftime. Ths etabies am ncontrnert be requirement that a regimen of inspection. exting. and maine- tance Be camployed with every firearm sytem "The driving force Bead every inspection, testing, and tnainenance program ste ned 0 make system reliability 35 high a posible. Reliability is essential for fire alr systems, simply de 1 mission objectives for hese systems. Fire alan systems are intend ofl tre eset obcives (1) n> sare ie safety (2 conserve property. and 3) ensure continuity ‘ofthe mission ofthe site. The ie safety objective is achieved ‘through timely warning of cccupant. This is way the high: «pny Mitigation of property damage i achieved tough the timely setwton of automatic re extinguishing ystems and ‘eanmiaon of ee sae signa to he ir service. This gem erally the second prion, Aer the fist two objectives are met. ‘he third objective, hats omtnaty ofthe mission ofthe site ‘comes atainble In many cases the mission objective places caer demands on the ir lam system, 8 this objective can- tobe atained ifthe systems unstable: nor can it beatae if the system allows too lage aire 6 develop pie 1 the acs tion of fire extinguishing systems. These the objectives can ‘only be achieve when he ire alan stem operates relay86 PART! m@ Detection and Alarm The reliability of a system includes both the ability to (1) detect and comrestly respond to every occurence of fie and (2) ot render fie alarm indication excep when he legitimate stimulus actually occur. Fora system to be deemed relabe. alarm signals wil occur and ony i there is afr. For the purposes of this chapter. ehabiity defined the mes- sre he certain thatthe stem will provide the appropriate espouse tothe conditions that occur, as they occu, during the eine etme ofthe 342m Expetience has sown tha reliability of a sem isthe = suit of rehailty contributions ftom four system clement (design, (2) equipenent (3) installation and (4) maintenance. Each of these elements contributes 10 the overall ibility of the system. Often some “problems” ae designe int the sys tem, For example, smoke detecoeHocated above soemally occurring source of aerosols that arent indicative of wire sa. ‘problem that is designed ino the sytem. This represents e- ution ofthe sys rtabiity that ocurred curing the design ‘process Other examples of design probiems are rteof-nse eat ‘detectors in an area where raph and wide ctoations im tem peanue ae expected, cont panels mounted on surtaces that are vibrating, or smake and hea detecor imopety mounted relative to the celng plane nial aspection and esting ofthe Sytem mst ideniy these pens that are designed int the system, 50 they can he corrected before the system is accepts. ‘Other problems are introduced during installation. These tke deduct from the stainable sy sem reinbility.For example, ‘natllaion-generae problems result rom the wie of wabean: dard wiring. ‘condi and bien where weather tught aera are needed maicient org on sre eran, abraded wire insulation The nil inapection and test of he sytem should uncover these types of problems Wey ae corrected prot to accepance they il ees prblees ose the ‘operational ite of se installation, Purherors, oes installation elated problems may not always be apparent during inkistimspection These erors are most likely ditenvered sare ‘ui of a rystem faire ora the coatet ofthe replay sed ted naintemane progr “These examples flusrat bow secessary an initial inspec thom andes programs uncover problems tha re erally de- sigoed or installed ino the sytem. “There is amither source of fire: the equipment self ‘Most of txay’'s electronic fie alr system devices are ex- tremely eluble. They are mature technologies. pred under stringent quality assorance programs that are audited by the ma ‘only recognized testing laboratories such as Underwriters LLabortories, Ie: (UL) and FM Global, However, al electronic ‘components manifest w statistical flr rate tha els i fi- tres ofthese devices over time. These failures accu after the system has Been ascepted and consequently can only be wnsov- ered through a program of regular maintenance and testing. “The inspection etng. and maintenance of fie ata > tems are critical to achieving the design objectives ofthe nyse. ‘This isthe final element affecting the reliability of every system. A fire alarm system without an inspectioe testing. and mainte- tance rogram isevery bila incomplete a acar with three wheel Although inspection. testing. and muntenance schedses hnnve traditionally teen developed bused upon the qualitative {ndgment of technical commitee member, the emerpemce of Performance-hased and objectve-onened designs demands 4 ‘more rigors mein of sscsing the reliability of a syiem. Performasce-hsed desig rogues tha the opecton, esting, and mairiaance schedules provide the reliability necessary 10 achive the performance objectives ofthe deen. rehable er formance i tobe ashiewd froma fies sytem, a rigors Anspectoe esting, and maienance program. dace hat ‘in derived from the compute relist ofthe system and es component serail Reliability Prediction Techniques for Fire Alarm Systems “Te elibiity ofa fire ala sytem, ie any electronic ser, can be compuid wing » method developed fom the Laser Frees Le Ths concept veh cuing Word War Uy {German rocket sient sed Lanner eh cone that he fetasy ot ast was he paki fhe abl fe Grid congonents. As the tuner composctt lacenid, the rehab of eah nia somponent Palo Pe impress ‘eommensuey a ade to mamas th Felt of the eral sytem The Laser prodert ow isexpeveed mathematically by FARRER KE ‘whee 4, = probabiiey of successful operation forthe system, ‘or relisblity = probability of successful operation of te ath ‘component 11 the number of cesta compaonents “This oquation applies to systems in which the failure of amy one ‘component will mean the failure ofthe xem. ‘The peobahility af aucceaful operation af a system, Ps not directly compatable. I i compute from faire rate ata for that system. Failure rate. that i, the probability of failure, is related to the prohabsliy of successful operation by Ars thy where ‘Ag = flare rate ofthe xa nyster Py = probabuity of successful operation forthe 9p sem, ‘or reliability ‘The failure rate. A of system assembled from compo ems having expeneuta falar ates. s compute from the Suen of the failure rates of each ofthe components, A, fom Ready taba + adn tad, where ‘A= failure rate ofthe total syste 44. quantity ofthe mt component in the 9ysem 2, failure rate ofthe ath component inthe systemCHAPTER 5 Fire Alam Systems: inspection, Testing. and Mantenance ST “The component failure rates are usualy expressed as fail ‘ares per milion device operating hour id). athe system faire rate is expressed as failures per milion operating hours (mob) The above equation enables one to exlculate the relia: bility of «system based upon the failure rates of the consent ‘components. Each fre slarm system comport, that is, a co0- ‘wol panel, detector, or notification appliance, has « calculable faite rate and ence the system failne rate can be computed. ‘The failure rate of cach ofthese major components is computed From the failure rates of the iadinadual electric componente from which itis made. Research int the reliability of systeans and competent has. shown that, for most physical systems, wher the failure rae is ploted versus time. a curve of familiar shape results from the ‘empirical data.'* This curve is termed the bath curve, The ‘batnub curve ean be madelled a the sum of two bell-shaped, ‘Gaussian curves. one centered at the ime the proct is made aa called the furn-on curve andthe other centred tthe design fete and termed the Mfetime curve. ‘The first, the turn curve, shown in Pigare S.8(a), de ‘scribes thera a which failures can be expected to oscw from the date of manufacture, r= 0, forward aver tame, de to inher ‘cat defects in both constinacnt components and manufactaring Aechinique. I illustrates the phe nomenoe known as infant mor tality” in the components and Finished proc. ‘The second curve. shown in Figure S1(b, ts also a Gaussian slsributioo, tat tis comer at = Zhe desig lifetime de sembes the distnbutin of falure rates du to han-term aging i i Tae he ©) FIGURE 5.1 (a) iniua/ Tun-On Curve Showing Falture ‘ate of a Component or Systoe at Turn-On; (0) Uletne ‘Gunve Pioting the Faure Rate Due to Long-Term Aging of ‘Components, and Establishing the Design Lifetime ig ‘When the faite rate rom the mia ur andthe ite lume curves are ase together having ads the sand de viation for gach ofthe dstibuioms mich hr experimentally measured file rates foreach failure mchani). tt sum pied a Bathtub curve as shown in Figure $2. ‘The butts curve is divided ito thee tepions. The left ‘most isthe “infant mortality” region. This ste intial tur-on tAise where failes du io ibereat defect in costitucat com poneats and manufacturing techniques wally appear In onde tesemure thal theve files scout Refs the prac x shipped ‘o.a customer, mast manufacturers “bari” het procs for tame periods sufficient allow sabeealy defective prodsts > fail prior to shipment “The righthand portion of the all curve is the “ead of useful if" ponion. This portion ofthe cures wed establish the design fete of the assembly. The design lifetime of » roduc in that age a which the probabil of operability atthe ‘end of he recommended service interval sexs han 0. de to the acceleration ne feqcncyof alae esting from ong term deterioration of coasituent compen. As Be faut rte ofthe comsinuet components continues t scale it becomes twcreangly ical to mata tbe operat of the assembly however, one can crrecty infer from this that the ifetime of nck cic be, sd often in extended by increasing the fre even ofthe inopestion, testing, ard maintenance procedures ‘This statistical fate mate region of the cure is very long Ssempured the inf merality region and cad-o ie regkon. (Over te stnstica fire rate epi. failures sre randomly us predictable. The center region of the reliability curves the tr Aisical falure rate wegion” This region is eel fa indicating a ary efor fle rate pe ui ime ore ths re ‘ion. Alough the acl failure rte may be low iis always 2 Fe pone number, Repardes of te disan n Petn se fang, he fall rte nthe tata are regio wil, wo theif preisom available from the asa a, approach & hero hse indicating a costa, evenly stra falee tate, Beraus this region i lat ove Gan we the concept of the ‘ee ime Rete failres (MTBF quantification of Cie ‘at, pdt te length of ie the system canbe expected to remain operatiomal tsa stutstical average that vali over 4 Fopulaion of spss but doesnot provide amy guktance on ‘shat will happen with any specific aystem a ey specifi time I f i58 PART mt Dotoctan and Alarm Since the failure rates essentially constant ove the satis ‘ical failure rate epi ofthe bathtub curve he failure ate of any electronic composer and hence, any electronic system can the derive from the failure rte data established in Aditary Handbook: Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipmes ‘This handbook, known as MUL Mndboak 217, provides exper mentally derived failure rate date on electronic gomponents common foun in electron ascenblis cling fire alate system components. MIL Handbook 217 allows the engineer to compute the fallare rates of the detector. tification appl ‘ances, contol pune ely panes merfaces, and other system empencats. From thse fale ates the engineer cam then eo ‘pe the inherent fibre rat IFR) fr the system. Is derived rom the failure rates ofthe components from which the system ‘hasbeen assemble. Its important to keep én min that this in- ‘neem flr ate doesnot ico failres ho improper de ‘sign o€ installation. Failures caused by design ecror oF Installation errs mut headed othe ier Fala at com ied from MIL Hondboot 217 ‘Once the inferent failure rate has ben computed, the rei- ably ofthe system can be ealeulated: where ‘R= ela ofthe system ‘¢= Napierian logan base 271828 (A intent failure ate of he system (> time pero for which ibility hasbeen some * ‘Once the performance of the system i defined in terms of the relat with which it eee the performance ofthe de- ‘ig, this elation x wie determine the maintenance interval fecesary to achieve that liability level. The facts the ia terval of time between each etccution ofthe inspection testing land maintenance psec for the system. Assoming maint ‘ance restores the cae system wo complet operably. the 1 squred mauntenance interval computed from I yl—A9 where ny = Napirian tog the required reislity, Ry A iahcren faire tate ofthe stom required maintenance itera ¥ achieve there quired cist ‘An Example Analysis ‘oils the wsfunes of the above conus eth, ‘omer te fir alr pt showin Figur $3 ess of TWemoke deiesom, «hove watifeaion appliance, anda coma pane. hs dengn objective so al te eccpants ‘fir, enblng hem 1 make safe eee fromthe fli, witha reabity of BD percent (090), Fr the pur of his eagle ‘only, and with hie undeevtuncing thet test failure eaten are 008 eed fom ony specie devie et ae intended ob of the ‘ame order of magne ss omnmecialyavalable rod {he falne aesi Table Conus om FIGURE 5:3. Simptiod Example Fee Alarm System TABLE 5.1 Comptation of Computed Faire Rates Provides the Basis fv the Raiacity Catulason Faire Quanity — Rate) (ah) System Componert |Wmaon) —_(Umen) ‘Smoke detectors 1” 190 10.00 Homstrene 1 250 280 Control panel 1 2800 25.00 ‘Screw terminals 2 010400 Wie sogmonts 3 00515 “The inhereot failure rate of the system ax described is R68 dima: 4148 Pinch = 0.004365 Fullures per hour(s) A= 0.3824 failures per year ‘Using the required interval equation tm RHA) here toy = In0.90~ 011 A= 036m 0. t= 0288 yr “This indicates that vis stem, wi the component faire rates ws wil require a complete spection test ant masine- mance routine every 0.288 year cede to maintain at east a0 (percent reliiity in achieving its design objectives. As perfor= mance bed byscthe-orentd designs Pevome more alent ‘elit predictions for thse systems sia 19 thi example ‘wil be reuired to determine the maintenance frequetey ace sary to achieve the performance ceria. A reliability of 090583 3aery high reliability, well above hat of most sytem, 1 means ‘that there is caly a 10 percent chance that there will be any fo fale ring the Meteo the stem ‘The concept failure is very rad here. Failures include trouble conditions fom supervised conditions; spuri- ‘08 lars: file Wo alarm within the design sensitivity oie frame for the design fre. and Failures of electronic components. ‘eve if the competent fle docs tot eae 4 ystems perfor ‘mance malfunston, A reliability of 0.90 (90 percent is much higher than mont ones eed. This sare system (sce Figure $3 and Table 5.1 cao achieve a 50 percent reliability with a main- tenance schedule of L8 years A maiaiemaace program preli- ‘ated upon an inspection and testing regimen performed every LS years will sey be less expensive than one based upon ‘ime imerval of every 0.288 years Consequently «balance must lhe achieved between the cost ofthe servicelmsinenanse pre ram andthe aneret reliability of the system. teal, the rel ability to be achieved should reflect analysis of the cost of failre which wil in tur need wo distinguish among different ‘types of failure as listed above. ‘The inspection, testing, and maintenance schedules re- ‘gered by NEPA 72", Nasional Fire Alarm Code re prescrip five i mature aod are hosed om a Consemsas opinion of what a sverage system requires. They are not the result of actual eis bility calculations, The facility ownerioperatr must sep in ‘mind hat the presripive requirements egvescat the minima acceptance cena anthat her ae fen cgcumatance which demand that these minimum criteria be exceeded. It bios ‘rom te above tha the larger cr meee comple the system is the moe frequently it mas be inspected ated if the design pet ormance ist be achieved “The implications of reliability cannot be overstated. The {allure wo maiatain 3 sytem viewally asures the owneropers- tor of the protected site thatthe fie alarm system will moe ahieve the design abyetse ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS ‘The amvipaed reliability of am clectronic stem, so a a ire ar system. canbe computed cause the reliability ofthe n> ‘dividt electronic components has been thoroughly studied and documented, primarily under the auspices ofthe U.S. Depa ‘ment of Defense, Tis prior research has shown that cach gn- feral type of electteic component exhibits panicular and ‘rodicable failure made. Understanding then file modes ead to understanding the impact such faite may have on 4 fire alarm system cornponeat (detector, notification appliance, ‘contr unt or ther such system component). Its important for the owmnenfoperator or responsible party tobe aware ofthese fil ‘ture modes, asthe test methods prescribed by NFPA 72 are ie {ended io uncover those system components that have suffered | component fir, ‘Semiconductors Semiconductor devices faethe 10 a shoe we open cuit. The semiconductor ba wse i moder fire alata ystems often i clude integrated circuits (1C) consisting of hundreds of thow- sands of simple semicondactor diodes an traitor, This is ‘specially me ofthe microcomputers at dhe operational core of ‘he conto unit garde of the comply ofthe component, ‘mvs cemicondato flues ae catastrophic tn nature. meaning ‘that they fit completely and presipitowsy, often with w le ull of white smoke curing up from the cit hour ‘Semicondcto failures are the result of oe af re atnew (1) internal fae, (2) overcurent of (3) overlie. lateral ‘ws are becoming less common as semicondustor mamfac: tapiag scence cootines t acnce Nevenless. occansaaly ermal migration of he onl alae typical eterna Mas. came a semiccaducor to fl, “Since mictacompulct merece cimis of large ener Creat araysof tame meron cells heres the posit of 4 memory cell failure. Often, control nits have digemosic rogram that ae exec during the regularly sched maio- ‘enance Yo detect memory location failures. Adfitonally.regu- {arthoragh fanconal texts owe souarance tat here age ‘memory Inco fatlres where the executable programs ate ‘sored. “The probability ofthis typeof event is adress in the vel blir calculations presented uti. Given enough me, fue ‘of this type is likely to occur. even withthe highest qu eee ‘onic gupment. The testing frequemey and methods spunea ‘bythe manufacturer and NFPA 72 ae intended entity these ‘pes of falues th a minimum elapsed ime period between the occurence of he fale an is daconery. Inter womb Ue time betwen fail ad it scovery is as shorts possible Overcurrent ad overvollge files ae wally isccisted ith some other event tut places am uniniended sess the system, Occasionally the event isthe failure of some thc eles ‘roais component subjecting adjacent componcts to the oves- woliage or wvercurent. More frequeniy. overvllages and ‘overcurrent ae the rel of wiring and intsconoectin ero. eganiles, bok overvkages and oveecurreate camne Severe ‘overheating of dhe semiconductor de, andthe curent-carrying ‘orton ofthe de melts andor vaporizes. Obviously. this type of ‘damage is irreversible. Ua, these types of files result ia ‘ole signals ad wewarranted activate pans of the 3° ‘tem, and generally do not go unsoticed. Ii important 0 sscily hemi) the source ofthe falar quickly. Otherwise, is likely wo eecuragam, Blccreal transients caused by ihm. ower upply spies and soges eperation of highly inductive or “capacitive equipment in chine prosimity tothe Gre aan yee, and even rao frequency interference hive been now to cause these types of flues. Generally. the reliability comptitions presen cate do not explicitly adress the contribution of these extemal vents othe faire rate ofthe System. Resistors, Capacitors, and Inductors “These components ae classified ay "pase" componcets They are fess likey to fal than semiconductor devices hocane the Saructre is much srple. Usually, these compen fail oan ‘penitent This generally canes me type of enexpicae 3c ‘om bythe system, sacha a tuble sal we the ansrarrantd citation of some coir systems function. Rely do these fail ‘wes osc, and tose rare anions when they do, they ate