The Transportation of

Liquefied Gas

An Overview of Some
Methods Used for Mitigating
the Risks

Marc Hopkins & Ann Hayward Walker

 MEMAC Focus
Regional co-operation in protecting the
marine environment from pollution
Combating pollution by oil and other
hazardous substances in emergency
situations
Concern rapid increase of marine
transportation of liquefied petroleum gas
 This Presentation
Describes potential hazards of LNG
and LPG
Summarizes various techniques to
minimize their risks
On the Vessels
At Terminals and Jetties
Combined Operating Practices and
Procedures
Contingency Planning
 Liquefied Gases in the
Middle East
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
Long history in the Gulf over last 30 years
24 million tonnes exported in 1999
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and UAE
Liquefied natural gas (LNG)
Past - only Abu Dhabi for over 25 years
Until recently 2.5 million tonnes a year.
Now approx. 20 million tonnes a year
UAE, plus new producers in Qatar and Oman
World wide demand to double in the next decade.
Much of demand to be met from the Middle East
 History and Safety Record
Marine Transportation
LPG started before WW2
Pressurised containment in small quantities
LNG started in 1959
Converted cargo ship - 5000m3
Slowly ships became larger
Present day ~ 1060 gas carriers
~200 greater than 60,000m3
LPG fully refrigerated - up to 100,000m3
LNG fully refrigerated - up to 138,000m3
Future
LNG to increase rapidly from 113 to over 200 in
next 10 years
 SIGTTO,
The Safety Record
WITH
ITSNoINDUSTRY

To date exemplary
loss of containment
MEMBERS,
No ISover
loss of a liquid gas carrier
5,000 cubic metres
WORKING
This TO of
despite a limited number
incidents
KEEP IT THAT
WAY!!
What are Liquefied Gases?
Defined in International Gas Carrier Codes
published by International Maritime
Organization
Products having a vapour pressure exceeding
2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of 37.8 C
and other products shown in Chapter 19 of
the Code, when carried in bulk.
(A gas at atmospheric pressure and ambient
temperature)
 Properties of LNG
Petroleum hydrocarbon (C1)
Flammable gas
Flammable limits in air: 5.3% - 14.0%
Floats and boils on water
Flammable, visible vapour cloud
Vapour approximately 600 times
volume of liquid
Aquatic & wildlife toxicity, food chain
concentration potential none
 Properties of LPG
Petroleum hydrocarbon (C3+C4)
Flammable gas
Propane flammable limits in air: 2.2% - 9.5%
Butane flammable limits in air: 1.8% - 8.4%
Floats and boils on water
Flammable, visible vapour cloud
Vapour approximately 250 times volume of
liquid
Aquatic & wildlife toxicity, food chain
concentration potential none
 Major Hazards of Liquefied
Gases
The major hazard of liquefied gases is
not in liquefied form - it is the vapour
from a release
The associated heat from an a vapour
cloud that is subsequently ignited
This could be remote from the point of
liquid release
Detonation of a vapour cloud of LPG (has
been simulated).
Detonation of LNG cloud has not been found
to be possible
 Hazards to the Marine
Environment
Not a water pollutant neither toxic nor
persistent
Explosion hazard
Acutely lethal effects to marine organisms in
the vicinity of underwater explosion
Less of a widespread, persistent, chronic
environmental hazard than a crude oil
spill
Contact with cold liquid will damage
tissues, especially with LNG
MOMSI
Other Hazards of LPG and
LNG
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Vapour Cloud
Explosion) occurs when pressurised
LPG containment becomes over
pressured and fails catastrophically
RPT (Rapid Phase Transition) can
only occur with LNG when correct
mixing with Water
Differences LPG and LNG
Vapour
LPG
vapour cloud is heavier than air, cloud
dispersion is at low level and LFL and
UFL is reached slowly
LNG
vapour becomes rapidly (over -100
deg. C) lighter than air, increasing
cloud dispersion and thus LFL and UFL
is reached quickly
 LNG/LPG Accidental
Release Behavior
When liquefied gas is released it vaporizes,
begin warmed by mixing with diluting air,
cooling the surrounding air
Some distance before diluted below the flammable
limits
Spreads rapidly until vaporization is complete
Vapour cloud, of LNG, is generally visible due to air
temperature being lowered below ambient dew
point.
On Land vaporization initially rapid until the
ground cools; can take hours to evaporate
On Water generally rapid throughout as
water transmits heat.
Mitigation of Risk - Vessel
Techniques

Legislative in nature (IMO)

SOLAS
Basic construction of all shipping,
Gas Codes -
Specific construction
Equipment

Operations

MARPOL
Mitigation of Risk - Vessel
Techniques

Surveys
Ships surveyed regularly
Against SOLAS & MARPOL
Classification Society Rules
Port State Control
Audit / Inspection by Charterers
and Industry
 Mitigation of Risk - Vessel
Techniques
Training (Legislative)
The Standards of Training and
Watchkeeping Convention (STCW95)
Legislative as a minimum requirement for
all seafarers
Specific training requirements for seafarers
serving on gas carriers
Training (non Legislative)
Simulator (On ship or ashore)
Enhanced training specific to vessel
Mitigation of Risk - Vessel
Techniques
Human error(Legislative)
The International Safety Management
(ISM) Code
Introduced for several classes of ship
(including gas carriers - in 1998)
A Quality Management system.
Human Error (non Legislative)
ISM as a minimum -
ISO 9002 ahead of ISM and improving
their operations by increasing the
scope
 Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
No international regulations or
legislation
Some National legislation
NFPA (USA)
Health and Safety Executive(UK)
Japanese Safety Bureau (Japan)
etc.
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
International Recommendations
SIGTTO
PIANC
OCIMF
IAPH
BSI
IMO
etc.
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Siting and Design Considerations
Basics site selections
Control of traffic near port
Weather conditions
Safe mooring
Secondary mitigation measures
safe distances
Terminal staff training
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Site Selection
Prime method of risk reduction
LNG controlled by
Gas Fields
Users (Power stations or industry)

LPG controlled by
Refineries
Users (Industry - bottling plant etc.)

Sheltered - deep water

Surrounding Industry & Population
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Control of traffic
Most accidents happen in or around
port areas or restricted waters
Safe transit to and from the berth
Complete passage has to be planned
and the risk of collision minimised
Use of VTS encouraged
Collision impacts to be taken into
account
Escort tugs / guard boats
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Weather conditions
Maximum weather conditions for
specific berths and ships must be
Established
Strictly adhered to.

These may vary if circumstances are

not fully as planned
E.G. (Mooring equipment not ideally
suited).
Tug capability is very important
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Safe Mooring
Prime defense against a liquid spill
during transfer.
Must limit the movement of a vessel
within the design of the transfer arms
Berth must be designed for the size of
ship
Mooring points must be adequately
strong and well positioned
Fenders must ensure that vessel is held
securely
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Secondary Mitigation Measures
Inter-linked Emergency Shut Down
(ESD) system
ESD 1 -
stops transfer operation when initiated
from ship or shore
ESD 2 -
disconnects hard arms by
Closing valves in arm (limits liquid spill to 5
litres)
powering the coupling apart
Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Safe Distances
A very common question
What is the safe distance???
Very difficult to define as the
risks vary from one jetty or
terminal to another.
If an absolutely safe distance
cannot be established other
mitigating steps have to be
considered.
 Mitigation Techniques for
Terminals and Jetties
Staff Training
No National or International
Regulations
Training of Terminal Staff involved
with Loading and Discharging
Liquefied Gas Carriers - produced by
SIGTTO
Training scheme based on
document has National recognition
More advanced publication by OCIMF
recently
 More Techniques -
Operating Practices and
Procedures
Risks to gas transportation
constantly changing
Regular review of operating
procedures and practices
New publication on best practices
Safety in Liquefied Gas Marine
Transportation and Terminal
Operations A Guide for Self-
Assessment
 Contingency Planning
How to minimize risks once an
accident occurs
Increasing response preparedness
Ongoing PROCESS
Develop contingency plans
Train responding personnel
Exercise the plan
Identify lesson learned
Implement lessons learned
 Types of Exercises
Facility
Vessel
Pipeline
Area
Government-led
Industry-led
 Forms of Exercises
Internal External
Notification Area exercises
Emergency (either industry or
procedures government led)
Response Government
management team unannounced
Equipment exercises
deployment
Table Top Field
 Exercise Components
Organization Response Support
Notifications Communications
Staff mobilization Transportation
Management system Personnel support
Operational Response Equipment
Source control maintenance and
Assessment support
Containment/recovery Procurement
Protection of sensitive Documentation
areas
Disposal
Sample Exercise Objectives
Exercise the response management team in a
review of:
Knowledge of contingency plan
Proper notifications
Communications system
Ability to access response resources
Internal organization coordination
Transition to more significant levels of response
Ability to access sensitive area information, etc.
Critical Success Factors
Set of things that must go right if an
operation is to succeed
Emergency response operations must minimize
release
Immediate response must mobilize enough
appropriate resources
Organization must be able to communicate and
manage information internally and externally
Response organization must be cohesive, pre-
plan roles/functions, and account for
stakeholder interests
Response organization must be able to sustain
operations
Response organization must be able to meet
realistic and achievable expectations
Incident Command System
(ICS)
FIRESCOPE (Evolved during early 70s)
Firefighting Resources of California Organized
for Potential Emergencies
Evolved to aid in the management of wild
land fires
Local, state and federal agencies involved
As more agencies became involved, the
system needed more flexibility
FIRESCOPE ICS became the National
Interagency Incident Mgmt System
(NIIMS) in 1980
 All-Risk / All-Hazard
Management System
Fully developed management
system
New training curriculum developed
in 1994 to make system functional
in all types of incidents
NIIMS ICS consists of:
Training Curriculum
Forms catalogue
Steering Group and Field Operations
Guide (FOG)
 ICS Use
US Coast Guard Industry
New York State Con Edison
Emer. Mgmt. ExxonMobil
Office ChevronPhillips
Fire Departments Federal
everywhere Emergency
Management
Agency
Others
Aircraft recovery:
TWA 800 and JFK Jr.Jr
Principle Features of ICS

Primary Functions
Management by Objectives
Unity and Chain of Command
Transfer/establish Command
Organizational Flexibility
The Incident Action Plan
Principle Features of ICS
(cont.)
Span of Control
Common Terminology
Personnel Accountability
Integrated Communications
Resources Management
Unified Command
Basic ICS Structure and
Management Functions

Incident Commander

Command Staff
(Safety, Information, Liaison)

Finance
Operations Planning Logistics and
Administration
 Functional Responsibilities
Function Responsibility
Responsibilit
Command = Overall responsibility

Operations = Direct tactical action

Planning = Prepare (IAP) - maintain

resource & situation status
Logistics = Provide support

Finance/ Cost accounting &

=
Administration procurements
Incident Management by
Objectives

4 Perform tactical direction

3 Select appropriate strategy
2 Establish incident objectives
1 Understand agency policy and direction
 Unity and Chain of
Command
Unity of Command - Have a clear line of supervision

Chain of Command - Orderly ranking of management

positions in line of authority
Possible Organizational
Structures
Large Incident
Small Incident Command Organization
Organization
Sections

Command Branches

Single Single Divisions/Groups

Resource Resource
Resources

Multiple layers are added

as needed for span of control
ICS Organization Flexibility
IC

PSC
RES TIME
F/F
SIT COM
1 2

Functions will determine the

Required organization
 Incident Action Plan
Always required can be oral or written

Incident objective(s)
Strategy (one or more)
Tactics
Assignments
Written Incident Action Plans
are Usually Required When:
Two or more Incident response
operating organization
organizations expands
Incident goes Government
beyond one dictates
operational
period
 Span of Control

Commanding Officer Commanding Officer

Type name here Type name here
Type title here Type title here

Ineffective Effective
 In ICS, Common
Terminology is applied to:
Organizational Elements
Position Titles
Resources
Facilities
 Best Response
A response organization will
effectively, efficiently, and safely
response to a hazardous material
release and will be perceived as a
success
Exxon Valdez did not achieve best
response under this definition
 The Goal of Best
Response. . .
Consequence Management
! Minimize ...
! the Adverse Impacts of
! the Incident
! - and -

! Maximize ...
! PublicConfidence
&
Stakeholder Satisfaction
 A Model for Response

nt
ple rty m e m y What We
Peo ope ron o no
Pr E nvi Ec Care About

Company Contractor Governmt Components

of Response

- a Collaborative Partnership -
 The Goals . . .
that drive response decisions
Minimize Adverse Impacts: Maximize Confidence &
- Human Health Satisfaction:
Satisfaction
- Environmental - Public
- Economic - Stakeholder

Operations Public Stakeholder

Information Service &
Support

Organizational Effectiveness through ICS

Media and Community
Relations
The entire LNG industry could be
affected by an incident
LNG project ownership is complex
Several shareholders
Different cultures
Geographically dispersed
Consistent approach to media
Pre-prepared and agreed statements
Quick and accurate response to media
Media and Community
Relations
Issue effective risk communication
messages early to the community
 Summary
Liquefied gas is similar to crude oil with
regard to jetty deign and other siting
considerations
BUT they are different in their
PROPERTIES
Invisible, flammable gas; can be toxic =
liquefied gases
Visible, flammable, toxic liquid = crude oil
 Summary
AND they are different in the type of
HAZARDS
People and property = liquefied gases
Environmental = crude oil
In spite of the strong industry safety
record, rapid phase transition remains a
major concern for LNG
 Summary
Primary techniques to prevent serious
accident
Eliminate human error
Location of facilities
Secondary techniques
Contingency planning
Effective media and community relations
The Transportation of
Liquefied Gas

An Overview of Some
Methods Used for Mitigating
the Risks

Marc Hopkins & Ann Hayward Walker