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Alwyn Wren C. Cuesta Engr.

Lina de la Cruz
ChE Laws, Ethics, Codes and Standards CH51FC1

Seveso is a small town of approximately 17,000 inhabitants, 15 miles


from Milan, Italy. The plant was owned by the Icmesa Chemical Company.
The product was hexachlorophene, a bactericide, with trichlorophenol
produced as an intermediate. During normal operation, a small amount
of TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin) is produced in the
reactor as an undesirable side-product.

On July 10, 1976, the trichlorophenol reactor went out of control,


resulting in a higher than normal operating temperature and increased
production of TCDD.

The root cause was human error. The hydrolysis reaction of the
reactor was shut down with only 15% of the solvent removed. The
electricity supply to the reactor was then switched off with its
temperature at 158 degree Celsius, and the plant was left unattended
for the weekend. This was completely contrary to the standard
procedures which required that, either no solvent should be removed,
or the solvent removal should be completed and the reaction quenched,
before the shutdown. The bursting of disc on the unheated and
unstirred reactor ruptured some six and a half hours later, and part
of the contents of the vessel was vented through the pipe in the roof.
The uncontrolled exothermic reaction raised the temperature and
pressure in a vessel, thereby causing a safety valve to rupture and a
fluid mixture to be released into the air.

An estimated 2 kg of TCDD was released through a relief system in a


white cloud over Seveso. A subsequent heavy rain washed the TCDD into
the soil. Approximately 10 square miles were contaminated.

Because of poor communications with local authorities, civilian


evacuation was not started until several days later. By then, over 250
cases of chloracne were reported. Over 600 people were evacuated, and
an additional 2000 people were given blood tests. The most severely
contaminated area immediately adjacent to the plant was fenced, the
condition it remains in today.

The Seveso accident could have been avoided if proper containment


systems had been used to contain the reactor releases. The proper
application of fundamental engineering safety principles would have
prevented the two accidents. First, by following proper procedures,
the initiation steps would not have occurred. Second, by using proper
hazard evaluation procedures, the hazards could have been identified
and corrected before the accidents occurred.

Source: www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1717264&seqNum=8
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=VyaTQgBu4Gg

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