NFOPMATION — coemmutzee Published as part of GE Global Asset Protection Services by industrial Risk Insurers OIL AND CHEMICAL PLANT LAYOUT AND SPACING INTRODUCTION Loss experience clearly shows that fires or explosions in congested areas of cil and chemical plants Can result in extensive losses. Wherever explosion or fire hazards exist, proper plant layout and ‘adequate spacing between hazards are essential to loss prevention and control. Layout relates to the relative position of equipment or units within a given site. Spacing pertains to minimum distances between units or equipment. IRI layout and spacing recommendations are for property loss prevention purposes only and are intended for existing and new oil and chemical facilies. These guidelines are intended to limit explosion overpressure and fire exposure damage. They do not address shrapnel damage. If these guidelines cannot be followed, then additional loss control measures, such as fire proofing, waterspray or blast hardening will be necessary. IRI guidelines only address spacing and layout within a plant and are mostly applicable to open structures. An open air design favors vapor dissipation, provides adequate ventilation, reduces the size of the electrically classified area, and increases firefighting accessibility. Additional information ‘can be found in several publications. IRI POSITION Management Programs Management program administrators should report to top management through the minimum number ‘of steps. They should also institute loss prevention inspection and audit programs to communicate program effectiveness to top management. This management feedback is a key feature of IM. ~ Management Programs (OVERVIEW). In developing a program, pay particular attention to the following important areas: Hazard Identification and Evaluation Program Determine the plant layout and spacing necessary to limit loss size based on worst case scenarios for vapor cloud, vessel and building explosions, and for fires. Calculate overpressure circles. See IM.8.0.1.1 for hazard analysis and evaluation methods applicable to various explosion or fire ‘scenarios. This analysis can be completed in coordination with IRI loss prevention personnel, £85 Woods Steet Haters, Conectt 05102010 opr? 20%, nul le tees GE Gib Ast Prevecton Series, which are devered by IRL ad tals ogc, incds Toss preven sures and er Pak managenon, Paes onl end fact se! manage eric. Use rie ste wn. Oe ramen, eres and Save doe then Ws rae ad ‘ary bine. The prin of sri ma Ye earphone heeded vo che he a aed ‘Bia organs do mo asin, and sal have no lb forecourt corctan, conaton or madifesion of oy eng eeubteny ocean he ‘pect iclain ey eran or reprexnution het cnplance ih ay acer ocammendaon Wah decane tis cones ll ok oa eatin sao aii or compe nth oy eal region. er ar gua nrg cy ecomendata, of ou he sete atone, pte coe1M.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 Management of Change Conduct a Hazard Identification and Evaluation program for all new processes or for any modification to an existing process prior to completing final site selection and equipment layout. Determine the need for changes to spacing or layout. Duplication of Facilities For large-scale chemical and petrochemical plants, provide multiple process trains. In large scale Plants, duplicate, with installed spares, equipment that is highly susceptible to loss or important for continued operations. For smaller scale or batch type plants, install processes important to production in the form of multiple small-scale units rather than a single large unit Physically separate duplicated units, process trains or equipment with adequate spacing in ‘accordance with this section or compartmentalze with blast resistant construction General Consider the following when determining the layout and the separation required: ‘* High hazard operations (see Appendix A) ‘* Grouped operations. © Critical operations © Number of personnel at risk ‘© Concentration of property and business interruption values © Equipment replacement and installation time © Interdependency of facilities © Critical customer or supplier relationships '* Market share concems ‘© Fire and explosion exposures '* Corrosive or incompatible materials exposures '* Vapor cloud explosions '* Sources of ignition ‘* Maintenance and emergency accessibility ‘© Drainage and grade sloping ‘© Prevailing wind conditions © Natural hazards and climate © Future expansions © External exposures Review the various hazards and loss potentials to establish the degree of separation required between units and equipment. Consult Tables 1, 2 and 3 in this guide for minimum spacing guidelines based on fire and vessel explosion hazards. Increase spacing where appropriate.alg 30 00 1.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 +00 +00 00 00 700) 100 100 100 100 ‘200 100 100 +00) 00 250 250 250 250 aso 300 200 300 ‘200 200 8 200 8 50 0 30 30 0 50 50 |200 [20 | 200 | 200 | 300 [ 350 360 250 [200 F200 | 7 1 8= 0305m |= no spacing requirements Examples: © 508 separation between two cooing towers ® 200 ft separation between service building and fare spacing given in Table 3 TABLE 1. Inier-Unit Spacing Recommendations For Oi And Chemical Plants1M.2.6.2 September 3, 2001 0 oot Lew =f AGE alelale allele agile i | =[>[=[o[=[=[=[=[=| oe =leleelelele[mlel so apelel=tefeletelatele oro eo) a a alll sas ala atal=[al=[=telwlel=lefal Lorne alelele/ala|a/= |e oleae ee is ‘no spacing requirements ‘TABLE 2.Inta-Unit Spacing Recommendations For Oil And Chemical Plants.IM.2.8.2 September 3, 2001 é 050" 8/8 3 SSS oe asp | oso S 1x0 | 1x0 | 1x0 rxo | 1x0 | 1x0 | 1x0 080 | oso | 1x0 | 1x0 1xo | 1xo | 1xo | 1x0 130 | 150 | 180 | a, | 180 | 180 | 1x0 sos | 20 | 10 a soo an | 00 an | so 730 | 180 | 150 |;,, | 120 | 150 | 1x0 roo ma {to nan | sme soon |100 a | 19 ma zx | axo | 2x> | 5,, | 2xo | exo | 1x> | 1x0 | 1x0 200 am | 200 nn | 200 zoo wa | mn | 0 | 10a | sca D = Largest Tank Diameter 1 barrel = 42 gallons = 159 C= (F-32)x0.555 1 f= 0.305 m “For Class lt produets, 5 ft spacing is acceptable Or Class ol operating a temperatures > 200°F. ‘TABLE 3, Storage Tank Spacing Recommendations For OilAnd Chemical Plants, ‘Where large amounts of flammable vapors could be released and a vapor cloud explosion could ‘occur, perform a more detailed hazard analysis and evaluation per IM 8.0.1.1. Calculate the vapor cloud explosion overpressure circles. Where applicable, base the minimum spacing required between Units upon the following criteria: ‘* Donot locate critical equipment of adjacent units within the 3 psi (0.21 bar) overpressure circle. '* Design equipment or structures of adjacent units within the 1 psi (0.07 bar) overpressure circle to withstand the calculated vapor cloud overpressure. I the minimum spacing requirements based on a vapor cloud explosion differ from the minimum, spacing required by the spacing tables, use the greater of the two.1M.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 Overall Plant Layout Initially, base site selection on exposure from uncontrollable factors, such as floods, earthquakes, tidal waves, subsidence, hurricanes, and adjacent oil and chemical plants. Once a site has been selected, arrange layout and spacing to reduce the effect of some of the following controllable and uncontrollable factors that contribute to losses: ‘* Uncontrollable factors include site slope, climate, exposure to natural hazards, wind direction and force. However, locating ignition sources upwind of potential vapor leaks or locating the tank farm downhill of essential units may reduce the loss potential from an explosion or fire, Figure 1 illustrates a good layout based on the prevailing wind. * Controllable factors include process design parameters, maintenance, spare parts supply, control logic and automation, fre protection design, spare production capacity, flammable liquid holdups, spill control and the type of process. Use proper drainage and separation to control spills and fire spread, Refer to IM.2.5.3 and IM8.0.1.2. = Caca Sooo } ‘Occupied Bidgs Te) ‘ame = GE LEL= i oar an, ae Tank Storage id am sath a = Process soon =e a ic fase a Gate Oe, a RaicarLoading Prevaiing << Win Figure 1. Good Layout Example. ‘Repsinted by permission of NOVACOR Cheical Lid.IM2.8.2 September 3, 2001 Use a hazard assessment of each plant operation to help establish the layout or orientation of blocks Or unit battery limits within the plant. Review the possible loss events and the consequences for each proposal. Select a layout which will minimize the overall property damage and related business interruption should an incident occur. ‘Subdivide the overall site into general areas dedicated to process units, utilities, services and offices. Since each area or unit block generally has a rectangular shape, keep the maximum unit size to 300 ft x 600 ft (82 m x 183 m) for firefighting purposes. Provide access roadways between blocks to allow each section of the plant to be accessible from at least two directions. * Avoid dead end roads. ‘* Size road widths and clearances to handle large moving equipment and emergency vehicles or to a minimum of 28 ft (8.5 m), whichever is greater. ‘* Maintain sufficient overhead and lateral clearances for trucks and cranes to avoid hitting piping racks, pipe ways, tanks or hydrants. * Donot expose roads to fire from drainage ditches and pipeways, * Slightly elevate roads in areas subject to local flooding. * Locate hydrants and monitors along roads to allow easy hook-up of firefighting trucks. '* Provide at least two entrances to the plant for emergency vehicles to prevent the possibilty of vehicles being blocked during an incident, e.g., open bridge, railway. ‘¢ Plan and implement a "Roadway Closure” permit system authorized and controlled by site Emergency Response personnel as part of the site impairment handling system. Provide spacing between units based upon the greater of either Table 1 or a hazard assessment. The space between battery limits of adjoining units should be kept clear and open. Do not consider the clear area between units as a future area for process expansion. Process Units Evaluate the process hazards and, depending on the results of such review, classify them in high, intermediate and moderate hazard groups as shown in IM.2.5.2.A. Consult the table in this section to determine the spacing required between the various blocks based upon the relative hazard of each process. ‘Separate hazardous units from other hazardous units to avoid fire spread. "Separate" or "buffer" high hazard units by using moderate or even lower hazard units as a way to reduce such exposure, e.9., separate a DNT plant from a TDA plant by placing a sulfuric or nitric acid unit between them, Locate equipment or structures'common to multiple process units, such as large compressors and turbines, central control rooms and fired heaters, so as to prevent a single event from impairing the ‘overall operation and causing extensive business interruption, Lay out the equipment within a unit in one of two general ways. '* Use grouped layout, where similar equipment is grouped together to ease operation, maintenance and controlIM.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 4 * Use flow line layout, where equipment is arranged in a sequence similar to the process flow diagram, ‘Wherever it does not conflict with loss control, consider accessibility for maintenance and operations In determining spacing and layout. Locate equipment needing frequent overhaul, maintenance or ‘cleaning at unit boundaries. Locate large vessels or equipment close to unit boundaries to allow easy ‘access of cranes, Use Table 2 for minimum spacing guidelines for spacing within process units. The recommended ‘separations are the clear, horizontal distances between adjacent edges of equipment. Hazard Classification The following hazard classifications are for equipment and processes: © Reactors: Classify process reactors as moderate, intermediate or high hazard. The relative hazard classification is detailed in IM.2.5.2.A. © High hazard pumps: © Handle flammable and combustible liquids, operate at temperatures above 500°F (260°C) or above the product autoignition temperature, © Handle flammable and combustible liquids and operate at pressures above 500 psi (34.5 bar). © Handle liquefied flammable gases. * Intermediate hazard pumps: All other pumps handling flammable or combustible liquids. Canned and magnetic pumps have a lower fire hazard, and therefore, there are no specific spacing requirements. Intra-Unit Spacing For proper intra-unit layout, include the following principles: '* Donnot group pumps and compressors handling flammable products in one single area. Do not locate them under piperacks, air cooled heat exchangers and vessels. Orient pump and driver ‘axes perpendicular to piperacks or other equipment to minimize fire exposure in case of a pump seal failure. Separate high pressure charge pumps from any other major process equipment and other pumps by at least 25 ft (7.5 m) © Locate compressors at least 100 ft (30 m) downwind from fired heaters and at least 30 ft (7.5 m) from any other exposing equipment. To avoid unnecessary exposure, do not locate lube oil tanks ‘and pumps directly under any compressor. * Detach heaters and furnaces from the unit or at least locate them at one corner of the unit. Locate Continuous ignition sources upwind of the process units. © Ifincreased spacing for very high hazard equipment susceptible to explosions, such as reactors, is not possible, separate them from other areas by blast resistant walls. © Keep flammable products storage to a minimum within the process unit boundaries. Install tanks, accumulators or similar vesse's with flammable liquid holdups at grade, if possible.1M.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 ‘The preferred layout of a process unit is a piperack located in the center of the unit with large vessels and reactors located outwards of the central piperack. Place pumps at the outer limits of the process area. Limit the stacking of equipment in process structures to equipment with no fire potential. Slope the ground surface so that liquids drain away from the center of the unit. Do not put drainage trenches under piperacks. Put cable trays in the top tier of the piperacks. us Locate central services, such as cooling towers, boilers, power stations and electrical substations, ‘away from hazardous areas so they will not be affected by a fire or explosion within the plant nor be a ‘source of ignition for any potential flammable liquid or gas release. Maintain adequate separation between different utility services because utility losses could then lead to unsafe conditions in other plant units, possibly creating fires or explosions. increase the reliabilty ofthe utlties by keeping adequate spacing between boilers or generators. Properly pressurize in accordance with NFPA 496° or separate electrical substations and motor control centers. Locate substations away from hazardous areas to increase the reliability of the power supplies should a loss occur. Bury electrical distribution cables to limit their exposure to explosions, fires, storms and vehicles, and to ease firefighting accessibility, Control Rooms Locate and construct control rooms, motor control centers, and other essential facilities to allow operators to safely shut down units under emergency conditions. Locate the control building where it will not be exposed by fires or explosions. If separation is not feasible, design the building to withstand potential explosion overpressure. Where control rooms are exposed to fires or blast overpressures, locate the emergency loss control coordination center in a safe area, Consider unmanned satelite computer rooms, terminal rooms and i/o rack rooms equivalent to motor control centers for the purpose of this guideline. Services Keep warehouses, laboratories, shops, fire brigade stations and offices away from process areas. ‘Welding equipment, cars and trucks as well as large numbers of people can become “uncontrollable ignition sources.” Loading and Unloading ‘Space loading racks, piers and wharves well away from other areas due to large numbers of trucks, rail cars, barges or ships carrying large amounts of flammable or combustible liquids, Reduce plant traffic to ease emergency vehicle movement and limit accident hazards by locating loading and off-loading operations at the plant perimeter close to the entry gate. Locate flares according to Table 1 or to API §21,° whichever is greater. Tank Farms Consult Table 3 for general recommendations for spacing aboveground storage tanks in the oil and chemical industry. The spacing is given as a distance from tank shell to tank shell and is a function of the largest tank diameter, If there are adverse conditions, such as poor fire protection water supply, difficult firefighting, poor accessibility, poor diking or poor drainage, increase the spacing by at least 50%. Treat crude oil as a flammable liquid.IM.2.6.2 September 3, 2001 See Table 1 for minimum spacing between tank farms and other units. Do not group or dike different types of tanks and contents together. Locate storage tanks at a lower elevation than other occupancies to prevent liquids or gases from. flowing toward equipment or buildings and exposing them. Locate tanks downwind of other areas. ‘Arrange atmospheric storage tanks and pressure vessels in rows not more than two deep and adjacent to a road or accessway for adequate firefighting accessibility ‘Since piping involved in ground fires usually fails within 10 or 15 min of initial exposure, locate an absolute minimum amount of piping, valves and flanges within dikes. Install pumps, valve manifolds, and transfer piping outside dikes or impounding areas. Provide tanks with proper dikes or drainage to a remote impounding facility. ‘Where tanks over 500,000 bbl (80,000 m®) are present, increase minimum distances to 1000 ft (805 m) spacing between them. ‘Space tanks so the thermal radiation intensity from an exposing fire is too low to ignite the contents of the adjacent tanks. Tolerances of tanks to thermal radiation can be increased by: ‘© Painting vessels a reflective color (generally white or silver). © Providing a fixed water spray or tank shell cooling system. Refer to IM.12.2.1.2 for additional guidance. Insulating or fireproofing the tank shell. Guidance can be found in IM.2.5.1 Atmospheric Storage Tanks Classify internal floating roof tanks as floating roof tanks when pontoon internal floaters are provided, ‘When plastic, aluminum or a steel pan are used in the construction ofthe internal floater, classify the tank as a cone roof tank for spacing purposes. «Floating roof tanks: Store crude oil and flammable liquids (Class |) in floating roof or internal floating roof tanks. Arrange floating roof tanks in excess of 300,000 barrels (47,700 m’) ina single row. If multiple rows are necessary, space tanks farther than one diameter apart '* Cone roof tanks: Combustible liquids (Class Il and Ill) may be stored in cone roof tanks with the following limitations or exceptions: © Cone roof tanks in excess of 300,000 barrels (47,700 m*) present an unacceptable amount of potentially explosive vapor space, even if storing heavy olls. In such cases, use only floating roof tanks. © Do not store liquids with boil over characteristics in cone roof tanks larger than 150 ft (45.8 m) in diameter, unless an inerting system is provided. © Avoid storage of flammable liquids (Class |) in cone roof tanks. If cone roof tanks are used for flammable liquids storage, restrict the tank size to less than 150,000 barrels (23,850 m°), provide an inert gas blanket, and increase the spacing © Space cone roof tanks storing Class IIB liquids, operating at ambient temperatures, as “floating and cone roof tanks smaller than 3000 barrels (480 m’).” 10 ei1M.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 © Increase separation of cone roof tanks in excess of 10,000 barrels (1590 m°) containing combustible liquids stored at a temperature higher than 200°F (83°C). Pressurized and Refrigerated Storage Tanks ‘Spheres and spheroids: Provide spacing between groups of vessels of at least 100 ft (30 m) or the largest tank diameter. Limit each tank group to a maximum of six vessels, See Table 3 for the minimum spacing between vessels, Drums and bullets: Limit horizontal pressurized storage vessels to not more than six vessels or 300,000 gal (1136 m*) combined capacity in any one group. Provide at least 100 ft (30 m) or the largest tank diameter between groups. Align vessels so that their ends are not pointed toward process areas or other storage areas, as these vessels tend to rocket if they fail during a fire. Avoid ‘mutiple row configurations. Do net locate pressurized storage vessels above each other. See also IM8.2.0.1 Refrigerated dome roof tanks: Provide spacing between groups of vessels of at least 100 ft (30 m) or the largest tank diameter. Limit each tank group to a maximum of six vessels. Provide greater spacing if exposed combustible insulation is used on the tanks, DISCUSSION ‘A good layout and sufficient spacing between hazards, equipment and units will have the following benefits: ‘+ Less explosion damage. Overpressures created by an explosion decrease rapidly as the distance {rom the center of the explosion increases. The mathematical relationship between overpressures ‘and their distances from the explosion center is given in IM8.0.1.1 © Less fire exposure. Radiation intensity from a fire decreases as the square of the separation distance, '* Higher dilution of gas clouds or plumes. Gas concentration decreases as the distance from the emission source increases. '* Easier access to equipment for maintenance, inspection and firefighting purposes. © Easier spill and spill fire control in open areas. ‘* Lower concentration of values, resulting in a lower property damage loss estimates should a given incident occur. IRI typically establishes a probable maximum loss (PML) and maximum. foreseeable loss (MFL) estimates based upon a vapor cloud explosion where such a hazard exists. An adequate spread of values and good spacing between explosion hazard areas will lower the PML and MFL. Extensive spacing might increase the intial investment required to build a given plant, More land will be required. More piping, cabling, roads and larger drainage systems will be required. Additional or larger pumps or compressors might be required as friction loss increases with the piping length and, therefore, operating costs increase. However, the loss control benefits outweigh the additional costs «due to less disruption to production when the incident occurs. Proper layout and separation distances should be designed into a plant during the very early planning stages of the project. This will require preliminary identification of hazards inherent to the operations. and of the natural hazards. A good layout may not automatically increase the construction cost because proper separation between hazards can decrease the exposure protection required. For "1M.2.6.2 September 3, 2001 example, a control room unexposed by a process unit would have no need to be explosion resistant. Optimum layout will achieve a balance among loss prevention, construction, maintenance and operation requirements. ‘Computer-aided design (CAD) generates three dimensional layouts which have proven effective for Visualizing the proposed spatial arrangement of a unit or plant. High equipment concentration and plant congestion are spotted easily by these computer generated techniques, The use of CAD allows operators, maintenance and loss prevention personnel to easily comment and make appropriate recommendations. Scale models offer similar benefits \Vapor cloud calculations could indicate that an even greater separation between some units is needed because of higher than normal explosion damage potential and business interruption. Other hazard assessment methods can provide good loss potential evaluations and are described in various Center for Chemical Process Safety publications,’ in the DOW Fire & Explosion Index,’ or in API RP 752° Table 1 provides minimum inter-unit spacing which should be increased where a hazard analysis shows that larger separation distances are required. Unfavorable conditions, such as inadequate sloping, poor drainage and critical operations, can increase the exposure between units, thus requiring higher separation distances. All distances between units are measured from battery limits. ‘Battery limits” as defined by IRI are imaginary lines surrounding a unit. Tis line is typically box shaped and encloses equipment required for the operation of the unit. Cooling towers, maintenance buildings or other structures not integral to the unit are considered to be independent and should not be included in the battery limits. Ths line crosses utility, service, raw material and finished product piping. ‘The processing units are generally the most hazardous operations in a plant. For operational purposes, the process units are generally grouped together and arranged in accordance with the general process flow. Often, fire protection spacing requirements will exceed maintenance accessibilty requirements. The relative location of equipment depends on its probable release of flammable materials, its flammable liquid holdup, and its potential to be a source of ignition. A domino effect loss is possible within Process units. NFPA 30 defines flammable liquids as Class | materials, and combustible liquids as Class Il and Ill materials. The classification depends on the flash point of the product. In some very hot climates, Class 1 liquids could behave as flammable liquids because the storage temperature could exceed the flashpoint temperature. Unstable liquids or gases and monomer storage require special precautions and are not addressed in Table 3. IRinformation” SECTIONS REFERENCED naa ‘Management Programs (OVERVIEW). M251 Fireproofing For Oi1 And Chemical Properties. IM2.52A Hazard Classfication Of Process Operations For Spacing Requirement: M253 Drainage For Outdoor Oi And Chemical Pants IM8.0.11 Oi And Chomioa! Propemies Loss Potential Estimation Guide, 118.012 Liquid Holdup Estimation IM1122.1.2 Water And Spray Deluge Protection For Oil And Chemica! Plants. 12IM.2.5.2 September 3, 2001 REFERENCES 1. Hazard Survey ofthe Chemical and lied Industries, Technical Survey No. 3, 1968, American Insurance Association, New York, NY. ‘An Engineers Guide To Process-Plont Layout, FF. House, July 28, 1888, Chemical Engineering, McGraw Hil, New York, NY. Process Plant Layout, by J.C. Mecklenburg, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY. ‘Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, F.P. Lees, Volumes 1 & 2, Butterworths, Boston, MA. ‘Loss Prevention Fundamentals For The Process Industry, 0.14 Sye J, Loss Prevention Symposium, March 1888, ‘American Insitute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY. [NFPA 20-2000, Flammable And Combustible Liquids Code, National Fire Protection Assocation, Quincy, MA. NFPA 58-2001, Liquefied Natural Gas, National Fire Protection Assoctaton, Quincy, MA. 2. NFPA 496-1998, Purgod And Pressurized Enclosures For Electrical Equipment In Hazardous (Classified) Locations, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 3. APIRP 521-1982: Guide For Pressure-Releving And Depressuritiny Systems, American Petroleum Insitute, ‘Washington, DC. 4. Center fr Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY, 5. Fire & Explosion index, Hazard Classifcation Guide, Dow Chemical Company, Sih edition, availabe from the American Insinute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY. 6. APL RP 752-1995: Management of Hazards Assocated with Location of Process Plant Bulkings, American Petroleum Insitute, Washington, DC. 13THIS PAGE HAS INTENTIONALLY BEEN LEFT BLANK.1M.2.5.2.A September 3, 2001 HAZARD CLASSIFICATION OF PROCESS OPERATIONS FOR SPACING REQUIREMENTS INTRODUCTION Processes differ from each other because of their inherent hazards. Processes and operations can be empirically classified into one of the three classes according to their explosion and fire hazards: © Moderate © Intermediate © High ‘These classifications do not substitute for a proper hazard identification or analysis method. They are intended only to be used in determining spacing requirements. Many additional factors and judgments can still affect the class to which the process is assigned such as: Vessel size © Flammable liquid holdup © Unit size * Gas vs. liquid phase * Pressures © Temperatures * Loss history ‘* Interdependency Lead time to rebuild © Market share ‘Therefore, if any of the above features of a process are higher than normal, raise it to a higher class. Typical process examples are given for each classification, ‘See IM.8.0.1.1 for an evaluation method to estimate damage from a vapor cloud or vessel explosion.IM.2.5.2.A September 3, 2001 FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD CLASSIFICATION Moderate This category includes processes, operations or materials having a limited explosion hazard and a ‘moderate fire hazard. This class generally involves endothermic reactions and nonreactive operations, such as distillation, absorption, mixing and blending of flammable liquids. Exothermic reactions with no flammable liquids or gases also fit in this hazard group. Typical examples include: * Acetic anhydride (carbonyiation of methyl acetate) * Acetone (dehydrogenation of alcohol) © Adiporitile * Ammonia © Crude distillation ‘© Dimethyl formamide © Chloromethanes Ethanol from methanol) © Ethylene glycol ‘* Formaldehyde (methanol oxidation) Methyl amines ‘¢ Methyl ethy! Ketone (dehydrogenation of alcohol) * Solvent extraction © Styrene © Urea © Visbreaking Intermediate This category includes processes, operations or materials having an appreciable explosion hazard and a moderate fire hazard. This class generally involves mildly exothermic reactions. Typical ‘examples include: '* Acetic anhydride (from acetic acid) ‘© Alkylation (Refinery) © Benzene (from toluene-xylene) © Benzene-Toluene-Xylene (BTX) © Cumene © Cyclohexane ‘© Ethyl benzene ‘© Methanol (Reforming) © Polyethylene HD (small units)IM.2.5.2.A September 3, 2001 * Polypropylene © Polystyrene ‘© Polyvinylchloride ‘© Reforming (Refinery) © Terephtalic Acid High This category includes processes, operations or materials having a high explosion hazard and moderate to heavy fire hazard. This class involves highly exothermic or potential runaway reactions and high hazard products handling. Typical examples include: © Acetic acid © Acetaldehyde (oxidation) * Acetone (cumene oxidation) * Acrolein © Acrylic acid © Acrylonitrile ‘* Butadiene (oxidation) © Caprolactam © Cumene hydroperoxide © Dimethyl terephtalate © Ethylene © Ethylene oxide © Hydrocracking (Refinery) * Maleic anhydride (butane oxidation) © Methy! metacrylate ‘© Phenol (cumene oxidation) © Phtalic anhydride ‘* Polyethylene LD (high pressure) © Polyethylene HD (large units) Propylene oxide © Vinyl acetate © Vinyl chloride (VCM-EDC)THIS PAGE HAS INTENTIONALLY BEEN LEFT BLANK.HRUnformation wz A publication of Industrial Risk Insurers DRAINAGE FOR OUTDOOR OIL AND CHEMICAL PLANTS INTRODUCTION Oil and chemical plants handle large quantities of flammable and combustible liquids. These liquid products wil, if released and ignited, form poo! fires that can severely damage exposed equipment and structures. Removing a flammable or combustible liquid spill rapidly will reduce the amount of fuel that could be involved in a fire. Grading, impounding, diking, trenching, and providing lunderground or enclosed drains will remove fuel and reduce the pool fire potential. Product spills must be controlled effectively and rapidly and routed away from buildings, structures, tanks, pipe racks and process equipment to a safe location without exposing adjacent equipment or units toa fire, oF causing a risk of flooding by fire protection or rain water runoff. This IRinformation® material focuses on requirements for drainage systems to control product spills, storm water, and fire protection water for outdoor oil and chemical facilities. Treatment and disposal of waste water, as well as the handing of spills for environmental concems are not discussed. Drainage for areas subject to flooding from rivers, lakes or seas is not included in this section. Drainage for indoor flammable and combustible liquids storage facilities is covered in NFPA 30° and M8.1.0 IRI POSITION Design drainage systems to remove spills and fire protection water simultaneously. Design to the largest of the following criteria: ‘* Expected liquid spill that can be released from equipment that is not readily isolated. ‘Fire protection water to be used for manual and automatic fre protection in a loss incident. Use IRinformation® IM.14.1.1.1 and IM.12.2.1.2 to determine the expected fire protection water flow rates. * Heaviest expected rainfall: heaviest rainfall of 1 hour duration over a 10 year recurrence period. Drainage Methods To provide the needed drainage, use one, or a combination, of the following methods, listed in descending order of preference: © Grading © Remote impoundment © Dikes © Trenches 85 Woodard Swot, rtrd Canna 061026010 Sopyigh 2000, Indust Fisk sues ‘The nformtion contained een nc man egy hat every posible hard ashen ented, het no ter hazards eth sal rot be costed a dctg te exsene or analy of coverage we ny ply for ony property or pe olor damage. No rsponsbly te traned or the eal o corto of enitont o brates ein the prmie ofthe nar. We Seccaly dct any marry ov epetntaan tt camplance thy eee cnn Rr ae 9 Preis or operon sf ar hell ox comple wth ary lw ae oF eli,1M.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 ¢ Underground or enclosed drains Grading Slope the ground appropriately in both process and storage areas to carry any spills and fire protection water away from the point of release to a collection point, such as a drain, trench or basin. Orient the slope so that spills flow away from equipment. Use a 2% minimum slope. Install smooth surfaces. Concrete surfacing is preferred, especially in process areas. lf rougher surfacing, such as gravel or crushed rock, is utilized, increase the slope above 2% accordingly. Do not consider the absorption of the spill, rain or fire protection water by the soll for drainage purposes. The ground might be very quickly saturated and the absorption of contaminants by the soil will lead to extensive cleanup and remeadiation costs. Remote impounding Direct the spill away by sloped ground to a remote impounding basin where its exposure to ‘equipment is minimized. Locate the basin in a safe area where the spill can burn, if ignited, without exposing buildings or equipment. Keep the impounding basin empty so that the full volume is available for spill and fire protection water runoff. Keep the basin dry and limit the surface area of the retention basin to reduce the vaporization of spilled liquefied gases. Apply foam on spills to reduce the formation of vapors and to extinguish fires. Size the impounding basin to handle the largest liquid spill volume that cannot be readily isolated plus the fire protection water. Keep in mind the capacity of the waste water handling facility when determining the impounding basin holding capacity. For tank farms, size the remote impounding basin to handle the contents of the largest tank within the basin, assuming the tank is full, or the largest liquid volume which cannot be readily isolated, plus the fire protection water. As a minimum, size the impounding basin to handle 110% of the largest tank. Diking Install dikes to hold, control or contain a spill. Use diking in storage areas where very large spills can be expected in emergency situations. Do not use diking in process areas because the fuel would pool and be an unacceptable exposure to the process structure. Design containment dikes to contain at least 110% of the contents that can be released from the largest tank within the enclosure, assuming the tank is full. Consider the volume ofthe tanks within the diked area, up to the height of the dikes, as unavallable space for the spilled liquid. Always use this ‘method to calculate the volume of diked enclosures. ‘Subdivide a diked area with spill dikes, where two or more tanks are within a single containment diked ‘enclosure, Design spill dikes to retain 10% of the largest tank volume within the spil dike area to prevent any small spill from exposing other tanks or equipment within the enclosure. Restrict spill dike heights to 1.5 3 ft (0.45 m—0.9 m) ora height well below the containment dike height. Also use spill dikes to control the liquid spill from pressurized storage tanks. Construct dike walls of compacted earth, concrete or solid masonry, designed to be liquid tight. Design dikes and all dike penetrations to withstand the full hydrostatic head of the impounded spill. Install liquid tight fire resistive expansion joints and sleeves with similar packing for al piping penetrations in all concrete dikes. if masonry dikes are installed, use very careful design and heavilyM.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 reinforce them against thermal and hydraulic stresses, otherwise they are not likely to survive for any appreciable time when exposed to a major tank fire. Design dikes for refrigerated storage tanks to withstand the thermal shock in case of a spill. Also design all dikes to withstand fire, earthquake, wind and rainfall exposures. Restrict dike heights to 6 ft (1.8 m) to allow easy fire fighting access, as well as better natural ventilation and vapor cloud dilution. Do not use high walls close to flammable storage tanks in place of dikes because of dificult fire fighting access. Construct each dike with sufficient slope to allow easy transit and fire fighting. ‘Avoid tank fire ignition by vehicles by restricting vehicle access ramps into diked areas as much as Possible. Require entry permits for vehicle entry into diked areas. Avoid locating tank farm access ‘oads on top of the dikes, because the roads are inaccessible for fire fighting equipment when the ‘material within the dike is on fire. Such practice would be acceptable only if roads on at least two Sides of the tanks are outside the diked area. In addition, heavy traffic on dikes can damage and settle the dike, especially if itis of earthen construction. ‘Minimize piping within diked areas, because once involved in ground fires, pipes usually fail within 10 or 15 min of initial exposure. Do not use fittings, such as quick couplings or cast iron fittings, which Can quickly fail when exposed to fire. Bury pipes wherever possible. If buried piping is not feasib instal fill and suction lines above a small raised berm to help prevent burning liquids from pooling under the piping. Do not run piping from one tank through the dike area of another tank. Properly seal Piping passing through dikes. Check the integrity of the dikes on a regular basis. A typical tank diking arrangement is shown in Figure 1. ROADWAY PREWAY Figure 1. Tank Diking Arrangement, Maintain enough distance between the tank shell and the base of dikes to contain a liquid jet spill ‘streaming out of the tank. NFPA 58” recommends the following equation to determine the minimum distance to the base of the dike: xey+aP: Where: X= distance between outer tank shell and base of dike Y= elevation difference of the maximum tank liquid level and the top of the dike A P= equivalent pressure difference between internal tank pressure in the vapor space and ‘atmospheric pressure1M.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 This equation, initially developed for refrigerated liquefied gas tanks, is valid for any type or shape of tank. For atmospheric tanks, the minimum distance between the outer tank shell and the base of the dike equals the maximum liquid height in the tank. In addition, space tanks in accordance with IM.2.5.2. Provide diked areas with trapped drains to allow for possible removal of the rainwater, fire protection water or a spil. Keep the drain valves closed and open them only as needed, because permanently ‘opened drain valves will not retain discharged liquids if the tank suddenly fails or leaks. Establish a ‘schedule for checking the drain valves. Drain water accumulation within diked areas immediately, because it only takes a few feet (meters) of water within a diked area to float a tank when the tank contents are low. Locate drain valves outside the dike and where they are accessible under fire conditions. Size drain piping to handle the maximum flow of fre protection water. It sump pumps are used, they should be rated for the intended service and be started manually. Trenching Direct spills, rain, of fie protection water from an area to trenches by sloping the ground. Locate trenches at the edges of process units. Size the trenches to handle the expected spill and the fire protection water from fixed and manual systems. Slope the trench at least 1%. Do not use open ditches or trenches where they could expose other equipment. Use partly covered trenches, per NFPA 15, to direct the spill and fire protection water to a safe area without exposing any other ‘equipment, because partly covered trenches can control burning without seriously exposing the adjacent equipment. Partly covered trenches are shown in Figure 2. Make trench covers of concrete or heavy steel plates, Figure 2. Parly Covered Trenches. Install fre stops at regular intervals, at road crossings, and at locations where ditches extend to adjacent units. I the trenches discharge into an underground drainage system, provide seals to avoid flame propagation into the underground drains. Do not install piping or cabling in or above open drains or trenches. If this is unavoidable, cover the trenches, or fireproof the exposed piping or cabling as outlined in IM.2.5.1. Underground or Enclosed Drains Install drains to collect spill and fire protection water at a low point and carry it into underground piping. Such drains can either replace or be used with a trenching system. Seal all points of ‘connection liquid tight or instal traps in all such connections to prevent propagation of flame or explosions through the drainage system. Remember, the safe operation of an underground drainageIM.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 ‘system depends upon minimal inflow of flammables, proper layout, well maintained seals and proper venting to reduce the hazard of accumulated vapors in the system. Design the underground drainage system to handle the largest anticipated flows, irrespective of whether itis spent cooling water, condensate, fire protection water flows, the largest anticipated spill or rainwater. This means that trunk drain designs tend to be dominated by maximum anticipated rainfall caleulations while smalier branch drains sizes are driven by the other flows. Do not interconnect laterals servicing incompatible processing areas within the battery limits of a process unit. For example, do not tie laterals which serve furnace areas into laterals which serve light hydrocarbon process areas. ‘Since drains can be plugged by foreign material or debris, include safety factors when designing drainage systems. Establish a minimum drain size of 4 in. (100 mm) in diameter to avoid plugging problems. Because a minimum velocity of liquids in the drains will provide some self-cleaning effect, try to maintain a minimum speed between 2.5 fv’s-4 tts (0.75 m/s—4 m/s). In all cases, establish and enforce a regular drainage system inspection and cleaning schedule, Design liquid seals or traps with sufficient depth to prevent vapors from escaping into any area where ‘sources of ignition might exist and to stop flame fronts that may be moving through partly filled drains. Maintain seals on various drains when units are shut down, either permanently or for repairs. Run a ‘small amount of water into the drains to offset evaporation losses. install biinds or blocks on unused branch lines or laterals where they enter an active underground drainage system. Check water seals in enclosed drains on a regular basis. Do not use mats to cover water seals to avoid excessive evaporation. Use the following three types of trapping devices as appropriate: '* P-traps - Cast iron soil pipe P-traps provide a 2% in. (65 mm) water seal in sizes 3 in.—6 in. (60. mm-150 mm), and a 3 in. (80 mm) water seal in sizes 8 in.— 12 in. (200 mm—300 mm). ‘* Junction Boxes ~ Seal laterals from open drains and catch basins at all junction boxes. A typical junetion box is shown in Figure 3. © Gas-trap Manholes - Typical design for these is shown in Figure 4. vent Gas Tight Lis Figure 3. Junction Box1M.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 Gas Tight Liss cast ie Ranle Depth OF Seat Figure 4, Gas Trap Manhole. Install vents to maintain atmospheric pressure on the underground drainage system and to release any flammable vapors to a safe location, because drains generally are designed for gravity flow. Since any trapped air or vapor will reduce the design capacity of the drain, install vents in sewer systems fo release vapors and to prevent vapor locks. Include the following features: ‘* Extend all vents away from areas with possible ignition sources. * Donot place vents near operating platforms or ventilating fan intakes. ‘Extend vents high enough to allow vapors being expelled to readily dissipate into the atmosphere, or connect vents to a waste gas treatment facilty rather than allowing vapors to accumulate at grade level, ‘Identity properly all vents to wam personnel of possible release of toxic or flammable vapors. ‘Ensure that all vents are not less than 4 in. (100 mm) in diameter. Smaller pipe sizes tend to freeze oF clog up in cold weather. ‘¢ Keep manhole or junction box vents free of obstructions, ‘* Provide steam jets in the vents to maintain a constant vapor flow and a steam atmosphere in the top portions of the vents. Steam jets may be used to extinguish vent fires caused by lightning. Drainage Areas Processes Handling Flammable and Combustible Liquids Provide a clean and smooth concrete grading slope to carry major spillage to the outer limits of process unit. Provide partly covered trenches at the limits of the process unit. Further collect the spill and fire protection water in trenches or underground drains connected to catch basins, remote impounding areas or separators. This system is described by Van Gaalen’ and is shown in Figure 5. ‘Avoid the use of underground drain intakes within units, if possible, as debris, such as insulation, rags, plastics, and dirt, will be washed to the floor drains together with the spillage and will block the underground drains. A poo! will orm increasing exposure to the process unit and possibly spreading fire to neighboring units.1.2.5.3 June 1, 2000 QO i 5 Bs Well oe see 90 HM j | =| 4 loo} ff ie eee ecco iA . 2 = ° Retaining cc) rere se|_[) 7 = Soe Figure 5. Process Area Drainage. Consider the use of foam. Foam discharging through water spray or deluge sprinkler systems, as described in IM,12.2.1.2, will blanket flammable ground poo! fires. The foam will also cover the ‘flammable liquid throughout the drainage path to further reduce exposure to equipment and. structures located along the drainage path. When foam is used, lower amounts of fie protection water are used which allows for faster spill and drainage control Do not use diking in process areas. However, small diverting curbs can be used to reroute a spillage that could expose equipment. Processes Handling Liquefied Flammable Gases Construct adequate sloping, open trenching and catch basins to allow safe removal of a spill and fire protection water. Do not use underground or enclosed drainage systems because of the explosion hazard, ‘Tank Farm Drainage Do not locate flammable or combustible liquid storage tanks within the same impounding or diked area as flammable gas or liquefied gas storage tanks. Flammable or combustible liquids could accumulate under liquefied gas storage tanks and create a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) should the spl ignite. Atmospheric Storage Tanks Use remote impounding in tank farms, especially for jumbo storage tanks in excess of 300,000 barrels (48,000 m’). Provide a sloping grade carrying spills away from the tank shell to the impounding area. Locate the impounding basin so as to allow safe handling of the spill and fire1M.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 protection water without exposing other tanks or property. Use dikes or trenches to divert the spillage away from other tanks. If the impounding basin is to be drained, use provisions simiar to those used to drain the diked areas. Where impounding basins cannot be used, provide containment dikes around the tanks. Where remote impounding is not possible, provide individually diking for all atmospheric storage tanks in excess of 25,000 bbl (3975 m*) containing flammable liquids (Class |. For smaller tanks containing flammable liquids, the total capacity within the same diked area should not exceed 25,000 bbl (3975 m’). These maximum capacities can be doubled for combustible liquid (Class Il and I storage. in addition to containment diking, provide spill dking or trenches for flammable liquids ‘storage tanks larger than 10,000 bb! (1590 m*) within the same diked enclosure. NFPA 30 has additional requirements for unstable materials or special tanks. Equip diked areas with drain valves located outside the diked area, and keep the valves accessible Under fire conditions. Use liquid seals in the drain lines to prevent fre propagation. Size the drains to handle the maximum flow of fre protection water. Pressurized Storage Tanks Provide remote impounding for handling liquefied flammable gas spl. f remote impounding is not possible, provide diking to control the liquid spill and fire protection water. Use a 2% sloping grade. Burning material accumulating under a vessel or tank could create a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion), therefore always slope the spill away from the tank. Do not use high dikes. They limit the natural ventilation and dilution of the gas cloud. However, some authorities do rot allow any diking; in such cases, remote impounding remains the only choice. Do not use enclosed drainage channels to drain liquefied flammable gases because of the explosion potential, Refrigerated Storage Tanks Ifa refrigerated storage tank suddenly fails, a large portion of the liquefied gas would spill on the ground. Design the impounding basin or dikes to handle the contents of the largest tank. Use remote impounding as the preferred spill control method. Where impounding is not possible, provide ciking sized to handle the largest stored liquid volume. Refer to NFPA 58 for additional information. Additional Requirements Provide adequate housekeeping, proper inspection and regular cleaning of drainage systems at all times to maintain spill and fire protection water control during emergencies. To avoid restricting or plugging the drainage system, keep the process and storage areas clean and free of debris. Flush the systems on a regular basis. Waxy or viscous liquids will pug drains; therefore, do not use enclosed drains or trenches when these materials are present. ‘Segregate building or sanitary drains from the unit drainage system. Control weeds and grass growing on and inside diked areas. When hot work is performed near drains, trenches or catch basins, temporarily seal all drain and manholes in the area. Use property designed, commercial drain and manhole sealers. As an ‘expedient, use sand covered tarpaulins dampened with water to cover the drains and manholes.1M.2.5.3 June 1, 2000 However, sand will inevitably be washed into the drainage systems and plug the drains, requiring lean out. Remove all drain covers immediately when welding is complete to return the drainage system to operation. Covered drains can severely impede spill control and fie fighting operations should an emergency occur in the unit. DISCUSSION Outdoor oil and chemical facilities generally require separate drainage systems defined as follows: ‘* Storm water drainage is a large system intended primatily for storm water runoff. The system may {go to a retention basin before going through an oll separation process. It will also carry off flammable or combustible spills and fire protection water. '* Oily water drainage is usually a small system, serving process sample point drains, pump base drains, and any other sources of expected hydrocarbon spillage. This system generally uses underground sewers and flows directly to an oil separator. '* Chemical effluent drainage is a small system that collects chemical wastes. Chemical effluents may require different treatment than oily water streams. Chemical wastes may need to be ‘segregated because they could react with each other or may require different disposal methods. ‘© Sanitary water drainage is a system that collects waste from sanitary facilities and usually conveys it to a municipal sewer systom, on-site treatment facilities or septic tank. If a pressurized storage tank suddenly fails, a large portion of liquefied gas will vaporize immediately ‘and reduce the expected amount of spill on the ground. The amount of the remaining liquid spill depends on the climatic conditions and the boiling point of the spilled product. In standard weather conditions, the maximum liquid spill will be about 50% of the tank contents, if the product vapor Pressure is less than 100 psia (6.9 bar abs.) at 100°F (37.8°C). For lighter products, the maximum liquid spill is an estimated 25% of the tank contents. Since drainage from dikes, trenches, impounding basins or underground systems generally is collected in a basin where the spill and fie protection water can be safely handled, emergency holding basins might be required when the expected spillage exceeds the waste disposal handling capacity. ‘The last issue to be considered is that of retention basin size. However product spills are handled by sloping or grading, diking, trenching, and underground drains, the material stil has to go somewhere. Whether impoundment is remote or right under the equipment or tank from which the spill originated, all of the spilled material and all ofthe firefighting water must be accounted for. In theory this should be a straightforward proposition; start with the volume of the largest vessel or train of vessels which ‘can not be readily isolated. Add the maximum expected quantity of fre fighting water. This can be calculated by adding up the design flow rates of maximum expected number of automatic and manual ‘systems and multiplying by the maximum expected duration, which in the case of chemical plants is Usually 4 h, The result of this approach, however, is a calculated retention requirement of several hundred thousand gallons. The expense of providing that much retention capacity often causes, designers to reconsider the duration of the expected fir. Itis true that the 4 h time assumes a fire under reasonably adverse conditions. If all required protection were in place and everything operated as it was supposed to, a duration of 30 min is more likely. Assuming a duration less than that is. ‘marginal as even with a quick and successful extinguishment of the fire there are bound to be delays in securing the fire site and turning off the operating automatic and manual systems. Remember, Whatever assumption for fie duration is made when designing the retention system, ifa fire occurs which exceeds that duration, the burning liquid is going to go somewhere when it overflows. Designers should always know where that somewhere is.1M.2.5.3 dune 1, 2000 IRinformation® SECTIONS REFERENCED M251 Fireprooing For Oi And Chemical Propertis. M252 Plant Layout And Spacing For Oil And Chomical Plants. IM.2.1.0 Flammable And Comeustible Liquids ~ NFPA 90-1986. 1M12.21.2 Fixed Protection For Oil And Chemical Plants IM14.1.14 Estimating Fire Protection Water Demands For Chemical Plans. REFERENCES 1. NFPA 30-1996, Flammable And Combustible Liquids Code, National Fire Protection Assocation, Quincy, MA. 2. NFPAS8-1968, Storage And Handing Of Liquefied Potroloum Gases, National Fire Protection Assocation, Quincy, MA. 3, A.Van Galen, Chemical Plant Drainage, An Overlooked Subject? ACHEMA, 1988, 10__GE GAP Guidelines cap204 June 3, 2002 ‘A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection Services DAMS AND OTHER HYDRAULIC STRUCTURES INTRODUCTION ‘The purpose of a dam evaluation is to review the design, construction and performance history of the dam and associated structures, and evaluate their structural integrity. The effective control and utilization of stored water is the obvious basis of operation of hydroelectric power generation, thus, reservoir operation is also important in evaluating the overall integrity of the project. The dam, spillways and outlet works, other appurtenant structures, embankments, the reservoir rim and reservoir operation as well as the powerhouse structure need to be surveyed. Electrical generating ‘equipment will be surveyed under other loss prevention guidelines. Regional watershed flow characteristics and upstream flow control structures are important in design considerations. They also affect the loss potential of a power project. POSITION Conduct regular self-inspections of hydraulic structures directed toward identifying potentially damaging conditions. Include in the inspections a review of site inspection, maintenance and instrumentation records. These records identify changes in conditions and highlight areas of potential distress, Loss Prevention Surveys at the site will require visual examination of the existing condition and review of data from instrumentation monitoring to identify changes in conditions and signs of distress. Also review maintenance records and note unusual repair. BACKGROUND ‘The *Power Project” physical arrangement consists of three major entities: © Water control, impoundment and distribution structures; '* Power generating structures; ‘© Electric substation and transmission equipment. Modern dams may be designed and constructed to control or withstand a probable maximum flood (PMF) of the watershed area. Earlier constructed projects will have a current hydrologic analysis Fepor indicating safe flood elevation. Since dams are water flow control structures; itis generally presumed that associated structures are not subject to flood. However, a number of unusual Circumstances may inadvertently cause flooding. For example, the unusual condition of logjam on the 1 Seat, Haro, Connect 061025019 Copy 2002, GE Glos! Ase Proton Sane GE Global ser Provcon Sere and it fled egonsions prove los prevention war and eer ik management, tse conta and fly act Imonagnen’ services Unless oheiae sted te mr, our peroneal a, sre donot aden fe ako ary Hable, The ‘proven of on erie isnt cont imp ta eer pose cardi ee dwifed a fair na oer haa ext GE lade Prochon Serves {dt afired ogo do na ome and shal oem habit for he contac, cntnuaton or median oan xs coniton or raion We ‘pec ln av yan or repremation hat compliance ml a) adie or recnmendation in a actor er common lnk ll peraton sf oa or an compane iho Pal or relation there area quero consign recomendations hav late ‘Bhat pls comaGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 Upstream side of the dam crest can raise the reservoir and upstream water elevation to above safe flood levels. A downstream obstruction can cause water backup into the dam tailrace. In addition to the threat of unusually high water levels are the long-term effects of water acting upon the soils of the embankments, constructed facilities and dam works foundations. The design of a dam will usually fal into one of the four basic categories with local condition requirements causing a variation of or a combination of these. Stability against abnormal load Conditions such as flood, ice or earthquake is required for all dams. Small dams of steel, timber or crib design, and small impoundments of other types are not considered inthis general discussion. ‘* Embankment Dam: Some literature may refer to any dam constructed of excavated earth materials such as sand, sand gravel or soils as a fil dam. As the name implies, material is filed or placed to create mass with sloping sides. Upstream and downstream dam faces of embankment dams are both sloping. Variations on this concept utilize different materials that might be rack, earth, rolled earth or hydraulically placed fil All require “sealing” against seepage with an impervious section, zone or core. Examples of embankment dams are shown in Figure 1 Earth Type Rock Fill Type Figure 4.’ Embankment Type. ‘© Gravity Dam: A dam constructed of concrete or masonry (quarried rock) units that relies upon its ‘weight for stability against overtuming or sliding. Variations of modem design may include arch, curve or cellular (hollow) styles. A sketch of gravity type designs is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2. Gravity Type. GE GAP Guidelines 2 ‘A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection ServicesGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 ‘© Buttress Dam: A concrete or masonry dam consisting of a watertight, upstream face supported at intervals on the downstream side by a series of buttresses. Variations of this design may include: curve; multiple arches; solid head; flat slab (Ambursen or Deck Dam); or prestressed. Figure 3 is a flat slab buttress design. Figure 3. Flat Slab ~ Butresse * Arch Dam: A concrete or masonry dam that is curved in plan so as to transmit the major part of the water load to the abutments. Variations on this design usually involve shape and load bearing element alterations. An example of an arch dam is shown in Figure 4, Figure 4, Arch Type. GE GAP Guidelines 3A Publication of GE Giabal Asset Protection ServicesGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 Regardless of dam type and style, design considerations must account for load conditions during ; operation, maximum flood, wind and wave, ice, seiche and earthquake which may act to erode, breach, overtum or slide the dam. Extensive investigative studies are necessary in choosing a dam site. Ground preparation may require modification of the profile of underlying earth, rock or both to stabilize the foundation. Stability, bearing strength and water tightness are basic criteria for foundation and abutment walls of the proposed site. Figure 5 illustrates seepage paths under a ‘central core dam. Inasmuch as water will be an attendant addition to the geologic environment, its effects must be assessed. ‘Visual and instrumentation monitoring of the foundation and structure is necessary to assess the continued integrity of the project. Such conditions as uplift, settlement, seepage, drainage and movement need to be monitored and evaluated in a continuing program. The purpose of instrumentation is to furnish data that can be used to determine if the structure is maintaining its integrity and stability as intended, and to provide a continuous surveillance of the structure to warn of developments which endanger its safety. DAM FAILURE Dam failures due to geologic or construction defects have occurred at projects during construction, immediately following construction, and at some time after the reservoir was filled. The Waco Dam Texas failed in 1961; construction of the embankment was within 13 ft 4.0 m) of finished elevation. The Teton Dam in Idaho failed in 1976 while the reservoir was being filled immediately following completion of construction. The Baldwin Hill Reservoir in Califomia failed in 1963, 12 yr after the reservoir was filled. The Malpasset Dam in France failed 5 yr after completion; however, the failure ‘was coincident with the first reservoir fling to the spillway crest. This failure was significant since it was the first in the history of arch dams. Each of these failures was attributed to the effects of water upon the site geologic environment. ‘A number of studies have been made of dam failures and accidents, and substantial statistics, ‘generated. Several items of interest regarding dams of the United States and Western Europe follow. ‘There has been a progressive improvement (decrease) in the rate of dam failures for structures constructed over the period 1900 to 1975 according to the Intemational Commission of Large Dams ((COLD) and the United States Commission of Large Dams (USCOLD)* now know as United States ‘Society on Dams. Embankment dams built in the 1900 era have a 10% probability of failure. ‘Comparable aged gravity dams (concrete) have a 6.5% probability of failure. Dams built in the 1930 era perform significantly better with only a 1% probability of failing; and “modem” dams (constructed from the 1950s on) have less than a 0.04% probability of failure. The probability GE GAP Guidelines 4 ‘A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection ServicesGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 decreases logarithmically. Dams over 30 yr old have a significantly higher risk of failing than do modem dams. Older embankment dams have a higher risk of failure than do concrete types. Dams that have been in service for an extended length of time are not immune to failure. Some failures may take years to develop. Changes in conditions need to be monitored; the structural behavior of a dam is dynamic and has a history. CAUSES OF FAILURE In a USCOLD report published jointly with the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1975, the following were some of the major causes of failure. Failure was considered when water was released downstream, © Overtopping has caused 26% of the failures but 13% of all incidents. The principal reason for overtoping was inadequate spillway capacity. Overtopping of earth embankment dams leads to surface erosion and failure. Overtopping of concrete dams and masonry dams does not necessarily cause failure. In one incident of overtopping involving a concrete structure, the powerhouse and electrical equipment were damaged, but not the dam. ‘+ Water seepage, leakage or internal channeling (piping) of embankment dams led to total breaching in 22% of all failures and 13% of all incidents. Water seepage is the principal causes of failure in embankment type dams. ‘* Foundation seepage, leakage or internal channeling is believed to be responsible for 17% of the failures and 24% of all incidents. This was the number one cause of all incidents. There was twice the amount of embankment type dam failures then concrete gravity type failures. * Channel erosion caused 17% of the failures and 12% of all incidents. Of these failures 82% involved embankment dams where the spilways failed. The remainder involved various structure washout or undermining of dams. ‘+ Sliding accounted for 6% of the failures and 12% of all incidents. Sliding was related to instability in the foundation, embankments or abutments. In one failure, a concrete gravity structure slid 18 in. (457 mm) downstream. Before repair and remedial measures could be taken, the reservoir was refilled and the load caused large sections of the dam to overtum or slide open like a door. '* The remaining failures are due to deformation, deterioration, faully design or construction, gate failures or other miscellaneous causes. There were incidents of damage due to earthquake instability in which two of the dams required complete reconstruction. Failure Mechanisms Indicators of project stress are seen as changes in physical conditions such as increased pore pressures, increased see pages, heavy drainage, piping (intemal channeling), bank erosion, soil saturation, landsliding, settlement, vertical tilting, or other displacements and undermining of the dam or associated structures, foundation or reservoir. Concrete deterioration is significant for concrete constructions. Soil saturation is particularly important in the reservoir banks and perimeter slopes where wave action or unstable slopes can cause slumping, landsliding and sedimentation. Structure ‘+ Water leakage, seepage, internal channeling and erosion are indicated by wet spots, boils or other evidence of pressure flow, leaching, channelization and gully formation, sinkholes, soft spots, local setting, marsh-type vegetation and unexplained soil loss. GE GAP Guidelines 5 A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection ServicesGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 + Heavy drainage can be caused by cracked, deteriorated or porous concrete, leaking tunnels and ppenstocks or internal sediment washout and channeling. Stress and strain cause cracking, crushing, displacement, offsets, creep, bending, buckling, subsidence and heaving. ‘© Instability causes tilting, tipping, sliding and overtuming, Reserv ‘* Pool stage changes, whirlpooling, depressions and sinkholes in the basin surface suggest heavy drainage or channeling in the reservoir foundation. * Leaning trees, hillside distortions, escarpments, pool encroachment, silting, channel approach obstructions and bank wetness suggest landslide potential. Watershed * Upstream headwater and river bank changes might affect regional precipitation runoff rates. River channel and bank changes might affect reservoir inflow volume and rate, and spillway discharge characteristics. Titt meters, strain meters, piezometers, seismometers and weirs are common devices used for monitoring the dynamic structural behavior of a hydraulic structure. The extent and nature of, instrumentation depends upon the project design, dam type, size of the impoundment, and the ‘complexity of the geologic environment. Project Evaluation Where a first survey is undertaken or a more thorough evaluation of the overall project is desired, greater detail and a broader scope of information is required. Following is a summary of data which ‘should be provided to the authority responsible for review and evaluation. Location * State, country and nearby city or town; Name of river or body of water; ‘Mile point location on river course; * Elevation and reference datum (i.e, sea level or other); ‘© Site plan and topographic quadrangle map which includes site. Dam Type and year of construction; ‘© Operating category (Ie, single dam, one of a series on the same water course, one of a group on converging waterways); ‘Design criteria (height, width, drainage area, run off, design inflow-outfiow. reservoir size area and elevation full, draw down, freeboard, foundation treatment, spillway capacity, safety devices); * General condition with record of inspection; * Seepage with record of monitoring and stability stud _GE GAP Guidelines - 6 ‘A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection ServicesGAP.2.9.1 June 3, 2002 ‘* Structural behavior with records of monitoring; ‘¢ Seismic zone of site and hazard design with records of seismic monitoring or activity; © Design flood analysis referring to 100 yr frequency and PML (probable maximum flood); © Dam break flood analysis and inundation map: Emergency action plan Water power projects are required to be licensed by the federal government and are inspected and examined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, usually on an annual basis. In addition, the licensee must provide an in-depth comprehensive safety evaluation conducted by an independent engineering consultant on a § yr schedule. State agencies also may make periodic inspections and reports of inspection are provided to the licensee. When a first survey involves a FERC licensed project, the original plus the most current FERC Reports will usually provide adequate information for GE Global Asset Protection Services project elevation. Copies of these reports should be requested. REFERENCES 1. Figures 1 thru 5 adaptod from Corps Of Engineers, U.S. Amy, Engineering And Design Manuals Series, EM 1110-2:2000, EN 1110-2-2300, 2. Lessons From Dam Incidents, USA 1979 Transaction of ICOLD Congress, New Delhi availabe through American Sooiaty of Civ Engineers, Reston, VA. GEGAP Guidelines _ 7 A Publication of GE Global Asset Protection ServicesTHIS PAGE HAS INTENTIONALLY BEEN LEFT BLANK.