CO vs.

HRET

Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district
of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the
private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a
Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the
elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted
there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those
born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is
not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative.
To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto
a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, votingand residence requirements.

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
GR. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he
is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the
petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of candidates for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allanrespondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship
in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts:
Petitioners filed for respondents disqualification for election alleging that respondent is a dual
citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for public office.

Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus
soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.

COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of the vrtue
that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.

Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?

Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus
saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application
of different two laws or more.

On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two
or more states.

In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount
to his election of Phil. citizenship meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and
thereby terminating their status as dual.

The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American
citizenship.

Jacot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filed his
Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the
COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as
required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national elections were held petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC
finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.

Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It specifically provides that public
office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and existing laws. At the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only
take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in
Philippine elections must only have one citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the
petitioner fails to do.

A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and
received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to
a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was
qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. The
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and petitioner
was DISQUALIFIED.

EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak
and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if
any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the
order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and
also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that
copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City
Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So familys business. He would
usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner
to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the
qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some
school organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation
by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there
are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52
To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an
individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has
no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This
implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be
honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be
taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to
the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with
more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its
failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by
the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed
that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be
deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most
number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to
permanent vacancy due to Frivaldos ineligibility.

Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him
to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?

2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be
elected to or hold public office?

3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?

4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

Ruling:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by
naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year
residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election
day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to
ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his
office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge
the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not
anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship
should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of
filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of
filing of his application.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose
his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days
following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's
proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a second
placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Altarejos vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and
that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004
elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with
the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position
but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and
was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections.

AASJS vs DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from
implementing R. A. 9225 entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63,
As Amended, and for Other Purposes." which was signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo
on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5,
Article VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3
thereof, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section
2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain
their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual
allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy
that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow
dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and
repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and
accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of
his undivided loyalty to the Republic.

Issues:

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

Held:

1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed
clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing

provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.
The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated
the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10
years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.
Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate
for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over
the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the
qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of
provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of
the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that
the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory
to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of
the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent
resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from
the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for
good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC

Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a
candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency.

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits

FACTS:
 The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per
station airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time

limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself a form of suppression of his political speech.