Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR,
G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue
of a Municipal Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands.
As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an
industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and
appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for
industrial use and directed the petitioners to cease and desist from further
developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
However, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed
the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA. However,
the CA affirmed the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though
reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over
which is vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses, pursuant to Section 4(i) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural
lands.
the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and
appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over
which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus
shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
NOTE: Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that reclassification of
land does not suffice
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject
landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from
reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying
how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject
to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a
mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a
landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants.
He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use
the agricultural land for other purposes.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),
vs. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 183409
June 18, 2010
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No.
07-97,3 entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural
lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued
DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and
updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes
the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity
such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt
the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR
AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-
99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO
No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued
Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of
housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice
not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS
THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
HELD:
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988"
have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority
stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to
promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and
that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land
use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands
that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in
any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution
as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified
that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR
has been given the authority to approve land conversion. Concomitant to
such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of
agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes
of land use conversion.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the
process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they
are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion
authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any
DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of
agricultural lands is already subject to DARs conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands.It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural
lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall
be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
Fortich vs. Corona
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of
Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR Management and Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian
Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao
Facts:
On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City.
They protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March
29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This decision already
became final and executory.
The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC
(Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was
leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the
property, and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to
industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to achieve
economic vitality.
Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted
to put the same under CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to
the farmers.
The case reached the Office of the President (OP). The OP rendered a
decision reversing the DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial area,
which became the subject of the strike of the farmers.
The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded
nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential
candidates tried to intervene for their cause.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue
the so-called Win-Win Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier
Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had already become
final and executory.
It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only
to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one
hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich
and company and declared that the Win-Win Resolution is VOID and of no
legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP already
became final and executory.
Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilao filed [separate] motions for
reconsideration for the said ruling (separate MRs were filed but was
resolved by the Court through one resolution).
The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the
separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998
Decision.
Hence, the instant motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred
to the Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions
for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by
a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was
not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by
this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court
(the resolution addressing the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should
be referred to the Court en banc.
Held: NO.
Ratio:
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however,
reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between CASES
and MATTERS.
o CASES are decided.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the
word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required
number of votes is not obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of case and not matter.
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting,
there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it
to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the
division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of
the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not
leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary
vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must
therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their
separate motions for reconsideration are of first impression. They are
arguing that the local government unit concerned still needs to obtain the
approval of DAR when converting land. However, this was rebutted in the
resolution dated November 17, wherein it was expressed that:
o Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en
banc. In the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals
wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval
of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.
o The Court voted unanimously in that case, hence, the argument of
the petitioners that their MRs are motions involving first impression is
flawed.
Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally
prohibited, unless there is a showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons
and a leave of court is filed. In this case, there was none.
Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29,
1996 ruling of the OP because it was already final and executory thus the
Win-Win resolution cannot be implemented anymore? Well, because of
this, there was a litany of protestations on the part of respondents and
intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The
sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects,
the case was disposed of on a mere technicality.
o The Court however said that it was not a mere technicality
because the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the
people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors
have standing to intervene in this case. The Court said there was none,
because the source of their standing to file is the Win-Win Resolution
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors
who derived their rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to them does not grant them
the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No
legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Reynaldo CHUA, doing business under the name & style Prime Mover
Construction Development vs The COURT OF APPEALS, Social Security
System, Andres Paguio, et al.
G.R. No. 125837 / 440 SCRA 121
October 6, 2004
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- On August 1985, private respondents filed a Petition with the Social
Security Commission for SSS coverage and contributions against
herein petitioner Chua, claiming that:
o They were regular employees of Chua;
o They were assigned by him in various construction
projects continuously;
o They were dismissed without justifiable grounds and
without notice to them;
o Chua did not report them to the SSS for compulsory
coverage.
- Petitioner Chua filed his Answer, averring:
o That private respondents had no cause of action against
him;
o That assuming they had any, they were barred by
prescription and laches;
o That private respondents were not regular employees, but
merely project employees whose work had been fixed for
a specific project. Hence, they were not entitled to
coverage under the Social Security Act.
- The SSS filed a Petition in Intervention, alleging that it has an
interest in the petition filed by private respondents. It stated that
it is a mandatory obligation of every employer to report its
employees to the SSS for coverage and to remit the required
contribution, including penalties for late premium remittances.
SSC: Order in favor of RESPONDENTS.
- The SSC declared private respondents to be regular employees of
petitioner, and ordered the payment of the unpaid SSS
contributions plus penalties.
CA: SSC order AFFIRMED.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents were regular employees of
petitioner, and therefore should be included in the SSS coverage.
SC: Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
- It is clear that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the
latter having control over the results of the work done, as well as
the means and methods by which the same were accomplished.
o Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his
construction projects, although the period of their
employment was co-terminus with their phase of work.
o The existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties can be determined by the application
of the control test. The essential requisites of an
employer-employee relationship are as follows:
Selection and Engagement of the Employee;
Payment of Wages;
Power of Dismissal;
 Power of Control, with regard to the means and
methods by which the work is to be
accomplished (this is the most determinative
factor).
o Despite petitioners contentions, the CA correctly held
that private respondents were regular employees.
They were employed as masons, carpenters, and
fine graders in petitioners various construction
projects.
The work they performed were necessary and
desirable to petitioners business, which usually
involves the construction of roads and bridges.
Moreover, employment ceases to be co-terminus
with various projects when the employee is
continuously rehired due to the demands of the
employers business, and re-engaged for many
more projects without interruption.
- Regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular
or project, private respondents are subject of the compulsory
coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling under
the exceptions provided for by law (Sec. 8.j).
- Private respondents right to file their claim had not yet prescribed
at the time of filing, considering that a mere 8 years had passed
from the time delinquency was discovered, or the proper
assessment was made.
o Under R.A. 1161, as amended, the prescriptive period is
20 years.
- The principle of laches does not apply to private respondents.
o The principle ordains that failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained amount of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
o In the instant case, there was no proof that private
respondents failed or neglected to assert their right.
Social Security System (SSS) vs Rosanna Aguas, et al.
G.R No. 165546 / 483 SCRA 383
February 27, 2006
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Pablo Aguas, a member of the SSS and a pensioner, died on
December 1996. He was survived by herein respondents, who filed
a claim for death benefits. The claim for monthly pension was
settled on February 1997.
- Shortly after, on April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from
one Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting
respondents claim for death benefits, where she alleged the
following:
o Rosanna abandoned the family home more than 6 years
before;
o Rosanna lived with another man on whom she had been
dependent for support;
o Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but the latter
had several with a certain Romeo dela Pena.
Enclosed was notarized copy of the original birth
certificate of one Jefren dela Pena, showing that
he was born on November 1996, and that the
parents were Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo
dela Pena, and that both parents were married
on November 1, 1990.
- SSS then suspended payments of Rosannas monthly pensions, and
conducted an investigation to verify Leticias allegations.
- Upon investigation, the SSS found:
o Rosanna had no children with Pablo;
o Jeylnn and Jefren were Rosannas children with Romeo;
o Rosanna left Pablo 6 years before his death, and lived with
Romeo while she was pregnant with Jeylnn;
o Pablo was not capable of having a child since he was under
treatment (infertile).
 - SSS denied respondents request to resume payment of pensions,
and advised the same to refund within 30 days P10, 350.00, the
amount released to her as pensions.
- Respondents filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a
claim/petition for Restoration/Payment of Pensions, where they
presented photocopies of:
o Pablo and Rosannas marriage certificate;
o Janets certificate of live birth;
o Jeylnns certificate of live birth;
o Pablos death certificate.
- Respondents claimed that Jeylnn was the legitimate child of Pablo,
and asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo, and that they lived as
husband and wife under one roof.
- The SSS also secured confirmation reports from civil registers
confirming respondents allegations.
- Among the testimonies presented, it was found that Jeylnn was the
legitimate child of Rosanna and Pablo, and that Janet was merely
adopted. Jefrens parentage was never cleared.
SSC: Petition DENIED.
- The SSS denied respondents claims and demanded a refund of the
pensions previously paid out to Rosanna.
- It ruled that Rosanna was no longer a qualified beneficiary since she
contracted marriage with Romeo during the subsistence of her
marriage to Pablo.
CA: SSC Order REVERSED.
- The CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing
that they were children of Pablo, and the same were binding upon
the parties, including the SSS.
- The CA also found no evidence showing that Rosanna ceased to
receive support from Pablo before his death.
- The CA also ruled that the alleged affair with Romeo dela Pena was
not properly proven. And even if Rosanna was married to him, it
would have been a void marriage.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to SSS pensions.
SC: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA Decision AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
- Only Jeylnn Aguas is declared ENTITLED to benefits accruing from
Pablos death.
o The following were defined under Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735:
Death Benefits (Sec. 13) Upon death of the
covered employee, his primary beneficiaries shall
be entitled to basic monthly pension, and his
dependents to the dependents pension.
Dependent (Sec. 8.e) The legitimate,
legitimated, or legally adopted child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
21 years of age, provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support
physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and
the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon
the covered employee for regular support.
Beneficiaries (Sec. 8.k) The dependent spouse
until he/she remarries, and the dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries.
o Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should
establish his or her right by substantial evidence. As per
the records, only Jeylnn sufficiently established her right
to a monthly pension.
She submitted a photocopy of her birth
certificate bearing the signature of Pablo. The
same was authenticated by the Civil Registry,
that she was born on October 1991. A birth
certificate signed by the father is a competent
evidence of paternity.
Given that the records show that Rosanna and
Pablo were married in 197, and that their
marriage subsisted until Pablos death in 1996, it
was evident that Jeylnn was born during the
marriage.
 Leticia cannot impugn the legitimacy of Jeylnn
since that right is strictly personal to the
husband, and in some exceptional cases, the
heirs.
The presumption of legitimacy cannot extend to
Janet since her date of birth was not substantially
proven. She, therefore, cannot claim for benefits.
The birth certificate she submitted was
not verified in any way by the civil
register. It is a mere photocopy which
was not confirmed by the civil register.
Moreover, the witnesses were
unanimous in saying that Janet was not
the real child since her adoption by
Rosanna and Pablo did not undergo any
legal proceedings.
Rosana also cannot claim for benefits.
For the spouse to qualify as primary
beneficiary, she must prove the
following:
o She is the legitimate spouse;
and
o She is dependent upon the
member for support.
Rosannas presentation of a verified
marriage certificate merely established
the fact that she was the legitimate
spouse of Pablo, but it did not establish
her dependency on him.
A wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband cannot be said to be
dependent for support upon the
husband, unless otherwise proven.
Dycaico v. SSS
G.R. No. 161357
November 30, 2005
Facts:
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980, and he
named herein petitioner Elena Dycaico and their eight children as his
beneficiaries. At the time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together with the
benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and
began to receive his monthly pension from SSS, and continued to receive
the same until his deal on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death,
Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Petitioner Elena filed an application for survivors pension, which was denied
under Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 or the Social Security law. This was
because the primary beneficiaries as of the date of the retirement of the
pensioner should be the ones entitled to receive the monthly pension. The
fact that they had not been married at the time Bonifacios retirement
meant that she could not be a primary beneficiary.
Elena filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition that alleged
that the denial of her survivors pension was unjustified, and that Bonifacio
had designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS
Form RS-1. There was also no indication that only legitimate family members
could be made beneficiaries, and that the SSS was bound to respect the
designation.
The SSC affirmed the denial of the claim, however. The SSC ruled that
entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary
beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of the relationship with and
dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during their
lifetime.
CA: The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Elenas petition, declaring
that as the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, the
designation done by the latter was void. Furthermore, none of their
illegitimate children could qualify as primary beneficiaries, as all of them had
reached the age of twenty-one (21) years old.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
of the SSC wherein legitimacy of relationship is necessary in order for one
to avail of the survivors pension as the primary beneficiary.
Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred.
The outright disqualification of Elena without her having had been given the
opportunity to prove the fact that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse
is untenable. Retirement benefits are property interest of a retiree, and
these employees have vested rights in the pension they are to receive. Thus,
the dependent spouse of such employees are entitled to their survivorship
pension under RA 8282.
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 is VOID, violating the due process clause by
depriving those surviving spouses of retired SSS members who contracted
their marriages after the retirement of the later. These is clear and outright
confiscation of benefits due to the same and they are deprived of their
opportunity to be heard.
GSIS v. Zarate
G.R. No. 170847
August 3, 2010
Facts:
The deceased Henry Zarate was a Senior Fire Officer who died in a vehicular
accident while on off-duty status. His wife, Felicitas filed a claim for death
benefits wit hthe GSIS under PD 626, which was denied due to the fact that
Henry had died from a cause that did not arise out of nor was in the course
of his employment.
Felicitas appealed the ruling to the ECC, which was dismissed. The ECC
affirmed the findings that Henrys death was not work-related and thus, not
compensable. Henry had gone to La Union to visit his mother, and thus, was
not in the actual performance of his duty as a fireman.
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC. The court found
that that there was reasonable work connection in Henrys death and that
the policy of the late extends state insurance benefits to as many qualified
employees as possible.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in granting
the claim for death benefits of respondent Zarate under PD 626, despite
the fact that the cause of Henry Zarates death did not arise out of or in
the course of employment.
Held: No, it did not.
It is not disputed that Henry visited his mother because of her illness, and
that he had asked his superiors permission to do the same. However, this
leave was granted on the condition that he returned the next day. The grant
of death benefits is reasonable, due to the fact that he had died on his way
back to his work station, in compliance with the timeline his superior gave
him.
Henry should already be deemed en route to the performance of his duty
when his accidental death occurred. He was on his way back to Manila in
order to be on time and be ready for work the next day as Senior Fire Officer
of the Pinagkaisahan Fire Substation in Cubao. He was traveling with his
superiors permission and was complying with the condition that he return
the next day. Under these facts, Henry was in the course of complying with
his superiors order when he met his fatal accident.
Gatus v. SSS
G.R. No. 174725
January 26, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac and was a
covered member of the SSS. He optionally retired from the same upon
reaching 30 years of service on January 2002 at the age of 62 years old. Over
the course of his retirement, he had been certified fit to work in 1975. In
1995, however, he had been diagnosed with Coronary Artery Disease (CAD),
and his medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a
smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given permanent partial disability benefits.
In 2002, he became a retired pensioner. In 2003, however, an SSS audit
revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to Gatus due to
his CAD being attributed to his chronic smoking and not his work. He was
notified of the same.
Gatus assailed the decision, but the SSS denied the same, and subsequently
denied his motion for reconsideration. He elevated the matter to the ECC,
which held that though CAD was an occupational disease under Annex A of
the Implementing Rules on Employees Compensation, there was nothing
on record to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstances for
responsibility. Gatus had failed to prove that the conditions at his former
workplace and the nature of his previous employment increased the risk of
contract his CAD. Thus, his appeal was denied.
CA: The Court of Appeals held that Gatus was not entitled to compensation
benefits under PD 626, affirming the ECC. It found that the petitioner, a
chronic smoker and hypertensive for 10 years, could have contracted the
CAD due to his habits.
Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Gatus was not entitled
to compensation benefits despite the presence of an occupational disease
(CAD).
Held: No, the CA did not err.
The burden of proof was on Gatus to show that his CAD was occupational
by proving any of the following conditions:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment
there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the
unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient
severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical
signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself
to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the
performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship
Gatus failed to submit substantial evidence, as required under PD 626, that
might have shown he was entitled to the benefits he applied for.
Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative
FACTS: Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-
members. Under its by-laws, owners-members are of two categories, to wit:
(1) regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of
membership; and (2) associate member, who has no right to vote and be
voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges provided
in its by-laws. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit
facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its owners-members.
In the discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives, respondent cooperative
entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco - a division of DOLE
Philippines, Inc. The owners-members do not receive compensation or
wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the
service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns from different areas
of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the said Service
Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their income from the
service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they
rendered, which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent
cooperative.
In September 2006, petitioner SSS sent a letter to the respondent
cooperative, addressed to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General
Manager Leo G. Parma, informing the latter that based on the Service
Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is actually a
manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason,
it is an employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus,
respondent cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS as an
employer and make the corresponding report and remittance of premium
contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.

Petitioners claim that SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed
before it by petitioner SSS as it involved an issue of whether or not a worker
is entitled to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. Petitioners contend
that there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members. The respondent cooperative is the
employer of its owners-members considering that it undertook to provide
services to Stanfilco, the performance of which is under the full and sole
control of the respondent cooperative.
Respondent cooperative alleges that its owners-members own the
cooperative, thus, no employer-employee relationship can arise between
them. The persons of the employer and the employee are merged in the
owners-members themselves. Likewise, respondent cooperatives owners-
members even requested the respondent cooperative to register them with
the petitioner SSS as self-employed individuals. Hence, petitioner SSC has no
jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS.
ISSUE: whether the social security commission has jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. since the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members was put in
issue and considering that the compulsory coverage of the SSS Law is
predicated on the existence of such relationship, it behooves the petitioner
SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee relationship that
exists between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship is not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters and the NLRC provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. - (a) x
x x.
xxxx
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
Hence, the question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship
for the purpose of determining the coverage of the Social Security System is
explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the
jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling
disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997.
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the
following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the
workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter
assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important element
is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result
of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish.
All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.
It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the respondent
cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide that there shall be no employer-
employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-
members. This Court, however, cannot give the said provision force and
effect.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the
respondent cooperative which has the exclusive discretion in the selection
and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who
will be assigned at Stanfilco.
Second. Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained, on a time, task, piece or commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under
a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done,
or for service rendered or to be rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends
or the so-called shares in the service surplus given by the respondent
cooperative to its owners-members were in reality wages, as the same were
equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor
laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area
and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of
wages. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service
surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-members
as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperatives client,
Stanfilco.
Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is
the respondent cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline
and remove the owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering
services at Stanfilco.
Fourth. As earlier opined, of the four elements of the employer-employee
relationship, the control test is the most important. In the case at bar, it is
the respondent cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and
means of performing the services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco
as well as the means and methods of work. Also, the respondent
cooperative is solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team
leaders and other representatives at Stanfilco. All these clearly prove that,
indeed, there is an employer-employee relationship between the
respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
Bunao vs. SSS
FACTS: Artus E. Bunao (Artus), husband of petitioner, was employed by
Ocean Tanker Corporation as an acting Second Marine Engineer on board
the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T Guimaras and M/T Buenavista from 20 July
1995 until 06 August 1999. Per Job Description from Ocean Tanker
Corporation, Artus was tasked with the duties enumerated hereunder:
1. Plans and implements proper operation, maintenance and repairs of
all deck and engine room machinery and equipment subject to the approval
of the Chief Engineer.
2. Conducts routine check-up of all engine room machinery and advises
Chief Engineer regarding malfunctions and operational defects particularly
with regard to critical vessel operations relating to safety or pollution as
detailed in the Shipboard Management Manual and recommends
subsequent repairs needed.
3. Accomplishes monthly reports on all engine operational performance,
maintenance and repairs conducted on all machinery.
4. Conducts meetings and submits confidential and other written reports
upon the discretion of the Chief Engineer.
5. Keeps log of performance of other machinery and conscientiously
maintains onboard engine room maintenance and operational records and
furnishes same to Chief Engineer for inclusion in vessel machinery records
and reports.
6. Ensures the upkeep and maintenance of the Engine Room by arranging,
monitoring and controlling day to day engine room maintenance activities
in coordination with Chief Engineer.
7. Ensures the smooth operation of the vessel main and auxiliary
machinery.
8. Transfers and/or fills up fuel oil and lube oil settling and dry tanks, if
necessary.
9. Sees to it that work is carried out safely and efficiently, and in
accordance with good engineering and work practices at all times.
10. Assumes engineering watch in port or underway.
11. Acts as the Chief Engineer in his absence.
12. Performs other duties as may be assigned.
On 23 September 1999, Artus was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital,
Tondo, Manila, because of body weakness. The diagnostic procedures
revealed an impression of Renal Cell Cancer with Liver Metastasis. He was
later discharged.
On 15 October 1999, the occurrence of Artuss sickness was reported to the
Social Security System. On 14 November 1999, Artus was again admitted at
the same hospital due to loose bowel movement and body weakness. He
was discharged after two days.
Artus died on 29 November 1999. According to the certificate of death, the
cause of death was Hepatic Encephalopathy, Renal Cell Cancer.
Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended, before
the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim on the ground that her
husbands ailment, which caused his death, is not included in the list of
occupational diseases, and that the same has no causal relationship with the
nature of her husbands work.
The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), upon appeal, affirmed the
SSS decision.
Petitioner maintains that that the risk of contracting the fatal ailment that
resulted in Artuss death was increased by the working environs to which the
latter was exposed as 2nd Marine Engineer in Ocean Tanker Corporation
from 20 July 1995 to 06 August 1999. She concluded that the renal cell
cancer which caused Artuss demise developed and was brought largely by
the conditions present in the nature of his job.
The SSS, on the other hand, mainly argues that Artuss ailment is not included
in the list of occupational diseases and that petitioner failed to submit proof
that would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the
condition of Artuss employment and nature of work caused the disease or
that such working conditions aggravated the risk of contracting the same.
ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits under PD
626
HELD: NO. For the beneficiaries of an employee to be entitled to death
benefits under the system, the cause of death of the employee must be a
sickness listed as an occupational disease by ECC; or any other illness caused
by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions.
There is no dispute that renal cell cancer is not listed as an occupational
disease under Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such,
petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal
relationship between her husband's illness and his working conditions.
Petitioner alleged that in the performance of her husband's duties as 2nd
Marine Engineer, the latter was exposed to leaded petrol and petroleum
products that contain various chemicals like hydrogen, benzene and lead
which are health hazards because of their carcinogenicity. She claims that
most of these chemicals precipitate kidney disease, kidney cancer and liver
cancer.
Unfortunately, such bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not
constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion that there is indeed a causal relationship between
the illness of the deceased and his working conditions. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.
There is no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about
largely by the condition. Petitioner did not present medical history, records
or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions on board the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T Guimaras and M/T
Buenavista increased the risk of contracting renal cell cancer.
Certainly, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a
person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a
lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in
water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether
the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue
collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
GSIS v. Angel
G.R. No. 166863
FACTS:
On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was invited from his post by a certain Capt.
Fabie M. Lamerez to shed light on his alleged involvement in a
"pilferage/gunrunning" case being investigated by the Philippine Army. He
was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation. The
following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his
cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. Respondent, the wife of the
late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation
Command, alleging that her husband was murdered.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, The Provost Marshal concluded that
foul play may have been committed against Sgt. Angel and recommended
that the case be tried by a court martial. On 25 April 1998, the Inspector
General, upon referral of the case, held that there is no evidence suggesting
foul play. It could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang
himself. On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in
his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died in line of
duty.
By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for
death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On 29 September 1999, the GSIS
denied the respondents claim on the ground that Sgt. Angels death did not
arise out of and in the course of employment.
ECC Ruled in favour of GSIS - the deceased was not performing his official
duties at the time of the incident.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS ORDERED to pay the death
benefits due the petitioner as widow of Sgt. Angel
The soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty
status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day.
He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status.
Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown
to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave.
ISSUE: WON the declaration by the Philippine Army that the death of Sgt.
Angel was "in line of duty status" confers compensability under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as "Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund.
SC:
Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must
have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the
employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3) if the
injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must
arise out of and in the course of employment proceeds from the limiting
premise that the injury must be the result of an accident.
An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if
happening through human agency, an event which, under the
circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to whom it
happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason of
some violence or casualty to the insured without his design, consent, or
voluntary cooperation.
Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the
disability or death was occasioned by the employees intoxication, willful
intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence or
otherwise provided under this title.
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did
not result from an accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree
No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act
which removes the resulting death from the coverage of the State Insurance
Fund.
Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the
incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his
cell, an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a
soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him
as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection
between his death and his employment.
Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted
from an accident and was not occasioned by the sergeants willful intention
to kill himself. It is not enough, as erroneously pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the sergeant
died while in the performance of his duties since he was not arrested but
was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was "part of
official duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the
Philippine Army." There must be evidence that the sergeant did not take his
own life considering the fact that he was "found hanging inside his cell with
an electric cord tied around his neck."
From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive
finding that there is no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play
may have been committed. The circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his
lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied
around his neck taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is
no evidence of foul play negate respondents claim of murder of her
husband and of compensability of such death. It was not accidental death
that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.
GSIS v. Manuel Besitan
G.R. No. 178901
FACTS:
Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines
(now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner.7
Subsequently, he was promoted as Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank
Officer III.
In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease
secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a kidney
transplant at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which
he incurred medical expenses amounting to 817,455.40.
Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the
disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626,11 as amended. The GSIS, however, denied
the claim. The GSIS Decision was affirmed by the Employees Compensation
Commission but reversed by the Court of Appeals.
GSIS contends that Besitans ailment, Glomerulonephritis, is not an
occupational disease; hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove that the risk
of contracting the said disease was increased by his employment and
working condition. And since he failed to show that there is a causal
relationship between his employment and his ailment, he cannot claim
compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.
Besitan admits that his ailment is not listed as an occupational disease under
PD No. 626, as amended. He, however, insists that he was able to prove by
substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the disease was increased
by his working condition. He maintains that in claiming compensation
benefits, certainty is not required, only probability. He points out that he
was in good health when he was employed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas in 1976 and that it was only in 2004 that he contracted his kidney
ailment.
ISSUE: Whether Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No.
626, as amended
HELD:
Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
provides that for the sickness or resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must prove either:
A. that the employee's sickness was the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, or
B. That the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his
working conditions.
Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the
employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease,
or that there is a connection between his work and the cause of the disease.
Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation,
however, is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational
disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation
proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the
employees for whom social legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted.
Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not necessary to prove a claim. Strict
rules of evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires substantial
evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
In this case, since Besitans ailment, End Stage Renal Disease secondary to
Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not among those listed under Annex "A," of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, he needs to show by
substantial evidence that his risk of contracting the disease was increased
by his working condition.
After a careful study of the instant case, we find that Besitan has sufficiently
proved that his working condition increased his risk of contracting
Glomerulonephritis, which according to GSIS may be caused by bacterial,
viral, and parasitic infection (i.e. Typhoid fever, Syphilis, Leptospirosis,
Toxoplasmosis, Varicella, Mumps, Measles, Schistosomiasis, Hepatitis B and
C infection, etc.).
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,
vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004]
Facts:
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married
Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old
widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits effective 18 February 1985 under PD 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole
beneficiary. Nicolas' last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985.
On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the
first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim
because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year
from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action
for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension.
Issue: Whether or not Section 18 of PD 1146 is valid insofar as it prohibits
the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.
Held: INVALID.
The proviso which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros
claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The
proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee
to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include
in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the
contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and
withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions and to
remit the same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its
corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions
from the government employee, the government pensions do not
constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing
view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension
where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for
providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to
encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the
best years of their lives in the service of their country.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process
clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire
a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner
acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under
the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such
person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without
notice and opportunity to be heard.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for
benefits to survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners.
Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of
survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted
marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the
purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered
by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance
benefits made available to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all government employees
irrespective of status.
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified
beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the
beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death
of the wage earner or pensioner.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive
survivors benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes
require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain
period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted
for monetary gain.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner
more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to
prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons
the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension
and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest
on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those
marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to
avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the
reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291),
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law
revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of
RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before
the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless
the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to
receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law
does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years
before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that
whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive
survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
legislation.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs JEAN E. RAOET,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 157038 December 23, 2009
Facts:
The respondents husband, Francisco M. Raoet entered government service
on July 16, 1974 as an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA). On July 5, 1978, he was appointed as Junior Civil
Engineer, and on April 22, 1981, he rose to the rank of Irrigation Engineer B.
On August 1, 1998, he was promoted to the position of Engineer A the
position he held until his death on May 5, 2001. As Engineer A, Francisco
supervised the implementation of construction activities of Lateral E and E-
1. He was also tasked to review and check the structural plan and the
facilities.
In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III,
Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center
from July 16 to July 25, 2000. As the GSIS considered this a work-related
condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability
benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during
treatment.
On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial
Hospital because he was vomiting blood. He was pronounced dead on arrival
at the hospital.
The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS on May 24, 2001 a claim for
income benefits accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to PD
626. On August 31, 2001, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the
respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that
Franciscos death was due to peptic ulcer.

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS in its decision of July
24, 2002. According to the ECC, it could not determine if Franciscos death
was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the
respondents claim. Since Francisco had no prior history of consultation
relating to peptic ulcer and no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause
of his death, the ECC could not conclude that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease
was the reason for his demise.
Issue: Did Franciscos occupation involve prolonged emotional or physical
stress to make his death due to peptic ulcer compensable?
Held: YES.
Based on the GSIS own records, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension,
Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and confined at the Region I
Medical Center in July 2000. The GSIS found this ailment work-connected
and awarded Francisco 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits. This
finding assumes importance in the present case because the established
underlying causes of the combination of these diseases are, among others,
the stressful nature and pressures inherent in an occupation. This was what
the GSIS acknowledged in recognizing Franciscos total temporary disability.
Francisco worked as Engineer A with the NIA, a job with enormous
responsibilities. He had to supervise the construction activities of Lateral E
and E-1, and review the structural plan and facilities. The stresses these
responsibilities carried did not abate for Francisco when he returned from
his Temporary Total Disability; he occupied the same position without
change of responsibilities until his death on May 5, 2001. Thus, Francisco
had continuous exposure to prolonged emotional stress that would qualify
his peptic ulcer a stress-driven ailment as a compensable cause of death.
In arriving at this conclusion, we stress that in determining the
compensability of an illness, we do not require that the employment be the
sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants illness
to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment
contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the
disease.
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is
merely substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What
the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmans claim is
based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded
especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-
connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required
that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for.
It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to
the development of the disease.
In this case, the chain of causation that led to the peptic ulcer is too obvious
to be disregarded. The pressures of Franciscos work constant, continuing
and consistent at his level of responsibility inevitably manifested their
physical effects on Franciscos health and body; the initial and most obvious
were the hypertension and coronary artery disease that the GSIS itself
recognized. Less obvious, but nevertheless arising from the same pressures
and stresses, were the silent killers, like peptic ulcer, that might not have
attracted Franciscos attention to the point of driving him to seek immediate
and active medical intervention. Ultimately, when the ulcer-producing
stresses did not end, his ulcer bled profusely, affecting his heart and causing
its arrest. In this manner, Francisco died. That his widow should now be
granted benefits for Franciscos death is a conclusion we cannot avoid and is,
in fact, one that we should gladly make as a matter of law and social justice.
[G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002] CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, petitioner, vs.
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP., respondent.
FACTS: Herein petitioner was first employed for fourteen years with
Department of Health after his resignation on November 2 1977. After which
he was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation which was subsequently taken
over by herein respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation.
Petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent
and continued to work as company dentist.
Respondent implemented a Manpower Reduction Program, wherein measure of the employees legal rights, there are legitimate waivers that
retrenched employees shall receive a two-month pay for every year of represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborers claims which
service. Petitioner resigned from PNOC upon reaching 60 years old wherein should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.
he received a retirement pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of
service and other benefits. Later, the president of said company was
replaced by Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente who implemented significant cost-
saving measures and later two employees were retrenched and were paid a
2-month separation pay for every year of service under Respondents
Manpower Reduction Program. Due to this, petitioner filed a complaint at
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full payment of his
retirement benefits wherein he argued that his service with the DOH should
have been included in the computation of his years of service. The Labor
Arbiters dismissed his complaint however, NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Respondent dismayed, filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari, and was granted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners years of service with the DOH must be
considered as creditable service for the purpose of computing his
retirement pay.

HELD: No.
The Supreme Court did not uphold petitioners contention that his fourteen
years of service with the DOH should be considered because his last two
employers were government-owned and controlled corporations, and fall
under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987
Constitution states that--
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are
government-owned and controlled corporations, they have no original
charters; hence they are not under the Civil Service Law. In addition,
petitioner also signed and delivered to Respondent a Release and
Undertaking wherein he waives all actions, causes of actions, debts, dues,
monies and accounts in connection with his employment with Respondent.
This quitclaim releases Respondent from any other obligation in favor of
petitioner. While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned
upon as contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full