Alain Dio vs Ma.

Caridad Dio

Facts:

Alain and Ma. Caridad started as childhood sweethearts. They began living
together in 1984 but decided to go their separate ways in 1994. After 2 years, the
relationship was restored until they decided to get married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar
of Las Pinas.

On 30 May 2001, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of psychological capacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. He claims that
Caridad failed to fulfil her marital obligations as she was irresponsible, unfaithful, and
prodigal. She was also allegedly violent towards him. Summons were sent to the
residence of Caridad in the Philippines but she was already residing in the US but
immediately upon learning this, Cardidad executed and filed an answer within the
reglementary period.

A psychological report, stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic

Personaity Disorder, was also presented. The said disorder was said to have rooted from
her early formative years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

In a void marriage regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, such as a petitioner and respondent in the case before the court. For
Article 147 to apply, the following elements must concur: (1) The man and the woman
must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or the marriage
is void. All these elements are attendant to the case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.

The petition holds water. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in ordering that
a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of
the Rules does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code.
 Agueda Benedicto De La Rama vs. Esteban De La Rama

Facts:

A suit was filed by Argueda against her husband for a judicial separation, an
equal separation of the property of the conjugal partnership, an allowance for support
while the action was pending in court and for counsel fees, costs, and general relief from
the disgrace brought about by Estebans adultery.

Defendant responded and alleged that wife was also adulterous, thereby resulting
to recrimination, hence, negating the existence of any community property. He, then,
prayed for a divorce without alimony.

On the trial, decision was rendered, decreeing a divorce on the ground of

husbands adulterous acts. Motion for a new trial was filed but was overruled. Esteban,
then, appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decree of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not recrimination is attendant to the case.

Ruling:

Time-honored principle suggests that one who seeks justice must do justice and
that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands. The case evolves within this
doctrine. Neither of the parties is entitled to divorce. Allegations of adultery come from
both parties and this was corroborated by evidences presented before the court. It can
therefore be construed that one cannot be entitled to file an action for divorce against the
other because of this. Furthermore, no party is entitled to recover any cost from the other
spouse.
 Erlinda K. Ilusorio vs Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio

Facts:

Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio is married to Erlinda Kalaw. He is about 86 years old

and is in possession of vast properties amounting to millions of pesos. He was Chairman
of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. His marriage to Kalaw only lasted
for 30 years, thereafter, they decided to separate themselves from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in different places, then, while, Erlinda stayed at
Antipolo City.

Upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he lived with Erlinda for five
months. Along the duration, their children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that their mother
gave their father an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. Consequently, Potencianos health
deteriorated. That was the time when Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of the former, alleging his advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.

After Potenciano attended a meeting in Baguio, he decided not to return to

Antipolo and stayed at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. As a result, Erlinda filed a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband.

Issue:

Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may compel Potenciano to live with her by
securing a writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:

A writ of habeas corpus encompasses all cases of illegal confinement or detention

or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.

In the present case, the petition entered into by Erlinda can only granted when the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
Moreover, the legal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. However, evidence
shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. His age nor his health condition does
not, necessarily, render him mentally incapacitated.

The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty. He did not request the administrator of Cleveland Condominium not to allow his
wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. Furthermore, the mere fact that he
had answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court, he was found to
have been of sound and alert mind. Even so, the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority
when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda did not
even invoke such right in her petition. The visitation was also emphasized to be with
force and effect and that refusal would amount to a penalty of contempt.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his

wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out
by sheriffs or by any other means or process. That is a matter beyond the judicial
authority and is best left to the each partys choice.
 Ayala Investment & Development Corp. and Abelardo Magsajo

vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50.3 million loan from Ayala
Investment & Development Corp. (AIDC) and secured such loan by executing security
agreements through its Executive Vice President, making the latter solidarily liable.

PBM, unfortunately, failed to settle the loan, as such there being a solidary
obligation involving the Executive Vice President, Alfredo Ching, the latter was the last
recourse. But when the obligation still remained unpaid, AIDC resorted to filing a case
for a sum of money.

Consequently, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to
pay the P50.3 million with interests. Pending appeal, upon motion of AIDC, the lowere
court issued a writ of execution. As a result, the respondents field a case of injunction
against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to
enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that among others, the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Thereby, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order, preventing enforcement of the execution and the public
auction.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal assets of Alfredo Ching be subject to the writ of
execution.

Ruling:

The family code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses
must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnerships liability is to the extent that the family is benefited. This is also in keeping
with some of the provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to
donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. As such, when Alfredo
Ching contracted into a suretyship, he has put in peril their conjugal property, their family
home, and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation. It must
be borne in mind that signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. No matter how often a corporate executive acted or persuade to act, as a
surety for his employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in
the business of suretyship. Especially, when these officials have enough properties or
assets to satisfy such obligations, they should not be made liable when the signature of
the spouse is not obtained. It may, however, claimed that on several occasions the lending
institutions would not require spouses signature but this alone does not mean that being a
surety became part of ones profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for
the conjugal partnership.