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Michael Jonathan

Dr. Benjamin Nathans

HIST 135-401

18 September 2017

The Unavoidability of the Cold War

AJP Taylor, a famous British historian, once said that Nothing is inevitable until it

happens. Because nothing is truly inevitable until it occurs, the problem of delineating the

origins of a historical event is one historians grapple with to this day. One event that continues to

arrest the attention of historians to this day is the Cold War, along with the challenge of

assigning a point in time after which it became unavoidable. It is clear, however, that this turning

point occurred during the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, as US-Soviet relations soured at

an exponential rate following this conference and the end of WWII. As one will see, the precise

event that gave rise to the unavoidability of the Cold War was the Allied decision to govern a

divided Germany without a unified objective.

The decision to divide Germany into zones of occupation without a unified objective

pushed the Cold War to the point of no return. All parties at the Potsdam Conference agreed to

the partition of Germany, although the severity of industrial reduction and reparations quickly

became a matter of dispute. In this way, discussions of post-war objectives came to a standstill

(Judge and Langdon 58). The United States and the United Kingdom wanted a stringent peace

that would greatly reduce German industrial production, provide reparations for the countries

victimized by Nazi aggression, and promote poitical democracy; on the other hand, the USSR

and France favoured fragmentation of [Germany], with the industrial heartlands of the Saar and

Ruhr passing under international control (Judge and Langdon 58). This lack of directional
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consensus translated to a rift in understanding that would eventually need resolution, whether

through peaceful negotiations or a conflict of strength.

There were other concurrent factors that exacerbated the rift between the US and the

USSR; nevertheless, none of them could have made the Cold War unavoidable on their own.

One such event was the replacement of Roosevelt with Truman, whom Edward Judge and John

Langdon described as having blunt, earthy language [which] made him appear more

confrontational than compromising (Judge and Langdon 37). Trumans brusque nature startled

the Soviets, and this sentiment was echoed by the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai

Novikov, who stressed in his 1946 telegram to Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov that there

has been a decline in the influence on foreign policy of those who follow Roosevelts course for

cooperation among peace-loving countries under Trumans presidency (Novikov 6). However,

the decline of US-Soviet relations through Trumans presidency was not significant enough to

have caused the Cold War on its own, although it did increase enmity between the two countries.

As Judge and Langdon purport, the unravelling of the alliance was merely a return to the status

quo ante bellum (Judge and Langdon 39). Had there been a unitary approach to the German

question of governance, it was very likely that there would not have been as much hostility

between the US and the USSR, as the return to the pre-war status quo was not muddied by

further disagreements.

Another concurrent event that further magnified this rift was Trumans decision to drop

the Atomic Bomb on Japan. Before the end of the conference, Truman informally advised Stalin

that the United States now possessed a new weapon of unusual destructive force (Judge and

Langdon 40). Stalin had known for quite a while several details about the bomb, but could not

have comprehended the scale of destruction that came with it. Stalin had expressed interest in
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entering the war with Japan, moreover, as a Japanese defeat would avenge Russias defeat in

the Russo-Japanese War of 19041905, establish a powerful Soviet presence in Manchuria, and

perhaps earn for Moscow a zone of occupation in Japan itself (Judge and Langdon 33).

Trumans decision to burn Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the ground resulted in Japanese surrender

six days later, and thus a sole US occupation of Japan. This would have shocked the paranoid

Stalin, as it meant not only that Russia failed to gain a buffer zone against the Western Powers in

Japan, it also translated to the future formation of a capitalist-friendly society right next to its

borders. While this may suggest that the atomic bomb brought US-Soviet relations to its

breaking point, it is unlikely that the resulting US occupation of Japan alone was enough to make

the Cold War unavoidable. Stalin must have known that the US and the UK wanted to cripple

Japan for the foreseeable future, so could not have feared the swift rise of a capitalist Japan

(Judge and Langdon 33). Thus, had the Allied Powers come to a consensus on the governance of

Germany, the USSR would not have had to fear the capitalist threat from either of its frontiers,

making it highly improbable that Stalin would have vexed the Western Powers by searched

As can be seen, the Allied Powers inability to consolidate an agreement on the

governance of an occupied, partitioned Germany made the Cold War unavoidable. The lack of

consensus began a rift between the USSR, which wanted a harsh peace, and the Western Powers,

which wanted a less stringent one. While there were other concurrent factors that exacerbated

this rift, none of them could have made the Cold War inevitable on their own. Trumans

ascendancy contributed greatly to the falling out between the USSR and the US, but this was

simply a return to pre-WWII status quo. Trumans use of the atomic bomb also intensified this

enmity, yet the Soviets would not have feared the future rise of an imperialist Japan, as the

Western Powers were bent on crippling Japan. Thus, with the decision to continue governing
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Germany despite lacking a common plan, the Cold War between the USA and the USSR became

unavoidable.
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Works Cited

Jensen, Kenneth M., ed. Origins of the Cold War : The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "long

Telegrams". N.p.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991. Print.

Judge, Edward H., and John W. Langdon. A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the

Cold War. N.p.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. Print.