Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul

Investigating Medieval
Philosophy

Managing Editor
John Marenbon

Editorial Board
Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin

VOLUME 3

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/imp

Robert Kilwardby on the
Human Soul

Plurality of Forms and Censorship

in the Thirteenth Century

By

Jos Filipe Silva

LEIDEN BOSTON
2012
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Silva, Jose Filipe.

Robert Kilwardby on the human soul : plurality of forms and censorship in the thirteenth century /
by Jose Filipe Silva.
p. cm. -- (Investigating medieval philosophy, ISSN 1879-9787 ; v. 3)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-22662-3 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Kilwardby, Robert, d. 1279. 2. Soul--History of doctrines--Middle Ages, 600-1500. I. Title.

B765.K54S55 2012
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2012009588

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 CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................................................vii
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................ix
Abbreviations.............................................................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................................................1
1. Life ........................................................................................................................1
2. Writings.............................................................................................................. 5
3. Nature and Scope ............................................................................................9

PART ONE
HUMAN BEINGS

1. The Soul ................................................................................................................27

2. Matter, Form, and Change...............................................................................43

2.1. A Man Generates a Man ..........................................................................52

3. The Soul as una forma viventis ........................................................................69

3.1. Unicity and Plurality of Substantial Forms ........................................97
3.2. The Posicio de Unitate Formarum in Epistola .................................. 105
3.3. The Disembodied Soul............................................................................ 117
3.4. Dead Body: Resurrection and Bodily Continuity ............................ 121

PART TWO
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

4. Sense Perception ............................................................................................... 131

4.1. The Two Processes Model......................................................................132
4.2. The Active Nature of Perception......................................................... 160
4.3. The Organ of the Common Sense ........................................................ 171

5. Intellectual Cognition ......................................................................................177

5.1. Abstraction ................................................................................................177
5.2. Universals .................................................................................................. 183
5.3. The Trinitarian Model the Soul ........................................................... 189
vi contents

5.4. Memories and Intelligence ................................................................. 199

5.5. Monopsychism .......................................................................................205
5.6. Individuation .......................................................................................... 210
5.7. Scientia ......................................................................................................215
5.8. Truth .........................................................................................................226
5.9. Language ..................................................................................................233
5.10. Angelic Intellect.....................................................................................237
5.11. Divine Illumination ..............................................................................242
5.12. Demons ....................................................................................................246
5.13. Divine Ideas ............................................................................................249

PART THREE
DISCUSSION

6.The Oxford Prohibitions of 1277 ..................................................................259

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................275

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources ..................................................................................................... 281

Secondary Sources .................................................................................................286

Index of Names.......................................................................................................307
Index of Subjects ....................................................................................................309
 PREFACE

Robert Kilwardbyan Englishman who was an arts master at Paris from

1237-45, before becoming a Dominican, an Oxford theologian (c. 1254-61)
and, finally, in 1272, Archbishop of Canterburyfeatures in most Histories
of medieval philosophy, but often for just one action. On 18 March 1277 at
Oxford, just eleven days after Bishop Tempiers condemnation of 219 the-
ses in Paris, he prohibited 30 propositions in grammar, logic and natural
science. The positions censured include, it is generally said, Aquinass
view of the unicity of the substantial formthe claim that the intellective
soul is the one and only substantial form for the whole human being.
Historians have often gone on to explain Kilwardbys opposition to his
confrere by his adherence to Augustine. Kilwardby was, it is said, a conser-
vative Augustinian who would be unwilling to accept new, Aristotelian
doctrines. Yet, as a Parisian master, Kilwardby had been one of the first to
study and expound the whole range of Aristotles logic, and his commen-
tary on the Prior Analytics, especially, was an important and influential
work. Did Kilwardby change his intellectual direction and afffinities when
he became a Dominican? But why, then, should he have chosen to attack
his orders most famous theologian?1
Filipe Silva is not the first scholar to have questioned the received story
about the Oxford Prohibitions, but he is the first to have studied thor-
oughly the area of Kilwardbys thought most relevant to his supposed
attack on the unicity of the substantial form: the soul and its ways of cog-
nition. As a result, not only is Kilwardbys achievement as a philosopher
seen in much more detail than before, but the background to the Oxford

1
That the view of the Oxford Prohibitions as an attack on Aquinas remains common
can be seen from three recent general books: Alain de Libera, La philosophie mdivale
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, 2nd edition), p. 416 (La mesure antithomiste
tait confirme et approfondie la mme anne Oxford par Robert Kilwardby une des
thse centrales de lontologie thomiste, la doctrine de lunit des formes substantielles, y
tant explicitement interdite.); my own Medieval Philosophy: an historical and philosophi-
cal introduction (London and New York : Routledge, 2007), p. 269 (among the propositions
condemned by Kilwardby were three clearly linked to Aquinass doctrine of the single
substantial form.); T. Kobusch, Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Sptmittelalters (Munich:
Beck, 2011) (Geschichte der Philosophie 5), p. 227. By contrast, David Luscombe (Medieval
Thought (Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 116) anticipates the inter-
pretation which Silva establishes: Kilwardby took as the norm his own outlooks when a
master [H]e was not attacking his fellow Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, in particular.
viii preface

Prohibitions and their aims become clear. There is, Silva shows, no abrupt
break between Kilwardby the Aristotelian arts master and Kilwardby
the theologian. Throughout his career, he continued to follow Aristotle
whereas he believed mostlyhe did not conflict with Augustine,
although where the two writers disagreed, he granted Augustine the
greater authority. Kilwardbys thinking about the soul was directed mainly
to the question of its substantial form (rather than the substantial form of
the whole human being). He believed that those who held that the souls
substantial form is simple could be shown to be wrong, since the multi-
plicity of the souls powersgrowing, sensing and thinkingcould be
explained only by a composite substantial form. The position which
Kilwardby prohibited at Oxford was this theory of the simplicity of the
souls substantial form. He did not have Aquinass theory of the unicity of
a human beings substantial form in mind. Indeed, he neither knew of its
details nor could make sense of the sketchy account of it which had
reached him. Silva accepts that Kilwardby would, indeed, have rejected
Aquinass views, which are incompatible with his own fundamental
assumptions about the souland that he did react against features of
Aquinass theory he learned about later. But Aquinas was certainly not his
target at Oxford, and Kilwardby was not a reactionary, unthinkingly tradi-
tionalist theologian, but ratherby the late 1270san old-fashioned,
even out-dated one.

John Marenbon
January 2012
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I started the research for this book in October 2004 and through the
years I have grown indebted to a number of persons and institutions
I would like to acknowledge now. Simo Knuuttila has been a great inspira-
tion by setting high the standards of academic excellence to his students.
I am grateful to be counted among them and owe much to his benevo-
lence and critical thinking. My friends and colleagues Vili Lhteenmki
and Miira Tuominen have been constant sources of encouragement and
support. In addition, Vili has been providential in guiding me through all
things Finnish. Alessandro Conti, Maria Cndida Pacheco, Jos Meirinhos,
Robert Pich, Taneli Kukkonen, Paul Thom, Henrik Lagerlund, Juhana
Toivanen, Paul Bakker, Martin Pickav, David Bloch, and Pekka Krkkinen
have contributed in diffferent but helpful ways. Thank you to Marcella
Mulder from Brill, who made the publication process feel pleasant and
seamless. Last but not least, thanks to John Marenbon, for his interest in
this book, and to Robert Pasnau, whose comments and suggestions
allowed me to correct some deficiencies as well as making this a (hope-
fully) better book to read.
At the institutional level, this book would never have been written with-
out the financial support of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and
Technology; the University of Jyvskyl; the European Science Foundation;
the Institute for Medieval Philosophy (Porto University); the History of
Mind Research Unit and the Philosophical Psychology, Morality and
Politicsboth Centers of Excellence of the Academy of Finland; and the
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies that has, for the last few months,
been my academic home. No scholar could hope for a better research envi-
ronment: many thanks to its director, Sami Pihlstrm, and research assis-
tant, Anne Tucker, for proofreading the notes and making the indexes.
Needless to say, all remaining mistakes are my responsibility.
This book is dedicated to my parents, to my son Toms, and to my wife
Sofia: they made things possible, he made everything real, and she made
life true.

JFS
Helsinki, January 2012
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Kilwardbys works:
LSP Commentary on the Liber Sex Principiorum
LDB Commentary on the Liber Divisionum Boethii
LPA In libros Priorum analeticorum Aristotelis Expositio et
interpretatio
NSLPery Notule super librum Peryermenias, ed. Conti (CP in Lewry 1978)
NSLPor Notulae super librum Porphyrii, ed. Conti (CI in Lewry 1978)
NLPA Notulae libri Prisciani De accentibus
NLP Notulae Libri Posteriorum
NSLP Notulae Super Librum Praedicamentorum
LT In librum topycorum
DSF De spiritu fantastico
DT De tempore
DOS De ortu scientiarum
DNR De natura relationis
QLIS Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum
QLIIS Quaestiones in Librum Secundum Sententiarum
QLIII1-2S Quaestiones in Librum Tertium Sententiarum
QLIVS Quaestiones in Librum Quartum Sententiarum
D43Q De 43 questionibus
E Epistola ad Petrum de Confleto

Other medieval authors:

DT Augustine, De Trinitate
DGL Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram
DM Augustine, De Musica liber VI
Dqa Augustine, De quantitate animae
Lda Avicenna, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus
FV Avencebrolis, Fons Vitae
Dia Dominicus Gundissalinus, De immortalitate animae
S Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae
CmdA Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima
dA Domenicus Gundissalinus, de anima
SB Phillip the Chancellor, Summa de bono
xii list of abbreviations

TdA John Blund, Tractatus De anima

SdA John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima
ST Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica
Da William of Auvergne, De anima
CPA Robert Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum
Libros
InIS Richard Fishacre, In primum librum Sententiarum
InIIS Richard Fishacre, In secundum librum Sententiarum
C Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri
Lombardi
OHI Roger Bacon, Opera hactenus inedita,
Dms Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum
SD Roger Bacon, Summulae Dialectices
ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae
SCG Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
CUP Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis
PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina

Note: the references are given in the following way: name of the work
abbreviated number of the question or chapter or lectio.paragraph (if it
applies), page number.line number (e.g., QLIS 1, 2.34; DOS I.2, 3.4). For the
editions used, see bibliography.
 INTRODUCTION

1.Life

Robert Kilwardby, or Robertus Kilwardbius (alias Kilwardbi, Kilwardbey,

Kilewardbii,1 or Kylwardeby, Kylwardby, Kylwardbi, Kylwarby, Kilvirbi,
Kulverbi,2 or Kalverbi),3 was an Englishman born in either Leicestershire
or in Yorkshire.4 The date of his birth, not known with certainty, is assumed
to have been between 1200 and 1215. The reason why the latter is preferred
is simple: the Statutes of the University of Paris prescribed that six years
of study were necessary for someone to become a Master of Arts, which
should not happen before the student was twenty-one. As students were
supposed to start only at around the age of fifteen, and Kilwardby begun
his studies at the University of Paris in 1231, becoming a Master of Arts
around 1237, he was probably born around 12151216, if he followed the
normal course of studies. The date of 1200 is based upon the suggestion
that he would have studied in Oxford before starting his studies at the
University of Paris. Sommer-Seckendorfff proved that there was no strong
foundation for this in her thorough study on Kilwardbys life and career.5
Kilwardby taught in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris
between 1237 and 1245, when he moved back to England. He entered the
Dominican Order6 around 1245 he starting a rather successful ecclesias-
tic career7 and thenceforth devoting himself to the study of Theology.8
He probably studied under Richard Fishacre (d. 1248),9 but the latters

1
Qutif and Echard 1979, 174.
2
Qutif and Echard 1979, 3767.
3
Pignon 1936, 7.
4
Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 1. Some passages in this and the following section can be
found in Silva 2011.
5
Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 2.
6
Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 17; Qutif and Echard 1979 places it in 1230.
7
Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 14 argues for Kilwardbys return to England to have taken
place in the beginning of the 1230s, working as a master of arts until his entrance in the
Dominican Order.
8
See also Trivet 1845, 278: Post ordinis vero ingressum studiosus in divinis scripturis,
originalibusque sanctorum patrum, libros Augustini fere omnes.
9
Qutif and Echard 1979, 118. Less assertive is Long 2002, 351. Long argues here that
Kilwardby was Fishacres successor as the Regent of Theology in Oxford; but Dales (1995,
61) argues otherwise.
2 introduction

influence can only be fully understood once the edition of Fishacres

Sentences Commentary has been made. He taught theology at Oxford from
ca. 1254 until 1261 (lecturing on Sentences between 1254 and 1256, and as
Regent Master from 1256 to 1261), when he was elected Provincial of the
English Dominicans, a position he held for eleven years.
In 1271, the Master General of the Dominicans, John of Vercelli (d. 1283),
sent a questionnaire to three theologians of the Order, Albert the Great
(ca. 12001280), Thomas Aquinas (1224/51274) and Robert Kilwardby.10
Whatever the initial purpose of the questionnaire, which probably origi-
nated from a quodlibetical dispute,11 its full meaning can only be under-
stood in relation to the condemnations the Bishop of Paris, tienne
Tempier, had pronounced one year earlier (containing a list of 13 articles
that he considered to be against the Christian Faith).12 The 43 questions,
which were to be answered in a strict form (forma taxata)13 and in accor-
dance with the authority of the Fathers,14 deal with a wide range of theo-
logical problems, from the cause of the motion of celestial bodies to the
location and nature of Hell.15
Some of the questions are mere curiosities, without any particular theo-
logical or philosophical relevance, whereas others are directly related to
the subjects in the condemned articles. Moreover, some of the topics are
clear examples of how the new Aristotelian natural philosophy raised dif-
ficult theological problems. The diffferent responses of Aquinas, Albert
and Kilwardby show that there was a lack of consensus, even among
learned theologians, about matters such as the animation of heavenly
bodies, the unity/plurality of substantial forms, and the influence of

10
Kilwardbys text has been partially edited in Chenu 1930, 191222; and more recently
in Dondaine 1977, 550 (complete edition). The text of Aquinas was edited as Responsio ad
magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 43 articulis, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino doctoris angelici
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita. Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1979, t. 42,
pp. 32735. Finally, the answers of Albert the Great were first acknowledged by Weisheipl
1960, 303354 and later edited by the same author as the Problemata Determinata, in Alberti
Magni Opera Omnia. Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorfff, 1975, t. 17, 4564. The possibil-
ity of the questionnaire having been sent to some other theologians in addition to Aquinas
and Kilwardby is raised by Destrez 1930, 1268.
11
Chenu 1930, 2114; Destrez 1930, 12831.
12
CUP I.432, 4867. See Grant 1979; and also Wippel 1977.
13
Thomas Aquinas, Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem, 327: Paternitas uestre litteras
feria quarta ante Pascha recepi dum Missarum solempnia agerentur, multos articulos
interclusa cedula continentes quibus singulis mihi respondendum mandastis, responsio-
nis forma taxata.
14
Weisheipl 1961, 286.
15
See Silva 2007.
 introduction 3

celestial motion upon human life (determinism/free will).16 The fact that
Kilwardby was consulted, together with Thomas and Albert, indicates his
importance within the Dominican Order.
Before that, in 1272, Kilwardby was nominated Archbishop of Can-
terbury. Two of his acts as Archbishop were the coronation of Edward I at
Westminster Abbey (19th August 1274), and the issuing of the Prohibitions
of Oxford in 1277. On 18 March 1277, as the head of a meeting including all
the regent and non-regent masters of the University of Oxford, he issued a
list of 30 propositions on the subjects of grammar (4), logic (10) and natu-
ral philosophy (16).17 These propositions were prohibited primarily for
being philosophical mistakes, and only secondarily for being against the
Christian faith.
Kilwardby issued his Prohibitions shortly (eleven days) after tienne
Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, published a list of 219 propositions that were
considered to be against the Faith, threatening of excommunication any-
one known to defend any of them. The condemned propositions are about
disparate topics, ranging from the unicity of the potential intellect to the
eternity of the world, and their cohesion is questionable. Nevertheless, it
is clear that many propositions are directed to doctrines of the so-called
Latin Averroists (or Radical/Heterodox Aristotelians), such as Siger of
Brabant (ca. 12401282). The Condemnations of Paris of March 7, 1277, can
be, in part at least, understood as the culmination of the instability caused
to medieval Christian thought by the new (new to the Latin West) works
of Aristotle and his Greek and Arabic commentators. Even though schol-
ars disagree on the overall reach of the Condemnations, the efffects on
medieval thought are significant.18
Although the Prohibitions of Oxford were very close in time to the
Condemnations of Paris, there is no proof of any connection between the
two events. It is frequently assumed that Kilwardby acted under Papal
orders, but even this is not proven. The direct targets of these propositions
have not, for the most part, been identified.19 Nevertheless, even in

16
A general survey on the subject can be found in Grant 1996.
17
CUP I.5589.
18
The text of the Condemnations is found in CUP I.543555, n.473. Two recent editions
of the text are Hissette 1977 and Pich 1999. For more on the Condemnations see Mandonnet
190811; Bianchi 1997, 1999, 2003; Hissette 1977, 1980; Thijssen 1997, 1998; and Wippel 1977.
See also Part Three of the present study.
19
The most detailed account on the subjects of logic and grammar is Lewry 1981b. On
the Prohibitions in general, see Sharp 1934; Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 13062; Callus 1943;
1955, 11; Calllus 1961; Wilshire 1964; Wilshire 1997, 15193.
4 introduction

Kilwardbys time, some of them in naturalibus were thought to be aimed

at the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, namely those having to do with the
unicity of the substantial form. The evidence for such an interpretation
is the letter written by a disciple of Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Conflans
(d.1290), demanding from Kilwardby an explanation concerning the rea-
sons why some of the articles were prohibited. Kilwardbys answer, still
extant,20 constitutes the clearest expression of his advocacy of the plural-
ity of substantial forms in human beings, and much of the later discussion
on the topic is dependent on the arguments he put forward in this letter.
The 1277 Oxford Prohibitions immediately attracted both criticism and
support. In 1278 William de la Mare (d. ca. 1290) wrote a treatise,
Correctorium fratris Thomae, supporting the censured theses, and clearly
associating them with some propositions found in Thomas Aquinas
works. In fact, Williams treatise is a presentation of and commentary on
some 118 theses found in Thomas writings. (Williams work became com-
pulsory reading accompanying Thomas works for Franciscans in 1282, at
the Orders General Chapter in Strasburg.) Williams treatise provoked a
strong reactioncertainly much stronger than Kilwardbys Prohibitions
from Dominicans, who went on to write works that came to be known
as Correctoria, i.e. correctives to the treatise. These include (?) Richard
Knapwells Correctorium corruptorii Quare from 1283, (?) Robert Orfords
Correctorium corruptorii Sciendum from 1283, John Quidort of Paris Cor-
rectorium corruptorii Circa from 12831284, (?) William Macclesfields
Correctorium corruptorii Quaestione from 1284, and Rambert de Primadizzi
of Bolognas Apologeticum veritatis from 12861288.21 After the Prohibi-
tions, and especially following William de la Mares treatise and John
Pechams renewal of the Kilwardbys Prohibitions (1284 and 1286), the
question of the unicity versus the plurality of substantial forms became a
matter of institutional divide: Dominicans followed Aquinas in the defense
of unicity whereas Franciscans adopted the doctrine of plurality of sub-
stantial forms in the human composite (especially due to their view of
matter as a positive entity even when separated from form). Kilwardby
was probably the last Dominican to publicly oppose the unicity theory.

20
Robert Kilwardby, Epistola Roberti Kilwardby Archiepiscopi Cantuarensis ad Petrum de
Confleto Archiepiscopum Corinthi, ed. F.K. Ehrle, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Englischen
Scholastik, Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1970, 1854.
21
For details, see Jordan 1982. See also Glorieux 1927a, viix. In addition to these, other
works dealing with the unicity versus plurality of forms should be mentioned, namely
Thomas Suttons De pluralitate formarum (ca. 1282), and Richard Knapwells Quaestio
Disputata De unitate formae (ca. 128486). See Roensch (1964) for details.
 introduction 5

Until then both the unicity and pluralist view had supporters in both
Orders: John of La Rochelle (1190/12001245) was a Franciscan and an uni-
tarian; Roland of Cremona (d. 1269) was a Dominican and an unitarian;
Robert Kilwardby was a Dominican and a pluralist; Adam of Buckfield
(ca. 12201294) was a Franciscan and a pluralist. The majority, among
which should be counted Richard Fishacre (d. 1248), a Dominican, and
Richard Rufus of Cornwall, a Franciscan, failed to take a clear stand on any
of them. There was, however, an unequivocal shift in the debate in the end
of the 1270s and in the early 1280s, which will be understood when more is
known about the thought of the diffferent thinkers concerned. This study
is an attempt to shed light on Robert Kilwardbys contribution.
The first step in the Dominicans backing of Aquinas theory was taken
by the General Chapter of the Dominican Order, meeting in Milan (1278),
which decided to send a commission in order to investigate and punish
those who blackened the writings of Thomas Aquinas in scandalum ordi-
nis. The next Chapter, held in Paris, repeated the admonition and pro-
moted the praise of Aquinas works. Meanwhile, Pope Nicholas III
appointed Kilwardby Cardinal of Porto and S. Rufina in 1278,22 which
allowed him to move from England to Italy. Kilwardby died in 1279, soon
after his arrival at the Papal court in Viterbo. In 131112 the Council of
Vienne would elect the Thomist unicity thesis as the offficial doctrine of
the Church, censuring the plurality thesis as heretical.

2.Writings

Kilwardbys literary production is uneven if we consider his career as a

whole. He was extremely productive during his years as a Master of Arts
at the University of Paris, but later when he assumed high ecclesiastical
offfice his production declined in terms of quantity. From the period when
he was Provincial of the Dominican Order and Archbishop of Canterbury
we have only his reply in the form of a letter to Peter of Conflans, the text
of the Prohibitions, and his responses to the questionnaire that John of
Vercelli sent him, together with some minor treatises dealing with theo-
logical issues and a few sermons. The complete list of his works includes
texts on logic, grammar, theology, and natural philosophy,23 which fall into
three diffferent periods.

22
Eubel 1913, 9; 36. See also Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 124.
23
Cf. Glorieux 1971, 3337; Lohr 1973, 10813; and the more recent and accurate Sharpe
1997, 5604.
6 introduction

I. The Parisian period (12371245): Course on the Logica Vetus attributed

to Kilwardby,24 which consists of a set of commentaries on Isagoge,25
Praedicamenta, Perihermeneias, Liber Sex Principiorum, and Liber divi-
sionum Boethii; and his commentaries on Analytica Priora (ca. 1240);26
Analytica Posteriora;27 Priscianus Minor; In librum topycorum (ca.
12401250);28 Sophistici Elenchi;29 and Ethica nova et vetus.30
II. The middle period (12451250): De ortu scientiarum (ca. 1250);31 De
spiritu fantastico; De tempore.32
III. The Oxford period (12501279): Quaestiones in quattuor libros
Sententiarum (shortly after 1256),33 De natura relationis (which appears
in some manuscripts as De relatione);34 and De 43 questionibus
(ca. 1271), Epistola ad Petrum de Confleto (ca. 1278). There are also some
minor theological works from the same period, such as De confessione,
De necessitate Incarnationis,35 De conscientia et de synderesi,36 Tabulae
super originalia patrum, Arbor consanguinitatis et afffinitatis, and some
sermons (Sermo in capite ieiunii and Sermo in dominica in Passione).37
A letter expressing some criticism concerning Franciscan poverty
(Epistola ad novitios de excellentia Ordine Praedicatorum), which

24
Lewry 1978, 64; 212. See also Weijers 1995b, 201.
25
Pich (2002, 115) places the Commentary on the Isagoge c. 1237, ou tout le moins
avant 1240 assurment.
26
See Ebbesen 1997, 327. It was published in Venice 1516 as Reverendi Magistri Egidii
Romani in libros Priorum analeticorum Aristotelis Expositio et interpretatio sum perquam
diligenter visa recognita erroribus purgata. Et quantum anniti ars potuit fideliter impressa
cum textu.
27
Extracts in Cannone 2002; the complete edition is published in Cannone 2003/2004.
28
Weijers 1995a, 114.
29
Ebbesen (1997, 341) dates this commentary as ca. 1240.
30
Lewry (1986, 806) dates the work ca. 1245. The same date is given by Celano 1986a, 25.
More recently Celano (2006, 11, n.38) maintains the attribution of the commentary to
Kilwardby but reserves the final judgment concerning the authorship for the edition of the
text (under preparation).
31
Judy in his Introduction to DOS, xv.
32
Lewry in his edition of the De spiritu fantastico (1987, xxii) dates them from not ear-
lier than the late 1250s.
33
Cf. Schneider in Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum
(1986), 56. Brown (1990, 95) refers to the date of 1253 for the Quaestiones in Librum Primum
Sententiarum, but he does not discuss the reasons for his dating.
34
Hanagan (1973, 257), places the De natura relationis in the period between 1256
and 1261.
35
Edited in Dondaine 1936.
36
Extracts edited in Lottin 1948, 31232.
37
The first was edited in Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 16376, the second in Lewry 1982.
 introduction 7

survives only in John Pechams answer (Tractatus contra fratrem

Robertum Kilwarby), is also worth mentioning.38
The commentary on Priscianus Maior and Sophismata grammaticalia are
considered inauthentic.39 Doubts have also been cast on the authorship of
the commentaries In barbarismum Donati,40 De accentu Prisciani,41 and
Sophismata logicalia. Gls42 identification of Kilwardby as the author of
the commentaries on Physics and Metaphysics ascribed to him by the
Stams catalogue (also called Stams Tabula, a medieval register of works
attributed to members of the Dominican Order from ca. 1235),43 and found
in MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 509, has been questioned,
and the two works are now thought to have been written by Geofffrey
of Aspall.44
Kilwardbys interest in Aristotle is unquestionable: in the group of
works from his earlier period, he comments and leans on Aristotles
thought more than on any other author. In these early logical commentar-
ies, he shows a knowledge of Aristotle that is not limited to the works com-
mented on or to any particular textbook, such as the Auctoritates
Aristotelis.45 He also attempts to provide an accurate and systematic

38
Tractatus contra fratrem Robertum Kilwardby O.P., eds. C.L. Kingsford, A.G. Little, and
F. Tocco, in Tractatus Tres de Paupertate (British Society of Franciscan Studies II), Aberdeen:
Gregg, 1910, 12147.
39
Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2007, 7883.
40
In Barbarismum Donati, ed. L. Schmcker, In Donati Artem maiorem III, Brixen:
A. Weger, 1984.
41
Edited in Lewry 1988; see Rosier 1994, 18.
42
Gl 1953, 25.
43
Catalogus Stamsensis, in Laurentii Pignon Catalogi et chronica (accedunt Catalogi
Stamsensis et Upsalensis Scriptorum O.P.), ed. G. Meersseman, (Monumenta Ordinis
Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, vol. 18) Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum
Praedicatorum S. Sabinae, 1936, 57 (5667).
44
Macrae 1968, 126. See also Callus 1963, 398; and Lewry 1975, 16+.
45
Long (1996, 56) has argued for Kilwardbys but mainly Fishacres knowledge of
Aristotle to be limited to florilegia (a view he has softened in the more recent Introduction
to his edition of Fishacres In secundum Librum Sententiarum, 19*). For a diffferent view, see
Brown 1996, 353 and Callus 1943, 2578; he refers to Fishacres knowledge of the new
Aristotle as astonishingly wide. Lewry (1978, 284) also explicitly denies that Kilwardbys
knowledge of Aristotle is based on florilegia. In order to prove his point, Lewry goes through
the references and identifies those that come from the Auctoritates and those that do not:
The numbers leave no space for doubts. For example, about Aristotles works on natural
philosophy, he says: 32 [out of 112!] of the citations of Aristotle feature in some form in
Auctoritates Aristotelicis, and thus may be commonplace, but the rest argue a direct
acquaintance with the libri naturales. The number of references to the Physica and
Metaphysica is particularly striking (263). See also Judy 1973, 76*7*; and Cannone 2002,
8 introduction

account of Aristotles text.46 Kilwardbys astuteness as a commentator on

Aristotles logical treatises gave him the recognitioneven though not
always explicitof his contemporaries. The influence of his commentar-
ies on Categories and Prior Analytics (ca. 1240)47 on Albert the Great,48
Roger Bacon (ca. 12141292/4),49 Lambert of Auxerre (d. 1270), Simon of
Faversham (12601306/7), Radulphus Brito (ca. 12701320), and Richard of
Campsall (d. 1350/60) is often noted.50
As a central figure of thirteenth-century philosophy and theology, in
both Paris and Oxford, Kilwardby shared a number of discussions and
influences with some of his contemporaries, such as Robert Grosseteste
(1168/751253), Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Alexander of
Hales (ca. 11851245), and Bonaventure (ca. 12171274). They share the
same commitment to central Augustinian doctrines, struggling (in difffer-
ent degrees) to accommodate this Augustinian influence with the newly
available philosophical sources, especially the works of Aristotle, Avicenna
and Averroes. This is clear in their approach to questions such as the
nature of the soul and its relation with the body, the relation between
divine illumination and Aristotles empiricism and realism, the positive
nature of matter, and the role seminal reasons play in explaining
generation.
The influence of Richard Rufus of Cornwall on the cause of individua-
tion and formal distinction is acknowledged,51 and Bonaventure features
prominently among the authors whose positions Kilwardby often refers to
in Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum (hereafter QLS). It remains a striking

7980: Kilwardby inoltre mostra di conoscere direttamente ed utilizzare lOrganon aristo-

telico; frequenti infatti sono i riferimenti (molti dei quali indipendenti da Grossetesta e
Temistio) alle opere logiche (Categorie, Analitici Priori, Topici, Elenchi Sofistici); e non solo
a queste ma anche alla Fisica, alla Metafisica e al De anima.
46
Thom 2007, 147.
47
Probably the first preserved commentary is Robert Kilwardbys from about 1240,
which is both thorough and quite sophisticated, Ebbesen 2010, 101.
48
In the words of Ebbesen (1997, 329), Albert the Great pillaged it for his own compan-
ion to the Prior Analytics. See also Ebbesen 1981a; and still Ebbesen 1980. See also Thom
2007, 67. More recently Steel (2009, 48485) argues that the influence is mostly felt in the
first part of the work (i.e. until quality) and that Alberts understanding of the doctrine of
the Categories is very diffferent from that of Kilwardby.
49
de Libera 1987, 180. See also Ebbesen 1997, 34051 (on the Sophistici Elenchi). The rela-
tion between Bacon and Kilwardby, which probably knew each other since they were at
the same time teaching in the Faculty of Arts in Paris (Kilwardby from ca. 1237 to 1245,
Bacon from ca. 12371247), remains to be fully explored.
50
Lagerlund 2000, 59; 132; 2289; passim.
51
Wood 1996a and 1996b.
 introduction 9

feature of Kilwardbys thought (and one that can only be accounted for by
pure speculation) how much he, a Dominican, sided with Bonaventure
and other Franciscans on all the major theological and philosophical
questions except the question of poverty, as the polemic with the
Franciscan John Pecham (ca. 12251292) shows. However, not much should
be made of this. Instead of finding associations with Dominicans or
Franciscans it might be more accurate to suggest that Kilwardby was fol-
lowing Augustine, and that he followed those who seemed to offfer a better
rendering of Augustines thought. Moreover, in QLS, one of the two extant
Oxonian Dominican questions from the period before 1280,52 Kilwardby
adopts and criticizes Franciscans (e.g., Bonaventure) and Dominicans
(e.g., Fishacre) alike.
There are also doctrinal similarities between Kilwardby and Roger
Bacon, who were both in Paris at around the same time (ca. 12371245).
Apart from the connection with respect to language, noted by Rosier
(1994) and Marmo (1997), an examination of Bacons natural philosophy
shows that they considered the same questions, and that they offfered a
good number of similar solutions in the discussion on the unity of matter,
the concept of active potency, the plurality of substantial forms, the cri-
tique of Averroes monopsychism, and the notion of intentio. I cannot go
further into the examination of these connections in the present work,
however, and I refer to them only when it seems to make Kilwardbys posi-
tion more intelligible. The central aim is not to discuss the extent and
faithfulness of these influences, but rather to provide an accurate account
of Kilwardbys thought on the nature of the human soul.

3.Nature and Scope

Robert Kilwardby is a particularly interesting example of on the one hand

the interaction between philosophy and theology and on the other

52
Wood 2002, 289. Friedman (2002, 478, n.9) in his analysis of the Sentences commen-
taries of the period between 1250 and 1320, notes that until 1285 no clear demarcation
between Franciscans and Dominicans is to be found in these commentaries. Friedman
leaves Kilwardbys questions on the Sentences aside from his examination, even though it
is one of the first issued by Dominicans, because strictly speaking it does not constitute a
commentary (see 478, n.9). Opposite view is held by Wood (2002, 290, n.5) according to
whom although unusual and incomplete, this is still a commentary. Still according to
Friedman, Kilwardbys QLS is highly unusual for this early period both in its format of
questions only loosely related to Lombards text and in that it does not seem to have any
particular connection to Kilwardbys attainment of the magisterium.
10 introduction

between Aristotelianism and Augustinianism in the thirteenth century.

He was writing during one of the most intense periods of intellectual
activity in the Middle Ages, in the twenty years before and after 1250. First
a student and then a Master in two of the leading universities, Paris and
Oxford, he represented in his career the constant struggle to deal with
both the authoritative texts of the Church Fathers, in particular Augustine,
and the later tradition these inspired (e.g., the Vitorines), and with the
recently discovered texts of the Peripatetic traditionAristotle himself
together with his Greek and Arabic commentators. Kilwardby was a stu-
dent at the Arts Faculty at the University of Paris immediately after the
strike of 122931, which was associated with the prohibition of Aristotelian
natural philosophy, and he was one of the first to comment on some of
these new texts. His Course on the Logica Vetus is, as P.O. Lewry notes, the
earliest complete extant set of commentaries. Kilwardby was also the
author of a widely circulated classification of the sciences, De ortu scien-
tiarum, which has been characterized as the most ambitious and astute
consideration of the nature, scope, and classification of the known sci-
ences in the thirteenth century.53 There has been an extraordinary
increase in original research on Kilwardby in recent decades. Our better
understanding of his academic career as well as of his views on logic and
grammar is due to the works of scholars such as Anthony Celano, Paul
Thom, Henrik Lagerlund, Olga Weijers, Debora Cannone, Rega Wood, and
Irne Rosier-Catach, to name just a few.
However, if one puts aside the studies devoted to his influential Prior
Analytics commentary and the grammatical commentaries attributed to
him, some aspects of his thoughtnamely those on which the present
study is focusedhave been largely neglected. The most striking of these
is his theory of the human soul, and this is particularly telling because he
wrote at a time when the topic of the soul and its relation with the body
was at the center of philosophical discussion and was one of the topics
involved in the Prohibitions of 1277 (on why this designation is preferred
to Condemnations, see Part Three).
The reason for this neglect is the polemical nature of Kilwardbys role in
these Prohibitions at Oxford.54 In most histories of medieval philosophy

53
Weisheipl 1978, 478.
54
Hanagan (1973, 5) puts it nicely: His greatest claim to historical footnotes seems to
have been the infamous condemnation of certain theses of Thomas Aquinas on 1277, an
action which if viewed benignly was an embarrassing blunder, and at worst was the death
knell of the scholastic method of theological and philosophical reflection to which he had
dedicated his life.
 introduction 11

he is immediately identified as the main promoter of the censure of thirty

theses on the subjects of grammar, logic and natural philosophy. However,
it is not so much the censure that attracts attention as its association with
the thought of Thomas Aquinas. As a result, traditional historiography
tended to label him a conservative neo-Augustinian, and say no more.
Any attempt to examine Kilwardbys theory of the soul was put aside
because it was already classified as reactionary and anti-Thomist or
anti-Aristotelian (too often thought of as equivalent expressions). It is
also interesting to consider how that qualification squares with the view
of the Parisian Kilwardby as a faithful interpreter of Aristotle and a pro-
moter of his thought.
One might well be intrigued by the reasons that led an influential
Dominican theologian with a rather successful ecclesiastical career pub-
licly to promote the censure of members of his own Order. One of the
main motivations for writing this book is to assess whether the identifica-
tion by some of Kilwardbys contemporaries and later scholars of a num-
ber of prohibited theses as being of Thomas Aquinas is accurate. The only
way to approach this question is to identify Kilwardbys theory of the soul
and to trace how it evolved throughout his career. Only if we understand
his theory of the human soul will we be able to understand which theories
of the soul, and of composites in general, Kilwardby was opposing in 1277,
and why he was opposing them. This book represents an attempt to fill
this gap in the literature so as to give a fair and detailed account of exactly
where Kilwardby stands with respect to the soul and the plurality of sub-
stantial forms in human beings. To that end I analyze all of Kilwardbys
works, from the early Parisian logical texts to his Epistola ad Petrum de
Confleto.
The debate on the unicity versus the plurality of substantial forms
wastogether with the questions of the substantiality of the human soul,
its union with the body, the matter-form composition of the soul, the rela-
tion of the soul with its faculties, the immortality of the soul, and the
nature of the human intellecta central issue in thirteenth-century psy-
chological discussions. In the thirteenth century, the newly available
Aristotelian texts with their hylomorphic account of composite substances
challenged the Platonic-Augustinian anthropological dualism of soul and
body conceived of as two distinct substances. The Aristotelian-Avicennian
division into three kinds of soulsvegetative, sensitive, and intellec-
tiveand the special status of the human intellect, with passive and
active aspects, set the framework within which late medieval thinkers
were to approach the subject of the human soul. The unicity-plurality
12 introduction

debate is not, however, only about the definition of the human soul as
simple or comprising a plurality of substantial forms. It concerns also the
nature of composite substances in general; whether things like com-
pounds have one or many substantial forms; whether human bodies have
a form of their own that is not their soul (thus continuing to exist as bodies
even separated from the soul); whether the substrate of substantial change
is prime matter as pure potentiality or an already informed matter;
whether matter has any actuality of its own; and so on. These philosophi-
cal concerns were later, in the last decades of the thirteenth century, com-
plemented with theological concerns.
The medieval discussion concerning the plurality of forms has attracted
the attention of many scholars, justified by the range of questions it
implies. Scholarship has focused on the theological and philosophical
aspects of the dispute, as the studies of Callus, Lottin, Pegis, Zavalloni, and
more recently Dales (which rests, for the most part, on the previous stud-
ies, particularly on Zavalloni) show. Many other studies focusing on indi-
vidual medieval thinkers provide an account of the position of that
particular thinker on the unicity or plurality debate as a side issue in his
thought. I decided to proceed otherwise. I take Kilwardbys pluralist view
as the central aspect of his theory of the human soul, and I pay particular
attention to his arguments defending the plurality of substantial forms in
human beings.
Kilwardbys plurality of forms is grounded on the diversity of origin and
of nature of the souls potentiae, and it is his commitment to this diversity
that explains his criticism of any theory that advocates the simplicity of
the human soul. The diffference in origin of the souls potentiae explains
why they require bodily organs to function, as it is the case with the natu-
rally generated vegetative and sensitive potentiae, or why they do not, as it
is the case with the created intellective potentia. The origin is also used to
explain the substantial nature of the intellective part of the soul and its
incorruptibility. According to Kilwardby, such a diversity cannot be
accounted for if the soul is simple; instead, the soul must be composite,
and one just needs to explain the nature of this compositionin other
words, what keeps the essentially diffferent potentiae together in such a
way as to form one soul that is the form of the human being.
The interest in his theory of the soul resides in its being the most explicit
pluralist theory of the human composite and the human soul up to Richard
of Middletons De gradu formarum, written in 1286. Until then philoso-
phers and theologiansto retain the two sides of the debate over the
unicity versus plurality of substantial forms as described by Richard Rufus
 introduction 13

of Cornwall and Roger Baconprovided arguments for both sides, but

resisted commitment to either view. This is true especially with respect to
pluralists.55 Whereas one finds several examples of the defense of the unic-
ity of the human soul even before Aquinas, it is diffficult to find someone
who explicitly endorses the plurality of forms. Most authors present argu-
ments for unicity or plurality followed by counterarguments against the
opposite view without a definite position being taken on the issue. Philip
the Chancellor (1165/851236) is a case in point. In his Summa de bono he
provides a wide range of arguments, which were to become highly influen-
tial, for the plurality of forms, but he ends up arguing against plurality and
in favor of the unity of the substantial form.56 Scholars have long disagreed
as to whether or not Philip should be classified as a pluralist or a unitar-
ian.57 No such ambiguity is to be found in Kilwardby, and this is one of the
reasons why he should be understood as the representative of pluralism in
the second half of the thirteenth century.58
The examination of Kilwardbys pluralism of forms in the human com-
posite, in Part One, will allow us to shed some light on the view(s) he was
opposing in his censorship at Oxford. Traditionally this has been identi-
fied with Thomas Aquinas theory of the soul. Even though Aquinas the-
ory puts him in clear opposition to Kilwardbys own view, the question to
be asked is if there is something that allows Aquinas theory to be identi-
fied as the direct target of Kilwardbys censorship. Part One will make clear
that Kilwardby was targeting the simplicity theory, meaning any theory
that defended the absolute lack of composition in the soul, both of matter
and form and a plurality of essences or substantial forms. Aquinas theory
of the unicity of substantial form in the human composite clearly fits
under the targeted theory in so far as it comprises the doctrine of simplic-
ity of the soulof which he was not the only or even the first proponent.
By deepening the metaphysical implications of the unicity theory, extend-
ing it to the human composite, Aquinas is responsible for shaping the later

55
Zavalloni (1950, 134) hints at this point.
56
Philip the Chancellor, SB, q.3, 231238; q.8, 281290.
57
Lottin (1957, 467) takes Philip to be a unitarian, Zavalloni (1951, 398) ranks him among
the pluralists. Dales (1995, 25) agrees with Zavalloni. Furthermore, Zavalloni claims that
Philip was the first to present the medieval theory of the plurality of forms as we know it
(1951, 422). More recently Bieniak (2010) sided with Zavalloni. Bieniaks book came out
when this book was at its later stages; I therefore could not take her arguments into
account.
58
Adam of Buckfield would be another possibility, even though his endorsement of
pluralism is not explicit. On Adams pluralism, see Callus 1939; Zavalloni 1950, 15.
14 introduction

discussion, but his was most likely not the theory Kilwardby was better
acquainted with. I shall argue that Aquinass unicity theory is not the pri-
mary target of the Oxford Prohibitions.
It is necessary to make clear what Kilwardbys view on the subject is
both for the sake of historical accuracy and of philosophical relevance:
historically it allow us to revise the traditional depiction of Kilwardby as
an anti-Aristotelian, which is true only if one takes the plurality of forms to
be an anti-Aristotelian doctrine.59 In addition, Aquinas unicity theory is
often thought of as unique in his time, challenging the traditional (plural-
ist) view on the matter,60 but in fact unicity seemed to be the dominant
theory of the soul for the major part of the thirteenth-century, and plural-
ism seems to find explicit partisans only quite late in the century.61
To understand Kilwardbys pluralism is philosophically relevant because
the doctrine of the plurality of forms is part of a wider philosophical tradi-
tion that attempted, in some cases, to integrate Aristotelian natural phi-
losophy into an Augustinian worldview and, in other cases, to offfer an
alternative view to Aristotelian natural philosophy. In either case there
was an efffort to develop coherent and systematic solutions to philosophi-
cal problems such as the relation of soul and body, the nature of the
human soul, perceptual and intellectual knowledge, and so on. Kilwardby
stands out as an example of this tradition.
I believe the portrait that will emerge is of a thinker who proposed a
coherent account of the human soul grounded on a certain reading of
Aristotle and Augustine, an account that diverges in many ways from the
most standard one. I will argue that the motivation behind the 1277 cen-
sure is the defense of that reading rather than pure and simple conserva-
tism and antagonism to a novel way of thinking. Kilwardby prohibited the
theses he thought problematic with respect to his own understanding of
the human soul and human composite (as well as grammatical and logical
theory), without necessarily targeting a specific person or individual
doctrine.
It is worth noting at this stage that Kilwardby justified his Prohibitions
by giving the same reasons he put forward for criticizing Averroes doc-
trine of one soul common to all human beings (monopsychism) and, for
that matter, the reasons Aquinas used to justify his criticism of Averroists
on the same subject: that they were contrary to philosophical truth,

59
Zavalloni 1951, 47274; Wippel 1981, 3145.
60
See the studies of Ehrle (1970) and De Wulf (1909).
61
See the studies of Forest (1931), Martin (1920), and Lottin (1932; 1957).
 introduction 15

Christian faith and, in the case of Averroes monopsychism, against

Aristotles intention. By this I mean that Kilwardbys actions were moti-
vated by his philosophical understanding of the questions, rather than by
conservatism, personal dislike, anti-Aristotelianism (the most unsound
argument of all), or active persecution of Aquinas and others of his school.
In works such as E he uses philosophically engaged argumentation in his
attempt to explain what motivated his theory of the soul. This said, it can-
not be overlooked that the Prohibitions were an offficial act of censure car-
rying much stronger implications than any criticism made by an individual
as a matter of philosophical view.
Classifying him as an anti-Aristotelian has clouded much of our under-
standing of Kilwardby because it has portrayed him as having an anti-the-
ory instead of a theory in its own right. There seems to be a general
unwritten historiographical assumption that change is per se of historical
value, and that authors are divisible into those who adopt new ideas with
celerity and those who do not. This is also true of the thirteenth century.
Although the traditional division of thirteenth-century philosophical
debate into three groups at odds with each otherthe Aristotelians,
the Averroists and the Augustinians (and the last one into Augustinian-
ism, neo-Augustinianism, Augustinianism-Avicennianism, and so on)
advocated in Neo-scholastic historiography is nowadays generally rejected
as a simplification that does not take into account the complexities of the
diffferent authors, there remains a prejudice against authors associated
with an Augustinian philosophy. Whereas Aristotelians and Averroists
belong to the group of people who accept the novelties of Aristotle
(Averroists going so far as to endanger the acceptance of Aristotelianism
by Christians because of a radical reading of his work), Augustinians
belong to the other side of the dispute, resisting the adoption of Aristotles
thought in favor of Augustine.62 Augustinianism is understood in this

62
The most clear and up-to-date discussion over the historiographical tradition and the
distinction between Aristotelian and Augustinian movements is Marrone 2001a, 125. As
Marrone points out, the problem is not to place a certain author in a certain movement or
school (of thought), but to define the doctrines that characterize that movement or school
(13)what he calls the search for canonical doctrinal lists (14). He concludes: While it is
possible to identify moments of doctrinal convergence among specific thinkers for short
periods of time, no list of doctrines can preserve its integrity long enough to define a school
of thought, (14). By contrast, Marrone proposes his own scheme, in which belonging to a
certain school is defined according to: (i) the tendency to resort to a distinct set of meta-
phors and analytical models; (ii) the conscious or unconscious tendency to imply specific
ideological commitments; (iii) the use of terminology identifiable with a certain scholar
or group of scholars (15).
16 introduction

context as an appeal to the authority of Augustine against the theses of

Aristotle and his most famous commentator (from the fourteenth century
onwards), Thomas of Aquinas.63 That is to say, although it has become
clear that these qualifications are inadequate, and that their usefulness in
terms of understanding medieval intellectual history is questionable, the
underlying distinction between conservatives (those who remained
Augustinians) and updated philosophers persists as a general grid in
which to place authors of the period such as Alexander of Hales, Philip the
Chancellor, William of Auvergne (ca. 11801249), Richard Fishacre and, of
course, Robert Kilwardby. What is problematic in this historiographical
account is not the efffort to somehow assign authors to a certain philo-
sophical tradition but the specification of the tradition in question. I do
not intend to discuss such classifications and qualifications here, but
I believe that it is reductionist to call thirteenth-century Augustinians
conservative because it reduces this theoretical position to the resistance
some of its members showed against the introduction of Aristotelian
ideas.64 As the works from his early period show, Kilwardby started his aca-
demic career by commenting on the texts of Aristotle, and only later, in
the 1250s did he move away from Paris and from Aristotelian philosophical
influence. Whatever the reasons for this event, it probably was not the
result of a love afffair (as fictionally suggested in Olga Collettes novel)65 or
of Kilwardbys reactionary nature. Even in the period when Augustine was
the primary influence in his thought, however, Kilwardby never com-
pletely abandoned Aristotle. A major goal of this book is to shed light on
how Kilwardby attempted to conciliate these two traditions.
Aristotles theory of the soul and his hylomorphic account of substances
left unresolved some questions that provoked discussion as soon as his
works were available and subjected to scrutiny in the Middle Ages. Some
of these problems stemmed from his works, in other words they had to do
with the compatibility between diffferent aspects of his thought or with

63
Other scholars have understood the Neo-Augustinian movement as a reaction, not to
Aristotle tout court, but to a certain interpretation of Aristotle, that of Thomas Aquinas
(see Van Steenberghen 1991, 470; and Wippel 1977, 178).
64
the Augustinian School consists of those scholastics who consciously took it upon
themselves to defend the heritage of Augustine against what they saw as Aristotelian
inroads. Because of their reactive posture, such thinkers are commonly labelled conserva-
tive, Marrone 2001a, 189. One of the authors who adopt this qualification is Roensch 1964,
173: Like other conservative theologians and prelates, Kilwardby seriously sought to pro-
tect Catholic orthodoxy from the inroads of the pagan Aristotle and the misunderstood
novelties of St. Thomas.
65
Colette 1999.
 introduction 17

the interpretation of his texts. One such question concerned whether the
intellect was part of the individual human soul, and if so whether this
applied to both the passive and the active intellect. Other problems arose
from the compatibility of Aristotles philosophy with Christian dogma
such as the doctrine of the eternity of the world. A subdivision of this lat-
ter source of problems was the question of the compatibility of Aristotles
thought with the thought of Augustine, whose authority was paramount
to medieval Western Christian thinkers. This conciliation was particularly
diffficult in the areas of Augustines thought in which the influence of
Neoplatonism was more acute, such as his views on the relation between
body and soul, the substantiality of the soul and the certainty of knowl-
edge, which involved the Augustinian doctrines of divine illumination and
divine exemplarism. To reduce thirteenth-century disputes to a struggle
between Aristotelianism and Augustinianism66 strikes me as misdealing
and reductive, however, and has long been an untenable position. The his-
tory of the reception of Aristotle in the Latin Middle Ages, of the transmis-
sion of his texts, and of the diffferent reactions to them is quite well
documented.
Kilwardby remained an Aristotelian throughout his career, although
with difffering degrees of intensity at diffferent times. When Augustine
arrived on the scene he took center-stage, but it can hardly be said that he
dominated it to the exclusion of Aristotle.67 In his works of the early 1250s,
Kilwardby set himself the task of promoting the conciliation of two
authors whose positions he took as being compatible. Once we accept this
description of what was going on we are able to put aside simplistic
accounts, such as presenting Kilwardby as an Augustinian fighting the
advances of Aristotle. This argument is profoundly misleading because it
ignores the extent to which Kilwardby attempted to promote a concilia-
tion between Augustine and Aristotle in dealing with the power of mem-
ory, the objects that are included in intellectual cognition, and the theory
of sense perception, for example.

66
lotta fra lAristotelismo e lAgostinismo, Ehrle 1970, 87. Here he argues that
although they do not constitute due scuole o partiti, the Masters would tend to belong
either to one or the other fields. See also Marrone 2001b, 27880; Bianchi 2003, 218.
67
As Lewry (1983a, 7; 8; 16) has made clear, Kilwardby refers to Augustine 12 times in his
course on the logica vetus, a group of commentaries written before 1245; on the DOS (of
1250s), Augustine is referred to 6 times against more than 200 references to Aristotle; and
in the DSF (of the same period), Augustine figures 100 times against 96 of Aristotle. In the
same article, Lewry claims that although Augustine is referred to just a few times in the
DOS, these references lay the foundation for an interest in reconciling the theories of
knowledge of Augustine and Aristotle (8).
18 introduction

What becomes evident from all these cases is that Kilwardby was not an
anti-Aristotelian, but an Augustinian who was also an Aristotelian. On the
other hand, because he was Aristotelian only to some extent, and fully
Augustinian, the criticism that he misunderstood some of Aristotles con-
cepts, or that he did not follow the principles of Aristotelian metaphysics,
fails to grasp the nature of his thought. He should not be judged according
to his faithfulness to a theory that he adopted only in so far as it did not
collide with the central principles of his thought, which from the middle
period on were Augustinian. To put it briefly, Kilwardbys philosophy was
built upon a certain understanding of Aristotle, which for the most part
was compatible with Augustine. He accepted Aristotles tripartite view of
the soul and adapted it to the unity of the soul required by Augustine; he
held, with Aristotle, that all our knowledge of sensible objects (even
intellectual cognition) originated in the senses, and made this fit with
Augustines view of intellectual cognition of spiritual objects that are pres-
ent in the soul from creation; finally, he reconciled Aristotles view of the
sense object as the cause of sense perception with the Augustinian thesis
of the impassibility of the soul by calling the object the necessary but
insuffficient cause, and by calling the sensory soul the effficient cause per se
of sense perception.
In dealing with these subjects, Kilwardby presents Aristotles and
Augustines arguments for their views and then offfers a solution combin-
ing the elements that are compatible. Whenever conciliation is not possi-
ble, however, he sides with Augustine. He was an Augustinian who was
also an Aristotelian to the extent that Aristotle was compatible with
Augustine.68 He wrote two works of a very diffferent nature, and which
show distinct influences in his middle period: De ortu scientiarum (hereaf-
ter, DOS), a widely circulated introduction to the arts based on the
Aristotelian notion of science, and De spiritu fantastico (hereafter, DSF), a
work written under the influence of Augustine aiming at a conciliatory
reading of Aristotles and Augustines view of sense perception. However,
although accepting the Aristotelian assumption that sense experience is
the source of human knowledge, together with the theory of the species
in the medium, Kilwardby adopted the Augustinian model of an active
theory of perception. What we also see in this work is the defense of
Augustines Platonism, most strikingly his anthropological dualism and

68
Kilwardby is more aware [than his teacher, Richard Fishacre] of the some of the con-
flicts between the Aristotelian and Augustinian theories of knowledge. This is perhaps due
to a knowledge of conflicting interpretations of Aristotle, Brown 1996, 364.
 introduction 19

the conception of the body as an instrument for the superior immaterial

soul. The latter presupposes a true hierarchical chain of being that is at
the core of Kilwardbys epistemology.
The picture of Kilwardby that emerges from this study is one of a thinker
torn between two philosophical traditions, resisting the temptation to
abandon either of them, and struggling to make both fit into a coherent
worldview, simultaneously sound and theologically orthodox. To view
Kilwardby as an Aristotelian or as an Augustinian as if they were mutually
exclusive qualifications is to reduce, and to a large extent to falsify, the
story. It could, of course, be argued that this is true of many authors of his
period. I do not dispute that to be torn between Aristotle and Augustine
was too common a feature to be distinctive of a particular author. I never-
theless believe that Kilwardby took the struggle and the attempt to make
the theories of both authors compatible to a new level. On the subjects of
human generation, the plurality of forms, sense perception, and even
intellectual cognition, Kilwardby attempted to offfer a coherent and philo-
sophically sound theory that followed the thoughts of both Aristotle and
Augustine. To demonstrate this compatibility was a motivating force of his
thought, as he himself often remarks.
The most natural place to look for Kilwardbys theory of the soul would
be in a De anima commentary, but even though he probably wrote one, as
it is attributed to him in a later medieval list of works,69 no such commen-
tary is extant. He discusses soul-related issues in much of his writing,
although not always in a very systematic manner. One thing that helps in
explaining this concerns his unorthodox career, which seemed to be at
odds with certain developments in the period: he was focusing on
Aristotles logical treatises before psychological questions became domi-
nant in philosophical discussion (he worked on logical commentaries in
his Parisian period in the 1230s and 1240s), and when they did become
dominant in Paris he moved to Oxford (c. 1245), where he was concerned
with theological questions. This does not mean, however, that he had no
coherent theory of the soul; on the contrary, he developed quite early his

69
See L. Pignon Catalogi et Chronica (accedunt Catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis
Scriptorum O.P.), ed. G. Meersseman, (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum
Historica, vol. 18) Rome: Institutum Historicum fratrum Praedicatorum S. Sabinae, 1936, 57.
Kilwardby does not refer to this work in his DSF or elsewhere; however, this silence can
hardly be considered a proof, since he usually does not refer to his other works (one excep-
tion is the reference to a commentary on the Topics found in his commentary on the
Perihermeneias; see Lewry 1978, 1445.
20 introduction

view, which with few exceptions, would remain the same throughout his
career. Already in DSF (ca. 1250) and QLS (ca. 1256) Kilwardby advocated
the essential distinction between the sensitive and intellective potentiae,
and he rejected a theory of the human soul according to which the ratio-
nal soul is created as a simple substance with all its vegetative, sensitive
and intellective powers. Thus, in order to provide a more systematic and
coherent account of his theory of the human soul we must concentrate on
DSF, DOS, QLS, D43Q, and E. His logical works refer to some aspects of the
soul qua form and his doctrine of seminal reasons, which must also be
taken into consideration.
It is therefore important to point out that even though my interest is in
discussing topics such as the human soul and the process of human
generation, with respect to the philosophical nature of the solutions
offfered, many of them cannot be separated from their original theological
contexts. As was common in the Middle Ages, many discussions of philo-
sophical topics in Kilwardby stem from theological questions, such as the
human rational soul as the image of the Trinity or the generation of human
beings in relation to the transmission of original sin. However, this does
not necessarily constitute a problem. As Simo Knuuttila wrote in 1999:
A purist conception of the history of philosophy suggests that a philosophi-
cal history of medieval thought should concentrate on what is philosophi-
cal. I think that even if there were an imaginary spotlight on the past
illuminating only philosophical thought, it would still be good to know from
what directions these items came into the beam of the philosophical light. It
belongs among the tasks of the history of philosophy to pay attention to the
birth of ideas. This requirement may demand investigation of the relations
between philosophy and other branches of cognitive activity. To be con-
scious of such historical connections can raise ones own preconceptions as
well, which is no bad thing for philosophers.70
For a scholar dealing with medieval thinkers, the theological discussions
and texts of a theological nature, such as the Sentences commentaries, are
essential reading in the process of understanding an authors thought.
Although this book is meant to be a philosophical work, many of the con-
clusions arise from Kilwardbys analysis of theological problems, and
many of the texts discussed are theological in nature.
*

70
Knuuttila 1999b, 238. See also Knuuttila 1996, 148.
 introduction 21

In the first part of the book I focus on Kilwardbys theory of the soul: the
definition and classification of its powers, and the relation between its
parts and between the soul and the body. I pay special attention to the
process of generationand the underlying (meta)physical principles
because the double origin of the human soul is at the base of Kilwardbys
plurality of substantial forms.
The metaphysical discussion of the unicity versus the plurality of sub-
stantial forms is often isolated from the epistemological question of how
we come to know the external world, even though the connection between
the two topics is too close to be overlooked. Kilwardby is a clear-cut exam-
ple of how the two issues are intertwined. I could not have addressed his
view on the plurality of forms without considering the consequences it
has on his theory of knowledge. For this reason, the second part of the
book focuses on the cognitive capacity of the human soul, together with
the powers involved in the processes of sense perception and intellectual
cognition. Special emphasis is given to the continuity between these pro-
cesses, as well as to Kilwardbys assumed intention of explaining sense
perception without any appeal to the powers of the intellective soul. His
main approach to knowledge is to conciliate the positions of Aristotle and
Augustine: he contrasts their views on the origin of our knowledge of
corporeal objects (DSF), the nature of memory (in Quaestiones), and the
objects of intellectual cognition (in DOS and in Quaestiones). He describes
the process of sense perception in a twofold manner: a more physiological
one according to which the corporeal spirit controls the body and carries
the information that arises from the sense organ afffected by sense objects,
and a more psychological one positing that the sensitive soul is the efffi-
cient cause of perception, intentionally turned to the bodily afffections
and making in and from itself the images of the sense objects. Perception
is due to the souls conformable nature in making itself like the images of
sensible objects informing the sense organs.
Kilwardby accepted the Aristotelian thesis that all of our sense knowl-
edge originates in the senses, but qualifies this with his theory of the active
nature of the sensory soul: the soul is the effficient cause responsible for
sense perception, whereas the object is the necessary condition. Kilwardby
gives a systematic account of the active theory of perception inchoately
formulated by Augustine, mainly in his works De Trinitate, De Genesi ad
litteram, and De musica. The main tenets of this theory are the spiritual
nature of the soul, which is whole everywhere in the body, its attentive
behavior with respect to the body in the protection of its instrument
for receiving information about the external world, and especially the
22 introduction

ontological presupposition of a hierarchy of being in which nothing infe-

rior (an exterior object or a corporeal spirit) can afffect anything immate-
rial (the soul). This derives from the Neoplatonic and Augustinian
presupposition of the impassibility of the immaterial soul: the object is
not able to cause any change in the immaterial sensory soul. Like many an
author of his time, Kilwardby introduces the corporeal sensitive spirit in
order to account for the interaction between body and soul. The difffer-
ence in nature between the two is so deep that the soul acts upon the body
only through the mediation of this bodily spirit, which is matter in a highly
purified state.
With respect to intellectual knowledge, I discuss the cognitive powers
of the rational soul as the image of the divine Trinity. Kilwardby follows
the traditional Augustinian image of the soul as expressing the Trinitarian
relations of persons. I start by presenting his solution for personal distinc-
tion, which he applies to the psychological model of powers and opera-
tions, and give special attention to the question of the verbum mentis in
the context of the operation of cogitatio and visio mentis.
I also discuss Kilwardbys understanding of the diffference between
Aristotle and Augustine with respect to the objects of intellectual cogni-
tion and their diffferent accounts of the power of memory; the science of
logic as the model for science and the ontological implications of his the-
ory of demonstrative reasoning; and the cognitive limits of created ratio-
nal souls. I present his criticism of Averroes monopsychism through his
theory of individuation and of universals. Kilwardby argues for a double
consideration of universals: as universals they exist only in the soul,
whereas as forms they exist as the essence of individuals. Thus, everything
that exists outside the soul is either itself individual or exists in the indi-
vidual. Moreover, universals also exist, as exemplar causes, in the Divine
mind. Finally, with respect to intellectual cognition, I deal with the doc-
trine of illumination and the cognitive power of the rational soul.
Finally, in the third part of the book, I address the issue that motivated
this investigation: what role did Kilwardby play in the 1277 Oxford
Prohibitions, and against whom were they targeted? Whereas I examine in
detail Kilwardbys own view about the human soul in Part One, in this last
part I use the conclusions reached to develop my understanding of what
theories of the human soul he was opposing on 18 March 1277. This last
part is more historical and more speculative, at the same time: focusing on
the events that led and followed the Prohibitions, I argue against most
scholarship that Kilwardbys target was the theory of the simplicity of the
human soul, not the theory of the unicity of forms. Kilwardby himself
 introduction 23

understood the latter, which was associated with Thomas of Aquinas, as a

particular case of the former, and as such it was to be avoided; but it was
not the target Kilwardby aimed at in the Prohibitions.
*
I sincerely thank Alessandro Conti, who generously made available to me
his provisory edition (based on Lewrys transcriptions) of Kilwardbys
commentaries on Aristotles Perihermeneias and on Porphyrys Isagoge:
fortunately his edition of Kilwardbys works survived the devastating
earthquake in 2008 that destroyed Professor Contis home and University
in the Italian town of LAquila. When referring to passages in these works
I indicate the manuscript and the folio as they appear in Contis provisory
edition.71 I have compared his edition with the Madrid manuscript, but
found no significant corrections to be made. Paul Thom was kind enough
to send me parts of the edition (and translation) of Kilwardbys Com-
mentary on the Prior Analytics he is preparing for publication. He has
meanwhile made that material available online.72
I would like to end this introduction with the words of Olga Weijers in
her edition of Kilwardbys (?) commentary on Topics: Tout article concer-
nant un ouvrage de Robert Kilwardby ou un texte attribu cet auteur
devrait commencer par un hommage Osmund Lewry.73 Indeed, no sin-
gle scholar has contributed more to the study of Kilwardbys thought than
the late P.O. Lewry. I willingly acknowledge my indebtedness to his inspir-
ing work.
All the translations that appear in the body of the text are my own,
except when otherwise noted. The exception is DSF, for which I use, with
minor corrections, A. Broadies version.
*

71
The sigla for the manuscripts are M = Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73; P =
Cambridge, Peterhouse 206; V = Venice, Biblioteca Marciana L.VI.66. See Lewry 1978, chap-
ter 1, for a detailed examination of the manuscripts. For the prooemium and first lectio of
each of these works, however, I use Lewrys edition to be found in Lewry 1978, abbreviated
respectively as CP and CI.
72
http://www.paulthom.net/Kilwardby%20Prior%20Analytics%20Commentary.html.
73
Weijers 1995a, 107.
 PART ONE

HUMAN BEINGS
 CHAPTER ONE

THE SOUL

Robert Kilwardby wrote at the time when the discussion on the nature
and functions of the soul was at its height.1 The discovery from the mid-
twelfth century onward of works of Aristotle in subjects other than logic
and the addition to these of commentaries by Greek and Arabic authors
irreversibly changed the philosophical (and theological) landscape, chal-
lenging many of the philosophical assumptions on which medieval
thought was founded. One of the fields in which this change is particularly
evident concerns the doctrine of the soul. Up until this time the
Augustinian view of the soul, strongly permeated by Neoplatonic influ-
ences, was dominant. Aristotle, directly and via his commentators, ques-
tioned the definition of the soul as a substance, and the nature of its union
with the body. The idea of the soul as the form (or actuality) of a (organic)
body potentially having life was the starting point of the doctrine, but how
thirteenth-century thinkers interpreted this idea varied significantly. The
majority tried to integrate the two worldviews and Kilwardby belonged,
with a twist, to this tradition.
According to Kilwardby, the soul is the form of the body,2 and the prin-
ciple of life in the animated being.3 Every living thing is able to perform the

1
As Pasnau (1997b, 109) summarizes it: Beginning with Averroess Commentarium mag-
num de anima (1190) and Johannes Blunds Tractatus de anima (c. 1200), Western philoso-
phers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries devoted immense efffort to developing
Aristotles thinking about the soul. Never before (and I suspect never again) has any indi-
viduals philosophical program received such detailed and sustained attention.
2
anima est forma corporis, QLIIS 79, 224.13. The soul is the form of the body not in
the sense of what makes the body a body (i.e. matter endowed with extension), but in the
sense of making it a living body and a specific kind of living body (i.e. as its perfection). The
form of the body qua body will be discussed later. As it will, hopefully, become clear later
on, whereas the form of the body in the latter sense is lost with death, the former remains.
As the motor of the body and its form or act, the soul is present everywhere in the body
(Est enim anima motor corporis et est forma sive actus eius, QLIIS 160, 443.54; and QLIIS
55.1, 160.823: Anima enim movet ut forma et ideo habet necesse esse in qualibet parte sui
corporis). In NSLPor 8, P 38vb, he says the soul is the actuality of an organic body (actus
corporis organici), being the act of the bodily parts by being the act of the whole (forma
totius). See also LSP 404.510; DOS VIII.35, 22.16 and DOS X.48, 25.18; QLIIS 78, 216.35; and
QLIIS 166, 462.279.
3
QLIIS 78, 216.35. Also QLIS 68, 201.8891: quia forma agens per se per virtutem
vitalem vita est, et omnis vita substantia est. See also LSP 401.14: Dubitatur postea de
28 human beings

operations that are appropriate to the kind of soul it has, which in the case
of human beings are those of nourishment, growth, local motion, sensa-
tion, and understanding.4 However, within this general definition are dif-
ferent parts that refer to diffferent parts of the soul.5 As Kilwardby states
elsewhere, we only know a compound when we know of what it is com-
posed;6 thus, it is necessary to consider which aspects of the general defi-
nition of the soul refer to which of these parts. Most authors of the period
agreed on the definition of the soul as the principle of life, and on the
notion that there were diffferent types of life, hence, diffferent life princi-
ples. They followed Aristotle in arguing for the existence of three such
principles: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. The consen-
sus broke down, however, when it came to how these principles are found
in complex beings, i.e. in those beings that have characteristics of more
than one type of life. A human being, for instance, has the properties of
intellective life in addition to sensitive and vegetative life. That these life
principles succeed one another is entailed by the process of natural gen-
eration, as the conceived being first lives a vegetative life, then develops
the powers of perception and motion and finally in the case of humans the
power of understanding. The question is rather what this succession
means to the successive life principles: is the existing one absorbed by the
supervening one, or do they coexist at one time in the same being? Yes is
the typical answer of an advocate of the theory of the unicity of the form
in the human soul to the first option; whereas a supporter of the theory of

anima hominis, utrum sit forma uel non, et quia illud quod res est actu id quod est, est
forma illius; anima autem est illud per quod est animatum id quod est, igitur anima est forma
animati; DOS XXXI.316, 113.911; DOS XLVIII.466, 160.67: Similiter corpus vivit anima
sua, et anima vivit vita sua, vita autem vivit seipsa et non aliunde. The soul as the principle
of life applies to any kind of living thing, whether a plant or an animal (E 4, 32.116).
4
Set dicendum quod uiuere dicitur multipliciter, uegetari, sentire, moueri secundum
locum et intelligere, LSP 402.123. Cf. Aristotles De anima II.2, 413a225.
5
I use the term part not in the sense something extended has parts but in the sense of
really distinct aspects of the soul. Aristotle himself refers to them as parts (e.g., De anima
III.9, 432a18-b13). For Kilwardby, see E 5, 42.237: Intelligere debetis, quod una est anime
racionalis substancia in homine, non tamen simplex, sed ex partibus composita, (emphasis
added).
6
Quoniam scimus compositum cum sciamus ex quibus et qualibus componitur, NSLP
1, 6.23.
7
Vegetativa enim, sensitiva et intellectiva partes sunt essencialite[r] diffferentes, et
secundum Philosophum, et secundum Augustinum, E 5, 42.257; also DOS XXV.199, 77.13
5: Verbi gratia, homo est compositus ex vegetativo, sensitivo et intellectivo, quorum vege-
tativum est natura prius, et intellectivum ultimum, et sensitivum medium. See also E 5,
39.247; E 5, 43.0608; E 5, 43.1820; E 6, 456.23-04; E 7, 53.1927; QLIS 61, 175.635; QLIIS
8, 29.402; QLIIS 8, 30.5962.
 the soul 29

the plurality of substantial forms in the human soul would typically

respond in the afffirmative to the second. (See section 3.1 for more details).
Two further questions follow from this: how these life principles come
into being and what is their ontological status. I will address the former in
section 2.1 and the latter in section 3.
With respect to the vegetative, sensitive and intellective parts of the
soul, Kilwardby argues that they difffer essentially from each other.7 He
generally refers to these parts as potencies (potentiae), but also as forms
(formae) and essences (essentiae).8 Thus,
(A) The human soul is composite of three really distinct potentiae:
the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective
The diffferent operations for which the soul is responsible are performed
by these diffferent parts. Vegetative potentia makes the body to take nour-
ishment, to grow, and to generate.9 The sensory part is the perfection of
the animal,10 and as a form works and acts continuously by flowing into
the body, which is matter in relation to it, holding together, preserving
and organizing it,11 and paying permanent attention to its afffections.12 The
attention (attencio) of the soul is due to the need to preserve the body,
which the soul uses as its instrument for knowing sensible objects.13

8
See Zavalloni 1951, 321, n.9. In Philip the Chancellor we find the expression tres sub-
stancie incorporee et una anima (SB, q. 3, 2334). We can distinguish three uses for the
term potentia in Kilwardbys works: the potentiae (or formae), which are the parts or kinds
of soul; the potentiae that are the powers (or vires) of the soul; and the potentiae activae,
which correspond to the seminal reasons. Each of the potentiae (or formae) has several
potentiae (or vires). I translate potentiae or vires as powers, and potentiae activae as active
potencies or potentialities. The first meaning of potentia is highly problematic to translate,
since each of the alternativescapacity, power, potencyraises some conceptual issues
of its own. I decided, hencefore, to leave potentia insofar as forma untranslated for the most
part or to translate it as form when justified by the context.
9
nutrire, generare, augmentare, E 5, 36.2.
10
Sensitivum est perfeccio animalis et actus et forma, E 5, 36.134. On the Avicennian
use of the term, see Avicenna, LdA I.1, 206.
11
Vt autem intelligatur eius sententia, nota quod spiritus sensitiuus, eo quod forma est,
continue operatur et agit influendo in corpus quod est ei materia, et hoc continendo,
uniendo, saluando et ordinando illud, DSF 99, 75.324. In the same paragraph, the opera-
tions of the sensory form seem to include those of the vegetative form, that is, life, the
power of growth, preservation, health, natural organization or organization of the body.
12
DSF 99. The soul reacts diffferently according to the intensity and nature of the afffec-
tion, e.g. the intensity of the light and color (cf. DSF 100, 76.1621).
13
Et hic appetitus saluandi corpus et attencio siue sollicitudo circa hoc spiritui inditi
sunt, pro eo quod corpus coruptibile est et lesibile, et pro eo quod est delectabile et utile
instrumentum ipsius spiritus ad multorum noticiam optinendam et ad comodum placi-
tum de multis consequendum, DSF 101, 76.247. See also QLIII1S 46, 216.634635, where he
uses the concept of intentio: potentia sensitiva constringit se convertendo se ad corpus
30 human beings

The way of operating brings about a distinction between the vegetative

and sensitive potentiae, which operate only through bodily organs and are
the actuality of some part of the body,14 and the intellective potentia, which
does not need the body for its operations, such as actual thinking.15
According to Kilwardby, the soul operates even better when it is separated
from the sensitive body than when informing it,16 probably meaning that
the operations of understanding are less disturbed by not being subjected
to the appetites and desires of the body and the multiplicity of external
stimuli. Therefore, the intellective soul is not the actuality of any part of
the body.17 The point is not that the intellective form does not need the
body at all; on the contrary, as will become clear, it needs to be united with
it in order to acquire information about corporeal objects. However, it
does not require the use of any organ to perform its operations.
Kilwardby makes a clear distinction between the sensitive soul, which
is the life and actuality of the body and its organs,18 and the intellective
form, which is the actuality of the sensitive body in the sense of being its
perfection.19 The intellective soul is able to subsist separated from the body
because it operates without the body, it is not the actuality of any part of
the body, and it is created directly by God. A fundamental aspect that
explains and justifies the essential diffference between the vegetative, the
sensitive and the intellective is how they come into being. Whereas the
vegetative and sensitive evolve from the potentiality of matter or, to be
more precise, from the potentialities in matter, the intellective is created

per intentionem, quia ad salutem corporis intendens hoc facit. Cf. Augustine, De quanti-
tate animae, ed. W. Hrmann, CSEL 89. Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 1986, 71.
14
Dicit uegetatiua et sensitiua quod est impossibile ut intrent corpus ab extrinseco; et
intellectiua quod intellectus intrat tantum ab extrinseco, et quod ipse solus est diuinus
quoniam operatio eius non habet communionem cum operatione corporali aliquo modo.
De aliis autem dicit quod habent communionem cum aliquo corpore, scilicet in opera-
tione sua, D43Q, 34, 39.9704. See also QLIIS 14, 52.47. (Cf. Aristotle, De generatione anima-
lium II.3, 736b289 that reads: intellectus tantum intrat ex extrinseco et quod ipse solus
est divinum, quoniam operatio eius non habet communicationem cum operatione corpo-
rali aliquo modo, in Michael Scots translation.)
15
sensitiva et vegetativa operantur in corpore, quae operantur et per corpora et non
sine illis, sed intellectiva non indiget corpore quia potius intelligit separata a corpore et ab
eius actionibus et motibus quam coniuncta, DOS X.54, 27.36.
16
QLIIS 8, 28.67; 29.389. The same idea is found in Dominicus Gundissalinus, Dia, 5,
lines 1219.
17
Item sensitiva potentia partium corporis actus est, sed intellectiva nullius partis cor-
poris actus est, DOS X.56, 27.112. See also NLP I.33, 206.613; and QLIIS 82, 232.234,
233.414.
18
QLIII1S 46, 215.620623.
19
E 5, 41.202.
 the soul 31

directly by God. The intellective form, Kilwardby claims, is related to the

sensitive body (i.e., the body informed by the sensitive form) just as per-
fection (perfeccio) is related to that which is to be perfected (perfectibile).20
The qualification of the intellective soul as the perfection (perfectio)
or completion (consummatio) of human life is referred to by other
Augustinians of the same period, including Roland of Cremona and
William of Auvergne.21 The choice of perfection instead of act or actual-
ity is not neutral; the intention is rather to interpret Aristotles hylomor-
phic account in the framework of a dualist theory of the human composite.
The intellective form comes to an already existing composite, whether
this be the human bodymatter plus form of corporeityor the human
sensitive bodya complex body informed ultimately by the sensitive
soul. Most unitarians before Thomas Aquinas upheld the former, that is a
dualism of substances (body and soul) or a pluralism of forms in the
human composite; pluralists such as Kilwardby argued for the latter, in
other words a dualism of substances and a pluralism of forms in the
human soul and in the human composite.22 Kilwardbys adoption of per-
fection makes sense in the face of his understanding of the intellective
potentia as the completion of human life, as I show in section 3.
In some places Kilwardby describes the relation between the intellec-
tive soul (intellectiva potentia) and the sensitive body as that between the
mover and the moved, or that the intellective soul relates to the sensitive
body as the sailor relates to his ship (sicut nauta navi).23 Latin Averroists
commonly used this analogy of Platonic origin to express the separability
of the intellect from the body. It was condemned in Paris in 1277 because it

20
E 5, 36; 40. Cf. Alexander of Hales, ST II, tract.1, sect.1, q.3, a.2, 420: Ad quod dicendum
quod anima rationalis coniungitur suo corpori ut motor mobili et ut perfectio formalis suo
perfectibili.
21
D43Q 34, 38.9556 and D43Q 34, 38.9502; and QLIII2S 63, 267.434. Cf. William of
Auvergne, dA, c. 5, p. 4, 118. See Gilson 192930, 39; Zavalloni 1951, 406; and Gauthier 1982,
358.
22
The dualism of substances entails a plurality of forms in the human composite
because the body to be a substance needs to have a form of its own other than the soul; it
leaves open the plurality or unicity of forms in the human soul.
23
Item sensitiva potentia partium corporis actus est, sed intellectiva nullius partis cor-
poris actus est, sed sicut nauta accedit navi iam factae et movet eam et separatur ab illa
manens navi corrupta, sic est de intellectiva et sensitivo corpore, DOS X.56, 27.114. Cf.
Aristotle, De anima II.1, 413a810; Plato, Timaeus. (The Loeb Classical Library, vol. VII)
London-Cambridge: William Heinemann-Harvard University Press, 1952, 34C, 65 (the soul
as the ruler and the body as the ruled). See also William of Auvergne, Da, c. 1, p. 7, 73.
However, in the QLIIS 55.1 (160.826), Kilwardby compares the human soul moving the
body as a form whereas the angelic soul can only be thought of as the mover of an assumed
body sicut nauta in navi.
32 human beings

implied that the intellect was not part of the individual human soul.24
Kilwardby dissociates the expression from its monopsychist implications,
however, relating it not to the power of the intellect but to the intellective
potentia, which is the perfection of the sensitive body. He does use the
analogy in the context of the relation between sense and intellect in DSF.
Here, citing the authority of Augustine, he explains that the intellect uses
the senses like a ship bringing sense data to it.25 In this context of sense
perception, the sailor-ship relation stresses the instrumental aspect of
the body and not the nature of the intellective soul or of its union with
the body.26
The main aim of the analogy is to explain how the intellective soul, as
the sailor, takes care of a ship that has been built, moves it and separates
from it when it has been corrupted. This Platonic-based theory, dressed in
Aristotelian terminology, seems to have been an attempt to deal with the
diffficulties of the definition of the soul as a form to be corrupted with the
composite and the required Christian immortality of the soul. The distinct
nature of the sailor with respect to the ship makes it easier to argue for the
latter, but creates diffficulties for the former. The subject for the soul is the
already constituted body, and it relates to the body not as an accident
inhering in a subject but as a substance (the sailor) to another substance
(the ship).27 Kilwardbys argument boils down to this: the body must first
reach a certain level of organization that is suitable for the reception of
the intellective soul, and in that sense the intellective soul becomes the
perfection of the sensitive body only after this moment. In other words,
the intellective soul assumes the function of sailor once the ship has been
built, with the vegetative and sensitive forms acting as preparatory dispo-
sitions.28 It thus informs an already constituted composite. It nevertheless

24
Quod intellectus non est forma corporis, nisi sicut nauta navis, nec est perfectio
essentialis hominis, article 7, in CUP 544. See Averroes, CmdA III, comm. 4, 400, 11.395
399; 405, 1.5446, 1.548. Thomas Aquinas SCG II.57, 2, identifies this position as Platos own.
25
Quibus uerbis uult dicere quod per sensus quasi per nauem transuectus est ab extra
a sensibilibus ad interiorem intelligenciam, DSF 30, 62.68.
26
Corporis quia bene obsequebatur animae, animae quia bene usa est corpore,
QLIII2S 1, 8.1701.
27
The clearest formulation is found in NSLP 7, 37.78: Est etiam anima in subiecto sibi
corpore sicut motivum in moto, non sicut accidens in subiecto: unde hic non arguit, ut
quidam obiciunt, animam non esse substantiam. A good introduction to this discussion is
Bazn 1997.
28
Cf. Richard Fishacre, InIIS, dist. 12, 246, lines 32024. The source of this position prob-
ably is Philip the Chancellor, SB, q.3, 231; q.8, 284. The same view is found in Alexander of
Hales, ST, t. II, inq. IV, tr. I, sect. 1, q. 1, c. 2, n. 345, 420.
 the soul 33

remains unclear how a substance composed of matter and form can be

said to be the actuality of another substance. The question cannot be eas-
ily put aside because the sailor-ship analogy exposes a striking diffficulty:
the sailor is not part of, or at one with, the ship whereas the intellective
form is the specific diffference of human beings.29
Kilwardby held that the soul was a substance, but also, by itself, act and
form. He makes no reference to the Avicennian double consideration of
the soul as a form, from the point of view of its relation with the body, and
as an immaterial substance, from the point of view of the definition of the
soul in itself.30 Nevertheless, he suggests that it falls under diffferent
descriptions depending on which branch of philosophy is in question:
from the point of view of the natural philosopher (physicus) the rational
soul is a natural moving principle, whereas the metaphysician considers it
to be a substance separable from physical matter, capable of subsisting
without the body.31 Let us next consider the substantial nature of the soul
and its other kind of composition, and then return to the relation between
the intellective soul and the sensitive body.
Kilwardby claims that everything that subsists, apart from God, has
two composing principles, a quod est (matter) and a quo est (form).32 This

29
That is precisely the sense of Aquinas criticism of Plato in SCG II.57, 45, as that
would make this union impossible and, at best, accidental.
30
Avicenna, Lda I.1; V.1. See Verbeke 1968, 20*46*.
31
DOS XXVIII.233, 88.1217. Also DOS XXVIII.235, 889.34-01: In quantum substantiae
sunt et per se entes ad metaphysicum pertinent; in quantum mobiles sive mutabiles, ad
physicum.
32
Kilwardby identifies them: Aliter dicitur communiter materia illud quod est, sicut
forma illud quo est, prout dicitur quod omne per se subsistens citra Deum habet aliquid
quod est et quo est, et illud quod defert formam et substat ei, DOS XXX.256, 96.36. See
also DOS XXX.255, 96.0306; XXXI.265, 99.1820; XXXI.268, 99.2728; QLIS 35, 90.33940;
QLIS 60, 171.535: et quia quod est et quo est denotant duo principia compositi scilicet
materiale et formale; QLIIS 14, 512.2434. The doctrine of universal hylomorphism is
defended by Solomon Ibn Gabirol (known to the Latin authors as Avicebron) in his Fons
vitae which was translated by Gundissalinus and John of Spain (cf. Avencebrolis FV I, 5, 7;
II, 24, 69; IV, 1, 211; IV, 5, 220; V, 12, 278. See also IV, 3, 216 for a plurality of forms in the soul).
The Boethian distinction id quod est/esse (from the De hebdomadibus) does not necessarily
coincide with the matter/form distinction (it is made to coincide by Gilbert of Poitiers,
adjusting to id quod est/id quo est; but e.g. Hugh of Saint-Cher, attributing it to Boethius,
does not follow it; also John of La Rochelle, SdA, c.17, 70). See Lottin 1957, 42843; and
Marenbon 1992. See also Bonaventure, CII, d.3, a.1, q.2, respondeo, 426: Et ideo tertius
modus dicendi, tenens medium inter utrumque, scilicet quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc
aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod intra se fundamen-
tum suae existentiae et principium materiale a quo habet existere, et formale a quo habet
esse. (See also II, d.13, a.2, q.1.) For Kilwardby, Gods essence and substance are the same
(QLIS 35, 86.2067).
34 human beings

constitutes a clear expression of the adoption of universal hylomor-

phism:33 matter can be spoken of in two ways, proprie and communiter.
In the former it refers to the stufff out of which something is made and
which is the subject of substantial change. This matter, materia physica or
naturalis, only exists in corporeal things (in corporalibus).34 Yet spiritual
creatures have matterquod estin a metaphysical sense,35 as that which
underlies (subsistit) the spiritual form36 and is defined as potential being

33
For the history of the concept, see Lottin 1932. Universal hylomorphism together with
plurality of forms constitutes what has come to be known as the binarium famosissimum.
For the history of the concept, see Spade 2003. According to Lottin (1957, 427), if we add
the identity of the soul with its powers to the matter-form composition of the soul and
the plurality of forms, we have the elements that distinguish the thirteenth-century
Augustinians and Aristotelians.
34
QLIIS 14, 5152.2430. Cf. DOS XXXI.265, 99.1819. Matter that enters in the composi-
tion of generable and corruptible things is studied by the natural philosopher (physicus)
because the natural philosopher studies things insofar as changeable; the study of sub-
stance and accidents as beings on their own belongs to the metaphysician (cf. DOS
XXVIII.235, 8889.34-01). However, their matter agrees in genus: DOS XXXI.270, 100.14;
QLIIS 15. (See following section.) See Matthew of Aquaspartas Questiones de anima, in
Gondras 1957, (II.D), 241, which refers to this distinction between the materia phyica, itself
composite of matter and form, and the materia pura. Matthew (ca. 12371302) refers explic-
itly to Hugh of St. Victors De sacramentis, I, p.1, cc.4 (PL 176, 189).
35
Communiter autem dicitur materia illud quod dicitur quod est in omni composito,
sicut forma est illud quo est, secundum quod dicitur quod omne per se subsistens citra
Deum habet quod est et quo est et illud quod est defert formam et subsistit ei. Et sic est in
spiritibus, quod sic patet, QLIIS 14, 52.3134. See also DOS XXXI.265, 99.1920. Although
Kilwardby refers to a materia spiritualis, he usually does so in the context of presenting the
view of others, not associating himself with such view (cf. QLIS 80, 257.6670). One excep-
tion is DSF 80, 72.2425; another QLIIS 16, 60.32. On spiritual matter, see Avencebrolis,
FV I.9, 12.
36
spiritualem creaturam de qua, cum iam constet de tota corporali natura quod
materiam habeat, quaeritur an et ipsa materiam habeat. Non dico generabilem et corrupti-
bilem, quia constat quod talem non habet, sed materiam quae dicitur quod est in omni
composito et quae defert formam et subsistit ei., DOS XXXI.265, 99.1621. See also QLIIS
82, 232.30. The composite substance is the subiectum of accidents, and matter of substan-
tial forms (QLIS 59, 167.312). This dependence on matter required by the universal hylo-
morphism expresses, in the words of Macken (1980, 207) une infriorit mtaphysique [of
the creature] vis--vis de la souveraine simplicit de Dieu. This matter is diffferent from
generable and corruptible things (QLIIS 14, 52.412: Aliter dicitur quod materia physica
non est in spiritibus, quia illa est transmutabilis. Sed materia metaphysica potest ibi esse.);
it is a more noble matter: Ad secundum potest dici quod anima iam habet materiam nobil-
issimam, QLIIS 82, 232.30; also QLIIS 14, 52.414. According to Long (1998, 241), Richard
Fishacre was the first Oxford theologian to held the composite nature of angels and human
souls. Although Fishacre was, probably, Kilwardbys teacher, the influence of Bonaventure
in this respect seems clear (cf. Bonaventure, C II, d.3, p.1, q.1). See also QLIIS 8, 30.5962:
Dicendum ergo forte quod sic multae diffferentiae constituunt unam speciem quasi quod-
dam aggregatum, sicut forte anima habet materiam super quam adiciuntur diffferentiae
vegetabilis et sensibilis et intelligibilis quae ab invicem diffferunt essentialiter sicut partes
unius definitionis, (italics mine).
 the soul 35

(esse potentiale).37 Things change only into something actual by being

something potential, and this being-potential is matter. Spiritual creatures
must therefore have matter as a metaphysical constituent,38 given that
their principle of receptivity and change is other than substantial.
Kilwardby believed that spiritual creatures included everything of a spiri-
tual nature, whether separate or separable; the latter type includes the
human rational soul, which subsists per se as a hoc aliquid.39
(B) The rational soul, angelic and human, is composed of matter and
form.
Spiritual beings must have matter because only compounds of matter and
form can be subjects of change (substantial change not included),40 and
have receptivity to accidents, but matter is especially necessary to account
for individuation (individuatio).41 Whereas human souls are individuals
but not persons (see below), angels are personally distinct from one
another.42 The individuality of the soul is theologically central, since the
human being can only be saved or damned through the exercise of his
individual liberum arbitrium.43
Thus, the human soul is a subsistent entity in itself, composed of matter
and three substantial forms. The nauta-navi analogy is the expression of
one way of dealing with a diffficult claim in Aristotelian psychology: how

37
QLIIS 14, 52.3542.
38
DOS XXXI.272, 100.1821. See also DOS XXXI.319; here Kilwardby argues that what
Aristotle wrote does not forbid (not vetat) considering that possibility. In QLIIS 17, 64.878,
Kilwardby adds that only individuals can be subject of change.
39
Et loquor de natura spirituali separata a materia vel separabili, et omnino quae hoc
quod est, aliquid per se subsistens est sicut hoc aliquid, DOS XXXI.265, 99.2123. For
Kilwardby, a hoc aliquid is an individual in the category of substance, that is, a first sub-
stance ( quidquid est unum numero significat hoc aliquid, prima substantia est tale,
NSLP 7, 33.2728). See also DOS XXXI.304; NSLP 6, 26.16: substantia quae est hoc aliquid
est per se ens. See also NSLP 7, 33.2324; 40.1113. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.3, 1029a27
30; Categories 5, 3b103.
40
DOS XXXI.320, 114.115.
41
DOS XXXI.266269, although not as an active cause. Et videtur quod materiam
habeat, quia sine illa non est individuatio, et in talibus spiritibus est individuatio, DOS
XXXI.266, 99. Cf. Bonaventure, C II, d.3, p.1, q.1, a.1, c and respondeo. Only a composite of
matter and form can be the subiectum for accidents (cf. DOS XXXI.269, 99.2930).
42
Dicendum quod non diffferunt specie sed tantum personali proprietate, QLIIS 20,
79.212.
43
Et huic propter liberum arbitrium imputatur meritum et demeritum et homini per
ipsam; per alias vero minime, nisi forte per accidens ex usu meritorio vel demeritorio veg-
etative vel sensitive, quo eis utitur intellectiva, E 5, 40.2428. See also E 5, 39.1923. The
science that considers the operations of the will is Ethics. But Ethics considers them non
dico separatas, sed quas homo gerit in corpore mortali (DOS XLIII.404, 141.1719. As such,
the science of Ethics is not subordinated to Metaphysics (cf. QLIS 14).
36 human beings

can operations so radically diffferent in nature as those of vegetative and

sensitive souls that are bound to the body on the one hand, and those of
the intellective soul, unmixed and operating without material organs on
the other, be accounted for by the same form? But it also makes the plural-
ist view of the human soul subject to strong objection: how can such dif-
ferent forms co-exist and form one soul, a spiritual substance?44 Moreover,
if the soul is defined as the substantial form of the body, how does the
form survive the destruction of the composite? Kilwardby, in line with
many of his contemporaries, offfers a simultaneous dualist and hylomor-
phic view of the soul-body relationship: dualism about the relation
between the intellective soul and the sensitive body relation, and hylo-
morphism about the relation between the sensitive soul and the body.45
However, in various places in his work he defines the soul as a unity (una),
the form of the human body (forma humani corporis) and the form of a
living thing (forma viventis).46
The theory so far seems to lean on what appears to be two incompatible
aspects: on the one hand Kilwardby argues for the transcendent nature of
the higher of the souls potentiae, the intellective, and on the other he
emphasizes the cohesion between the parts of the soul and its unity.
It remains unclear whether the union between the human intellective
soul and the sensitive body, in other words the body informed by the sen-
sitive and the vegetative potentiae, is accidental or essential. Furthermore,
there seems to be tension concerning which aspect of the union to stress,
the intellective form or the lower potentiae. The following texts show how
Kilwardby understood the issue, and what solution he offfered:
(1) Because the human soul naturally desires to be united with the body and
naturally hates to be separated from it.47

44
Thomas Aquinas points out this objection in his De potentia, q. 3 a. 9, respondeo.
45
The problem is clearly pointed out by Lagerlund (2007, 5): These two aspects of the
soul pull in diffferent directions, namely according to the first aspect the soul is an indepen-
dent thing and according to the second the soul is essentally united to a body that it ani-
mates. Can the soul consistently have both of them?. See also Crowley 1950, 122; and, for
Aristotle, see Shields 1988.
46
QLIII2S 63, 268.8990 and E 7, 53.26, respectively.
47
Quia humana anima naturaliter appetit corpori uniri et naturaliter odit dissolvi ab
eo, DOS 37.358, 127.35. See also E 5, 40.202; and QLIII1S 46 on the nature of this sufffer-
ance. A similar expression is found in R. Grosseteste, De cessatione legalium, ed. R.C. Dales
and E.B. King. London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1986, III, VI.8, 150:
anima naturaliter appetat coniungi suo corpori, nichilque tamen abhorreat quam a cor-
pore suo per mortem separacionem. Cf. Dales 1995, 434. See also Richard Fishacres InIIS,
dist. 17, 346, line 186.
 the soul 37

(2) but this is not about the intellective potentia and the body to which it is
united, as it [the intellective potentia] attends only to the powers and opera-
tions of the body except, in a certain way, by accident. From this [it follows]
that the human sensitive potentia is able to be united with the intellective
[potentia], due to its [the human] body having a nobler complexion than
[the body] of brutes.48 But this is not primarily or immediately for the sake of
the intellect and its operations, but because of the sensitive [potentia] with
which the intellect and its operations must be united.49
(3) and in the same way as in the beginning, when man is generated, accord-
ing to the Catholic faith, the intellective is created and infused, and the res-
urrected body is united with the same, because the body with its sensitive
and imaginative desires to be united with the intellective potentia, as their
perfection.50
(4) but by this is given to understand a certain essential diffference within
the substance of the soul through which is made the aptitude for the union
[or, to be united].51
In (1) and (4) Kilwardby stresses the union from the point of view of the
intellective potentia, with respect to the body, whereas in (2) and (3) he
emphasizes the union from the perspective of the sensitive human body.
In the former (1 and 4) the capacity to be united is proper to the specific
nature of the intellective potentia; whereas in the latter (2 and 3) the
unibility (unibilitas, i.e., the ability or capacity to be united) is essential
for the sensitive human body but for the human intellective potentia, from

48
A very similar reasoning can be found in Bonaventure, C II, d.1, p.2, a.3, q.2, respondeo,
where he argues that the union of the rational soul with the human body is neither acci-
dental nor ignoble, since the human body, insofar as the noblest of the bodies must be
completed by the nobler of the forms. See also Richard Fishacre InIIS, d. 17, 338, lines
286289.
49
sed non est ita de potentia intellectiva et corpore cui unitur, ut scilicet attendatur
natura corporis penes virtutes et operationes illius nisi quodammodo per accidens. Ex hoc
enim quod sensitiva potentia humana unibilis est cum intellectiva, decet suum corpus
nobilior complexio quam brutorum. Sed hoc non est primo et immediate propter ipsum
intellectum et eius operationes, sed propter sensum cui debet uniri intellectus et eius oper-
ationes, DOS X.53, 26.2835. Cf. Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 1534. Another important
point in this passage is the sentence: decet suum corpus nobilior complexio quam brutorum.
Kilwardby is connecting the type of body, its higher complexity with respect to the body of
other animals, to the type of soul that should inform that type of body. Human beings have
a higher soul because their bodies are also more complex.
50
et sicut a principio, cum generatus esset homo, creata est intellectiva, et infusa
secundum fidem catholicam, sic resurgente corpore eidem unitur, quia corpus cum sensi-
tiva et ymaginativa sua appetit uniri intellective potencie, sicut sue perfeccioni, E 5,
40.159.
51
sed per hanc datur intelligi aliqua essentialis diffferentia quae intra est de substan-
tia animae per quam fit aptitudo ad uniendum, QLIIS 7, 27.301.
38 human beings

the point of view of its operations, the union is accidental. Therefore the
soul is not created for the sake of the body and its operations, but it is con-
tingently related to its operations. I believe that there is no contradiction
between the two accounts, as in (1) and (4) the capacity and natural incli-
nation to be united with the body is a constitutive diffference of the human
intellective soul, and therefore essential to it because no two things can be
distinct in species by something accidental;52 however, from a functional
perspective, the human intellective soul does not need any bodily organ
for its operations. This, as Kilwardby points out, explains why Aristotle pro-
duced no independent work on the human intellect among his writings
on natural philosophy: the intellect operates without any bodily organs
and, in terms of its operations, is only accidentally united with the body.53
The same tension seems to emerge in QLIII1S 10, in which Kilwardby
states that the rational soul is perfect and an essential perfection qua
rational; however, it is imperfect with respect to the natural appetite to be
united with the body, which it has in common with the inferior potentiae,
the vegetative and the sensitive.54 To be united with the body is essential to
the soul as a soul, but not to the soul as a rational spirit.55 Therefore, as far
as the intellects powers and operations are concerned, the relation with
the sensitive body is accidental, whereas with regard to the essence, the
rational human soul is created to be united with the sensitive human body.
Kilwardbys position seems to fit in with what B.C. Bazn called the eclec-
tic interpretation of hylomorphism, in other words a dualist view that
attempts to conciliate the substantiality of the human soul with its role as
the completive form of corporeal substance.56 The two aspects express

52
It also constitutes a distinction between the human body and the animal body (see
QLIIS 7, 26.810).
53
DOS X.53. On the other hand, Aristotle wrote works on animals and plants (DOS X.51
2). The work on plants Kilwardby refers to as De vegetabilibus. However, such work (also
known as De Plantis) is by Nicholas of Damascus, translated from the Arabic by Alfred of
Sareshel (see Aristoteles Latinus. Codices descripsit G. Lacombe in societatem operis adsump-
tis A. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, Aet. Franceschini, Roma: La Libreria dello Stato, 1939, 1923.
See also Nicolai Damasceni, De plantis libri duo Aristoteli uulgo adscripti, ex Isaaci Ben
Honai uersione arabica uertit Alfredus, ed. E.H.F. Mayer, Lipsiae, 1841); and Nicolaus
Damascenus, De Plantis, ed. et transl. by H.J. Drossaart Lulofs and E.L.J. Poortman,
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1989. Cf. Lohr 1997, 253.
54
QLIII1S 10, 53.7985. The rational soul is imperfect when separated from the body.
55
QLIII1S 10, 534.1068.
56
From this point of view, three distinct groups of commentaries can be distinguished.
First, those who developed an eclectic interpretation of hylomorphism in order to accom-
modate into it some basic principles of the Latin world-vision. These commentaries are
characterized by the afffirmation that the human soul is simultaneously a spiritual sub-
stance in itself and the substantial form that completes the corporeal substance (anima est
forma et hoc aliquid), and by the anthropological dualism that ensues, Bazn 2002, 122.
 the soul 39

Kilwardbys struggle to bring together his dualism of substances (body and

soul) and his plurality of forms (the three potentiae of the soul), based
on the double origin of the souls potentiae (see (F) in section 2.1). The
more the transcendence of the intellective soul is emphasized the more
dualist the outcome of the theory will be. The divine origin of the intellec-
tive soul deepens the transcendence even more. Kilwardby was aware of
this problem, and attempted to solve it in two ways: first, through the
notion of person, and second through the principle of unity amongst the
souls potentiaewhich I discuss in section 3.
The intellective soul, as the perfective form of the human body, must be
created as a true thing and a hoc aliquid.57 However, it has an incomplete
nature without the body, in that it is not created in order to remain per se
but to be the act of a sensitive human body.58 In other words, although
the rational soul is created so as to be able to exist without the body, its
natural state is to be united with the human body as its perfection.
Kilwardby took this natural inclination to be united with the body not to
be an accidental feature but rather to belong to the essence of the human
rational soul.59 Although he does not refer to it, this could support the
argument that the soul is not created prior to the body. The human ratio-
nal souls naturalinclination to be united with the body is its distinctive
character with respect to the angelic rational soul.60 A human being is a

Bazn himself does not refer to Kilwardby, neither does Kilwardby have a commentary (at
least one that has survived) on the De anima, but I believe the definition just mentioned
can be applied to Kilwardby. (Zavalloni uses this same term clectique to qualify the
authors of the Augustinian tradition, such as William de la Mare, Richard of Middleton,
which attempt to conciliate the theories of Aristotle, Avicebron, and Augustine; see
Zavalloni (1951), 4345.) Already for Aristotle the soul is a substance in the sense of being a
form, but precisely because it is the form of a natural body having life potentially (De
anima II.1) it cannot be a subsisting thing according to the principles of Aristotles hylo-
morphism. See also Averroes, CmdA, II.5, 1345.
57
Ad secundum dicendum quod anima perfectiva humani corporis debet esse vera res
et forma naturalis intellectiva et in se hoc aliquid. Et ideo oportet quod de nihilo creetur et
infundatur, QLIIS 138, 370.23941.
58
Intellectus quoque, licet creetur ut hoc aliquid, non tamen creatur, ut sic maneat per
se, sed ut sit corporis humani sensitivi actus, E 5, 41.202, (emphasis added). Note the difffer-
ence between what Kilwardby is saying, that is, that the intellective soul is the act of the
sensitive body (the body ultimately informed by the sensitive form) and what we find in
the Summa Halensis, that the rational soul is the act of the body, i.e. the body informed by
the form of corporeity (II, inq.4, tract.1, sect.1, q.3, tit.2, a.4, n.347, p. 422).
59
Appetite (appetitus) here means natural inclination, as anything tends to its perfec-
tion, rather than a volitional act implying rational assent. The intellective potentia cannot
desire otherwise (cf. QLIIS 8, 28.9: Item iste appetitus unionis est naturalis, quia non
potest eam non appetere). This is a diffficult term to translate. I use appetite, inclination
and desire. For this notion of natural appetite in Thomas Aquinas, see Laporta 1973, 3956.
60
haec unibilitas est diffferentia essentialis faciens hominem diffferre ab angelo,
QLIIS 7, 26.234. See also QLIIS 79, 224.213: Ostensum enim est supra, ubi actum est de
40 human beings

compositeof a rational soul and a body, difffering from the angelic rational
soul, which is not united with a body.61 Angels and human beings agree
(conveniunt) in the highest genus of substance, but they difffer in species:
human beings are corporeal substances and angels are incorporeal sub-
stances.62 The unibility is also important in accounting for the transmis-
sion of Original Sin.63
(C) The natural inclination of the intellective soul to be united with
the sensitive body is an essential feature of its nature.
Although Kilwardby considered the rational soul to be a this something
(hoc aliquid), able to subsist as separated from the body after death and
before resurrection, almost, as it were, a person (quasi personaliter)64
this was not enough to account for a person. Taking Peter Lombard
(ca.10951160) as his authority, he presents three criteria for personhood:
to be a complete substance of the rational kind, to exist in actuality (i.e., to
be an individual in its kind), and not to be a part of another thing.65

diffferentia essentiali angelorum et animarum rationalium, quod animae naturaliter appe-

tunt unionem. In hoc enim diffferunt ab angelis. The angelic souls are not forms of bodies.
See also QLIIS 6, 7, 74, 166. In QLIIS 166, Kilwardby argues that one of the reasons God could
not make the human rational soul without this natural appetite is that it would disturb the
hierarchy of the universe, placing human beings at the same level with angels. Bonaventure
probably influenced Kilwardby in this aspect; please see Osborne 1999.
61
Ergo homo qui est compositus ex rationali et corporali, difffert specie a rationali non
unita corpori, QLIIS 6, 23.223. See also QLIII1S 10, 50.146. Steel (2009, 488489), argues
that in NSLPor 8, Kilwardby distinguishes between rational as a specific diffference in
human beings and a property (proprium) in angels. In fact, Kilwardby uses that same argu-
ment in NSLP 4, 17, saying that rational is a per se accidens (a proprium) in incorporeal
substances and a diffference in corporeal substances. See also Vittorini 2009, 332334. In
QLIIS 37, 119.812, Kilwardby refers to the opinion of the moderni for whom angels do not
have a body. According to Lenzi (2007, 34) Albert the Great refers to the moderni who
defend the opposite view, that is, the composite nature of spiritual substances.
62
Item quaecumque conveniunt in solo genere generalissimo, diffferunt specie. Sed
homo et angelus sic conveniunt, quia immediate dividunt substantiam per corpoream et
incorpoream, QLIIS 6, 23.1416.
63
Alligatur autem corpori unde natura est appetitu naturali, et quia corpus est vitia-
tum, accidit ut vitietur et anima. Quia igitur non vitiaretur anima nisi uniretur corpori
actione naturalis appetitus, aliquo modo causatur vitium animae ex hoc appetitu et
actione, QLIIS 160, 443.5962. See also D43Q 33, 36.8728.
64
Et ideo creata est potencia intellectiva tamquam hoc aliquid potens quasi personali-
ter subsistere post corporis separacionem, E 5, 40.224. The soul qua spiritus rationalis, i.e.
without the consideration of its unibility with the body can be said to be, in a less noble
way, a person. That is how Kilwardby reads Hugh of St. Victor (QLIII1S 10). For an introduc-
tion on the discussion whether the soul is per se a person, see Wber 1991, 5760; 789; 499.
See also Hipp 2001.
65
de ratione personae non sunt nisi tres condiciones, scilicet quod sit natura ratio-
nalis et quod sit atoma in illo genere et quod non sit alicui unita, QLIII1S 10, 53.8990.
Also Ad secundum quod ad esse personae secundum Magistrum concurrunt quattuor
 the soul 41

The rational soul fulfills all but the last criterion because it is an essential
part of the person.66 Although being able to exist by itself, is not made to
exist apart from the sensitive body. Thus, the rational soul is not a person
when it exists together with the body (in the actual living being) or when
it is separated.67 Only the whole of which the rational soul is a part prop-
erly constitutes a person, a complete substance of rational nature actually
existing, and existing per se, in other words not having a natural inclina-
tion to be united with another thing as a part of something else.68 Only the
sensitive human body and the rational soul together constitute a person.69
It is worth emphasizing that the human body is an essential part of the
person because this frames Kilwardbys insistence on a bodily identity for
the resurrected person. The disembodied soul, however, longs to be united
with the body because alone it remains incomplete. Therefore, soul and
body are the metaphysical constituents of a human being (Kilwardby
makes no distinction between human being and human person), and
neither of them taken in isolation constitutes a human being.70 This
anthropological dualismin the sense that body and soul are two distinct
substancesis softened by the natural inclination or appetite of the

condiciones scilicet quod sit res rationalis naturae, et quod sit in actu, et quod non sit alte-
rius pars, sicut anima est pars hominis, et quod non sit nobiliori unita, sicut natura rationa-
lis humana in Christo est unita Verbo, QLIS 35, 89.28890, (italics mine). (The forth is only
related with the soul of Christ.) See also QLIII1S 8, 3940.10811; QLIII1S 9, 47.1237; QLIII1S
10, 51.458. Cf. Peter Lombard, S III, d. 5, cap. 2, 48: Persona enim est substantia rationalis
individuae naturae. Hoc est anima; igitur si animam assumpsit, et personam.Quod ideo
non sequitur, quia anima non est persona quando alii rei est unita personaliter, sed quando
per se est. Absoluta enim a corpore, persona est, sicuti angelus. Illa autem anima numquam
fuit quin esset alii rei coniuncta; ideoque non, ea assumpta, persona est assumpta. See also
QLIS 35, 86.2145, 216.
66
Mens enim rationalis est aliquid hominis qui est persona, QLIS 35, 90.325; and
QLIII1S 10, 51.434 ( pars personae non est persona).
67
Quod enim est alteri coniunctum vel naturaliter coniungibile, non est existens per se
solum vel non est natum existere per se solum. Quod tamen pertinet ad verum individuum
et ad personam, per consequens. Ex his videtur quod neque sit anima rationalis persona
quando coniungitur corpori, neque quando separatur, QLIII1S 8, 40.1148. Also QLIII1S 10,
52.656, appealing to the authorities of Peter Lombard and Hugh of St. Victor. Cf. McEvoy
1982, 270.
68
Kilwardby precises his definition: individuum ibi accipitur pro completa substan-
tia rationalis naturae, signata in actu completo, non dependente ad aliquid naturaliter
cuius sit compars, QLIII1S 10, 52.5254.
69
Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron, 10.2.7, 293: Et quia substantia animae unita est
corpori in unitate personae; the passage is quoted by Richard Fishacre, InIIS, dist. 17, 345,
lines 14243: substantia animae unita est corpori in unitate personae.
70
nec homo dicitur anima nec corpus solum, DOS XXXI.316, 112.33. See also QLIIS
69, 193. The body is a substance made to subsist on its own ( corpus est substantia facta
per se subsistens, QLIIS 69, 193.40)
42 human beings

intellective soul to be the act of the body, and the bodys inclination to be
perfected by the intellective soul.71 An important question that arises from
this is whether the unity of the soul itself is re-acquired only in resurrec-
tion and whether or not all the three potentiae remain in the disembodied
state. As I will show later on, Kilwardby offfers two contrasting views on
the matter.
Kilwardby claims that the human rational soul is a substance, but it is
not simple; it rather is composed of three potentiae, namely the vegetative,
the sensitive and the intellective.72 I will consider in Chapter Three how
these potentiae are related to each other in order to produce what I call a
composite unity. Let me remark for now that Kilwardby considered the
three potentiae to be essentially distinct from each other, and he argues for
this essential distinction in two ways. First, he claims a twofold origin of
(substantial) forms: some are created ex nihilo and some come from semi-
nal reasons. The vegetative and sensitive potentiae are generated by means
of the action of created agents, whereas God creates the intellective poten-
tia and infuses it in each being at a certain stage of fetal development.73
Second, he claims that a diversity of operations implies a diversity of
potentiae, which are essentially distinct from one another.74 These two
arguments are essential in shaping his theory of the soul and in explaining
Kilwardbys criticism of any theory that advocates the simplicity of the
human soul.

71
On anthropological dualism, see Bazn (1969, 32), where he suggests the replacement
of the expression pluralism of forms advanced by R. Zavalloni by his anthropological
dualism or dualism of substances since he considers that this is the problem at stake in
the pre-thomistic view of the relation of soul and body. All those who admit that the body
has a form of its owna form of corporeityapart from the rational soul hold a dualism
of substances or pluralism of substantial forms in the human composite. But this says
nothing about the unicity or plurality of forms in the soul as a substance and a form. It is
possible to argue for a plurality of substantial forms in the human composite and the unic-
ity of forms in the human soul. That is the case of William of Auvergne (see below).
72
Intelligere debetis, quod una est anime racionalis substancia in homine, non tamen
simplex, sed ex partibus composita. Vegetativa enim, sensitiva et intellectiva partes sunt
essencialite[r] diffferentes, et secundum Philosophum, et secundum Augustinum, E 5,
42.237. See also DOS XXV.199, 77.135.
73
Cuius sententia, nisi fallar, talis est quod uegetatiua <et> sensitiua educuntur de
potentia seminis opere nature, sed intellectiua exterius uenit opere diuino, D43Q 34,
37.9002. Cf. QLIS 64, 1878; 65, 18991; 66, 1923; 67, 1948; QLIIS 138, 372.283285; and E
5, 41.057. See also Philip the Chancellor, SB, q.3, vol. II, 233; Bonaventure, C II, d.18, a.1, q.3;
Thomas Aquinas, SCG II.8687.
74
Ut igitur elongentur animi infirmorum ab erroribus, et appropinquent philosophice
veritati, que concordat fidei catholice, multo melius dicetur tercio modo, videlicet, quod
diffferunt essencialiter ab invicem vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva potencia, E 5,
39.247.
 CHAPTER TWO

MATTER, FORM, AND CHANGE

As argued in the previous section, the soul is composed of matter and

three substantial forms. The other essential part of the person, the human
body, is also a substance composed of matter and form.1 The matter is not
the same in each case, however. What these two kinds of matter have in
common is that both are informed, the soul being informed by the forms
of the kinds of soul, the body by the form of substance, the form of corpo-
reity plus the specific forms of bodies together with its active potentiali-
ties. Given Kilwardbys adherence to the principle of the double origin of
the forms that constitute the human soul, it is necessary to explain the
general principles of his theory of change, and in particular of generation.
By way of clarification, let us consider the basic constituents of all sub-
stances, starting with matter.
The question of whether there is some matter that is common to spiri-
tual and corporeal things leads him to examine the problem of the unity
of matter in the long chapter XXXI of DOS. Albert Judy, the modern
editor of the work, notes that this chapter was probably the result of a
public disputation, constituting an extraordinarily clear report of a cele-
brated controversy among the proponents of universal matter in the
mid-thirteenth-century.2 Here Kilwardby presents the arguments for and
against the view that all things have some kind of matter in common, a
view that Roger Bacon, a contemporary, took to be widely held.3

1
Substantia igitur composita ex materia et forma corporali, quae est corpus substan-
tia, DOS XXIX.245, 92.145.
2
Judy (1973), 73*. A systematic presentation of the arguments, some questions about
the form of this chapter, and the comparison with other similar accounts found in Roger
Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise, and Thomas Aquinas, can be
found Judy 1973, 49*73*.
DOS XXXI.275321 (The full analysis of the concept of matter can be found in DOS
XXVIIIXXXI.229321, 87114). Kilwardby returns to the subject on the QLIIS 15, where he
follows the same reasoning but in a briefer manner. The DOS account is more system-
atic,with the presentation of the arguments for and against each position. I will present
the two opposing positions on the subject in the DOSs manner but follow the more brief
presentation of the arguments in the QLIISs style.
3
See Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, 120121; cf. Crowley 1950, 92.
44 human beings

Kilwardby starts by distinguishing two ways of considering prime mat-

ter (materia prima): (i) according to the essence (secundum essentiam), in
other words considered in se and per se abstracted from any form; and
(ii) according to the being (secundum esse), in other words considered in
its existence together (concreta) with form.4 In the latter case, prime mat-
ter can, informed by the form of substance, be said to be one as a genus;5
or multiplied in accordance with the plurality of actual existing individu-
als (actualiter exsistentibus).6 Prime matter has potentially distinct parts
that become actually distinct by receiving diffferent forms.7 In the former
case (i) there are two views:8
(i) matter has a unity of essence (unitas essentiae): according to the
view Kilwardby attributes to Averroes (ca. 11261198), matter, apart from
form, is one and simple in essence,9 being potential with respect to any
form whatsoever.10 It is form that distinguishes and diversifies.11 Prior to
the diffferentiation introduced by the specific and individual forms (for-
mas specificas et individuales), prime matter is one.12 Kilwardby presents a

4
DOS XXXI.276. The same discussion can be found in Bonaventure, CII, dist.3, p.1, a.1,
q.2. Bonaventure opposes the same two ways of knowing matter (modus cognoscendi mate-
riam): through privation (that is, abstracted from form) and through analogy (in connec-
tion with form). See Macken (1980). This double consideration is, according to Zavalloni
(1951), 3046, common to the Franciscan school (point repeated by Macken, 190). The same
seems to apply to form; on the Liber Sex Principiorum, Kilwardby argues that form, accord-
ing to the essence is simple, whereas according to the esse is divisible (see LSP 400.2830).
Here Kilwardby also claims that the simplicity of form only exists abstracted from matter
(idem, 445).
5
DOS XXXI.277, 101.227; 318, 113.279. See also QLIIS 15, 56.6870.
6
Et ideo si consideretur concreta cum forma individuali, est una vel plures numero
sicut et individuum est unum numero et individua multa numero, DOS XXXI.277, 101.157;
dixit QLIIS 15, 56.5961.
7
DOS XXXI.286.
8
Cum enim circa materiam duplex sit opinio, una quod ipsa sit una numero in
omnibusdico numerositate essentiae et non numerositate individuialia quod sit in
diversis diversa per essentiam, DOS XXIV.188, 73.302. See also DOS XXIX.241242, DOS
XXXI.278 and ssg., and QLIIS 15, 56.6570.
9
QLIIS 17, 62.402.
10
QLIIS 17, 65.1425. See also NSLP 17, 132.3031: cum materia una numero se habeat
ad omnem formam.
11
DOS XXIV.189190; and DOS XXXI.279. The view according to which (i) there is a mate-
ria uniuersalis omnium rerum, and (ii) the diuersitas non est nisi ex formis, is found in
Avencebrolis, FV I.12, 15: Hoc non potest esse ut essentia materia sit aliud ab essentia
eorum quae sunt, sed ea quae sunt, facta sunt aliud a materia per formas quae adueniunt
ei, scilicet diffferentias quae diuidunt eam. unde diuersitas quae est inter ea, quae sunt,
manifesta non aduenit nisi per formas manifestas.; and he concludes, materia prima
uniuersalis una non habens diuersitatem.
12
DOS XXXI.289, 105.911: Item Commentator Super XI Metaphysicae dicit quod mate-
ria prima est una numero, quia non habet in se pluralitatem formarum individualium ex
quibus est in rebus multitudo numeralis; dixit QLIIS 15, 55.279. Cf. Averroes, In Meta.
 matter, form, and change 45

series of objections to this view, of which the more substantial is that prior
to the reception of any form matter cannot be numerically one because
individuation and numerical distinction only arise from an individual
form.13 In reply, Kilwardby offfers a generous reading of Averroes, claiming
that the Commentator should be understood as claiming that matter is
one by privation only, in other words in the absence of the numerical dis-
tinction that arises from diffferent forms.14 Read in this way, Averroess view
does not seem to difffer substantially from (i).
(i) matter is essentially diffferent in numerically diffferent things and
even in diffferent parts of the same thing considered in its essence.15 If we
conceptually strip down the forms from spiritual, celestial and natural
beings, what is left is naked prime matter; but this prime matter is, accord-
ing to this theory, still essentially diffferent. Prime matter has essentially
diffferent parts, not with respect to the forms it receives, but in itself. The
diffferent kinds of beings have prime matter with diffferent degrees of sub-
tly and purity.16 We should therefore speak of diffferent prime matters
according to the kind of being they constitute. Prime matter is one by
analogy only.17 Kilwardby, although never explicitly, endorses this latter
view. In addition to the plurality of forms, Kilwardby also holds a hierarchy
of degrees of prime matter that constitute the diffferent kinds of being.
Kilwardby offfers a triple account of prime matter: absolute prime matter,
bodily prime matter and natural or physical prime matter.18
Pure prime matter underlies any general and special form.19 Prime mat-
ter first receives the most general form (forma generalissima), by which

XII.14, ed. Iunctas, 301, L. Aquinas refers to exactly the same theory of Averroes on the unity
of matter in De ente et essentia, 2, ed. Leonina, 373. However, in the NSLP 1, 9.30 Kilwardby
attributes that thesis to Aristotle.
13
quia non habet aliquam unam formam individualem qua res sit una numero,
QLIIS 15, 58.119120.
14
QLIIS 15, 58.1214; DOS XXXI.293. Roger Bacon also criticizes the view of prime matter
as numerically one in all things (una est materia numero in omnibus rebus, et quod solum
est diversitas a parte formarum; sed hic est error infinitus), in Opus Majus IV, I, d.4, c. 8, 144.
15
DOS XXXI.280, 102.79; 285, 1034.35-04.
16
DOS XXXI.285, 104.10-9; 286, 104.267; 292, 106.58.
17
QLIIS 15, 57.1002. See also DOS XXXI.280, 102.79: Secunda opinio ponit quod sit
substantialiter diversa in rebus diversis et etiam in partibus diversis eiusdem rei, et non
una nisi per quandam analogiam.
18
This threefold account (tripex est materia aut triplex status materiae) can be found in
DOS XXIX.246-ssg.; DOS XXXI.320; E 2. Presenting these types of matter, Kilwardby follows
the natural order, whereas their order of being known is the opposite: we first know what
comes to our senses and only by intellectual consideration come to know what is hidden in
sensation (DOS XXXI.321, 114.258).
19
Materia enim pure prima praeter omnem formam considerata substat omnibus for-
mis generalibus et specialibus, DOS 246, 92.235; DOS XXXI.320, 157. See also E 2, 23. It is
46 human beings

the composite is called a substance.20 Nothing mediates between pure

nothing and the actuality of the first form to perfect matter, the form of
substance.21 Kilwardby points out, in his NSLP, that substance is said in
many ways: matter and form, composite and essence. He concludes, how-
ever, that the noun substance signifies primarily the aggregate of matter
and form, not on account of matter but on the account of form.22
Substance, the highest genus (genus generalissimum), divides into cor-
poreal and incorporeal.23 Incorporeal (created) substance is further
divided into the angelic and the human rational soul.24 Kilwardby is
explicit in stating that bodies and spirits have in common the form of sub-
stance, which is the highest genus;25 hence it should properly be said that
corporeal and spiritual beings belong to the same genus from a logical
point of view only.26

the unity of this prime matter that Kilwardby discusses at length in the DOS and QLIIS 15
(see section 2.2.)
20
Cum igitur advenit ei forma generalissimi qua compositum recipit rationem sub-
stantiae, DOS XXIX.246, 92.267. Cf. DOS XXIV.166; DOS XXXIII.340, 121.168. See also
NSLP 5, 19.12, and DOS XXV.2045, 79. For Kilwardby, form and matter alone do not qualify
as substance; substance is always a composite (or aggregate (NSLP 6, 25.2835). Substance
is said first of all of the absolute essence which is the highest genus in the category of sub-
stance (NSLP 6, 27.15); then it is said first and second substance: a first substance answers
the question what is? (Quid est?), and it is that which subsists on its own (per se substat);
genus and species are the second substances, and subsist through the first substance
(secundas substantias, quae non per se et primo recipiunt hanc intentionem substantiae
quae est substare, NSLP 6, 28.1314). Wheras a first substance is a hoc aliquid, a second
substance is a quale quid (NSLP 7, 33.2325). Quale here means a substantial qualification,
i.e. that genera and species are essences and quiddities of first substances (innuendo gen-
era et species significare quale substantiale, et qualitates quae sunt formae substantiae
quae sunt quidditates et essentiae primarum, NSLP 7, 34.910), i.e. what (quid) the thing
(first substance) is (NSLP 7, 40.68). A species is more substance than a genus because
(i) it is closer (propinquius) to the first substance and (ii) the genus is predicated of the
species, not the other way round (NSLP 6, 2324; and 27.1213).
21
Actus enim formae generalissimae est primus actus post nihil, DOS XXXI.274,
100.345.
22
NSLP 6, 2526.28-09.
23
NSLP 6, 27.13; and QLIIS 6, 23.1416. See also DOS XXX.259, 97.2425: Forma enim
corporalis et spiritualis, quae primo dividunt substantiam; NSLP 5, 19.12; and DOS XXV.208,
80.256; DOS XXXI.273; that is, they have the same genus: DOS XXVI.212, 82.1620. See also
NLSP 6, 27.13. The highest kind is that which does not have a supervenient genus. There is
not one such a kind which is the highest of all kinds; there is one genus generalissimum in
each category, as the categories are the diffferent ways the being is said (being is not a kind).
See NSLPor 5, which seems to be a close reading of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.2, 1003a3335).
Matter as the genus generalissimum is found in R. Bacon (Opus tertium, in OHI, chapter 38,
12021) and from that in R. Fishacre (cf. Long 1998, 2434).
24
QLIIS 6, 23.5; 23.146; 23.223; 23.3942. See also DOS XXVIII.233, 88.157.
25
DOS XXV.208, 80.2526. See also DOS XXVI.212, 82.1721.
26
Respondendum ad primum obiectum, cum dicit spiritus et corpus communicant
idem genus, verum est quoad considerationem logicam. Unde sicut in corporalibus et
 matter, form, and change 47

Substance is made corporeal by receiving the form of corporeity (forma

corporis or corporalis), which endows it with extension.27 Kilwardby distin-
guishes between the substance of the body, i.e. the capacity for receiving
three dimensions, and the bodys quantity, i.e. three-dimensionality
itself.28 Corporeal substance is a generic, incomplete because nonspecific
form,29 i.e. without any special form of bodies.30 A body is a substance that
has three dimensions conjoined in the act of being.31 This applies to both
celestial and terrestrial bodies, which agree on the common genus of
matter.32 Corporeal substance is further divided into animate and
inanimate.33
Matter then receives the specific forms of the bodies, those that move
circularly or rectilinearly; the latter can be heavy or light, simple or

spiritualibus est genus unum secundum rationem, non secundum rem, sic et materia,
QLIIS 16, 60.3942. This fits with Kilwardbys conclusion that matter is one by analogy.
27
Cum autem deinde advenit ei forma corporalis qua compositum dicitur et est cor-
pus, aestimo fieri dimensionem et magnitudinem omnino, DOS XXIX.246, 92.2830; also
DOS XXV.208, 80.289; forma corporalis, DOS XXIX.246; DOS XXXIII.340, 121.1820: actio
iterum formae corporalis absolute quae secundo advenit super materiam, cuius actio vide-
tur esse materiam extendere et spatium occupare; QLIIS 62, 178.43 (forma corporeitatis).
See also NSLP 8, 57.2631; NSLP 18, 140.1920. The question of the form of corporeity is a
long discussed topic. Its origin has been attributed to Simplicius by Wolfson 1929.
Avencebrolis argues for the existence of a materia corporeitatis (= substance) and a forma
corporeitas (FV II.1, 23). The body receives then other forms, such as figure, colour, etc. See
also de Haas (1997), chapter two. Kilwardby does not identify, as many of his contempo-
raries, following Grosseteste, the form of corporeity with light (Grosseteste, De luce seu
inchoatione formarum, ed. Baur, 51).
28
NSLP 4, 17.113. See also Difffert autem corpus quantitas a corpore substantia, quia
corpus substantia denominat potentiam recipiendi trinam dimensionem, corpus quanti-
tas est ipsa trina dimensio, NSLP 7, 57.101; and NLPA 127.1758. According to Wolfson 1929,
5823, for Avicenna [m]atter itself, though incorporeal, has a predisposition to receive
corporeal dimensions. This predisposition, not the dimensions, is the corporeal form. It is
form, being received in matter, which determines matter in extension, concentration and
rarefaction.
29
QLIIS 62, 178.406.
30
DOS XXX.251, 94.235. See also DOS XXX.260, 97.2931; and E 2, 26. The form of cor-
poreity (an incomplete form) is more universal and prior to the forms of the elements, the
first supervening complete forms (QLIIS 61, 173.4851: Primae formae, scilicet complete
advenientes materiae, sunt elementares, sed non prima forma incompleta. Forma enim
corporis dans materiae extensionem, ut longitudinem et latitudinem, praecedit omnes for-
mae elementares). See also NSLP 18, 140.1921. Kilwardby is probably following Richard
Fishacre, InIIS, dist. 12, 245, lines 28894; and both seem to be following Avencebrolis FV
I.1617, 1922.
31
Sed istud solvitur per hoc quod in substantia quae est corpus, est triplex dimensio
coniuncta secundum actum existendi, NSLP 7, 55.910. See DOS XXIV.166, 65.16; XXIV.183;
DOS XXX.257, 97.67; and XXV.205, 79.1920.
32
Ad secundum dicendum quod caelum, ut mihi videtur, materiam univocam habet
cum aliis corporibus eo modo quo genus est univocum, DOS XXX.257, 96.123.
33
QLIII1S 10, 50.21.
48 human beings

composite.34 The shape (terminus et superficies) arrives with the physical

diffferences that constitute a particular species of body.35 Together with
these specific diffferences, matter receives certain active and passive quali-
ties.36 The matter that is common to all generated and corruptible bodies
(i.e. sublunary bodies, both elemental and mixed), does not exist stripped
from corporeity and always has some form in act and several in potency.37
Kilwardby calls this natural or physical prime matter (materia prima
physica or materia prima naturalis).38 It is a corporeal substance with
dimensions and corporeity (corporeitate),39 and active potencies,40 and is
the substrate of substantial change.
(D) The substrate of substantial change is natural or physical prime
matter, i.e. corporeal substance endowed with active potencies.
Physical prime matter is changeable due to the existence of these poten-
cies, which once set in motion evolve into actual form.41 According to

34
DOS XXIV.166; also XXVIII.234, 88.235. As Kilwardby himself points out elsewhere,
this is not to say that it is the same part of matter that receives all the forms (DOS XXX.263,
99.46).
35
terminus et superficies adveniunt per diffferentias physicas constituentes species
corporum, DOS XXIV.183, 72.35.
36
Consequenter autem tertio gradu recipit dicta materia diffferentias speciales corpo-
rum, scilicet circulare et rectum et huiusmodi, cum quibus diffferentiis etiam recipit quas-
dam qualitates activas et passivas, DOS XXIX.248, 93.810. See also E 2, 23.168: Tercia est
materia communis omnibus corporibus rectis simplicibus et mixtis ex eis. The diversity in
the specific form explains the diversity in motion (QLIIS 70, 197.1213).
37
Et haec nunquam denudatur a corporeitate et semper habet aliquam formam in actu
et multas in potencia, E 2, 24.123. The order of matter receiving forms is the opposite to
our knowledge of matter: we first know the materia transmutabilem and from this proceed
to the matter informed by more general forms (cf. DOS XXXI.321, 114.259).
38
DOS XXIX.248, 93.146 (for physica); DOS XXXI.320, 114.20 and E 2, 24 (for naturalis).
39
E 1, 21.811. See also DOS XXIX.244, 92.47: In omni enim transmutatione substantiae
in substantiam necesse est esse subiectam materiam quae maneat eadem per substantiam
in tota transmutatione, et haec materia est substantia corporea.
40
Quando ergo dicitur, quod potencia activa ad formam est in materia, neque de
prima, neque de secunda materia intelligitur, sed de tercia, quae est vere materia naturalis.
Naturalis enim considerat res ut mobiles sunt et transmutabiles; et quia transmutacio in
substancia non est nisi in corporibus rectis, simplicibus, et mixtis ex eis, ideo materia
transmutabilis per generacionem et corrupcionem in ipsis solum est. Et talis materia non
est in celo neque in spiritibus creatis, E 2, 2324; and E 2, 28.611: Intelligenda est igitur
materia naturalis prima non sicut quiddam proximum nichilo nichil forme habens nec
aliquid actualitatis aut composicionis, sed est quiddam dimensiones habens corporales,
inpregnatum originalibus racionibus sive potenciis, ex quibus producendi sunt actus
omnium specificorum corporum sive simplicium sive mixtorum per operacionem nature.
See also DOS XXIX.244245.
41
DOS XXIX.248. Substantia enim corporea potentiis gravida, quibus potest mutari a
forma in formam, physica materia est, DOS XXIX.250, 94.23.
 matter, form, and change 49

Kilwardby, when it is argued that Aristotle saw no matter in celestial bod-

ies, angelic spirits and in the rational soul, this must be understood as only
natural or physical matter, not matter tout court.42 Celestial bodies are not
corruptible, whereas terrestrial bodies are.43 The potentiality of the matter
of celestial bodies is only for place (ubi), and it is always in actuality; in
them, the distinction between potency and act is only conceptual.44
Kilwardby does not oppose the pure potentiality of matter as such;
prime matter is pure potentiality if by prime matter is meant matter
stripped of even the forma generalissima that makes it a substance.45 What
he denies is that the matter underlying change in generable and corrupt-
ible things is absolute prime matter. Matter of generable and corruptible
things always has some kind of actuality of its own, and this is a constitu-
tive feature of his metaphysicsa feature he took to be Augustinian in
origin.46 Kilwardby has the notion of prime matter as absolutely stripped
from form but it does does not play any role in Kilwardbys natural
philosophy, as it is not the substrate for change.
Central to his argument is the concept of privation. Following Aristotle
(Physics I), he refers to three principles of change: matter, form and priva-
tion.47 Matter (natural or physical prime matter) is the subject of change,

42
Unde definitur in VII Metaphysicae quod est illud quo res potest esse et non esse, et
si quando invenitur quod in caelo not sit materia vel in spiritibus angelicis vel in anima
rationali, de tali et sic dicta materia aestimo intelligendum esse, DOS XXXI.321, 114.325.
43
DOS XXIX.249.
44
DOS XXX.261262.
45
E 2, 24.79. Prime matter has entity (Ergo quod est pura materia, nihil habet de enti-
tate. Hoc falsum est, QLIS 79, 253.279). Cf. Wood 2002, 339. However, in an earlier work
like the NSLP, Kilwardby seems to be closer to the Aristotelian position ( secundum
quod dicit Aristoteles in primo De generatione quod materia prima est maxime subiectum
generationis et corruptionis, NSLP 13, 101.256). See also DOS XXXI.309. As Macken (1980,
209) pointed out, the idea of the pure potentiality of matter is essentialy a Thomist inter-
pretation, not without challenges (as by Scotus and Ockham) which arise from the diffficul-
ties of the Aristotelian texts; see Zavalloni 1951, 45763. For references to Ockhams works,
see Hirvonen 2004, 27, nn.10, 13; for Scotus, see Cross 1998, especially chapter 2.
46
The Augustinian definition of matter as nihil aliquid appears in Kilwardbys DOS, in
the context of the position designated by prime matters unity of essence. Matter and God
are in the extremes of existence: while God is pure actuality and without potentiality, mat-
ter is maximally in potentiality, proxima nihilo (DOS XXXI.302). Kilwardby is presenting the
argument of two conflicting theories about the unity of prime matter (essential or analogi-
cal unity), but he does opt for one. He does however deny that prime natural or physical
matter (the one of which generable and corruptible things are made of) is quiddam proxi-
mum nichilo (cf. E 2, 28).
47
DOS VIII.33, 21.356; XXVIII.229, 87.156. See also LSP 407.1920; NSLP 17, 132.123 (
tria sunt principia cuiuslibet rei fiendae per naturam, scilicet materia, forma et privatio).
Matter and form are essential principles, while privation is accidental: DOS XXVIII.232,
50 human beings

i.e., that which persists through change, whereas privation and form are its
two termini: privation is the starting point and form is the finishing point.
Matter and form are principles of substance qua substance, whereas pri-
vation is a principle of substance qua changeable.48 According to the
Thomist reading, privation is the negation of a form in a subject.49
Aquinas distinguishes between privation as the absence of a certain form
in matter and the natural desire of matter for that certain form.50 Privation
is not matter, as Platonists mistakenly claimed in Aquinas view.51
Generation is not from absolutely nothing to being but rather from being
in potency to being in actuality. Matter is in a state of privation to a form
only when it is informed.52 Unlike Aquinas, Kilwardby considered the
notion of potency as receptivity for form to be insuffficient in explaining
what comes into being from certain matter, arguing instead that the mat-
ter of natural changeable things must always be endowed with some
active inclination for form.53 This should be understood in the light of his
distinction between the two senses of potentia: on the one hand it signi-
fies the possibility of being or nonbeingthis is the passive potency of
matter;54 on the other it signifies power (potestas), and that is the active
potency.55 This distinction goes together with another distinction between
the passive potency of matter (potentia passiva materiae), i.e. the capacity
to receive form (receptibilitas siue capacitas qua potest capere formam),

87.256. Cf. E 3, 29.913: est enim unum subiectum, scilicet materia, et duo contraria, sci-
licet privacio et habitus, et hec tria sunt principia onmium generabilium, ita, quod materia
et forma (sive habitus) sunt principia substancie rei, privacio vero transmutacionis aut
fieri. See also NSLP 7, 32.16.
48
privacio, de qua hic agitur, est principium quoddam transmutacionis naturalis,
E 3, 29.89. See also LSP, 407: Et dicendum quod priuacio non est principium rei naturalis
existentis set ut est in transmutacione; solum enim rem ingrediuntur ista duo, materia et
forma. See also Richard Fishacre, InIIS, d. 2, 50.
49
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles Physics, I, lesson 15, 135, 70.
50
Idem, n.136.
51
Idem, n.133.
52
Commentary on the De generatione et corruptione, nn. 4748; also n. 57; and n. 69.
53
Substantia enim corporea potentiis gravida, quibus potest mutari a forma in for-
mam, physica materia est, DOS XXIX.250, 94.23.
54
Si secundo modo, tunc se habebit ad opposita, et sic erit ad utrumlibet, et dicitur hec
potentia possibilitas materie, et hec possibilitas est potentia qua se habet ad esse et non
esse. Hoc autem contingit ex infinitate et interminatione materie, NSLPery I.9, P 75rb.
55
Ad quod dicendum quod potentia communiter se habet ad potentiam activam et
passivam, unde Aristoteles, omnis potentia aut est activa aut passiva; possibilitas autem
solum se habet ad potentiam passivam, et ideo dicitur materia possibilis, quia omnis pas-
sio gratia materie et omnis potentia passiva; potestas autem solum se habet ad potentiam
activam, et ideo dicit hic, potestate, haec est quaedam potentia activa, NSLPor 8, M 7va.
 matter, form, and change 51

and the active potency, in other words form in an incomplete state

(of actuality) that can be educed into a fully actualized form.56
Kilwardby argues that privation is a certain disposition or aptitude for
being; it cannot be simply because it is the starting point of change.57 (The
problem stems from Aristotles ambiguous definition of the matter that
underlies change; as many authors have pointed out, the diffficulty arises
from the apparent incompatibility between matter as pure potentiality
and matter as a principle of change.)58 He makes this clear in the fourth
article in naturalibus of the 1277 Oxford Prohibitions, and also explains it
in some detail in E 3.59 The target of the Prohibitions was probably a
Neoplatonic conception of matter as a receptacle.
Motion comes from privation, although privation is not merely an
absence of form, rather the active inclination of matter to take a form:
privation names precisely the imperfect60 state of lacking the indebted
perfection that is brought to actuality through the action of an exterior
agent.61 Negation stands for nonbeing, whereas privation stands for non-
actual being.62 Kilwardbys main argument is that substantial change is
not creation or annihilation: creation starts from nothing and ends in
being (ens), whereas annihilation starts from being (ente) and ends in
nothing.63 Both creation and annihilation demand an infinite power.64
Generation is from what already is,65 and the starting point is privation.

56
QLIS 59, 167.4550.
57
Privatio igitur, que est principium rei fiende ut fiat et secundum quod fit, non potest
omnino nichil esse, E 3, 29.167. On the diffference between logical, metaphysical and nat-
ural philosophy considerations of privation, see E 3, 2930.20-02: Logic and metaphysics
consider privation apart from form, whereas natural philosophy in connection (concreata)
with form. For Richard Fishacre, there are two kinds of privatio: (i) the absence of any
actual form but the presence of a seminal form; (ii) the absence of even the seminal form
when there is only prime matter (InIIS, dist. 12, 244, lines 25769).
58
See Pralong 1999, 4834; Zavalloni 1951, 45963. See also Kostman 1987.
59
Article 3 of E reads Utrum privatio sit nihil (29).
60
Accipiatur ergo privacio ut concernat aliquid imperfectum () scilicet non habens
sibi debitam perfeccionem, E 3, 30.714. The relation with the Augustinian definition of
matter as nihil aliquid (Confessiones 12.3.6; 12.15.22) seems clear.
61
Hiis intellectis manifestum est, quomodo privacio est tercium principium natura-
lium, et quod non est pure nichil, sed est imperfectum quiddam cum materia concreatum
tendens in actum, quando iuvatur ab exteriori agente, E 3, 30.1922.
62
negatio difffert non est ab ente, secundum quod priuatio tantum ens ab ente,
NSLPor 7, P 38rb. This point is made by Marmo 2003.
63
creacio incipiens a nichilo et terminans in ens, et adnichilacio incipiens ab ente et
terminans in nichil, E 1, 20.1920.
64
E 1, 21.26.
65
E 2, 27.1821. Kilwardby expresses this with the dictum: Quod enim nichil est, nullius
est causa nec principium (E 3, 29.18), i.e. nothing cannot be the principle (or cause) of any
52 human beings

Privation here means a state of imperfection attributable to an active dis-

position in matter that, set in motion through the action of an exterior
agent (mote a movente extrinseco), evolves into the actual form of the
thing.66 Change is explained by the existence in natural matter of an active
potency:67
just as in one and the same matter many original forms of things lie hidden,
which however appear distinct and separate and without confusion into act,
and also appear in orderly way, because no form appears except at suitable
opportunities suitably grasped, and no form appears except by way of oppor-
tunities suitable to itself. (DSF 211, transl. Broadie)
The matter of generable and corruptible things has an aptitude for form
and this aptitude is already something of the form; it is form in an incom-
plete state of actuality.68 The form-to-be-actual pre-exists in matter as an
active potency, and as Kilwardby remarks, the whole essence of form is in
the seminal reason, not in actuality, but in reality.69 These latent forms, or
active potencies, are central in terms of understanding Kilwardbys
account of human generation.

2.1.A Man Generates a Man

There are three things necessary for generation: the substrate for change
(matter),70 an agent to bring about the actuality of the form, and the form.
That an agent is required is clear from the medieval dictum, Whatever
comes from potency to act must be brought about by something already
in act.71 Now it is necessary to explain from where the form of the new

natural change. In the beginning and in the end of motion/change, there must be
something.
66
Et hec eadem [active potency] dicitur privacio, quia non habet sibi debitam perfec-
tionem, per quam nata est facere se in actu. Et ideo, cum transit hec potencia in actum,
cessat esse privacio, et constituitur compositum ex materia et actu, E 3, 30.148. Cf. also
E 2, 25 and D43Q 26, 289.62935; QLIIS 146, 402.768. It is in this context that Roensch
(1964, 174) has accused Kilwardby of having misunderstood the concept of active and pas-
sive potency.
67
potencia enim activa materia precedens actum in solis naturalibus est, E 2, 28.
68
E 2, 27.1014.
69
Videtur secundum Philosophum et Augustinum quod tota essentia formae est in
ratione seminali non actualiter sed realiter, QLIIS 45, 136.578.
70
Natural or physical matter, i.e., matter endowed with dimensions and corporeity (E 1,
21.711). See also E 2, 26.47, where Kilwardby calls the natural prime matter the funda-
mento of substantial change.
71
omne quod exit a potentia in actu exit a potentia in actum per aliquod ens actu,
NSLPery I.1, V 2v.
 matter, form, and change 53

generated thing comes, when something comes into being. According to

Kilwardby, the form is either created out of nothing (ex nichilo) or it comes
from another thing as its generator.72 The former must be excluded because
in that case the change would be creation and not generation; the latter
should also be excluded because if something gives its form to another
thing it ceases to be; and therefore cannot move to another matter because
it is corrupted.73
Kilwardby argues instead that, as generation is not creation and form
cannot come in actuality from the agent, the form of the conceived being
must somehow be in matternot in actuality, but in potentiality.74 He
finds the solution to the problem of generation by positing the existence
in matter of active potencies as internal principles of change. The form of
the generated thing is educed from the aptitude of matter; this is the active
potency:75
Moreover, the Philosopher says: matter strives for the form in the same way
as the female for the male, and the bad for the good.76 This appetite is for
the form. Therefore, as to strive is some kind of action and action is taken

72
The series of alternatives follows Richard Fishacre InIIS, dist. 17, 342, lines 307: when
something makes something else, either it makes it from nothing and that is creation; or it
makes it from something. If from somethin, either from the whole of its substance, as God
the Son; or from part of its substance, and this in two ways: either its matter, as a man gen-
erates a man; or its form, as fire in air makes fire.
73
I follow Kilwardbys reasoning in E 2, 267. This might constitute an answer to William
of Auvergne, dA, c.5, p.1, 111, where William argues that generation cannot be from nothing,
otherwise it would be creation. It must then be from something, either the father or the
mother. As the soul is not a body, it cannot be generated from a body. It must be from the
soul of the father or mother or both. The problem is that, if the father gives his soul (or part
of it) to the child, it is corrupted.
74
Cum ergo non procedat de nichilo, nec de esse materie per se loquendo oportet quod
procedat de alico existente in materia, non actu sed potencia, E 2, 27.1921. Only compos-
ites, not forms, are generated and corrupted (E 1, 22.115). The same principle is enunciated
in LSP 400.401: Set dicendum quod non generatur uel corrumpitur forma set composi-
tum, ut declaratur in Metaphisicis.
75
Omnia enim de potentia actiua preexistente in materia formas accipiunt, corruptis
formis que prius erant materie. Ex hiis manifeste liquet quod nihil generari potest nouum
naturaliter de eo in quo non est potentia motiua ad idem generabile, D43Q 26, 29.647651.
This aptitude does not refer to the being of matter (nec de esse materie), otherwise matter
and form would not be distinct by essence (cf. E 2, 27.145, 1920). The nondistinction is
prohibited by the 14th article in naturalibus, Oxford 1277 (see CUP I.559).
76
Cf. Aristotle, Physics I.9, 192a2124, where the text reads the female desires the male
and the ugly the beautiful. Thomas Aquinas (Commentary on Aristotles Physics I, lesson 15,
n. 138, 72) interprets the passage diffferently: matter to strive for form means nothing else
than matter to be ordered to form as potency to act.
54 human beings

universally to be of form,77 it follows that matter has something of a form,

through which it strives. And that is the active potency.78
Thus, matter has something of a form by means of which it strives for
form. The active potency is this something of a form, which given the
appropriate conditions evolves into the actual form of the thing.79 Potency
here means neither the potentiality to be acted upon nor the potentiality
to act on; but the power to develop into an actual form. Active potency is
potency because it is disposed to act, and active because it is something of
a form (aliquid forme), a form in a low degree of actuality.80 Active potency
and the completely actual form are the same in essence, i.e., the potency
from which the form is educed has the whole essence of the form;81
they difffer only in degree of actuality.82
Everything that exists in a state of potentiality desires the perfection of
actuality.83 The desire or striving of matter for actuality indicates that it
already has within something of the form-to-be; active potency difffers
from the actualized form as the incomplete difffers from the complete.84

77
Forma secundum philosophos universaliter est activa, QLIS 35, 81.534. See the fun-
damental article by McAleer 1999, 3354. In this as well as in other articles, McAleer claims
that the existence of some kind of real possibilities in prime matter is found in Averroes.
On the same, see Prez-Estevez 1998, 199211. See also Gilson 1962, 486. One of the thesis in
naturalibus condemned in Oxford is precisely Item, quod nulla potentia activa est in
materia (cf. CUP 559, n. 474.)
78
Item dicit Philosophus: materia est appetens formam, sicut femina masculum et
turpe bonum. Iste appetitus est ad formam. Cum ergo app[e]tere sit aliqua accio, et accio
universaliter est forme, sequitur quod materia habeat aliquid forme, per quod appetit eam.
Et hec est potencia activa, E 2, 25.115. Cf. Aristotles Physics, I.9, 192 a 1825. In various
places Kilwardby calls them original reasons (originales raciones) instead of seminal rea-
sons (e.g., E 2, 27.69, where he explicitly identifies the two).
79
Haec enim ratione dictarum potentiarum, quae non nihil formae sunt, mutabilis est
in formam actualem et mota movet, DOS XXIX.248, 93.178. Cf. E 2, 25. The seminal reason
only comes into full actuality with an appropriate circumstance or opportunity (DSF 211).
80
E 2, 28.7.
81
QLIIS 139, 374.6162.
82
QLIIS 138, 364.4445. See also E 2, 28.1622. Or, Aliqui dicunt quod ratio seminalis
quae est in materia, est aliquid formae et non tota forma, QLIIS 45, 135.545. See also DOS
XXX.261, 98. (Cf. Bonaventure C II, d.7, p.2, a.2, q.1, 196: Ad illud quod obicitur, quod formae
sunt in materia seminaliter, dicendum quod illa ratio seminalis valde remota est ab actu
completo nec potest ad actum reduci. See also d.18, a.1, q.3, ad 4.) However, to this he
answers: Sed contra. Videtur secundum Philosophum et Augustinum quod tota essentia
formae est in ratione seminali non actualier sed realiter, QLIIS 45, 136.578.
83
omne ens in potencia appetit perfici et educi de potencia ad actum, C I 357.078.
84
Istud autem est potencia activa que aliquid est ipsius, et unde originaliter fit forma,
et ex qua educitur; et habet nomen potencie antequam generatum sit, quia non est actu,
sed potencia. Cum vero generatum est, habet nomen forme et actus, et difffert sic et sic
secundum racionem sicut completum et incompletum, sed non secundum essenciam,
 matter, form, and change 55

Tobe educed from the potency of matter by an effficient cause means to

actualize the form that already exists in an inchoate state in matter.85
When the principle of motion is internal to the thing moved, then the
motion is natural.86 Generation must be explained not by the introduction
of a new form, but by the existence in the moved thing, in an imperfect
state, of the form attained at the end of the change.
Active potencies purport to explain how and why things are pregnant
with certain rather than other possibilities, in other words why a thing has
the potentiality to become actually a certain thing rather than something
else.87 Only what is determined by these potencies comes into a complete
state of actuality.88 R. Zavalloni defines active potency very concisely as
a principle that contains in itself, in a virtual state, what would be the
form in a state of actuality.89 An essential feature here is that this aptitude
for form (aptitudo ad formam), or formal predisposition (aptitudo forma-
lis) as Albert the Great also calls it,90 expresses the active nature of matter,
which cannot be merely a passive recipient of change. Although the con-
cession of a certain degree of activity to matter does not necessarily lead
to a pluralist view on substantial forms (as Alberts position shows), one
finds that such a concession is a common feature among pluralists.
According to S. Donati, the presence of active potencies in matter was
accepted almost unanimously by English commentators between 1240

E 2, 27.216. See also QLIS 60, 171.379; and QLIIS 138, 364.445: Quia secundum
Philosophum potentia et actus non variant essentiam. See Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 156.
Cf. Bonaventure, C II, d.18, a.1, q.3, respondeo, 453. See also Pralong 1999, 4907; and Wood
2001, 1378
85
E 2, 27.104. The doctrine of the inchoatio formae appears with Robert Grosseteste, De
luce, 519. See also Bonaventure, C II, d.7, a.2, q.1, that refers to the latitionem formarum of
Anaxagoras (Bonaventura dixit, 197); d.12, a.1, q.3; d.18, a.1, q.3. Cf. Nardi 1979; Snyder 1996.
86
Inde enim naturaliter mobile est quod in se habet huiusmodi principium motivum,
DOS VIII.35, 22.145. See also NLP I.7, 40; D43Q 2, 12.8590; and E 2, 245; DOS VI.20.
87
In his NSLP (12, 91.112), Kilwardby says that matter is said to be ad aliquid because it
does not stand for whatever form (non se habet indiffferenter ad omnem formam) but that
diffferent parts of matter stand for diffferent forms. This standing for is justified by the pres-
ence in matter of seminal reasons.
88
Dicendum quod quando illud unde aliquid provenit se habet ad illud per modum
dispositionis ad ipsum ut ad finem, non est hoc inconveniens. Sic enim dispositiones prae-
cedentes habitum se se debent habere ad ipsum, et sic se se habent in naturalibus disposi-
tiones materiales ad formam inducendam, ut cum de embrione fit animal. Quaelibet enim
dispositio continue facta in materia diminutum quiddam est respectu formae inducendae,
et forma est aliquid completum, QLIII2S 22, 92.107113. See also E 2, 28.0611; and QLIIS
139, 374.6162.
89
un principe qui contient en soi, ltat virtuel, ce que sera la forme ltat actuel,
Zavalloni 1951, 449.
90
Nardi 1979, 8693. Cf. E 2, 27.104. See also Snyder 1996.
56 human beings

and 1270, and marked the passage from the notion of matter taken as the
receptive substrate of form to the notion of matter taken as a physical
principle of change.91 Furthermore, the distinction between a physical
and a metaphysical/logical consideration of matter among Oxfordian
authors around 1250 constituted a general trend.
Kilwardby strengthened his position by identifying active potencies
with Augustinian seminal reasons.92 This identification is relevant to his
account of human generation. He backs up his philosophical explanation
with theological authority: God creates directly and instantly (immediate),
de nihilo rational souls, matter without any specific forms, and seminal
reasons.93 For Kilwardby and Augustine, these seminal principles explain
the continuous generation of human beings throughout the centuries
(cursus seculorum), without the need for continuous acts of creation (per
propagationem temporalem administratorum).94 Moreover, the seminal
reasons serve to explain why some things rather than others come into
being from a certain quantity of matter, in other words how a being

91
il passagio dalla nozione di materia intesa nella sua dimensione statica di sostrato
recettivo della forma alla nozione di materia intesa come principio fisico del cambia-
mento, Donati 2002, 221. See also Karger 1998. One of the thesis in naturalibus condemned
in Oxford is precisely Item, quod nulla potentia activa est in materia (cf. CUP 559, n. 474.)
Moreover, according to Donati (2189) the distinction between diffferent levels of matter is
a consequence of a logical-metaphysical consideration of matter (and not only physical, as
in Aristotle) and it is present in these commentaries (Oxford 12401270).
92
The identification of the active potency with the seminal reason is found in several
places, for instance QLIIS 85, 239.49: Potentia activa materialis idem est, ut puto, quod
ratio seminalis. See also DOS XXX.260, 97.301; also 261, 98.5; 20, 17.78; E 5, 3940.247.
The identification of active potency (potentia activa indita materiae) with seminal reason
probably came down to Kilwardby from Bonaventure (C II, d.7, a.2, q.1; d.12, a.1, q.3; d.18, a.1,
q.3, respondeo, 453: potentia activa, quam dicimus rationem seminalem. For
Bonaventure, seminal principles are genera from which the species come into being, being
actual with respect to matter and potential with respect to the species. See also d.30, a.3,
q.1). For the history of the concept, see McAleer 1999, 3547; Mazzarella 1978, 25988; and
Zavalloni 1951, 306. This identification can also be found, with relevant diffferences, in
Albert the Great, De natura et origine animae, in Opera Omnia, tomus XII, Monasterium
Westfalorum, 1955, tr. 1, c. 3. Kilwardby uses the notion of the seminal reasons (raciones
seminarias) as early as his LSP (see Lewry 1978, 328).
93
QLIIS 138, 372.2835. See the objections of Richard Fishacre for the human species to
be created as in ratione seminali, in InIIS, dist. 17, 343, lines 7890. He holds that the human
soul is created without the body in primo instanti temporis (344, lines 1234).
94
Item, si non sunt originales potencie active in materia prima naturali, tunc falsum
est quidquid ponit Augustinus de originalibus racionibus fiendorum; item, tunc falsum est,
quod ponit omnia corpora simul esse creata in operibus condicionis, que postmodum
opere nature evolvuntur per opera administracionis, E 2, 28. See Brady 1964, 14158. The
terminology of seminal reasons is originally Stoic, and later used by Neoplatonic writers as
Plotinus; see Verbeke 1983, 45; 22. According to Verbeke is diffficult to know whether
Augustine took it directly from the Stoics or through Plotinus (302).
 matter, form, and change 57

generates another being similar in nature to itself. Natural generation

means that the generator has the capacity to generate a being of the same
species.95 As noted, seminal principles exist in matter and determine
which thing is to exist, because in the case of things that are generated
from seed, that which is to become exists already in a potential state in
the seed.96
In the original context, Augustine used seminal reasons as explanatory
tools to account for the apparently contradictory instances of the Wisdom/
Ecclesiasticus/Sirach (18:1), in which it is said that God created everything
in one instant (omnia creata sunt simul), and Genesis (1:5; 2:47 and Exodus
20.11), in which it is said that things were created by God in successive
creative acts.97 Augustine solves the problem by offfering an account
according to which God created everything at once and inserted in matter
the seminal reasons or principles of all things that are to appear in the due
course of time.98 Augustine explains this idea through an analogy with
seed:99 the world is pregnant, and in the seed there is already, in a latent
state, that into which the seed will develop.100 In the primordial creation
beings generated from seed, such as human beings, were created poten-
tially in their causal reasons (i.e. incomplete in their kinds).101 These semi-
nal principles exist in Gods mind as causal principles, but become
ontologically significant entities through his creative power, i.e. through
the action of the Word (the Son).102 Kilwardby (and other theologians, such
as Bonaventure) adopted the same explanatory tool.

95
QLIIS 45, 135.479. The same idea is already present in DSF 129. See Hoenen 2001, 427.
96
Hence the fact that beans are not produced from grains of wheat or wheat from
beans, nor human beings from cattle or cattle from human beings, Augustine, DGL 9.17.32,
394.
97
does that mean that the things which were being made were all made simultane-
ously () and not rather made one after the other at intervals according to the predeter-
mined days?, Augustine, On Genesis: The Literal Meaning of Genesis, transl. by Matthew
OConnell. The Works of Saint Augustine (I/13). New York: New City Press, 1999, 4.33.51,
2712. See also 4.33.52; 4.34.53. See QLIIS 61, 172.1927.
98
Consequenter autem nunc opere naturae quae tunc creata sunt habentia rationes
seminales producendorum, cursum illum a Deo statutum continuant per saecula, QLIIS
63, 179.246. On Augustine on seminal reasons, see DGL 5.23.4456; 10.1711.19.
99
Augustine, DGL 2.15.30; 5.23.445; 6.16.27. This analogy is also found in Kilwardbys
NSLPery I.5, M 5rb: Unde philosophus: non sic latent individua in specie sicut specie et
diffferencie in genere, sed latent species et diffferentiae in genere sicut in grano latent ratio-
nes seminarie omnium granorum quae ex ipso possunt procreari. (The context is the dis-
cussion over how species and diffferentiae exist potentially in the genus.)
100
Augustine, DT 3.16.
101
DGL 6.6.10; see also 6.11.18; 6.15.26.
102
See, for instance, DGL 6.12.22.
58 human beings

Kilwardby distinguishes between creating and making (aliud est facere,

aliud creare proprie).103 Everything is created simultaneously but is not
made so, since things continue to come into being over time. Creation
consists in bringing into being from nothing. Moreover, some forms, such
as the rational soul and seminal reasons, are made immediately, whereas
others are educed from the active potencies or seminal reasons that exist
inchoately in natural matter.104 Kilwardby states that the first individuals
of each kind were created directly by God, whereas making refers to the
generation that takes place through the existence of seminal principles or
causal reasons in the seed.105
According to Kilwardby, a created thing could be said to exist (esse) in
four ways:106 (1) as an eternal causal reason (ratione causali eterna) in the
Word of God;107 (2) as a created causal reason (ratione causali creata),
which can be either (2.1) as the first individuals of the each genus, when
God first made everything simultaneously, or (2.2) as seminal or causal
reason, which is the cause, through generative power, of the generation of
individuals over time; and (3) as the nature of each individual (in propria
natura).108
I will concern myself here with (2.2), how the species continues over
time.109 In the Creation, God created the corporeal matter out of which
Heproduced the first light as well as the first individuals of the diffferent
species, and woman from the side of man.110 He made the body of woman
in no time at all (subito) from a small amount of matter, in accordance
with the eternal causal reason and without the addition of extraneous
matter.111

103
Omnia enim simul creata sunt, sed non facta, QLIIS 61, 174.7374. Cf. Augustine, DT
5.24.16; DGL 4.26.43.
104
QLIIS 138, 366367.117121.
105
In principio enim creationis indite sunt iste potentie materie propter hoc quod
materia uertibilis sit <de> forma in formam, ut res rebus succedant ubi indiuidua manere
non possunt, et sic explicentur cursus seculorum, D43Q 26, 29.6636. See also QLIIS 85,
240; D43Q 15, 21.3701; QLIIS 61, 176.13233. Cf. Augustine, DGL 6.11.19; 6.12.22; 6.14.25;
6.15.26; 6.18.24; 9.17.32. See also Robert Grosseteste, Hexameron II, 5.2.
106
Cf. Bonaventure, C I, d.36, a.2, q.2.
107
Cf. Augustine, DGL 6.10.17.
108
QLIIS 85, 240.
109
This is a problem found also in the Aristotelian tradition. See Freudenthal 2002, 810.
110
D43Q 1, 11.525; 10.2730; 11.602.
111
QLIIS 88, 245.4951. As for the last aspect, Kilwardby argues that, if in a small amount
(modico) of semen there is enough matter secundum essentiam to make innumerable indi-
viduals beings, God, by his unlimited power, can make a body out of a small amount of
matter. That is not a natural action, but a miraculous one (QLIIS 85, 239.357). See also
D43Q 26, 31.
 matter, form, and change 59

When God created the first individuals, He inserted seminal reasons in

them so that the species would continue throughout time.112 Seminal rea-
sons explain how a man generates a man and a horse generates a horse.113
This explains not only the continuation of the species but also the process
of generation of each individual of the species. Even though the intention
of nature is preserve the species by means of the continuous generation of
individuals that instantiate it,114 nature works for the generation of an indi-
vidual thing.115
According to Kilwardby, both the semen or seed (semen) and the semi-
nal reason (ratio seminalis) are involved in the process of generating a new
(human) being.116 The semen is the body produced by the generative power
of the father for the purpose of generation. There is enough matter to gen-
erate innumerable individual beings in a small amount of semen.117 The
semen is mainly a byproduct of transformed food used as nourishment for
the conceived being and as protection for the seed.118 It is superfluous ad
aliquid (and not simpliciter): it is superfluity purposefully made for the
generation of descendancy.119 However, generation does not come exclu-
sively from the superfluity of food,120 otherwise the son would be cognate
with the aliment of the father, not the father itself.121 Seminal reason is an

112
E 4, 32. See also E 1, 22, and 5, 3940; D43Q 26, 31.72131; QLIIS 85, 240). Nature can
only make matter exist inasmuch as informed by a complete form but God can (quasi
miraculum et summae potentiae) make even an incomplete form exist. (Natura enim non
potest facere ut subsistat materia nisi sub forma completa. Unde quasi miraculum est et
summae potentiae indicium quod sub incompleta consistit, QLIIS 61, 1734.545. Cf. also
QLIIS 62, 178.4851.)
113
D43Q 7, 17.2678. See also E 4, 33.1620.
114
NSLP 18, 140.
115
NLP I.7, 41. See also NSLP 18, 140.135 (1223): quia non solum intendit natura ut fit
universale, sed ut salvatur in esse, ut continua existente generatione in singularibus, et
propter hoc non quiescit natura a motu existente universali, sed est ei motus continuus ut
salvetur universale.
116
QLIIS 85, 240. See Bonaventure, C II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, respondeo, 44851.
117
QLIIS 88, 244.
118
D43Q 34, 378, 92531.
119
QLIIS 94, 257.4549. The separation (decisio) of the semen is pleasant, Kilwardby
says, because it fulfills the goal of the generative poweri.e. to generateand any natural
power is pleased in an operation that is natural to itself (QLIIS 94, 257.3133).
120
E 4, 33.15.
121
Et quo sequitur, quod filius cognacionem non habet cum patre, sed forte utcumque
cum patris alimento, E 4, 31.168. (Cf. Bonaventure, C II, d.30, a.3, q.1, respondeo, 754.) An
interesting medieval discussion concerns the nature of this matter present in the semen,
namelly whether it is or not superfluity of food. According to Alexander of Hales (c. 1185
1245), the semen from which the body is generated is a byproduct of food in the last stage
of digestion (superfluitas ultimi cibi). A good introduction to the topic can be found in
Reynolds 1999, 24365. See also Nardi 1938. However, such food does not enter in the
60 human beings

active formal power in the semen that explains how one being generates
another that is similar in nature.122 In addition to this internal principle,
generation requires the presence of an external moving agent,123 through
whose action that which is in a state of active potentiality becomes the
actual form of the thing. The agent does not introduce the form from out-
side, but educes it from the active potency in matter.124 The seed evolves
into a tree not upon receiving a new form from the outside, but upon real-
izing its latent potential.
In order further to specify this Augustinian-based explanation of gen-
eration, I will now turn to question thirty-four of D43Q, where Kilwardby
deals with Aristotles embryological process.
[T]he thirty-fourth question concerns the Philosophers words in book 16 of
the De animalibus: the spermatic body, with which comes the spirit, the
power of the principle of the soul, is separated from the body and is a divine
thing (res divina), and as such is called intellect; (this) can or should be
expounded in the following way: that spirit or formative power is called an
intellect by likeness, because in the same way that the intellect operates
without an organ, so does this power.125

constitution of the truth of human nature (Caro nutrimentalis non est de veritate huma-
nae naturae, Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed.
PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1952, t. 13, II, d.30, 14, 292.
Cf. also Augustine, De 83 questionibus, q. 73, PL 40, 84.)
122
Notandum ergo quod semen proprie loquendo est corpus per vim generativam
decisum ab aliquo ut inde fiat simile decidenti. Ratio seminalis est quaedam vis formalis in
ipso semine, QLIIS 85, 239.4648. This seems very close to Bonaventures distinction
between semen and ratio seminalis (C II, d.17, a.1, q.2). The origin is however probabbly
Augustinian; see Reynolds 1999, 27 on the two factors in semen: physical stufff (substantia
corporalis or corpulentia) and a formative principle (ratio seminalis).
123
Quando igitur aliquid generatur naturaliter, non est solum principium extra mov-
endi, sed in ipso transmutato est principium movendi. Quod autem est principium
movendi, videtur esse activum. Ergo in transmutato est aliquod activum coagens generanti
en hoc potentiam activam, E 2, 25.1822. See also E 5, 42.78: Et is hiis pars actus proximi
ad accionem faciendam est ab intra, pars ab extra. Something changes into something else
only if it has within itself something of that into which will change (QLIIS 138, 363.312).
And QLIIS 85, 239.50; QLIIS 138, 3667.11922: Quaedam [things are made] de aliquo mate-
rialiter, et hoc vel coagente exteriori patiente ad sui eductionem, et sic fiunt naturaliter res
de potentiis activis vel rationibus seminalibus in materia naturali latitantibus, aut non coag-
ente, et sic fiunt formae impressionum in arte, (my italics).
124
Et istud, si intime consideretis, est, quod prius vocavi potenciam activam, que ideo
dicitur potencia, quia ordinatur ad actum, ideo activa, quia aliquid forme est, et ideo ali-
qualiter coagit transmutanti, quando confortatur ab eo, E 3, 30.114. Also E 2, 24.8.
125
Tricesima quarta questio est an illud uerbum Philosophi, De animalibus libro XVI,
Corpus spermatis, cum quo exit spiritus qui <est> uirtus principii anime, est separatum a
corpore <et> est res diuina, et talis dicitur intellectus sic possit exponi uel debeat, id est:
Ille spiritus <siue> uirtus formativa dicitur intellectus per similitudinem, quia sicut intel-
lectus operatur sine organo, ita et illa uirtus, D43Q 34, 367.8905. The De generatione
 matter, form, and change 61

From the father comes the spermatic body, which contains semen (here
meaning the seminal principle)126 and the corporeal spirit.127 In beings that
are generated from the seed there is something (aliquid) that is separated
(decisum) from the (specific not personal) nature of the parents to the
substance of the foetus, together with matter.128 This something is the
principle of life out of which vegetative and sensitive souls are educed into
actuality from their latent state in the matter of the conceived being.129
Nothing of the personal integrity of the father is lost by the separation of
the semen because this something exists only potentially in the father for
the purpose of generation.130
The corporeal spirit, which leaves the body of the father within the
semen, is called the power of the principle of life (uirtus principii uite)
because it is responsible for educing the principle from the semen.131

animalium, II.3, 736b2629, in the translatio Guillelmi reads: Relinquitur autem intellec-
tum solum deforis advenire et divinum esse solum: nichil enim ipsius operationi commu-
nicat corporalis operatio, in Aristoteles Latinus, ed. H.J. Drossaart Lulofs, Bruges-Paris 1966.
See also Hamesse 1974, 224, n.190: solus intellectus est in nobis ab extrinseco. Kilwardby
(QLIIS 81, 228.267) refers again to the passage and to the divine and external origin of the
intellect: Item Aristoteles II De animalibus: Intellectus ab extrinseco intrat, quia ipse solus
habet esse divinum. See also Thomas Aquinas, De potentia 3, 9; ST I.90, 34; 118, 2; and
Richard Fishacre, InIS, d.3, *31. For Aristotle, van der Eijk 2000, 70.
126
We remind the reader that in the QLIS 85, Kilwardby calls both the stufff-like body
(in the D43Q the spermatic body) and the seminal principle, semen. In what follows Iadopt
the reading he gives in D43Q 34, with semen meaning the whole, whereas spermatic
body meaning the matter (stufff) of the semen.
127
In hoc etiam spermate simul cum semine deciditur spiritus ille corporalis, D43Q 34,
38.9312. Cf. Alfred of Sarashels De motu cordis (c.10, 3, 38): Id [the corporeal spirit] ergo
primum est animae organum. Eius actus primus vita; qua medieante ceteras corporis vir-
tutes producit. Id semini naturaliter inest necessario.
128
Est ibi principium uite, scilicet in ipso semine, quod intelligo non esse cibum alter-
atum, sed aliquid decisum a natura parentum quod spectat ad substantiam fetus, D43Q
34, 37.9146; also QLIIS 85, 239.467: Notandum ergo quod semen proprie loquendo est
corpus per vim generativam decisum ab aliquo ut inde fiat simile decidenti; and QLIIS 94,
257.3845. The father is the main principle of generation, the mother the passive principle
of generation. The father contributes with the active principle, whereas the mother con-
tributes with the matter (in sangue menstruoso)(QLIS 37, 120.2327).
129
ut intelligatur principium uite illud quod primo inducitur et ab intra producitur,
scilicet uegetatiua et sensitiua, D43Q 34, 38.9478.
130
Item id quod secundum speciem est et descinditur ad generationem prolis, forte
non est aliquid de personali integritate parentis essentialiter, sed est in parente in potentia
et non in actu ei inditum ad propagationem. Et illud fit in actu actione virtutis generativae
cum descinditur, et ita non descinditur aliqua pars actualis eius quod est secundum
speciem in parente sed pars potentialis et quae non est essentialiter de integritate personae
generantis unde persona est vel individuum sed forte unde generativum et sic non dimi-
nuitur esse personae, QLIIS 94, 257.3845.
131
Spiritus autem ille dicitur uirtus principii uite, quia natura ipso utitur ad principium
uite producendum, D43Q 34, 38.94950.
62 human beings

Thecorporeal spirit performs two kind of actions: on the one hand it orga-
nizes the matter of the semen in such a way as to form the diffferent parts
that constitute the body, and on the other, once the matter is suffficiently
organized, it brings forth the actuality of the composite from the seminal
or original reasons latent in the matter of the conceived being.132 The cor-
poreal spirit educes the vegetative and sensitive potentiae, through which
the new being becomes alive and performs the operations proper to its
kind of life.133 The corporeal spirit must be supported in its action by the
heat of the sun (calor solis) and other heavenly luminaries assisting ani-
mal heat (calor animalis).134
The first to be educed is the vegetative part of the soul by means of
which the begotten is able to perform the operations necessary to the
preservation and foment of life, nutrition and growth.135 Thereafter, the
corporeal spirit educes the sensitive potentia,136 which is responsible for
the operations of sensing and moving. The sensitive potentia is, according
to Kilwardby, the highest potentia that can be produced from the ele-
ments.137 I take this to mean that the eduction/actualization of any poten-
tia needs to be preceded by an appropriate level of organization of the
matter of the fetus.138

132
E 4, 32.1722. See also QLIIS 69, 194.7577; and QLIIS 88, 245-3437.
133
Spiritus ergo ille per calorem, et calor per spiritum, distinguit partes in semine et
distinctas efffigiat antequam cibetur, educens de potentia intima concepti uegetatiuam per
quam nutriatur et augeatur; efffigiando uero partes simul disponit ad sensum, producens
pariter potentiam sensitiuam et exit ista de interioribus materie prius disposite per uege-
tatiuam, D43Q 34, 38.933938. Cf. Bonaventure, C II, d.15, a.1, q.1.
134
et per calorem solis uitalem ex sole et aliis luminaribus celestibus ibi stratum qui
confortat calorem animalis et perficit ad usum rectum nature in formatione fetus et uege-
tatiue atque sensitiue productione, D43Q 34, 37.9168. Light is present in luminous bodies
as its form (Lux ergo proprie et per se solum forma est in corpore luminoso, QLIIS 67,
188.2930). Kilwardby repeats the Aristotelian dictum (secundum dicit Aristoteles) that
homo hominem generat ex materia et sol (NSLPor 3, M 3va). Cf. Aristotle, Physics II.2,
194b1314.
135
In omni enim habente vitam vegetativam est aliquid radicale quod est primum subi-
ectum vite, et quod per se et primo suscipit accionem anime, E 4, 32.13. Cf. Alfred of
Sareshel, De motu cordis, c. 12.
136
Et dicit spiritum corporalem aptum per duos calores predictos ad producendam
potentiam uegetatiuam per quam cibetur et nutriatur conceptum, et postea sensitiuam
qua sensificetur; quo completo iam aptum est conceptum ad humanam perfectionem:
tunc ab extra diuinitus datur potentia rationalis, ut uidetur secundum ipsum, D43Q 34,
37.9204. See Boylan 1984.
137
Et hec forma sensitiua ultima est et potissima in omnibus que de elementis et ele-
mentatis produci possit, D43Q 34, 38.93839. See also E 5, 40.25; and QLIIS 87, 243.167:
natura distinguit partes semini et distinctas format et in illis totum corpus efffigiat.
138
Item, si tantum esset, perfeccio esset, ubi non est suum perfectibile, et actus vel
forma, ubi non est sua materia, E 5, 36.1213.
 matter, form, and change 63

(E) A potentia can only come into full actuality once the appropriate
material dispositions exist.
Nature organizes the matter of the semen through the corporeal spirit,
first in a manner that is suitable for the vegetative potentia and then the
complete body for the sensitive potentia (mediante mixcione vel complex-
ione ordinata).139 The process of generation is constituted by a fixed succes-
sion of forms, and each level of determination functions as the disposition
preparatory for the following level. The principle of operation must exist
only when the instruments through which the operations of the principle
are carried out already exist, otherwise the potentia would exist without
being able to carry the operations that are proper to it. For instance, the
sensitive soul, which is the form of the body, can be educed into actuality
only when there is a body endowed with the organs for sense perception
and motion. The animal soul is the actuality of an organic body.140 As the
elements are the starting point of the material organization of the animal
body, the eduction of the vegetative and sensititive forms from the semi-
nal reasons is intertwined with elementary change: the elements are
arranged into a mixture, and these into more complex organized matter of
which (the parts of) the body is made (in mixto mixtione humanae com-
plexione).141 It is necessary to emphasize the importance of the existence of
an appropriated material configuration for the eduction of a form to
Kilwardbys theory, as it is the source of many of the objections he raises
against unicity theories. If the process of embryonic development requires
successive and increasingly more complex levels of material organization,
how can the supervenience of a new form corrupt that same material con-
figuration?142 In Kilwardbys view the forms that precede a supervening
form remain distinct from it because they retain their function.
The eduction of the sensitive soul completes the process of natural
generation; the corporeal spirit dissipates as soon as its formative func-
tion ends.143 However, the process of development is not yet complete.

139
E 5, 3940.28-04; QLIIS 88, 245.3942. See also QLIIS 84, 237.324. Here Kilwardby
argues that the body must be proportional to the soul.
140
Et hoc etiam apparet ex difffinitione anime, cum sit actus corporis organici, NSLPor
8, P 38vb.
141
QLIIS 87, 243.810. See also E 7, 52.13: Item, caro et actus eius universaliter opere
nature producitur de potencia elementorum mixtorum, (italics mine). See also QLIIS 85,
240.7980.
142
See in particular articles 7 and 16 of the Prohibitions, and Kilwardbys objections to
theories 1 and 2 in E 5 (below).
143
D43Q 34, 38.962963.
64 human beings

Thesensitive human body, in other words, the body informed by the veg-
etative and sensitive potentiae, remains incomplete: it needs to be per-
fected, it needs to become a human being. This last step of the process
takes place when the foetus receives the intellective soul. The intellective
potentia is not produced by nature but comes from the outside (ab extrin-
seco). Kilwardby found the expression, intellectus tantum intrat ab
extrinseco in Aristotles De generatione animalium, and this led him to the
belief that the rational soul is created by God and infused (creata et infusa)
in the body at a certain stage of foetal development.144 Nature and God
cooperate in the making of an individual human being: nature is respon-
sible for the development of a being disposed to receive the intellective
soul and when the body gets its final shape (efffigiato), i.e. the organs and
members are completely formed, God creates the intellective potentia.145
Kilwardby calls the intellective form the consummation of human life,146
the form that is perfective and completive of the human composite.147
(F) Diffference of origin: the vegetative and the sensitive are gener-
ated, whereas and intellective is created.
Kilwardby refers to the double origin of the soul and its essential desire to
be united with the body when he discusses the theological question of the
transmission of original sin.148 In commenting on Peter Lombards
Sentences, he needed to explain how original sin had been transmitted

144
According to Roger Bacon, the theory of the dual origin of the human soul was
adopted by the majority of authors in Oxford (OHI, 28182). See Nardi 1979, 16; Hackett
2006, 123435.
145
QLIVS 32, 135.3133. See also D43Q 33, 356.8669: fides catholica credere animas
rationales creari, non simul omnes sicut angeli facti sunt, sed quod singule creentur
quando humana corpora singula formata sunt et efffigiata atque disposita ad anime ratio-
nalis susceptionem; and QLIIS 138, 363.45; QLIVS 32, 135.33; E 5, 36.1924 and QLIIS 81,
229.512; 230.812: homo generat hominem, quia dat materiam et disponit eam ut sit
necessitas ad formam completivam. This was a widely accepted view; see e.g., Richard
Fishacre, InIIs, dist. 18, 377, lines 515517; Thomas Aquinas, SCG II.44; also II.71; and
Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei q.3, a.9. Aristotle advanced 40 days for men and 90
for women (cf. History of Animals 7.4, 583b230). Nowhere does Kilwardby refer to a spe-
cific time in the development.
146
Intellectus uero res diuina est, per quod intelligitur quod non est decisus cum sper-
mate ad principium uite producendum, sed est potentia <> uite humane consummatio,
D43Q 34, 38.9502. In QLIIS 138, 363.102, Kilwardby says the human body has such a dig-
nity that its perfection, the rational soul (anima rationalis), must be created de nihilo. The
interesting point here is the justification of the creation of the soul by appealing to the
dignity of the body.
147
D43Q 34, 37.9204; 38, 9502.
148
The connection original sin-origin of the human soul is a common feature of the
authors up to the twelfth-century. Cf. Resnick 1991; Cruz Pontes 1964.
 matter, form, and change 65

from parents to children since the times of Adam. Augustine connected

this theme with the question of the origin of the soul, and he never com-
pletely dismissed the creationist and the traducianist account.149 According
to the former view, each soul is created and with it original sin, which
brings with it the problem of making the Creator responsible for original
sin in each human being.150 The traducianist view, on the other hand, is
that the soul is somehow transmitted from parents to their children.
Kilwardby rejects traducianism:151 the rational soul is created directly by
God.152 Only the rational soul is specifically human, whereas the lower
potentiae, the vegetative and the sensitive, are the result of a natural pro-
cess of generation. The idea of the transmission of original sin is justified
since the whole of human nature was present in Adam, and through suc-
cessive natural generation the sin is transmitted to each of us.153 In QLIIS
166 Kilwardby argues for the pedagogical function of original sin, which is
understood as a fair punishment and as motivating the massa damnata to
regain their original condition.154
He discusses the view of those who refer to the authority of Peter
Lombard in arguing that for the first sin the first parents received a double
punishment of the flesh: (i) the afffectability of the soul (by the body) and
(ii) the viciousness through which the soul contracted the original sin.155
Kilwardby considers (i) valid whereas (ii) is not. In his view, the punish-
ment for the sin of the first parents was the mortality of the body or, as he
preferred to express it, corruptio vitalis qualitatis.156 The prelapsarian

149
See, for instance, De libero arbitrio, ed. W.M. Green, (CCL 29) Turnholt: Brepols, 1970,
3.20.5621.59 (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, transl. T. Williams, Indianapolis/
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993, 108111). See also DGL 10.11.189 (where the
question is placed in relation to the problem of the origin of the human soul (discussed in
10.3.510.17). Cf. Rist 1997, 31720; Fitzgerald 1999; and Mann 2001, 478.
150
Cf. Augustine, DGL 10.11.19.
151
E 5, 378.
152
quod non sint anime rationales ex traduce sed ex diuina creatione, D43Q 33,
36.872; and QLIIS 81, 231.934: Modo tamen pro certo tenet Ecclesia quod non sunt ex
traduce sed de nihilo creatae simul et infusae.
153
quia omnes in primo peccante fuerunt materialiter et ab illo propagatione natu-
rali descenderunt, QLIII1S 2, 11.14950; see also QLIIS 148, 406.6870; and QLIIS 156, 428.5
6. See Bonaventure, C II, d.31, a.2, q.2.
154
QLIIS 106, 282.501.
155
Hic dicunt aliqui ad salvandum quod dicit Magister quod Adam per primum pec-
catum incurrit duplicem corruptionem carnis: unam poenalitatis per quam anima ei coni-
uncta est passibilis, aliam vitiositatis et foeditatis per quam anima contrahit originalem
culpam, et haec est illa de qua dicit Magister quod causatur originale in parvulis ex foetore
libidinis seminantium, QLIIS 157, 4312.904.
156
Quia illa corruptio quae inflicta est homini propter peccatum primum ex parte car-
nis, est vel mortalitas vel mortifera qualitas quae inest brutorum corporibus, quae nihil
66 human beings

human body was far superior to the body of the other animals, but with
sin it became similarly subject to death.157
The corruptibility of the body, the mortality that is associated with a
downgrading of its nature, is expressed in the tendency to turn to sensual-
ity (sensualitas), in other words to become subject to its appetites, like
other animals.158 This subjection to bodily enticements constitutes a pun-
ishment for the rational soul, which remains impotent to restrain the body
in the face of those appetites.159 Thus Kilwardby refutes the view according
to which concupiscentia is the cause of original sin and of its transmission:
concupiscentia is the efffect of the sin, not its cause.160 The mortal nature of
the post-Fall body is the cause of the transmition of original sin, and con-
cupiscentia or vitium libidinis in propagationis is just an incidental cause. It
is incidental in the same way as it is said that the musician builds: what is
meant is that a human being, who incidentally is a musician, builds.161
It is the duty of the higher part to control the lower part, and when it
fails to do so, attending to its inclinations with regard to the sensible realm
of the pleasure or concupiscence of the flesh, it sins. This is, as it were, to

aliud est nisi corruptio vitalis qualitatis quae prius inerat ad praeeminentiam corporum
brutalium vel forte afffectus eius, QLIIS 157, 434.15660. Doing so, Kilwardby uses the
authority of Hugh. Interestingly, he says Lombard follows Hugh in attributing to concupis-
centia rather than mortality the causative role of sin. However, he claims that was Hughs
position in the De sacramentis, whereas in a later work, the Sententiae (the Summa
Sententiarum), he corrected his former view ( emendanda sunt ad formam illius operis,
scilicet De sacramentis, QLIIS 157, 435.1912). It is interesting because it shows Kilwardbys
knowledge of Hugh and because nowadays the Summa sententiarum is thought to derive
from Hughs teaching but not to be his work.
157
ante peccatum corpus humanum excellebat corpora brutorum in qualitate nobili
qua aptum erat adiutorio ligni vitae sive per conservationem sive per reparationem sibi
vitam perpetuare sine molestia morbi et senectutis, QLIIS 157, 433.1214.
158
Ex hac autem mortifera qualitate sive corruptione optimae qualitatis vitalis, quod
idem est, causatur in homine ex parte sensualitatis motus similis sensualitati brutali ad
omnia quae placent, QLIIS 157, 433.1368. Cf. Augustine, DGL 10.12.20.
159
Ex hoc autem inest sensualitati necessitas concupiscendi et rationi impotentia reg-
endi per consequens, QLIIS 157, 433.1467. But reason has some power of restraint over the
senses (QLIIS 94, 258.6568).
160
Ecce aperte vult Augustinus quod mortalitas inflicta sit in poenam primi peccati et
quod inde causata sit concupiscentia. Ex quo videtur quod mortalitas ipsa causa sit origi-
nalis peccati etiamsi numquam interveniret libidinosa commixtio, QLIIS 157, 431.803.
161
Vera enim causa originalis peccati a primis parentibus traducta per carnem est, ut
aestimo, eadem mortalitas vel mortifera qualitas quae inest brutorum corporibus. Videtur
tamen quod posset dici pro Magistro sic, scilicet quod est causa essentialis et accidentalis.
Et primo modo mortalis qualitas est causa originalis peccati a parentibus traducta per car-
nem, secundo modo libido propagationis. Verbi gratia musicus aedificat, quia homo qui est
musicus, QLIIS 157, 434.1638. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V.9, 1017b2930; Physics II.3,
195b13.
 matter, form, and change 67

consent to be subjected to sensuous appetites.162 Kilwardby discusses this

question in the context of his examination of the freedom of the will (see
especially QLIIS 131). He points out that freedom applies to the will in two
ways163: first, it is not free from the penalty of coercion (coactionis); second,
it is free to behave in rectitude, which presupposes that the mind knows
what it is to act correctly, i.e., to live according to the immutable princi-
ples of right conduct that are impressed in the rational soul of every
human being.164 Kilwardby claims that everyone wishes to conform to the
principles of righteous living.165 It is the same essential potentia, the ratio-
nal soul, that first discerns, then chooses, and finally initiates action, but
it does so through diffferent powers, the intellect and the will.166 The deci-
sion of the liberum arbitrium is a joint act venture of the will and intel-
lect. In the end, however, divine Grace is needed for meritorious acts
(QLIIS 136).
God created the rational soul, which is given to each individual human
being as the form and actuality of the body. The soul then receives the
punishment for original sin, which consists in being united with a mortal
body.167 Kilwardby argues that because of the souls connection with the
body, it is contaminated through the body as if there were an infection.168
The problem with this solution is, as he soon points out, that it seems as if
the body could act upon the soul, which is contrary to his Augustinian
metaphysics. He deals with this objection by explicating what is intended
by this afffection: the soul sufffers from being bound to a body that is

162
QLIIS 123, 314.2830.
163
QLIIS 134, 353.238.
164
QLIIS 143, 385.323. The synderesis is mentioned in this context as the power in con-
tact (colligata) with the immutable and eternal truth. It is not enough for a human being to
desire the good to be called good, but it must live according to the principles of righteous
living.
165
QLIIS 143, 385.357.
166
QLIIS 139, 371.678.
167
QLIIS 91, 252.167.
168
Imperfectio culpabilis descendit a patre in prolem per naturam corpoream corrup-
tam et infectam, et eius uidelicet corporalis nature infectione inficitur omnis anima per
creationem infusa: tanta est enim unio corporis et anime ut infectum corpus inficiat ani-
mam, D43Q 33, 36.87680. Also QLIIS 81, 231.956: Peccatum enim licet non sit in carne,
tamen a carne fit in anima. This sort of physical traducianism might be inherited from
R. Fishacre (see Reynolds 1999, 187). Only the rational soul can be infected, not the soul of
the other animals (Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de animae bruti, tum quia
ibi non est ex parte carnis corruptio vitians primam institutionem; tum quia non est ibi
anima rationalis quae sola potest contrahere vitium quod sit peccatum, QLIIS 160, 444.81
3). The result is the infection of whole of the human nature, body and soul ( tota natura
humana corrupta est in spiritu et corpore), see QLIIS 161, 448.778.
68 human beings

inferior to it in nature. However this condition does not constitute any

kind of action on the part of the body upon the soul.169
The infection (infectio) does not qualify as an action, but rather afffects
the soul by limiting its action, in the same way as a debilitated hand limits
the operations of the agent.170 Kilwardby qualifies this as action by resis-
tance (actio per resistentiam).171 The soul is in the body in the same way as
that which is received is received according to the way (of being) of the
recipient,172 and these limitations are felt by both the sensitive and the
rational soul. It is in this sense that the body imposes its conditions on
the soul, and is said to afffect the soul.173 Apart from the above-mentioned
tendency towards bodily desires, the sensory power to perceive is limited
by the infirmity of the body,174 and the same is true about the rational soul.

169
Responsio. Hoc peccatum proprie loquendo contractum est ex alligatione animae
rationalis cum corrupto corpore vel mortali et non est factum alicuius actione, QLIIS 160,
443.457. See also QLIIS 160, 443.5962: Alligatur autem corpori unde natura est appetitu
naturali, et quia corpus est vitiatum, accidit ut vitietur et anima. Quia igitur non vitiaretur
anima nisi uniretur corpori actione naturalis appetitus, aliquo modo causatur vitium ani-
mae ex hoc appetitu et actione.
170
QLIIS 161, 4489.95101. The same argument is repeated in QLIVS 40, 2178.902:
Aliter deficit argumentum, quia corpus non facit animam peccatricem per influentiam
aliquam positivam in illam, sed per sui defectum facit illam defectivam.
171
QLIIS 162, 450.89; 216. The action of the soul upon the body is qualified as proprie,
i.e. the soul acts and the body is acted upon.
172
anima ex colligatione sui naturale cum corpore sequitur plurimum condiciones
corporis ut sit vita in vivente per modum viventis et receptum in recipiente per modum
recipientis, QLIIS 161, 446.168. The same principle is formulated in the NSLP 17, 128.301:
quia receptum est in recipiente per naturam recipientis et non recepti. This expression
bears a striking resemblance with the Aristotelian-Thomist dictum that the object is in the
knower according to the latters way of being (see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on
the De anima, lectio 24, *552).
173
QLIIS 161, 448.1016. The possible ways of afffection have been drawn in QLIIS 160,
445.1026: Ad duo ultima distinguunt quod aliquid agit in aliud tripliciter, scilicet per
praedominantiam sicut contrarium in contrarium, vel per influentiam sicut caelum in
haec inferiora, vel per colligantiam ut quando ex unione duorum ad invicem unum trahit
alterum in sui naturam communicando illi proprietates vel conditiones suas. Et isto tertio
modo inficit corpus animam, (my italics).
174
QLIIS 161, 4467.2341.
 CHAPTER THREE

THE SOUL AS UNA FORMA VIVENTIS

The double origin of the human soul raises some questions concerning
the relation between the diffferently originated potentiae, the relation
of the created soul to the body, and the way the diffferent potentiae make
the kind of unity the soul has. The diffference in origin is the keystone of
Kilwardbys pluralism, the element that allowed him to build his own
theory.
In the following I will consider what constitutes the substance of the
human soul, the status of the potentiae in terms of how they defined and
distinguished from one another, and finally the relations among the poten-
tiae, and between the potentiae and the body. The relations among the
potentiae require a brief presentation of the two opposing positions of
Kilwardbys contemporaries, a debate commonly referred to as the unicity
versus the plurality of substantial forms.
One of Kilwardbys most detailed accounts of the human soul is to be
found in the fifth article of his Epistola, which deals with the principle of
life in the embryo (de principio vitae in embrione).1 He presents three theo-
ries concerning the substance and potentiae of the human soul. I will fol-
low his description of the main tenets of theories (i) and (ii) and his
objections to each of them. Undoubtedly, position (i) is the one to which
he was most opposed: he presents no less than eleven arguments against
it, whereas position (ii) warrants only three. The third theory (iii) is the
one Kilwardby adopted as his own. The three theories are summarized
below.

(i) The soul is substantially simple (simplex), i.e. not composed of distinct
parts, and the same simple and single essence is, therefore, responsible for
the vegetative, sensitive and intellective functions. The potentiae do not

1
From the fifth article onward, E changes substantially. Until this point the text is
focused on metaphysical questions, such as the principles things are made of (matter and
form), the principles of change (matter, form, and privation), and the elements involved in
the process of generation. Articles five to seven deal with anthropological questions, that
is, the relation of body and soul, and the nature of the human soul.
70 human beings

add any real diversity to its essence or substance, being only operative
aspects of the souls substance.2
some say the rational soul is a simple essence difffering only according to the
operations, which when it understands it is called intellective, when it
senses it is called sensitive, when it vegetates it is called vegetative. Yet, they
are [operations] by the same essence. And this is found in the book The
Spirit and the Soul, chapter 10.3
This is the view Kilwardby attributes to De spiritu et anima in QLIIS 8,
making it clear that he did not consider this to be the work of Augustine.4
The description of the same theory is found in some contemporaries,
namely Roger Bacon, John Pecham and, more importantly, in Richard
Fishacre (I will return to this in Part III).5 Richard Rufus of Cornwall
declared that the theory of the creation of the rational soul with all its
potentiae was the common view among theologians.6
The problem with this view is, Kilwardby argues, that the diffferent
potentiae exist in diffferent beings: the vegetative without the sensitive and
intellective in plants, the vegetative and the sensitive without the intellec-
tive in animals, and the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective in
human beings. But if they are distinct in the sense of being able to exist

2
Una est, quod substancia anime racionalis sit tam simplex, quod non habet partem et
partem, sed idipsum simplex in essencia sit, quod vegetat, quod sentit, quod intelligit, ac si
esset unus homo qui diversis potenciis vel artibus faceret tres operaciones. Et istum
modum concipiendi videntur sonare verba vestra. Isto eciam modo potencie iste nichil
addunt substancie, nisi forte raciones quasdam vel modos diversimode se habendi, E 5,
35.814.
3
Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod anima rationalis sit una simplex essentia diffferens solum
secundum operationes quae cum intelligit dicitur intellectiva, quando sentit sensitiva,
quando vegetat vegetativa. Eadem tamen est in essentia. Et hoc videtur haberi in libro
Spiritus et animae cap. 10, QLIIS 8, 29.314. Kilwardby probably has in mind the following
passage in the De spiritu et anima, in PL 40, 13, 78889: Dicitur namque anima, dum vege-
tat; spiritus, dum contemplatur; sensus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; dum intelligit,
mens; dum discernit, ratio; dum recordatur, memoria; dum consentit, voluntas. Ista tamen
non diffferunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima
est; proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una.
4
QLIIS 8, 29. Nec cogit auctoritas De spiritu et anima, quia ille liber non est Augustini,
ut puto, QLIIS 8, 30.523. On the same period, Rufus attributes it to Augustine, while
Bonaventure showed some doubts about the authorship. Albert and Thomas both accept
and deny that Augustine was its author (cf. Thry 1921, 3337).
5
Tractatus de anima Ioannis Pecham, 31. An incipient version of this theory is found in
Philip the Chancellors SB, q.3, 235: Alii dicunt quod una tantum est anima in homine,
scilicet rationalis, et huius sunt potentie vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis in una substantia
fundate.
6
Callus 1939, 43132; Zavalloni 1951, 385. Weisheipl (1984, 464) remarks that theologians
went from being the supporters of the unicity doctrine to its most severe critics.
 the soul as una forma viventis 71

without the others, how can they in the case of human beings constitute
one single essence or substance? Anticipating the objection that these
potentiae could be said to be equivocal in diffferent beings, Kilwardby
states that as the operations performed by each one are the same in difffer-
ent beings, the potentiae are univocal (univoce) and not equivocal.7 If these
potentiae are univocal, then, they must be present in all beings, meaning
that plants would also have the sensitive and intellective potentiae.8 The
acceptance of such a position would lead to absurd consequences. Each
form, qua actuality and perfection, is the actuality and perfection of mat-
ter disposed in the appropriate manner to perform the operations it is able
to perform; however if all the potentiae are one single essence, the actual-
ity or perfection would exist in a certain being without the appropriate
material disposition to perform them. A plant would possess the sensitive
potency without the material dispositions to move or sense. The same
goes for the embryo, for if the three potentiae exist at the same time from
the beginning, the embryo would have the principles of sensitive and
intellective operations without the material dispositions necessary to per-
form those operations. If the foetus were to die before the body was com-
plete (efffigiatus), there would not be a body to be resurrected.9 Lastly, if
the essence of the soul is simple, the three potentiae are either (a) created
or (b) naturally generated. If (a) is the case, the souls of plants and animals
would be created from nothing, which is against both Aristotles and
Augustines position; if (b) is the case, the intellective soul would be gener-
ated by natural agency, which is against the Catholic faith.

(ii) The human rational soul is created as a hoc aliquid, a composite of a

material substrate informed by three potentiae essentially distinct from

7
E 5, 35.224. The same univocity claim is already present at the DSF (44), where he
argues that the operations of the sensory soul are the same in human beings and in other
animals. This thesis is already found in Nemesius of Emesas De natura hominis.
Cf. Knuuttila 2004, 105. See also Philip the Chancellor, SB, q.3, 237; and clearly against it,
John de La Rochelle, SdA, c.26, 88. They are diffferent only in the sense that in human
beings, the sensitive cognitive powers must prepare the images received through sense
perception for the mind (mens) to judge (cf. DSF 44, 139, 140). The human sensory soul does
not difffer from the animal sensory soul only if the sensory soul is not essentially one with
intellective soul (see QLIIS 8, 30.4958).
8
Item, si vegetativum est univoce in homine et in aliis, et vegetativum in homine est
simul sensitivum et intellectivum, ergo vegetativum in planta esset sensitivum, et intellec-
tivum, E 5, 36.46.
9
E 5, 367. The origin of this argument might be found in Anselm of Canterbury,
De conceptu virginali et originali peccato, c.7, ed. F.S. Schmitt, 148: perit, antequam
72 human beings

one another. Whereas the souls of plants and animals are naturally gener-
ated, the three potentiae of the rational soul in human beings are simulta-
neously created and infused, and will be separated together.10 Kilwardby
criticizes this theory because he found it impossible to accept the simulta-
neous creation of all forms, which would imply the presence in the being
of the perfections previous to the appropriate material dispositions:11 they
are present at the same time only when the being is already human.12
Moreover, if the human vegetative and sensitive potentiae are univocal
with those of other animals;13 one might then ask how they are generated
by natural agency in the case of plants and animals, and created in the
case of human beings.14 The way to avoid these objections is to claim that
the potentiae are created and infused after the being has reached a certain
stage of development. In order to explain how this stage of development is
reached, it would be necessary to posit generated vegetative and sensitive
potentiae.15 The doctrine of double vegetative and sensitive potentiae
seems to be response by unitarians to the embryogenesis argumentthe
double origin of the soul-partsby pluralists.16 Kilwardby soon dismissed
the possibility of double vegetative and sensitive potentiae because it

perveniat ad figuram humanam, athough what Anselm here denies is that the embryo has
the human soul from conception.
10
Alia posicio solebat in disputando proponi, videlicet, quod, licet vegetativum in
planta et in bruto procedant in esse per generacionem, et sensitivum in bruto similiter,
tamen ista tria in homine simul creantur. Et hec posicio habet, quod sunt diversa per
essenciam, sive sint in eodem, sive in diversis, et quod anima racionalis est creata quasi
quiddam hoc aliquid habens aliquid, quasi quod est pro materia et istas tres potencias
quasi quo est, que sunt tres forme sue, quo est illa, sue materie inherentes. Et sic composita
est anima hominis ex materia et triplici forma, et hoc totum simul creatur et simul infun-
ditur, simulque separatur, E 5, 38.1423. This seems to include in the same thesis the two
opposing positions of theologians (all are created) and philosophers (only the rational soul
is created) at the time (see McEvoy 1982, 3135).
11
Ad infirmacionem huius plura sunt iam dicta, quia si anima ista sic composita infun-
ditur embrioni, perfeccio aderit, antequam sit, quod perficiatur, E 5, 39.13.
12
Quod vero dicitis, quod iste tres potencie semper sunt in homine simul, hoc verum est,
postquam est homo, E 5, 44.112, (italics mine).
13
E 5, 35.24.
14
E 5, 39.158.
15
E 5, 39.814. This view is also found in John of La Rochelles SdA (see Zavalloni
1950, 21). It seems to be also Bonaventures (and Richard Rufus of Cornwall) position. For
Rufus, criticized by Roger Bacon on this topic, see Hackett 1997, 293; for Bonaventure, see
Dales 1995, 1023. See also Pegis 1934, 2676. There is not however an agreement on what is
Bonaventure position. Zavalloni 1951, 389, takes him for a unitarian; Pegis 1934, 53, for a
pluralist. Crowley 1950, 12933, shows that the textual evidences that allow for both claims.
16
On the use of this argument by pluralists, see Cruz Pontes 1964, 20018. See also
Crowley 1950, 13436.
 the soul as una forma viventis 73

made the work of nature (generating the vegetative and sensitive poten-
tiae) redundant.
Some ten years later (ca. 1266), Roger Bacon, criticized exactly the same
theory in his Communia naturalium.17 He claimed that the theory accord-
ing to which the soul is created with all its powers was formulated on the
basis of two works wrongly attributed to Augustine, De spiritu et anima
and De eccesiasticis dogmatibus, and taught publicly by many moderns.
According to the theory, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective poten-
tiae are simultaneously created and separated from the body at death.
In Bacons view this went against the theory that had been upheld by the
philosophers for the previous twenty years, according to which only the
intellective is created, whereas the vegetative and the sensitive are natu-
rally produced from the potentiality of matter. The simultaneous creation
of all parts of the soul would imply the existence of double vegetative and
sensitive potentiae in one and the same being because the embryo needs
to develop appropriatedely before receiving the intellective soul and this
development could only be explained by means of the vegetative and sen-
sitive potentiae.18 (Therefore, what Kilwardby took to be two diffferent the-
ories (iii), Bacon took to be two aspects of the same theory.)

(iii) The third theory19 posits that the human soul is a rational substance
composed of three potentiaethe vegetative, the sensitive and the intel-
lectivewhich difffer essentially from one another.20 They correspond to
real determinations of the being, and the vegetative and sensitive poten-
tiae, as forms educed from the potentiality of matter, dispose matter to a
higher degree of ontological complexity. Human beings are more specific
than animals, animals more specific than plants, and plants more spe-
cificthan bodies without qualification. Arguing against the two first theo-
ries, Kilwardby claims that the three potentiae exist in human beings at
the same time only after the embryo becomes a foetus. According to this
third theory, the three potentiae of the human soul come into being in

17
Roger Bacon, Communia naturalium, distinction 3, chapter 1, in Opera hactenus ined-
ita, ed. Steele, 281282, as noted by Hackett 2006, 1234. See also Hackett 1997, 2923. For the
date, see Crowley 1950, 128. The De spiritu et anima and the De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus,
both wrongly attributed to Augustine (the first is probably by Alcher of Clairvaux, the sec-
ond by Gennadius of Massilia), were used by unicists as authoritative evidence against
pluralists.
18
Hackett 1997, 292293.
19
Hec est posicio tercia de anima humana et tribus eius potenciis, que plane philoso-
phica est usque huc et fidei christiane consona, E 5, 41.12.
20
Cf. footnote 7, page 28. See also E 5, 44.1824.
74 human beings

successionfirst the vegetative, then the sensitive, and finally the intel-
lective. Whereas the vegetative and the sensitive potentiae are the work of
nature, coming into being from the seminal reasons,21 the intellective
potentia is created by God.22 The embryo remains unspecified until the this
potentia, supervening on the sensitive body, perfects the being and makes
it fully determined and complete in its species.23 Kilwardby should be
counted among the proponents of the so-called theory of delayed homi-
nization.24 The same holds for the corruption of the human composite.
When this happens, the vegetative and the senstive potentiae return to the
condition of original reasons; only the intellective potentia subsists sepa-
rated from the body, retaining its natural inclination to be united with the
body.25 In resurrection, the vegetative and the sensitive potentiae are
restored instantaneously to their state of actuality by divine interven-
tion.26 This was Kilwardbys own position, which he took to be in agree-
ment with the Catholic Faith.
The diffferent origin of the potentiae of the human soul explains their
diffferent nature: whereas the vegetative and sensitive souls operate only
through corporeal organs, the intellective soul performs its operations
without the assistance of the body. Kilwardby argues that operations that
are so diffferent in nature cannot belong to the same substantial form. For
instance, the operations of the vegetative formto take nourishment, to
generate, and to growwhich are performed through bodily organs, can-
not be rooted in a form that does not need the body for its operations, as
in the case of the intellective form.27 He discusses the essential distinction

21
multo melius dicetur tercio modo, videlicet, quod diffferunt essencialiter ab invi-
cem vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva potencia, ita quod in omnibus vegetabilibus natura
producat vegetativam animam, sive vitam, a potenciis elementorum mediante mixcione
vel complexione ad vegetacionem ordinata. Sensitiva similiter producitur opere nature de
potenciis elementorum, mediante mixcione vel complexione ordinata ad sensitivam, et
originales raciones earum a principio materie rerum transmutabilium indite fuerunt, que
consequenter in esplicacione seculorum de operibus condicionis exeunt in esse per opera
administracionis, E 5, 3940.26-07. For the notion of complexion, see Reynolds 1999,
1068; see also McAleer 2001, 34970.
22
E 5, 40.224.
23
Quod vero additis de hominis embrione, omnino negandum est, quia non est embrio,
nisi dum indistinctum est et nondum formatum est. In quo satis declaratum est prius non
esse omnes tres; antequam enim sit homo efffigiatus, ita quod dispositus sit perfecte ad
potenciam intellectivam, non habet omnes tres, E 5, 44.127.
24
Cf. Donceel 1970; Heaney 1992; also Kretzmann 1998, 376405.
25
Et intellectus post corrupcionem corporis separatus appetit reuniri corpori, tam-
quam suo perfectibili, E 5, 40.202.
26
E 5, 40.724.
27
E 5, 3536.
 the soul as una forma viventis 75

between the sensitive and the intellective potentiae in QLIS 61, arguing
that when actions or operations do not depend on one another and can be
separated according to the subject and the being,28 they correspond to dif-
ferent essences or potentiae, such as sensing and understanding (sentire et
intelligere).29 Kilwardby explicitly denies that essentially diffferent opera-
tions can be performed by one completely simple form:
I know many corporeal and spiritual forms that do not have unity with one
another; I also know that some have a certain unity, but not completely; and
I know a diversity of objects gives rise to a diversity of actions arises because
it leads to the cognition of such diversity, and because then there arises a
cognition of the diversity in powers and forms: that the unity of forms would
be complete, exercising diverse species of actions and requiring diffferent
species of objects, I neither know nor understand, but I consider it false and
impossible.30
Kilwardby adoped the well-known principle that a substantial form
accounts for the capacities of the thing it informs.31 (It will soon become
clear how he interpreted this principle in a nonstandard way.) In the case
of living things, the soul accounts for the operations proper to that kind of
thing. In the specific case of human beings, this includes taking nourish-
ment, perceiving, and thinking. To this principle, however, Kilwardby
added another, which states that the diversity of operations must be
accounted for by a diversity of substantial forms, and cannot be accounted
for by one single essence: But I do not see how this can be true, because
Ido not see in what way diffferent operations do not proceed from difffer-
ent potentiae rooted in diffferent essences.32

28
That is, they can exist in beings other than human beings, as the vegetative exists
without the sensitive and intellective in plants, the vegetative and sensitive without the
intellective in irrational animals, and the intellective without the vegetative and sensitive
in angels and the human soul in the disembodied state (E 5, 35.1720). It does not mean
they are like two souls or the souls of two human beings (cf. E 5, 44.1820).
29
QLIS 61, 175.635.
30
Novi enim multas formas corporales et spirituales, que nullam habent ad invicem
unitatem; novi eciam aliquas quandam habere unitatem, sed non omnimodam; et novi a
diversitate formarum diversitatem procedere accionum, et quia per diversitatem obiecto-
rum venitur in cognicionem diversitatis accionum, et quia inde proceditur ad cogni-
cionem diversitatis in potenciis et formis: sed quod unitas sit formarum omnimoda,
diversas specie acciones exercencium et diversa obiecta specie requirencium, nec novi,
nec intelligo, sed falsum iudico et impossibile, E 7, 4950, 20-03.
31
Cf. Aristotles De anima II.3.
32
Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod anima rationalis sit una simplex essentia diffferens
solum secundum operationes quae cum intelligit dicitur intellectiva, quando sentit sensi-
tiva, quando vegetat vegetativa. Eadem tamen est in essentia. () Sed et hoc non videtur
76 human beings

(G) Operations that are diffferent in nature must be rooted in diffferent

essences.
The diffferent nature of certain operations entails that they belong to
essences that are diffferent in nature. The operations are performed by
each potentias powers. Each essential perfection corresponds to a substan-
tial form. This means that each potentia is the principle of certain opera-
tions proper only to itself.33 Kilwardby attempted to clarify the relation
between the potentiae and their powers by means of acts and the objects
of the acts.34 Powers belong not only to the category of quality, but also to
that of relation because they are defined with respect to their operations.35
In Aristotle one arrives at knowledge of the operations through knowledge
of the objects, and from this knowledge one comes to knowledge of the
powers and dispositions.36
(g) Powers are directed to objects.
Thus, powers are defined in terms of their operations,37 and those powers
that perform operations that are diffferent in nature must be distinct.

verum, quia non video quomodo diversae operationes non procedunt a diversis potentiis radi-
catis in diversis essentiis, QLIIS 8, 29.402 (italics mine). For other examples of adoption of
this criterion, see Beha 1960, 183204; and Michael 1992, 1557.
33
A toute perfection essentielle, toute perfection qui ne peut tre rduite des l-
ments plus simples correspond une forme substantielle distincte. Tout tre suppose autant
de formes quil a dactivits difffrentes, Zavalloni 1951, 310. Cf. Bonaventure, CII, d.15, a.1,
q.2, ad 3.
34
virtus est ultimum de potencia, E 6, 46.2 (see also DOS XXXI.301, 109.15; cf. Richard
Fishacre, InIIS, dist. 10, 213, line 184); and Forma est ultimum in operatione, QLIIS 79,
224.13). Cf. QLIIS 137, 362.802, where Kilwardby refers the distinction between the first
actuality and second actuality of a power: first actuality as a capacity of the substantial
form to which it belongs, and second actuality with respect to the operations it performs
(Ad secundum patet quod omnis virtus est in actu suo primo vel secundo. In actu primo
quo refertur ad substantiam intra cuius est, semper est. In actu secundo quoad extrinse-
cam operationem non semper). Also in QLIVS 32 (140.1725), Kilwardby distinguishes
between habitus and usus or actus, for instance, the intellect as a power and its act, which
is understanding (intelligere); in the same way, he says, visus as a disposition and visus as
the act of seeing. A power remains a capacity even when not in operation. For the consid-
eration of powers as habits and acts or operations, see QLIS 61, 174.
35
QLIII2S 33, 12930.289.
36
Quia per notitiam obiectorum et operationum venimus in notitiam potentiarum et
habituum, secundum Philosophum, QLIII2S 31, 121.17880. Also: et novi a diversitate
formarum diversitatem procedere accionum, et quia per diversitatem obiectorum venitur
in cognicionem diversitatis accionum, et quia inde proceditur ad cognicionem diversitatis
in potenciis et formis, E 7, 49.236. Cf. Aristotles De anima II.4, 415a1622. See Anonymi,
magistri artium (c. 12461247), Sententia super II et III De anima, ed. B.C. Bazn, Louvain-
Paris: Editions Peeters, 1998, lectio 9. See also DOS XLVIII.466; and NSLP 7, 39.910: nos
non cognoscamus essentias et actus nisi per actiones. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.76, a.3 c.
37
QLIIS 137, 362.68.
 the soul as una forma viventis 77

The diffferent powers, being directed to diffferent actions and diffferent

objects, are rooted in diffferent essences.38 It is worth pointing out that the
diversity of operations is not enough to justify the diversity of potentiae
otherwise diffferent powers such as memory and imagination would
belong to diffferent potentiae; the operations or acts must be essentially
distinct, such as to think and to perceive. The diffferent powers belong to a
simple essence (in una essentia simplici), are ordered to each other (ordi-
nantur ad invicem), and difffer only in their ways of operation (that is, per-
form diffferent actions).39 Kilwardby introduces a distinction between two
kinds of potentiae within the human soul:
(i) potentiae partiales, i.e. powers
(ii)potentiae totales, i.e. substantial forms
The human soul is constituted of three substantial forms (tribus formis
substancialibus),40 each of which having several powers.41 There is an oper-
ative distinction between the powers of the potentiae and an essential dis-
tinction between the potentiae of the soul.42
A substantial form is a constitutive part of a naturally subsistent thing,43
a perfective form of the thing, act with respect to matter, form in the sense
of the principle responsible for a set of operations proper to the thing.44
Each of the three potentiae or substantial forms has its own active pow-
ersthrough which it exercises the operations that are proper to it.45 Each
of them is responsible for certain operations, according to the princi-
ple that each form acts through its power, and the power by means of
operation.46

38
E 6, 456.23-04.
39
QLIS 61, 174.416.
40
E 5, 44.58.
41
Potencia vero primo modo dicta est in anima humana triplex diffferens per essen-
ciam, et quelibet istarum habet suam potenciam accidentalem, E 5, 43.1820.
42
Quia licet una sit essentia vel substantia mentis, tamen diversae sunt potentiae ratio
speculans et voluntas, et diversitati potentiarum respondet diversitas habituum. Item quia
eiusdem potentiae communis sive totalis multi sunt habitus diversi et multae potentiae par-
tiales prout diversa potest opera et respectu diversorum obiectorum, QLIIS 139, 3756.97101,
(italics mine). The active powers of a certain substance are distinct from one another only
conceptually and by their way of operating (ratione et modo) (QLIS 60, 171.413).
43
D43Q 34, 37.899900.
44
E 5, 43.918.
45
Et in ipsis formis substantialibus sunt potentiae activae quae mediantibus acciden-
tibus concomitantibus melius vel peius se habent ad actionem ut praedictum est, QLIS 59,
169.1179. See also E 5, 43.134.
46
DOS XLVIII.466, 160.5.
78 human beings

In addition, the way a power performs its operation depends on a num-

ber of conditions that must be met. This is made clear in the following
passage:
it must be said that the name of natural potency is taken equivocally. In one
way it is something of the substance, and the truth of each thing naturally
subsistent by which it can be said either active or passive. In another way it
is some quality that belongs to the being of the thing, an essential potency
by which the thing is able to act and to be acted upon to a higher or lower
degree. And this quality is not an acquired habitus or disposition, but [one
that is] concomitant with the being of the thing.47 For example, in the organ
of sight there is the power for seeing, which is something of the truth of the
thing, because it is something of the sensory soul. And there is a certain con-
sequent [upon the thing] and concomitant accidental disposition, such as
the cleanness of the pupil, or transparency, or something similar. And this is
an accident by which the thing performs its operations in a better or worse
manner.48
Kilwardby distinguishes here between the active powers (potentiae acti-
vae) that are part of the things essence (aliquid essentiae rei),49 and the
concomitant dispositions such as, in the case of sight, the cleanness of the
eyes pupil (limpiditas pupillae), that allow these powers to carry out their
operations in a better or worse manner. Without the appropriate disposi-
tions, the power is not able to perform adequately its operations.
There is some discussion as to which category these active powers
belong. On the one hand they should belong to quality, but on the other,
by being part of a things essence they belong by reduction to the genus
substance.50 Kilwardby was clearly in contention with Bonaventure, who

47
See also NSLP 17, 132.267.
48
Ad primum contra dicendum quod nomen naturalis potentiae aequivoce sumitur.
Uno enim modo est aliquid de substantia et veritate uniuscuiusque naturaliter subsistentis
quo potens dicitur sive activum sive passivum. Alio modo est aliqua qualitas consequens
esse rei qua res per potentiam essentialem est habilior vel minus habilis ad agendum vel
patiendum. Et haec qualitas non est habitus vel dispositio aliunde adquisita, sed concomi-
tatur esse rei. Verbi gratia in organo visivo est potentia videndi quae est aliquid de veritate
rei, quia est aliquid animae sensitivae. Et est ibi dispositio aliqua accidentalis consequens
et concomitans, ut limpiditas pupillae vel transparentia vel aliquid simile. Et est accidens
quo res melius vel peius se habet ad actionem, QLIS 59, 168.809. The same conception is
found in NSLP 13, 100.302; 1012.34-05. See also QLIIS 127, 3267.2836.
49
QLIS 59, 169.97. See also QLIIS 138, 371.24652.
50
Respondeo: Quidam dicunt quod sunt accidentia et de secunda specie qualitatis et
hoc volunt universaliter de omnibus potentiis activis et passivis forte. Alii vero rationalibi-
lius et probabilius quod potentiae illae quibus per se sunt substantiae potentes, reducun-
tur ad praedicamentum substantiae, et hoc ita quod ad aliquod principiorum substantiae
compositae. Et istis consentiendum ad praesens, QLIS 59, 168.749. As the image of the
 the soul as una forma viventis 79

believed that the powers could be understood in both ways, i.e. as the acci-
dents of the second species of quality and as belonging to the genus
substance.51 Bonaventure admitted the distinction between what the
thing is and that by which it operates: the powers belong to the same
genus, substance, by reduction (per reductionem), but the soul is not to be
(essentially) identified with its powers.52 Moreover, to be and to operate
cannot be the same, otherwise the thing would have to be operating (all
the operations it is able to perform) permanently, in the same way as it has
being. For Kilwardby, although it was not the same to be and to operate, it
did not follow that that by which the thing is and that by which the thing
operates are diffferent.53 The form that gives being operates through its
powers. To be and to operate are efffects of the same form, as the same
tongue both tastes and speaks.54
Chenu argues that Kilwardby, taking a more extreme view than
Bonaventure, reduces the acts of the powers to the substance of the soul.55
Chenu is right in his claim, but I would like to pursue the matter a little,
further qualifying this reduction. Kilwardby remarks in DFS that all actions
(or motions) of the soul are of the soul, therefore they can be reduced to
the category of the soul, which is a substancethis is the case with images
of sensible objects in the soul. However, these images could also be under-
stood as images of the objects, and as such are accidents and belong to the
category of quality (and relation). When called upon to explain how an
action could be identical to a substance, Kilwardby argued in a similar

Trinity in man, the powers of the rational soul cannot be accidents; moreover, they cannot
be distinct from the soul itself (cf. QLIS 60, 172.7781).
51
See Bonaventure, CI, d. 3, pars 2, a. 1, q. 3: anima est in genus substantia, sed poten-
tiae eius sunt in secunda species qualitatis, scilicet naturali potentiae vel impotentiae. For
Aquinas there is a real distinction between the powers and the soul. The powers belong to
the genus of accident (cf. ST I, 54, a. 3; 77, a. 1; 77, a. 3).
52
anima not est suae potentiae per essentiam, See Bonaventure, C I, d. 3, pars 2, a. 1,
q. 3, respondeo. Cf. Beha 1960, 1903.
53
Secundo modo dicendum quod licet diversum sit esse et operari, non tamen sequi-
tur quod diversum sit quo res est et quo operatur. Esse enim et operari sunt diversi efffectus
eiusdem formae, QLIS 60, 172.6972. See also QLIIS 2, 9.447; and QLIS 71, 207.5564: id
ipsum sunt actio et forma (in this question, Kilwardby opposes God that acts through the
whole of its substance and the human mind which acts through its forms. Cf. 208.845).
The form acts through the power which performs certain operations ( forma agit per
virtutem, virtus per actionem: DOS XLVIII.466, 160.5. Aquinas would certainly not dis-
agree with this principle (cf. SCG II.79). He would disagree, however, that from the diversity
of operations the diversity of substantial forms should be endorsed. Cf. Wber 1970, 153.
54
Similiter loqui et gustare sunt diversa, et tamen causantur ab eadem lingua median-
tibus diversis potentiis eius, QLIS 60, 172.756. For a similar discussion, see John Pecham,
Quaestiones tractantes de anima, q. 31, 202203.
80 human beings

fashion, answering the question of how a relation can be a substance. His

argument was as follows. One could consider any such accident inhering
in a substance from the point of view of that in which it inheres and from
the point of view of its relating to something else. The relating is the nature
proper of the accident, whereas the that in which the accident inheres is
a substance. If one takes what is proper to the accident, what remains is
the substance. It is in this sense that relation can be identified with sub-
stance, and the same is valid with regard to the actions or operations of
the soul that are identified with the substance of the soul.56 There is no real
(in re) diffference between the soul and its powers, or between the powers
and its operations, only a diffference in mode (in modo). This brings us to a
basic principle of Kilwardbys theory of the soul, that unity does not mean
simplicity:
If the rational soul is a substance, and that substance is a form, therefore
[the rational soul] is a form; therefore [the rational soul] is simple. I do not
understand these words in any another way. But it does not follow that if it is
one form, ergo it is simple. For all composite things have unity, but not
simplicity.57
Kilwardbys argument is clear: from the simplicity of the soul one must
posit its unity, but from its unity one need not posit its simplicity. He
directs his effforts against the understanding of the human soul as being
simple just because it is one. Instead he claims that
(H) A thing can be composite and still have a unity.
This is the case with the human soul, which is a composite substance
made of three essentially distinct potentiae. That the soul is one is not
open to questioning; what is necessary to consider is the kind of unity it is,
in other words how its essentially diffferent parts together form one soul, in
the sense of a (composite) unitybecause this is what Kilwardby took

55
Chenu 1928, 190. Chenu refers to QLIS 71.
56
Ergo dictae actiones [memorandi, intelligendi et amandi] ut videtur sunt menti
consubstantiales, QLIS 71, 207.34.
57
si anima racionalis est una substancia et illa substancia est forma, ergo est una
forma; ergo simplex. Aliud non intelligo de verbis istis. Sed non sequitur: si est una forma,
ergo simplex. Omnia enim composita habent unitatem, non tamen simplicitatem, E 6,
467.25-03. The article number 12 of the 1277 Oxfords Condemnations read: Item quod
vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint una forma simplex, CUP 559, n. 474. Cf. Bonaventure,
C II, d.17, a.1, q.2, ad.1: Ad illud quod obicitur, quod omnis forma est simplex, dicendum
quod auctor ille, definiens formam, loquitur de forma illa quae est forma tantum, non de
ea quae est forma et hoc aliquid.
 the soul as una forma viventis 81

Aristotle and Augustine to have said.58 First of all, therefore, he had to pro-
vide an account of the composite nature of the soul, and then account for
what made it a unity. Let us start with its composition.
In E 6 (about the simplicity of the principle of life in human beings)
Kilwardby considers the four ways in which something can be said to be
simple and composite: in substance (in substancia), in potency or power
(potencia seu virtute), in concretion (in concrecione), and in extension (in
extensione).59 He concludes that the soul is simple in concretion and in
extension. It does not exist in a subject as an accident, and as a spiritual
substance the soul is simple in the sense of being neither divisible nor
extended.60 He argues strongly against the view that takes the souls pres-
ence as whole in every part of the body to follow from its simplicity. If this
were so, it should follow from the simplicity of a point that a point could be
present everywhere in a body. One should rather say that the soul is whole
in each part of the body due to its spiritual nature.61 It is its spirituality, not

58
E 5, 42.237: Intelligere debetis, quod una est anime racionalis substancia in homine,
non tamen simplex, sed ex partibus composita. Vegetativa enim, sensitiva et intellectiva
partes sunt essencialite[r] diffferentes, et secundum Philosophum, et secundum Augustinum,
(italics mine). See also DOS 199, 77.135. The passage makes clear that Kilwardby is talking
here about the human soul as a whole constituted of the three potentiae, and not the intel-
lective potentia only. This precision is necessary because it could be object that only the
intellective soulwhich the actuality of no bodily partis simple and nonextended. On
the other hand, the inclusion of the vegetative and sensitive makes the division into pow-
ers and their ventricular localization even more problematic to be accounted for.
59
E 6, 45.167. See Hugh of St. Chers fourfold consideration of the soul with respect to
composition and simplicity in Lottin (1932, 25). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputa-
tae: De anima, a.10, 319, where Aquinas presents the three ways a thing can be said to be
composite (i.e. to have parts): in quantity, in its essential principles, and in power. For
Aquinas, the soul is tota in qualibet parte corporis, and the only way he accepts that the soul
is not such (i.e. tota in qualibet parte corporis) is in those powers (as the intellect and the
will) that do not require (any part of) the body for their operations.
60
Istis modis non est composicio in anima, sed simplicitas, quia ipsa est de genere
substancie et commune est omni substancie in subiecto non esse, E 6, 46.102, and Isto
modo non est composicio anime, quia non habet dimensionem. Neque enim iste modus
simplicitatis inest ei, quia in puncto est concrecio et potencia; anima vero est simplicitatis
superioris spiritualis, E 6, 46.169. In QLIIS 54 (156.228), Kilwardby discusses the way
something is said to occupy a space (in loco corporali). There are three requirements: to be
in a present place (quod locatum sit praesens loco), the place to be determinate (quod locus
sit determinatus), the diffferent parts of the thing must occupy diffferent parts of the place
(quod sic sit praesens ut faciat partes locati distare per dimensiones suas). A body fulfils all
these requirements. Spiritual beings only fulfil the first two, since they are not extended.
God only fulfills the first because he is present everywhere.
61
Forte spiritualitas cum potencia et virtute proporcionata ad corpus movendum,
regendum et continendum causa est, quod sit in qualibet parte tota, E 6, 48.57. See also
QLIIS 17, 701.3048; QLIIS 55, 158.267; and NSLP 17, 132.224 ( sic enim se habet quae-
libet pars animae ad quamlibet partem corporis sicut tota ad totum). See also QLIIS 17,
82 human beings

its simplicity, that gives the soul the capacity of being whole everywhere in
the body. On the other hand, the soul is composite in potency and in sub-
stance. It is composite in potency because it is constituted by aplurality of
powers (distinguishable by their objects) rooted in diffferentpotentiae,62
and in substance because it is a composite of a material and a formal prin-
ciple, or formal principles, even though each of its componentsmatter
and formis, in the final analysis (ultima resolutio)simple.63 In sum, the
human soul is a form and a spiritual substance (1), composite of matter
and form (2), and comprising diffferent potentiae or parts (3).64
Having settled the compositional nature of the soul, comprising both
matter and potentiae, let us now consider how the potentiae are organized
within the unity they compose. Kilwardby argues that the relation between
the lower potentiae and the higher potentia within the composite (unity)
is that between the one perfecting and the one perfected.
I know, however, that one man has one form, which is not simple (simplex),
but rather composite of many [potentiae or forms], having a natural order to
each other, without which no man can be perfect, and the last of which,
completive and perfective of the whole aggregate, is the intellect.65

71.3067; and QLIIS 78, 217.802. The Augustinian notion of tota in toto corpore can be
found in De immortalitate animae 16.25, and DT 6.6.8. Cf. also Nemesius of Emesa,
De natura hominis, c. 2, 256.
62
In potencia seu virtute, quando sunt diverse potencie essencialiter diffferentes ordi-
nate ad diversas acciones et diversa obiecta () Istis modis non est in anima humana sim-
plicitas sed composicio, E 6, 456.23-04. See also QLIIS 139, 373.323. See John Pecham,
Questiones de anima, 188190.
63
In substancia, sicut quando unum aliquid componitur ex multis essencialiter difffe-
rentibus licet quendam ordinem ad invicem habentibus; et talia sunt omnia ex principiis
naturaliter composita. Huic opposita simplicitas est in qualibet formarum vel parcium
ipsius compositi, quando facta est resolucio ultima, E 6, 45.1822. On the simplicity of the
form abstracted from matter, see LSP 400.445; DOS XXXI.303; QLIS 53, 159.20; QLIIS 17,
72.3501. Substances are composite of matter and form, a material and formal principle,
quod est and quo est (QLIS 60, 171.3555).
64
(1) E 6, 46.34; (2) QLIS 60, 171.3344; QLIIS 14, 52.314; QLIIS 1516; E 2.23; (3) QLIIS 8,
29.43.
65
Scio tamen, quod unus homo unam habet formam, que non est una simplex, sed ex
multis composita, ordinem ad invicem habentibus naturalem, et sine quarum nulla perfec-
tus homo esse potest, quarum ultima, completiva et perfectiva tocius aggregati, est intel-
lectus, E 7, 53.137. On Albert the Greats use of the expression forma simplex (which is
one of the articles of the 1277 Proihibitions), see Werner 2004. In his commentary to the
Perihermeneias, Kilwardby distinguishes between simple and complex unities, in proposi-
tions and in natural things, according to the form: an element, as water, is one by having a
simple form, whereas a mixture (complexionatum) is one by having a form of the compos-
ite; a proposition is complex because it is constituted by a plurality of terms and, neverthe-
less, it has a unity of signification and reference (intellectus et rei), as in the case of the
 the soul as una forma viventis 83

The perfection or accomplishment (consummatio) of the human life, to

use Kilwardbys terminology in D43Q, is the rational soul. This clearly
shows how Kilwardby envisaged generation as a process towards its end,
the determination of the developing being by its specific form. Once
infused, the intellective potentia is conjoined to the other potentiae that
develop naturally from the potentialities in matter,66 and together they
make one soul (effficit unam animam).
Referring to the analogy between the kinds of soulsvegetative,
sensitive and intellectiveand the three basic rectilinear geometrical
figuresthe triangle, the quadrilateral and the pentagonpresented by
Aristotle in De anima II.3, Kilwardby argues that:
the <intellective [form]> conjoined with the others [which were] naturally
educed make one soul, in much the same way as from the quadrangular,
which in fact contains two triangles, if from one side is added a triangle, it
would become a pentagon.67
Yet, if an angle is raised from the side of a square, it becomes a pentagon,
although one part of it was first and an exterior part is added. Also, two tri-
angles are parts of the existing quadrangular, and through the bringing
together of these a new species is made because the quadrangular consists
of two triangles. It is not incongruent that we can explain that which has
been said of the three potencies of the soul in the [geometrical] figures.68
When the intellective soul supervenes on the existing composite, it relates
to the previous soul-kinds as their completion. This binding is similar to
the way in which a quadrilateral, which contains two triangles, becomes a
pentagon with the addition of another triangle. The ratio of this analogy is
in the progressive order of figure and souls, in that the more basic figure/
soul (or its properties/functions) is found in the later figures/souls.

utterance Animal rationale mortale est, which stands for the definition of human being
(see NSLPery I.6, P 71vb). Therefore, he says, every [oratio] which is simple is one, but not
the converse (omnem simplicem esse unam, et non conuertitur, NSLPery I.6, V 9r); the
same principle applies to the unity of the human soul.
66
intellectiua uero potentia desuper hiis immititur, coniungitur sensitiue imme-
diate et per ipsam uegetatiue et toti corpori, D43Q 34, 38.93941. (See next footnote.)
67
<intellectiua> coniuncta aliis naturaliter eductis unam effficit animam, per modum
quo ex quadrangulo qui in ueritate continet duos triangulos, si addatur ex aliqua parte eius
triangulus, erit unus pentagonus, D43Q 37.9025.
68
Adhuc, si super latus tetragoni erigatur angulus, fit pentagonus, licet pars eius prius
fuerit et pars exterius sit apposita. Quadranguli eciam, qui preerat, sunt duo trianguli
partes et per eorum copulacionem fit nova species, quia quadrangulus ex duobus constat
triangulis. Hec in figuris non incongrue possumus explanare, que dicta sunt in tribus
anime potenciis, E 5, 42.913.
84 human beings

Kilwardby understood Aristotles example as implying that the addition

of the new triangle to the existing square (already constituted of two tri-
angles) did not eliminate the existing figures, but rather complemented
them. In the case of the soul, this means that the vegetative and sensitive
potentiae continue to be responsible for their operations after the infusion
of the rational potency, which is the forma completiva that gives the being
its specific perfection. Precisely because he considered generation a pro-
cess in which successive levels of determination are acquired, he resisted
the idea of considering these stages as disposable in the face of a new
perfection.
The several powers of the human soul are rooted in three potentiae that
difffer essentially (per essentiam) but are, none the less, parts of the same
soul (nihilominus sunt eiusdem animae partes).69 The question is how these
potentiae relate to one another and to the body. The following passage
clarifies the issue.
The human soul consists of many potentiae because it contains the vegeta-
tive, the sensitive and the intellective, and each of these consists of many
other powers. And all them, together, make one human soul, which is the
form of the human body. However, the soul can be thought of with respect
to the body, which is its matter, and in comparison with the operations that
are proper proper to them (). When compared to the body, [each of] the
potentiae that are constitutive of the human soul can be considered as that
which vivifies the body, which is common to all souls [and not to a specific
kind of soul], or as that which vivifies human life. In the first of these, all the
potentiae are equal and no single one is the form of the others, but they
rather difffer in species the same way as the kinds of life are distinct. In the
second [of these ways] the rational potentia is the form of the others and
their complementum, or so it seems.70
In this excerpt, apart from stating the compositional nature of the soul
composition in potentiae and powersKilwardby proposes a double
consideration of the potentiae: on the one hand, each potentia is an

69
QLIS 61, 173.156.
70
Anima humana constat ex multis potentiis, quia continet vegetativam, sensitivam et
intellectivam, et quaelibet harum habet in se potentias plures. Et hae omnes congregatim
faciunt unam animam humanam quae est una forma humani corporis. Potest autem
anima talis considerari in comparatione ad corpus quod est sua materia, et per compara-
tionem ad operationes propter quas est () Dum enim comparatur ad corpus, possunt
potentiae dictae animam constituentes considerari ut vivificativae corporis, quod est com-
mune omni animae, vel ut vivificativae vita humana. In primo istorum omnes dictae
potentiae pares sunt et nulla est aliarum forma, sed sic diffferunt specie si distinguas modos
vitae. In secundo rationalis potentia est aliarum forma et complementum, ut patet,
QLIII2S 63, 268. 8797.
 the soul as una forma viventis 85

animating principle of the body, because that is what is proper to the

common definition of the soul (soul=principle of life); on the other hand,
or as the animating principle of a certain kind of life, human life, one of
the potentiaethe intellectiveis the completion of the being and in
that sense can be said to be the form of the other souls; they are, as such,
ordered to the higher, completive (completiva), form.71
(I) The intellective form is the perfection of the sensitive body.
If the soul is taken as the principle of life, it is common to all beings that
are livingand such is said univocally of plants, animals and human
beings.72 However, Kilwardby explicitly points out that with respect to the
operations and their objects, the diffferent souls (potentiae/forms) difffer in
species (as they have distinctive properties), and therefore remain dis-
tinct. Nevertheless, they do constitute one soul that is the form of the
human body (una forma humani corporis).
Kilwardby presents the same reading, but in a more logical manner, in
NSLPor (and NSLPery), arguing that the genus is in potency to the species,
which is contracted by the specific diffference. The last supervening form is
that which makes the whole into one;73 the ultima diffferentia is therefore
said to be the whole form. Previous forms are thought of as dispositive, or
potential, with respect to this last form,74 which in human beings is the
intellective.
(K) The lower forms are dispositional with respect to the higher form.
This could be termed the subordination principle. There is in the human
soul a hierarchical organization of forms and an essential unity resulting
from the last diffferentia.75 It is this dispositive nature of the potentiae with
respect to the intellective that allowed Kilwardby to argue that the plural-
ity of potentiae did not threaten the unity of the soul.

71
Sed in praecedentibus exemplis de potentiis humanae animae et de coloribus et
lineamentis constituentibus unam completam picturam, QLIII2S 63, 270.1557. Interesting
enough, the same example is used in NSLPor 8, P 39ra, where Kilwardby argues against
omitting the intermediate images between the starting and the last one.
72
Univocal are those things that have the same name and account (ratio); they agree in
either genus, or species, or number (QLIS 43, 1378.256). See also NSLP 7, 32.2930;
33.1618.
73
Difffinitio est per formam ultimam quae unius rei unica est, NSLPor 9, P 39vb.
74
NSLPor 8, P 39ra.
75
Et intellige quod est una ab unitate diffferentie ultime, scilicet unitate essentiali, cum
alie diffferentie sint de natura primi generis et sicut entes in potentia respectu ultime, sicut
uult Aristotiles in VII Philosophie prime, NSLPery I.6, P 71va.
86 human beings

The several dispositions are perfected by the last form, the highest
degree of actuality, which makes the whole a complete being. The analogy
of a statue and a human being Kilwardby presents in QLIII2S 63 clarifies
this point: first the structure of the statue is formed, without the details of
its figure; then traces of who it is intended to portray are added, followed
by colours and whatever is necessary to make the statue a perfect imita-
tion of a human being: the nose, eyes and such are given their final shape
so as to represent the whole body of a particular human being. Thus,
many are the dispositions that are added to matter prior to the last actual-
ity, which is similar to the thing as a complete whole.76 It is the statue as a
whole that represents this particular human being, not the nose or the
mouth; in the same way, it is one soul that is the form of the human body.
In all things that constitute one natural whole, the last and noblest part
denominates the whole. Although the rational part is a constituent of the
human soul, together with the vegetative and sensitive parts, because it is
the highest one, the whole of the soul is denominated with reference to
the rational soul.77 This is not a semantic principle, but an expression
of the hierarchy of progressive determinative principles.78 On the one
hand there is no form that subordinates other forms, given that each of the
forms, insofar as they are essential determinations, remains distinct from
the others: they account for the functions that are proper to the diffferent
kinds of life. On the other hand, the rational soul is the form that, as the
completion and perfection of the others, designates this quasi-aggregate.79
It is in this sense and in this sense only that the soul, including the intel-
lective soul, is the form of the body.
The analogy with geometrical figures calls our attention to a central fea-
ture of the plurality solution, as R. Zavalloni aptly points out, the principle
of subordination of forms. According to him, the development of the
pluralist doctrine concentrates on this particular aspect.80 The pluralists

76
Et sic iungitur donec ultimo formatis ciliis, oculis, naribus et huiusmodi ultimitati-
bus totius corporis repraesentent hominem individuum determinatum. Sic ergo multae
dispositiones adiciuntur materiae ante ultimum actum qui assimulat rem ex toto com-
plete, QLIII2S 63, 269.1203. Here Kilwardby reasons that the potentiae of the soul relate to
the whole soul as the lines and colors to the complete picture (cf. QLIII2S 63, 270.1558).
77
In naturis concurrentibus ad unum totum naturale constituendum est ita quod a
digniori denominatur totum. Verbi gratia, ex mixto et vegetativa potentia constituitur
vegetabile, ex vegetabili et sensitiva potentia sensibile, ex sensibili et rationali rationale,
QLIII1S 9, 46.836. See also LSP 399.237. Similarly, in a composite of the four elements, the
dominant element names the whole (QLIII2S 61, 258.1138).
78
For an interesting approach to this question, see Hochschild 2001; see also Klima 1996.
79
This use is legitimized in DSF 139.
80
Zavalloni 1951, 36771.
 the soul as una forma viventis 87

organize the plurality of forms that, according to them, constitute the

human composite into one of two general schemes of subordination, the
essential, i.e. as the relation between matter and form,81 and the disposi-
tive, i.e. the lower forms disposing matter in order to receive a more
perfect determination.82
Kilwardby represents dispositive or functional pluralism, as the lower
potentiae are incomplete determinations disposing matter to receive a
superior form or determination.83 The three potentiae constitute one soul
because they are ordered to one another, in other words each lower form
is matter in relation to a higher determinative form.84 The souls potentiae
are not degrees in a single form, but rather incomplete forms that are com-
pleted by the specific form of the thing (the intellective form in human
beings), resulting in one single spiritual substance, the soul. In this sense,
the intellective form is united with the body through the mediation of the
sensitive form.85
The question of the origin of the human soul is part of a wider discus-
sion concerning the existence of only one determining principle in the
composite or the existence of many potentiae. Kilwardby claims that each
of the lower potentiae remains in actuality even with the supervening of a
higher potentia: each of the forms is a real determination and a perfec-
tion of some kind, irreducible to any of the other forms. The body is a
body by a form that is diffferent from that by which it lives, or senses or

81
This seems to be the case of Peter John Olivis pluralism; for him, matter receives all
the forms directly. See Partee 1960, 247.
82
Zavalloni 1951, 3124 (the terms are Zavallonis). These two types of subordination
are found in Franscisco Suarz, Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disputatio XV.10, ed. Vivs,
536. See Bazn (1969, 33). Zenk (1968, 215) argues that there are two major orientations
within pluralism, following two explanations of relationship between forms within a com-
posite. The first of these sees their ordering as a functional one, the lower disposing the
composite to receive the higher. () The second envisage the lower forms of a composite
in essential dependence upon the higher forms. It embraces a subdivision: separate
degrees of one form, and essential subordination of distinct forms. See also Cruz Pontes
1964, 210.
83
And so it is in forms. Some are material forms, which are in potentiality to an ulterior
form, and some are ultimate and completing forms (Quaedam est forma materialis et in
potentia ad formam ulteriorem, quaedam autem est ultima et completiva), LPA 1516, apud
and transl. Thom 2007, 57.
84
One could argue for the unitarian side, as Henry of Ghent does (see Cross 1998, 49),
that there are no such things as incomplete substances; however, one could argue back, for
the pluralist side, that that is exactly what Thomas Aquinas does In De generatione et cor-
ruptione, lectio 8, 227, in order to explain human generation.
85
Appetit ergo intellectiva sensitivae uniri et sensitiva vegetativae et vegetativa cor-
pori, QLIIS 8, 32.1167. (See footnote 112, page 94.)
88 human beings

understands,86 and it senses by a form that is diffferent from that by which

it understands.87
The human being is an aggregate of which the intellective potentia is
the perfection, and any one human being has one form. Kilwardby makes
it clear what kind of pluralism of forms and the kind of unity of the soul he
had in mind. The plurality of essentially distinct forms finds its place in a
hierarchy in which the lower forms exist in an incomplete state with
respect to the higher form, and the unity that results from these distinct
forms is a unity of distinct but incomplete things. In E 5, he states:
If, however, someone objects that two things in actuality do not make one in
actuality, and therefore, from the sensible body [i.e. the body informed by
the sensitive form], which is already in act, and the intellect, which is cre-
ated as being in act, cannot be made one naturally, the answer must be that
none of them is complete in act, because the body of a human being,
although sensible in act, is generated in such a way that it does not complete
and perfect matter but disposes it for the intellective [form].88
Kilwardbys response to the objection that two things in actuality cannot
make one actual thing is that, although the sensitive body and the intellec-
tive soul are both in act, one is incomplete (the sensitive body) and the
other (the intellective soul) is its completion; and because the latter is cre-
ated, as previously argued, to be the perfection of the sensitive body, the
intellective soul as such is incomplete as well.
(L) Incomplete things can constitute one complete thing.

86
Item sequitur, cum non sit corpus, nisi per formam corpoream, nec vegetativum, nisi
per formam vegetativam, nec sensitivum nisi per formam sensitivam, quod non esset in
homine accio senciendi vel vegetandi vel existencia corporis, et hoc idem dico de aliis
innumerabilibus formis repertis in homine., E 7, 50.1923. Although Avicenna is used as an
authority by the pluralists because of his defence of the form of corporeity (cf. Zavalloni
(1951), 4238), he clearly defended the unity of the soul (cf. De anima I.3).
87
Non enim vegetatur homo quo sentit, nec sentit, quo vegetatur, nec intelligit, quo
sentit vel vegetaturper se dico, sicut nec graditur homo per oculum, nec videt per
pedem, E 5, 423.27-03. And E 5, 43.234: intelligit homo per intellectivam formam aut
potenciam, et non per sensitivam vel vegetativam.
88
Si quis autem obiciat, quod ex duobus in actu non fit unum in actu, et ideo ex cor-
pore sensato, quod iam est in actu, et intellectu, qui creatur ens actu, non potest fieri natu-
raliter unum, respondendum est, quod neutrum est complete in actu, quia corpus hominis,
licet sit actu sensitivum, tamen illud sensitivum est talis generacionis, quod non complet
materiam perfecte, sed disponit ad intellectivam, E 5, 41.1420. See Thomas Aquinas argu-
ments against the thesis that two things in act can make one being in De spiritualibus crea-
turis a.3, 381 (Non enim fit simpliciter unum ex duobus actibus). See also Aristotle,
Metaphysics VII.13, 1039a38.
 the soul as una forma viventis 89

With this principle Kilwardby aims at safeguarding the unity of the human
being and its essential composite nature. It is fundamental that these two
elements are not randomly connected, but that the sensible body is gener-
ated in order to be perfected by the intellective soul and that the intellec-
tive soul is created in order to perfect the sensitive body. The constitutive
parts of a human being are naturally inclined to each other and are orga-
nized according to a natural order.89 The sensitive form does not complete
matters aptitude for form, as Bonaventure remarked before Kilwardby,
but prepares it for a higher determination.90 The intellective form is the
perfection of an already existing composite, the sensitive body. Composite
things have a unity resulting from their being a composite of many things
that are naturally inclined to one another.91 (The extent of this composi-
tion will become clear soon.) Kilwardby uses the natural inclination
between the potentiae to justify the composite unity of the soul (una sub-
stancia composita), thus extending the application of principle (C), i.e. the
essential natural inclination of the intellective soul to the sensitive body,
to all potentiae. The mutual inclinations of things that are naturally
inclined justify the natural unity of the soul.92
(M) The forms or potentiae of the human soul have a unity that results
from their being ordered to each other (ad invicem).
The unifying principle of the substantial forms that constitute the human
soul is the internal and substantial natural inclination of each of the parts
to be united with the other parts of the whole. Kilwardby points out that
the unity of the soul is the same as the unity of a definition:
One should argue forcefully that in the same way as many diffferences consti-
tute one species almost like an aggregate, so the soul has matter to which are

89
Corpus enim solidum et spiritus corporeus et vegetativa et sensitiva et rationalis
habent in se inclinationes naturales ad se invicem immediate secundum ordinem natura-
rum, QLIII1S 6, 31.5961.
90
Bonaventure, C II, d.12, a.1, q.3.
91
tum quia non fit una natura composita ex pluribus nisi invicem inclinatis mutuis
inclinationibus naturalibus, QLIII1S 9, 44.2830. It is this principle of mutual inclination
and order among the potentiae of the soul that explains how the action of the power of one
potentia can prevent a competing action of the power of another potentia; for instance, an
act of the (rational) will can prevent a contrary (sensory) appetitive act (see QLIII1S 49,
243.136144).
92
E 5, 41.223. See also QLIIS 160, 443.547; and QLIII1S 1, 5.646: Et ratio est, quia
natura non unit nisi quae habent ad invicem respectus aut inclinationes mutuas appe-
tentes ad sui perfectionem coniunctionem talem (emphasis added).
90 human beings

added the vegetative and sensitive and intellective diffferentiae, which difffer
essentially from one another, as parts of one definition. 93
Kilwardby implies here that, in providing a definition for the soul, the
three potentiae correspond to three diffferentiae.94 The diffferentia living is
added to the genus substance, the diffferentia sensitive is added to the
genus living substance, and the diffferentia rational is added to the genus
animal. This is the view of the so-called logical realism that derives from
Averroes, who held that the essential determinations (i.e. substantial
forms) existed in a given composite in the same way as the many diffferen-
tiae were constitutive parts of a definition.95 The same plurality of forms
found in the definition of a thing corresponds to real and distinct forms
existing in the things to which the definition applies. The plurality of
forms in the real order corresponds to the plurality of diffferentiae in the
logical order.96 Following Boethius (ca. 480524/5), Kilwardby argues that
a diffferentia stands between substance and accident, has an incomplete
being, and is a principle of a substance.97 Applying this principle to the

93
Dicendum ergo forte quod sicut multae diffferentiae constituunt unam speciem
quasi quoddam aggregatum, sic forte anima habet materiam super quam adiciuntur difffe-
rentiae vegetabilis et sensibilis et intelligibilis quae ab invicem diffferunt essentialiter sicut
partes unius definitionis, QLIIS 8, 30.5962. See also and E 7, 53; and NLP II.3, 346.9092,
where Kilwardby says that A definition is an expression that signifies the essence of a
thing. The essence is a form whose parts are expressed by the parts of the definition.
(Difffinitio enim est oratio significans quiditatem rei. Quiditas autem est forma cuius
partes exprimuntur per partes difffinitionis.) The definition of human being (homo)
includes the diffferentiae animated body, sensible, rational and mortal (NLP II.5, 366.136
137). On Aristotles distinction between being an aggregate, a heap and a substance with
one substantial form, see Aristotles Metaphysics VIII.17, 1041b1133. Cf. Klima 2000.
94
Et sicut diffferencie tres se habent in una difffinicione, sic iste tres potencie vegetativa,
sensitiva, intellectiva in una anime humane substancia, E 5, 43.68. Kilwardby has in
mind, probably, Aristotles Metaphysics, where he says a definition is a formula, and every
formula has parts, and as the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula to the part
of the thing, Metaphysics VII.10, 1034b2022, transl. Ross, 1633.
95
Aquinas attributes this view to Averroes in Thomas Aquinas, De spiritualibis creaturis,
a.3, arg. 15; 17. See also Richard Fishacre, InIIS, d. 16, 336, lines 221230, which argues that all
the spiritual forms other than God have many diffferences.
96
See Vittorini 2009. See also McAleer 1999; Thomas Aquinas attributes this thesis to
Avicebron. See Forest 1931, 179, n. 4, for references. Forest (178) stresses the Platonic origin
of this thesis. For Aquinas, a human being is an animated corporeal substance, an animal,
and a human being, and these forms exist only in the mental/logical order; they are the
same form in, say, Socrates. On Aquinass criticism of such a reading of the definition, see
his Commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics VIII, lectio 5, 580, n.1756.
97
Nec ponit esse inconveniens esse medium inter substantiam et accidens dummodo
illud non fuerit ens completumsicut sint diffferentiae, quae sunt principia substantiae,
NSLP 7, 38.1617.
 the soul as una forma viventis 91

question of the soul, he claims that the soul is constituted by a plurality

of real existing forms, each of which corresponds to a diffference
(diffferentia).98
Next Kilwardby considers the way in which diffferent things are present
in a bodily aggregate, and draws an analogy to the soul. The body, as an
individual material composite substance, is constituted of an ordered
series of forms,99 the forms of the limbs and organs, and still we call the
assemblage of these forms one human body.
(N) The body is an aggregate of parts, each having its own form.
The unity of the soul does not preclude the plurality of substantial forms
in the same way as the unity of the body does not exclude the plurality of
parts, each of which has its own form. Kilwardby shows how far his plural-
ism goes in what constitutes an original contribution: the human body is
constituted of a plurality of bodily forms. His pluralism results from the
application of his compositional unity principle as well as his principle
that the diversity of operations must be accounted for by a diversity of
forms. Organs could be considered qua organs, and as such they belong to
one and the same species or qua parts of the body.100 The idea that the
unity of the body comprises several diffferent parts is taken not only from
medical literature, as Graham McAleer argues,101 but is also to be found in
the authority of St. Paul. In his First Letter to the Corinthians, which

98
For a very similar reasoning, see John Blund, TdA 36, 10. For later applications of the
same principle, see Des Chene 2000, 87, n.38.
99
QLIIS 17, 65.147.
100
Ad primum contra dicendum quod res una numero potest dici res plures et species
plures diversimode, scilicet praedicatione formali et in recto, et sic non est unum numero
plura specie; vel materiali et in obliquo, et sic est unum numero plura specie quia ex pluri-
bus specie, et sic est mixtum ex quatuor corporibus specie diffferentibus, et sic est unum
corpus animalis ex multis organis diffferentibus specie. Quodlibet enim membrum corporis
organum est et pars. Unde pars respicit totum, et sic non est species sed pars totalis corporis.
Unde organum respicit hoc generale praedicatum de omni organo, scilicet organum, et sic est
species, QLIII2S 33, 130.3846, (italics mine). Any individual thing cannot be further
divided into a thing (as its part) of the same kind (QLIII1S 8, 39.868). In NSLP 7, 38.3235,
Kilwardby points out that, according to Aristotle, in a whole which is made of diffferent
parts, the being of the parts is transfered to the being of the whole (denudantur ab esse
proprio et transeunt in esse totius). The parts have being by means of the form of the
whole (forma totius).
101
McAleer 2001, 364. McAleer traces the conception of the human being as an aggrega-
tum back to Galen to whom the human being is an aggregatum of things, forms and sub-
stances, which are unified through a nature acting as a structural principle but which is
also a res, 356.
92 human beings

Kilwardby quotes in QLIII2S 6,102 the Apostle claims that the body it has
many constituent parts.
In the same way as the body is one even though it comprises diffferent
organs, the soul is a composite of many essentially diffferent potentiae,
and still it is the (one) form of a living thing (una forma viventis).103
In Kilwardbys cumulative account, each thing continues to exist as part of
the wholethat is precisely what the plurality of substantial forms is
about: the unity achieved by pluralism is that of an aggregate.104 Therefore,
the soul is a quasi-aggregate, in the same way as the body is said to be.105
The quasi is a necessary addition because whereas the body is a unity by
aggregation, which means the unity that results from bringing together
complete things, the unity of the soul is explained by the hierarchy of
forms with diffferent degrees of completeness: the lower forms are incom-
plete and dispositional with respect to a higher-order form up to the per-
fective intellective form. This ad invicem unity is better suited to the soul.
There are several levels of unity being discussed: the unity of the body
(i.e., the whole of the body made from its parts), the unity of the soul

102
QLIII2S 6, 25.1156. The context here is the body of Christ taken as the symbol of the
Church. In both cases the basic argument is the same: distinct things can constitute a unity.
Although Kilwardby does not quote St. Paul in the reasoning of the E, I believe it is in the
background.
103
Sed sicut hec sunt membra in corpore, sic ille sunt partes in anima, E 5, 43.34; and
E 7, 53.1927: Et sicut ex parte corporis multa sunt membra proprias formas et propriam
naturam habencia, quorum nullum est alterutrum, tamen constituunt unum corpus per
ordinem et colligacionem naturalem, quam habent ad invicem, sed non constituunt cor-
pus simplex: sic ex parte anime sunt multe partes essencialiter diffferentes, que tamen per
ordinem et colligacionem naturalem unam animam effficiunt, non tamen ita, quod anima
sit simplex per essenciam, sed una forma viventis.
104
For Kilwardby the parts exist in actuality prior to the whole but they are incompletely
actual: Et sic iungitur donec ultimo formatis ciliis, oculis, naribus et huiusmodi ultimitati-
bus totius corporis repraesentent hominem individuum determinatum. Sic ergo multae
dispositiones adiciuntur materiae ante ultimum actum qui assimulat rem ex toto com-
plete, QLIII2S 63, 269.1203. Here Kilwardby reasons that the potentias of the soul relate
to the whole soul as the lines and colors to the complete picture (cf. QLIII2S 63, 270.1558).
In a whole made out from parts, the parts retain their proper forms in the composition of
the whole (cf. NSLP 7, 39.911).
105
Cf. Bacon, OHI III, dist. 3, ch. 5, 296: partes integrales sunt eque in spiritualibus ut
in corporalibus, unde, sicut cor caput et epar et hujusmodi partes constituunt corpus, sic
vegetativum et sensitivum constituunt animam. And, especially, 297: Cum autem arguunt
quod tunc erunt multe substancie in anima, cum tamen autores dicant quod est una subs-
tancia, dicendum quod est una substancia composita ex pluribus partibus, sicut corpus,
que partes sunt diverse per essenciam sicut partes corporis, tamen sit unum per essenciam
ex eis, et hoc est vere unum, quia sicut in corpore resultat una forma tocius, copulans
omnes partes in unitate essenciali, sic est a parte anime quod una natura substancialis
resultat ex partibus pluribus in qua habent unitatem essencialem.
 the soul as una forma viventis 93

(made from its forms), and the unity of the human being (made from its
parts, the soul and the body).106 Kilwardbys basic claim is that just as two
substances make one living human being, and a composite body consti-
tutes one body, so three essentially distinct potentiae or substantial forms
make one human rational soul. One might wonder whether or not the
analogy works. First of all, the aggregate analogy with the body seems to
make the unity of the soul too weak to account for an absolute unity,
the kind of unity on which both Aristotle and Augustine insist. Moreover,
each of the parts of the wholebody and human beingis constituted
of matter and form (each limb has its own form, according to Kilwardby;
the body has its own form and matter, as does the soul). As he admits
elsewhere, in natural things the conjunction of two things with a natu-
ral tendency to one another makes a third thing, the composite.107 The
sensitive body and the intellective soul are two entities in their own
right (both are in act), and are essentially united in that they depend on
each other.108
The main problem here is how the three potentiae informing the mate-
rial principle of the soul can be said to be, as the unity-soul, the form of the
body. It is clear that Kilwardby took this to be the case. The solution is to
be found in the diffferent level of actuality of the potentiae; the lower forms
only dispose the composite to be perfected by the intellective form, the
composite remaining incomplete up to its being thus informed.
The soul is a composite of matter and three substantial forms informing
it, each of them being matter in relation to the higher determinative form.
The sensitive body (i.e., the body informed by the sensitive potency)
remains incomplete until it is perfected by the intellective potency, thus
becoming a sensitive human body.109 It is rendered determinate by the
intellective form that is its proper (propria) form or perfection and makes

106
The composite unity is said properly of the whole made of the parts (cf. QLIII1S 1,
5.768).
107
Quae uniuntur, aliquod tertium constituunt, ut materia et forma compositum aliud
ab his, corpus et anima hominem, QLIII1S 1, 3.167; also QLIII1S 1, 5.623: Ad quartum
dicendum quod in his quae naturaliter uniuntur, verum est illud, scilicet quae uniuntur,
aliquod tertium constituunt; and still QLIII1S 14, 67.156: Nota quod est compositio pro-
prie dicta unio aliquorum habentium mutuam inclinationem ad invicem in constitu-
tionem tertii.
108
QLIII1S 1, 4.3842.
109
quia corpus hominis, licet sit actu sensitivum, tamen illud sensitivum est talis
generacionis, quod non complet materiam perfecte, sed disponit ad intellectivam, E 5,
41.1720.
94 human beings

it a member of the human species.110 The potentiae of the soul have a natu-
ral inclination to each other and to the body:111 the vegetative potency has
a natural appetite to be united with the body, the sensitive to be united
with the body and the vegetative potentia, and the intellective potentia to
be united with the sensitive body.112
Having argued that the soul, the body, and the person is a unity on its
own, and that the first two are incomplete in themselves, Kilwardby had to
explain what made the unity of those things insofar as they were compos-
ite. What tie binds those constitutive metaphysical elements together so
that they become the strong unity found in a human being and a human
soul? The answer is quite straightforward:
according to Augustine, the whole of the rational soul in all its powers essen-
tially desires to be united with the body, and this is its natural perfection,
since this rational soul is born to know everything.113
The souls natural desire to know explains its natural inclination to be
united with the body. The soul is in one way all things, in other words it
is born to acquire the likenesses of everything,114 both the sensible as

110
cum nihil sit in specie sine forma et perfectione propria (QLIII2S 63, 266.910)
which in the case of human beings is the rationalis potentia, inasmuch as the completion
of the other forms (QLIII2S 63, 268.967).
111
Et propter istas mutuas inclinaciones naturaliter sibi inditas, quibus sese respicunt,
fit ex hiis unum naturaliter, E 5, 41.223. See also QLIIS 8, 32.1167, QLIII1S 6, 31.5962. Cf.
Bonaventure, C II, d.17, a.1, q.2, ad.6, 427: Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem
habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam;
sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est et tamen habet appetitum
ad suscipiendam animam.
112
ergo assequatur perfectionem suam quam naturaliter appetit, scilicet scientiam
corporalium, necesse est animam intellectivam uniri corpori tamquam organo. Appetit
ergo intellectiva sensitivae uniri et sensitiva vegetativae et vegetativa corpori, QLIIS 8,
32.1146. See also QLIIS 8, 1323.1204.
113
Quod si verum est, patet, quia secundum Augustinum tota anima rationalis in omni-
bus potentiis essentialiter appetit uniri cum corpore, et hoc ad naturalem sui perfec-
tionem, quia ista anima rationalis nata est cognoscere omnia, QLIIS 8, 32.10911, (emphasis
added). See also QLIII2S 24.3, 83.7981. The commentary on the Isagoge starts with the
statement that the soul is born to describe the likeness of any thing whatsoever (Cum
anima quoddammodo sit omnia, et nata sit ut describatur in ea uniuscuiusque rei simili-
tudo, NP, Prooemium). This probably follows from the Aristotelian principle of Metaphysics
I.1 that human beings naturally desire to know: cui consonat Aristotiles dicens in primo
Metaphisice, omnes homines natura scire desiderant, CI 358.45 See also DOS IV.6,
11.1125.
114
Cf. CI 357.12: Cum anima quoddamodo sit omnia, et nata sit ut describatur in ea
uniuscuiusque rei similitudo. (See also pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu et anima 11, p. 781.)
See also DSF 15, 58.146: Item, idem infra in eodem libro [Aristotle, De anima III] docet
quod anima est quodammodo omnia, scilicet intellectus omnia intelligibilia, et sensus
omnia sensibilia.
 the soul as una forma viventis 95

well as the spiritual. Kilwardby formulates the argument most clearly in

QLIII1S 46.115 The rational soul is naturally united with the body because
(O)The soul is born to know everything,
which entails
(o)The knowledge of all things includes sensible and intelligible
objects;
(o)Sensible things can be known only through sense perception;
(o)Sense perception depends on the sense organs of the body;116
(i)the senses are the actuality of the bodily organs,
(ii)hence, the soul desires to use the senses
therefore,
(P) The intellective soul needs to be united with the sensitive body in
order to fulfill its perfection, the knowledge of all things.117
Kilwardby hence concludes that the cause of the rational souls natural
appetite to animate the body by itself is its natural desire for knowledge.
One could infer from this argument not only that the sensory soul is
perfected by the rational soul, but also that being united with the sensory
soul perfects the rational soul and the body. Hence, (P) is a transitive prin-
ciple expressed in (K): the intellective form is the perfection of the sensi-
tive composite, but at the same time needs to be the perfection of

115
Responsio. Sicut habitum est ubi de naturali unione animae rationalis cum carne
dictum est, ipsa sic facta est ut recognoscat omnia, ut tamen sensibilium notitiam paula-
tim per sensum adquirat. Quia igitur naturaliter desiderat scire et hoc desiderium non
potest impleri per viam naturae nisi mediante sensu, appetit uti sensu. Sed sensu nequit
uti nisi mediante organo corporali, cuius sensus sit perfectio. Appetit igitur propter hoc uti
corpore et animare ipsum per potentiam sensitivam immediate et consequenter per se
ipsam. Causa igitur naturalis appetitus animandi corpus quantum est ex parte rationis per
se ipsam, est appetitus sciendi, et per scientiam in his volo intelligi afffectum et opus quae
scientiam consequuntur, QLIII1S 46, 2012.22030. It should be remarked how Kilwardby
in this passage defends the strong and essential nature of the union of the soul with the
body and the instrumental nature of that relation (the soul desires to use the body).
116
Tamen sic facta est ut non possit cognoscere corporalia nisi per sensum nec sentire
potest nisi per organum corporeum, QLIIS 8, 32.1113. The rational human soul is born to
know everything, which has a double source: it knows by conversion to phantasms (i.e. by
turning to the images of sensible things), and it knows by turning to the intelligible eternal
reasons (QLIIS 24).
117
Et sic in tota anima est appetitus et inclinatio naturalis ad uniendum cum corpore et
hoc ut sic assequatur perfectionem suam naturalem, scilicet cognitionem sensibilium,
quod sine corpore non potest, ut iam patet, QLIIS 8, 32.1179.
96 human beings

the sensitive composite in order to fulfill its own perfection. Due to this
inclination, body and soul form one living human being.118
Thus, according to Kilwardby, every human being has one soul, a spiri-
tual substance that is constituted by three substantial forms (potentiae),
given that:
(i) the three forms are ordered to each other
(ii) the lower form (or the composite of the lower form and matter) is
dispositive to the higher form
(iii) there is only one form that completes and perfects the whole com-
posite, the intellective soul.
He thus advocates a plurality of substantial forms that inform both spiri-
tual and corporeal matter, each responsible for certain determina-
tions, and placed under a unifying form which is the perfection of the
composite. A human being is constituted of two distinct substances, body
and soul, two wholes that are further divided into constitutents of
very diffferent natures: a physical whole, the body is made of diffferent
physical parts, each of which has its own form; a nonphysical whole, the
soul is a composite of matter and three diffferent forms whose essential
diffference from one another is defined in terms of origin and opera-
tions.Kilwardby argues for unity, not unicity. The resulting unity is founded
upon a natural inclination determined by the natural desire to know. This
unity, the unity of an aggregate, may fall short, and in a strict Aristotelian
sense it does, of unity in a strong sense, convertible with being, the unum
simpliciter: the substantial form must be not only the unifying principle,
but also the principle of being of the thing; in fact, it is the unifying prin-
ciple of the thing by being its principle of being.119 To argue for a theory
that bundles powers together is to offfer a solution that does not explain
why they are together or how they come to be powers of the same being,
rather than diffferent existing things coinciding in a certain respect, as

118
Potentia animae apprehensiva et corpus faciunt substantialiter et vere unum. Et
ideo est supremum in corpore et aliquod infimum in potentiis apprehensivis, quorum
unione ex corpore et anima fit vere unum, QLIS 68, 202.12932. And Et propter istas
mutuas inclinaciones naturaliter sibi inditas, quibus sese respicunt, fit ex hiis unum natu-
raliter, E 5, 41.223.
119
unius rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse substantiale.
Ergo unius rei est una forma substantialis. Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis.
Ergo impossibile est quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima intel-
lectiva, ST I, 76.4.
 the soul as una forma viventis 97

is the case when the being of the part is distinct from the being of
the whole.120

3.1.Unicity and Plurality of Substantial Forms

Kilwardby argues against a unity implying that one substantial form is the
only determining principle of a being and responsible for all its opera-
tions. In response to Peter of Conflans, he refers to this view as the posicio
de unitate formarum.121 The discussion between his own position and the
position he opposes here was part of an on-going debate over the unicity
versus the plurality of forms in a composite substance.122 Kilwardby
addresses however the issue of the unicity of the substantial form in a very
particular way. (I develop further this view in Part III.) Although Robert
Pasnau, possibly with good reason, refers to the diffficulty in understand-
ing what the two sides in the dispute were in fact disagreeing on,123 it is
clear from the extent of it that the unicity versus plurality debate occupied
a central place in thirteenth-century philosophical and theological
thought. It is not my intent to provide a full account of the two positions,
and I will merely present the basic theses so as to show the background
against which Kilwardby was developing his theory of the soul.
Medieval authors, for the most part, agreed on the division of the three
types of souls: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. Moreover,
they accepted the general definition of the soul as the principle of life.
Living and having the capacity for growth is complemented in the case of
some beings with sensation and motion, and in others with understand-
ing. There is a hierarchy of beings based on the complexity of the opera-
tions their souls are able to perform in that the operations proper to a
particular kind of soul constitute its specific properties. In addition, the
process of the generation of human beings seems, at least to some extent,
to require a succession of life principles, or (kinds) of souls: first the being

120
That is the criticism we find in Francisco Suarz with respect to the plurality of sub-
stantial forms: see Francisco Suarez, On the Formal Cause of Substance, I.15.7. Cf. Pasnau
2004, 38. See CI 384.2430.
121
E 7, 49.20.
122
Another aspect of the discussion was the way the substantial forms of the elements
were present in compounds, featuring the classical solutions of Avicenna (9801037) and
Averroes.
123
So the controversy concerns the number of substantial forms that a single substance
can possess. But we should go beyond the Aristotelian terminology and consider exactly
what it is that the two sides disagree on. It is not easy to say, Pasnau 2002, 127.
98 human beings

lives the life of a plant, then that of an animal, and finally that of a human
being. Where these authors difffered was in how to consider the nature of
each soul and the relation between them in complex beings (in other
words those possessing more than one soul or part of a soul). There were
two main interpretations.
The first theory holds that each form, being responsible for certain
operations, remains even with the supervening of a higher form. The last
form completes or perfects the being rather than determining it com-
pletely, because that which is made to enhance or perfect the existing
being cannot be responsible for corrupting it. The result is one soul consti-
tuted of a plurality of substantial forms. Pluralists did not deny the unity
of the composite; they just argued that the plurality of forms did not pro-
hibit the unity of the soul, the body, or body and soul, and that a unity by
aggregation or by hierarchy of incomplete and completing forms suffficed
to explain the unity of any given composite. According to the second the-
ory, there is in any composite only one substantial form because such form
gives it being and unity. In the case of human beings, the rational soul is
the only substantial form.
The discussion is blurred by the use of the same authoritiesAristotle,
Augustine and Avicennaby both sides of the dispute.124 As D.A. Callus
remarks, Gundissalinus occupied a central position in it because he was
responsible for the circulation of both the unicity and the plurality thesis
through his translations of Avicennas De anima and Avicebrons Fons
vitae, together with his own works, such as the treatise De anima.125
Avicebron (1021/21057/8) was an influential author for the pluralist side,
although his real contribution is a matter of disagreement.126 It is also a
disputed question whether unicity or plurality was the dominant theory

124
Although Kilwardby does not attribute the De spiritu et anima to Augustine, other
authors did and the text was understood to express Augustines view on the soul. The text
is quite clear in defending the thesis that the soul is a simple substance. In fact, both sides
argue for the support of Augustine and it seems clear that to divide the sides between
Aristotelians and Augustinians is to limit the discussion in an artificial manner as, e.g.,
Roensch, 1964, 1, does: This problem of the unicity of substantial form was inextricably
bound up with the attitude of Christian theologians towards Aristotle. This is particularly
true of Kilwardby because his criticism of the unicity thesis is not an attack against
Aristotle.
125
Callus 1961, 2649. Gundissalinus treatise is edited in Muckle 1940, 23102.
126
Callus (1961, 270) overstates his role, Zavalloni 1951, 4203 underestimates it. Cf.
Wippel 2000, 335, n.154. (See Avencebrolis, FV V.20, 295.) Although the theory of universal
hylomorphism is present in the discussion, there are few direct references to Avicebron
and his Fons Vitae in the thirteenth-century. For instance, Fishacre takes it to be an
Augustinian doctrine (cf. Long 1998, 241, n.8; and Bacon is one of the first to identify
Avicebron as the source of the doctrine (cf. Donati 2002, 2101).
 the soul as una forma viventis 99

in the period, although the traditional claim is that pluralism was the
common view before Aquinas.127 What seems fairly undisputed is that
almost all, if not all, authors, accepted that there was only one soul in each
human being, that prior to Thomas Aquinas almost all, if not all, authors
defended the position that the body has a form of its own, i.e. apart from
the soul, that Thomas Aquinas introduces a new depth into the debate, by
supporting it with a full-blown theory of being, and that his theory is a
development of existing views, namely those of Roland of Cremona and
William of Auvergne.128 In that sense it would be more informative to use
the expression unicity versus plurality of substantial forms in the human
soul to refer to the pre-Thomist stage of the debate (because all thinkers
took the substantiality of the body not to be explained by the soul) and
unicity versus plurality of substantial forms in the human composite to
refer to the post-Thomist stage (because what characterizes the Thomist
view is the existence in any given composite of one single substantial
form). Anyway, the two positions can be synthesized as follows:129

Unicity
(a) Prime matter is pure potentiality, i.e. completely indeterminate and
determinable;
(b) In generation, the arrival of a new substantial form is the corruption
of the previous forms;
(c) The substantial form is the absolute determining principle, which
gives being and unity to the thing it informs;
[therefore] in one and the same individual there can be but one substan-
tial form.

127
Callus assumes the argument that Kilwardby and Pecham are misleading us when
they claim the pluralist position to be commonly held. Cf. Callus 1943, 253; also 1955, 22.
In Callus 1961 he says: There is a general consensus among scholars that it was St. Thomas
who gave to the problem of the unity of substantial form its full significance. It is equally
agreed that the question could not have originated with him, since it was current in the
schools as early as the first decades of the thirteenth century (25960). For the opposite
view, Lottin 1957, 4789; and Zavalloni 1951, 430, who argues that prior to Aquinas, the the-
ory of the unity, comme conception metaphysique, was non-existent. See also Zavalloni
1950, 67.
128
Callus 1961, 27981; Lottin 1957, 4645; Zavalloni 1950, 101. According to these schol-
ars Aquinas inherits from Roland the metaphysical notion that each thing has being from
one single perfectionwhich in the case of human beings is the rational souland from
William the principle of the succession of the souls in embryonic development.
129
This is inspired by Callus 1961, 258. See also Callus 1955, 9; and Michael 1998, 142146
(before focusing on the early modern period, the author presents a clear exposition of
Aristotelian traditions on form and matter). A thorough systematization of the arguments
is found in Zavalloni 1951, 25561 (for the unitarians), 3169 (for the pluralists).
100 human beings

Plurality

(a) Matter has some kind of actuality, even if very imperfect;130

(b) In generation, the supervening form perfects but does not corrupt the
previous substantial form; a substantial form is a determining princi-
ple but accepts further determination (i.e. may be dispositive with
respect to another form). The exception is the completive form of the
composite;
(c) A diversity of operations implies a diversity of substantial forms;
[therefore] there is in one and the same individual a plurality of forms.
Scholars tend to agree that (a) and (c) are the aspects in which the lack of
consensus is more acute because some of the subordination schemes of
the pluralists come too close to the unicity position. A useful way of distin-
guishing between the two sides of the debate is to consider how they
understand the constitution of substances: whereas the pluralists seem to
take a bottom-up approach, meaning that the elementary building blocks
of the substance, such as the forms of the bodily parts, the form of the
body, and the lower kinds of soul, remained distinct even when more com-
plex ones were added, the unitarians seemed to take the top-down view,
meaning that once a substantial form supervened on the existing sub-
stance it constituted a new substance.
Most authors of the period claimed that the pluralists supported their
side of the argument with reference to embryogenesis, according to which
the embryo is an independent living thing and its lifeas well as its devel-
opmentshould be explained in terms of the presence in it of the vegeta-
tive and sensitive souls. The resulting being must comprise a plurality of
forms or essences. The question is inchoately discussed in Philip the
Chancellors SB, and thereby entered into philosophical discourse. Yet the
objection to pluralism seemed to be based on the diffficulty in reconciling
the corruptibility of the naturally generated vegetative and sensitive souls
with the required immortality of the created rational soul. The theory of
unicity seems to have been preferred when the debate began in the 13th
century. It was only around 1230 with Hugh of St. Cher (11901263) that
pluralism seemed to find its first defender (and this is disputed). Slightly
later, Philip the Chancellor presented many supporting arguments, but

130
Le problme de la composition des formes substantielles reut diverses explicita-
tions, mais, quelles quelles fussent, elles se fondaient toutes sur une conception de la
matire comme acte minimal, par soi, Pralong 1999, 491.
 the soul as una forma viventis 101

almost as many for unicity, and scholars still disagree as to the view he
endorsed. In the following years, up to 1275, Adam of Buckfield, Roger
Bacon and Peter of Spain (d. 1277) appeared as partisans of the doctrine of
the plurality of substantial forms in the human soul, whereas John Blund
(ca. 1210), Roland of Cremona (ca. 1230), William of Auvergne (ca. 1240),
and John of La Rochelle were among those advocating unicity. Others such
as Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure remained uncom-
mitted to either view, or else scholars still disagree on which side of the
fence they stood. The diffficulty in ascertaining the party to which most
of these thinkers belonged is striking, as nothingapart from philosophi-
cal reasonseems to have prevented them from supporting one or other
of the views.
To frame the discussion in terms of unicity and plurality of forms is
somehow misleading in what concerns the thought of Robert Kilwardby
because, as section 3.2 and Part Three will make clear, his main target was
the simplicity of the soul.131 I will thus concentrate on the views of John
Blund and William of Auvergne,132 because they are crucial in terms of
understanding the development of Kilwardbys theory of the soul and the
theory he opposed. John Blund (ca. 11751248) wrote his Tractatus de
anima in Paris around 1210, and was strongly influenced by Avicennas psy-
chology.133 He argues in chapter IV that each addition of diffferentiae (veg-
etative, sensitive, rational) specifies the substance, but that this
specification does not result in many substances.134 The result is one soul
with three degrees of determination. Kilwardby would certainly have
agreed with this conclusion, but not with the status of each diffferentia.
Blund was arguing against the notion of human beings with three souls
(tres anime in homine).135 However, the plurality of souls was not a pluralist
claim. Pluralists argued against the idea of a single determining principle,
not the idea that the soul was onewhich was axiomatic for them too.136

131
There are of course two main senses of the simplicity of the soul: simplicity as
opposed to matter-form composition and simplicity as opposed to composition of forms.
132
Others could be also presented, as Roland of Cremona, Hugh of St Cher, Albert the
Great, Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle.
133
For an introduction to John Blund, see Callus 1943, 2419; 2512.
134
John Blund, TdA, 36, 10.
135
The existence of three souls in a human being is found often in Aquinas, who attri-
butes it to Plato (see SCG II.58; ST 76.3. See also ST 118.2, ad 2).
136
Zavalloni 1951, 385: On relve chez les scolastiques beaucoup dimprcisions dans
lusage des mots, notamment par le fait quils emploient indistinctement les termes
essence et substance; mais une chose est certaine: personne nadmet la pluralit des mes.
Tous les scolastiques admettent lunit de lme, mais plusieurs penchent pour une unit
de composition.
102 human beings

In other words, both unitarians and pluralists argued for the unity of the
soul, diverging on the unicity of substantial form in the soul and in the
composite. The three-souls argument seems to have been either a misun-
derstanding of the pluralist theory or an intentional attempt to raise the
question of orthodoxy by simplifying, through radicalization, the pluralist
view. This would probably explain Aquinass position in SCG but hardly
Blunds, since the sides in the dispute were not so engaged at the time
of his Tractatus. Later, in chapter XXIVWhether the soul is simple or
compositeBlund discusses the simplicity of the soul: the soul is a com-
posite of genus and its diffferentia, although a composite of matter and
form should not be completely ruled out.137 Nevertheless, he concludes by
suggesting that the soul has simple being.138
William of Auvergne wrote his De anima in Paris around 1230.139 The
importance of this treatise has often been overlooked: not only does he
clearly set out the basics of the unicity theory, as some of his arguments
were to re-emerge in Thomas Aquinas. In parts III of chapter III, he ana-
lyzes the problem of the simple or composite nature of the soul. First he
argues for the absolute lack of composition because the soul is a spiritual
substance and purely immaterial form.140 It is a substance, as the body,
which has a form of its own together with the forms of the elements.141 The
soul lacks any kind of matter because otherwise, as a form it would be the
form of that matter and not of the body.142 William argues against those
who argue for a matter-form composition of the soul based on the princi-
ple that receptivity requires matter by saying that if matter were the capac-
ity to receive accidents, matter rather than the soul would be the subject
of those afffections.143 He then continues to argue for the absolute unity
and simplicity of the soul, which is indivisible and not constituted of dif-
ferent parts.144 The soul is a human beings unique perfection:

137
John Blund, TdA, 40, 12; 45, 13. See Dales 1995, 19.
138
John Blund, TdA, 333, 90.
139
Moody 1975, 10. I follow to great extent Moodys conclusions. A detailed account of
Williams theory of knowledge can be found in Brenet 1998, 771.
140
William of Auvergne, dA, c.2, p.11, 81.
141
Moody 1975, 33. Zavalloni (1951, 4067) excludes William from the partisans of the
unicity theory because he holds a duality of substances.
142
William of Auvergne, dA, capitulum 3, pars 1, 86. See Bazn 1969, 448. The body is
defined as the instrument through which the soul operates (see William of Auvergne, dA,
cap. 1, p. 7, 73; R.J. Teske (transl.), William of Auvergne, The Soul. Marquette: Marquette
University Press, 2000, 62).
143
William of Auvergne, dA, c.3, p.1, 8687. See Moody 1975, 26.
144
William of Auvergne, dA, capitulum 3, pars 1, 87. Cf. Moody 1975, 27; de Vaux 1934, 39.
 the soul as una forma viventis 103

since it has already been made clear to you that the potencies that are
ascribed to the human soul for such operations are essentially something
one and that none of them is anything other than the soul itself, it has been
made clear to you that all such operations proceed from the one essence of
the human soul. Hence, one can clearly preserve the unity of the human soul
in so great a variety or multitude of operations. (transl. Teske 2000, 164)
William was adamant about the souls unicity and simplicity,145 dismissing
the need to postulate a plurality of souls that would follow from the plural-
ity of operations the soul performs: this is the opposite of what Kilwardby
enunciates in (G). If the soul were composed of potentiae that belonged to
diffferent species, it would not be one but a heap or aggregation of them.146
The soul has no parts and even its powers are not related to it as parts,147
but belong to its substance.148 The only division in the soul is its division
into functions, such as to perceive or to understand.149 Contrary to what
some thinkers argued, one does not need to posit a plurality of parts or
souls (diverse in species) to account for the diversity of operationson
the contrary:
It is, therefore, explained to you in this way that a soul one in number is what
perfects this man or this rational animal, and the same soul perfects the ani-
mal and vegetative or living being, because a man obtains these three
denominations from these three efffects, that is, that he is said to be vegeta-
tive, animal, and rational. Hence, it is not necessary on account of the plural-
ity or diversity of these efffects or operations that there be many or diverse
souls in one human being. (transl. Teske 2000, 161)
A human being is not animal and human being by diffferent forms but is
this human being and this animal by the same form, the human rational
soul.150 Moreover, in response to the argument that operations difffering in
species must belong to souls difffering in species, William claims that such
a principle would require not three but at least fifteen souls in human

145
Verum quoniam in hoc adhuc sum, ut removeam ab anima humana compositionem
omnem faciam te scire unitatem ac simplicitatem ejus quae prohibet ab ea partem et par-
tem, dA, c.3, p.2, 87.
146
nihil igitur aliud est ipsa anima humana quam acervus sive aggregatio ipsarum,
William of Auvergne, dA, cap. 3, p. 2, 87, (my italics); transl. Teske 2000, 106. See Teske
1994, 86.
147
William of Auvergne, dA, c.6, p.5, 162.
148
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 108.
149
a potency within the human soul is nothing other than the soul itself in those acts
that it does through its essence, William of Auvergne, dA, c.3, p.6, 92, transl. Teske 2000,
117118.
150
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 107.
104 human beings

beings because that is the number of their powers (five senses, common
sense, memory, estimation, imagination, nutritive power, formative power,
etc).151 Nothing prohibits the diversity of operations being rooted in the
same substance. He bases his argument on the identity of the powers with
the soul itself: since all the powers are the soul, those operationsdiverse
as they may beare operations of the soul. The contrary view leads to
contradiction: it is impossible to claim that the soul is one and that it has
many potencies and powers that are essentially diffferent, but one could
make such a claim if the multiple potencies and powers were understood
as the functions of one and the same substance.152 The unicity of the soul
can be granted if there is a diversity of operations, but not if there is a
diversity of essences. Thus, William concludes, the soul must be indivisi-
ble and simple.153 All the operations can be performed by the rational soul,
hence other souls, such as the sensitive, are superfluous.154
William defines the view he opposes as holding a plurality of souls in a
human being. If there were an aggregation of souls, an animal would not
be one but a flock of animals.155 Pluralists base their theory on the prin-
ciple that we share with other living thingsplants and irrational
animalsthe same operations, and thus conclude that we must have the
same vegetative and sensitive souls.156 William counter-argued that the
vegetative soul in human beings and in plants is not of the same species.157
He accepts the succesion of souls in the process of human generation:
the embryo is on the way to completion, which is achieved at the end
of the generation by the form of the species. God creates the rational soul
and infuses when it a body has been reached a level of development that
is appropriate to receive it.158 Against the pluralists, however, he argues
that when the rational soul is infused, the soul that informs the embryo
ceases to be and is absorbed or extinguished by the rational soul.159 In con-
clusion, he emphasizes the absolute simplicity of the human soul.
He denies its composition of matter and form, of essentially diffferent

151
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 108.
152
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 108.
153
Moody 1975, 27.
154
William of Auvergne, dA, c.1, p.5, 6971.
155
William of Auvergne, dA, c.1, p.5, transl. Teske, 5455.
156
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.1, 104105.
157
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 107.
158
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.34, 108110. William directs many of his arguments
against a plurality of souls to Avicenbron.
159
William of Auvergne, dA, c.4, p.3, 107. See Masnovo 1955, 937.
 the soul as una forma viventis 105

potentiae, and he even denies the distinction between the soul and its
powers.
The theory of the soul Kilwardby criticizes in QLIIS and in Es first six
articles seems very close to the simplicity theory, which Blund briefly
defends and William of Auvergne does so more extensively. My aim how-
ever is not to replace one targetThomas Aquinaswith other possible
ones (John Blund and William of Auvergne). Instead, I wish to suggest that
Kilwardbys opposition is not directed to any of those particular thinkers,
but to a theory of the soul that was available to him and which he describes
in very broad and general termsthus encompassing a variety of doc-
trines. It is worth noting that such a theory was available in the 1240s, and
I will return to this question in Part Three of the book. However, in his let-
ter to Kilwardby after the Prohibitions, Peter of Conflans asks if he was
criticizing the theory of the unity of forms (positio de unitate formarum),
which he (Peter) associated with Thomas Aquinas (although Aquinas is
never explicitly mentioned). In the following section I examine Kilwardbys
response to this question.

3.2.The Posicio de Unitate Formarum in Epistola

Kilwardby starts by denying that the theory of the unity of forms (posicio
de unitate formarum) had been prohibited in Oxford, that he did not
remember having heard such a position, and that it was incomprehensible
to him. He describes this position as follows:
that the last supervening form, which is the perfective of the composite, cor-
rupts all the forms preceding it in matter, and the last supervening [form]
acts by itself all actions. This is intolerable and impossible.160
The theory of the unity of forms is an impossible position because it holds
that the last form arriving at the composite is the perfection of the com-
posite, corrupts all previous forms, and performs on its own all the actions
performed by them. Kilwardby argues against this, using both philosophi-
cal and theological arguments in order to prove his point.161 The eleven

160
Exponitur autem quod predictum est de unitate formarum in hunc modum, quod
ultima forma adveniente, que est perfectiva compositi, omnes alie que precesserunt citra
materiam corrumpuntur, et ultima adveniens per se ipsam agit omnium acciones. Istud
intolerabile est et impossibile., E 7, 50.48.
161
E 7, 4954.
106 human beings

arguments he puts forward in the seventh article of E fall into three kinds
of proofs.
(I) Metaphysical and logical proof: the intellective form, as a perfec-
tion, cannot corrupt the previous forms: (1), (2), (7); the previous
forms are univocally predicated of man and the other animals: (8).162

(1) All parts of the body, be they like-nature (homogeneous) parts such as
the flesh, bone, nerves or blood, or dissimilar-nature (heterogeneous)
parts such as the eye or the foot,163 have, each of them, a form of their
own.164 This means that diffferent constitutive parts of the body have difffer-
ent substantial forms even though they are ordered to constitute the
human complexion.165
This is a hard claim to make, and it is diffficult to understand how these
forms of the parts relate to the form of the body, as an integral whole.
In order fully to grasp what is intended here we need to analyze the way
Kilwardby understood the existence of the elements in mixtures and parts
in compoundssince heterogeneous bodies are made of homogeneous
bodies, which in turn are made of simple bodies, the four elements. The
explanation of how elements remain in compounds is important because
it allows us to understand whether substantial forms admit some varia-
tion (e.g., remission), allowing for a plurality of substantial forms in the
same (composite) thing.
According to the traditional Aristotelian account, a mixture requires
that which is mixed to be altered, and the resulting mixture has properties
that are new in comparison to the properties of the initial ingredients.
It also means that the resulting mixture is uniform, for otherwise there
would be no mixture but just an intertwining of separate elements.166
The elements remain potentially in the mixture, in other words they are

162
The numbering in between parenthesis refers to the order of the arguments as they
appear in E 7.
163
Homogeneous (homogeneis) bodies are those that the whole and the part are of the
same nature; e.g., a part of bone is bone. See DOS X.58, 28.256 ( in homogeneis eadem
est natura totius et partis). Heterogeneous parts are made from homogeneous parts. See
Aristotle, Metereology IV.10, 388a1221; History of Animals I.1, 486a514. For the Aristotelian
background and its medieval interpretations, see Wood and Weisberg 2004; Freudenthal
2002, 119; Whiting 1995, 78; and Frede 2004.
164
Videmus enim sensibiliter in homine carnem, os, nervum, sanguinem, oculum,
pedem, et talia, quorum nullum est sine vera et propria sua forma, E 7, 50.911.
165
QLIIS 87, 243.810.
166
See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.10, 328a412.
 the soul as una forma viventis 107

neither destroyed nor do they remain unaltered,167 and can be recovered

it.168 The persistence of elements in mixtures, and their way of persisting,
was a much-discussed topic in the Middle Ages. There are two big issues
here: first, whether at a certain moment a thing can have more than one
substantial form (which seems to be required for the persisting of the ele-
ments in the mixture), and second or whether a substantial form admits
of degrees in order to be accommodated together with other substantial
forms and survive the mixture. Kilwardbys version takes elements from
both issues.
According to Kilwardby, then, the forms of the elements are present in
natural matter in a state of potentiality. In natural generable and corrupt-
ible things there is, at any time, only one (last) form, which is the act or
perfection of the thing, for there can be no contraries at the same time in
a certain portion of matter;169 nevertheless, the existence of this perfective
form does not prevent there being beneath it many latent potencies that,170
once activated by an appropriate external agent, come into full actuality
and replace the previous actual form, which returns to a state of (active)
potentiality. By way of an example, the earth can only change to any of
the other elements if the potencies of the other elements are hidden under
its actual form.171 Therefore, one element changes to another through

167
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.10, 326b2231. See also Thomas Aquinas,
SCG II.56, 4.
168
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.10, 327b2431; II.7, 334a315.
169
In illa materia simul sunt potentiae ad omnia quatuor elementa, sed non potest ali-
qua esse in actu simul nisi unica, et ratio est quia in actibus est contrarietas et contraria
non simul eidem insunt, sed potentiae non sunt contrariae, licet sint contrariorum, DOS
XXIX.249, 93.315. One could take the last part of the sentence to mean that elements (and
their qualities) are contraries, but that would only violate the principle of contraries in the
same matter in case they were simultaneously in actuality; however, in so far as the poten-
tiae for the other elements (thus, the potentiae of the contraries) are not active, no problem
arises. See also E 2, 27; and NSLP 11, 83.1012. Reynolds (1999, 82) calls attention to the fact
that the question seems to arise already in Aristotle: the ingredients survive in mixtures in
a potential mode which must be more than mere passive potency.
170
In rebus naturalibus generalibilibus et corruptibilibus, ita est quod una quecumque
unicam formam habet siue actu aut perfectionem qua est; sed sub illa forma multe latent
potentie quasi in materia sepulte sint sopite, D43Q 26, 289.62932. For a complete difffer-
ent view, see Thomas Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum, ed. Leonina, vol. 43; transl. Larkin
1960, 6772.
171
D43Q 26, 29.63642: Verbi gratia in gleba terre non est aliqua forma in actu nisi
forma terre, sed sunt ibi potentie ad alia tria elementa; et si agens conueniens ad genera-
tionem aque adueniat, potentia que fuit in materia ad aquam, confortata per tale agens,
disponit materiam ad formam, donec, reuocata forma terre in suam potentiam, ipsa fiat
forma materie et sic transeat terra in aquam. Per similem motum mutari potest hec aqua
in aerem, aut in ignem, aut iterum in terram. The same idea is found in the E 2, 24.1321:
Terra enim, ex quo potest transmutari in alia elementa, habet in se materiam possibilem
108 human beings

the action of an external agent, and because there is in the matter informed
by the actual element the form of the other elements in a latent state.172
The point to be made here is that Kilwardbys pluralism admits of a plural-
ity of forms in diffferent degrees of actuality, as the elements in active
potentiality and the element in full actuality, and a plurality of forms
actually informing diffferent parts of matter, as it is the case with the
body-parts.

(2) What is proper for a perfection is to perfect that which it is supposed to

perfect. Intellective potentia, considered the perfection of the sensitive
human body, must promote the body and its diffferent parts, each of which
has its own form:
We see through the senses in a human being flesh, bone, nerves, blood, eye,
foot, and such, of which none is without a true and proper form. () A per-
fection does not corrupt that which it is supposed to perfect, but rather car-
ries it forward, cherishes it, comprises it; corruption, on the other hand, is
not accomplished by its perfection.173
Intellective potentia designates the sensitive human body as an instance
of the human species, hence it cannot corrupt the existing disposi-
tionalforms that are necessary for that body to be a sensitive human body.
The perfection of something is not accomplished by its corruption.174

et formas aliorum elementorum et insunt terre racione materie potencie active ad formas
aliorum trium elementorum eciam cum actuali forma terre. Nec posset naturaliter trans-
mutacio fieri a terra per corrupcionem terre in alia elementa per eorum generacionem nisi
inessent materie terre potencie singule ad singula aliorum. Quod iam dici de terra transmu-
tanda in alia elementa, idem dico de singulis aliorum ad alia, (italics mine). An account
based on the intensification (intensio) and remission (remissio) of the active and passive
qualities can be found in the NSLP 7, 42.933 (in particular 1314: Sed istud solvitur per
hoc quod intensio et remissio quae accidit in miscibilibus debetur qualitatibus activis et
passivis et non naturae ipsius substantiae). See also QLIII2S 19.
172
Praeterea causa quare unum elementorum inducit formam suam in materiam alte-
rius, est, quia invenit ibi rationem seminalem ad suam formam, QLIIS 70, 199.7476. See
also D43Q 26, 29.6479. Kilwardby probably inherited the view according to which the
forms of the non-actual elements remain in low actuality from Averroes. Cf. commentary
on De generatione et corruptione, comm. 8290, 8694; on De caelo, comm. 67, 227228. See
de Haas 1999, 22.
173
Videmus enim sensibiliter in homine carnem, os, nervum, sanguinem, oculum,
pedem, et talia, quorum nullum est sine vera et propria forma. () Perfeccio enim suum
perfectibile non corrumpit, sed provehit, fovet et continet; corrupcio eciam per contra-
rium, et non per suum effficitur perfectivum, E 7, 50.916. Aquinas (Quodlibet I, in
Quaestiones quodlibetales, ed. Raymund Spiazzi, Turin: Marietti, 1956, q.4, a.1 [6], arg. 4, 6)
argues that the form that perfects also corrupts.
174
Perfeccio enim suum perfectibile non corrumpit, sed provehit, fovet et continet;
corrupcio eciam per contrarium, et non per suum effficitur perfectivum, E 7, 50.146.
 the soul as una forma viventis 109

Therefore, that which is supposed to perfect some thing cannot be the

cause of the corruption of the thing that is supposed to perfect.

(7) If the intellective form corrupts the previous forms educed through
natural agency, then nature labors in vain.175

(8) If other animals have forms of corporeity, and vegetative and sensitive
forms, and if none of these is equivocal in a human being and other beings,
why do they not have an intellective form?176 Let us consider this argu-
ment. It assumes that:
(A) In every animal there are several forms, i.e., corporeity, vegetative,
sensitive;
(B) Our vegetative soul belongs to the same genus as the soul of any living
being, in the same way as our sensitive soul belongs to the same genus as the
souls of other animals, such as a cat or a donkey;177 the fact that souls belong
to the same genus means that they have the same properties, i.e. that they
perform the same functions in all beings;
(C) The intellective soul performs all operations in human beings.
Kilwardby thus concludes that other animals, apart from man, should have
an intellective soul. Implicit in this argument is the idea that operations
proper to certain forms cannot be performed by other forms. If the sensitive
form is responsible for sensing in both human beings and any other animals,
why should there be another form performing these same operations?
The argument is not a very strong one. Unitarians would counter-argue
that although human beings and cows, for example agree in genus, there
is nothing that is in a genus that is not determined into a certain species.
To claim that other species of the genus animal should have the intellec-
tive form just because they have forms that are responsible for operations
that are proper to animals would imply that we must then have the same
properties as all other species of animals, since the genus is less deter-
mined than the species. This is exactly the criticism one finds in Aquinas
and Bonaventure.

175
Item, tunc usque ad creacionem intellective frustra laborasset natura tot partes
constituendo et inducendo tot formas, E 7, 51.78.
176
Item, si intellectiva per se ipsam agit omnium formarum acciones, quare ergo non
ponitur intellectus forma omnium corporalium, forma eciam omnium vegetabilium ac
omnium forma brutorum?, E 7, 51.912.
177
In DSF 44, Kilwardby explicitly says sensing is not equivocal in us and in the other
animals.
110 human beings

(II) Psychological proof: the intellective form cannot alone account

for the diversity of operations: (5), (6).

(5) If the intellective form is responsible for all operations, then it must be
the actuality of the parts of the body through which these operations, such
as sensation or nutrition, are performed.178 Kilwardby pinpoints here a rec-
ognized problem in a strict hylomorphic understanding of the human
composite, due to the special nature of the intellect. This general diffficulty
is emphasized in a theory that allocates one form only to the human
composite.

(6) If the intellective form were responsible for all operations, the
Aristotelian principle that the diversity of objects implies the diversity of
actions and forms would be false. 179 According to Kilwardby, however, the
absolute unity of forms is contradicted by the diversity of the species of
the actions and of the objects: the same potentia cannot be responsible
for operations that are so diffferent in nature, such as sensing and under-
standing. He argues that diffferent operations directed to diffferent objects
demand diffferent powers, and that the powers are rooted in diffferent
potentiae. The operations that belong to man through the vegetative
potentia, for examplesuch as to grow, to take nourishment and such
are primarily and per se properties of the vegetative potentia. Moreover,
the vegetative potentia with its properties is distinct from the other two,
just as the sensitive potentia with its properties is distinct from the vegeta-
tive and the intellective.180
(III) Physical and theological proof: there must exist a form of cor-
poreity for both philosophical (natural philosophy) and theological
reasons: (3), (4), (9), (10), (11).

178
Item, tunc intellectiva potencia sentiret sensu proprie dicto, et esset perfeccio oculi
ad videndum, auris ad audiendum, cum dicat Philosophus, quod nullius partis corporis
actus sit; tunc eciam nutriret corpus, augmentaret et generaret, E 7, 51.14.
179
Item, tunc nichil esset, quod ubi sunt diversa obiecta, essent acciones diverse et
accione forme diverse, E 7, 51.56.
180
Et quaedam sunt proprietates vegetativi primo et per se, quae non sunt sensitivi
nisi per vegetativum, ut augeri, nutriri et huiusmodi, et similiter de aliis duabus dictis
potentiis. () Et ideo praeter illa considerari potest, et proprietates quae sunt hominis per
potentiam vegetativam sunt vegetativi per se et primo, DOS XXV.199, 77.1525. See also E 5,
423.27-03.
 the soul as una forma viventis 111

(3) There must be a form by which a body is body; a vegetative form,

responsible for nutrition and growth; a sensitive form, responsible for
perception and motion.181

(4) If (3) is false, then a human being is a composite of the intellective

form and prime matter.182 This has serious implications with respect to
the theological dogmas of Incarnation (9), Transubstantiation (10), and
Resurrection (11).

(9) When Christ assumed the human nature He assumed a human body in
that human beings are made of rational soul and flesh.183 However, as the
intellect together with matter stripped of any form are not enough to
account for flesh,184 it is necessary that there be a form of flesh other than
the intellect.185 For Kilwardby this constituted a strong argument in favor
of the existence of a form of corporeity other than the rational soul (as the
single determining principle or substantial form), and thus the existence
of at least two substantial forms in the human composite. There are
more but, so the reasoning goes, accepting that opens up the possibil-
itythat there are many. Kilwardby starts his discussion on the nature of

181
Item sequitur, cum non sit corpus, nisi per formam corpoream, nec vegetativum, nisi
per formam vegetativam, nec sensitivum nisi per formam sensitivam, quod non esset in
homine accio senciendi vel vegetandi vel existencia corporis, et hoc idem dico de aliis
innumerabilibus formis repertis in homine, E 7, 50.1923.
182
Item, tunc intellectiva potencia nude materie uniretur, et non esset homo aliud, nisi
quoddam compositum ex intelligibili et materia aliis formis nudata, E 7, 50.246.
183
Sic enim Unigenitus Deus humanam non assumpsit naturam; si homo consistit ex
anima racionali et carne, caro de substancia hominis est, et per carnem intelligo, quicquid
ex parte carnis subintelligitur, E 7, 51.1821 (see also QLIII1S 8, 36.37). Cf. Peter Lombard,
S III, d. 6, cap. 2, 502. See also Bonaventure, C III, d. 21, a. 1, q. 3. Flesh here means every-
thing that constitutes the human body, as limbs, organs, etc. Flesh is a body made of hot,
cold, humid and dry (caro est corpus complexionatum ex calidis, frigidis, humidus et sic-
cus, DOS XXV.204, 79.09). For brief discussion on Kilwardby on Christ, see Cross 2002, 138.
184
Item, intellectus cum materia denudata a formis, que precesserunt in ea ante eius
adventum, non constituunt carnem, E 7, 52.56. Caro is a sensible corporeal substance
(DOS XXV.203, 7879.341.
185
Unde oportet, quod ibi sit alia forma carnis, quam intellectus, E 7, 51.267. Cf. John
Pecham, Quodlibet IV (Romanum), in John Pecham, Quodlibeta Quatuor, eds. G.J. Etzkorn
and F. Delorme, (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 25) Grottaferrata:
Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1989, q. 11.12 (Utrum oculus dicatur de oculo Christi vivo et
mortuo univoce vel aequivoce); q. 25 (Utrum anima rationalis sit forma corporis unde
corpus). Although Aquinas does not hold, at least in his later writings, the form of corpore-
ity, he does posit matter (undesignated matter) in the definition of human nature (cf. ST
III, q.2, a.2, respondeo; De ente et essentia, c.2)
112 human beings

incarnation by claiming that when Christ became incarnate He assumed

the human nature by assuming the body and the soul.186 It would not have
been enough to assume the soul because the body is also a constituting
principle of the human nature. There is a significant diffference between
Christ and human beings: when Christ became incarnate He started to
exist as a human being immediately, in other words at the same time
(ineodem instanti) as his body was made and given a human shape his
soul was created and infused; in human beings other than Christ there is a
succession of formsfirst the vegetative soul is educed from the potenti-
ality of matter, then the sensitive, and finally the intellective soul is
created and infused in the individual human being.187
Although Kilwardby does not go into great detail in his account of
incarnation in E 7, he does so in QLIII1S. In what follows I will give
the general outline of his theory as the background for his rejection of the
unicity of substantial form. The bottom line is his alignment with the
offficial view: Christ assumed the human nature but not the human per-
son.188 Nature could be considered in abstraction or according to the
essence, and in concretion or according to the being. In abstraction it is
the universal that can be predicated of all the particulars that instanti-
ateit.189 In concretion, it could be considered as existing in many or only
inone individual; the assumed human nature must be of an individual in
the species.190 However, nature, in the individual, can mean either the
principles that constitute the thing, which in created things includes mat-
ter and form, or the thing that is composite of the principles.191 Similarly,
human nature can be considered materially, as including the constitutive
principles of the individual man, flesh/body and soul [human-nature-as-
parts], or formally as the composite of the two constitutive principles
[human-nature-as-a-whole].192
According to Kilwardby, Christ assumed human nature taken materi-
ally, i.e. the constitutive principles (which are naturally prior) and not

186
prius natura assumpta sunt a Verbo ista principia compositi, scilicet anima et
caro, bene dicitur assumpsisse naturam, QLIII1S 8, 39.813.
187
Item, in Incarnacione subito et sine mora formatum et efffigiatum est corpus Christi,
et in eodem instanti creata est anima et infusa, et coniuncta Deitas, E 7, 52.0911. See also
QLIII1S 19, 85.423.
188
Assumpsit enim Verbum naturam hominis, non personam, QLIII1S 8, 40.12930.
189
QLIIS 148.
190
An atomus in specie (QLIII1S 8, 38.679) or a supposit (QLIIS 148, 407.103104).
191
Natura enim atoma dicitur dupliciter, scilicet aut composita ex principiis aut ipsa
principia componentia, QLIII1S 8, 38.712.
192
QLIII1S 13, 64.259.
 the soul as una forma viventis 113

their composite.193 Christ assumed the rational soul and, through its medi-
ation, the body.194 The constituting principles are not the same as the
thing itself because a thing is only an individual when it has a complete
being of its kind. An individual is that which cannot be further divided
into something of the same kind, and that exists in complete actuality.
Here Kilwardby explicitly refers to his statement in QLIIS that the cause of
individuation is matter and form designated by the last designation, which
is the supervening form that makes the thing distinct from others of its
kind. 195 To be a human person requires the actual existence of an individ-
ual of rational nature in a unique spatial-temporal location.196 Nothing can
be a person unless it is able to subsist alone, not as part of something
nobler, and is not naturally conjoined with another thing.197
Christ was already a higher, divine, person,198 and therefore assumed the
human naturethe conjunction of body and soulbut not a human
person.199 He was a divine person who, through incarnation, was made

193
QLIII1S 5, 27.3749. The composite of matter and form (body and soul in the case
of man) makes a third thing. See QLIII1S 1, 3.167; QLIII1S 1, 5.623; QLIII1S 14, 67.156.
(Cf.footnote 65, pages 4041.)
194
QLIII1S 6, 30.3637; 31.5556.
195
QLIII1S 8, 39.85102.
196
Ibi enim dicebatur quod causa individuationis est materia et forma signatae signa-
tione ultima. Ex quo sequitur quod personalis proprietas sit actualis existentia et determi-
nata ac signata per se. Sicut enim hoc est verum communiter in omni alio individuo, sic in
individuo rationalis naturae quod est persona, QLIII1S 8, 39.98102. See also QLIII1S 13,
65.7980: persona requirit actualem et distinctam existentiam ab aliis per se, non solum
in natura, sed etiam in esse et permanentia temporis. (The question of individuation is
further discussed below.)
197
Sed illud quod est in aliquo unito quasi in toto formatum nobiliori forma quam
ipsum in suo genere habeat, iam non in actu est proprie, sed potius in potentia. Similiter, si
sit principium materiale alicuius rei quae iam in actu sit vel esse possit, non est in actu
completo sui generis, et ideo proprie nullum horum est individuum vel persona sed tan-
tum aliquo modo singulare, QLIII1S 8, 39.1037. See also QLIII1S 8, 40.1314: Ad primum
dicendum quod non omnis coniunctio animae rationalis et carnis facit humanam perso-
nam, sed illa quae manet per se distincte in suo genere sine unione cum nobiliori, per
quam unionem iam est quasi in potentia et quasi pars et aliunde denominatur. And
QLIII1S 8, 41.1446: Nec tamen assumpta est persona quando tale coniunctum assumptum
est, quia plus exigitur ad personalitatem quam talium principiorum coniunctio. See also
QLIS 35, 89.28890; QLIII1S 8, 3940.108111; QLIII1S 10, 51.458.
198
Neque etiam humana natura, quamvis assumpta sit coniuncta ex anima et carne,
fuerat umquam persona, quia semper fuit nobiliori naturae sive personae unita sicut for-
mae digniori, QLIII1S 8, 40.11820. See also QLIII1S 19, 87.9698; QLIS 35, 89.28890: et
quod non sit nobiliori unita, sicut natura rationalis humana in Christo est unita Verbo.
199
Patet igitur quid hic intelligendum per naturam, scilicet individuam naturam in
genere humano, et quid per personam, scilicet res in actu sui generis, manens distincte ab
omnibus aliis, QLIII1S 8, 40.1235.
114 human beings

composite by assuming the human nature together with the divine.200

The human nature is united with the divine person, and it assumes per-
sonhood by means this union.201 There was no need for Christ to take a
personal human property because this is essential to an individual but
accidental to the nature.202 If He had assumed the human person together
with His divine person there would have been two persons in Christ, but
saying so would have been a Nestorian heresy.203 Christ was one person
and, contrary to what Eutyches held, had two natures, the divine and the
human, instead of one composite nature. The two natures remain sepa-
rated and cannot be united with one anotherthere is in the divine per-
son and nature no inclination to be united with the human nature, and
only in things that incline naturally to one another can unity can occur.204
Furthermore, if Christ had assumed the human nature as a composite, we
could not refer to His dead body as the body of a man since the composite
would no longer be there. We could refer to the dead body as that of a
human being, because we would mean a human being in the material
sense, taking the part (flesh) for the whole.205 In sum, incarnation means
that Christ assumed a human body, which can only happen if there is a
body to be assumed. According to Kilwardby, the body must have a form
of its own that is not the rational soul.

(10) Likewise, in the Eucharist (in sacramento altaris), the bread and wine
should be transubstantiated into the true body and blood of Christ.206

200
illa persona [persona divina] ante incarnationem fuit simplex, sed in incarna-
tione facta est composita, ita quod quae prius erat persona solius naturae divinae, dein-
ceps esset persona divinae naturae et humanae, QLIII1S 8, 41.1546.
201
Et tunc ad primum contra hoc dicendum quod si hypostasis sive persona Christi
haberet suum esse ex unione duarum naturarum, sicut persona puri hominis habet suum
esse ex compositione corporis et animae, bene argueret. Sed nunc aliter est, quia persona
Christi habet suum esse a Patre ab aeterno, absque omni unione cum humana natura, et
humana natura adveniens nihil ei confert personalitatis, sed ab ea suscipit personalita-
tem, QLIII1S 14, 68.438.
202
Ad tertium Christus assumpsit naturam humanam et per consequens omnia essen-
tialia ipsi naturae. Personalis autem proprietas non est essentialis naturae, ut dictum est,
sed individuo. Et ideo hanc non assumpsit QLIIS 19, 78.435.
203
QLIII1S 9, 44.2833.
204
Neque enim natura divina vel persona habet talem inclinationem ad humanam
neque econverso, QLIII1S 1, 5.668.
205
QLIII1S 13, 65.5964; 66.8591.
206
E 7, 52.1926. Nevertheless, in QLIVS 42 (228, 1478) Kilwardby says that in the
Eucharist the body of Christ should not be understood literally. For an introduction to the
debate concerning the relation between the transubstantiation and the plurality of forms,
see the excelent work of Bakker 1999; for Kilwardby, see 1789.
 the soul as una forma viventis 115

However, if the intellective soul shuns all bodily forms, there is no blood or
flesh of Christ, just his intellective soul. On the contrary, Kilwardby claims,
the body and its parts must have their own forms.

(11) This form of corporeity also accounts for the resurrected body.207 If the
supervening intellective soul corrupts all existing forms, including those
of the bodily parts, there is no body to be resurrected. Resurrection
requires the soul to be united with the same body it had when living.208
The sameness here means the numerical identity that arises from material
continuity. Kilwardby argues that there must be in human beings a form of
the body other than the rational soul.

He concludes his criticism of the so-called posicio de unitate formarum by

stating that the unity of a human being (humanitas una) is the result of
the unity of the many forms that constitute the body, and the unity of the
many forms that constitute the soul as the form of a living thing.209 He did
not understand how any other kind of unity was possible, or could be
accepted in philosophy.
What Kilwardby did in the seventh part of his reply to Peter of Conflans
was to describe what he understood the theory of the unity of forms to
be, and to present his objections to it, making it clear that this was not
censured by the Prohibitions. I have presented his arguments in detail
because I find his reply significant for two reasons. First, it enhances
understanding of the view he was opposing, independentlyat this point
at leastof who was the author of it (if one could be singled out and iden-
tified). Second, it constitutes the most detailed and systematic analysis of
the arguments against the theory of the unicity of forms, and of those in
favor of the theory of the plurality of forms. Even though the debate was
not new at the time, and further systematic accounts would appear later,
Kilwardbys E 7 sets out the main argumentsranging from natural phi-
losophy (elemental change, embryogenesis) to theology (resurrection, the
Eucharist)some of which had been used before and some he himself

207
Sed ex ypotesi sequitur, quod forma humani corporis, cum corrumpitur, cedit in
pure nichil. Quod autem in pure nichil vadit, nunquam reverititur. () Et si hoc, non resur-
git idem corpus hominis, quod moritur; quod nobis fidelibus nequissimum est dicere, E 1,
21.139. Bonaventure holds in his C II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, 452, that no natural form is corrupted
into nothing (the same way as it does not create from nothing).
208
E 1, 21.1520.
209
Ex hiis formis corporalibus iam memoratis, et hac spirituali que constat ex multis,
humanitas una resultat, E 7, 53.278.
116 human beings

puts forward, but all of which were to find their way into later discussions
on the topic.
Kilwardby seemed to be among the first to incorporate the new theo-
logical arguments that appeared in the late 1260s and early 1270s into the
philosophical reasoning of authors writing in the 1240s. (The use of theo-
logical arguments cannot hence explain why earlier thinkers had shied
away from committing themselves to either the unicity or the pluralist
view.) His use of these theological arguments in his works is a proof of a
development internal to his theory. In the early QLS, from 1256, the argu-
ments he presents in defense of the plurality of forms are mostly psycho-
logical, such as arguing for the essential distinction of the souls potentiae
based on the diffferent nature of their operations, whereas in the later
E (from ca. 1278) he uses the theological arguments of Incarnation,
Resurrection and Eucharist to justify the plurality of substantial forms in
the human composite. The introduction of these arguments in the end
of the 1270s and in the early 1280s reveals an evolution not only in
Kilwardbys thought, but also in the nature of the whole debate. Whether
or not this could be attributed to the influence of John Pechamwho
moved to and taught in Oxford ca. 127276 after having disputed with
Thomas Aquinas in Paris (12691270) on the nature of the body of Christ in
the triduoremains to be fully understood. (Pechams Quodlibet Romanum
is from ca. 12771279. On this issue, see Wilson 1998). As noted before, the
core of these theological arguments is the thesis that there must be a form
of the body, by which the body is a body, other than the rational soul.
I have also argued that Kilwardby introduced at least two original argu-
ments into the debate. The first was the application of the principle of the
diversity of functions to the parts of the body, drawing an analogy between
the compositional unity of the soul and the compositional unity of the
body. Second, he used the same notion of unibility, or essential inclina-
tion to be united to, that primarily applied to the soul-body union (see
John of La Rochelle and Bonaventure) to explain the relation between the
diffferent potentiae. These constituted one soul, a spiritual substance, due
to their natural inclination to one another. This union was so strong that,
at least in one version of the theory, it could not be broken following the
separation from the body, even though some of these potentiaethe veg-
etative and the sensitivecould operate only through bodily organs.
Finally, Kilwardby was unequivocal about where he stood in the discus-
sion: he was a pluralist and was not afraid of saying so, by contrast with the
practice of his predecessors and contemporaries (Philip the Chancellor,
Bonaventure, Fishacre, Richard Rufus, for example). Notwithstanding the
 the soul as una forma viventis 117

ongoing nature of the debate over the unicity versus plurality of substan-
tial forms, Kilwardby seemed to be one of the few who explicitly and
unequivocally endorsed the view. He did not limit himself to presenting
both sides of the dispute, but committed himself to defending his view. In
offfering a compelling defense of the plurality of forms in the human com-
posite, and making a vehement attack on the theory of the unity of forms,
he became the representative of pluralism in the same way Aquinas was
the representative of unicity. In the third and final part of this study I will
take my argument that Aquinas was not Kilwardbys main target even
further.
To argue against the unicity of form and for the compositional unity of
the soul does not exhaust the question, however. Kilwardby had to address
the issue of what happens to the human composite with the separation
ofthe soul from the body at death. The unity of the human person presup-
poses the existence of these two substances, body and soul. It is, however,
a central tenet of the Christian faith that the soul is immortal, whereas the
body is corruptible. Consequently, there is a certain moment when the
unity of the two composite substances (neither the soul nor the body is
simplex) that constitutes the person is broken. First of all, there is the
question of what soul (or, what parts of the soul) are separated. I men-
tioned above that the diffferent origin of the souls substantial forms
imposes a limit on them: can the naturally generated vegetative and sensi-
tive forms remain when the soul is not united with the body (and thus
they cannot perform their operations), or must they be corrupted together
with the body (this would mean that new vegetative and sensitive forms
must be created together with the resurrected body)? Second comes the
question of the nature of the body that is separated from the soul, a topic
of high theological value due to its association with the subject of relics,
and how the re-composition takes place given that medieval theologians
understood the resurrection of the body to be a dogma of the Church.210

3.3.The Disembodied Soul

What happens to the composite unity of the soul when its separation from
the body takes place? There is no doubt about the human souls immortal-
ity; the question here is whether the composite soul with all its potentiae

210
That is, it is primarily the object of belief (cf. QLIII2S 5.1, 21.1024). Resurrection is of
the body and the soul (QLIVS 41, 220.2425).
118 human beings

or only the intellective part remains in the disembodied state. Kilwardby

offfers two accounts, one more aligned with Aristotle and the other with
Augustine. He argues thus in QLIIS 8.
On the basis of this and what has been said above, I believe that it is ade-
quate to consider that, according to Augustine, the rational mind and the
spirit, which is called imaginative, common to us and the brutes, are two
essentially diffferent parts of the soul, which are simultaneously created
and simultaneously separated. And so the sensitive and intellective [poten-
tiae] are essentially diffferent and are simultaneously created and sepa-
rated.On the subject of the vegetative potentia I do not remember having
read him as expressing anything. I take it, however, to be probable that it
is the same as with the others, since it concerns the integrity of the human
soul. 211
For Augustine, then, the composite unity of the soul remained integral
even when separated from the body.212 The natural bond that tied the dif-
ferent potentiae together explained the integral continuation of the
human soul even in its disembodied state. The vegetative and sensitive
potentiae of irrational animals were, on the contrary, generated and cor-
rupted with the body.213 The (vegetative and) sensitive part of the human
soul was separable not because of the operations it performed, but due to
its natural inclination to the rational part.214 It is important to notice that
this passage is the description of Augustines view, according to which the
sensitive and intellective are simultaneously created and separated.
In Augustine, according to Kilwardbys interpretation, the separability of
the sensitive form is linked with its simultaneous creation with the intel-
lective. This view difffers from Kilwardbys in one important aspect: for

211
Ex his et supra positis puto satis constare quod secundum Augustinum mens ratio-
nalis et spiritus ille qui imaginativa vocatur, communis nobis et brutis, duae partes animae
sunt essentialiter diffferentes, quae simul creantur et simul separantur. Et ita intellectiva et
sensitiva potentia secundum ipsum diffferunt essentialiter et simul creantur ac separantur.
De potentia vegetabili non memini me legisse aliquid expressum ab ipso. Verumtamen
probabile est quod illa cadat in eadem ratione cum aliis, ex quo de integritate animae
humanae est, QLIIS 8, 32.1018. See, however, QLIIS 85.
212
una pars animae secum trahit alias propter unionem earum ad invicem, QLIIS 8,
30.5758. This is a particularly diffficult problem for the pluralists. Unitarians can easily
argue that the vegetative and sensitive remain inactive but virtually present in the rational
soul. For the pluralists, these being distinct entities, the solution is far from easy.
Bonaventure discusses the topic in the C II, d.19, a.1, q.2, ad.34.
213
In brutis autem sensibilis et vegetabilis generantur et corrumpuntur cum corpore,
QLIIS 8, 30.634.
214
QLIIS 8, 301.6879; 31.734; 32.1035. For Kilwardby the sensitive soul is incorrupt-
ible because it is united with the intellective soul.
 the soul as una forma viventis 119

Kilwardby the sensitive potentia is (as the vegetative) naturally generated,

whereas the intellective potentia is created by God.
Kilwardby presents a diffferent view in DOS, D43Q and E (5, 40), arguing
that the lower potentiaethe vegetative and the sensitiveare corrupted
with the body and that their acts are restored in the resurrected body by
divine intervention (see below). This conclusion follows from the double
origin of the soul and the diffferent nature of the souls resulting from it:
whereas the vegetative and sensitive forms are non separable because
they are naturally generated, the intellective form is separable because it
is created.215 His authority in this was Aristotle who, he points out in DOS,
held that the vegetative and sensitive parts are not separable from the
body because they are the acts of some part of the body and cannot per-
form their operations without it.216
In DSF, Kilwardby seemed to be of the opinion that the disembodied
soul is able to perform imaginative acts by means of the images of sensible
things stored in the memory.217 He presents this argument against the
objection that there could be no perception without the corporeal spirit.
He denies such a requirement, claiming that it is enough for the soul to
retain the species in the power of memory. The corporeal spirit is only
required when the soul needs to act upon the body.218 The sensitive poten-
tia, which is born to animate the body and to sense, cannot receive infor-
mation from external objects through the senses when separated;219 it can,
however, receive this information in another way, from the images of

215
E 5, 41.0513. The conclusion leaves no doubt: Relique autem partes manifestum est
ex hiis, quod non separabiles sunt. To argue against this separability was usual: see, e.g.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG II.81, 12; ST I.77, a.8. Philip the Chancellor takes the separability as a
central argument for the diffference between the sensitive and the intellective (cf. SB, q.3,
231).
216
Item ad idem valet quod sensitivum secundum quod huiusmodi totaliter est a
natura et corrumpitur - dico secundum Aristotelem de cuius processu modo loquitur - sed
intellectiva potentia a solo creatore est, et incorruptibilis est, DOS X.55, 27.710, (italics
mine). That is the view of Philip the Chancellor, SB, q.3, 231232; 235.
217
dicendum quod non est dubitandum, ut uidetur, quin spiritus ymaginatiuus
hominis a corpore separatus possit excercere opus ymaginacionis per se sine spiritu cor-
poreo, DSF 214, 107.235. Cf. pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu et anima 15 (PL 40, 791). The
same idea can be found in Augustines Confessiones 10.9.16: sicut aliquid, quod corpore
tangendo sentitur quod etiam separatum a nobis imaginatur memoria.
218
Cf. DSF 217.
219
Quamvis etiam nata sit potentia sensitiva animare carnem () sed separata non
sentit, sed nata est sentire, sicut et carnem animare, QLIII1S 46, 2023.25760. Item. Quia
sic facta est sensitiva, ut in corpore possit sentire, separata vero non possit sed sentire nata
sit, cum perficit corpus, QLIII1S 46, 203.2703.
120 human beings

sensible objects stored in the mind.220 The problem is, however, that if
imagination and memory, which are powers of the sensitive soul, operate
in the disembodied state, thus the sensitive soul must continue to exist
apart from the body. Furthermore, Kilwardby offfers as evidence for the
separability and incorruptibility of the sensitive soul Augustines argu-
ment that separate souls are tormented by the images of corporeal things,
which must be received by the body and cannot exist except in the imagi-
nation, which is a power of the sensitive soul.221
If Kilwardby did accept this he would seem to have contradicted him-
self, having stated in DOS that the sensitive soul does not operate without
bodily organs, and in E and D43Q that there are no such things as capaci-
ties without the instruments to perform its operations. Now he was sug-
gesting that the instrument of the sensitive soul was the body. He found a
way to avoid this objection in pointing out (QLIII1S 46) that no problem
would arise from a state in which the sensitive powers would remain with-
out performing their operations, in the same way as the vegetative powers
remain without performing their operations in the resurrected body or, as
he argues in D43Q, in the body of the blessed.
The two incompatible accounts cannot be dismissed by using some
form of development hypothesis, as both accounts are found in works of
the same period; they rather seemed to have come from the author
Kilwardby was appealing to at the time: whereas DOS and E were written
under Aristotles influence, QLIIS was written under Augustines. Even so,
it is surprising that Kilwardby considers the separation from the body
enough to break the strong unity of the soul he so much argued for in most
of his works. In fact, it is remarkable that he does not use the strong nature
of the unity to argue for the integrality of the human soul in the disembod-
ied state.
This is the case of the disembodied soul, but what about the other part
of the person, the body? What happens to the body when it is separated
from the soul?

220
Sed iste spiritus non aliud videtur secundum rem quam sensus, quare potentia sen-
sitiva separata rerum notitiam sensibilium quam non potest habere per sensum, potest per
aliam viam obtinere, QLIII1S 46, 203.27981. See also QLIII1S 46, 203.2758: quia mens
ipsa cui unitur, in separatione habet notitiam suffficientem omnium et potest () rerum
imagines corporalium in spiritu sibi unito formare.
221
Probatio. Docet enim Super Genesim lib. XII cap. 18 quod animae cruciantur separa-
tae per imagines rerum corporalium quas a corporibus susceperunt et secum ferunt.
Sed illae imagines non sunt per ipsum nisi in spiritu quem ponit esse idem cum imagina-
tiva. Ergo anima separata secum habet sensitivam et ita tota anima simul creata est ut
numquam desineret, QLIIS 8, 301.704.
 the soul as una forma viventis 121

3.4.Dead Body: Resurrection and Bodily Continuity

The discussion thus far has covered the principles of the composite sub-
stance, as well as the diffferent forms responsible for making that kind of
substance. Kilwardby defended the existence of a form of corporeity that
made a substance a body. Such a form was essential in addressing the cen-
tral theological question about the nature and identity of the body of
Christ in the tomb during the three days that elapsed between His death
and His resurrection (the triduum).222 The problem concerns the identity
(numerical or formal) of the living and the dead body, in other words the
body that is animated by the soul and the body that is separated from
the soul. Pluralists and unitarians are on opposite sides with respect to
this question.
The status of the body without the soul is an important argument for
pluralism and one of the resilient problems for unitarians.223 It is therefore
strange how little space Kilwardby devotes to the question in De 43 ques-
tionibus, QLS and Epistola, especially because the issue was at the heart of
the debate between John Pecham and Thomas Aquinas in Paris 126970.224
This is also discussed in association with the question of resurrection.225
Resurrection is particularly diffficult to explain for authors who adopt
Aristotelian metaphysics, as they must hold with Aristotle that the numer-
ically same substance cannot return into being.226 On the other hand,
authors who accept the pluralism of forms to the efffect that the unity of
a human being is a unity by aggregation adopt the view that the form
by which something is a body is diffferent from the form by which some-
thing is a human being. This makes the explanation of resurrection more
simplewhich is not to say easier.227 In both cases, resurrection is
ultimately dependent on divine intervention.

222
Peter Lombard, SIII, d.21, c.1, 800.
223
Zavalloni 1951, 25861, 3179; and McCord Adams 1987, 647654.
224
See Wilson 1998. In his Letter addressed to the University of Oxford (10 November
1284), the then Archbishop John Pecham focuses on the nature of the body of Christ as an
objection against the unicity of substantial form, making explicit, in case it was not explicit
enough, the article prohibited by Kilwardby (article 13th in naturalibus: Item quod corpus
vivum et mortuum est aequivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum, secundum corpus mortuum,
sit corpus secundum quid). Aquinas endorsed this view around the Easter 1270, but in 1271
he denied it; for references, see Cross 1999, 184, n.7.
225
The discussion is originally found in Augustines Enchiridion 23 (8493) and De civi-
tate Dei 22.5.125; 20; and Peter Lombards Sententiae IV, d. 44. Cf. Reynolds 1999, 51, n.6.
226
For references, see Solre 2006, 5112, n. 135.
227
Cf. Reynolds 1999, 52.
122 human beings

According to Aristotles homonymy principle, the material parts of the

corpse can only be equivocally predicated of the parts of a living body
because they cease to perform their function.228 A dead eye is no longer
able to see and it is an eye in name only.229 Aquinas follows this thesis,
arguing that the form of the body, by which the body is a body,230 is the
rational soul, which is no longer present in the dead body.231 Body is only
homonymously said of the living body and the corpse.232 When the human
soul is separated from the body, the body is corrupted to the form of a
mixture that is not a substantial form but a disposition of matter to receive
the human substantial form.233 Moreover, the soul is the form of the
whole and therefore it is also responsible for giving being to the parts.234

228
See, e.g., Aristotle, Generation of Animals 734b24; and Parts of Animals I.1, 640b34
641a5. Cf. Lewis 1994, 251. The proximate matter required for an animal is the living body
which must be already informed in a appropriate manner, i.e. a body characterized by the
relevant set of organs (Lewis 1994, 252, n.14). Whiting (1992, 80) raises some objections
against the view that for Aristotle all the matter of the body ceases to be immediately with
the ceasing to be of the living organism. She refers to the distinction between composi-
tional and functional flesh. Still according to Whiting, the homoiomerous parts are the
ultimate matter of living organisms, 78. T. Irwin talks of proximate and remote matter,
(24147). The elements, for instance, are remote matter in such a way as not to be even
potentially alive. According to Shields, Aristotle must keep the homonymy principle due to
what he calls the functional analysis of kind identification, (1988, 135), i.e. a thing belongs
to a kind if it performs the operations that kind performs.
229
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.1011, 1035b1425, 1037a302. See also On the Soul II.1,
412b2023: when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in nameno
more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure. See Thomas Aquinas, SCG II.72;
Sentencia libri De anima, ed. R.A. Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino doctoris angelici Opera
omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 45.1. Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1984, II,
capitulum II, 412b1725, 75.
230
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q.79, a.1, ad.4: Corpus humanum, praeter hanc formam mix-
tionis, non habet aliquam formam substantialem nisi animam rationalem.
231
E.g. Thomas Aquinas, SCG II.58.10; Quodlibet III, q.2, a.4. See Brown 1992; and Bazn
1983, 369409. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.1011, 1035b211036b2228. See Irvin 1990, 241
2. See also Reynolds 1999; and Bynum 1991, for a historical rather than a philosophical view.
232
Thomas Aquinas, ST III.50, 5. Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet 2, a.1; Quodlibet 3, a.4;
Quodlibet 4, a.8. The question was also discussed by Albert the Great, in his De quindecim
problematibus (prop. 14), as an answer to Giles of Lessines. See Aristotle, De anima 412b21.
On Aristotle on homonymy, see Shields, (1988), especially 5.2.
233
Thomas Aquinas, ST III, suppl. q. 79, a.1, ad 34. In his Commentum in quatuor libros
Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera omnia, Parma, 185273 (reprint, New York:
Musurgia Publishers, 194850), IV, 44.1.1, q.1, a.3, Aquinas argues that the human body is
corrupted to the elements and that it is prime matter which the body and the corpse have
in common (cf. Reynolds 1999, 4045). Reynolds says that prime matter cannot account
for sameness of matter (405) in the sense of explaining numerical continuity because it is
entirely one and contains no diversity (408).
234
Thomas Aquinas, ST I.76, 8. For soul is the actuality of the body, primarily and irre-
spectively, whereas it is the actuality of the parts only in so far as they are subordinated to
 the soul as una forma viventis 123

Aquinas makes clear in De ente et essentia that only undesignated matter

is part of the definition of human being,235 because the individual does
not have a definition. Flesh and bone enter into the definition of the body
and the body into the definition of human being, but not this flesh or this
body. The identity of the resurrected body is secured by the rational soul
as the forma totius, which remains the same, and it is the cause of the iden-
tity of the human composite.236
According to a contemporary reading of Aquinas, championed by
Eleonore Stump, he seemed to dissociate material continuity from per-
sonal identity, for the sameness of form is enough to account for the iden-
tity of the resurrected human being.237 For him the decisive argument was
that the matter (i.e. stufff) of our bodies is permanently changing, but nev-
ertheless we take it to be the same body, and we do so because the same
substantial form (the rational soul) makes it a human body.238 The identity
of the body is guaranteed by the sameness of its form. Hence, he appar-
ently saw no need for the same matter to enter into the constitution of the
resurrected body because the particular matter of the (once) living body
in no way accounted for personal identity. In sum, personal identity does
not require material continuity. According to another reading of Aquinas,
championed most notably by Robert Pasnau, both the body and the soul
are necessary conditions for personal identity,239 and consequently the
numerically same bodyand not only a body of the same speciesis
required for the personal identity of the resurrected person. Ultimately,
however, the sameness of the body is explained by the sameness of the
form.240 I will not dwell on this debate here.
Whatever the correct interpretation of Aquinas is, the problem for
medieval authors was how to explain the relation between the matter
wecall the corpse of Christ and the living body of Christ. Any solution to

the whole, Henry 1991, 300. Kilwardby discusses how parts can be predicated of wholes in
DOS XXXI.316 (cf. Dales 1995, 62).
235
In difffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata, Thomas Aquinas, De
ente et essentia, in Opera Omnia, Leonine edition. Rome, 1976, t. 43, c. 2, 371.
236
Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV.81. See also CT 154; ST III, suppl. q.79, a.2. On the evolution
of Aquinas thought on the subject (and his dialogue with Pecham), see Wilson 1998, 423
31. For further analysis of Aquinas position, see Solre 2006, 52658.
237
Stump 2006, 1381. See also Stump 2003, 523.
238
SCG IV.81, 4. Cf. Solre 2006, 516. See also Wippel 2000, 361.
239
Pasnau 2002, 389393. See also Reynolds 1999, 396428; Davies (1992, 218219).
240
Pasnau 2002, 393. Reynolds (1999, 388) argues that, for Aquinas, the identity of the
body in resurrection depends upons recovery of numerically the same matter. The recov-
ery is efffected by divine intervention.
124 human beings

this problem must explain the persistence of the body together with its
same accidental features, i.e. the same height, weight, scars, and so forth.
As such features only inhere in substances, one must ask what is the sub-
stance in which those same accidental features now inhere that once were
possessed by the living body, and how the same accidents move from one
substance to another.
Kilwardby argues in E (especially 1.21) that if something is generated
from nothing it must be corrupted into nothing, and as that which is cor-
rupted into nothing never returns, the body cannot be resurrected.241
Consequently, because the body is not created out of nothing it is not
resolved into nothing. When it is separated from the human soul, it
resolves into cimbolo, in other words matter informed by the form of cor-
poreity and the form of the elements prior to the complexion that results
from their mixture.242
Kilwardby goes back to his theory of composite substances in QLIII1S
10: bodies (corporeal substances) divide into the animated and the non-
animated; the latter further divides into those that are born to be animated
and those that are not. The body that is to become human belongs to the
genus of what is generated to be animated, but is an incomplete individual
without the vivifying presence of the soul as its specific determination.243
The body (and its parts, we are led to conclude) continues to be called a
body even though it is no longer capable of performing the functions it is
supposed to perform when living. When it loses its soul, the dead body
returns to its state of incompletion but remains an individual in its kind, a
corporeal substance.244 Following the principle enunciated above, when

241
Et si hoc, non resurgit idem corpus hominis, quod moritur, E 2, 20. (See above. )
242
In the critical apparatus of the edition, the editor offfers as an alternative reading sue
commixcionis principium, which probably is the meaning Kilwardby wants to convey (40).
This reading agrees with what Kilwardby says in the DOS XXIX.244, 92.48: In omni enim
transmutatione substantiae in substantiam necesse est esse subiectam materiam quae
maneat eadem per substantiam in tota transmutatione, et haec materia est substantia cor-
porea. Non enim fit resolutio nisi usque ad commune symbolum. That the elements or
things made from the elements are the underlying matter in natural change is asserted in
QLIIS 85, 238.78: Omne quod fit de praeiacenti materia, fit de elementis aut de rebus
elementatis. Thomas Aquinas (ST, Supplementum Tertiae Partis, q.80, a.3, respondeo)
talks of cambium as a kind of humidity already in a stage of mixture. Richard Knapweell
uses the notion of symbolic quality (simbolum) to explain the numerical sameness of the
dead body with respect to the living body. See his Quaestio Disputata De Unitate Formae,
ed. Kelley, 67.
243
QLIII1S 10, 50.204.
244
Ad tertium quod sicut corpus quod est natum animari, est genus imperfectum, sic
et corpus hominis mortui est eius individuum. Sed non est propterea nisi individuum
incompletum, QLIII1S 10, 52.5961.
 the soul as una forma viventis 125

something loses a substantial form it is not annihilated, but remains at

least with the dimensions and form of corporeity, a view that Aristotle and
his commentator Averroes supported.245 Therefore, when the soul is sepa-
rated from the body, the body continues to exist because it retains the
form of the body qua body, i.e. the form of corporeity or bodiliness.246
The dead body is then reduced to matter that is common to the elements,
the corporeal substance, and in resurrection it will be restored by divine
intervention in order to be re-united with the soul.247 This is done in an
instant.248 It remains unclear how this secures bodily continuity. As soon
as the body is restored by God, the lower forms return to its acts, but this
again seems to imply that the vegetative and sensitive forms cease to be
and now return into being. This raises a further problem: as the vegetative
and sensitive forms are now created in order to inform the resurrected
body, what continuity is there for the human being prior to death? Whereas
for unitariansthe problem seems to arise from the form of the body, for
a pluralist such as Kilwardby the status of the vegetative and sensitive
forms in the time between the death and resurrection seems to be the real

245
E 1, 21.711.
246
This form is especially relevant to explain how the accidents of the living body
remain in the cadaver. That question is raised by, among others, Richard of Middleton (cf.
De gradu formarum, in Zavalloni 1951, 81), William Ockham (see V. Hirvonen 1999, 43),
Suarz, etc. Ockham develops this point in his Second Quodlibet, question 11, proof 1:
Tamen ad hoc probandum arguo primo sic: motuo homine sive bruto animali, remanent
eadem accidentia numero quae prius; igitur habent idem subiectum numero. () igitur
remanet aliqua forma praecedens, et non sensitiva; igitur corporeitas, Guillelmi de Ockham
Quodlibeta Septem, ed. Joseph C. Wey, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1980, 161
(When a human being or a brute animal dies, numerically the same accidents remain as
were there previously; therefore, they have numerically the same subject. () Therefore,
some form that was there previously remains, and this form is not the sentient soul.
Therefore, it is the corporeity, William of Ockham Quodlibetal Questions (vol. 1: Quodlibets
14), transl. A.J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley, New Haven-London: Yale University Press,
1998, 137). He concludes by arguing that the subject must be the form of corporeity.
247
Et sic homine resurgente, sicut redit corpus in suum actum a suis originalibus racio-
nibus vel a suo cimbolo, sic vegetativa et sensitiva simul redeunt ad suos actus, ut quod
prius factum eram per naturam, reficiatur per graciam eo tempore iussu divino; et quod
tractu temporis fuit generatum, in momento resurgat, E 5, 40.105. Kilwardby offfers, in the
same place, as an alternative solution, that the body is reduced to its original reasons
(raciones originales), which probably are the same as the seminal reasonsmy identifica-
tion is based on the description of these original reasons in the only other place where, as
far I am aware, Kilwardby mentions them, DSF 211. Richard Fishacre (InIIS, d. 17, 343, lines
823) says that the seminal reason of the human body is present in matter, more specifi-
cally in the four elements. It is, however, diffficult to understand how universal forms could
provide an account for the resurrection of the body this human being.
248
Et secundum exemplum Augustini Enchiridion 23 homo potest se ipsum occidere
cum vult, sed non resuscitare, QLIIS 142, 383.489.
126 human beings

diffficulty.249 As Kilwardby offfers no definitive solution to the problem, his

account of the resurrection and of the status of the body of Christ seems
at best shaky.
One point that might help us to understand Kilwardbys view is what he
says about the incorruptibility of bodies after resurrection. His explana-
tion runs as follows. All generable and corruptible things have one form in
act but many hidden (sopite) active potencies in their matter. If these
latent potencies are removed from bodies, all change becomes impossible
and things will remain in their actual form, albeit devoid of their original
function.250 After resurrection God removes them and the bodies remain
incorruptible. Bodies continue to have teeth, a stomach and genitals, but
do not chew, or digest, or procreate,251 and therefore no change can take
place in them.252 The bodies of the glorified do not remain uncorrupted
naturally, but rather do so by divine power.253 Incorruptibility demands a
supernatural cause.254 In QLIII2S 22 Kilwardby considers whether genera-
tive power remains in heaven arguing that a name is imposed on some-
thing due to its essential action:255 the generative power is essentially
directed to the action of generation.256 It remains in heaven even when it
actually does not generate anything, i.e. even when it does not exercise
its operations.257 In other words, generative power remains a power, but is
not generative.258
This does not apply to the bodies of the damned, however, because they
must be physically punished.259 If this punishment is to be efffective the

249
The awareness of that diffficulty is already noticed by Thomas Aquinas, in his In Sent.
IV.44, 1.1, ad 3. Cf. Hughes 1997, 98101.
250
D43Q 26, 29.65660.
251
D43Q 26, 30.6879. QLIII2S 22, 75.2313.
252
D43Q 26, 30.699700: Et ideo nulla mutatio corruptibilitatis eis accidere poterit, nec
ab intra nec ab extra.
253
D43Q 26, 28.6103.
254
D43Q 26, 28.6257.
255
QLIII2S 22, 75.2313.
256
Sed potentia generativa ordinatur essentialiter ad actum generandi et per se, unde
et nomen imponitur, QLIII2S 22, 76.2601.
257
QLIII2S 22, 76.2502.
258
Posteriori modo sic dicendum quod potentia generativa id quod est manebit, secun-
dum tamen quod generativa non manebit, QLIII2S 22, 77.2701.
259
Kilwardby believes in the physical existence of hell, located at the center of earth
with material fire and corporeal punishment. According to Kilwardby the spiritual soul
sufffers from physical fire and the corporeal body be eternally punished by fire, while
remaining undestroyed in the process. All the senses sufffer from this punishment (Ad tac-
tum ergo punientur igne, ad gustum humore sulphureo ignito, ad olfactum fetore sulphu-
ris, ad auditum planctu maledicta exprobatione secum punitorum, D43Q 27, 32.7679).
Human beings perceive physical pain by the reception of the sensible species, as they do in
 the soul as una forma viventis 127

damned must be able to feel, which only happens if the active and passive
qualities of the body still exist. Only Gods power can keep these bodies
uncorrupted,260 even though continuously sufffering punishment by fire.261
In sum, Kilwardby presents a view of the human being that simultane-
ously advocates a pluralism of forms and a dualism of substances.
A human being is composite of a plurality of forms of body parts that con-
stitute a body, and of a plurality of potentiae that together make one soul.
He attempts to justify how the diffferent substantial forms make a unity,
the soul, which is responsible for the operations of that living being, and
how two substancesbody and soulmake the unity that is a person.
The soul has an ordered unity, the body has a unity of aggregation, and the
human person has a substantial unity.262 From a strict Aristotelian per-
spective, these unities fall short as rivals competing with the strong meta-
physical bondthe unity of beingthe body as matter and the soul as
form provide. However, being a (strict) Aristotelian was not the central
concern for many medieval thinkers. From 1250 onward Kilwardby com-
plemented the reading of Aristotle with that of Augustine, and interpreted
the former from the point of view of the latter. Having been called upon to
comment on other readings of Aristotle, he did not refrain from taking
them as philosophically unsound. The next part of the book, especially
section 4.2, will show that Kilwardby does not shy away from criticizing
Aristotle and the Aristotelians.
One of the aims of this book is to show, contrary to the traditional view,
how thoroughly Aristotelian Kilwardby remained throughout his career.
His faithfulness to Aristotle was not surprising in the Parisian period,

this life (D43Q 27, 32.75862: Et quia fides Ecclesie tenet quod ignis ille materialis sit, unde
dicendum extimo quod dampnati in suis corporibus afffligentur et ledentur in igne mate-
riali, et illum sentient atque apprehendent per receptionem speciei sicut fit in hac uita,
licet per modum multo acerbiorem). To this we must add the spiritual dimension of the
punishment, intense pain combined with the anguish of punishment (ex quibus omnibus
infelicissima interioris hominis generabitur angustia; D43Q 27, 33.7757). The eighth article
of 1270 Condemnation says: Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne cor-
poreo, in CUP I.432, 487. (Also in 1277, as number 19, in CUP I.432, 544). See Silva 2007.
260
D43Q 26, 31.7324: Cum tanta moles sit in modica potentia, non sit mirabile si cor-
pus dampnatum, Deo disponente, ad actionem ignis iugiter uaporem et humorem scatu-
riat et numquam consumatur.
261
D43Q 26, 31.70810. More on the punishment by fire in QLIVS 39 (198.1256) and
QLIVS 40 (215.134), where Kilwardby argues for the punishment to be possible even for
the soul stripped of the body, although such is not natural and it requires a divine
intervention.
262
To make use of the insightful distinction made between the senses of unity in Cross
1998, 7.
128 human beings

when he was commenting on his logical works, but some may wonder
at this faithfulness to a certain interpretation of Aristotle in later periods.
His relationship with Aristotle was double-sided: on the one hand he
wanted to understand him as close to the text as possible, as becomes
clear in his logical commentaries, but on the other hand he did not con-
sider it a betrayal to fit his thought into another philosophical tradition,
that of Augustinianismor Kilwardbys understanding of Augustine.
In addition, Kilwardbys theory of the human soul and the human com-
posite was an attempt to integrate the varieties of sources available to him,
a feature he shared with his contemporaries. At the centre of his concerns
were how to promote a pluralist, compositional view of the soul together
with a doctrine that safeguarded the immortality and transcendence of
the intellective soul. I have argued for an interpretation of Kilwardby that
allows for the union between the intellective soul and the sensitive body
to be thought of as essential to both parts of the composite. From the side
of the sensitive body, the intellective soul supervenes as its perfection;
from the side of the intellective soul this unibility is essential and constitu-
tive of its nature. Interestingly, Kilwardby used his pluralism of substantial
forms to soften the dualist current underlying his thought: the principle of
mutual inclination that explains the unity of the soul, and at the same
time states its composite nature, also justifies the unity of the human com-
posite. He strongly argues, both in QLS and in E, against any theory of the
soul that endangers this unity and the compositional nature of the soul. By
doing so and in such an explicit and unequivocal manner, he becomes the
advocate of an alternative view that should be considered on its own mer-
its. This is what I have attempted in the first Part of the present study.
Building on the conclusions put forward in this Part, I shall address in Part
Three what theory Kilwardby was oppositing in the Oxford Prohibitions.
Inow turn to Kilwardbys theory of knowledge.
 PART TWO

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
 CHAPTER FOUR

SENSE PERCEPTION

No account of the human soul is complete without an account of what we

are able to know and how we know what we know. I hence turn in this part
to Kilwardbys theory of knowledge, first to his account of sense percep-
tion and then to intellectual cognition.
Kilwardby discusses the process of sense perception at length in his
work De spiritu fantastico sive de receptione specierum,1 written around
1250.2 I argue that the two main features of his theory of sense perception
are (i) the co-existence of two complementary and to some extent over-
lapping explanatory processes: one is physiological with elements of fac-
ulty psychology; the other, which I will designate as psychological, is
characterized by stressing the active nature of the soul in the process.
Kilwardby places all the explanatory role of perception in the second pro-
cess. Whereas in the first part of DSF he discusses at length how species-
dependent our process of perception is, in the second part he places all
the emphasis on the role of the sensory soul in actively forming an image
of and perceiving the external thing. This leads us to the second (ii) main
feature of his theory of sense perception: his attempt to reconcile the
Aristotelian species-based account of perception with the Augustinian
account stressing the activity of the sensory soul. I will show that Kilwardby
was aware of the diffferences between the two theories, and that he tried to

1
Chenu (1926) called it De spiritu imaginativo, which in view of the nature of the text
seems more appropriate than the later chosen De spiritu fantastico. However, both titles are
acceptable since Kilwardby himself takes phantastica and ymaginatiua as equivalent, at
least, in DSF 1, 151. (The same use is found in John of La Rochelle, Tractatus de divisione,
secunda pars, LIV.1513, 133), and the part phantastica of the soul of Aristotles De anima
(III.9, 432a18-b13), which in Latin was translated as imaginativa. See also Nemesius
of Emesa, De natura hominis, traduction de Burgundio de Pise, eds. G. Verbeke and
J.R. Moncho, Leiden: Brill, 1975, c. 5, 701.) Both John and Nemesius refer to the Augustinian
spiritus as the part of the soul which receives the likenesses of sensible objects ( spiritus,
vis animae quaedam mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur,
Augustine, DGL 12.9.20, which Kilwardby quotes in his DSF 1 (the same sentence appears
in the pseudo-Augustinian On the spirit and the Soul 10. See also QLIIS 37, 119.646; QLIII2S
22.3, 84.6970. For Augustine, see Solre 2006, 70912.
2
Lewry 1983a, 167. Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937, 2, and Hinnebusch 1951, 375, place it
when he was a Master of Arts in Paris (between c. 123745).
132 theory of knowledge

offfer a (fairly original) theory that retained Aristotelian elements explain-

ing how we receive information about the external world, and Augustinian
elements explaining what happens once this information is received.
In that sense, a fair description of the treatise is to be found in Henry O.
Coxes Catalogue of the manuscripts in the Oxford colleges, which states
[A] Philosophical book about the faculties of the soul, especially about
the imaginative, in which the author most often mentioned is
St. Augustine.3 The following section deals in some detail with two pro-
cesses of perception, and section 4.2 examines the way Kilwardby under-
stood and attempted to integrate the theories of Aristotle and Augustine.

4.1.The Two Processes Model

The focus of DSF is on the imaginative part of the soul, which Augustine
called spiritus and philosophers called ymaginativa. This is too vague,
however. In fact, the work addresses four main questions (cf. DSF 105):
(1) Is the imaginative soul endowed from its origin with species or images
of corporeal and sensible things, or does it acquire them later? What
is the origin of our knowledge of sense objects?
(2) In what way are species or images of corporeal and sensible things
acquired by the imagination? How do we perceive?
(3) How does the imagination acquire images of corporeal and sensible
things by means of the senses? What is the effficient cause of sense
perception?
(4) What is the organ of common sense?
Before addressing these questions Kilwardby presents four indisputable
starting points of his theory of sense perception.4 First, of the three poten-
tiae constituting the human soul, two are cognitive, the sensitive and the
intellective and are,5 as already noted, essentially distinct.6 Kilwardby
refers to them as the two parts of the soul (anima), the superior (mens)

3
Liber philosophicus de animae facultatibus, maximum de imaginativa, in quo saepis-
sime citatur S. Augustinus, Henry O. Coxe, Catalogus codicum MSS. qui in collegiis aulisque
Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur, Oxford, 1852, vol. 1, Codices MSS. Collegii Balliolensis, p. 1.
See Chenu 1926, 39.
4
Hec ad euidenciam subsequentium sine disputatione prelibata sint, DSF 4, 56.245.
5
cum non sint nisi due partes anime cognitiue, scilicet sensualis et intellectualis, et
non habemus nisi alteram tantum communem cum bestiis, scilicet sensualem, DSF 87,
74.113. See also QLIII1S 46, 208.401402.
6
Cf. QLIS 61, 175.639; 64, 188; 65, 18991; 66, 1923; 67, 1948.
 sense perception 133

and the inferior (spiritus), the latter being that which we have in common
with other animals.7 He is not consistent in his use of this terminological
distinction, however, and uses spiritus to refer both to the soul as a whole
and to any of its parts;8 in the same way, he sometimes uses anima to refer
only to the mind.9 What is not found is mens applied to the lower part of
the soul, or to the soul as a whole.10
The mind (mens), is the most excellent part of the soul (anima), and is
directed to intelligible objects.11 The sensitive or imaginative is responsible
for the operations of local motion and sensation, and can therefore be
divided into apprehensive power and appetitive power.12 The appetitive
power is the same secundum essenciam as the apprehensive power,13 in
other words it is by means of the same power that one animal perceives an
object, judges it pleasant, and sets in motion the body in order to achieve
its goal.14 The apprehensive power is constituted of the five external senses

7
DSF 2; 85. Our sensory operations are not diffferent from those of the other animals,
except with respect to the relation with the intellect, which is absent in other animals.
However, the diffference in degree does not account for a diffference in kind.
8
A clear example of the wide application of the concept can be found in QLIS 39,
125.4558. Here Kilwardby holds that the term spiritus refers both to something corporeal
(subtilioribus corporibus diaphanis et alia corpora penetrantibus), something incorporeal
(hoc nomen spiritus quoad illud cui nomen imponitur significat substantiam subtilem;
et sic congruit vocabulum omnis substantiae incorporeae), and even applies to God (spiri-
tus ergo isto modo dictus de Deo essentialis terminus est). This is not original with
Kilwardby; cf. Bono 1984, 99: What gave special urgency to these expansions of Galens
modest medical spirits was the philosophical and theological constraint felt by those
Christian Latin authors who wished to create a language embracing both the phenomena
of life and the experience of salvation within a unified conceptual framework.
9
The same uses can be found in Augustine. Cf. ODaly 198694, 3157. See also Chenu
1957, 20912. In this Augustinian perspective, the conception of spiritus as ignis also plays
an important role, acting as vital force whose origin is traced back to the Stoics, and later
popularized in the twelfth century by Hugh of St. Victors De unione corporis et spiritus.
However, Kilwardby uses the term spiritus, in its incorporeal meaning, to refer to the sen-
sitive or imaginative part of the soul (cf. QLIS 35, 90.32831; QLIIS 8, 29.445).
10
Ad tercium dicendum quod mens accipitur semper pro parte racionali et intellec-
tiua, DSF 139, 87.201; and QLIS 64, 188.256: quia mens proprie non dicitur ipsa anima,
sed quod in anima est excellentius.
11
QLIS 64, 1878.236. See also QLIII1S 44, 190.1103 and 125128; QLIII1S 3, 16.7984;
QLIII2S 39, 150.401.
12
DSF 99, 75.34. See also DSF 257; DOS X.48; here the distinction is between the potentia
apprehensiva and the potentia motiva. See Gundissalinus, dA, c.9, 6768. On D43Q 8,
18.2912, Kilwardby distinguishes between the spiritus sensitiuus as responsible for sensa-
tion and the spiritus motiuus as responsible for motion, both having its origin in the brain;
to these, must be added the spiritus vitalis, whose origin is the heart (D43Q 24, 27.580).
13
Item, suppono quod uirtus apprehensiua et ei respondens appetitiua non diffferant
per essentiam, DSF 257, 114.267. See also DSF 284.
14
QLIS 61, 174.5255. In QLIII1S 46 (especially 215216), Kilwardby makes clear how
the potentia sensitiva bears a close relation to the body and its organs with respect to
134 theory of knowledge

and the internal senses, which are common sense, imagination, and mem-
ory.15 In DSF, Kilwardby describes sense perceptions as activities of the
sensory soul, not of the mind.16 He offfers an account of nonrational per-
ception, explaining how we come to know sensible things by means of
the soul we have in common with other animals. Elsewhere he claims that
we are able to engage in intellectual acts about inner objects and sensory
acts directed to external objects without either obstructing the other.17
Sense and the intellect operate in continuous realms, but each part of the
soul is responsible for a definite set of operations. Perception belongs to
the sensory soul without interference from the intellective part. In this
Kilwardby parts company with.18
Second, the sensitive and imaginative parts do not difffer in essence,
only in mode and function:19 the action of the sensitive soul is called
sensitive in the presence of the sensible object, and imaginative in its
absence.20
Third, the body is an instrument of the soul, which is its ruler. The sen-
sory soul knows sensible things through itself and primarily, whereas the
body knows them through the soul.
Fourth, as Kilwardby interprets both Aristotle and Augustine, sensi-
blethings are known insofar as their species, or likenesses, or images, are

appetitive motion: sensory emotions are closely related with, being the cause of, bodily
states, as the motion of the heart. Opposite motions cannot exist at the same time in the
sensory soul because one always dominates the other. In the case of two conflicting afffec-
tions in diffferent potentiae of the soulsensitive and intellectivethey can coexist with
one promoting or resisting to the afffection of the other (QLIII1S 49, 243).
15
DSF 141. For the general presentation of the internal senses, see Wolfson 1935.
16
The suggestion is raised in DSF 86 and answered in DSF 140. See also DSF 109, 79.18
20: intencio animi et spiritus sentiens et acies eius idipsum sunt realiter, quia id quod
animuset dico animum qui communis est nobis et bestiis.
17
QLIII1S 46, 210.45860.
18
For an account of nonrational perception in Augustine, see Brittain 2002. However, in
many places, Augustine explains sense perception by appealing to the notion of animi
intentio, which is an action of the will (DT 11.2.2; see ODaly 2001, 1656). A useful distinc-
tion between the diffferent ways the power of the will is used by Augustine can be found in
Knuuttila 1999c, 210.
19
DSF 2, 556, 26-04. See also DSF 15; and 52, 66.2930. Cf. John of La Rochelle, Tractatus
de divisione multiplici, secunda pars, chap. 49, 125.
20
DSF 2, 56.12; 102. See also 143 and 192. According to Kilwardby (DSF 143), it is the
same image that the sensitive spirit passes on to imagination, and not a diffferent one gen-
erated as it were from the first. This is surprising because in the traditional Augustinian
view (se, e.g., DT 11.5.12) there is a chain of species. See Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones
disputate de fide et de cognitione, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Florence: Quaracchi,
1957, 261; Spruit 1994, 185. See also Steneck 1970, 11.
 sense perception 135

present in the knower.21 Having set out these four theses, he addresses the
first of the four questions that constitute DSF.
The senses are the source of our knowledge of sensible objects.
According to Kilwardby, there is no knowledge of sensible things without
and prior to sense experience,22 and even our intellectual cognition of sen-
sible objects is dependent on data received through the senses.23 Sensible
things are perceived by means of their species or likenesses or images that
are presented to the sense organs,24 in other words we only have access to
extramental sensitive things through the reception, in the organ of the
senses, of the likeness (similitudo) or species of the sensitive thing.25
The object generates something from its nature26a likeness (similitudo),

21
DSF 4. Form means both one of the principles that constitute a substance (the other
being matter) and likeness (QLIVS 42, 227.1157). The form which is the likeness of a thing
is commonly said the species, although Kilwardby points out that it should be rather called
intention of the species (intentio de specie). In nonspecialized terms the species is the last
form of the thing, which delimitates the shape (figura) and the exterior disposition of the
thing (NSLPor 5, M 4rb).
22
Estimo enim partem anime fantasticam siue ymaginariam omnino nudam esse ab
ymaginibus corporalium rerum donec homo usus fuerit sensibus, DSF 23, 5960.35-02. See
also DOS 27.84, 220.257; DSF 6 and 8; QLIS 4, 11.45; QLIII1S 44, 188.602: In nobis autem
qui prius non habemus rerum scientiam quam sentiendo adquiramus.
23
DSF 76, 71.256; 123, 82.289. See also QLIS 62.1, 178.469; QLIIS 37, 119.623: Sed
rationalis humana non recipit imagines corporalium in se ipsa immediate, sed in spiritu
quodam in quo communicamus cum brutis; and QLIII2S 24.3, 84.901: secundum dic-
tum Aristotelis quod intellectus noster omnis oritur ex phantasmate et sensu. The same
idea is found in his NLP: Set omnis intellectiua cognicio fit sic, et causa huius potest esse
quia intellectus humanus copulatus corpori non cognoscit nisi mediante sensu et fantas-
mate, prout dicit Aristotiles quod omnis intellectus rerum ortum habet a sensibus et ex
fantasmatibus, in Lewry 1983a, 9, n.19. The same reference to Aristotle appears in the DSF
26, 61.812: Et de isto genere intelligibilium et de modo intelligendi illud, uidetur agere
Aristotiles in 3 De anima. Dicit enim ibi quod nequaquam sine fantasmate intelligit anima;
et post pauca, Species igitur intellectiuum in fantasmatibus intelligit.
24
DSF 4, 56.1824. See also QLIII1S 44; and QLI 89, 280.70. On the diffference between
imago and similitudo, see QLIIS 77.3, 2112.2838. Similitudo requires formal conformity
(convenientia formalis) of nature between that which generates and that which is gener-
ated, whereas the conformity of imago is natural imitation (convenientia imitationis natu-
ralis), for example, the statue imitates that of which is the statue.
25
DSF 4. See also QILS 35, 83.957: Ergo ipse visus semper gignit suam similitudinem in
se vidente. Ergo est ibi gignens et genitum. Prima propositio sic ostenditur: Visum univer-
saliter assimulat sibi videntem; non enim aliter videretur aliquid. Sed hoc non potest nisi
faciendo in vidente sui similitudinem. Sed sui similitudinem non facit aliunde quam de se,
et non aliter quam per viam naturae; and QLIIS 37, 119.845: Nos enim habemus organum
corporale in quo et per quod suscipimus species corporalium. Only corporeal things can
be sensed: Nichil enim est sensibile nisi quantum et partes habens, neque aliud inuehitur
sensui, DSF 35, 63.145.
26
species sensibilis in organo sentiendi non sit nisi quedam influentia sensibilis,
DSF 58, 68.156 See also QLIS 69, 193.35: Per hoc enim cognoscimus corpora quod de se
136 theory of knowledge

species, image (ymago), or form27 through which it touches, via the

medium, the sense organ.28 The species is first in the medium,29 causing a
change in it,30 and finally it afffects the sense organ.31
Kilwardby was not being particularly original here. In fact, most thir-
teenth-century theories of perception postulate the existence of a mediat-
ing entity called a species as explanatory of the interaction between a
perceiver and an exterior object. Generally speaking, these doctrines posit
that an exterior object generates species endowed with the power to rep-
resent the thing that generated them. Kilwardby seemed to be, at odds
with Grosseteste and Bacon in assuming that it was one and the same spe-
cies that traveled throughout the medium.32 The details of the diffferent
doctrines difffer significantly with respect to the nature of the species and
to the kind of change the sense organ undergoes. It remains highly debat-
able exactly what it means, in this context, to say that we receive the form
of the object without its matter. Another feature of the species doctrine is
that it assumes that cognitive subjects are somehow disposed to receive
these likenesses in such a way as to cognize them.33
Next, Kilwardby discusses and refutes the view, which he attributes
to Boethius (Consolatione 5.4), that the role of the species is to excite
the senses and to lead the soul to search within itself for the species of

gignunt similitudines; and QLIS 89, 279.289: Nos cognoscimus res per aliquid ipsarum
ab ipsis susceptum scilicet per similitudinem ipsorum.
27
DSF 4. On a similar use, see Roger Bacon (Dms I.1, lines 2329).
28
DSF 57.
29
DSF 190.
30
DSF 189. The medium is a body (DOS XVII.122, 49.301). In QLIIS 78, 219 Kilwardby
argues against the possibility of an object to generate an infinite number of likenesses. He
claims that these species are generated into a continuous medium, which is divisible in
potency only; thus, only a finite amount of species can be generated.
31
eadem species primo suscipitur in medio et consequenter in organo sensitivo,
QLIS 61, 173.301.
32
Furthermore, he says that when we see a form or likeness in the mirror, and if the
mirror is broken, the same (in species) form is multiplied in the diffferent pieces of the
broken mirror (sic et de ipsa specie uidebitur quod cum sit una forma et essentia com-
pleta in se, numeratur tamen in materialibus siue in partibus, NSLPor, lectio 5). This is a
highly discussed aspect among the so-called perspectivists (see Lindberg 1967, 3389).
According to Tachau (1988, 4, n.4.), the notion of the species in medio was present in the
works of Kilwardby, as well as Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon and Alexander of Hales and
to give credit to Tachau, Kilwardby was influenced by Grosseteste. Even though he does not
directly refer to him, he could have either read him himself or through Richard Fishacre or
even Richard Rufus of Cornwall. On Grossetestes influence upon Rufus and Fishacre, see
Dales 1971.
33
For an overall view on sensible species, see Smith 1981; Perler 1996; and Simmons
1994.
 sense perception 137

sensible things.34 He strongly objects to this because it implies the exis-

tence of innate species of sense objects to which the soul turns when fac-
ing the external object.35 Accepting it would entail that the soul perceives
two types of species, those exciting the sense organs and those within the
soul.36 This would not only be redundant, it would also question one of
Kilwardbys starting points, that all knowledge of sensible objects must
come through the senses.
Having argued that the soul is completely empty before sensation,37
Kilwardby proceeds to explain in detail the process of acquiring this infor-
mation, which he divides into two moments. First, the species of individ-
ual sensible objects arrive at the organs of the proper senses and afffect
them,38 and second, the images go from the organs of the proper senses to
the organ of common sense.39 However, this account seems to collide with
Augustines position on sense perception, according to which the soul
knows sensible objects in itself (in semetipsa) and from itself (de
semetipsa).40 Here is how the discussion proceeds: in DSF 42 Kilwardby

34
DSF 4 and 2021. See Boethius, Philosophiae consolatio, ed. L. Bieler, Turnhout:
Brepols, 1984, v, metr. 4; and pros. 5, 1567.
35
See DSF 5-ssg. Corporeal vision supplies the intellect with the images of corporeal
things (DSF 31, and 43; in both places Kilwardby refers to Augustines DGL 12.11). One pos-
sible target is William of Auvergne, to whom the soul is active in the perceptual process
because it is excites by the object (cf. dA VII.89). However, Williams theory supposes the
existence of several levels of abstraction, which constitutes a diffferent approach to the
question of the active nature of the soul in perception. But the most probable target of
Kilwardbys criticism is Richard Fishacre who, in his In I Sent., d.3, says the following: Cum
ergo species sensibiles veniunt ad cor, excitatur anima per has ad intuendum species intel-
ligibiles in se ipsa (Long 1968, *31).
36
DSF 22. The same criticism is found in Matthew of Aquasparta (see Rohmer 1928, 164).
37
Ibi enim vult intelligibilium species semper animae esse praesentes quae sunt per-
petuae et immutabiles, et spectant ad visionem intellectualem, sed corporalium imagines
quae spectant ad visionem spiritualem nullo modo animam habere posse nisi per usum
sensuum corporalium, QLIS 62.1, 178.469; also DSF 25, 60.2930: Ymagines uero sensibi-
lium et corporalium rerum non perueniunt ad fantasiam ut uideantur ymaginaria uisione
nisi mediante uisione corporali.
38
DSF 151.
39
DSF 168.
40
Item, si spiritus sensitiuus in se formaret ymagines sensibilium, tunc aut faceret eas
de nichilo, aut de aliquo. () Et quod de se formet illam, concordare uidetur cum uerbo
Augustini I0 libro De Trinitate superius allegato, vbi dixit quod mens conuoluit et rapit yma-
gines corporum factas in semetipsa de semetipsa, DSF 80, 72.218. Also Item, posset dici
quod quando dicit Augustinus anima uel mens facit in semetipsa et de semetipsa similitu-
dines corporum, DSF 134, 86.89. (Cf. Augustine, DT 10.5.7; DGL 12.16.33). Now, whereas
Augustine, in the text quoted by Kilwardby, speaks here of the highest part of the soul, the
mind, Kilwardby speaks here about the sensory soul, which is common to human beings
and the other animals (DSF 85, 109). In DSF, Kilwardby explains sense perception from the
138 theory of knowledge

specifies the three possible causes: (i) the intellect, (ii) the imagination,
and (iii) the body (here taken as either the sensible object or the sense
organ). He quickly dismisses (i) and (ii): (i) because the intellect receives
the images of sensible objects from the sensory soul rather than the other
way around, and because sensing is univocal in human beings and other
animals that do not have a rational part of the soultherefore, the source
of the images must be the same in them; and (ii) because the images must
first be in the sensory soul and only then will the imagination have access
to them because the imagination works only in the absence of the sensible
object. He assigns to (iii) a longer refutation focusing on the existence of
an ontological hierarchy of being in which nothing lower on that scale can
afffect something that is higher on the same scale.41 The object and sense
organ are on the same ontological level in that they can be acted upon and
are made up of contraries;42 therefore, the object can afffect the organ in
that it is proper to the nature of the sense organ to be afffected by the sen-
sible species. I will return to this point later on.
Kilwardby denies that any visual rays emanate from the subject, a view
he attributes to Augustine.43 He brings up the extramission theory of vision
and quickly dismisses it, claiming that the species must come from the
object to the sense organ.44 Let us take the prototypical case of vision

point of view of the sensory soul and its powers, without the appeal to higher cognitive
faculties.
41
Set in mundo maiori ita est quod natura inferioris existentie omnino regitur et pati-
tur a natura superioris existentie et non agit in illam. () Igitur sic erit in homine, vbi cor-
pus est inferioris existentie quam anima et organum sensitiuum quam spiritus ipsum
animans, DSF 56, 678.28-05. See also DSF 60, 68.3033; and QLIIS 160, 445.111112..
Although this conception is Platonic, the same principle can be conciliated with the
Aristotelian principle that the agent is more noble than the patient. Cf. Thomas Aquinas,
ST, Ia, 84, ad.6.
42
Et cum corpus extra sensibile sit eiusdem gradus existencie cum organo, quia
utrumque passibile et ex contrariis conpositum, DSF 56, 68.57.
43
DSF 172175 (Cf. Augustine, DGL 12.16.32; Dqa 23.43). However, Kilwardby claims that
Augustines extramission theory should be understood as meaning only that the spirit,
being luminous, is difffused through the eyes, becoming somehow luminous. In QLIS 89,
278.223, Kilwardby refers to, and immediately refutes the extramission theory ( quod
corporalis fit per emissionem radiorum ad rem loco distantem): we know through the spe-
cies we receive from the things themselves. Kilwardby argues that among animals only cats
have eyes endowed with the power to illuminate the medium (DSF 213). As Lindberg has
pointed out, medieval authors could choose between Euclids and Ptolemys extramission
theory, Epicurs intromission theory, and a combination of both as found in Plato and
Galen. See Lindberg 1967, 321; Hahm 1978, 629 adds still the Stoic theory of the optic
pneuma. John Pechams Tractatus de perspectiva (ed. Lindberg, chapter 4) refers to this
theory but just in order to dismiss it.
44
DSF 151.
 sense perception 139

because it is the noblest sense.45 According to Kilwardby, there are two

objects of sight, light and color: light is the primary object in the sense that
it is light that makes things visible, whereas color is the material object of
vision, the terminusthat which is seen.46 So strong is the connection
between light and color that he takes colour to result from a mixture of the
light from fire and a diaphanous body,47 meaning that color does not have
its own being but is just a mixture of light, which is a species of fire, and a
transparent body.48
Whereas color is perceived directly, light is not perceived by the eye in
its own nature, but only as conjoined with the illuminated object. Light is
then the means by which colored objects are made visible, but is cognized
only reflectively, not by the sensory soul but through a higher judging
capacity. Only the mind is able to discriminate between light and the
object that is made visible through the action of light.49 Thus, here

45
visus est sensus nobilior in se et ad doctrinam utilior, DOS XVIII.126, 501.28-01.
On the relation of vision and perspective, see DOS XI.778, and in particular, whether the
rays of light, irradiating from the object, moves in a straight line or not, see DOS XVII.1212.
On the nobility of the organ of sight, see QLIII2S 22, 72.1056. Cf. Tachau 2006, 910.
46
In visione corporali duplex est obiectum, scilicet lux et color. Et lux est primum
obiectum visus motivum et informativum visus ad videndum et coloris ut videatur. Color
autem est secundum obiectum, non dico secundarium; et est color obiectum materiale
terminans visionem. Unum ergo est motivum et reliquum terminativum, utrumque tamen
obiectum, quia utrumque videtur, sed lux per se ipsam et color per lucem, QLIII2S 5, 18.25
30. See also QLIVS 42, 228.1356. Color inheres in the surface of a bodyLSP 405. The more
far the source of light is, less visible it is (literally, less discerned it can be) because it has
less efffect upon the one seeing (minus efffectus eius scilicet illuminationis est apud videntem;
QLIVS 15, 57.96101). It is important to notice that this passage argues against an extramis-
sion theory of vision. Richard Fishacre (InIIS, d. 17, 345) extends the importance of light
claiming that light is somehow present in all the other sensibles.
47
Color enim fit ex admixtione lucis igneae cum diaphano terminato. Cum enim haec
admiscentur, fit quidam modus lucis essendi qui color dicitur. Per quem modum fit lux
sensui nostro visibilis, quae in se non videretur, QLIIS 68, 190.347. Cf. Averroes,
Compendium Libri Aristotelis De sensu et sensato, 156. See also William of Auvergne, dA
c.7, p.4, 207; and Roger Bacon, Dms pars I, cap. 3, 3941; 545.
48
Si quaeritur in quo genere debet haec qualitas poni, videtur quod color proprie esse
non potest, quia color non nominat nisi esse quod resultat ex luce ignis in diaphano, QLIIS
68, 190.4547, (emphasis added). As K. Tachau has recently pointed out (2006, 30), the
question of colour remains a little studied aspect of medieval theories of perception.
49
Ipsa enim non videtur ab oculo corporali nisi secundum quod illustrat visibilia.
Unde ipsa videtur ut illustrans, ut splendens, ut fulgida, aliquando etiam ut laedens vel
placens vel huiusmodi, et sic per ea quae circumstant naturam lucis, ipsam lucem vide-
mus. Ipsam autem in se omni obiecto circumscripto videre non possumus. Quamvis enim
mente discernamus distincte lumen ab illuminato, tamen oculus corporalis non compre-
hendit ipsum nisi simul cum illo. Et tamen certum est quod oculus lucem videat, quamvis
in collatione tali. Illuminatum enim non videtur nisi per lumen et lumen per se ipsum.
Unde lumen primo videtur et secundo illuminatum, et est lumen causa illuminati ut videa-
tur. Sed e converso illuminatum est occasio luci ut videatur, quia per reflexionem ad ipsum
140 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby is suggesting that color, not light, is the immediate object of

sight, even though colour is perceived only by means of light.
Light is required for the actual vision to take place.50 It makes the
medium appropriated to receive the species of color,51 and it acts upon a
colored object, causing it to generate the species into the medium.52 The
species of color changes the transparent and illuminated medium53 and
the eye.54 The medium must be diaphanous, otherwise the motion of
therays of light is impeded; for instance, there is no light in a vacuum, and
light is reflected when it touches an opaque body.55 In other words, the
sensible object is visible because it is colored, and light activates the visi-
bility of the object: it shines on the object, which causes the species of

vel in ipso videtur. Patet igitur quod lumen videtur ab oculo corporali non in sui natura et
specie propria sicuti est absolute circumscriptis aliis visibilibus, sed in his quae circa natu-
ram sunt, et hoc in collatione cum aliis visibilibus et in eis, QLIII2S 26, 94.191204. The
thesis that colors are not visible without light is found in Alhazens Optics I.6: see Sabra
1978, 163; see Alhacens De aspectibus, ed. Smith, I, chapter 7, 2268. Kilwardby refers
directly to Alhazens Optics in DSF 298, as the auctor Perspectiue in the context of the
description of how the optical nerves connect with the brain. But Kilwardby diverges from
Alhazen in that for Alhazen both light and color are perceived directly (see Lindberg 1967,
323; the same doctrine is found in Avicenna and in Baconsee Tachau 1988, 14).
50
verum est certumque, tamen lumen spiritus sensitivi, qui est in oculo naturaliter
ad videndum preparatus, non potest videre absque lumine ab extra veniente, ut secum
misceatur et naturaliter ei uniatur ad visionem actualem faciendam, E 5, 412.25-03.
51
medium extra per lumen sibi infusum preparatur ad suscepcionem speciei colo-
ris, DSF 191, 100.1921.
52
DOS XVII.119. See also QLIIS 146, 402.756: Ut color recipit dispositionem illumina-
tionis passivae qua iunvatur ad speciei suae irradiationem; and Et ista forma lux [which
comes from the luminous body] est quae adveniens materiae facit esse quoddam et
modum quendam qualitativum in composito quo reddit se visibilem, QLIIS 68, 190.389.
Cf. QLIII2S 63, 270.1534; QLIII2S 22, 75.224; and LSP 405.257. In QLIIS 137 (3601.2934),
Kilwardby compares lux with gratia and color with virtus. Light is the cause and color is the
efffect. Cum enim illuminatur coloratum forinsecus, est ibi illuminatio actio et passio, et
ipsa illuminatio passio est aliqua dispositio et qualitas illuminati, et per hanc illuminationem
potens est color immutare medium et sensum, et non servatur nec manet illa dispositio nisi
ad presentiam illuminantis in actu, QLIIS 138, 369.1826, (italics mine). Also lumen per
se et essentialiter est illuminativum. In QLIS 61, 174.578, Kilwardby distinguishes between
lucere, the absolute action of light with respect to no object and illuminare, which is the
same action but insofar as it afffects (ut respiciens) an object.
53
color immutat diaphanum illuminatum, DSF 153, 91.56. Certain dispositions in
the medium are required (disposiciones requiruntur in medio) in order for this change to
take place, as the light in the case of sight or the air waves in the case of hearing (DSF 191).
See also QLIIS 146, 402.756.
54
Similiter dicitur quod color immutat visum, cum tamen si ponatur immediate super
oculum non videatur, oportet enim quod distet et irradiet a se speciem suam per quam
tangat oculum, et videtur tunc color per speciem suam, DOS VII.25, 19.104 (see following
lines until 20). See also QLIS 68, 190.329.
55
QLIIS 69, 195.106109; 195.115116.
 sense perception 141

color to be brought forth, changing the medium and progressing until it

reaches the sense organs of the perceiver.
The dispositions of the medium, which make change possible, must
also be in the sense organs.56 In the case of sight, Kilwardby claims that
the eye should be somehow luminous.57 Species behave diffferently in the
medium and in the organ.58 The motion in the sense organ is like the
motion of liquid in a vessel (in uas),59 whereas in the medium it is like
the motion into a vessel (ad uas). I take this to mean that species move in
straight lines in the medium, and once in the sense organ they spread
throughout it. In the case of sight, the species of color move in a straight
line.60 Due to this feature, the object must stand directly opposite the eyes
of the perceiver, at a distance (DOS 7.25; DSF 4). The visual intention, or
intention of sight, and the visual species (intentio uisus et species uisibi-
lis) must meet in a suitable matter; we cannot see an object that is behind
or hidden from us.61 (Kilwardby claims that the face of the species must
be turned to the intention of the viewer, and only when they meet fron-
tally can the visible species be apprehended.) The rays of light are not lines
because lines belong to bodies, and light is not a body,62 but they move
in straight lines,63 which can be reflected and broken but not bent.64

56
DSF 191. Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.1, 424b312.
57
DSF 191. In paragraph 171 Kilwardby quotes Augustines De musica (6.5) where he
claims that the instrumental spirit is in a purer state in the eyes, which makes it something
luminous (See also E 5, 412.25-03).
58
DSF 189. Cf. Aristotle, De anima II.711.
59
Ille enim motus in organo est sicut motus liquoris in uase, non ad uas, DSF 189,
99.167. Kilwardby uses that same analogy in the QLIS 138. This is a puzzling remark, and
the meaning it conveys diffficult to assert. I believe, however, that Kilwardby is here refer-
ring to a passage of Alhazens Optics that reads as follows: The sensitive body [i.e. crystal-
line] does not receive the forms in the same way as they are received by transparent bodies.
For the sensitive organ receives these forms and senses them, and the forms go through it
on account of its transparency and on account of the sensitive power that is in it. Therefore
it receives these forms in the manner proper to sensation, whereas transparent bodies
receive them only in the manner proper to transmission without sensing them. And if the
sensitive bodys reception of these forms is not like their reception by non-sensitive transparent
bodies, then the forms do not extend through the sensitive body along the lines required by
transparent bodies, but rather along the extension of the parts of the sensitive body, (my ital-
ics), Optics II.2, transl. Sabra (1978), 1656.
60
DSF 190. See also QLIIS 69, 196.119121. On the concept of spiritual, see Tweedale 1992;
and South 2001.
61
DSF 190, with changes. Cf. QLIS 69, 1956.11529.
62
See QLIIS 67; DOS XVII.122, 49.312, Cf. Averroes, De anima II.70, 237.
63
DOS XVII.123, 50.14; D43Q 2, 12.93 (radii lunares). The thesis of the rectilinear propa-
gation of light seems to be a winning theory already in Late Antiquity (see Hahm 1978, 61).
64
OI 188, 118. This position is found in Alhazens De aspectibus or Perspectiva; see
Lindberg 1967, 324.
142 theory of knowledge

These requirements probably derive from Alhazens optical theory, which

postulates these principles in order to guarantee the effficacity of vision in
locating the object.65
Sense organs are receptive to certain species,66 the proper sensibles,
through their potency.67 Kilwardby describes this change (motus) or afffec-
tion (passio) as a certain resistance.68 The change the sense organ under-
goes must be understood as the fulfillment of its capacity, in other words
the object actualizes the sense organ, whose natural disposition is to
receive sense impressions.69 Sense perception is a passive process in this
sense.
The change caused by the species in the sense organ difffers according
to the species, however. There are two kinds of species that flow from
sense objects and afffect the sense organs: material species, such as of
sound and smell, and spiritual species, such as visual species. The criterion
for this distinction seems to be that a species is spiritual if it is not subject
to the motions of the medium. In the case of sound and smell the species
move in a circular fashion because, as they are material, they are moved by
airwaves.70 On the other hand, Kilwardby describes the species of sensible
things as spiritual lights that are produced from corporeal forms by radia-
tion so that the forms may be revealed.71 Spiritual here must mean a spe-
cial kind of matter, but matter nevertheless; the species of colour are
corporeal entities. It is probably this that Roger Bacon had in mind when
he commented that some called spiritual the existence of the species in
the medium when they meant only that the species were insensible, in
other words they could not be observed in the medium.72 A species is a

65
See Lindberg 1967, 328; see also Smith 1981. On the rectilinear motion of the species,
see DSF 152. The science that studies the rectilinear propagation of the visual rays is per-
spective, by means of which one comes to know the accidents of sight, such as place, dis-
tance and the form of the thing, as well as the accidents of the rays themselves, such as
direction, reflexion, etc. See DOS XIII.77, 36.25.
66
DSF 184. See also DSF 69, 112.
67
DSF 153; and 191 for the required dispositions.
68
DSF 190. This resistance which is qualified as touching is probably a reminiscence of
the material account of certain extramission theories of vision.
69
DSF 5960. DSF 97. This is how Aristotelians would describe it. See also DSF 61.
70
DSF 188. Also DSF 190, 100.79: Et causa horum est quod sonus et odor sunt adeo
materiales quod mouentur pulsu et attractu aeris; set species coloris est adeo spiritualis
quod non mouetur taliter motu aeris. See also DSF 153.
71
species sensibilium non immutant nisi secundum incessum rectilineum, eo quod
sunt lumina spiritualia a corporalibus formis ad sui ostensionem per modum irradiacionis
genita., DSF 152, 90.246.
72
Roger Bacon, Dms III.2, 192; cf. Lindberg, ed., lxvi-vii. See Spruit 1994, 153. This is,
according to Lindberg, the position of both Averroes and Avicenbron. See Averroes,
 sense perception 143

likeness of the thing, not the thing, and does not share with the thing its
physical properties.73 The species of color is not the colored object. This
means that a species has a manner of being diffferent from the thing that
generated it, not that it is immaterial. It is the materiality of the species
that motivated Kilwardbys rejection of the idea that perceptual acts are
caused by the object and its species because of the objects and the spe-
cies ontological inferiority.
I have described thus far what conditions must be met in the medium
and in the sense organs for perception to take place. In addition, it requires
an agent, that which actually perceives. Animals are percipient because
they are animated beings endowed with powers to perceive. To see is an
action of sight.74 We need to distinguish between the bodily organ and the
souls power, in the case of sight, between the eye and vision.
The eye has the power to see, even when it does not see or before seeing.
In the same way, in the embryo there is the power to see, and this is because
there is a material disposition for sight. However, when this material disposi-
tion is removed, it does not have the power of seeing anymore, but only the
aptitude,75 as in a blind man in whom there is not the material disposition
for seeing because the organ is missing. Therefore, the blind man is not said
to be able to see, [but] only that he was born with the capacity for seeing, as
inherent in him is some kind of potency. Whence, inasmuch as some potency
inheres in it, it is said to have aptitude. When there is also material disposi-
tion, it is said to have the power. However, when there is nothing of potency
at all, it has neither potency nor aptitude, the same way as in a dead [being].76

Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. Crawford, II.97, 278.6877; cf.
Sorabji 1991, 237238: Averroes also argues for the diversity of the diffferent sense-processes
as regards their degree of materiality. The being of odour is less spiritual than that of colour,
because it is blown about by winds. See also Thomas Aquinas, A Commentary on Aristotles
De anima, II.14, 216218, for a diffferent understanding of spiritual. On this topic, see South
2001, 221222, nn.1415.
73
sicut etiam in nobis est quod nos intelligimus quantum per speciem non quantam,
et album per speciem non albam et huiusmodi, QLIS 92, 292.134. Also in the NLPA he says
that that which is received in the eye is not colour but the species of colour ( sicut color
non recipitur in visu set species color), 127.1878.
74
Item sicut videre pertinet ad oculum ut ad agentem, et ad lumen ut ad disponentem
medium, et ipsum videre est actio oculi non luminis, QLIS 19, 46.4446.
75
Both in Bonaventure (e.g., C II, dubia 1) and in Aquinas (e.g., ST I, 76, a.1, ad 6), the
term aptitudinem is used as a synonym for inclination (inclinationem).
76
Et vide exemplum. Oculus quando non videt vel antequam videat, habet potentiam
ad videndum. Similiter in embryone est potentia ad videndum, et hoc quia est ibi materia-
lis dispositio ad visum. Quando autem amissa fuerit haec dispositio materialis, non habet
iam potentiam ad videndum, sed tantum aptitudinem, ut in caeco in quo non est disposi-
tio materialis ad videndum, quia deficit organum. Et ideo caecus non dicitur potens videre
sed tantum aptus natus ut videat, quia aliquid potentiae inest. Quamdiu ergo aliquid
144 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby distinguishes between having the disposition and having the

aptitude for sight. The natural disposition for seeing depends upon the
material dispositionthe existence of the organwhereas the natural
aptitude exists even in the absence of the material disposition, given that
we are the kind of beings (animals) that have a natural ability to see.
A blind animal is born with the aptitude for seeing because it has the
power of the soul that is responsible for seeing, but it does not see77
because it lacks the material disposition (the organ).78 In the absence of
the material disposition the aptitude for the operation remains.79 In the
disembodied state the sensitive potentia retains its sensory capacity but
cannot sense because it does not have the sense organs through which to
make contact with the external world.80 Aptitude here means incomplete
potentiality,81 or privation, because it is proper to the species to have the
disposition (habitus) for seeing.82 Blindness (caecitas) is defined as priva-
tion of sight. It is not the absence of the capacity to see, but the absence of
the possibility of exercizing the act of seeing.83 To put it more simply, apti-
tude (potentia visiva) + material disposition = the power to see (potentia
completa ad visum). Only a dead animal lacks both the disposition and
the aptitude.
Kilwardbys view of the physical side of perception can be summarized
as follows. An object generates a species, which changes the medium and

potentiae inest, dicitur habere aptitudinem. Cum autem inest etiam dispositio materialis,
dicitur habere potentiam. Quando autem nihil omnino potentiae, nec habet potentiam
nec aptitudinem, sicut in mortuo, QLIIS 91, 253.3444.
77
dico caecum esse quod est aptum natum videre non videns, NSLP 17, 133.26.
See also QLIS 95, 301.
78
Oculus enim caecatus in iuventute aptus natus est videre, nec est ibi potentia com-
pleta ad visum, sed aliquid de illa cum defectu, quia est ibi potentia animae visiva, sed
desunt ei materiales dispositiones organi, DOS XLVII.429, 149.125.
79
NSLP 17, 133.34.
80
QLIII1S 46, 203.2704.
81
Aptitudo enim dicitur hic incompleta potentia, DOS XLVII.429, 149.12. Kilwardby
distinguishes here between the esse actuale, the esse potentiale (when something has the
principles to be actualized) and the esse aptitudinis.
82
intellige quod non loquitur de habitu nisi de illo qui intraneus est rei qui ad subs-
tantiam et essentiam rei pertinet, qui dum est res, secundum speciem est, NSLP 17, 132.26
8. See also QLIS 59, 168.847: Et haec qualitas non est habitus vel dispositio aliunde
adquisita, sed concomitatur esse rei. Verbi gratia in organo visivo est potentia videndi quae
est aliquid de veritate rei, quia est aliquid animae sensitivae. See also QLIS 93, 295.36:
privatio non est nisi in debente habere habitum. Privation is not nothing (E 3, 30
1.26-03). The habitus is always prior in nature to the privation (NSLP 17, 131.9). On a similar
analysis, see Thomas Aquinas, De principiis naturae 2, 40, 3033.
83
NSLP 17, 131.02. Cf. Aristotle, Categories 10, 12b21. On Kilwardby on privation, see
Marmo 2003, 99.
 sense perception 145

the sense organ. The result of this motion is the impression of the sensible
species in the sense organ,84 which remains in it as long as it is externally
influenced.85 The sense organ is receptive to the species through an appro-
priate disposition.
Now, as the sense organs receive their own proper sensibles (as well as
common and accidental sensibles),86 there must be in the sensory soul a
power that is responsible for know[ing] and distinguish[ing] all the indi-
vidual sensible things [while still present].87 This power is the common
sense, the organ of which is located in the brain and in the heart (see
section 4.3), to which the organs of all the proper senses are connected.88
In order to explain how the species that are received in the sense organs
are transmitted to the common sense, Kilwardby offfers two (partially
overlapping) accounts, one physiological and the other psychological. Let
us begin with the former.
The corporeal spirit is responsible for this carrying of the species
received in the sense organs to the organ of the common sense.89 This cor-
poreal spirit is made of subtle materials such as fire and air, and is almost
invisible.90 It is divided into vital spirit, which is generated in the heart,

84
Et hec non est nisi impressio similitudinis obiecto in ipso organo facta, DSF 103,
77.212. See also DSF 967.
85
DSF 194. The sense organ is not suited, by its nature, to retain the species for long.
Using Augustines image in DT 11.2.3, Kilwardby claims that the form of the object only
remains in the water while the object is present, impressing the form in the surface (DSF
198; QLIIS 138, 36869.17390).
86
DSF 32. Each sense has its set of proper sensible qualities, as sweet to taste and heat
to touch (NSLP 13, 96.46).
87
OI 154, 110 ( sic sensus communis est simul omnia cognoscere et discernere, DSF
154, 91.189). On proper, common, and accidental sensibles, see DSF 32. In Aristotle, the
common sense, apart from making a unity from the common sensible determina-
tions(such as movement, figure, etc) that arise, undefined, to the several proper senses,
perform the role of being the conscience of sensation, of sensing the sensing (Cf. De
anima, II.6).
88
DSF 156.
89
DSF 184. See the introduction to the topic of the relation between the medical spirits
and the soul (or, what he calls the language of theology and the Galenic language of life)
in Bono 1984.
90
Si quis requirit hic cuiusmodi corpus est iste spiritus qui est per se et primum instru-
mentum animae, <dicendum> quod sit corpus compositum ex quattuor elementis ita
quod ex subtilissimis eorum partibus et summe defecatis, adeo ut non sit iste spiritus cor-
pus per se uisibile. DSF 174, 95.314; see also 176, 179, 180. Cf. Pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu
et anima, PL 40, I.33, 8023. See also Hugh of St. Victors De unione spiritus et corporis, 884
5. A clear introduction to the doctrine of the spirits in the Latin West can be found in
Knuuttila 2004, 2128. For an historical survey of the early use of the concept, see Harvey
1975, 48; and Burton 1916, 390413.
146 theory of knowledge

and animal spirit, which is made in the brain from the purified vital spirit,91
and is spread in the body through a neural system, as Avicenna posits.92
Kilwardby adopts Costa ben Lucas two-spirit scheme (vital and animal)
rather than the Galenic three spirits (psychic or animal, vital, and natu-
ral).93 The brain is connected to all the sense organs.94 Kilwardby calls the
whole of this physiological mechanism the organ of sense. It includes the
organs of the proper senses, the nerves connecting these sensory organs to
the ventricles of the brain and the heart, and the corporeal spirit. The cor-
poreal spirit is the organ of sense in a primary meaning, whereas the
organs, nerves and ventricles are the organ of sense in a secondary mean-
ing.95 Therefore, when it is said that the organ of sense receives the species
or likenesses of sensible objects, it refers primarily to the reception of
these species by the corporeal sensitive spirit.96
The corporeal (sensitive) spirit does not act by itself; it is rather the
instrument of the sensory soul to control the body.97 The soul acts upon
the body as its rector and artifex.98 Here Kilwardby introduces the distinc-
tion between the incorporeal vivifying sensitive spirit (spiritus sensitivus

91
Hec quoque hic adiciendum est quod cum medici distinguant spiritum corporeum
per uitalem et animalem, quorum secundum eos uitalis generatur in corde et est adhuc
ineptus ad sensificandum corpus et ad mouendum secundum quod huiusmodi, set anima-
lis generatur in cerebro de uitali et ex tunc operatur spiritus sensum et motum, potest
eciam istud aptari premisse sententie Aristotilis, DSF 270, 119.16. See also DSF 239; and
QLIIS 70, 199.5561: Spiritus humanus est immediatus rector corporis humani. Iste spiritus
primo generatur in corde, et inde magis depuratus ascendit ad cerebrum ubi adhuc magis
digeritur et purgatur. Primo igitur in corde habuit esse imperfectum et tunc motu recto
ascendit ad cerebrum ubi haberet esse perfectius. Nunc autem cum in cerebro perfectus
est, non rectum motum habet sed circularem, movens scilicet ad omnia membra corporis
ad sensificandum et vivificandum ea.
92
Notandum igitur quod secundum auctores qui de illis loquuntur, animal sentit per
quosdam neruos continentes spiritum quemdam corporalem subtilem ualde, qui est
immediatum instrumentum anime. DSF 168, 94.136.
93
For Costa ben Luca, see Wilcox 1985, 578; for Galen, see Rocca 2003, 20137.
94
DSF 185. I deal with this example later on.
95
Ex hiis patet quod instrumentum sensus dupliciter accipi potest. Tamen quod per
se et primo tale est, corpus quoddam subtile est, per quod anima uiuificat et mouet corpus
et sensificat, DSF 173. Also Spiritus autem ipse est per se et primum [sentiendi], DSF 168,
94.201.
96
DSF 173.
97
per huiusmodi corpus agit anima et administrat grossum et ponderosum corpus,
DSF 174, 96.45. See also DSF 168, 94.136; 179, 217; and QLIII1S 6, 30.3941. Broadie trans-
lates spiritus with soul. I think this is terribly misleading because it overlooks the essential
distinction between corporeal and immaterial accounts of Kilwardbys theory. Furthermore,
it leads to strange notions as the corporeal soul (rendering spiritus corporeus, DSF 179,
191). The corporeal spirit (spiritus corporeus) is a technical term of medieval psychology
and should be dealt appropriatedely (see Chenu 1957).
98
DSF 3. Cf. Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 21.3.
 sense perception 147

vivificans, the sensitive or sensory soul) and the corporeal vivified sensi-
tive spirit (spiritus corporeus vivificatus).99 The organs of the senses are
vivified by the sensitive soul through the corporeal spirit as an instru-
ment.100 The soul operates through its organs,101 but the organs are not the
soul because their nature is diffferent:102 the sensory soul is a form and the
organ is a part of the body.103 The existence of the mediatory corporeal
spirit is necessary because of the ontological distance between the spiri-
tual soul and the body.104 Perception and locomotion are thus explained
through the interaction between these two spirits.
Once species have been received in a sense organ they are carried by
the corporeal sensitive spirit, through a corporeal pathway, up to the fron-
tal ventricles of the brain, which is the seat of imagination and common
sense.105 At this stage, Kilwardby introduces the faculties of the sensory

99
Ex hiis patet quod duplex est spiritus in animali: vnus corporeus qui mouetur et
uiuificatur; alius incorporeus qui mouet et uiuificat. DSF 182, 97.178. (From these points
it is obvious that there are two souls in an animal. There is a corporeal soul which is moved
and is vitalized, and there is another, incorporeal which causes motion and vitalizes, OI
116). See also DSF 185. Spirit signifies both an incorporeal substance and a very subtle cor-
poreal body (and isto modo accipiendo distinguitur spiritus in l. Augustini De Trinitate
XIV c. 35 et Super Genesim ad litteram l. XII c. 13 et in libro De spiritu et anima c. 8, QLIS 39,
125.557). The corporeal spirit moves the body and is moved by the sensory soul (DSF 179).
In the same way, the sensory soul (anima sensibilis) both moves the body through the
instrumental bodily spirit and is moved by the rational soul (anima rationali). Cf. NLPA
125.1035. Later authors seem to have associated the corporeal spirit and the sensory soul;
see Casini 2006, 7778, n. 245 for references.
100
DSF 168, 94.157.
101
Kilwardbys theory of brain ventricles (DSF 169) is based on Costa ben Lucas De dif-
ferentia animae et spiritus (although he does mention the existence of the vermis which,
according to Costa, is responsible to control the spirit in the brain) and Avicennas Liber de
anima seu Sextus de naturalibus (cf. DSF 152). See also Augustines DGL VII.18.24 (cf. DSF
220) and pseudo-Augustines De spiritu et anima 22 (DSF 221; with the diffference that here
the frontal ventricle is for sensation and the one in the rear is for motion; cf. PL 40, c. 22,
795): the two ventricles in the front of the brain are for the common sense and imagination,
the ventricle in the rear is for memory and the one in the central part of the brain is the
rational chamber (DSF 201, 103.246: Et forte ideo ponuntur due cellule in anteriori parte
cerebri ut una sensui communi deseruiat et altera ymaginacioni). The same scheme can
be found in Nemesius of Emesas De natura hominis, c. 5, 71; c. 7, 81; c. 12, 89.
102
Cf. Augustine, DGL 7.18.24; 20.26.
103
nota quod spiritus sensitiuus, eo quod forma est, DSF 99, 75.323.
104
Et hoc est quia dictorum extremorum tanta est distancia in spiritualitate et corpora-
litate quod non sunt nata coniungi ad cognicionem faciendam et suscipiendam nisi per
dicta media, DSF 140, 88.47. However, this account seems to be a later development, since
in LSP Kilwardby accepts the action of the body on the soul in perception: the soul acts by
means of the body and is acted upon by means of the body (LSP, 401.267). See Hugh of
St. Victor, De unione de spiritus et corporis, 25, 883.
105
Et forte ideo ponuntur due cellule in anteriori parte cerebri ut una sensui communi
deseruiat et altera ymaginacioni., DSF 201, 103.246. The identification of common sense
148 theory of knowledge

soul. Imagination is substantially the same power as the common sense.106

When the common sense receives images from the proper senses it pro-
duces its judgements concerning what is received.107 For instance, the
common sense can judge that what is white is not sweet, discerning what
was received through diffferent senses.108 These images are kept by the
power of memory, the chamber (ventricle) of which in the brain is said to
be a repository of forms.109 Memory is also responsible for perceiving con-
tinuity: for example, when our ears are afffected by an utterance, the unity
of the percept is guaranteed by the power of memory.110 Memory displays
the images to imagination.111 After the act of sensing, in the absence of the
sensible thing outside, memory presents the selfsame sensed image to
the imagination.112 However, the imagination is not restricted to imagining
the objects that have been perceived; it can, in fact, compose images of
non-existent objects from the images it receives from memory. The ele-
ments of these images must come from the senses because if noth-
ing similar was apprehended by the senses it cannot be imagined.113
Imagination is the intermediate power between the senses and the intel-
lect, and gives to the intellect images of corporeal things.114

and imagination is held by Aristotle (De memoria 1.1, 450a12), Richard Rufus, and Bacon.
Also by Avicenna, and transmitted by John of La Rochelle, Tractatus de divisione, II.3, 73:
Item nota quod Auicenna quandoque accipit sensum communem, fantasiam, ymagina-
tionem pro eodem, quandoque distinguit; et hoc est, quia sensus communis, fantasia et
ymaginatio eadem sunt potentia secundum substantiam, diffferunt tamen secundum
rationem. See Avicenna, LdA I.5, 879; Harvey 1975, 234.
106
DSF 285, 122.302.
107
OI 280, 140 (Cum hoc autem concomitatum est quod per organum fiat opus commu-
nis sensitiue, quod est omnia sensibilia recipere et de receptis iudicare, DSF 280,
121.124).
108
QLIS 91, 291.4345.
109
formarum reposicionem, DSF 199, 103.11.
110
DSF 64, referring to Augustines DM 6.5.10. See also DGL 12.11.22.
111
DSF 206; and DSF 207, 105.1921: Ymaginacio autem sine memoria esse non potest,
quia ymaginacio est rei sensibilis absentis ymaginis intra per memoriam representate
contemplatio.
112
DSF 192; see also 142. For Kilwardby, imagination is another name for fantasy (cf. DSF
151, 90.15; 193, 101.6). Imagination is a motion from the actual sensing (fantasia est motus
factus a sensu secundum actum), as already defined by Aristotle in the De anima (III.3;
DSF 32).
113
OI 24, 76. (Si autem nichil simile fuerit sensu conceptum, non continget illud imagi-
nari, DSF 24, 60.134.)
114
DSF 2, 56.45; 25; 36, 63.301. Imagination as the intermediate between sense and
intellect is a common feature both of the Peripatetic tradition as well as of some works
influenced by Augustine as the De spiritu et anima and Isaac of Stellas Epistola. Cf. Wood
2007, 2728. See Isaac of Stella, Epistola de anima, PL 194, 187590; transl. McGinn 1977,
15377.
 sense perception 149

It is remarkable how little attention Kilwardby pays to accounts of the

soul from the perspective of its powers and operations. Instead, for the
most part in DSF he explains perception by means of the sensory soul
(or the incorporeal sensitive spirit) and its acts, with no partition into
powers. One wonders what this faculty psychology-based explanation
contributed to his view of perception. For instance, he states at some point
that memory must go to its chamber or ventricle in the brain in order to
remember.115 This fits in with traditional conception of memory as the
storehouse or repository of images, but if the sensory soul is wholly in
every part of the body, what need is there to perform its operations in a
specific part of the body? The explanation seems devoid of any real
explanatory value, and his account of faculties is more illustrative than
explanatory. This is not a problem that is exclusive to Kilwardby, but he is
a clear example of it. He fails to fully integrate the faculties of the sen-
sorysoul (and the common doctrine of ventricular localisation) into his
theory of perception as they seem to hang around, attached to his true
theory, based on the doings of the sensory soul considered as a whole.
Finally, it could be said that Kilwardby presents a very sparse scheme of
the internal senses or powers of the sensory soul in comparison with sim-
ilar schemes devised by his contemporaries, influenced by Avicennas De
anima. In this respect he seems closer to the 12th century and the monas-
tic treatises on the soul than to his own time.
The only time the powers of imagination, common sense and memory
seem integrated and play an explanatory role is in connection with appeti-
tive motion and the interaction between the soul and the body in desire.
Imagination, after considering the image of the object, moves the body in
accordance with the pursuit or avoidance of what it desires or wants to
avoid.116 The soul avoids or pursues things that are unpleasant or pleasant
to itself,117 and the motion of desire requires the perception of the present
species itself in an actual imaginative act.118 Imagination contemplates

115
DSF 199.
116
Quia enim impetus ad mouendum ab ymaginacione procedit, DSF 284, 122.223;
and eciam mouet secundum quod in appetendo afffecta est, DSF 284, 122.15. See also
QLIII1S 46, 215.6246.
117
Anima indiget pro sui salute prosequi sibi comoda, uel querere cum non sint presen-
tia, et fugere nociua et aduersa eciam antequam sint presentia. Sec hoc non potest nisi per
motum processiuum. Motus autem talis non procedit nisi ex appetitu. Appetitus autem
non est sine ymaginacione appetibilis uel fugibilis, DSF 207, 105.149. See also QLIS 62,
179.5960.
118
Tunc enim mouetur animal appetendo quando actualiter ymaginatur rem appetibi-
lem, DSF 209, 105.2829. Kilwardby posits no estimation faculty as found in Avicenna and
150 theory of knowledge

the desired thing distinctly and separately,119 and how to get it (DSF 209
10). It is the same power that first sees the image, then desires and finally
moves through the heat and the corporeal spirit.120
Kilwardby apparently believed that this account of what happens once
the species has been received by the sense organs was not suffficient, leav-
ing unexplained how the form of a material object comes to be in the
spiritual soul. In order to explain it, he introduces a second account of
perception (paragraphs 182 to 218 of the DSF), which partially overlaps
with the first, as he acknowledges (DSF 1845).
According to this second process, the sensory soul is in a permanent
state of tension, paying attention to everything that happens to the body.
When an exterior object afffects the sense organ, the soul must move it in
accordance with the ways in which it has been afffected.121 This movement
is needed in order to protect the sense organ, which can be injured and
destroyed by an excess of light, for instance.122
The reception of the species in the sense organ is followed by the
counter-motion of the soul, which reacts to the afffection of the sense
organ.123
When the sense organ is afffected, i.e. undergoes a change caused by the
object, the soul immediately reacts to this bodily change and by the action
of the sensory soul attending to its sense organ there is formed in the sensory
soul an image of a sensible thing by means of which that sensible thing is
sensed (DSF 112, transl. Broadie).

makes no use of the concept of intention in this context. In this sense, Kilwardby could be
understood as siding with Averroes, but the Dominican does not attribute any retentive
function to imagination. On the diffference between Avicenna and Averroes, see Black
2000.
119
Whether this also works in this way in other animals, Kilwardby is less certain: Et
forte in brutis est aliquid simile, licet nobis occultum, DSF 210, 106.1920
120
Et quia appetitiua indiget uigore faciendi impetum et mouendi animal, quod non fit
nisi per calorem multum et spiritus fortes, DSF 284, 122.1820. See also QLIII1S 46,
215.624626.
121
Cum anima diuersimode moueat suum corpus secundum diuersitatem passionem
eius, diuersimode tunc mouebit spiritus sensitiuus instrumentum sensitiuum secundum
quod illud diuersimode affficitur, DSF 100, 76.125.
122
pro eo quod corpus coruptibile est et lesibile, DSF 101, 76.25. This is probably the
best way to read Augustine as well; I therefore disagree with Caston 2001, to whom the
selective nature of attention (intentio) is justified by pre-existing knowledge. This would be
true if for Augustine the goal of attention was the cognition of sensible things; but it seems
to be the wellbeing of the animal. Therefore, the stimuli are selected according to their
importance for the preservation of this wellbeingit is not hence necessary that having
an intentio implies that we already have some intentional contents, as Caston (42) argues.
See also Brittain 2002.
123
DSF 112, 79.306. Cf. Augustine, DM 6.5.15.
 sense perception 151

During this motion the soul makes itself similar to the species impressed
in the sense organ,124 resulting in the formation of an image or likeness
(similitudo) of the sensible thing.125 The image is formed in the soul by the
soul (DSF 120).
And if you ask what is the species or the image of the thing in the soul
according to Augustine, it seems that it should be said to be nothing but the
soul or mind or spirit, which is assimilated to the exterior thing known. And
this coming to be like the corporeal objects happens through assimilation
and conformation with the afffection, which is made in the sense organ by
the sensed thing.126
Sense perception is the result of the souls assimilation into the bodily
change. According to Kilwardby, the image or likeness of the object is not
the species received in the sense organ but the image made by the souls
motion in likeness of the said species:
Since, therefore, sensing is nothing but a more attentive motion of the soul
directed towards passivities of the body, a motion which is not concealed
from it, as we learn earlier in the same book [Augustines De musica VI],
chapter 14, the only things which seem to be transmitted to the memory from
sense are motions or impulses of the soul which the soul produces in the
directions of the passivities of the body when it senses. Aristotle also seems
to mean this when he says that a fantasy is a motion made by sense when in
act. (DSF 150, transl. Broadie, italics in the original)
The soul does not perceive the change of the sense organ but the motion
or impulse (motus uel impetus) of the soul towards the change of the sense
organ.127 In order to clarify this point, Kilwardby refers to Averroes dual

124
anima penetrans et regens corpus atque se cum specie reperta ibi conuoluens,
sibi speciem imprimit per illam cum qua se conuoluit, DSF 121, 82.179.
125
Cum primo tangitur spiritus corporeus uiuificatus a specie sensibili sibi intromissa
in extremo sui respiciente exterius, statim, in eodem instanti occurens, spiritus sensitiuus
uiuificans passioni corporis conuoluit se cum illa et in se format speciem similem, DSF 185,
98.137. See also DSF 166, 93.2931: Quando enim anima occurrit sua actione passioni cor-
poris, mouet corpus et se applicat uel conuoluit cum ymagine qua passum est corpus, et
per huiusmodi motum aquirit sibi similitudinem rei sensibilis.; and DSF 121, 82.179.
Broadie translates conuoluendo as co-mingling; however, I prefer the term involving
because to mingle seems to imply a misture between the sensory soul and the species,
which are of diffferent natures, and that Kilwardby wants to avoid.
126
Et si forte quaeris quid est species vel imago rei in anima secundum ipsum, videtur
dicendum quod nihil aliud sit nisi anima vel mens vel spiritus assimulatus rei extra cognos-
cibili. Et haec forte assimulatio erga corporalia est per assimulationem et conformationem
passioni factae in organo sensus a re sensata, QLIS 68, 202.10912. See Brown 1999, 240.
My attention was brought to this passage by Brown 1996, 35169.
127
DSF 103, 77.156. See also 150 90.35; QLIS 4, 12.2835; QLIS 68, 203.13543; and
QLIII2S 38.4, 145.734.
152 theory of knowledge

consideration of motion:128 motion could be considered as that which is

acquired by means of the process, or as the process itself.129 In the former
sense the image is the result of the process; it is the likeness acquired
through the motion of the soul. In the latter it is one and the same as the
activity of the soul, in other words the souls becoming like the species of
the sense object received in the sense organs. In any case, it is the souls
becoming like the impression of the likeness of the object upon the sense
organ, rather than the bodys action on the soul.130 The soul does not
receive any image from the body, but makes it in itself and from itself. 131
The image is made by the souls power and out of its own substance.132
Kilwardby points out the potential objection that the two expressions,
in itself and from itself, are contradictory because the same thing would
be a substance and an accident:133 either an image exists in the soul and is
an accident or it is made from the soul and is a substance.134 In response he
states that from does not refer to matter but to the natural power of the
soul to make in and from itself images of sensible things;135 and second,
images can be considered materially from the point of view of the matter

128
Quando enim anima occurrit sua actione passioni corporis, mouet corpus et se
applicat uel conuoluit cum ymagine qua passum est corpus, et per huiusmodi motum
acquirit sibi similitudinem rei sensibilis, DSF 166, 93.2931. See also DT 65: Sed localiter
moveri, sicut dici Averroes, est duobus modis: movetur enim localiter qua transit de uno
loco ad alium, et hoc est mutare locum non secundum subjectum; vel quia aliter est nunc
quam prius et posterius in eodem loco, et hoc est mutare locum non secundum subjectum,
sed formaliter. See also E 3, 30.27.
129
Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, book 3, comment 4; and book 5, comment 9.
See Trifogli 2000, 4751.
130
DSF 103. As Kilwardby points out in DSF 198, the sensory soul is able to assimilate
itself to the (image of the) object, in the same way it is able to act upon the corporeal spirit.
The object is perceived only through the actions of assimilation and conformation (
quia necesse est videntem conformari viso et assimulari, QLIII2S 24, 84.656). See also
QLIS 68, 203.135143, and QLIS 35, 845.15275.
131
DSF 54. See also DSF 56, 678.28-05;102, 77.23.
132
Item, si spiritus sensitiuus in se formaret ymagines sensibilium, tunc aut faceret eas
de nichilo, aut de aliquo. () Et quod de se formet illam, concordare uidetur cum uerbo
Augustini I0 libro De Trinitate superius allegato, vbi dixit quod mens conuoluit et rapit yma-
gines corporum factas in semetipsa de semetipsa, DSF 80, 72.216; and DSF 134, 86.89:
Item, posset dici quod quod dicit Augustinus anima uel mens facit in semetipsa et de seme-
tipsa similitudines corporum. Cf. Augustine, DT 10.5.7. For the Augustinian character of
the terminology, see Silva 2008.
133
DSF 81. See also DSF 93. DSF 8486 brings forward arguments from Augustine for the
images to be made by the mind and not by the part of the soul which we have in common
with the other animals. In DSF 8893 he presents the arguments for the images as sub-
stances. In DSF 9496 there are the arguments for the images as accidents.
134
DSF 80, 82.
135
DSF 134.
 sense perception 153

from which they are made, and formally from the point of view of the mat-
ter in which they exist.136 In the first case, given that the soul is a substance
and the formation of the image is the motion of the soul assimilating itself
to the species of the sensible thing received in the sense organ, the image
is a substance. The soul makes itself like the sensible thing and becomes
like the sensible thing.137 In the second case, however, as a form, the image
is an accident because an image or likeness exists in relation to some-
thing,and as such it inheres in a subject, the soul.138
Thus Kilwardby distinguishes between the soul as the effficient cause
of the image of the external thing and the change in the sense organ as the
necessary but insuffficient condition:139
The image in the organ, or the organ informed by the image, is a necessary
condition of the image coming to exist in the sentient soul, but it is not the
effficient cause. The action of the sensible thing or its image does not rise
beyond the limits of corporeal nature, but once it has reached the innermost
part of the sense organ, it stays there. On the other hand the sensory soul,
which presides over the sense organ, and is directed towards its passivities
while it flows more attentively into the organ which has been thus afffected,
penetrates it through and through, co-mingles with the spiritual image and
assimilates itself to it. (DSF 103, transl. Broadie, with changes)
The soul is an effficient cause per se, and the object an effficient cause per
accidens. The action of the sensible thing afffecting the sense organ is just
the necessary occasion (occasio necessaria), or effficient cause per acci-
dens, for perception.140 The object must be present otherwise the sensory

136
Sic ergo facit ymagines corporum in se et de se: in se, si formaliter considerentur; de
se, si materialiter, DSF 135, 86.278.
137
DSF 138.
138
Ad questionem que postea querebatur occasione uerborum Augustini, scilicet
utrum ymago rei sensibilis in spiritu sit substancia uel accidens, iam faciliter potest res-
ponderi ex premissis. Si enim accipiatur materialiter, substantia est; si formaliter, accidens.
() ymago accepta pro anima assimilata rei sensibili substancia est; ipsa tamen accepta
pro assimilacione, que non est nisi respectus et relacio, accidens est, DSF 142, 88.1825. See
also DSF 94. The discussion on the soul as forming in and from itself the images of sensible
things, and the ontological nature of the images, that is, whether they are substances or
accidents, takes place from paragraphs 88 to 96, and from 134 to 142. As an accident, the
likeness of the sensible thing in the soul has a diminished being with respect to the sub-
stance of the thing (cf. DSF 96).
139
DSF 63.
140
DSF 117, 801.323; 123, 83.25. See also DSF 123. The idea that the senses provide the
occasion to arouse the mind to form the images of sensible objects can be found in William
of Auvergne, De universo II.2.74. The active nature of the cognitive faculties in William is
pointed out by Marrone 1983, especially 5863. Tachau (1988, 42, n.46; 50, n.72) has argued
the influence on this aspect of William over Olivi. I believe the influence could be also
extended to Kilwardby.
154 theory of knowledge

soul would be able to produce at will any image, even in the absence of any
external object.141 Moreover, the object is the necessary condition, the
causa sine qua non, for perception.142
It should be said that cognition, whether intellectual or sensitive, is caused
by sensible things as by a causa sine qua non, not as by a cause which princi-
pally and essentially is an effficient cause of cognition and informs the soul,
but as by a necessary instrument or a necessary occasion. For the art of the
artificer is essentially the cause of the statue, but the adze is the accidental
cause as the necessary instrument by means of which the art is exercised.
Likewise, the soul going out to meet the passivities of the body is essentially the
cause of cognition; the sensible things and the sense organ are an accidental
cause like an instrument or instruments used by the mind in order to become
informed. (DSF 123, transl. Broadie, with changes, emphasis added)
The attention of the soul, as well as its capacity for making itself similar to
the species, is the cause of perception.143 Having made this point clear,
Kilwardby proceeds to the next stage of the perceptual process. The
becoming like the object, in other words the formation of the image by
the sensory soul, is not yet perceiving. Perception demands that
the sensory soul, by turning itself more attentively to its sense organ which
has been informed by a sensible species, makes itself like the species, and by
turning its own eye upon itself it sees that it is like the species. And thus it
senses the sensible object outside by means of the image which it has formed
in itself. (DSF 103, transl. Broadie)
The image of the object is a necessary condition for the soul to perceive,
but actually to perceive the object, the soul must turn its eye upon itself
and see itself as being similar to the species of the sensible object.144

141
DSF 78.
142
Est autem ymago in organo uel organum ymagine formatum causa sine qua non
fieret ymago in spiritu sentiente, set causa eius efffectiua non est, DSF 103, 77.3234. See
Silva 2010, 256.
143
Similiter anima occurrens passionibus corporis per se causa cognicionis est, sensibi-
lia et organum sensitiuum accidentalis sicut instrumentum uel instrumenta quibus utitur
anima ad sui informacionem., DSF 123, 82.346. This is, I believe, influenced by the distinc-
tion between a causa longior (the soul) and a causa proxima (the bodily spirit) in sense
perception found in Qusta ibn Luqas On the diffference between spirit and soul (see Wilcox
1985, 187, lines 5336). He distinguishes between the soul as the causa longior of the anima-
tion of the body and the spirit as the causa proxima. Kilwardby uses a diffferent terminology
in the QLIS 84, distinguishing between the causa propinqua et propria and the causa
remota et non propria.
144
sic enim spiritus sensitiuus se conuertendo attentius ad suum organum specie
sensibili informatum facit se ei similem, et in se propriam aciem reflectendo uidet se
talem. DSF 103, 77.2831.
 sense perception 155

Thus it perceives the object by means of the image it has made in itself.145
Taking the common Aristotelian example of the wax and the seal,
Kilwardby argues that:
if you place a seal before wax so that it touches it, and you assume the wax
has a life by which it turns itself towards the seal and by striking against it
comes to be like it, by turning its eye upon itself it sees in itself the image of
the seal. (DSF 103, transl. Broadie)146
The contrast with the mainstream Aristotelian passive account is clear.
According to Aristotle, perception is the efffect of sensible forms actualiz-
ing the potentiality of the senses. It is understood in the general frame-
work of a theory of change and according to the principle of act-potency:
it is the taking on of the sensible form, and the senses becoming like the
object of perception is effficiently caused by that object. Aristotles analogy
of the reception by the sense organs of the form to wax receiving an
impression from a seal exemplifies this point most clearly, independently
of the kind of change the receiving of an impression or the form without
matter is taken to mean.
According to Kilwardbys theory, on the other hand, it is as if the wax, by
pressing itself against the seal, makes itself like the seal. The sensory soul
sees itself as having the image of the object. Kilwardby thus attributes the
initiative to the sensory soul, which presses itself against the seal rather
than receiving the motion from outside. Furthermore, what the soul sees
is the image (of the thing) in the soul. Although the image that is imprinted
in the wax (the soul, not the sense organ) is the image in the seal, it is as if
it were the soul (wax) that presses itself into the seal.
Some problems arise from this psychological solution. Kilwardby
addresses some possible objections. (1) What is the order between the
reception of the species, the formation of the image and perception? (2) Is
the image or the external object perceived? (3) What images do we
perceive?
The first of these poses a serious problem to Kilwardbys theory because
if there is a delay between (1) the reception of the species in the sense

145
Et sic sentit sensible forinsecum per ymaginem quam in se formauit, DSF 103,
77.312. See also DSF 125.
146
See also QLIIS 138, 36869.17390. Cf. Augustine, DT 11.2.3; In DSF 11617, Kilwardby
offfers a second way to read the analogy: it is not the seal itself which is the effficient cause
of the image in the wax; rather, that which impresses the seal upon the wax is the effficient
cause per se of the image. In the same way, only incidentally is the image in the sense organ
the effficient cause of the image in the soul. Rather, the sensory soul is per se the effficient
cause of this image coming to be in itself.
156 theory of knowledge

organ and image formation and (2) the image formation and the percep-
tual act, it seems that the causal connection he wanted so much to avoid is
asserted. He resolves the diffficulty by pointing out that the image pro-
duced by the incorporeal sensitive spirit is simultaneous with the afffec-
tionof the sense organ.147 In the same way, the formation of the image and
the perception of the object are successive in nature but simultaneous
in time.
But what follows is not that before the soul forms the image it possesses the
image which is to be formed, but that it has a formed image before it senses
it. For the forming and the apprehending do not occur simultaneously in the
order of nature, though they are simultaneous in time. (DSF 126, transl.
Broadie)
In the first sentence Kilwardby explains that it is not the case that, prior to
the sensory experience, the soul possesses the image (which is to be
formed) of the object because that would imply that either the soul
innately has images of sensory objectswhich he vehemently deniesor
that it forms the image of an object without there being present a corre-
sponding objectwhich he also denies with respect to actual perception.
He denies in DSF 78 that the soul can make the images of sensible objects
from itself at will, without any corresponding object in reality. The spe-
cies in the sense organ is a necessary occasion for perception. In other
words, the image of Rome one has in ones mind upon hearing someone
describing it would have a necessary correspondence with the real, exist-
ing, city.148
Kilwardby claims in NSLP that there are four kinds of priority: in time,
in nature, in order, and in dignity. A little later he adds a fifth, causal prior-
ity.149 He argues in the final paragraphs of Lectio 18, that there is no incon-
venience in holding that two things can be simultaneous in time even
though one is prior to the other in the order of nature. He also claims that
x is prior in nature to y when x is the cause of y, as the premises are prior
to the conclusion. In arguing for the forming of the image of the sensible

147
Tamen quod inuenit, non inuenit in spiritu corporeo extra se formatum, set in se
inuenit quod forte postea spiritui corporeo imprimit, DSF 199, 103.13.
148
Item, si spiritus fantasticus haberet apud se ymagines istas et excitatus uere ymagi-
naretur, cum sermo fiat de omnibus sensibilibus, posset uerbo uocali excitari ad recte yma-
ginandum omnia corporalia et omnia sensibilia. Ergo si quis tibi loquitur de Roma quam
numquam uidisti, uel de Cesare uel aliquo simili, statim ymaginaberis rem de qua loquitur
ymagine sua recta et uera, quod non est verum, DSF 10, 57.238. The relation with
Augustines Alexandria is evident (see DT 8.6.9; 9.6.10).
149
NSLP 18, 13841.
 sense perception 157

thing in DSF (192) he had this kind of natural priority in mind, because the
forming of the image is the cause of the sensing of the object. In the pro-
cess of perception the soul pays attention to the afffection of the organ and
in another moment of nature (simultaneous in time) it pays attention to
itself and the image in itself.150 In order to be aware of the images exis-
tence, the soul must turn its eye (the eye of that soul we have in common
with the other animals)151 upon itself and see the sensible object through
the image made by itself in and from itself.
The second question concerns whether it is the image in the soul or the
external thing that is perceived. This question is relevant because in many
passages Kilwardby can be quite misleading. Fortunately he address the
issue explicitly as follows:
But you will say to this: If the sentient soul first turns its eye upon itself and
then upon its sense organ, why is it not said to sense both itself and the sense
organ?
Reply. It is because it does not turn its eye upon these two things except in
so far as they are informed by the sensible thing, and the eye of the soul does
not stop at these things but passes on to the sensible thing. And neither the
intention to sense nor the action itself terminates at these two things, but it
is the sensible thing outside which is the end, and therefore that alone is
rightly said to be sensed. (DSF 110111, transl. Broadie)
The soul does not sense either itself or the sense organ, it senses the exte-
rior thing. It does not distinguish one image from the other, in other
words it does not distinguish the species received in the sense organ from
the image made in and from itself.152 The image is that by which the soul
comes to know the sense object.153 Kilwardbys reasoning is daring. His
simultaneity in time argument avoids the common Aristotelian view that

150
DSF 125.
151
QLIS 62.1, 181.1167. The awareness of the image of the object is an operation of the
sensory soul and not of reason ( intencio animi et spiritus sentiens et acies eius idipsum
sunt realiter, quia id quod animus - et dico animum qui communis est nobis et bestiis, DSF
109, 79.1820, (italics mine)).
152
Nec discernit ymaginem ab ymagine, scilicet illam quam fecit sensibile in organo et
quam ipse in se conuoluendo se cum ymagine inuenta in organo. Tamen, cum sint
coniuncte et simul, ut ita dicam, conuolute uel applicite, per illam que formata est in spi-
ritu uidetur siue sentitur illa que formata est in organo, vtraque tamen sentitur et simul,
sed exterior per interiorem, DSF 104, 78.510. The source of this conception might be
Augustines DT 11.2.3; 11.3.6; 11.4.7.
153
Quia non conuertit aciem in hec nisi in quantum sunt informata a sensibili, nec in
hiis sistit acies, set transit in sensibile; nec in hiis terminatur intencio sentiendi, nec actio
ipsa, set sensibile et finis quod extra est. Et ideo illud solum recte dicitur sentiri, DSF 111,
79.236. See also QLIS 89, 280.678.
158 theory of knowledge

effficient causality in perception must be attributed to the object, although

still arguing for objectivity. Secondly, his claim that the species in the
sense organd and the image in the soul are not distinguishable by the soul
prevents him from falling into a form of representationalism. When the
soul sees the image in itself, or itself as assimilated to the image, it sees the
exterior object, which is the object proper of the act of perception; other-
wise, the species rather than the exterior thing would be the object of
perception.154
Kilwardbys view can be explained as follows. Let x stand for the object,
x1 for the species in the medium and in the sense organ, and x2 for the
image in the soul. Because x1 is the exact likeness of x and x2 is the exact
likeness of x1 and, hence, of x, to see x2 is to see x. Since the soul does not
see itself qua itself but qua informed by x2, that is qua having the form of
the external thing, to see itself infomed by the image of the external thing
is to see the external thing. He hence grounds his claim for direct realism
by afffirming the conformity of the representation x2 to the thing x it repre-
sents. The soul is able to make the image on account of its natural power
and a natural instinct.155 I take this to mean that, as Kilwardby saw it, the
sensory soul is naturally endowed with the capacity to make correspond-
ing representations of external objects.
Let us now turn to the third question. Kilwardby follows Augustine in
stressing the image-forming motion in perception. We should distinguish
between (i) the motion of the soul in forming the image from the recep-
tion of the sensible species and (ii) the awareness by the sensory soul of
that image and through it, of the sensible object.156 When a human being
is sleeping, the sense organs continue to be impressed by the species flow-
ing from the sense objects via the medium; however, these impressions
alone, without the attention of the soul, do not give rise to any act of
perception. In the same way,

154
However, in QLIS 88, 276.2933, in the context of comparing the human way of
knowing with the divine, Kilwardby presents the position of quidam (identified by the edi-
tors as Bonaventure and Aristotle), according to whom In nobis videmus quod duplex est
cognitum scilicet proximum et immediatum vel remotum et mediatum. Hoc patet in
sensu. Est enim sensatum proximum et immediatum species in sensitivo, et est sensatum
remotum et mediatum sensibile cuius est illa species. Et primum horum est non solum
quod sentitur sed etiam quo, secundum est quod sentitur solum.
155
Ex hiis manifestum est quod spiritus sensitiuus formans in se ymaginem rei sensibi-
lis, etsi hoc fecerit non sentiens neque apprehendens adhuc ipsam, non facit hoc casualiter
set naturaliter, et prout a superioribus causis cognicionem et artem regitiuam habentibus
directus, instinctu naturali ducitur, DSF 128, 84.1923. See also DSF 134.
156
DSF 103, 77.1525; 125, 83.236.
 sense perception 159

the species of many sensed things may exist simultaneously in one corpo-
real spirit, though of them only those to which an intention of the soul
(intencio animi) is on some occasion directed are perceived (apparent). (DSF
203, transl. Broadie, with changes)
The human soul does not get confused even in the presence of many stim-
uli, because only the images upon which it directs its attention are per-
ceived.157 The text also suggests that to every afffection of the sense organs
corresponds the formation of an image by the soul, even though the soul
does pay attention to those images only in some cases. It thus seems that
the soul works somehow automatically in making the images. This is in
line with Kilwardbys claim that the soul acts by instinct. The question is
whether or not it is aware of itself making the images.
Kilwardby does not go into detail in explaining by what criterion the
soul selects some rather than other images. The only time he addresses
this issue he states that, of the many rays reaching the eye at a given
moment, one excels all the others and it is this one that is perceived. It
seems that the criterion is the intensity of one (e.g., ray) above the others
(rays).158 The intensity of the reaction seems to be proportional to the
intensity of the afffection: the soul reacts diffferently to a bright light and to
a dim one:159 according [to whether] the afffection of the body is greater or
less, the attention of the soul which goes forward to meet the afffection will
be greater or less.160 Kilwardby seemed to follow the principle of the pro-
portionality of the reaction with respect to the change in the sense organ.
The problem with this is that it implies a causal relation that goes against
everything Kilwardby wanted to admit in suggesting that the attention of
the soul is stimuli driven.
I would like to conclude this section by returning to the issue of the
two overlapping accounts. Kilwardby was aware that he had left loose
strings, especially in how the two accounts come together. The most puz-
zling aspect is why the soul, as soon as it makes the image of the sensible
thing, informs every part of the corporeal spirit with that image.161 In his
words:

157
As Leijenhorst (2008, 205) remarks, this constituted a major diffficulty for an
Aristotelian theory of sense perception.
158
DSF 203.
159
DSF 100.
160
OI 102, 93 ( et secundum quod maior uel minor est afffectio corporis, erit et maior
et minor attencio spiritus occurrentis, DSF 102, 76.357).
161
quam cito formatur spiritus ipse uiuificans ymagine rei sensibilis, mox per ipsum
et ex ipso informatur eadem omnes partes spiritus uiuificati, DSF 185, 98.185.2730.
160 theory of knowledge

When the vitalized corporeal spirit is first touched by a sensible species

transmitted to it at the extreme of the soul which faces outward, then at that
very same instant the vitalizing sensory soul co-mingles with a passivity of
the body and forms in itself a similar species. And since that vitalizing soul
is a simultaneous whole the same both in the organ of common sense and
everywhere throughout the whole medium, through itself as thus informed
and existing everywhere, soon the sensible species is everywhere in the
organ of sense right to its innermost extreme. (DSF 185, transl. Broadie).
He illustrates the process with the example of many lines terminating at a
central point.162 The corporeal spiritthe primary organ of senseis like
all those lines, spread throughout the body,163 and the incorporeal vitaliz-
ing spirit is everywhere in the corporeal spiritus vivificatus at the same
time.164 Due to its spiritual nature, the soul can be whole everywhere, just
as the species can be everywhere in the spirit.165 There is no doubt about
that; the question is why Kilwardby was intent on positing that the sen-
sory soul imprinted the image of the object it had made in itself in its
instrument, the corporeal spirit. His explanation lies in the fact that the
corporeal spirit is the souls instrument for controlling the body. The soul
impresses the image in the corporeal spirit in order to make its instrument
obey its rulings.166 What exactly this means, and especially what it entails,
is unclear. Why and how does a material instrument need to or can be
motivated? Kilwardby gives no answer.

4.2.The Active Nature of Perception

I have argued in the previous section that, although Kilwardby offfers two
accounts of the process of perception, it is clear that he took the real

162
DSF 185, 98.1330.
163
Exemplum [qua] quale potest esse de multis lineis exeuntibus ab una basi termina-
tis ad vnum punctum conoidalem. () Quelibet enim pars spiritus corporei uiuificati
habentis extensionem et dimensionem est sicut linea, DSF 185, 98.206).
164
Spiritus autem uiuificans, qui simul totus est cum qualibet parte spiritus uiuificati,
DSF 185, 98.267.
165
Ymago autem non ita se agit per totum organum sensus particularis usque ad orga-
num sensus communis quod ipsa sit particulatim hic et ibi, set tota fit ubique et tota in toto
utro que organo. Sicut enim tota species coloris uel soni est in toto medio extra et tota in
qualibet parte medii, nec est minor in parte quam in toto, licet uarium esse habeat in diuer-
sis medii partibus, sic est eciam de eadem specie suspecta in organo sentiendi, quod tota
est extime sensus particularis ubi respicit medium extra, et tota statim apud sensum com-
munem, et tota ubique in uia media pertinente ad ipsum sensum particularem, DSF 184,
978.336.
166
DSF 217.
 sense perception 161

explanatory value to rest on the second psychological account. Bearing

this in mind, I would like to point out a relevant aspect of his sense percep-
tion theory, one that has received little atttention and whose assessment
in these terms constitutes his originality.
It is clear that Kilwardby sought to reconcile Aristotles and Augustines
accounts of perception. What interests me here is how conflicting
Kilwardby considered these two positions to be, and how he attempted to
find some common ground between them. As he points out, according to
Aristotle, the sensible thing exerts its influence on the medium to change,
then on the sense organ, and finally on the sensory soul.167 Thus it seems
that sense perception is caused by the objects.168 Hence, a kind of change
takes place in sensation, which is best described as the passage from a
state of potentiality to a state of actuality. The sensory capacities must be
actualized by an external element, the sensible form in the organ.169 The
species in the organ make the sensory soul exercise its capacity for sens-
ing. Aristotles process of sense perception could be described as follows:
the sense object causally afffects the medium, and through it the sense
organ and the sense faculty.170 The result is the impression of the form of
the object in the sense organ and in the sense faculty,171 or, to put it even
more crudely, perception requires the absorption of the form of the per-
ceptible object.172 Thus, sensation involves some kind of change in the

167
Et ita spiritus sentiens secundum ipsum uidetur informari ymagine rei sensibilis per
actionem et influentiam corporis sensibilis, licet per aliqua media, DSF 69, 70.2830. See
also QLIIS 138, 368.1737, where he attributes this view to the philosophers.
168
QLIS 35, 8485.152161.
169
Aristotle, De anima II.5, 417b1626. See also Sense and sensibilia 2, 438b2124: For the
organ of smell is potentially that which the sense of smell is actually; since the object of
sense is what causes the actualization of each sense, so that must beforehand have been
potentially such and such. For the explanatory actuality-potentiality device, see Knuuttila
2008, 26. Kilwardby seems to accept this form of explanation in his early NSLP when he
says that the sensible [object] perfects in a certain way the sense organ the same way as
the intelligible [object perfects] the intellect and that this implies that this actualization
of the sense organ cannot be done by any sensible whatsoever, but by a specific sensible in
respect to a specific sense organ (Et sic notat quod sensibile perficit quodammodo sen-
sum sicut intelligibile intellectum, et quod non quilibet sensus natus est ad quodlibet sen-
sibile sed proprius sensus ad proprium sensibile, NSLP 13, 96.35).
170
Cf. Aristotle, Sense and sensibilia 1, 436b0610: Now it is clear, alike by reasoning and
without reasoning, that sensation is generated in the soul through the medium of the
body. Kilwardby himself describes it this way: the sensible things themselves change
first the medium, then the sense organ, thirdly the soul itself, OI 97, 92.
171
Cf. e.g. Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia 1, 450a31-b01. A way of saying it is,
Aristotelian perception is an intentional and causal transaction between the senses and
the world. It is a kind of alteration producing an afffection on the soul, Spruit 1994, 37.
172
Irwin 1990, 315.
162 theory of knowledge

faculty.173 In Kilwardbys view, the change Aristotle acknowledged was

alteration, and in DSF 61 he considers the two possible types of alteration:
(i) proper alteration, when a previous disposition ceases to be and a new
one comes into efffect, and (ii) when a new disposition perfects the exist-
ing one.174 According to Kilwardby, it is (ii) that fits into Aristotles theory
of perception. The process is explained in terms of metaphysical presup-
positions, in a schema that involves diffferent levels of potentiality and
actuality because to the capacity of the object to change must correspond
the capacity of being changed in the thing that is acted upon.175
I have argued elsewhere extensively in favor Kilwardbys theory of sense
perception as an explicit contrast to this view of the Aristotelian and
Augustinian theories.176 Kilwardby acknowledges that all knowledge of
things outside the soul starts with the reception of sensible species issued
by the sensible thing in the sense organs. However, what he found prob-
lematic was the Aristotelian claim that the object via the species actual-
ized the sensory powers in such a way that our perception of the external
world is caused by those same objects.177 He objected to the fact that it
presupposed that material objects were able to be the cause of change in
the immaterial soul, just as a patient sufffers the action of an agent. (See
Silva & Toivanen 2010 for fuller details.) Let us consider two instances
when Kilwardby describes the process in Aristotle or Aristotelians.
It should be said in reply that the sensory soul does not produce in itself
images of sensible things, but rather the sensible things themselves change
first the medium, then the sense organ, thirdly the soul itself or the sensory
power. For it makes an impression of its likeness continuously right through
the media up to the soul itself () Assuming this, it should be said that it is
not absurd that the mind or soul be moved by the organ or the sensible

173
Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or afffection from
without, On the Soul II.5, 416b345; see also 417a30b1. Aristotle discusses the nature of the
change involved in perception in De anima II.5. Kilwardby himself refers to Aristotles De
anima II (QILS 35, 84.1578) as saying that sensus in actu alteratio quaedam est. For the
controversy on the nature of the change involved in sensation in Aristotles psychology or,
what it means to acquire the form of the object without its matter (i.e. whether the organ
takes on the sensible quality), see Burnyeat 1995. Burnyeat divides the camps between the
spiritualists, himself included (see Burnyeat 2001), and the literalists (see, e.g., Sorabji 1995.
The same debate has taken place with respect to Aquinas. Cf. Cohen 1982; and Hofffman
1990.
174
See also QLIS 35 and NSLP 13, 96.34.
175
Tuominen (2007, 164) puts it neatly: interaction presupposes that the object that
is capable of producing activity is capable of producing it only in things capable of per-
forming that activity.
176
Silva 2010, 252260.
177
DSF 62.
 sense perception 163

thing, because the sensory soul is in potency to the sensible species, and the
organ and the soul have that species in act. And that act has a natural
potency to the fulfillment of that potency. Perhaps Aristotelians would say
this, for to judge from those of his writings which have reached us he does
not seem to have thought diffferently. (DSF 97, transl. Broadie)
According to Aristotelians, the sensible thing first changes the medium,
then the sense organ, and finally the soul or the sensory faculty. The object
in this passive theory of sense perception is, via the species, the effficient
cause of perceptual acts by bringing the actualization of the potentiality
of the senses. The exterior object is responsible for causally moving the
soul. In the second sentence, Kilwardby takes Aristotle to mean that the
afffection of the sense organ by the sensible object is a certain alteration of
the percipient that brings about the perceptual act.
There are, however, many expressions of the contrary position. First there is
Aristotle, for he says: Sense is receptive to sensible things without their mat-
ter, as wax receives the mark of the ring without the iron and the gold. ()
Since therefore the motivating terminus of the change which occurs when
sensing occurs, is the sensible thing, and the end is the sensory soul, it seems
that the change is extended continuously through the medium and the organ
up to the sensory soul, so that the unmoved mover is the sensible thing or is that
which draws the sensible thing into an act of producing change, and what is
moved without being a mover is the sentient soul (DSF 69, transl. Broadie,
emphasis added)
According to Kilwardbys interpretation of Aristotle, perception results
when sensible forms actualize the potentiality of the sense organs and the
powers.178 There is a causal relation between the object (actual) and the
sense powers (potential) in that the objects act upon the sensory soul and
the sensory soul is acted upon.179 The actuality of the sensible object brings
about the actuality of the sensitive faculty of the percipient and makes it
become like the object.180 Kilwardby readily agreed with Aristotle that our

178
sensibile agens imprimit suam similitudinem in sensitivo et sic generat sentiens
in actu, quod est unum compositum ex sensitivo in potentia tamquam materia et specie
sensibilis eidem impressa tamquam forma, et est sensibile in actu gignens sentiens geni-
tum. Quod autem sentiens sit genitum vel sensitivum in actu quod est idem quod sentiens,
patet secundum Aristotelem, QLIS 35, 84.1527. See also DSF 69, 70.2330.
179
See Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri de anima, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera
Omnia, 45.1, Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1984, II.26 (III.2 in Pasnau translation).
Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.2, 426a101.
180
See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri de anima, II.10, 109; transl. Pasnau, 189:
So in this way even sense, after it has been actualized by a sense object, is like that object,
whereas beforehand it is not like it. See also Quaestio Disputata de Anima a. 13, respondeo;
and SCG II.57.8.
164 theory of knowledge

knowledge of sensible objects must come from sense experience and that
the sensitive soul is empty of images prior to the use of the senses. However,
this could not imply that the soul is acted upon and that something is
generated by the sense object in such a way that a corporeal thing acts
upon the spirit.181 To accept the Aristotelian account of perception would
mean accepting that a corporeal object acts upon the spiritual soul.
For Kilwardby, however, neither the object nor the sense organ can act
upon the soul;182 not even the species could be said to afffect the soul
because they are of an inferior nature and, being accidents, are even infe-
rior to the body from which they radiate.183 A corporeal thing cannot bring
about a change in the sensory soul by means of effficient causality because
that implies that the soul could be subject to the action of what is infe-
rior to it, which is impossible (DSF 62). Instead, Kilwardby argues, the
action of the object and its species upon the perceiver is limited to the
sense organs.
The only way out is to argue, as Kilwardby does extensively in DSF, for
an active theory of perception. By active theory of perception here I mean
a theory that takes perception to be the result of the activity of the soul
reacting to the afffection of the sense organs. Kilwardby takes this to be
Augustines own theory. Although Augustine did not formulate a system-
atic account of sense perception, it is clear that his account of perception
rests on the following theses:184
(i)The immaterial and indivisible nature of the soul: the soul is wholly
present in every part of the body;185

181
Si autem velit Philosophus quod res aliqua irradietur a sensibili, et haec transeat per
organum sensus, et inde uniatur spiritui, tamquam corpus sic agat in spiritum, et species
in spiritu sit aliud essentialiter a spiritu et ab extra ei immissum, non videntur concordare,
QLIS 68, 202.1258.
182
DSF 4750; 526. What Kilwardby takes to be Augustines position is clearly expressed
in DSF 54, 67.146: Ex hiis omnibus constat Augustinum intendere quod spiritus sensi-
tiuus dum sentit non recipit ymagines sensibilium a corpore tamquam patiens ab agente.
See also QLIIS 160, 443.3544.
183
ipsa species est res minus digne existentie quam corpus a quo irradiatur uel in
quo suscipitur. Est enim uel accidens uel accidentalis nature, que per se non subsistit set in
alio et ab alio continue presenti, DSF 60, 68.2730.
184
I owe many of the references to ODaly 1987; and Gannon 1956.
185
De immortalitate animae 16.25: Anima uero non modo uniuersae mold corporis sui,
sed etiam unicuique particulae illius tote simul adest. Partis enim corporis passionem tote
sentit, nec in toto tamen corpore. Cum enim quid doles in pede, aduertit oculus, loquitur
lingua, admouetur manus. Quod non fieret, nisi id quod animae in eis partibus est, et in
pede sentiret; nec sentire quod ibi factum est absens posses. Non enim nuntio aliquo cre-
dibile est fieri non sentiente quod nuntiat: quia passio quae fit non per continuationem
 sense perception 165

(ii) The attentive nature of the soul: the soul is present in the body
through vital attention,186 paying permanent attention (intentio) to
the afffections of the body by external objects, and reacting to these
afffections;187
(iii) The conformational nature of the soul: the soul is able to make an
image of the object in the process of reacting to the afffection;188
(iv) The ontological superiority of the soul, which does not receive any
form whatsoever from the body or the object; the body is inferior to
the soul and cannot act upon it.189 The soul senses through the body,
as the result not of the action of the body, but of itself upon the
body.190
Augustine particularly stresses the last element in De musica, arguing that
the body is the instrument of the soul, which moves the body according

molis currit, ut caeteras animae partes quae alibi sunt latere non sinat; sed illud tote sentit
anima quod in particula fit pedis, et ibi tantum sentit ubi fit. Tota igitur singulis partibus
simul adest, quae tote simul sentit in singulis. See also De quantitate animae 59; and DGL
7.15.21.
186
Augustine DT 8.21.42. See ODaly 198694, 327; ODaly 1987, 44.
187
Wherefore vision is produced both by the visible thing and the one who sees, but in
such a way that the sense of sight as well as the intention of seeing and beholding come
from the one who sees, while that informing of the sense, which is called vision, is
imprinted by the body alone that is seen, namely by some visible thing, DT 11.2.2, 63; in
11.2.3, Augustine distinguishes between vision, which is caused by the object seen and sen-
sation, which is caused by the percipient. See also De quantitate animae 23. Also ODaly
1987, 856: Intentio is an activity: Augustine will give particular emphasis to the active
nature of perception. We have seen that he can describe sensation as a counter motion to
that of the sensory stimulus. () The awareness of such activity or motion in the soul is
precisely the Augustinian definition of perception.
188
Augustine, DGL 12.16.33; and DT 10.5.7.
189
Numquam enim anima est corpore deterior, et omnis materia fabricatore deterior.
Nullo modo igitur anima fabricatori corpori est subiecta materies, Augustine, DM 5.8,
245. See also DT 10.7.9; DGL 12.16.33; and DM 5.9, 289: Nec ab isto quidquam illam pati
arbitror sed facere de illo et in illo tamquam subiecto diuinitus dominationi suae, ali-
quando tamen cum facilitate, aliquando cum diffficultate, operari, quanto pro eius meritis
magis minusue illi cedit natura corporea. Corporalia ergo, quaecumque huic corpori inge-
runtur aut obiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod
operi eius aut aduersetur congruat. Ideoque cum renititur aduersanti et materiam sibi
subiectam in operis sui uias diffficulter inpingit, fit adtentior ex diffficultate in actionem,
quae diffficultas propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur. Cf. Thomas
Aquinas reading of the passage in ST I, q. 84, a. 6.
190
Augustine DM 6.5.910. See also DGL 12.16.33. Spruit 1994, 182: This does not imply
that the human body is capable of afffecting the soul: in the act of sensation, our soul is
not causally involved, but nonetheless reacts, untouched in its own structure, to bodily
afffections. According to Augustine, sense perception amounts exactly to this reaction:
perception is an activity of the mind taking place when the body receives impressions.
166 theory of knowledge

tothe needs of its proper operations.191 Thus, the basic principle of the
active theory, as M. Gannon points out, can be expressed in the dictum
[t]he souls awareness of the bodys passions is constituted by its aware-
ness of its own actions against those passions.192 Kilwardby faithfully
follows Augustine:
Moreover, where Augustine explains [De musica 6.5] in what way a soul is
not acted upon by a body but on the contrary acts upon it and with regard to
it () he reveals what he has in mind especially in respect of sensing, teach-
ing how the soul does not receive something from the body when it senses,
but acts upon the body. Hence he says in the same place that to sense <some-
thing> in a body is not to be a passive recipient of something from a body,
but to act more attentively with regard to its passivities. (DSF 54, transl.
Broadie)
The last passage in particular clarifies the main elements of Kilwardbys
theory of perception and his indebtedness to Augustine: the sense is not
acted upon and the soul pays attention and reacts accordingly to the afffec-
tions of the body. Sense perception is an intentional process, resulting
from the souls dedicated attention towards bodily afffections.
Kilwardby refers to the same instrumental use of the body by the soul,
and the souls impassibility with respect to the body is the basis of his
rejection of the passivity implied in the Aristotelian causal explanation.
The master-slave analogy Augustine offfers in De musica (6.5.13) expresses
the hierarchy of being and the superiority of the soul over the body as an
instrument.193 Kilwardby sustains the Augustinian theory with arguments
focusing on the speed of the formation of the image from the image seen
or the utterance heard,194 the existence of a moving and effficient principle
with respect to the body that cannot be the body itself,195 and the impos-
sibility of the senses being responsible for translating the images of the
corporeal object into the incorporeal nature of the soul.196

191
uidetur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati sed in eius
passionibus adtentius agere, et has actiones () et hoc totum est, quod sentire dicitur. Sed
iste iste sensus, qui, etiam dum nihil sentimus, inest tamen, instrumentum est corporis,
quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima, ut in eo sit ad passiones corporis cum attentione
agendas paratior, Augustine, DM 5.10, 2831. See also De quantitate animae 25.48, PL 32,
col. 1063: sensus sit passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam. See Silva 2010, 249;
and especially Brittain 2002, 274282 for the analysis of this last passage.
192
Gannon 1956, 156.
193
The idea of the soul as paying permanent attention to the passions of the body is very
far from the working together of the body and the soul in the process of sense perception
which one finds in the hylomorphic account of Aristotle.
194
DSF 6465.
195
DSF 66. Cf. Augustine, DGL 12.16.33.
196
DSF 67.
 sense perception 167

He justifies all this through an ontological hierarchy, according to which

only the higher can afffect the lower, not the other way round.197 It is impos-
sible for something material to act upon something immaterial, i.e. the
body or the sense object upon the soul:
For in Augustines view what is inconvenient is not that a soul as having such
and such a function should be said to be acted upon by a body, but that a
soul qua soul, and qua more excellent than the body by nature, should be
said to be acted upon by a body. (DSF 52, transl. Broadie)
Proof of the passivity of the sense organ comes from the fact that the spe-
cies flowing from the sense object remains in the sense organ only as long
as the object is present.198 When we look for a long time at a strong light,
the impression remains for some time after we have stopped looking at it.
The passivity of the sense organ explains the persistence of after-images,
but not the persistence of the sensory images in the soul.199 In the end, it all
comes down to the diffferent nature of the two constituents of the human
being, body and soul. The soul must control the body, and be the effficient
cause of its own acts.
Sense perception is not a passive process in itself because it consists not
in the reception of a sensible form by a sensitive power, but in the image
of the sensible object being produced by the sensory soul in response to
the afffection of the body.
It should be said that strictly speaking the organ is a sense organ not because
it impresses the received species upon the sensory power, but because by
means of it, or with its support, the impression comes into existence. But it
comes into existence by virtue of the sensory soul embracing, and involving
with, the species found in the organ. It is in this way that one should under-
stand the physical doctrine concerning the way sensing occurs, and then
Aristotles doctrine will accord with Augustines. (DSF 113, transl. Broadie)
Kilwardby attributes no effficient causality to the object or to the species
in the sense organ, or even to the sense organ informed by the species.200

197
Sed is est ordo naturae, ut per spiritualia agat et disponat corporalia et non e contra-
rio, ut docet Augustinus, lib. III, De Trinitate, cap. 6, et lib. VIII, Super Genesim, cap. 19 et
quattuor sequentibus, QLIVS 39, 194.659.
198
nullum vestigium assimilationis quam habuit retinet, quia non conservatur nisi
ad imprimentem actualiter coniuncta, quia solam potentiam passivam et receptivam
habet ad illam, QLIVS 40, 217.5860.
199
DSF 202. The existence of after-images and the possibility of sense organs to be
destroyed by looking too long to a strong light are arguments against such extramission
theories and can be found in Alhacens De aspectibus. Lindberg makes this point in 1967,
322323.
200
DSF 60.
168 theory of knowledge

The impossibility for the body and the sense object to act upon the spiri-
tual and superior soul is based on an ontological presupposition: the cre-
ated world has a hierarchic ordination according to which inferior things,
like bodies, do not act, but are rather acted upon by superior things, such
as souls.201 A body is lower than the soul on the scale of being, and the spe-
cies, which is an accident, is even lower. Therefore, neither of them can
afffect the superior spiritual soul,202 otherwise a cause would bring about
an efffect that is superior to its cause.
In discussing whether the body can afffect the soul in QLIIS 160,
Kilwardby turns to Augustines two authoritative texts De musica 6.5.8 and
De Genesi ad litteram 12.16.33, in which he strongly dismisses the possibil-
ity that something spiritual can be afffected by something material.203
Kilwardby concludes: From these and similar statements by Augustine it
seems suffficiently clear that he means the sentient soul itself forms within
images of corporeal and sensible things.204 The soul forming in and from
itself the image of the exterior object is the result of the attention it has of
any bodily afffection, and in the case of its being afffected, the reaction
towards it.
If, however, you wish to have it in the Augustinian way, it can be said that
there are not many species of the same object in the same intellect, because
the species do not move from the organ to the spirit by means of the spirit,
nor from the sense to the intellect, but the spirit forms in itself and from
itself the image of the exterior thing in imitation of the image received in the
sense [organ].205

201
Cf. DSF 56: The top of the hierarchy is God and the creatures form the lower grades.
Among creatures, angels are ranked higher than corporeal beings. Among spiritual crea-
tures, angels are superior to human souls. Matter is inferior to form, thus bodies are inferior
to the souls that govern them and sense organs are lower in the hierarchy than the vivifying
soul. Finally, the sense organ and the exterior sense object rank in the same levelthat is
why the latter can act upon the former.
202
Si igitur inconueniens est corpus aliquid agere in spiritu propter excellentiam spiri-
tualis nature super corporalem, multofortius per eandem racionem inconueniens est yma-
ginem ipsam per se in spiritum agere, DSF 60, 68.303.
203
tum quia Augustinus in praemissis auctoritatibus De musica et Super Genesim
aperte dicit quod non facit aliquid corporis in spiritum, QLIIS 160, 445.1112. Also in QLIIS
162 he refers several times to the De musica 6 (5.9; 4.7) as an authoritative text on the
impossibility of a proper action of the body upon the soul.
204
OI 68, 86 (Ex hiis et similibus dictis Augustini satis uidetur ipsum uelle quod spiritus
ipse senciens in se formet corporalium et sensibilium ymagines, DSF 68, 70.145).
205
Sin autem vis tenere modum Augustini, dici potest quod non sunt eiusdem cognos-
cibilis plures species in eodem intellectu, quia non transit species ab organo in spiritum
secundum ipsum, neque a sensu in intellectum, sed spiritus in se format et de se imaginem
rei forinsecae ad imitationem imaginis receptae in sensum, QLIII1S 44, 189190.1037.
 sense perception 169

The incorporeal sensitive spirit is able to become like the corporeal spe-
cies and the result is the likeness (similitudo) of the sensible object
formed in and from the sensory soul. Following Kilwardby, I call this to-be-
made-like (assimilatio, conformatio) capacity the chameleonic capacity of
the soul. For the chameleon (chamaeleo), the color in the environment is
just a necessary but not suffficient cause of the change; the nature of the
chameleon is the effficient cause of change.206 Contrary to the Aristotelian
model and Kilwardbys interpretation of it, the soul is active and that
which is apprehended is the object, by means of the action of the soul
assimilating itself to the species.207
Someone might object that Kilwardby was simply presenting the views
of Aristotle and Augustine, without siding with any of them. His response
to this was as follows:
But since we know that Saint Augustine was much more sublimely enlight-
ened than Aristotle, especially in spiritual matters, and since it is not easy, by
this reply, to do justice to the arguments which they produce on behalf of
Augustine, we therefore believe that the first side of the question, which is
Augustines judgement, is true, and we shall adhere to that judgment hereaf-
ter. (DSF 98, transl. Broadie)208
It thus seems that Kilwardby kept Aristotle in the game as much as possi-
ble, but when Aristotles view departed from what was reconciliable with
Augustine he sided with Augustine.209 He would accept the basic idea that
for both Aristotle and Augustine knowledge is some kind of assimilation
of the soul to its objects, but he would point out that the effficient cause of

The context of the quotation is whether Christ has diffferent species of the same thing:
those received by sense perception and the ideas in his mind. Kilwardby answers that
the thing is known in a more imperfect (diminuta) way through its species afffecting the
senses than through its idea existing in the mind of God because no aspect of the thing is
left unknown with the knowledge of its idea (QLIII1S 44, 188.718). Christs soul, once
excited by the sensible species in the sense organs, finds the ideas of those objects within
itself (QLIII1S 44, 190.1079). Kilwardby denies that this happens in other human beings;
his arguments against Fishacres theory of the double origin of the species in QLIS 62 is
intended to deny this suggestion (see section memories and intelligence below).
206
QLIIS 157, 432.1013. Kilwardby says that the chameleon changes according to the
various colours it sees. Augustine uses the image of the chameleon to explain the process
of sense perception in DT 11.2.5.
207
QLIS 68, 203.13543.
208
See also DOS 27.85, 222.102; QLIS 4, 12.245.
209
See also DSF 92; and DSF 198 where Kilwardby examines the persistence of sensory
images in the corporeal spirit and in the soul. He claims that the images quickly leave from
the former but remain in the latter. He takes this to be in disagreement with Aristotle, but
in agreement with Augustines view.
170 theory of knowledge

the assimilation in Aristotle is the sense object, whereas in Augustine it is

the sentient soul itself which forms within itself images of corporeal and
sensible things.210 Kilwardby interprets Aristotles statement that the
object is the cause of the actualisation of sensation211 as referring to the
action upon the sense organ only and not as implying the passivity of
the power of sensing (spiritus sensitivus).212 Although the object afffects the
organ of sense (body), it does not afffect the soul;213 on the contrary, it is
the soul that acts upon the body.214 The soul is not afffected in any way
either by the body or by the object; sense perception is not a passive
process.

Conclusion
The core of Kilwardbys account of knowledge rests in the notions of
assimilatio and conformation, which he used to qualify the action/motion
the soul performs in order to acquire knowledge of its objects. He under-
stood this making itself to be like (assimilatio) or taking a similar form
(conformatio) to be quite diffferent from the passive reception of the spe-
cies. He envisaged the soul as actively procuring information about the
world, rather than as a passive recipient of whatever information reaches
it by means of the senses. At the center of such a conception is the under-
standing of the sensory soul as the form and ruler of the body, using the
bodyby means of the mediatory corporeal spiritas the instrument of
acquiring sensory information. Kilwadby built his theory by putting
together Augustines view of the process of forming mental images in De
Genesi ad litteram (for example, 12.16.33) and De Trinitate (for example,
12.18.40) with his assumption that in sense perception the soul makes the
images of sensible things rather than being acted upon by the material

210
OI 68, 86. ( spiritus ipse senciens in se formet corporalium et sensibilium yma-
gines, DSF 68, 70.15.)
211
Et ita spiritus sentiens secundum ipsum uidetur informari ymagine rei sensibilis per
actionem et influentiam corporis sensibilis, licet per aliqua media, DSF 69, 70.2330. See
also DSF 70, 70.3133.
212
Quod ergo dicit Aristotiles quod sensus est susceptiuus specierum sensibilium sine
materia, de organo sensitiuo dicitur, DSF 112, 7980.36-02.
213
Item, in 6 De musica, capitulo I4, vbi declarat quomodo anima non patitur a corpore,
set omnino facit in illo et de illo () Ex hiis omnibus constat Augustinum intendere quod
spiritus sensitiuus dum sentit non recipit ymagines sensibilium a corpore tamquam
patiens ab agente. DSF 54, 67.616.
214
In quo, ut iam patet, patitur corpus ab alio corpore et non agit in spiritum, set spiri-
tus eius passioni occurrit agens, DSF 102, 77.23.
 sense perception 171

object (especially in De musica 6.5.8). Kilwardby uses the Augustinian

conception of the spiritual nature of the soul to account for the swifteness
of image formation, but in justifying his choices he offfers an account of
perception that is much more systematic than the one given by Augustine.
In trying to reconcile the Augustinian spiritual view with the Aristotelian
species in the medium approach, Kilwardby was forced to explain the gap
between the material species received in the sense organs and the images
made by the immaterial sensory soul. The two explanatory and partially
overlapping mechanisms he offfers in DSF are intended to provide a solu-
tion to this problem.
In the end, however, sense perception consists in a chain of physio-
psychological processes in which the two aspects (physiological and
psychological) remain apart from one another: the process of the species
flowing from the sensible object and afffecting the sense organ is exclu-
sively material in nature, whereas the transmission of the image of the
sense object from the organ of the proper senses to the organ of the com-
mon sense is explained in psychological terms and also as a physiological
process that is a material reproduction of the physiological process for the
sake of moving the body.

4.3.The Organ of the Common Sense

The last question in DSF is that of the localisation of the common sense.
Although I have already discussed the operations of the common sense,
let us take a look at Kilwardbys view of the location of its organ.215
Throughout Kilwardby uses the term menbrum for a physical organ (the
heart and the brain) and organum interchangeably with instrumentum,
both referring to a membrum as a functional unit. This is in line with his
principle that the powers of the soul operate through the organs as instru-
ments of its action.216 The question arises from his identification of the
apprehensive with the motive power. Given the diffference in the nature of
the operations to be performed, there have to be organs of a diffferent
nature to perform them: the organ responsible for motion needs to be

215
Quia igitur in responsione dicte questionis tactum est de instrumento sensus com-
munis, super quo uidentur auctores dissentire, parum digrediamur ad inquirendum quod
menbrum corporis sit eius organum, DSF 219, 108.358, (my italics). See also Richard
Fishacre, InIIS d.2, 47, lines 644645.
216
See Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, 72.81.
172 theory of knowledge

warm whereas the organ responsible for apprehension needs to be cold.

It would be diffficult to find one organ that is simultaneously warm and
cold, and Kilwardby therefore argues that we need two organs, or a double
organ to be more precise, for the common sense.
Kilwardbys starting point is the existence of conflicting interpreta-
tions. He wanted to reconcile two major theories concerning the location
of the organ of the common sense. The first of these was the theory of
Augustine, the medical tradition,217 and Costa ben Luca,218 that the brain is
the organ of the common sense, which occupies one of the ventricles in
the front part of it, from where a series of nerves lead to the several sense
organs.219 The other theory was the Aristotelian view that the heart is the
organ of the common sense.220 Kilwardbys question also seems to have
been motivated by two medieval works he found valuable, and which
defended opposing views on the seat of sensation: Costa ben Luca posited
that it was the head, in line with the Platonic-Galenic system, whereas
Alfred of Sareshel, in his De motu cordis, claimed that it was the heart.
Kilwardby reiterates Aristotles view that the brain is very cold (ualde
frigidum), and that it does not have blood or nerves (nullus neruus est in
capite),221 characteristics that an organ of the desiderative and apprehen-
sive power needs. The common sense is the primary power of an animal
qua animal.222 The primary power must be exercised in the primary
organ,223 which in an animal is the heart; therefore, the organ of the com-
mon sense must be the heart.224 Kilwardby attempts this reconciliation by
arguing that Aristotle also saw the brain as the organ of the common
sense.225 The discussion is focused on providing a reading that allows for
this view, in other words how for Aristotle the brain is also the organ of the
common sense.

217
DSF 265.
218
DSF 288.
219
Ad eadem quoque anteriori parte cerebri oriuntur nerui sensitiui missi ad diuersas
partes corporis, ut in eis operentur sensus proprii, DSF 301, 126.345.
220
Ex hiis uidetur quod sensus communis exerceat operaciones suas in corde, DSF 255,
114.145. For references to Aristotle, see Rocca 2003, 2831. On the two conflicting views on
the instrumentum of the sensitive soul (thus, not of the common sense), see Roger Bacon,
Opus maius 5, 1.2, 1112.
221
DSF, respectively 259, 261 and 262.
222
Deinde, uirtus prima in animali, vnde animal est, sensus communis est. Sensus
enim est perfectio animalis inquantum animal, DSF 254, 114.910.
223
Item, si animal constat ex multis uirtutibus et menbris multis, racionabile est quod
prima uirtus excerceat operaciones suas in primo menbro, DSF 253, 113.246.
224
DSF 253, 113.246. See also 242 and 251.
225
DSF 242263.
 sense perception 173

Kilwardby acknowledges that Aristotle does not explicitly state that

the organs of all the proper senses converge in some place other than the
heart,226 but did not think that this excluded the possibility that, for
Aristotle, it was also located in the brain.227 Aristotle thus did not contra-
dict the ancient doctors who argued that the organs of the proper senses
arise in the brain and converge in the same place in the one organ of the
common sense.228 Kilwardby thus had to prove that Aristotle believed the
brain was capable of sensing, despite evidence to the contrary.229 He claims
that Aristotle acknowledged that the brain was the organ of three of the
senses: sight, smell, and hearing.230 On the otherstaste231 and touch232
he was not explicit, but the teachings of Aristotle probably accord with
those of the others,233 and Aristotles words will not be at odds with the
positions of doctors when they say that the tactual nerves arise in the
brain as do the nerves of the other senses.234 It is clear that the brain is
connected to the organs of the proper senses.235 Kilwardbys second strat-
egy was to find out what Aristotle had in mind when he referred to the
brain.236 The brain can refer to the substance made of water and earth,
and as such it is not connected with other things, or it can be taken to
mean the vascular net, and as such the brain is connected with the organs
of the proper senses.237 According to Kilwardby, in stating that the organs
of the proper senses are not connected to the brain, Aristotle was merely
referring to the first meaning.238 It is in line with the second meaning that
the brain is connected with the sense organs.

226
Ideo tamen temere asserere non audemus non aliter esse quam ut posuerunt, quia
Aristotiles non ponit expresse quod alicubi concurrant organa sensuum omnium proprio-
rum nisi in corde, DSF 315, 130.113.
227
DSF 266, 288, 303.
228
OI 315, 148 ( organa sensuum propriorum oriantur a cerebro et ibidem concurrant
in vnum organum sensus communis, DSF 315, 130.89).
229
DSF 225233.
230
DSF 278, 315.
231
DSF 289296.
232
DSF 297.
233
OI 315, 148 ( constat quod probabiliter concordata sunt dicta Aristotilis et aliorum,
DSF 315, 130.178).
234
OI 297, 144 See also DSF 248; 288. For Kilwardby there are two diffferent types of
nerves, some which produce motion, and others which sense (DSF 196).
235
DSF 299.
236
DSF 300.
237
OI 300.
238
DSF 252.
174 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby concludes that both the brain and the heart and the interme-
diate pathway between them,239 comprise the organ of common sense and
imagination, which according to his interpretation would suit Aristotle
and the others: Aristotle would agree that both heart and brain are the
organ of common sense and imagination, and as imagination and com-
mon sense are located in two chambers in the frontal part of the brain, he
would also agree that the inner senses have chambers in the brain.240
Kilwardby explains that the two positions are not contradictory, but
rather complementary, and Aristotles position could even be said to cor-
rect the Augustinian and medical view.241 His interpretation of Aristotles
position was that the brain and the heart are both organs of the common
sense (duplex principium sentiendi242 or domicilia).243 However, the brain is
more its organ and the heart is more its source,244 and that which connects
them is the corporeal spirit.245 The common sense is essentially one sen-
sory power performing its operations incidentally by means of two organs,
the heart and the brain.246 This happens because the mind does not pro-
duce acts of sense and motion in the body except by means of heat, the
source of which is in the heart.247 The excess of heat must be regulated by
a cold organ, which is the brain.248
There are two kinds of corporeal spirit, the vital spirit, which is pro-
duced in the heart and the animal spirit, which is produced in the brain
from the vital spirit.249 These spirits connect the organs to one another.
In brief, the process is as follows.250 The corporeal animal spirit carries the

239
DSF 266; 299.
240
DSF 315.
241
Aut dicendum quod contrarie sunt opiniones Aristotilis et aliorum, et ideo diuersi-
mode posuerunt. Aut, quod forte potius est, opinio Aristotilis non est aliis contraria, set est
appositiua ad opinionem aliorum et eiusdem correctiua, quia quod alii minus dixerunt de
hac questione ipse addidit, DSF 266, 116.1923.
242
Quibus iam concessis, patet quod sensitiue communis duplex est organum ad quod
perueniunt ymagines sensibilium, et duplex principium sentiendi vnde hauriunt sensus
particulares, DSF 271, 119.146.
243
DSF 280, 121.14.
244
Ex quibus videtur quod ipse attribuit sensum tam cerebro quam cordi: cerebro,
tamen, magis sicut instrumento quam sicut principio; cordi, uero, magis sicut principio
quam sicut instrumento, DSF 266, 116.325.
245
Ex quo sensus communis habet duo, ut ita dicam, domicilia sese a regione respi-
cientia, inter que discurrunt sanguis et spiritus corporeus, cui presidet immediate ipsa sen-
sitiua communis, DSF 280, 121.146.
246
DSF 274.
247
OI 274, 138. Cf. DSF 284, 122.1821.
248
DSF 274, 120.14. See also DSF 275278.
249
DSF 270.
250
DSF 285.
 sense perception 175

sensible species from the sense organs to the brain where the power of the
common sense receives and judges them.251 The result of this judgement is
then carried by the corporeal animal spirit to the organ of the common
sense that is responsible for movement, the heart. The heart spreads the
corporeal vital spirit through the body, causing it to move,252 pursuing or
avoiding the object of desire.253 Therefore, in terms of apprehension,
i.e., perceiving and imagining, the organ of the common sense is primarily
the brain because it is more spiritual and peaceful organ,254 whereas in
terms of desiderative power, the heart is primarily that organ because it is
the source of the heat that is required to cause motion.255 Two organs are
better than one or the common sense because then it is possible to accom-
modate the nature of the operations with the nature of the organs without
much complication.
The debate over the location of the organ of the common sense was
something that Kilwardby attempted to resolve so as to show the compat-
ibility between Aristotle and Augustine, who as he understood it had quite
diffferent overall theories of perception. He had his reasons for discussing
at length (one third of the treatise) the location of the organ of the com-
mon sense: whereas in explaining perception, the Aristotelian causal
account had to be corrected by the active Augustinian account, due mainly
to the danger it presented to the souls superiority over material things, in
the case of the location of the common sense no such ontological argu-
ment was necessary. After spending two thirds of DSF showing how the
theories of Augustine and Aristotle on how we come to know sensible
things are complementary, he pursues the same goal with respect to

251
carries back, or transmits, the species of the outer sensible things to the brain so
that the brain should make a judgement about them, OI 268, 136 ( qui informati exterio-
rum sensibilium contactu reportant uel transuehunt eorum species ad cerebrum ut de illis
iudicetur, DSF 268, 117.245).
252
Hence the vital spirit, taken from the <vascular> net round the brain, is digested,
purified, refined, and clarified in the ventricles of the front part of the brain, and thus it
becomes the animal spirit, which is then transmitted by way of the sensory nerves in order
to activate the <power of> sense in the body, and it is transmitted by way of the motivating
nerves in order to produce motion, OI 301, 145 (Spiritus igitur uitalis, acceptus a reti cere-
bri, digeritur et purificatur et subtiliatur et clarificatur in uentriculis cerebri anterioris, et
sic transit in spiritum animalem, qui deinceps per neruos sensitiuos transmittitur ad ope-
randum sensum in corpore, et per neruos motiuos ad operandum motum, DSF 301,
1267.36-03).
253
Anima indiget pro sui salute prosequi sibi comoda () et fugere nociua et aduersa,
DSF 207, 105.146.
254
DSF 284, 122.168.
255
DSF 285, 122.2935. See Veenstra 2004, 12.
176 theory of knowledge

the location of the common sense. Here he could treat Aristotle and
Augustine as equals, however, because Aristotles view did not endanger
the ontological hierarchy at the basis of Kilwardbys worldview. I take this
to be a specific piece of evidence against the claim that Kilwardby was an
anti-Aristotelian.
 CHAPTER FIVE

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION

Although many of the elements discussed in the section that follows will
be familiar to the those who know something about medieval epistemol-
ogy, semantics and logic, it is worth reminding the reader that Kilwardby
was contributing to an ongoing discussion rather than following a well-
established trend. Both P.O. Lewry as S. Ebbesen note that his commentar-
ies on some of the new logical texts available are some of the earliest
whose authorship can be identified. Those on Perihermeneias, Analytica
Priora, and Analytica Posteriora date from ca. 1240, in other words some
thirty years earlier than those of Thomas Aquinas (127172), even preced-
ing those of Albert the Great (125767) by over a decade. Thus, Kilwardby
was actually not reiterating what most people thought at the time, he was
saying something that would be repeated by others later on. A clear exam-
ple of this is his influential treatment of the problem of universals, espe-
cially with respect to the semantic implications.1 Kilwardby was also
among the first to criticize Averroes monopsychism and this is why I pres-
ent his arguments against this view in some detail.
In the remaining sections of this chapter I examine Kilwardbys views
on central topics of medieval theories of knowledge, such as divine illumi-
nation, truth, theory of divine ideas, and others less central, such as angelic
and demoniac cognition.

5.1.Abstraction

Thus far I have discussed the perception of particular objects, which

according to Kilwardby, is the source of all human knowledge. Sensation
is the gate to human cognition, for no other knowledge is possible with-
out the perception of particulars.2 The intellect united (copulatus) with
the body does not know except by means of sense experience and through

1
Conti 2008, 370.
2
sensus est porta cognitionis humane et ideo necessarius est: nisi enim maneret
sensibile post sensum, non esset cognitio ultra sensum, NLP II.33, 509.219221. See also
NLP I.33, 90.156.
178 theory of knowledge

phantasms.3 This is valid for universals and for the principles of demon-
stration.4 The process by means of which universals come to be in the
mind from the sensible species received in the senses is called abstraction.
Kilwardby describes this process as multilayered:
Thus, science is drawn from sense, i.e., through the senses is made memory,
and [sense impressions] multiplied by memory made experience, and sufffi-
cient experience makes the universal.5
The sensible species of the exterior object remain in the power of the
memory in the absence of the object;6 from the multitude of sensible spe-
cies in the memory the soul is then capable of discovering a unity, the
experience, the consideration of the features that the particulars per-
ceived by sense experience have in common.7 For example, one can con-
clude from its efffect of curing the fever that affflicted Socrates and Plato
that the potion used cures that kind of fever. Kilwardby points out that
only human beings are capable of experience because only they have
rational power together with the power of memory and of imagination.8
Experience is the first unit of what is common to relevant sensible species,
but is not yet a universal.9 The universal must be said of all the singulars of
the same species.10

3
NLP I.1, 13.
4
omnis universalis habet cognosci per inductionem () set inductio fit per singula-
ria, ergo ad cognitionem universalis exigitur cognitio singularium si per inductionem
cognoscatur, LPA 171.2957. See also NLP I.33, 90.1821.The intencio universalis, i.e. the
intencio generis et speciei, is the form abstracted from its material conditions (cf. LSP
398.117). See also DOS IV.10, 13.3; XXV.196, 76.123; XXXIII.335, 119.245; XLI.379, 133.01;
XLVII.436, 151.610; XLVII.437, 151.1922; and NLPA 170.2669.
5
Sic igitur per sensum hauritur scientia, scilicet ut per sensum fiat memoria, et ex
memoria multiplicata fiat experimentum, ex experimento suffficienti universale, DOS IV.11,
13.46. Also DOS IV.12, 13.168; DOS XLVIII.465, 159.1929. See also NLP II.33, 504.1004:
ex sensu fit memoria () et ex memoria multiplicata experimentum, quia unum experi-
mentum numero est ex multis memoriis () experimento multiplicato, fit uniuersale, dico,
ipso uniuersali in anima quiescente et ente uno preter multa, id est particularia, non tamen
separatum a particularibus. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II.19, 100a038.
6
NLP II.33, 503.802.
7
DOS IV.9. For a general introduction (Kilwardby is referred to briefly), see King 2004.
As King points out, medieval commentaries follow Aristotles Posterior Analytics II.19, and
Metaphysics A.1.
8
DOS IV.8. Cf. Grosseteste, CPA 404, lines 2840.
9
NLP II.33, 509.2245.
10
Nec tamen adhuc est mox universale; sed dum accipit unum ex multisnon tamen
confert omnia eiusdem speciei ad invicemexperimentum est tantum. Quando autem
confert omnia singularia eiusdem speciei sic: Talis potio universaliter sanat talem febrem in
taliter disposito, universale est et principium artis et scientiae, DOS IV.10, 123.33-02.
Kilwardby says in NSLPor 5, P 37ra), that experience is, according to Aristotle, cognition of
singulars (cum dicat Aristoteles quod experientia est cognitio singularium).
 intellectual cognition 179

Universals do not exist apart but in individuals exemplifying their uni-

versal nature, in other words there are no essences of things without there
being individual things.11 Thus, universals are reachable only through
abstraction from individuals,12 and consideration of the essential likeness
in which the individuals agree.13 Abstraction is the intellectual discovery
of the ratio uniuersalis14 or communis in a certain set of individuals beyond
that which is proper to any of them.15 For example, the soul discovers in
the forms of many diffferent animals what is common to all of them,
animality.16
In NLPor, Kilwardby describes the process of abstraction as the work-
ings of the intellectual power: the agent intellect (intellectus agens)
abstracts the intelligible species (species intelligibiles) from the species or
images (ymagines) or phantasms (fantasmata) of sensible things acquired
through sense perception. The intelligible species are then deposited in
the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis).17 The intellect receives infor-
mation about things outside the mind by means of their intentions, which
lack any composition, and the possible intellect is precisely the capacity
the intellect has for receiving intentions,18 characterized as being bare or
naked before this reception.19 To be naked means that the intellect exists

11
universale non est per se aliquid in actu, sed subsistit per individuum et in ipso, et
per esse individui est universale., QLIIS 18, 76.679. See also DOS XLVII.438, 151.245. Cf.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.24, 85a32; 31, 2933.
12
CI 360.345. See QLIIS 17, 73.3725; and QLIIS 78, 221.1901.
13
sic duorum hominum est convenientia essentialis in humanitate non individuali
sed in humanitate simpliciter considerata praeter esse signatum et individuale, QLIIS 17,
71.3379, (italics mine).
14
Quare manifestum est quod prima multiplitate sensuum in talibus fit quedam difffe-
rentia in anima, id est: quedam ratio uniuersalis ex omnibus presentatis accepta, NLP
II.33, 503.8991.
15
Ad secundum quod abstractio est consideratio intellectiva rationis communis in qua
assimilantur simulacra eiusdem naturae non concernendo proprias et particulares rationes
ipsorum simulacrorum, QLIIS 78, 222.2435. See also QLIIS 78, 222.2456; DOS IV.7,
112.26-02; IV.11, 13.910; XXV.196, 76.125; XXV.201, 78.510; and QLIS 83, 261.2829.
16
Verbi gratia, ex hoc quod stat in anima forma animalis particulariter et multiplicata,
ut dictum est, stat ibi consequenter animal, NLP II.33, 506.1557.
17
Denudatur a fantasmatibus cum actu intelligit, intellectu agente abstrahente species
intelligibiles a fantasmatibus sensibilibus, ponente eas in intellectu possibili, CI, 241. See
Lewry 1978, 357; and Pich 2002, 144.
18
Item, quia intellectus est species specierum sicut manus est organum organorum,
conuertit se ad quidlibet, et accipit res per suas intentiones; et intentio cuiuslibet rei est
simpliciter carens compositione: et propter hoc intellectus possibilis est acceptio rei cuius-
libet, NSLPery I.2, M 46vb, (emphasis added).
19
Omnis enim talis cognitio intellectiva humana vel in hac vita fit ex praeexistenti
cognitione sensitiva, secundum quod alibi dicit Aristoteles quod omnis intellectus noster
ortum habet ex phantasmate et ex sensu, QLIS 4, 12.4043.
180 theory of knowledge

so as to be dressed by those phantasms.20 The same conception of the

intellect as a blank tablet on which nothing has yet been written and as
that in which all things can be made is to be found in DSF.21 What seems
clear is that these constitute two aspects (active and passive) of the same
power rather than two really distinct powers.22 There is no reference to the
agent intellect in other works, however, except in QLIS 71. Here the con-
cept resurfaces in the form of a supposedly Averroistic distinction between
the agent (intellectus agens) and the material intellect (intellectus materia-
lis), with Kilwardby arguing that Averroes considered the latter to be a
power of the individual soul, whereas the former was not. I will return to
the question of universals and the intellect later.
What this makes clear is that Kilwardby assumed continuity between
sensory and intellectual cognition. Even though the sensitive and the
intellective parts of the soul are essentially diffferent, they are nevetherless
parts of the same soul and directed toward the same intelligible things
(QLIS 61). Human knowledge proceeds from what is acquired through the
senses, particular intentions, to knowledge of what is more distant from
the senses,23 the common intentions abstracted from them by the intel-
lectual power.24 In that sense, even though science is not primarily about
particulars, it is also about individuals.25 As Kilwardby puts it, there are
many intelligible things that are not sensible, but nothing is sensible with-
out being intelligible;26 in other words, there are things that are not known

20
Et dicitur intellectus nudus intellectus denudatus a fantasmatibus; non enim dici-
tur nudus nisi quia aptus est uestiri, CI, 240.
21
DSF 14. Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.4, 429b30430a2.
22
The most clear presentation seems to be QLIS 89, 279.458 where, comparing the
human intellects way of operating and that of God, Kilwardby claims that intelligible
objects are permanently present to God, not in potency and in act as in our intellect (non
est in suo intellectu actus et potentia sicut in nostro). On the same question on
Grossetestes works, see McEvoy 1980, 1502.
23
Penetrans enim humana ratio ab exterioribus substantiae sensibilis pervenit ad
intima, et sic a rebus infimis ascendit in cognitionem supremarum. () scilicet quia cogni-
tio humana procedit ab his quae sunt notiora sensui ad ea quae sunt remotiora a sensu et
notiora intellectui, DOS LXIII.627, 214.2532.
24
in nobis abstractio nihil aliud est quam acceptio communioris intentionis per se
praeter intentiones particulariores, et hoc ab intellectiva potentia, QLIII1S 44, 189.8890.
On common intentions, see CI 360.502.
25
Similiter ad illud quod ulterius infert quod scientia non erit de universalibus sed de
singularibus. Est enim primo et per se de universalibus, sed non ut seorsum exsistentibus
extra animam et individua sed ut concernunt individua et sunt in eis, et ita per consequens
est scientia de individuis, QLIIS 17, 73.3725.
26
quia multa sunt intelligibilia quae non sunt sensibilia, sed nihil est sensibile quod
non intelligibile, DOS XLVII.431, 150.34.
 intellectual cognition 181

through sense perception, but everything that is perceived is intelligible.27

Both the particular and the universal are intelligible; what difffers is the
degree of intelligibility as well as the power responsible for its apprehen-
sion. The images (simulacra) of sensible things (corporalia) received
through sense perception are intelligible but not qua universal, as only the
intellect is able to proceed further in the intelligibility of the species.28
(The superior cognitive power is able to apprehend the same as the infe-
rior power, but not vice versa.)29 Perception is directed to intellectual cog-
nition because, although perceptual acts are about individual things,
sense perception is about universals, in other words it is about Callias not
insofar as he is an individual (human being), but insofar as he is a human
being.30
This can be understood in terms of the distinction in Posterior Analytics
between priority to us and priority to nature. Prior and posterior to
nature mean the order of informing the same matter: the form of sub-
stance is prior with respect to the form of the body, which is posterior.31
The order of cognition is the opposite, however, in that we need to pro-
ceed from what is better known to us (i.e. that which is immediate in sense
perception, the singular thing) to what is better known by nature or of

27
DOS XLVII.430, 149.356. See also QLIIS 18, 75.4957: Ad quartum quod est Boethii
dicendum quod dicitur singulare dum sentitur, et universale dum intelligitur, non quia
singulare non intelligitur, sicut quidam male intelligentes putant, sed quia intellectus solus
concipit universale in ratione universalis et solus intellectus separat ab eo esse individuale
et abstrahit ipsum considerando absolute et per se. Quod autem singulare intelligatur,
constat ex hoc quod de singulari ratiocinatur intellectus et tradit cognitionem intellecti-
vam, tum quia quidquid comprehendit inferior virtus, comprehendit et superior; tum quia
non posset separare rationem singularitatis ab universali abstrahendo universale nisi
cognosceret tam singulare quam universale. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II.19, 100a17.
28
QLIIS 78, 218219.11722.
29
omnino virtus apprehensiva superior omnia quae inferior, sed non e converso,
QLIIS 78, 218.1156.
30
Ad quod respondet, dicens quod quamuis actus sciendi sit singularis respectu singu-
larium tamen sensus est uniuersalis: non enim inest hominis Callia, id est singularis homi-
nis, sed etiam hominis, scilicet simpliciter et uniuersalis, NLP 33, 505.13941. See also DOS
XLVII.433, 150.15; and NLPA 1712.3025.
31
Quaelibet igitur istarum formarum potest considerari absolute vel comparative. Si
absolute, nominatur essentia, et in hac consideratione convenit cum materia et in eius
nominatione. Si comparative, aut per comparationem ad materiam aut ad aliam formam.
Si ad materiam, aut ad materiam simpliciter, et sic dicitur forma et adhuc communis est;
aut ad hanc materiam vel huius materiam, et sic est haec forma vel huius forma et haec
ratio est individualis. Si consideretur per comparationem ad aliam formam, aut ad poste-
riorem et sic dicitur genus vel universale, aut ad priorem et sic dicitur species vel particu-
lare. Forma igitur eadem multiplicem habet rationem. Sed omnes rationes cum inter se
diffferant, idem sunt quod illa, QLIIS 17, 66.14858.
182 theory of knowledge

itself (i.e. that which is more remote from the senses, the universal).32 The
intellect discerns from the many forms existing in the same thing what is
prior and what is posterior, and by considering what is prior it reaches the
universal.33 Whereas through the senses we perceive particularsthis
flesh, this body and this substance, through absolute consideration, in
other words considering that which is common to the particulars that
instantiate the quiddity or common essence, and without considering it
insofar as it exists in the particular, we come to know what is more remote
from the senses, the universalthe flesh, the body and the substance
secundum se.34 This mental consideration of the forms that are conjoined
with matter without the matter, and with the prior without the posterior,
is called abstraction.35
The multitude is better known to us than the principle of the multitude,
in the same way as the efffect is better known than the causeonly
through a process of intellectual abstraction do we reach that which is
prior by nature, the cause.36 We can also say that we know universals
before we know particulars in that we first perceive a distant body, then an
animated body, then an animal, and finally this animal (hoc animal)this
is called a confused universal.37

32
NSLP 18, 13940.283. See also NLP I.7, 39. Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea
1095a24.
33
Separat tamen anima rationem individuationis quae posterior est, et considerat eam
in ratione formae quae prior est, et sic facit universalitatem, QLIIS 17, 66.16870.
34
DOS XXV.203, 789.34-05.
35
DOS XXV.201, 78.510; and DOS XXV.199, 767.28-06: Ad primum dicendum quod abs-
trahentium non est mendacium quia cum idem sit ex multis formis compositum quae se
habent prius et posterius secundum ordinem, illi composito diversae insunt proprietates
penes illas diversas formas. Et sicut in natura una forma est prior alia et per consequens
proprietates eius proprietatibus illius, sic prior forma cum suis proprietatibus potest apud
intellectum sumi sine posteriori et eius proprietatibus. Quod enim est prius per naturam
potest ab intellectu concipi per se sine posteriori. See also QLIS 83, 262.3335: Et huius
manifesta exemplificatio est in abstractione nostra quam facimus separando rationem
posteriorem a priori, et particularem ab universali, et specificam a generali, et individuam
a specifica.
36
multitudo est nobis notior quam principium multitudinis, sicut efffectus est notior
sua causa, NSLPor 3, M 3rb.
37
et est aliud universale quod non est universale simpliciter sed per confusionem, et
sic dicitur singulare generis esse universale respectu singularis speciei. Aliquis enim per
prius percipit quod aliquid sit corpus, deinde quod animatum, deinde quod homo: et sic
sunt universalia nobis notiora, et sic loquitur Aristoteles in principio Physicorum, NSLPor
11, M 9vb. See also NSLP 18, 13940.28-05, where he refers to the authority of Avicenna.
 intellectual cognition 183

5.2.Universals

Kilwardby argues that science cannot be about fictions (figmenta) in the

mind.38 Thus, universals must correspond to something in the world.39
According his realist approach, univocal predication, definition, and
meaning are possible because universals have their real foundation in
extra-mental things, as the essence of individual things.40 Meaning is
grounded on the correspondence between the words (the common
names) we use in our language and the essences of the things they sig-
nify.41 The name human signifies the essence of a human being instanti-
ated in all the individuals of the kind and existing as a universal in the
intellect.
A definition corresponds to what the thing is; however, the thing is
made of matter and form,42 of which only form is intelligible.43 Forms are
either essential or accidental; an essential form can be the whole or part of
the essence of things.44 The two forms that are part of the essence are the
genus and the diffference (diffferentia).45 The logical definition concerns
being according to reason (esse secundum racionem), and includes a com-
mon form (forma communis), the genus, and a proper form (forma pro-
pria), the diffference.46 The physical definition concerns being according to
nature (esse secundum naturam), which is constituted of matter and

38
Aliud videtur esse contra, scilicet quod ipsum universale nihil omnino sit secundum
veritatem extra animam neque erit praedicatio univoca neque definitio. Quare nec scientia
erit nisi figmentum quoddam animae, QLIS 17, 69.26870. See also QLIII1S 17, 80.438. The
same idea is found in the NSLPery (see Lewry 1981a, 377).
39
QLIIS 17, 73.37680; QLIIS 78, 221.2057.
40
DOS XXXI.303. See also QLIS 76, 244.89: Quando enim nihil subest realiter opera-
tioni rationis, figmentum est quod facit. For an introduction to late medieval realist theo-
ries of universals, see Conti 2008. The classic work on universals is de Libera 1996.
41
Conti (2008, 370371) puts it nicely: moderate Realists conceived of universals as
metaphysical entities, existing independently of our minds, which are necessary condi-
tions for our language to be significant.
42
NSLPor 8, M 7vb.
43
Ad quod dicendum quod omne universale est forma, cum universale per se ipsum est
intelligibile, et omne inteligibile est intelligibile per suam formam, NSLPor, Prooemium,
M 1va.
44
Forma autem aut est essentialis aut accidentalis. Si est essentialis, aut igitur dicit
totam essentiam, et sic est species - est enim species totum esse individuorum, secundum
Boethium, id est tota essentia - aut partem essentiae, et hoc dupliciter, aut enim materia-
lem aut formalem: primo modo genus, secundo diffferentia, NSLPor, Prooemium, M 1va.
45
CI 364.67: Ad difffiniticionem autem quia cum species sit difffinitum, genus et difffe-
rencia difffiniencia; and CI 359.15.
46
LSP 407.19.
184 theory of knowledge

form.47 The genus is the material principle of the species48in other words
the species exists potentially (latent) in the genus49 and the diffference
contracts the genus to the species.50 The species is the whole essence of an
individual.51 A definition also includes middle forms that are dispositional
with respect to the last form.52 The last diffference in a given genus is the
last species (species specialissima). The previous diffferences are in potency
to the last one, which completes and makes the thing one. Kilwardby
repeats the principle that is essential to his pluralism: from two existing
things in act no one thing can be made, but from the incomplete and the
complete one thing results.53 For real definitions to be true they must cor-
respond to something that really exists outside the mind.
Although there is no definition of particulars, it is from these particular
things outside the soul that the intellect brings forth the universality
(intellectus agit in eis universalitatem), and it is to those things that a defi-
nition applies.54 The genus and specific diffference constitute the logical
definition of a thing, but a thing only exists as an individual thing compos-
ite of matter and form, since only individual things exist.55 Even though

47
genus et diffferencia sunt principia cognoscendi, materia et forma essendi, LSP
406.301. See also NLP 132, 4401. On this distinction in Grosseteste, see Crombie 1953, 58.
48
NSLPor 3, M 3ra.
49
NSLPor 5, M 5rb. A more general form (forma communior) is in potency with respect
to a more specific form (forma specialioris) (LSP 397.25).
50
NSLPor 4, M 4ra. (See also NSLPor 8, M 7va.) The job (opus) of diffferentiae is to distin-
guish (opus diffferentiae est facere difffere, NSLPor 7, P 37vb)but not everything that
distinguishes sub genere is a diffference: only what leads to being and is part of the essence
of a thing (NSLPor 8, P 38vb).
51
species enim est quod difffinitur. () est enim species totum esse individuorum,
secundum Boethium, id est tota essentia, NSLPor, Prooemium, M 1va. See also QLIIS 17,
68.220; and QLIS 71, 208.812: Similiter esse compositi non est aliud ab ente vel essentia
quae est forma. The individual is said of one only; the species is predicated on many indi-
viduals; the genus is predicated of many diffferent species (NSLPor 4, P 35va). Now, whereas
a genus requires at least two species, the species does not require at least two individuals
(NSLPor 4, P 35vb): there are cases of species that have one individual only, such as fenix,
sol, lua, celum (NSLPor 5, M 5ra). (The proprium is predicated of one species onlyand of
those individuals that belong to that species).
52
NSLPor 8, P 39ra.
53
cum omnes prime diffferentie sint de natura primi generis; ex quo sequitur quod
sunt entes in potentia respectu ultime; et sic ex illis entibus in potentia et ultima ente in
actu et forma fit unum; ex duobus enim actu existentibus numquam fit unum, ut habetur
in VII Methaphisice, NSLPery II.4, M 60rb. See also DOS XXXI.306. Godfrey of Fontaines
presents this same pluralist argument in his Second Quodlibet, q.7, in Les quatre premiers
Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Louvain-Paris, 1904,
9798.
54
QLIIS 17, 72. 356361.
55
materia et forma conferunt esse singulare, genus et diffferencia esse universale; set
idem est esse singularis et universalis, LSP 406.446.
 intellectual cognition 185

there is no definition of singulars, the singular is implied in the definition

of the universal: there is no universal that is not the essence of individual
things; thus, there are definitions only insofar as universals exist in indi-
vidual things.56 Literally, there is a definition of particular things insofar as
they have the universal in them.57
Having examined how we come to know universals, I will now turn to
their ontological status. In the second lection of NSLPor, Kilwardby formu-
lates Porphyrys famous three questions on universals, which Porphyry
himself chose not answer:58 whether universals are in things or only in the
intellect;59 whether universals are incorporeal or coporeal;60 and whether
universals exist apart from or in sensible things.61 Kilwardby takes these
questions to apply specifically to the status of genus and species more
than to all universals (here, the five predicables), and therefore his answers
focus on genus and species.
The first and third questions can be handled together. According to
Kilwardby, universals have a diffferent mode of existence in the mind and
in extra-mental things.62 Thus, a universal could be considered: (i) as that
which is (id quod est), that is according to its nature, as it is in itself; and
(ii) according to the reason by which it is universal.63 In the former (i), the
universal is one according to its essence, apart from the individuals in
which it exists. However, according to its being, the universal exists out-
side the soul only as the essence of individual things.64 Universals cannot

56
Non enim definitur res universalis extra animam tamquam res quae per se sit extra
singularia, sed ipsa est in singularibus et ut in eis est definitur, QLIIS 17, 72.3546.
57
secundum quod in se habent universale, QLIIS 17, 72.3678.
58
a Porphyrio, se velle abstinere a diffficilibus quaestionibus, NSLPor 2, M 2ra-rb.
59
Prima igitur quaestio quam recusat determinare est ista, utrum universalia sint ali-
quid in re, an solum in intellectu ita quod non in re, sicut posuit Plato, NSLPor 2, M 2rb.
60
Secunda quaestio est utrum sint corporalia vel incorporalia, NSLPor 2, M 2rb.
61
Tertia quidem est utrum sint separata a sensibilibus, an sint posita in sensibilibus. Et
has dicit se nolle determinare, NSLPor 2, M 2rb. For a detailed analysis of Kilwardbys
NSLPor and similar contemporary commentaries, see Pich 2002.
62
Ad haec igitur notandum quod universale duplex habet esse, esse in anima et esse in
rebus extra, NSLPor 2, M 2vb. See also QLIIS 78, 218.10910.
63
Universale potest considerari dupliciter, scilicet vel id quod est vel secundum
rationem qua universale est, QLIIS 18, 74.1920. Kilwardby identifies (i) as being the posi-
tion of Averroes, for whom the intellect makes actual the universals existing potentially in
the images acquired through the senses. See also QLIIS 18, 74.123. See Averrois, CmdA I,
com. 8, 12, lines 2126: Demonstratur per hoc quod ipse non opinatur quod difffinitiones
generum et specierum sunt defffinitiones rerum universalium existentium extra animam;
sed sunt difffinitiones rerum particularium extra intellectum, sed intellectus est qui agit in
eis universalitatem., (emphasis added).
64
Et nota quod quamuis dixit hic Aristotiles quod uniuersale sit unum preter multa
et tamen quod sit in omnibus, non tamen dixit incompossibilia, quia considerando
186 theory of knowledge

exist outside the soul independently of the particulars that instantiate

them because everything that exists outside the soul is either an individ-
ual or it exists in an individual.65 (Individuals difffer in both signate matter
and signate form.)66
Secondly (ii),67 a universal could be considered either (ii) as being in
many, that is existing in many individual things; or (ii) by abstraction
from many, that is existing in the mind through abstraction from individ-
ual things.68 Kilwardby argues that there is no universal human being:
homo signifies a universal in the mind, but this does not exist in reality as
such; what exist are individual human beings.69 The universal exists
through and in the individuals because the universal forms exist in the
individuals only as individuated.70 Existing individuated in their instantia-
tions outside the soul they are universals in potency only, because one and
the same actual thing cannot be present in many things simultaneously.71
The mind is able to consider a form as abstracted from its material condi-
tions (i.e., the actual existence of the sensible object as existing here and
now).72 The form, which is conjoined with matter in a particular being, is
individuated, but it can be considered universal by the mind.73

uniuersale secundum suam essentiam, est unum preter multa; considerando autem ipsum
secundum esse, in multis est, NLP II.33, 5045.1158. See also NSLPor 2, P 34va: Intellige
etiam quod uniuersale consideratum secundum sui naturam et sui essentiam est substan-
tia et quidditas indiuidui; and NLP I.23, 148.
65
Item omne quod extra animam est, vel est individuum vel in individuo, QLIIS 17,
64.90; see also QLIIS 17, 70.2858; and omne quod est est singulare vel in singulare,
NSLPor, lectio 2, M 2vb.
66
QLIIS 17, 71.3159.
67
QLIIS 18, 74.2123.
68
Et dico universale quod opere rationis et intellectus a multis simulacris similibus
abstrahitur, QLIIS 78, 221.1901 (Cf. CI 360.345; QLIIS 18, 74.213; and DOS IV.10). Here
Kilwardby distinguishes between the universal acquired through abstraction (ut dicatur de
multis) and the universal obtained through demonstration (ut dicatur de quolibet et semper
et primo). The same distinction is found in the NLP I.15, 89.737: Item, nota quod uniuer-
sale difffinitum in libro Periarmenias et acceptum a Porphirio materiale est ad uniuersale
hic acceptum, quia illud solum exigit multitudinem ut dicatur de multis, istud autem exigit
aptitudinem ut dicatur de quolibet et semper et primo, sicut ex predictis patet. Et talis
universalitas solum cadit in demonstratiuis.
69
Homo enim uniuersalis non est homo, quia hoc quod dico uniuersale quoddam esse
hominis et aliorum, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, significat, NLP I.7, 41.5254.
70
universale non est per se aliquid in actu, sed subsistit per individuum et in ipso, et
per esse individui est universale, QLIIS 18, 76.679. And Non est enim aliqua forma tam
generalis quae si consideretur ut in signata materia, quin sit individua vel individuata.
Verbi gratia substantia vel corpus generales formae sunt, sed haec substantia et hoc corpus
individuae, QLIIS 17, 70.2869.
71
DOS XXXI.303, 110.1013; and 301, 109.78.
72
DOS XXV.201, 78.710.
73
DOS XXV.200, 77.2830. The universal (such as a diffferentia) is separable from an
individual thing according to intellectual being, not natural being (NSLPor 7, M 6va).
 intellectual cognition 187

Whereas in (i) Kilwardby takes what the universal is in itself, in (ii) he

takes the universal in relation to individual things. The distinction between
(ii) and (ii) seems precisely to be between two aspects of universals: to
exist in many and to be said of many. According to (i) and (ii), the univer-
sal is the work of nature and not of the intellect and as such it exists in
extramental things. On the contrary, (ii) is nothing but the work of the
intellect and therefore the universal exists only in the intellect. The intel-
lect reaches universality by abstracting forms from the likenesses of sen-
sible objects acquired through sense perception.74 That in which they
agree has a unity of a species or a genus, not of an individual.75 The species
is the likeness that is common to numerically distinct individuals, and the
genus is that in which the species agree.76 There is an essential agreement
in their humanity, not insofar as individuated and contracted to Peter and
Paul as individuals, but in humanity simpliciter.77 The universal exists out-
side the soul as this essential likeness that all the many extra-mental
things have in common. P.O. Lewry refers to this unity of the universal
based on the agreement of essence as modal unity.78
David Pich argues that the sort of realism (immanence realism) shared
by Kilwardby and many of his contemporaries requires the assumption
that there are in the world outside the soul things such as essences or
quiddities in addition to individual things.79 However, Kilwardby refutes a
more extreme form of realism, a position he refers to as of the Adamites,
according to which the universal is one and the same thing in all the
individuals which instantiate it. He argues that universals have a separate

See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 4, qod. 2, q. ii. 59, where he presents the three ways of
considering common essences.
74
DOS XXV.196, 76.145. See also NLPor 2, M 2vb: et hoc verum est secundum esse
quod habent in anima, scilicet secundum quod habent esse per abstractionem a singulari-
bus, et sunt in modo abstractionis, et summunt esse et actum ab intellectu. On this double
consideration of the universal, see Pich 2002, 18284 (Pich does not take into consider-
ation Kilwardbys threefold division in the QLIIS 78).
75
QLIIS 17, 71.3289.
76
Unde species non incongrue dicitur essentialis similitudo individuorum et genus
essentialis similitudo specierum, QLIIS 17, 72.3423.
77
Verbi gratia Petrus constat ex materia sua et forma sua et Paulus similiter ex sua, et
utriusque materia et forma secundum quod huiusmodi signata est, et secundum hoc
uterque difffert ab altero tam per materiam quam per formam propriam. Neque enim pro-
pria materia Petri est Pauli neque propria forma Petri est Pauli nec e converso. Tamen quia
utriusque materia propria est materia et utriusque forma propria est forma, ideo conve-
niunt in ratione materiae et formae simpliciter. Similiter diffferunt in hac humanitate et
illa, tamen conveniunt in humanitate simpliciter, QLIIS 17, 71.31522. See also QLIIS 17,
712.33742.
78
Lewry 1978, 244.
79
Pich 2002, 180.
188 theory of knowledge

existence in the real order outside the soul not as a quod est, but only as
aquo est, as that by which something is.80 The universal outside the soul
is one thing (res una), but this unity should be understood not as
numericalit is not an individualbut as the unity of the essential like-
ness that individuals of the same species have in common.81 Universals
exist in the real world only as quiddities and essences of individual things,
not as actually existing things. 82
It is interesting that even though Kilwardby believed that universals
exist in Gods mind as ideas and formal causes, and as exemplars of
things,83 he rules out their role in normal human cognition. He argues
against the existence of essences of things as separated from matter, ut
Plato posuit, suggesting instead that such ideas, which have existed in
Gods mind from eternity, are of no use to science because science is about
what exists in and is said of individuals.84 He makes the same point in NLP
I.23, arguing against Platos consideration of a universal as one form exist-
ing outside things; this, he remarks, is a deception because the universal is
one in many and said of many.85
The logical universal, or the universal of predication, is founded upon
the metaphysical universal, in other words a universal can be said of many

80
Ad aliud dicendum quod minor est falsa: si recte sumat, suberit enim haec assump-
tio, universale est quod est, et haec est falsa; est enim quo est, est quidditas et essentia et
forma individui; nec est unum numero in quolibet singulari, ut posuerunt Adamitae, sed
est unum per modum secundum quam forma per se considerata dicitur una, scilicet per
convenientiam vel per simplicitatem suae essentiae, NLPor 2, P 34va. This point is made by
Lewry 1983b, 67, where he argues that Kilwardby and Grosseteste are probably commen-
ting upon the view of Adam of Balsham. As a quo est the universal is the quidditas et
essencia et forma indiuidui, CI, 243. See also CI 360.018. As Kilwardby says in this work
(CI 359.367), the essencia et forma et quidditas indiuidui are the cause of the universal. Cf.
Lafleur and Pich 2007, 307, n.16; and Pich 2002, 204.
81
Et sicut haec similitudo est extra animam, sic et universale est res extra animam; et
sicut haec similitudo una, et universale est res una, sed non una res individua, ut dictum
est, QLIIS 17, 72.3435. See also NSLPor 2, M 2va; QLIIS 17, 72.343345; and QLIIS 78,
222.23642.
82
Universalia igitur sunt res;sunt enim quidditates et essencie rerum, CI, 245; QLIIS 17,
72.36870. Alessandro Conti has described such an account on universals in a very precise
manner saying that for the moderate realist view, universals are not self-subsistent enti-
ties, but exist only in individual items, as universals have no being (esse) outside the being
of their instantiations (Conti 2008, 37273).
83
nec sunt universalia ideae solum in mente divina, ut posuit Plato, quamvis sint
cause formales et exemplaria universalium, NLPor 2, M 2vb.
84
NLP I.36, 230231.137142. The only exception is found in the case of Christs knowl-
edge, where the rationes causales vel ideales bear epistemological force, due to the union of
his soul with the Verb (QLIII1S 43, 182183).
85
Plato autem uult uniuersale formam esse singularem existentem extra singularia, et
in hoc fuit deceptio, quod non esset unum in multis et de multis, NLP I.23, 148.240242.
 intellectual cognition 189

because it exists in many individual things as their essence.86 Given that

the universal is the essential agreement of individual things, it is grounded
on things outside the mind and knowledge (scientia) and definitions are
not about mere fictions of the mind. Nevertheless, universals exist in the
soul in a diminished state with regard to the complete being they have in
things outside the mind.87
It follows from this that universals are treated diffferently depending on
how they are supposed to be considered: according to its essence, the uni-
versal is eternal as the form that exists in the causing intellect (the divine
intellect), whereas according to its being in individuals it is corruptible
because the particulars that instantiate the universal form are corrupt-
ible.88 Whereas humanity as a universal in the first sense is perpetual, in
this human being it is corruptible because in this human being the species
exist conjoined with matter.89

5.3.The Trinitarian Model of the Soul

In characterizing the rational soul Kilwardby adopts the Augustinian view

of the rational soul and its three powers (potentiae activae)intelligence,
memory and will90 as the image of the divine trinity.91 According to a
distinction probably derived from Robert Grosseteste,92 these powers
can be further divided into a cognitive part (aspectus), which includes

86
non sicut rei actualiter exsistentis extra animam praeter individua sed sicut rei
concernentis individua et quodammodo individuatae in illis, QLIIS 17, 72.36870.
Kilwardby takes this to be the position of Aristotle and Averroes on the subject, a point he
also makes in NSLPor 2, M 2vb: ut dicit Aristoteles et Averrois quod quidditates rerum
non sunt sine individuis. See also QLIS 83, 261.289: Sicut enim particularia in aliquo
conveniunt, et hoc est eis species dummodo sit essentiale illis; and QLIIS 17, 72.3403.
87
QLIS 90, 289.1902. In DOS XXVI.216, 83.1718, he expands the ente diminuto to include
everything that is in the soul, and that is true or false.
88
NLP I.21, 1234.8599. Also in NLPor 2, P 34vb, Kilwardby says that universals are
incorruptible according to their being in the intellect, whereas corruptible in the particu-
lars which instantiate them (e.g., in each individual human being): homo enim in omni-
bus hominibus est incorruptibilis, in isto autem homine est corruptibilis. Nota etiam quod
universalia sunt perpetua secundum esse intellectuale, sed secundum esse naturale non.
89
NSLPor 2, M 3ra.
90
QLIS 35, 86.1957. Cf. also QLIS 36, 5971; QLIS 70.
91
QLIS 5971. Cf. Augustine DT 10.11.179; 12.7.12. In a strict sense, however, only the ratio
superior is the image of the divine Trinity (see, for instance, QLIS 64, 188.2933).
92
See Kitanov 2006, 7983; Knuuttila 2004, 196; 210; 265; and Wood 2002, 295. Kilwardby
could also have found out about them by Fishacre, who uses these concepts in, e.g., InIIS d.
8, 172, lines 480481.
190 theory of knowledge

memory and intelligence, and a volitional part (afffectus), which includes

the power of will.
Kilwardby claims that aspectus and afffectus are two aspects of the ratio-
nal part of the soul, and that there is no real distinction between them, as
there is not between powers within the same potentia.93 They are distin-
guishable by their perfections: the human aspectus is perfected by the
truth of things, and the afffectus by the choice of good actions.94 Kilwardby
points out in NLPor that the soul has two perfections: knowledge of the
truth and comprehension of what is good. Human beings have a natural
desire for knowledge and are thus endowed with the capacities to fulfill
this natural desire.95 However, whereas knowledge (scientia) is the perfec-
tion of the intellective part (partis intellectivae), virtue is the perfection of
the whole soul.96 He formulates this slightly diffferently in Commentary on
the Posterior Analytics: starting from the same principle that all human
beings naturally desire to know, he distinguishes between the perfection
of the practical intellect, which is achieved by the good, and the perfection
of the speculative intellect, which is achieved by knowledge (scientia).97
The latter formulation incorporates the idea that knowledge is subordi-
nated to virtue. Kilwardby stresses that a moral end motivates knowledge
in his Commentary on Ethica vetus et nova,98 which he repeats in DOS: all
cognition is ordained to good work and action.99 He makes the same point
in Quaestiones, arguing for a distinction between nude et pure verum,
which belongs to the aspectus, and verum salutiferum, which belongs to
the afffectus part of the soul.100 The idea that knowledge has a moral end is

93
QLIS 61, 176.114116; QLIS 62, 183.19419; QLIII1S 46, 208.4068: in mente sive
potentia rationali id ipsum sunt in re apprehensiva et motiva sive aspectus et afffectus.
94
DOS XXXV.34751 (especially 350).
95
omnes homines natura scire desiderant, CI 358.5; and also CI 358.89: Nos igitur
naturaliter scire appetentes, et per consequens a natura scire potentes.
96
CI 357.34.
97
NLP, Prologus, 4.
98
scientia ad virtutem ordinanda est. Primo enim oportet habere notitiam finis
principalis, et deinde illa quaerenda sunt quae ad illum consequendum possunt promo-
vere, DOS LXIII.639, 219.79. See Celano (1999). All human beings desire naturally the
good (Naturaliter enim appetimus bonum, QLIII2S 12, 43.100101). See also DOS XXXV.347,
123.034: Omnia bonum appetunt, secundum Aristotelem (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1,
980a21); and QLIS 15.
99
DOS XLIII.405, 141.3133.
100
QLIII1S 1, 7.13643. In this context, Kilwardby argues that the two parts are not oppo-
sites; fides requires the assent of the cognitive part of the soul: Unde videtur quod non
incongrue sic describeretur fides habitus: Fides est quaedam spiritualis impressio passio
facta in mente rationali ex parte afffectus ab arte incommutabili recte credendi cui mens
adhaeret per amorem, per quam ab afffectu inclinatur aspectus ad assentiendum ei quod
non videt, QLIII2S 1, 6.11721
 intellectual cognition 191

at the heart of Kilwardbys conception of knowledge, such that the orderof

the sciences finds its justification in the degree of bonum they attain.101
Kilwardby also argues for a distinction between sciences that are useful in
the search for truth and righteous living but useless for salvation, and
those that are primarily oriented toward salvation (ad salutem necessaria),
thus to a higher end;102 there are also sciences that are useless in both
respects, such as the mechanical (DOS 2). Thus, the order of learning must
respect this hierarchy. Sciences that are directed toward higher ends are
the last to be acquired since they require knowledge of the others in prep-
aration. It is in this sense that theology is the science to which all the oth-
ers are subordinated or at the service of (QLIS 14, 35). Here, too, is the
basic Augustinian principle that influenced medieval learning: science/
knowledge must be directed to virtue (scientia ad virtutem ordinanda
est;DOS 639). The same principle explains the subordination of philoso-
phy to theology: whereas philosophical knowledge is knowledge of
things,theological wisdom is about the love of the true good, the cult of
God and the practical aspects of faith, hope and charity.103 Furthermore,
this subordination is also motivated to a degree by the certainty that is
achievable in philosophy and theology, with Kilwardby claiming that the
principles of faith are known with more certainty than the principles of
demonstration.104
I will now turn to the more psychological discussion that the adoption
of the Trinitarian model brings about with respect to the status of the
powers and the operations they perform. In order to understand the rela-
tion between the powers we must first consider how the relation between
the persons of the divine Trinity is defined.105 I will thus start with present-
ing Kilwardbys explanation of the problem of the Trinity. I will then con-
sider how the relation between persons is translated into human
psychology, in particular the relation between memory and intellect, and
finally, I will deal with the ontological status of verbum mentis.
The most thorough analysis of the divine trinity is to be found in QLIS
35 and 36. Kilwardby refers to Richard of St. Victors notion concerning the

101
ordo scientiarum penes fines attendendus est penes bonitatem finium, DOS
LXIII.636, 217.34. This follows the principle of knowledge as directed to virtue (scientia
ordinatur ad uirtutem). See CI 357.
102
The salvific utility of knowledge is an argument used by Kilwardby to justify the study
of the Bible, in his QLIS 7. See Wood 2002, 294295.
103
QLIS 7, 19.3542.
104
QLIS 8, 20.2124.
105
QLIS 65; QLIIS 77. See Augustine, DT (especially book 5). For an introduction to the
subject, see Knuuttila 1999a, 37; Friedman 1997; 1999; see also Gelber 1974, 125.
192 theory of knowledge

incommunicable existence of divine persons who share a common

nature.106 This incommunicable existence means, as Kilwardby stresses
elsewhere, the impossibility of that which is said of one only being predi-
cated of others.107 The problem with Richards solution is that he does not
clearly explain what distinguishes these persons. Kilwardby suggests three
causes of any given plurality (of supposits or hypostases):108 (i) a diffference
in origin, when something is generated from another; (ii) matter, when
form is made discrete by being present in many numerically distinct
things; (iii) origin and matter, when something is made multiple through
matter and through generation. Of these causes, (i) applies to God only in
that only He does not have matter, (ii) to angels, and (iii) to human beings.
Both (ii) and (iii) apply exclusively to creatures because only creatures
have matter.109 Therefore, the philosophical reason for the personal dis-
tinction within the Trinity is the origin: to generate, to be born and to pro-
ceed.110 God is from God, in other words the generating God generates the
begotten God from its substance.111 The third person of the trinity, the Holy
Spirit, proceeds from both the Father and the Son.112 Although the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one essence,113 the origin and the way of
being originated introduces a distinction between them: generating, being
generated, and proceeding.114 God is one essence and three persons, really
distinct because of the diffferent modes of origin.115
Kilwardby claims to be following Anselms position in holding that the
question of origin implies opposing relations between the three persons:
generating and not being generated, being generated and generating, and
proceeding and not generating.116 The Father only generates and is not

106
QLIS 35, 81.345. See also QLIII1S 10, 50.414.
107
QLIII1S 10, 523;748.
108
QLIS 36, 934.2834.
109
QLIS 33, 75.4244.
110
Item sola causa pluralitatis personarum in Deo est quod est Deus de Deo nascendo
et procedendo, QLIS 36, 93.178; also In Deo nequit esse pluralitas personarum non de se
praedicabilium nisi per diffferentias originis, QLIS 35, 81.367. See also QLIS 36, 94.3440.
111
QLIS 35, 82.656.
112
QLIS 36, 94.40, 503. The filioque of the Latins is meant to correct the mistake of the
Greek theologians, for whom the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only (cf. QLIII2S 6,
29.2445).
113
QLIS 35, 81.59.
114
quia non diffferunt personae nisi proprietatibus, QLIS 40, 128.910.
115
QLIS 36.8, 108.5015. See also QLIS 72, 217.2478. Although in God there is no real
diversity from the point of view of His essence (QLIS 36.8, 111.595), there is a pluralitas realis
in personis (QLIS 76, 245.278).
116
QLIS 36, 93.236. Also QLIS 36, 98.197200: Ex his patet etiam quod personarum
divinarum oportet primam esse Patrem sive genitorem, secundum natum sive genitum
 intellectual cognition 193

generated,117 thus His personal property is innascibility.118 Both the Son and
the Holy Spirit are from the Father but in diffferent ways.119 The Son is born
of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds120 from the Father and from the
Son (connecting both).121 The Son is generated and generates, and the Holy
Spirit only proceeds and does not generate.122 The Holy Spirit proceeds
from both the Father and the Son, i.e. His origin is by procession.123 Thus,
Kilwardby concludes, divine persons have their essence in common, but
are distinguishable by their personal properties,124 which result from their
origin.125 He seemed to follow Bonaventure on the priority of emanation or
origin over relations because relations arise from a diffference in origin.126
Kilwardby considered it important to clarify what is predicated of each
of the three persons. In doing so he adopted the terminology used by the
Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church in their Trinitarian discussions:
person, essence, substance, nature, and hypostasis.127 This procedure has
its source in Boethius Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, adopted in Lombards
Sententiae,128 and the commentaries on this text by Albert the Great,

sive Filium, tertiam ex utraque manantem simul et copulantem utramque, ita quod
gignens et genitus simul spirando producant tertiam procedentem.
117
The ingeneratio vel innascibilitas is the personal property of the Father (QLIS 36,
116.751).
118
QLIS 36, 116.751.
119
QLIS 36, 95.72.
120
QLIS 36, 94.40, 503.
121
Deinde ulterius attende quod persona procedens ut donum et a principio voluntario
liberaliter procedit ita quod non sit unius tantum, sed duorum et hoc eosdem copulans,
QLIS 36, 97.1557.
122
Declarata est igitur tota propositio scilicet quod tantum unica potest esse persona
ex se habens esse divinum et alteri tribuens, et una sola recipiens solum et nulli tribuens,
et una sola media recipiens et tribuens, QLIS 36, 98.1946. Only the Son receives and gives
the divine being (esse).
123
Et isto modo convenit Spiritui Sancto, quia per spirationem passionem. Et intelligo
originem et modum originis scilicet processionem, QLIS 39, 126.6971. Active spiration
belongs to the divine essence (QLIS 39, 126.635).
124
Diffferunt enim personae non per essentiam sed per proprietates relativas, QLIII1S 3,
153536.
125
QLIS 36, 958.78193. See also QLIS 36, 97.14852: Oportet igitur quod processio
determinans personam aliter sumatur, quam sit in communi. Processio enim per viam
naturae et nascendo unam personam constituit, processio autem per viam liberalitatis et
donationis aliam; et sic accipitur processio quando dicimus quod persona procedens dis-
tinguitur contra nascentem; and QLIS 35, 81.368: In Deo nequit esse pluralitas persona-
rum non de se praedicabilium nisi per diffferentias originis, scilicet quia una de alia
procedit, et una est de qua procedit alia. See also QLIS 72, 217.2478.
126
According to Friedman (1996, 1456), only after 1250 the two ways of distinguishing
the persons of the Trinity, relation and emanation, are thought of as contradictory.
127
See Durrant 2003, 87111.
128
Peter Lombard, S I, dist. XXIII, cap. 4, 2, 185.
194 theory of knowledge

Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, as well as in the Summa fratris

Alexandri.129 The Greeks preferred to say that there was one essence and
three substances, whereas the Latins prefer the formulation of one sub-
stance and three persons. According to Kilwardby, this is like taking sub-
stance to be, in an absolute manner, equivalent to essence but, insofar as
it is an individual substance, also equivalent to hypostasis or person.130
After giving a detailed account of what is to be understood by person
in general, Kilwardby analyzes the definition that corresponds to the
divine person. He concludes that each divine person has individual prop-
erties that must not be predicated of their common nature.131 All three are
as one in terms of a shared common nature or essence, but not in the
incommunicability of their exclusive properties,132 by means of which they
are distinguishable.133
The begetter, the begotten, and that which proceeds are relatives, but
relations are substances, not accidents.134 How can relations be sub-
stances? According to Kilwardby, this happens in one of the following
ways:135 (1) as the constitutive principles of composite substances, matter
and form, refer to each other;136 (2) as creatures refer to the Creator;137
(3) what is proper to relation is to stand towards something extra se.138

129
Cf. Emery 2004, 130148.
130
QLIS 35, 87.229242; 88.260.266. See also QLIS 85, 268269.11434. Cf. Hipp 2001,
160176.
131
The names of the persons (Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus) are names of primae inten-
tionis while persona, hypostasis, ens are names of second intentions. See QLIS 85,
268269.1146.
132
Diffferunt enim personae non per essentiam sed per proprietates relativas, QLIII1S 3,
15.356.
133
Personae igitur debent esse discretae personalibus proprietatibus et invicem incom-
municabiles, sed non debent esse discretae natura communi predicabili, sed in illa debent
convenire. Et sic est de personis divinis, QLIS 35, 89.299302.
134
QLIS 35, 89.3034. See also NSLP 12, 91.914; and DNR 523, 24.12 (page, paragraph.
line): Et dicendum quod in hoc diffferunt substantia et accidens: quod substantia per se
subsistit, accidens per substantiam cui inest. () Tolle igitur ipsum inesse, et dimitte hoc
quod est ad aliquid esse, et tulisti naturam accidentis dimittendo naturam relationis. Sed
tollendo naturam accidentis, relinquis necessario naturam substantiae. Et ideo, substantia
potest esse ad aliquid, sive relativum sive relatio, quia non repugnat naturae substantiae
respicere aliud, sed ei repugnat inesse. For an introduction to the subject, see Henninger
1989.
135
QLIS 35, 89.30715. See also DOS XXXIII.342.
136
quomodo prima principia substantiae compositae ad invicem referuntur, scilicet
materia pura et forma, QLIS 35, 89.3089.
137
quomodo etiam creatura relativa est ad creatorem, QLIS 35, 89.309310. A crea-
ture is a being that is made out of nothing; DNR 21, 50; thus, all creatures are relatives (DNR
21, 49).
138
I adopt the reading of Hanagan 1973, 33. According to Hanagan, for Kilwardby the
essence of relation consists in a respectus (81).
 intellectual cognition 195

Whereas what is proper to an accident is to inhere, what is proper to a

substance is to subsist through itself. A relation may be both ways: it is an
accident from the perspective of inhering, but it is a substance from the
perspective of standing towards something extra se.139 If the inhering is
taken away, the accidental nature of relation is taken away, and that which
remains is the nature of relation as standing towards something. This is
precisely the substantial nature of relation. Here Kilwardby means that
relation, insofar as it is founded in a substance, could be said to be a sub-
stance. Divine persons are relations from this point of view: the Father is a
substance that is Father in relation to the Son. With regard to the Father
being a substance rather than being Father, that is taking away the
standing towards something extra se, what remains is that which stands
towards something extra se.140
Let us now consider how the Trinitarian model applies to the rational
soul and its powers, a traditional topic of medieval psychology. The difffi-
culty in applying this model to the human soul is that the distinction
between persons is more extreme than the distinction between the pow-
ers of the rational soul. Whereas the powers are only distinct operatively,
not having any real diversity, divine persons must be really distinct.
Kilwardby goes for a modal distinction (ratione et modo).141 The powers of
the soul are the same as the substance of the mind.142
According to Kilwardby, Augustine and Anselm identified each of the
persons of the divine Trinity with one of the powers of the rational soul:143

139
See DOS XXXIII.342. Cf. Hanagan (1973), 946.
140
Relatio accidens aliunde est accidens et aliunde relatio; accidens enim est unde
inest, relatio unde ad aliquid extra se respectum habet. Tolle ergo hoc ipsum inesse et
tulisti accidens. Quod ergo remanet, substantia erit. Ubi ergo nihil est inhaerens, non est
accidens. Et tamen bene potest inesse respectus ad aliquid, et ille erit substantia. Et sic est
in personis divinis., QLIS 35, 89.3115. This same idea is found in NSLP 7; DNR 24, 523;
QLIS 71, 208.6574. (Aquinas seems to have held a similar viewsee McCord Adams 2008,
108.) But, as Thom 2007 has argued, Kilwardbys argument is flawed. It is relatives, not rela-
tions, that are ad aliquid. So, the most the argument could show is that a relative may be a
substance. However it cannot even show that, because a relative, being a denominative, is
neither substance nor accident.
141
QLIS 60, 171; and especially QLIS 62, 183.193196. See Wood 2002, 324.
142
QLIS 59, 1689.7495; QLIS 60, 171.4243: dictae tres potentiae sunt id ipsum cum
mente in essentia, sed diffferunt ratione et modo; and 171.5152: dictae tres potentiae
sunt id ipsum in re, sed ratione et modo diffferunt. The same topic is discussed at length in
QLIS 67, 196.9192 and QLIS 68, 201.779.
143
QLIS 36, 99.2038. Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion, ed. F.S. Schmitt, in Opera
omnia, I. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946, c. 59, 70: Intelligitur autem in memoria pater,
in intelligentia filius, in amore utriusque spiritus.
196 theory of knowledge

the Father is identified with memory, Intelligence with the Son,144 and
Love or Will with the Holy Spirit.145 Memory is the beginning or principle
of cognition, intelligence is its consummation (i.e. actual cognition), and
love proceeds from cognition.146 The following schema represents these
relations:147

Person Property Power

Father To beget Memory
Son To be begotten Intelligence
Holy Spirit To be aspirated Love

The purpose of this schema is to stress how the property of the person cor-
responds to the property of the power: only memory, as the Father, gener-
ates. However, according to Anselm the Father not only remembers but
also understands and wills, the Son not only understands but also remem-
bers and wills, and so on.148 If this were not so there would be a limitation
on the power of each of the divine persons.149 In the same way, it would
follow that there are several Words, because what one (person) does, the
others do.150 Therefore, in God saying and understanding are the same,
because as God is one substance, what is said of one is said of the three.151
Kilwardby refutes Anselms view in arguing that, although saying
(dicere) and understanding (intelligere) are essentially the same, they are
diffferent in terms of each persons distinguishing properties within the
divine essence.152 If one holds that the three powers of the rational soul
memory, intelligence, and willare the image of the divine trinity, one

144
Sic autem Filius repraesentat Patrem, cum in memoria intelligatur Pater et in intel-
ligentia Filius secundum Anselmum Monologio 59, QLIS 39, 124.235.
145
QLIS 36.1, 99.2038. See also QLIIS 77, 214.96100: Alia quia in divinis personis nulla
est diffferentia nisi qui de alio et de quo alius. Si ergo est imago horum in anima, oportet
quod quodlibet eorum habeat aliquam harum proprietatum. Et ita est. Memoria enim est
de qua gignitur intelligentia, et intelligentia quae de memoria, voluntas autem quae de
utroque procedit.
146
QLIS 36, 103.3289.
147
QLIS 36.8, 103.32932.
148
QLIS 36.1, 99.20911. Cf. Anselm, Monologion, ed. Schmitt, c. 59, 70: Totam quippe
suam memoriam summus spiritus intelligat et amat, et totius intelligentiae meminit et
totam amat, et totius amoris meminit et totum intelligit.
149
QLIS 36, 99.2118.
150
QLIS 36.2, 99.21924. Cf. Anselm, Monologion, ed. Schmitt, c. 60, 71: Singulus enim
quisque essentialiter est et memoria et intelligentia et amor et quidquid summae essentiae
necesse est inesse. See Sirridge 2007 on this point.
151
QLIS 36.2, 100.22932, 2845.
152
QLIS 36.8, 102.295304. See also QLIS 72, 2267.57181. Sirridge 2007 deals with the
same passages, but she approaches it in a very diffferent way.
 intellectual cognition 197

has to hold that the powers imitate the properties of the persons. This they
do, according to Kilwardby: memory generates intelligence as the Father
generates the Son.153 Anselm was wrong when he first distinguished divine
persons on the basis of their diffferent operations, and then claimed that
they were the same because they were of the same essence, one common
substance.154 Therefore, saying must either be said of the three persons,
and in which case it belongs to the common essence, or of one person, and
in that case it constitutes a personal property.155 In confusing both Anselm
commits the fallacy of figura dictionis. He equates memory (Father) as a
person (generator) with memory (Father) as the essence, and in doing so
changes the category from relation to substance.156 One should avoid the
confusion between a personal property and a common shared essence
because, given that the essence is indistinct and the persons are distinct
from each other, confusing what belongs to the persons with the essence
renders the distinction between them unintelligible.157
The properties of each person/power can be assigned to the other per-
sons/powers only because they are said of the essence the persons/powers
share. The properties of a person are said of the other persons only inci-
dentally. The Father qua Father is essentially memory, but incidentally He
is intelligence and love.158 The same goes for the others, in other words
the Son is essentially intelligence but incidentally memory and love,
whereas the Holy Spirit is essentially love but incidentally memory and
intelligence.159 Thus, although memory and intelligence have their own

153
Alia quia in divinis personis nulla est diffferentia nisi qui de alio et de quo alius. Si
ergo est imago horum in anima, oportet quod quodlibet eorum habeat aliquam harum
proprietatum. Et ita est. Memoria enim est de qua gignitur intelligentia, et intelligentia
quae de memoria, voluntas autem quae de utroque procedit, QLIIS 77, 214.96100.
154
Istud enim non valet: Pater est generans et Pater est divina essentia. Ergo divina
essentia generat. () Similiter cum dicitur: Memoria generat vel potius est generativa.
Sed memoria est divina essentia. Ergo divina essentia generat vel est generativa. Et
eodem modo de intelligentia et amore dicendum et de consimilibus, QLIS 36.8,
103.3424()348351.
155
Item si dicere conveniret omnibus personis, tunc esset essentiale praedicatum et
absolutum absque proprietate personali. Sed secundum Augustinum opposito modo se
habet, QLIS 36.8, 105.403404.
156
QLIS 36, 103.3558. In the first proposition generating is not the category of action
but relation because in God to generate is aliquo modo esse vel se habere ad aliquid (QLIS
36.8, 110.5712).
157
Tertio dubidatur de hoc quod dixit tres personas esse invicem mutuo, et se ipsas uno
et eodem dicere scilicet divina essentia, quia indistinctio non facit intelligi distinctionem.
Sed essentia est penitus indistincta, et tres personae sunt distinctae, QLIS 36.8, 105.4125.
158
QLIS 36.8, 103.32836. The same goes for the other divine persons.
159
Patri ergo secundum quod talis est, essentialis est memoria, sed accidentalis intelli-
gentia et amor. Similiter Filio unde talis est, essentialis est intelligentia, sed accidentalis
198 theory of knowledge

operations, they are both functions of the rational soul, 160 in the same way
as the divine persons have diffferent personal properties and still are one
God.
Kilwardby points out that saying is not the same as understanding
because saying is the personal property of the Father,161 whereas under-
standing is the property of the Son.162 The Father says the Word (Verbum),163
the Son is the Word said; and to be said is proper only to the Son.164 The
word is correlative to the one saying it, as the Son is to the Father,165 but it
is not the one saying it.166 On the other hand, Augustine was correct in
asserting that saying belongs to memory and understanding belongs to
intelligence.167 Let us consider what Kilwardby had to say about the rela-
tion between the two powers of the cognitive part of the rational soul,
memory and intellect, and what this relation says about the first two per-
sons of the divine trinity.

memoria et amor. Et Spiritui Sancto essentialis est amor, et accidentalis est memoria et
intelligentia, QLIS 36, 103.3359. Kilwardby stresses that accident here means only that
each divine person has an accidental disposition to one another ( non quod ibi sit ali-
quid vere accidens vel accidentale ut in creaturis, sed quod rationes istae habeant quandam
accidentalem habitudinem ad invicem secundum modum praedictum, QLIS 36.8,
103.33941).
160
QLIS 67, 197.1213. See also QLIS 60, 171.502: sic dictae tres potentiae [memory,
intelligence and will] sunt id ipsum in re, sed ratione et modo diffferunt. For the power of
the will, see also QLIIS 77, 214.923.
161
Ex his videtur quod dicere sit notionale et personale, et idem quod prius tunc seque-
tur scilicet quod non sit dicere idem quod intelligere, QLIS 36.8, 105.40911; 4256. See also
QLIS 36, 105.395: Solus enim Pater videtur dicere; and et sic loqui vel dicere semper est
personale et ad solum Patrem pertinens.
162
QLIS 72, 2245.499513. The diffference extends to the nature of the operations: to say
is some kind of action of the mind, whereas to understand is some kind of contemplation.
I do not discuss here the two aspects of saying, that is, the act of generating and the act of
signifying (cf. QLIS 72, 211.7880; 212.1013; 217.2625; 227.596603).
163
Pater loquitur vel dicit Verbo, ergo generat Verbum, QLIS 72, 211.801. A good
introduction to the subject is Panaccio (1992).
164
Unde verbum secundum plenam descriptionem est similitudo de re expressa ad
eius notitiam faciendam. Sic igitur proprie dicitur et pertinet ad solum Filium, quia impor-
tat nativitatem de vera sui significatione, QLIS 36.8, 107.4624.
165
Sicut enim Pater est correlativum Filii, sic dicens Verbi, quia omne verbum dicentis
est verbum et omnis dicens verbum dicit, QLIS 36.8, 105.4012. See also QLIS 36.8, 108.484.
166
On correlactiva, see QLIS 72.2, 2223.43542.
167
Videtur ergo locutio mentis pertinere ad memoriam proprie, et audire sive intelli-
gere ad intelligentiam, et sic videntur ibi habere rationes oppositas. Et non videtur esse
verum quod dicit Anselmus quod dicere sit cogitando intueri, QLIS 36, 104.3869.
Intelligence is the same as the power of the intellect (QLIII2S 38, 1434.2531, although he
also uses the term meaning the superior part of the soul that has in itself the immutable
truths (QLIII1S 44, 190.1258), and the act of understanding. In QLIII2S 38, 143.25; 144.345,
Kilwardby explicitly asserts the equivalence between intelligentia, mens, visio mentis and
intellectus; there are some particular uses which do not need to concern us here.
 intellectual cognition 199

5.4.Memories and Intelligence

Kilwardbys QLIS 62 is a response to Fishacres InIS, and as such should be

understood in the context of the discussion on the soul and its powers as
the image of the divine Trinity. The divergence between Kilwardby and
Fishacre concerns the source of the species in the soul as well as the rela-
tion of priority between memory, which Kilwardby identifies with the
Father, and intelligence, which he identifies with the Son (the Verbum).
This is particularly relevant in that he places the personal Trinitarian dis-
tinction in the origin of the divine persons. Moreover, this discussion is a
meeting point of the Aristotelian and Augustinian theories of the human
mind and of knowledge. Aristotle had no conception of intellectual
memory, and his view of the process of understanding had a very diffferent
tone than the Augustinian inner vision. This was in contrast not only
with Aristotle but also with Kilwardbys own account in his logical
commentaries.
According to Kilwardby, some authorshe meant Richard Fishacre168
subscribed to the view that there is a double memory in other words the
soul has the same intelligible species from two sources. On the one hand it
receives these species by means of abstraction from the phantasms, and
on the other it is innately endowed with the species of the same objects.169
In fact, this is quite an accurate description of Fishacres third distinction
in InIS, in which he claims that human beings have a double memory: one
is the memory of the possible intellect, the repository of the species
received in the intellect, and the other, which is the disposition of all the
intelligible forms in the mind, is the memory of the agent intellect.170
(Another problem with the theory, which I cannot deal with here, is the
assumption that innate in the soul are the species of corporeal things,
which is contrary to Augustine.)171

168
Brown 1996, 3607.
169
Ad quam sustinendam dicunt aliqui quod duplex est memoria. Anima enim ut
dicunt habet apud se omnes species intelligibiles a natura sibi inditas, et harum memoria
praecedit intelligentiam. Item eadem recipit alias species etiam eorundem intelligibilium
per sensum et per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et harum memoria sequitur intelli-
gentiam, QLIS 62, 178.3438.
170
Duplex est un nobis memoria: una quae fit ex speciebus primo receptis in intelligen-
tia, et deinde in memoria repositis; et haec est memoria intellectus possibilis. () Alia est
habitus omnium formarum intelligibilium in mentem, saltem angelica, ex conditione sua;
et haec est memoria intellectus agentis in nobis., Richard Fishacre, InIS, in Long 1968, *30.
See also Long 2006, 1270.
171
QLIS 62, 178.4344.
200 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby starts by presenting two apparently contradictory defini-

tions of memory. Augustine defines it as a power (potentia) of the soul,
which deals with both intellectual and sensitive objects, and concerns the
present, past and future.172 Aristotle, on the other hand, distinguishes
between memory (memoria), in other words a disposition (habitus) or
afffection of the sensitive part of the soul, and recollection (reminiscentia),
which is an intellectual activity.173 Moreover, memory is only of the past.174
The central feature of both theories seems to be that the diversity of
objects implies a diversity of powers.
According to Kilwardby, the soul operates with two kinds of intelligi-
bleobjects,175 eternal and immutable truths and images of sensible things
received through the senses. Objects of the first kind include the unchange-
able principles of geometry and arithmetic,176 our own faith, the soul, and
God.177 These intelligible objects do not originate in the senses, but are that
against which our sense experiences are measured. For example, the per-
ception of a line or a triangle is judged on the basis of the respective geo-
metrical definition.178 These principles, as will be shown in the section on
illumination, are present in the intellective soul from its creation.
Kilwardby argues that in order to account for the diffferent kinds of
objects, it is necessary to distinguish between a higher and a lower
memory.179 The lower memory (A), which is called brutalis, belongs to the

172
Augustines DT 14.11.14.
173
QLIS 62, 177.213; QLIS 59, 167.5761. See also DOS 10.48, 25.257. Cf. Aristotles De
memoria et reminiscentia 1, 449b528; 2, 453a514; Bloch 2007, 27. On the qualification of
habitus, see QLIII2S 70, 78, 26970. Kilwardby considers habitus a stronger disposition,
something between capacity and action, and between science and opinion. In NSLP 13,
100.1013, he discusses this definition in detail. There are four types of habits, some innate,
some acquired. Sensus is an innate habit, intellectus is both innate and acquired (quodam-
modo acquisitus, quodammodo innatus), scientia is an absolute acquired habit (scientia est
habitus animae: QLIS 90, 286.94), and opinio is a disposition with respect to science. See
also NLP I.5. Our intellect is first in habit, then in act (QLIS 89, 279.4950).
174
In the DOS, Kilwardby presents a diffferent account of memory from the one in the
QLIS. In the DOS (X.48), he distinguishes between the recordativa and the reminiscitiva,
the former the sensitive memory, the latter the intellective memory.
175
DSF 26.
176
Res enim intelligibiles, que sunt in disciplinis liberalibus et non capiuntur sensu,
perueniunt ad intelligenciam ita quod uideantur intellectuali uisione absque alia uisione
media, DSF 25, 60.268. See also DSF 39; and QLIII1S, 190.1258: superior pars animae
rationalis quae intelligentia dicitur, habet apud se praesentem incommutabilem veritatem
in qua sunt rationes immutabiles omnium figurarum, de quibus agit geometria. According
to Kilwardby, this is the view of Plato and Augustine (DSF 35). Cf. Augustine, De libero arbi-
trio 2.8.20; 2.10.28; Confessionum 10.12.19. See Mcdonald 2001, 7677; Rist 1997, 7677.
177
DOS XXVII.222, 85.
178
DSF 35; 40. Cf. Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2.12.34.
179
Ad huius evidentiam notandum quod duplex est memoria: Una quae pertinet ad
partem animae irrationalem, quam etiam communicamus cum brutis, et potest vocari
 intellectual cognition 201

sensory soul and concerns sensible objects,180 whereas the higher memory,
which is called rationalis, belongs to the rational part of the soul. Rational
memory is further divisible into a superior and interior (B) and an inferior
and exterior (C) memory.181 What distinguishes (B) and (C) are their
objects: (B) concerns spiritual objects, which are presented to intelligence,
whereas (C) concerns images of corporeal objects, which are presented to
imagination. There is a more significant diffference, however: whereas the
inferior rational memory and the sensitive memory receive the images of
sensible species, the superior rational memory does not, in fact, receive
the intelligible eternal truths because they are already in the mind.182
Therefore, B and C have the same nature, and are distinguishable by their
objects (B, intellectual and C, sensible),183 whereas A and C have the same
objects but a diffferent nature (C is part of the rational soul, A part of the
sensory soul). A and B difffer in both nature and object.
Thus, the diversity of objects explains the diffference between memo-
ries, but Kilwardby was particularly concerned about the relation of prior-
ity between memory (or memories) and intellect. Whatever the kind of
memory, it must first have the image (of the object) before keeping it and
before displaying it to the power of imagination in the case of memory A
or the power of intellect in the case of both memories B and C.184 There is
no particular diffficulty in the distinction between memory as the power
responsible for keeping and intellect as the power to understand; the
question is rather how images of intelligible objects come to be in the soul.

brutalis vel irrationalis. Alia quae pertinet ad partem rationalem, in qua excellimus bruta,
QLIS 62.1, 179.558. See also QLIIS 126, 323.401. According to the editors, Kilwardby is argu-
ing against the view of Richard Fishacre; but in turn it seems Fishacre is opposing the view
we find in Kilwardby (cf. Long 2006, 1270). On a triplex memory, see John Pecham,
Quaestiones tractantes de anima, q.29, ed. cit, 197, with the editors referring to Alexander of
Hales and Bonaventure.
180
QLIS 62.1, 179.5960; DSF 207; LSP 401.3943.
181
Ut autem plenius eluceat natura memoriae, nota quod haec memoria posterior quae
et rationalis est, bipartida est scilicet superior et interior, vel inferior et exterior, quarum
prima pertinet ad superiorem rationem, secunda ad inferiorem. Et prima continet spiritua-
lia de quibus est visio intellectualis, quae per se ipsa sunt praesentia, et ut multum perpe-
tua. Secunda continet imagines rerum corporalium per sensus adquisitas de quibus est
visio spiritualis sive imaginativa, QLIS 62.1, 8995.
182
See also QLIS 45, 147.935.
183
Et dico istas diffferentias quoad habitus, non quoad potentias forte., QLIS 62,
180.1045. The diffference between B and C is of dispositions not of power (A and (B/C) dif-
fer as powers belonging to diffferent substantial forms.
184
Discurre igitur per omnes memorias, et ubique videbis quod prius habetur et tene-
tur visibile, quam intueatur illud acies habentis. Non enim videt illud nisi in se, nec sibi
exhibere potest nisi quod habet, QLIS 62, 181.118120. See also QLIS 62, 179.6973 (for A),
and 179.8083 (for B-C).
202 theory of knowledge

Kilwardbys answer is: by reception through natural assimilation.185 The

soul, through the power of memory, has the capacity to assimilate itself
into the species of objects, and by means of this assimilation to retain
these species.
In the case of sensory memory (A), this means assimilation to a bodily
afffection (in passione).186 Kilwardby explains this in his description of the
workings of memory in sense perception:
It should be said that the vitalizing sensory soul was so made in order that by
its nature it should be assimilable to sensible things, it should preserve this
assimilation, and it should show the assimilation to itself while contemplat-
ing itself. And its power which is of such kind is memory. For memory is
that power of the sensory soul by which it assimilates itself to sensible things
outside, when it has brought back and retained a sensible image from out-
side which is to be shown to its own eye at another time in the absence of the
sensible thing outside. Therefore the nature by means of which the sensitive
power retains the species it has received is memory. (DSF 206, transl. Broadie,
with changes)187
It is the same in the case of memory (B). In fact both intellectual cognition
and sense perception could be understood in the light of the model of
generation, according to which something generates and something is
generated.188 In the case of sense perception, the sensible object generates
actual sensation by impressing its likeness on the sense organ, which is in
potency to the sensible species.189 In the process of intellectual cognition
memory has the cognoscible thing in itself (in se), or the likeness by which it
can be known. The eye of the mind has not yet cognized what is possible to
understand or cognize, but only when it turns itself to memory and directs
[its attention] to it does it understand or cognize in act, and this is because
memory conjoined with the eye [of the mind] assimilates the eye into itself,
impressing in it the likeness of the thing it has in itself, not releasing from
itself that which it has (in itself), but a [likeness] similar to the one it has [in
itself], impressing it in the eye. And there is the impressing likeness in the

185
Sed quaeris forte quomodo memoria habet speciem exhibendam aciei nisi reci-
piendo, et si recipiendo habet, quomodo aliter recipit quam videndo. Respondeo: Habet
eam per receptionem. Sed haec receptio non fit videndo proprie, sed naturali assimulatione,
QLIS 62, 181.1347 (emphasis added). See also QLIS 62, 181.1423 Sic ergo memoria recipit
per assimulationem ad illud cui naturaliter copulatur.
186
QLIS 62, 181.13738.
187
OI 206, 124. See also DSF 217, 108.1821. On the role of memory in Augustine (influen-
tial for Kilwardby), see ODaly 1987, 878; 1318.
188
QLIS 35, 84.1545.
189
QLIS 35, 845.15261. This passage is however problematic in face of Kilwardbys
theory of perception as described in DSF.
 intellectual cognition 203

memory and the likeness impressed in the eye, and from the likeness
impressed and the eye [of the mind] comes into being one offfspring, which
is intelligence. And, in the same way as in perceiving the sensible form
remains in its matter when its likeness disappears from the sense when it
turns to another object and what is sensed is generated again when it turns
to it, so in the intellect the intelligible species remain in the memory when
the likeness impressed in the eye will disappear from the eye when it turns
to another object of cognition, and the intelligence is generated again from
it when it turns to it.190
The above passage makes it clear that the soul must have, prior to the act
of understanding, an image of what is to be understood.191 Kilwardby uses
the term conformatio to refer to the state or disposition of being informed
by those images.192 The intellect must then turn to the images, stored in
and presented by the memory,193 and actually think them.194 In the same
way as the sensible object generates actual sensation by impressing its
likeness in the sense organ, memory generates an act of understanding by
impressing a likeness of the cognizable object in the eye of the mind.
Memory makes an image of from the species intelligibilis it has within,

190
Omnino simile convenienter est in nostro intellectu cogitante ubi motus non est.
Memoria enim habet rem cognoscibilem in se, vel eius similitudinem qua potest intelligi.
Acies mentis nondum cogitans possibilis est cogitare vel intelligere, quae quando convertit
se super memoriam et applicat se illi, intelligit vel cogitat in actu, et hoc quia memoria
aciei coniuncta assimulat sibi aciem imprimendo ei rei similitudinem quam apud se tenet,
non a se emittendo quam habet, sed similem illi quam habet, imprimendo illi scilicet aciei.
Et est similitudo imprimens in memoria et similitudo impressa in acie, et fit unum geni-
tum ex similitudine impressa et aciei, quod est intelligentia. Et sicut in sentiendo manet
forma sensibilis in sua materia, postquam eius similitudo perit a sensu per aversionem
sensus ad aliud sentiendum, et iterum generatur ab ea sensitivum in actu per conver-
sionem sensus ad illam, sic in intellectu manet species intelligibilis in memoria, postquam
similitudo quam impressit aciei perierit ab acie per conversionem aciei ad aliud cogitan-
dum, et iterum ab illa generatur intelligentia per conversionem aciei ad illam, QLIS 35,
845.15276. Cf. Augustine, DT 11.3.6.
191
QLIS 62.1, 179.804. See also QLIS 65, 189.167.
192
quod habitus iste [the intellect/intellectus] nihil aliud est nisi conformatio mentis
secundum aspectum cum rebus spiritualibus; per quam scilicet conformationem ipsas
cognoscit, sicut et imaginaria cognitio est conformatio animae cum rebus corporalibus per
earum imagines spiritui impressas. Sic enim oportet quod res spirituales praesentes sint
menti per se ipsas vel per aliquas causas vel efffectus vel annotationes quae suffficientem
earum generant similitudinem ad innotescendum eas menti, et aspectus sic informatus et
tali similitudine eis conformatus habitum intellectus habet, et ista conformatio est intel-
lectus habitus, QLIII2S 38.4, 145.718. In NLPery I.2 (P 67va), Kilwardby points out the
many senses of the term intellectus which means concept but also designates a faculty of
the rational soul and the knowledge of the principles of demonstration.
193
QLIS 89, 279.4753.
194
Non enim videt illud nisi in se, nec sibi exhibere potest nisi quod habet, QLIS 62.1,
181.11920. That is why it is called intellectum: intus lectum, to read inside (QLIS 88,
276.468).
204 theory of knowledge

which it presents to the eye of the mind (acies mentis).195 In exhibiting it,
memory generates an act of understanding (intelligentia),196 which is best
portrayed as mental seeing.197 Understanding (intelligentia) is the eye of
the mind assimilated to the image impressed on the eye by memory.198 The
verbum mentis is the actual cognition of the knowledge (notitia) memory
has and which it presents to the eye of the mind.199
The same holds for the objects of memory (C): these intelligible things
are present in the mind, hidden in the cell of memory,200 but are not actu-
ally thought about all the time.201 We have them but we only cognize them
when memory displays them; when I actually think about them, I know
that I know them.202
Kilwardby distinguishes between knowing something and actually
thinking about it: understanding is the act through which the soul sees
what it has already stored in itself. In other words, the human intellect
goes from a state in habitu to a state of actuality (in actu), that is a state of

195
It is not the image that exists in memory that generates the mental act, but the like-
ness of that image made by memory impressed in the eye of the mind (see Augustine, DT
11.3.6.) This series of images/likenesses respects the Augustinian doctrine in DT (11.9). Cf.
Spruit 1994, 1845.
196
Sicut enim sensibile non percipitur nisi per impressionem quam ingerit sensui, sic
nec aliqua species intelligibilis intelligitur nisi per spiritualem impressionem quam ingerit
intellectui, QLIII1S 44, 191.1435. My attention was drawn to this distinction by Yrjnsuuri
1999, 54. In other places Kilwardby calls intelligence the superior part of the rational soul
(superior pars animae rationalis quae intelligentia dicitur), the part of the soul directed to
the intelligible objects (QLIII1S 44, 190.1103 and 125128).
197
Potest enim apprehensio dicere actualem contituitionem quae est visio vel intellec-
tio, QLIS 62, 182.1556. Much of the terminology used here can be found in pseudo-
Augustines De spiritu et anima 10: the mind is the eye of the soul; the souls vision, intelli-
gence; its gaze, reason. There are some diffferences between the corporeal and the
intellectual or interior vision: Kilwardby points out that, according to Augustine (DT
14.3.5), the bodily eyes see the exterior object through its species, whereas the intellectual
vision (interius cogitando) sees through the similitude of the species (non per ipsam
speciem, sed per eius similitudinem) (QLIII2S 22, 70.525).
198
QLIS 67, 197.110114.
199
cogitatio est verbum natum de memoria notitia, QLIS 35, 84.1324. See also QLIS
67, 197.110114. Cf. Augustine, DT 15.10.19.
200
Ibi enim vult intelligibilium species semper animae esse praesentes quae sunt per-
petuae et immutabiles, et spectant ad visionem intellectualem, QLIS 62.1, 178.467.
201
Ex his collige quod intelligibilia omnia semper sunt in mente, sed non semper cogi-
tantur. Et ut actualiter cogitentur, proficit scientia nostra per tempus et locum. Similiter
videtur posse esse in angelis quod habeant apud se notitiam omnium corporalium, sed
non semper ea cogitent, QLIIS 37, 121.14750. Also QLIIS 37, 120.101112.
202
Omnia intelligibilia quorum notitiam non adquirimus per sensum ut artes liberales,
semper sunt menti nostrae praesentia. Et, ut dicit, illa omnia semper novi, sed non semper
cogito. Secundum enim ipsum quae sunt in memoria abdita, novi quidem, sed non cogito;
quae autem in memoria manifesta, novi et etiam scio me nosse, quia haec actualiter
cogito, QLIIS 37, 121.1338.
 intellectual cognition 205

actual understanding.203 This corresponds to the distinction philosophers

make between knowledge (scientia) as act and knowledge as disposi-
tion.204 Therefore, in some sense Kilwardby was justified in arguing against
an incompatibility claim between Aristotles and Augustines theories. The
picture that emerges from this is of knowledge as a series of processes in
which memory occupies a central role: memory assimilates, keeps and dis-
plays the images of sensible and intelligible objects and still keeps these
images after the acts of imagination and intellect.205
Returning to the Trinitarian question, Kilwardby argues that only by
adopting Augustines reading (and not Anselms) can the distinction
between persons and powers be secured. Memory (the Father) presents a
likeness of the intelligible species to the eye of the mind, and the actual
understanding is intelligence (the Son). Memory generates intelligence.206
When I say, I understand a, the act of understanding a refers to one per-
son only, the Son, not the whole Trinity.207 Kilwardby offfers a complemen-
tary reading in QLIS 67. The mind could be considered either as knowing
and loving, or as that which is known and loved. It is considered in the
latter case from the point of view of its essence, and in the former from the
point of view of its powers and operations: the power that exhibits
theessence of the mind is memory, generating knowledge in the intelli-
gence and love in the will.208

5.5.Monopsychism

The main focus in Part One of this book is on the question of the unicity or
plurality of substantial forms, and Chapter 1 also deals in some detail with
the special status of the intellective soul with respect to the sensitive body.
This latter aspect assumed major importance in thirteenth-century

203
QLIS 89, 279.4647; 50. Kilwardby does not connect this with the discussion of the
agent and possible intellect but this view derives from his conception of one intellectual
power which is at times potential and actual.
204
Et haec distinctio sumitur ab Augustino lib. XIV De Trinitate cap. 14 et Confessionum
lib. X cap. 11 et est similis illi qua distinguitur apud philosophos scientia ut habitus, scientia
ut actus, QLIIS 37, 120.1136.
205
On the distinction between the two acts of memory, keeping and displaying the
images, see QLIS 62, 177178 and QLIIS 39, 125.
206
Memoria enim gignit de se intelligentiam et in hac gignitione sibi complacent et sic
per voluntatem coniunguntur, QLIIS 77, 214.923. See also QLIS 63, 185.4547: Memoria
per exhibitionem cognoscibilis est gignitiva, intelligentia vero per receptionem eiusdem
est formabilis vel generabilis.
207
QLIII1S 3, 15, 4954.
208
QLIS 67, 196.7786; 197.96100.
206 theory of knowledge

psychological discussion with the circulation of Averroess theory that one

intellect was common to all human beings. After initially accepting the
psychology of the Commentator without realizing the full extent of his
theory, Latin thinkers started to criticize Averroes doctrine,209 and
Kilwardby was among the first to offfer such a critique.210 Compared to later
and more fully developed critiques, such as that of Thomas Aquinas, his
objections look fairly insipid. They show however an awareness of, and a
growing concern with, the implications of Averroes doctrine, and a first
attempt to dismiss it as philosophically unsound.
Kilwardby considers whether there is one intellectual soul common to
all human beings or an individual intellectual soul in question 78 of
QLIIS.211 I will go into some detail because this is one of the instances when
Kilwardby develops more thoroughly his view on individuation and uni-
versals. He begins by claiming that Averroess position was not only against
philosophical truth but also against faith, accusing him of misreading
Aristotle on the nature of the intellect.212 He presents Averroes three main
arguments for the existence of one soul common to all human beings as
follows:
(1)One soul is enough to vivify the diffferent limbs and organs; the difffer-
ence between the parts of the same body is greater than that between
diffferent bodies; therefore one soul is enough to vivify many bodies.213
(2)As the cause of the distinction of individuals within a species is also the
cause of their corruptibility, in other words matter, one rational soul is
enough for the salvation of the species, since the rational soul is
incorruptible.214
(3)The intelligible thing, which is a universal, is either the same in diffferent
intellects, in which case there is only one, or it is diffferent in diffferent
intellects, in which case it is individualized, being not universal but
singular.215

209
Salman 1937, 2045; 2112.
210
Kilwardby, together with Albert the Great (whose De unitate intellectus contra
Averroem is from 1256) and Bonaventure, C II, d.18, a.2, q.1, 4589), were the first to identify
Averroes position (cf. Gauthier 1982; 1984, *221*2). Cf. also Kuksewicz 1980, 15; de Vaux
1933; and Salman 1937.
211
Postea quaeritur utrum omnium hominum possit esse una anima numero, ut dicit
Averroes et imponit Aristoteli quod ipse sic intellexit, QLIIS 78, 215.45. The examination
of QLIIS 78 is complemented with what he says elsewhere, especially in the DOS IV and
QLIIS 1718.
212
Respondeo dicendum quod non est una anima omnium et erravit Commentator
ponens contrarium. Hoc enim est absurdum et impium secundum fidem et etiam secun-
dum philosophiam nec fuit haec intentio Aristotelis., QLIIS 78, 216.4951.
213
QLIIS 78, 215.911.
214
QLIIS 78, 215.124.
215
QLIIS 78, 215.1922.
 intellectual cognition 207

(3)Moreover, if the same species were diffferent in diffferent intellects, it

would difffer either partially or completely. If partially, then it does not
represent the thing; if completely, then neither is it a species nor does it
stand for the thing. Therefore, the species must be one in number and
the intellect is necessarily one in number.216
Kilwardby goes on to raise a number of objections to Averroes arguments
that are explicitly taken from Aristotle. The first is the claim in De anima
that the soul is the form of the body (forma corporis est anima), and there-
fore each body must have a soul as a form of its own. Second, it is the soul,
as a form, that makes human beings essentially diffferent from one
another.217 Kilwardby backs up these two arguments in defining the soul as
the form of the body (QLIIS 79), and the qualification of the intellective
form as the perfection and accomplishment of the human being
(D43Q 34); thus there must be one for each individual human being. Third,
whereas the First motor is one in number with respect to a first mobile
and the heaven, both of which are one in number, the perfection of many
human beings cannot be the same. Fourth, although the soul is defined as
the form of the body, matter requires its own actuality; therefore, there
must be another form for each individual body apart from the soul. Finally,
if there were only one soul for all men, the same soul would know and
ignore and, more importantly, be saved and damned. However, the indi-
viduality of the human soul is essential to account for the human beings
being judged for the use of his free will.218
After giving his objections, Kilwardby presents his own solutions to the
questions Averroes raised. He argues against (1) that, although the difffer-
ent organs have a form of their own, they are parts of one and the same
body and are connected to a main organ that spreads life to them all; like-
wise, the soul is also one with respect to these parts but not to diffferent
bodies.219
With respect to (2), Kilwardby denies that corruptibility is the only
cause of the multitude of individuals, and Kilwardby identifies two prin-
ciples of individuation, matter and form (see section on individuation).

216
QLIIS 78, 215.2530.
217
Si ergo homines diffferunt essentialiter, hoc erit per formam diversam. Sed haec est
anima, QLIIS 78, 216.389.
218
This is the work of the intellective potentia: Et huic propter liberum arbitrium impu-
tatur meritum et demeritum et homini per ipsam; per alias vero minime, nisi forte per
accidens ex usu meritorio vel demeritorio vegetative et sensitive, quo eis utitur intellec-
tiva, E 5, 40.248. See also E 5, 39.1923. Cf. Roger Bacon, OHI III, dist. 3, ch. 3, 286287.
219
QLIIS 78, 217.5861.
208 theory of knowledge

However, of most significance are his arguments against (3): it does not
follow from the presence of the same object in diffferent souls that there is
one soul, as Averroes claimed. The intelligible is one in diffferent intellects
not because the representations are one but because they agree in species
(or genus).220 The souls of diffferent human beings are distinct even when
they concern the same object because numerically diffferent likenesses of
the object are present in diffferent souls, being one only according to the
species.221 The thing is one, intellects are multiple, and likenesses are rep-
resentative of one and the same thing although they are numerically dif-
ferent in diffferent intellects. In other words, Kilwardby denies that the
unity of the thing known implies the unity of the knower.
In order to make his point clear, Kilwardby sets out the terms on which
a form can be numerically one. A form can be considered as (i) a part of
the thing in which it is received and as such it is numerically diffferent in
diffferent things; or (ii) separated from its material being, and as such it can
be one and the same in diffferent things.222 This is the case with the soul,
which as immaterial can be simultaneously present in the foot and in the
head.223 It is also the case with the intelligible species (species intelligibilis)
which can be in any intellect whatsoever because it depends not on the
material circumstances of particular sensible things but only on the cogni-
tive power of the intellect that abstracts and considers it.224
Given that the soul receives the species from the things existing out-
sideof it,225 it knows both the likeness of the sensible thing in the imagina-
tion, and the universal as the result of intellectual abstraction from the

220
Potest et aliter dici intellecto in diversis intellectibus et magis forte ad veritatem,
scilicet quod non sit unum numero intelligibile in diversis intellectibus quamvis sit unius
rei repraesentativum, sed unum specie vel genere, QLIIS 78, 218.1024. See also QLIIS 17,
71.3289: Et illud est unum non unitate individuali sed unitate speciei vel generis.
221
simulacrum eiusdem rei sensibilis a diversis intellectum non est idem numero sed
specie solum, QLIIS 78, 221.1889. Roger Bacon (OHI III, dist. 3, ch. 3, 288289) presents the
same objection: one must distinguish between the thing known and the species of the
thing in the soul.
222
QLIIS 78, 217.727. See also NSLP 7, 43.223: substantia autem secunda, cum sit
universale, est abstracta a materia.
223
QLIIS 78, 217.7985.
224
QLIIS 78, 217.7289. The species intelligibilis is sublimatur ab esse materiali (QLIIS
78, 217.856), and is in the soul in the same way as the colour is the eye (sicut susceptum
in suo susceptibili, ut color rei uise est in oculo. Isto etiam modo omnis species intelligibilis
est in anima, NSLPery 2, P 67 va), i.e. not as in a subject but according to the way of being
of the recipient.
225
Et loquor adhuc sicut prius supponendo quod species ab extra veniant a rebus in
animam, QLIIS 78, 218.1045.
 intellectual cognition 209

multiplicity of similar likenesses.226 Likenesses of Plato are numerically

diffferent in the imaginations of Socrates and Cicero because they are in
numerically distinct subjects,227 but to be numerically distinct is acciden-
tal in relation to the image or likeness as representatives of the thing of
which they are the image or likeness.228 According to Averroes, the unity of
the thing known requires that all the knowers must share the same intel-
lect because the images through which they come to know the things dif-
fer either completely or partially: in the first case they cannot be images of
the same thing, and in the second they cannot account for the knowledge
of the same thing. Hence, both cases fail to explain how diffferent subjects
know the same thing, and therefore there must be one intellectual soul
common to all human beings.
In response to (3) Kilwardby claims that the likenesses agree com-
pletely or disagree completely depending on the reason for the agreement
and disagreement. Things of diffferent genera difffer completely from one
another (substance and quantity) in that they do not agree in anything
essential. However, although individuals are numerically distinct as indi-
viduals, they agree in species.229 Two images in diffferent souls are the same
only to the extent that they are two images or likenesses of Plato.230 It is not
the same image that is present in diffferent souls but diffferent images
agreeing in species,231 in the same way as two individuals belong to the

226
Talem autem intelligibile aut est simulacrum rei sensibilis tantum in spiritu imagi-
nativo repositum aut est universale a simulacris similibus abstractum opere intellectus et
rationis. Nec potes dicere quod simulacra sensibilium non sint intelligibilia, QLIIS 78,
218.1069.
227
Loquamur igitur de simulacro rei sensibilis intromisso per sensum. Esto quod Sortes
habeat penes simulacrum Platonis et Cicero iterum eiusdem simulacrum, videtur quod
simulacrum Platonis in imaginatione Sortis et in imaginatione Ciceronis non sit unum
numero sed plura, et tantum unum specie, quia in diversis animabus sunt, numero difffe-
rentibus in quibus et per quas habent subsistentias, QLIIS 78, 219.1238. See also QLIIS 78,
221.1879.
228
QLIIS 78, 218.1024.
229
Alio modo sicut essentiae individuales eiusdem speciei, ut haec forma et illa, haec
materia et illa et huiusmodi; et talia habent essentialem convenientiam qua possunt idem
indicare aliquando, QLIIS 78, 220.1802.
230
Nec potes propter hanc diffferentiam arguere quod altera non ita complete indicat
Platonem sicut reliqua vel aliquid simile, quia istae diffferentiae haec, illa omnino acci-
dentales sunt ad indicandum Platonem. Non enim ideo indicant, quia haec est ista et illa
est illa, sed quia utraque est imago vel similitudo Platonis, QLIIS 78, 220.1615. See also
QLIIS 78, 220.17782. Cf. Roger Bacon, OHI III, dist. 3, ch. 3, 290291.
231
Sic igitur patet quod simulacrum eiusdem rei sensibilis a diversis intellectum non
est idem numero sed specie solum, QLIIS 78, 221.1879. See also NSLPery 2, M 46rb/P 67vb:
intellectus comparatus ad intelligentem non est idem numero apud omnes set tantum
idem specie; comparatus tamen ad id quo inteligitur est idem numero, quia id quod intel-
ligitur est idem numero. Lewry makes this point in 1981a, 381.
210 theory of knowledge

same species.232 Whereas the unity of the likeness is not compatible with
the existence of multiple souls, the unity or agreement in species is.
Therefore, Averroes was wrong in claiming the unity of the intellect and
his mistake was to confound the likeness with what it represents. The like-
nesses in diffferent subjects are numerically one only with respect to the
thing they represent (of which they are likenesses). It is as if we have a
mirror reflecting the likeness of a thing, and if the mirror is shattered the
image of the same thing is multiplied by the number of fragments. They
are numbered according to the individual pieces of mirror, but the thing
represented is still one and the same.233
Kilwardby suggests that the same holds for the universal. When I receive
the likenesses of Socrates and Plato through the senses, I receive two
numerically distinct likenesses of two human beings that agree in essence,
i.e. humanity.234 The universal is that in which the many images of the
same nature agree. In the same way as likenesses are one in species in dif-
ferent souls, the universal in diffferent intellects is one in species.235

5.6.Individuation

Apart from the criticism of Averroes on epistemological grounds, based

on the nature of the representations of objects of knowledge and of the
objects themselves, the other main argument against monopsyhism is the
cause of individuation (the objection to argument (2)).
There are two aspects of individuation to be considered, the individua-
tion of any given composite, and the individuation of the human soul. We
need to explain in the first case how a being comes to be that particular
human being, a concrete existing individual, and in the second case how a
certain soul is this human soul, an actually existing individual of a rational
nature separable from a sensitive human body. Given Kilwardbys view

232
QLIIS 78, 220.1712.
233
Et exemplariter potest uideri qualiter ipsa species numeratur in ipsis individuis:
sicut enim uidetur obiectum in speculo integro unam facere formam vel similitudinem, si
autem frangatur speculum multiplicatur illa forma in alias formas per multiplicationem
fractionis, sic et de ipsa specie uidebitur quod cum sit una forma et essentia completa in se,
numeratur tamen in materialibus sive in partibus., NSLPor 5, P 37ra.
234
Unde humanitas in anima tua quam abstraxisti a simulacro Sortis et a simulacro
Platonis, non est una similitudo numero sed duae convenientes essentialiter in ratione
humanitatis, QLIIS 78, 222.23840.
235
Universale est ibi unum specie, non numero, ad imitationem rerum extra et non est
aliud nisi ratio essentialis convenientiae plurium simulacrorum eiusdem naturae., QLIIS
78, 222.2368. See also NLPor 2, 11; and QLIIS 17, 71.
 intellectual cognition 211

that the rational soul is created directly by God, infused in a suitable body,
and is able to survive separation from the body, he had to explain whether
the soul is created as an individual or whether it makes the individual
together with the sensitive body.
The problem of individuation is a fundamental one in that it applies to
two aspects of philosophical inquiry. The first concerns what there is in
the world, and the second whether things in the world conform exactly to
ones knowledge about them: although things can be placed in a genus-
species schema, they exist as individuals. Now, are kinds only in my mind
or they do exist in things outside my mind? I focus on the second problem
in the following pages, and deal with the first one later.
The classical solutions to the problem of individuation lie in the basic
metaphysical components of things: matter and form. In other words,
medieval authors offfered a solution based on form or matter, or both.236
Boethius gave an account based on accidents,237 Aquinas considered des-
ignated matter the principle of individuation, and Bonaventure and Rufus
turned to both matter and form. As Lewry points out, Kilwardby took two
positions on this matter.238 In his Parisian and middle periods he referred
to matter as the cause of the individuation of any given composite, whereas
in his Oxford period he followed the lead of the two Franciscan Masters,
Bonaventure and Rufus.239 He was aware of Bonaventures Parisian teach-
ing through Richard Rufus abbreviation of Bonaventures Commentary on
the Sentences (12531255).240
Kilwardby justified individuation through matter only in the works of
his Parisian period,241 claiming that matter made form exist here and
now. The following passages are enlightening:

236
For a general overview on the topic, see Garcia 1994; King 2000.
237
In QLIIS 17, 63.624, Kilwardby explicitly denies Porphyrys position which he takes
to be that the collection of accidents (collectio accidentium) as the principle of individua-
tion. The same view is criticized already in NSLPor 6, M 5vb: because accidents are poste-
rior to individuals, they cannot be the cause of theirs individuation ( nec accidens per
se, cum sit posterius individuuo, consequens ipsum, et illud quod est posterius non est
causa prioris). An individual is a non-repeatable collection of properties but these follow
the existence of the individual rather than are the cause for it to be an individual.
238
Lewry 1978, 84; 25054.
239
This influence by Richard Rufus of Cornwall has been argued by Wood 1996a, 13043.
For Rufus account, see also Karger (1998), 545. It has also been argued that Bonaventure
might be following William of Auvergnes position in the De universo. Cf. Marrone 2001b,
284.
240
Wood 2002, 289. Wood argues against the qualification abbreviation since she takes
the text to be a presentation of Rufus own views (even if substantially borrowing from
Bonaventure): see Wood 1996b, 217. On Rufus abbreviation, see Raedts 1987, 4063.
241
loquamur de individuo quantum ad hoc quod materia est principium individuans
quae facit formam esse hic et nunc, NSLP 7, 39.212.
212 theory of knowledge

substance, however, is made particular through something of its own

essence, i.e. by matter.242
therefore, matter is the cause of individuation, for it individuates form by
making it exist here and now.243
He states in the later Quaestiones, however, that individuation is the result
of both matter and form, matter as the receiving cause and form as the
active cause.244 Everything outside the mind either exists in an individual
(as accidents) or is itself an individual.245 As individual things are primary
substances made from matter and form, the existence of the actual being
is the result of the conjunction of matter and form.246 The existence, or the
act of being, of an individual substance is the result of the conjugation of
matter and form. Matter alone neither individuates nor is individuated.
Form alone must also be excluded because form contracted to the indi-
vidual is either specific or individual, either accidental or substantial. If it
is individual, this would beg the question. If it is specific, it would be com-
mon to the species, and not individuating. Accidental form is also
excluded: accidents cannot individuate because accidents inhere in indi-
viduals, being posterior to individuals.247
The main cause of individuation is effficient causality. The effficient
cause educes the individual form from the universal (species), in the same
way as specific forms are educed from the genus.248 The cause of individu-
ation is then a double principle, the conjunction of signate form and sig-
nate matter.249 However, one should say that the cause of an actual and
individual being is the act of designation of matter by form.250 In other
words, the designation is an act of form and a passion of matter.251 Matter

242
substantia autem fit particularis per aliquid quod est de sua essentia, scilicet per
materiam, NSLP 8, 49.1415.
243
igitur materia est causa individuationis, facit enim formam esse hic et nunc, et sic
ipsam individuat, NSLPor 6, M 5vb.
244
QLIIS 17, 64.1034.
245
QLIIS 17, 64.90. See also QLIIS 78, 221.194. See Pich 2002, 250.
246
Item ex coniunctione formae et materiae quae sunt diversae in essentia, resultat
actio quae non est accidens, sed substantia scilicet esse quod est actus entis, QLIS 71,
206.203.
247
QLIIS 17, 62.325.
248
QLIIS 17, 63.704.
249
causa individuationis est coniunctio formae signatae cum materia signata, QLIIS
19, 77.910. Cf. Bonaventure, CII, d.3, p.1, a.2, q.3, resp.
250
QLIIS 17, 64.94106. Cf. also DOS XXV.204, 79.1217, and LSP 406.45: materia et forma
conferunt esse singulare; and unius rei unum est esse; unius autem rei est esse ex materia
et forma, LSP 406.401.
251
QLIIS 17, 65.129.
 intellectual cognition 213

is the receptive cause, or causa sine qua non, whereas form is the active
cause, or from which, of individuation.252 In a more analytic fashion:
Therefore, first there is matter and form, then designation of matter by form
and third, through form the individual that is a being in act.253
Prime matter receives a universal form, and then it receives other forms
until the individual form.254 The complete individuation that perfects the
individual only takes place with the most particular species, which
determines and specifies the thing as this thing.255 Through the act of
designation the species is contracted to the individual, making this being
a member of the human species at the same time as it makes it an
individual.256 Furthermore, the form designates matter and designates
itself.257 The universal form is in an imperfect and potential state until it is
completed and perfected by the actual determination in an existing
individual.258
Designation and the form that designates are really the same, being
only conceptually distinct.259 The form of the species is the same as the
form of the individual; humanity (humanitas) is contracted to the indi-
vidual through this humanity.260 Kilwardby was pointing out here that the
same form could be considered both as individual and as universal: con-
sidered apart from matter the forms of body or substance are universal

252
QLIIS 17, 63.70; QLIIS 17, 64.1034.
253
Primo igitur sunt materia et forma, deinde signatio materiae a forma et tertio per
illam individuum quod est ens actu, QLIIS 17, 64.1046.
254
QLIIS 17, 62.413.
255
Hoc dicit, quia perfecta individuatio non est nisi in specie specialissima ubi forma
prius est considerabilis in communi quam in signatione ultima. Nihilominus tamen quae-
libet praecedentium per materiam individuatur, sed non ita quod compleat individuum
perfectum, QLIIS 17, 67.18790. See also E 1, 22.710. The species specialissima is that which
does not take any further division except for the individuals in that species (i.e. has no dif-
ferentiae). Each category has its own genus generalissimum and species specialissima, and
the in-between genera and species. Cf. Porphyrii Isagoge translatio Boethii 4, 15, in ed.
L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus I, 67, Bruges-Paris, 1966. See Aristotles Metaphysics
VII.12.
256
Humanitas enim per hanc humanitatem contrahitur ad individuum et igneitas per
hanc igneitatem, QLIIS 17, 67.1989.
257
Et per hoc nota quod forma signando et individuando materiam ex consequenti
semetipsam signat atque compositum ac individuat, QLIIS 17, 64.1078. Kilwardby
promptly says that it individuates and is individuated secundum diversas rationes.
258
QLIIS 17, 65.1246; and QLIIS 17, 67.2045: Forma enim ut signata actu contrahit se
ipsam ut est indeterminata et in potentia.
259
QLIIS 17, 67.2024.
260
QLIIS 17, 67.1989. See also NLP II.1, 331.9394: uniuersale per singulare
numeratur.
214 theory of knowledge

forms, whereas in connection with designated matter they are this

substance and this body.261 Therefore, the same form is individual because
it exists in an individual thing as its form and universal when the mind
considers it apart from its individuating circumstances.262 Igneity (ignei-
tas) is individual when considered in this particular fire, whereas it is uni-
versal when considered absolutely, i.e. apart from its existence in this
individual.263
It might be helpful here to present an argument Kilwardby develops in
NLP (I.7, 4142). According to some authors, he observes, form has four
capacities: (i) to perfect matter; (ii) to perfect the individual as its habit
such is form as a power; (iii) to multiply itself through the matter of many
individualssuch is the universal form; (iv) to perfect this singular, and as
such to be an actual individual. However, for him there is no form of the
individual other than the form of the last species (species specialissima)
contracted to matter;264 otherwise the essence of the individual would be
distinct from the essence of the universal and each individual would be
made of two essences.265
The essential properties of the individual are matter and form and
actual existence.266 Kilwardby wonders whether to be located in space

261
QLIIS 17, 70.28890. See also QLIIS 17, 66.1613: Quia etiam quaelibet forma extra
animam est in materia signata, quaelibet individua est.
262
Ex his patet quod idem est in re id quod est universale et individuum, sed ratione
difffert. Quia hoc quod est universale circumscripta comparatione ad materiam signatam,
fit individuum si comparetur ad materiam signatam. Quia etiam quaelibet forma extra
animam est in materia signata, quaelibet individua est. Quia autem consideratione intel-
lectus potest ab ea tolli ratio secundum quam est in materia et dari ei ratio qua prior est
alia forma vel posterior, ideo universale est etiam extra animam. Nec dat ei anima talem
rationem quam prius non habuit, sed considerat eam sub illa ratione praeter aliam, cum
non sit in re sine alia, QLIIS 17, 66.15967. See also QLIIS 17, 70.2856.
263
QLIIS 17, 66.168172. Therefore, he concludes, what is abstract and absolute by
essence, is compared and concrete by being, (Quod enim est abstractum et absolutum
per essentiam, est comparatum et concretum secundum esse, QLIIS 17, 70.29697).
264
QLIIS 17, 67.1957. Kilwardby adopts here Bonaventures solution according to which
the universal form is individuated not through the reception of another form but by con-
junction with matter (CII, d.18, a.1, q.3, 454).
265
esset essentia universalis una et essentia singularis alia, et sic quodlibet habens
essentiam universalis et essentiam singularis esset habens duas essentias, et esset duo per
essentiam; et sic se habet quodlibet singulare: quare quodlibet singulare esset duo
per essentiam, NSLPor 2, M 3ra. This point is made by Lewry 1978, 246.
266
Ad illud Porphyrii dici potest quod per proprietates potest intelligere ea quae dicta
sunt essentialia individuo, cuiusmodi sunt signatio actio et signatio passio et actualis exsis-
tentia, QLIIS 17, 67.206208. See also QLIIS 17, 65.11921. See also QLIIS 19, 77.123; and
QLIII1S 9, 39.98101: Ibi [Kilwardby is probably referring to his QLIIS 17, 65.11921] enim
dicebatur quod causa individuationis est materia et forma signatae signatione ultima.
 intellectual cognition 215

(here) and in time (now) is essential to the individual.267 He first claims

that they are accidents and thus posterior to the constitution of the indi-
vidual substance, but he also argues that they could be essential to the
individual in the sense of opposing it to the universal, which is every-
where and always.268 The individual is characterized by its indivisibility,
which is the result of the designation that makes an actual individual
existing thing distinct from any other.269 Now, whereas the actual existence
of the individual is essential to the individual, it adds nothing to the spe-
cies.270 The actual existence of any individual of a certain species is acci-
dental to the nature of the species.
Each individual is the result of many constituting forms:271 there is in
this fire the form of substance, the form of the body, and the form of fire.272
Similarly it could be said that in this human being there is the form of
substance, the form of the body, the form of a living being, the form of
animality, and finally the form of humanity. Each being has a unity that
transcends the unity of the genus or species, and this is actual existence.273
Here Kilwardby probably meant that an individual is not any one of the
things that enter its constitution, it is the combination of all those things
in the one thing that exists here and now.

5.7.Scientia

My aim in this section is, first, to outline Kilwardbys conception of intel-

lectual knowledge,274 the objects of intellectual cognition, and the theory

Ex quo sequitur quod personalis proprietas sit actualis existentia et determinata ac signata
per se.
267
QLIIS 17, 64.979.
268
QLIIS 17, 689.22642.
269
Et haec indivisio essentialis est aliqua proprietas individui et ab illa nomen imposi-
tum est et concurrit semper cum illa proprietate superius dicta, scilicet cum actuali exsis-
tentia rei, QLIIS 17, 69.2524.
270
Et si quaeritur utrum sit substantialis vel accidentalis, forte dicendum quod est
essentialis individuo et tamen est accidentalis speciei, tum quia species subsistit bene sine
esse actuali huius vel illius, QLIIS 17, 65.1226. In other words, the species exist (poten-
tially) even if this individual would not exist.
271
QLIIS 17, 72.3469.
272
plures formae sunt in una materia in constitutione unius individui, sicut in hoc
igne est forma substantiae, forma corporis et forma igneitatis, QLIIS 17, 656.1478.
273
Et universaliter nota quod quando dicitur eadem res est quae secundum diversas
rationes est essentia, forma individua, genus et species, unitas rei neque accipienda est
secundum genus neque secundum speciem neque secundum numerum, sed unitas aliqua
realis deferens has omnes rationes, QLIIS 17, 72.34650.
274
Science is intellectual cognition (scientia est cognitio intellectiva; DOS XLVII.425,
148.20).
216 theory of knowledge

of scientific demonstration. I will then discuss the cognitive limits and the
nature of the human mind with respect to the mind of God, as well as the
question of illumination. The section ends with an analysis of Kilwardbys
theory of divine ideas.
Knowledge, or scientia in Latin, had a specific meaning in medieval
thought, especially among Augustinians. As Kilwardby remarks in the
opening paragraph of DOS, scientia pairs with sapientia as two distinct
dimensions of human knowlege: knowledge of what is eternal and immu-
table (wisdom, i.e. sapientia) and knowledge of what is temporal and
changeable (knowledge, i.e. scientia). With the introduction of Posterior
Analytics in the Latin West, scientia assumed a further meaning as the
knowledge associated with the deductive model of scientific knowledge.
In NLP, Kilwardby discusses the four meanings of to know (scire), accord-
ing to a classification from Grossetestes Commentarius in Posteriorum
Analyticorum Libros:275

(i)Commonly it is comprehension of the truth of contingently existing

things;
(ii)Properly it is comprehension of the truth of something that fre-
quently is such;
(iii)More properly it is comprehension of the truth of something that is
absolute and immutablethis is the knowledge of the principles
and conclusions of a demonstration;
(iv)Most properly it is comprehension of the truth of something that is
always the same, and its truth and being are granted by something
prior to itthis is the kind of knowledge of the conclusion of a
demonstration.

Thus, in the most proper sense knowledge is said of the conclusion of

a demonstration. The problem is how this Aristotelian conception of

275
scire dicitur quadrupliciter: com[m]unissimo autem modo dicitur comprehen-
sio ueritatis rei qualiscumque sit res, et sic etiam sciuntur contingentia ad utrumlibet; et
proprie dicitur comprehensio ueritatis rei, que frequenter et utroque modo se habet, et sic
sciuntur contingentia nata; magis proprie autem dictur scire comprehensio ueritatis rei,
que simpliciter uno modo se habet, et est immutabilis, et iste modus sciendi communis est
principiis et conclusionibus; maxime proprie dicitur comprehensio ueritatis rei que sem-
per uno modo se habet per acceptionem alterius prioris a quo habet suam ueritatem et
suum esse, et iste modus appropriatur conclusionibus in demonstratione, NLP 5, 312.93
102. See Cannone 2002, 111, n.124.
 intellectual cognition 217

science fits into Augustines view of intellectual knowledge. In fact,

Kilwardby recognizes a certain discrepancy between Aristotle and
Augustine on the issue of what is intellectual knowledge and how it is
acquired.276
Kilwardby argues that, according to Augustine, knowledge results from
the three kinds of vision that are related to three kinds of cognition: corpo-
real, spiritual, and intellectual.277 In fact, both spiritual and intellectual
visions are performed by the intellect.278 The intellect operates in two
ways: it knows corporeal things through the images made by the sensory
soul from sensible species, and it knows intelligible objects (spiritualia)
from the objects it has within.279 The same power, the intellect, has two
objects, created and non-created spiritual truth.280 Spiritual vision is
knowledge of sensible things received through the senses by means of the
imaginative power, whereas intellectual vision (visio mentis) concerns the
non-sensible intelligible objects not received through sensation.281
Whereas Augustine considered these two processes of knowledge acquisi-
tion complementary, Aristotle did not seem to acknowledge the latter
type of intellectual cognition.
Kilwardby compares, in QLIII2S 38, Aristotles and Augustines philo-
sophical views with respect to the three kinds of intellectual knowledge:
communiter, proprie, and magis proprie. The main points of comparison
are set out below: 282

276
Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.2.922, 99; see also Boh 1993, 234. See chapter XXVII of the
DOS, question 4 of the QLIS (the text is partially the same), question 68 of the same book,
and also QLIS 12 and QLIII2S 38.
277
See DSF 36; and QLIII1S 44, 186.89: Cum scientia consistat in triplici visione,
scilicet intellectuali, spirituali sive imaginaria et corporali. Cf. Augustine, DGL 12.7.16;
12.11.226; pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu et anima 24. The theory of the three eyes of the soul
and the three visions is very important for Victorine anthropology. See Hugh of St. Victor,
De sacramentis I, 10, 2, in PL 176, 329330; In Hierachiam Coelestem III, in PL 177, 976a. See
Silva 2006.
278
QLIIS 4, 11.1820.
279
Sic est de mente humana rationali. Addiscit enim ex duplici parte, scilicet infra et
extra se a creaturis, supra et intra a Deo, QLIII2S 24.3, 83.546; QLIII2S 38, 145.657; 39,
14950.2437. See also DSF 189.
280
QLIII2S 38, 145.824.
281
Cf. DOS XXVII.222.
282
Kilwardby excludes from this comparison the highest maxime proprie scire.
218 theory of knowledge

Intellectual ARISTOTLE AUGUSTINE

cognition
Communiter all knowledge derived from all knowledge acquired
previous sensitive by the mind, which
cognition, as in the case of includes the
the apprehension of spiritualia and
universals and the excludes corporeal
knowledge of the principles objects and faith284
283
of demonstration
Proprie apprehension of universals285 consists in two kinds of
vision performed by
the intellect:286
spiritual vision, i.e.
the knowledge of
sensible things by
means of the
imaginative power;
and intellectual
vision, about
intelligible non-
sensible objects not
received through
sensation, as God.287
Magis proprie cognition of the principles cognition of spiritual
of demonstration objects

The schema is illustrative of what should by now be a familiar principle in

Kilwardbys thought: Aristotle and Augustine had complementary rather
than conflicting views. The starting point is promising in that they did
seem to agree that the object of human knowledge (scientia) is everything

283
QLIII2S 38.4, 144.4451. A principle is an immediate (i.e. first in its genus) proposition
of demonstration (NLP I.8, 44).
284
QLIII2S 38, 1445.5467.
285
DOS IV.7, 12.12; QLIII2S 38.4, 144.4451. See also DOS IV.10, 13.3; XXV.196, 76.123;
XXXIII.335, 119.245; XLI.379, 133.01; DOS XLII.405, 141.2425.
286
QLIIS 4, 11.1820.
287
QLIII2S 24.3, 83.546; QLIII2S 39, 14950.2437. See also DSF 189; 36, 63.3031. DOS
XXVII.222; QLIIS 37, 119.72. In QLIS 62 (180.9295) Kilwardby calls spiritual or imaginative
vision to the cognition of the images of sensible things and intellectual vision to the cogni-
tion of the spiritualia, present in the mind from its creation.
 intellectual cognition 219

that is apprehended by the intellect.288 After remarking that Augustine was

much more enlightened than Aristotle in spiritual matters,289 Kilwardby
proposes broadening Aristotles conception of intellectual knowledge to
include, in addition to the abstraction of universals from sensory images,
indirect knowledge of intelligible objects. As Augustine points out in many
places, the human soul proceeds from knowledge of sensible things to the
realm of the uncreated and God, ascending from complexity to simplicity
(simplicitate), and from mutability to immutability.290 Likewise, the human
being is not able to see himself directly, only through his image in a
mirror.291
In what follows I concentrate on the two highest forms of knowledge, in
other words the knowledge of the principles of demonstration and knowl-
edge of the conclusion that follows from knowledge of the premises.292 The
aim is not to present Kilwardbys theory of the syllogism in detail,293 but to
systematize his view of knowledge and demonstrative science. The rele-
vance of this presentation lies in the fact that Kilwardbys commentary on
Aristotles Posterior Analytics was one of the first such commentaries
following Grossetestesand hence introduced an account of scientific
inquiry and a demonstrative model for science that was to become stan-
dard during his lifetime. The application of this model to the classification
of sciences helps to explain the success of DOS in the later middle ages.
(I supply, as extensively as possible, references to other works in which he
deals with these same questions.)
According to Kilwardby, knowledge is the comprehension of the truth
of a thing that is always the same,294 thus following Aristotle in placing

288
QLIS 12, 32.901. See also DOS XLVII.425, 148.20. For Augustine, any true knowledge
understood by the mind is scientia (QLIS 12, 31.745).
289
Augustinus enim proprius et strictius sumit intellectualem cognitionem quam
Aristoteles, QLIS 4, 12.245. The same argument (?) is repeated in DOS XXVII.222, 85.1012
and DSF 98.
290
QLIS 4, 12.4959; QLIS 42, 138.334; 139.789; D43Q 16, 23.4602.
291
QLIS 4, 12.4955; 4, 13.569; DOS XXVII.223225, 86.0123. See also QLIS 42, 138.334;
42, 139.789; QLIIS 77, 212.4142; QLIII2S 22, 73.147164; D43Q 16, 23.4602. We do not see
God directly but through the efffects, that is, through His image impressed in the created
world. Kilwardby stresses repeatedly (e.g., QLIII2S 38, 143.1617) that our knowledge (noti-
tia) of God is obscure and enigmatic (obscura et aenigmatica). True and certain knowledge
is acquired only in patria. The terminology as well as the example is probably taken from
Augustines De doctrina Christiana 2.7.11, to which Kilwardby explicitly refers to in QLIII2S
38, 148.169174.
292
NLP I.1, 13.6163.
293
Kilwardbys syllogistics theory is one of the few subjects where his thought has been
subjected to a closer scrutiny; see, notably, Lagerlund 2000 and Thom 2007.
294
[scientia] est comprehensio ueritatis rei que semper uno modo se habet, NLP
I.10, 48.356.
220 theory of knowledge

demonstrative science (scientia demonstrativa) as the model for knowl-

edge.295 All men, he wrote, naturally desire to know, and the way to fulfill
such desire is by means of demonstration because every science proceeds
by demonstration, and to bring about knowledge is the aim of demonstra-
tion.296 It is not enough that we perceive the apparent cause of a phenom-
enonan eclipse, for examplewe have to understand it to be its true
cause and that therefore it will happenonce the cause is present
always in the same way.297 To know in this case means to know that the
cause of the defect in the moon is the interposition of the earth between it
and the sun.298
The object of scientific knowledge is necessary truth, which is to be
found both in immediate propositions (or principles) and in the conclu-
sion of a (necessary) demonstration.299 Kilwardby contrasts understand-
ing (intellectus) as the habit pertaining to immediate propositions with
knowledge (scientia) as the habit pertaining to conclusions.300 Even though
there can be no knowledge of a conclusion without knowledge of the prin-
ciples,301 and the principles are more known and believed than the conclu-
sion (NLP I.10, 49.38), knowledge is, according to Aristotle, knowledge of
the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism.302 The general epistemologi-
cal principle according to which to know is to know the cause also applies
here in that the premises are the cause of the conclusion, by means of the
middle term.303 We assent to the conclusion because we come to see how,

295
DOS XLI.381, 134.1921; DOS XLVIII.447, 154.215. Although theology depends on
divine inspiration and not human invention (QLIS 7, 18.0918; QLIS 12, 31.6470), it seems
to find a place in this conception of science (see Wood 2002, 298).
296
Cum omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, constat quod hoc desiderium
frustra non est: quare possunt fieri scientes, sed non nisi mediante demonstratione.
Necesse est ergo habere cognitionem de demonstratione, quia per ipsam fit omnis scien-
tia, NLP, prologus, 3; and Scire autem est finis demonstrationis, NLP I.5, 29.4748.
297
NLP II.2, 341.
298
NLP II.2, 339. See also DOS XLVII.428; LIII.497.
299
obiectum scientiae demonstrativae est verum necessarium simpliciter, tamen
verum necessarium est duplex, unum quod est immediate propositionis sive principii,
aliud quod est conclusionis (et horum primum est ductivum in secundum), QLIII2S 38,
145.7982.
300
QLIII2S 16, 53.1037. See also DOS IV.6, 11.1415; NLP I.1, 13; I.36, 232.304307; and QLIS
90, 283.1920: Item scientia est habitus conclusionis in demonstratione quae nihil aliud
est nisi veritas conclusionis scitae.
301
Cognitio uero conclusionis uniuersalis consequitur inmediate precognitionem
determinatam, quia eius precognitio est ex precognitione principiorum suorum, NLP I.3,
19.135. See also NLP I.33, 500. Although the Media translation was available in Paris ca.
1250, Kilwardby probably used the Arabic-Latin version (Lewry 1978, 263).
302
QLIS 12, 3031.5360.
303
DOS IV.6, 11.169. See also QLIS 12, 29.89; DOS XLVII.428, 149.3; QLIS 79, 249.667; CI
359.35 ( est enim scire causam cognoscere).
 intellectual cognition 221

through the middle term, it follows from the premises and is worthy of
assent.304
A demonstration is a syllogism that brings about knowledge.305 A syllo-
gism is an expression that requires three terms and two propositions.306
A conclusion follows from the premises by means of the middle term.307
The conclusion is the terminus of intellectual cognition.308 A syllogism
may be dialectical or demonstrative, but only the latter leads to science
because it comprises true premises (the dialectical deals with what is
probable);309 and among demonstrative syllogisms, the priority goes to the
afffirmative universal of the first figure.310 In the highest kind of demonstra-
tion (potissima demonstratio), as in mathematics,311 true necessary conclu-
sions follow from necessary true universal immediate first principles.312
There are two main types of demonstration, however: the demonstration
propter quid, which demonstrates the immediate or remote cause, and the
less powerful quia, which shows the fact and proceeds from the efffect.313
Reasoning consists in advancing from one term to another through a
middle, which requires knowing how to compose (afffirm) and divide
(deny) the terms from one another within a proposition,314 and how to

304
QLIS 13, 33.23; QLIII2S 5, 20.8890: et sic credere medio conclusionis alicuius
nihil aliud est quam assentire quod ipsum est verum medium talis conclusionis ostenden-
dae; and especially QLIII2S 5, 189.305: Simile est in visione sive cognitione intellectuali.
Primo enim videtur medium, deinde per illud conclusio. Et medium ostendit se ipsum et
conclusionem et movet informando mentem ut consentiat conclusioni, et etiam facit
conclusionem esse dignam assensui. Conclusio autem est obiectum terminans motum
huius cognitionis, et sic est ibi duplex obiectum. See also DOS XLIX.472. The relation with
Grossetestes analogy with corporeal seeing (CPA I.19, 279) is inequivocal.
305
demonstratio est sillogismuus faciens scire, NLP 5, 31.84. See also NLP,
Prologus, 8.
306
LPA 3rb; DOS XLIX.469, 161.07; LIII.501, 170.169. See also LIII.502, 170.203; LIII.505;
NLP I.11, 58; and NLP I.34, 210.25.
307
DOS LVII.561, 192.324. See also DOS LIII.501, 170.189: tres terminos, duo extrema
et medium unum ex quibus connectuntur duae propositiones.
308
Hic enim est quod syllogismus dicitur oratio in qua ex quibusdam positis ex neces-
sitate sequitur conclusio, DOS LIII.493, 168.45. The unity of the oratio follows from the
unitate finis, the conclusion (cf. Ebbesen 1997, 328).
309
NLP I.34, 210.4045.
310
NLP I.30, 180.
311
NLP II.34, 512.
312
DOS LIII.503, 171.36; NLP I.20, 116.46. See also DOS XLI.382, 135.67; NLP II.1,
333.143146.
313
NLP I.5, 28.3135.
314
Quia vero ratiocinatio est inquisito rationis decurrens ab uno termino in alium per
medium, quod non contingit nisi prius componat terminos cum medio, aut unum compo-
nat et reliquum ab illo dividat, ut sic consequantur compositionem terminorum ad invi-
cem vel eorum divisionem ab invicem, ideo, antequam doceatur ars ratiocinandi, oportet
habere artem componendi terminos et dividendi. Et quia compositio et divisio species
222 theory of knowledge

arrange the propositions. Logic must encompass knowledge of noncom-

plex terms, acquired through sense experience,315 and from this it proceeds
to the knowledge of the propositions,316 achieved through the composition
and division of simple terms.317
These diffferent operations are ordered to the syllogism, and are
dealtwith in Aristotles various logical works: simple significative terms
inCategories;318 declarative sentences in Perihermeneias,319 and syllogism
in Prior Analytics.320 The study of syllogism is further broken down:

sunt propositionis sive enuntiationis, DOS LIII.517, 177.410, (italics mine). See also QLIS 7,
and QLIII2S 16, 523.98112. DOS LIII.505, 171.256. The mode of the combination of the
terms and the propositions is the form of a syllogism (cf. CP 381.1825).
315
Si quaeritur quomodo in notitiam rerum venitur quae significantur per sermonem
inquisitivum ignotorum, dicendum quod statim cum incipit homo habere usum sensuum
et rationis naturaliter aliqua incipit noscere sine obstaculo omni per quae postea de ignotis
inquirit, DOS L.480, 163.2934. The incomplexa are known through abstraction from the
sensible species (cf. QLIIS 37, 118.51). See also DOS XLVIII.465, 159.1920: ad universale
quod est principium artis et scientiae venitur per sensum et experimentum.
316
Sic ergo in scientiis humana ratione inventis sunt hi tres modi necessarii [difffinire,
dividere, colligere], ubi a cognitione incomplexorum proceditur ad cognitionem com-
plexorum, QLIS 7, 19.302. See also NSLP 4, 16.126; and QLIII2S 16, 523.98107.
Inventionem and iudicium as the ways of preceding of sciences, in particular the science of
logic (cf. Kilwardbys Prologus to LPA). Kilwardby distinguishes between noncomplex
terms (incomplexa) and combination of terms (complexa, i.e. statements or propositions).
Cf. QLIS 90, 284.5760. See also DOS LIV.524, 179.0610; but especially NSLP 2, 12.
317
ars componendi terminos et ars syllogizandi ordinantur ad artem demonstrandi,
QLIII2S 4, 17.534. See also Commentary on the Perihermeneias, ed. Lewry, 381.1828. See de
Libera 1990, 223 (edition of an excerpt of Robert Kilwardbys (?) Commentary on the
Sophistici Elenchi). Kilwardby presents two ways of considering division: (i) as the taking
of (remotio) a predicate from a subject; (ii) as the intellectual operation of division (as a
genus is divided into species). See NSLPery I.7, M 54vb.
318
Lewry 1978, 2667; Pini 2003, 147. See the Prooemium of the NSLP and LSP 390.101:
subiectum istius sciencie est sermo simplex significatiuus.
319
As Kilwardby himself points out at the beginning of his commentary, interpretatio
here means vox prolata cum ymaginatione significandi. In his NSLPery I.2, M 46ra-rb,
Kilwardby distinguishes between the science of the Predicaments, which is about terms as
meaningful, thus, focus on the relation between words and things, the science of the
Perihermeneias focus on the relation between words and concepts because it is about a
term being said of another. For Kilwardby, the subject matter of the De interpretatione is
the oratio enuntiatiua, or, in its extended formulation, de dicibili secundum quod dicibile est
ordinatum cum dicibili in interpretatione enuntiatiua, that is, meaningful words arranged
with other meaningful words into a declarative sentence. It is the sentence itself, not what
is said or what the sentence is about, that is the subject matter of the work (NSLPery, pro-
emium, P 66ra). The study of the declarative sentence belongs to logic because the inter-
pretatione enuntiatiua is part of the syllogism (idem). The proximate dispositions of the
sentencesuniversality, particularity, afffirmation, and negationcontribute to the being
of the sylogism (idem). Other dispositions, such as truth and falsity, only remotely diversify
(diuersificant) the syllogism and therefore are not dealt with in the Prior Analytics; still oth-
ers, such as to be first, true, better known are dealt with in the Posterior Analytics.
320
DOS LIII.517518; see also DOS XLVII.439, 152.12.
 intellectual cognition 223

demonstrative syllogism is discussed in Posterior Analytics, dialectical syl-

logism in the Topics, and sophistical syllogism in Sophistical Refutations.321
Logic is the science the subject matter of which is the syllogism. It is
used to teach the method of how to proceed, through correct reasoning, to
what is not known from what is known.322 Proficiency in reasoning allows
for the discovery of truth in every field of inquiry,323 and that is why logic is
thought of as the science among sciences.324 Whereas a particular science
is about a certain genus, thus the related knowledge is about the things
that belong to that genus, logic is the discipline assigned the task of dis-
covering a method of investigation common to all sciences.325
Kilwardby distinguishes between logic in a broad sense as scientia ser-
mocinalis, the science of speech that deals with correct expression
and includes dialectic, rhetoric and grammar,326 and logic understood in a

321
NSLP Prooemium, 5.1524; DOS LVI.541.
322
Logica est scientia de ratiocinatione docens modum investigandi veritatem ignotam
circa thesim vel circa quaestionem philosophicam, DOS LIII.523, 178.313. See also DOS
XLIX.468; LVIII.578, 198.236; DOS XLIX.475, 162.2730: Ex his patet quod non incongrue
sic definiri potest sermocinalis scientia, scilicet quod sit scientia de sermone docens recte
significare quod notum est et recte ratiocinando investigare quod ignotum est. According
to Black 1997, 241, Kilwardby is implicitly invoking the famous Avicennian dictum that
logic seeks knowledge of the unknown by way of the known, a dictum that becomes a
veritable clich in Latin logical commentaries. It is then easy to suppose that Kilwardby
took also from Avicenna the definition of Logic as being about second intentions. See
Tachau 1988, 123.
323
DOS XLVI.419, 147.710.
324
DOS LIII.499, 169.324, and DOS LXIII.638, 218.16, respectively. See also LT 125.5763
( logyca, que cum sit scientia et modus procedendi in scientiis determinans () nec
solum aliarum set sui ipsius preparat instrumenta, et propter hoc dicitur: logyca est ars
artium, scientia scientiarum); DOS LIV.524 and DOS LVII.566, 194.224: Verumtamen in
hoc dicitur scientia demonstrativa quae in logica traditur adminiculari aliis scientiis, quia
omnes per eam constituuntur et augentur et complentur. See also DOS XLVI.420;
XLVIII.447; LIII.499; LVII.564, 193.324; and CI 358.1923: Inter omnes quoque artes primo
querenda est illa ars que dicitur ars arcium et sciencia scienciarum, sicut manus dicitur
organum organorum et intellectus species specierum. Hec autem est dialectica siue logica
proprio nomine dicta. Hec enim est modus omnium aliarum scienciarum. Cf. Roger
Bacon, SD, 2829, 175; transl. Maloney 2009, 7, 6. The expressions ars artium and disciplina
disciplinarum can be found, applied to philosophy, not logic, in Isidore of Sevilles
Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, II, c.24, pars 9; Cassiodoruss Institutiones, II, c.3,
pars 5; and Hugh of St. Victors Didascalicon II, 22.
325
Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiua, et hoc per modum et rationem discernendi,
logica autem habeat determinare modum inquirendi veritatem in aliis scientiis, LPA,
Prologus. The modus scientiae consists in the speculation about the properties of its sub-
ject-matter and the parts of the subject ( modus scientiae consistit in speculatione pas-
sionum et proprietatum de subiecto et partibus subiecti, NSLP, Prooemium, 4.345.) The
unity of a science is the unity of the genus of its subject-matter (NSLP, Prooemium, 4).
326
DOS LXVI.660; see also DOS XLIX.474, 162.223; LI.483, 165.12.
224 theory of knowledge

specific sense as ratiocinativa, or the science of reasoning,327 which

concerns the beings of reason (res rationis, such as judgement),328 and has
the syllogism as its subject matter.329 Just as all sciences require reason-
ing,330 all types of reasoning can be reduced to syllogism.331 The syllogism is
the privileged instrument of scientific knowledge.332
Any demonstrative science must start from principles that are true,
first, immediate, prior, better known and the cause of the conclusion.333
According to Kilwardby, the most important are to be true, first and imme-
diate: true because there is science only of what is necessarily true,334 first
because demonstration begins from the first principles, and immediate
because the ultimate premises are not achieved through the mediation of
the middle term.335 The principles must also be necessary, however.336 In a
valid syllogism, the conclusion follows from the premises of necessity,337 in
other words it cannot be otherwise.338 The kind of necessity Kilwardby had

327
Est igitur logica ratiocinalis scientia quia modum ratiocinandi docet et rationes
entium considerat. Est et sermocinalis quia agit de ratiocinatione per sermonem expressa
et non solum in mente latente, DOS LVIII.578, 198.1921. See also LSP 391.14; CI 359.2931;
and DOS LIII.523, 178.201. (The term sermocinalis applied to logic is found in the Glosule
of the late eleventh century (cf. Yukio Iwakuma (1999), 172). In that sense, logic concerns
proficiency in writing, speaking and reasoning correctly. Cf. DOS XLVI.423, 148.68.
Proficiency here means the capacity of expressing oneself in an appropriate and efffective
manner (DOS XLVI.421; LI.483).
328
LPA, Prologus.
329
DOS LIII.492; NSLP Proemium, 5.156. Cf. Black 1997, 242.
330
DOS XLVIII.4445, 153.2933; LIII.494; and especially DOS LXIII.639, 218.314: Quia
omnes scientiae raciocinantur () logica prae omnibus discenda est.
331
Omnes enim modi ratiocinationum, sicut docet Aristoteles in Prioribus, vim habent
ex syllogismo et in ipsum reducuntur, DOS LIII.523, 178.246.
332
DOS LIII.503, 170.357; 522, 178.89. See also LT 128.156; DOS LIV.531, 181.269.
333
necesse est demonstratiuam scientiam esse ex ueris, primis, et immediatis, prio-
ribus et notioribus et causis conclusionis, NLP I.6, 34.89.
334
NLP I.6, 34.
335
NLP I.6, 38. Of these, only immediate belongs to the definition of principle (NLP I.8,
44).
336
NLP I.12, 61; QLIII2S 38.4, 144.4651; DOS IV.6, 11.146; DOS LIII.503. See also DOS
XLVII.428, 149.3; XLI.383. The clear-cut example is that of the triangle which is found in
DOS LIII.497. In DOS XVII.118; XLI.380 (e.g.), Kilwardby refers to two types of demonstra-
tion: propter quid and quia. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.13, 78a23 sgg., and Kilwardby,
NLP I.5. In NSLPor (1, M 1vb), Kilwardby distinguishes between four kinds of necessity:
(i) sine quo res non potest esse; (ii) sine quo res non potest non bene esse; (iii) violentum; (iv)
non potest non esse.
337
DOS LIII.522, 89. See also NLP in Cannone 2002, 116.213: Ergo demonstratio est ex
necessariis, quia necessarium non potest sciri neque causari nisi ex necessariis. See also LT
126, 87: Patet etiam iste ordo eo quod necessitas, que est dispositio necessaria ad sillogis-
mum completum, reperitur in sillogismo demonstrativo.
338
impossibile est aliter se habere, NLP I.6, 36.65.
 intellectual cognition 225

in mind was de omni, per se, and universalia.339 The kind of universality
required for demonstration is not that it must be said of many (de mul-
tis),but that it must be said of all and always (de quodlibet et semper et
primo).340
These principles are self-evident, known by virtue of themselves (sunt
per se nota) and not demonstrated.341 If it were otherwise, the source of
scientific knowledge would rest on an infinite series of demonstrations.342
Kilwardby takes up the question of how the principles of demonstration
are known in the long lemma 33 of NLP, which occupies ten pages of the
modern edition, and leaves the question of which power of the soul is
responsible for its apprehension for the shorter lemma 34. Kilwardby
denies that these principles are innate, arguing instead that they are
acquired from sense experience. He supports the general principle accord-
ing to which intellectual human cognition is derived from preexisting
knowledge.343 The premises of demonstration include preexisting knowl-
edge of the conclusion, and the universals abstracted from sense data
acquired through sense perception are the elements of the preexisting
knowledge of the principles.344 Due to its union with the body, the human
intellect knows by means of the senses and phantasms.345
The principles are known to be true by virtue of the light of truth
itself.346 The grasping of the truth of the premises results from knowledge

339
NLP I.12, 62. Kilwardby follows Aristotle with respect to the existence of four kinds of
per se, but he focus on the first two (see for example NLP I.14, 82). On the subject, see
Cannone 2002.
340
See footnote 69, page 186. Cf. Roger Bacon, SD, 200201, 215; transl. Maloney 2009,
314, 164.
341
DOS XXXII.331, 117.356. See also DOS LIII.503; and QLIII2S 1, 7.14951. Cf. Aristotle,
Posterior Analytics I.3; II.19. See Tuominen 2007, especially section I.3; see also Taylor 1990,
11822.
342
NLP I.11, 53.
343
Item, per preexistentem cognitionem intellige ibi cognitionem principiorum et ter-
minorum et sensus; precognoscuntur enim conclusionem in suis principiis, principia uero
in suis terminis que etiam est cognitio sensitiua, NLP I.1, 13.613. That is the diffference
between syllogistic knowledge which starts from universals and better known by nature
and inductive knowledge which starts from particulars and better known to us (NLP I.1,
12.3034).
344
NLP I.1, 13. See also NLP I.33, 203.1920.
345
intellectus humanus copulatus corpori non cognoscit nisi mediante sensu et fan-
tasmate, NLP I.1, 13.567.
346
Principiorum autem cognitionem non posuit huiusmodi esse nec debuit. Et illam
vocat intellectum, quia certa sunt in se ex luce propriae veritatis praeter universalia prae-
cedentia vel causas demonstrativas, QLIS 12, 31.613. The formulation is very close to
William of Auvergnes dA, c.3, p.10, 98. See also, for Grosseteste, Olivier 2004.
226 theory of knowledge

(notitia) of the terms that constitute them, and is associated with some
kind of illumination from within the soul.347
The immediate principles of demonstration are dignitas, which is com-
mon to all sciences and includes the principle of noncontradiction and
the law of the excluded middle,348 and positio, which is proper to a particu-
lar science. Unlike proper principles, common principles do not require
any external justification.349 Their truth is immediately grasped by any
intellect as soon as aspectus mentis rests upon it. Proper principles are fur-
ther divided into suppositio, i.e. a proposition that says of something that
it exists or not, and difffinitio, i.e. the expression of what a thing is.350 A defi-
nition is not really a principle, because a principle is a proposition in
which something is predicated of something, whereas a definition is an
expression of the essence of something.351

5.8.Truth

Kilwardby states that truth is an equivocal notion: there is the truth

of things and the truth of propositions. The truth (ueritas) of a thing
is its being (esse),352 its essence or quiddity expressed by its

347
distinguendum est quod est assentire dupliciter, scilicet ex illuminatione aliqua
ex parte virtutis apprehensivae prout assentimus principiis propter terminorum notitiam
et conclusionibus propter media, QLIII2S 1, 7.14951. See also NLP I.11, 54. Robert
Grosseteste seems to hold a similar view. See Marrone 2001a, 58; see also Van Dyke 2010.
348
NLP I.2, 15.1016. See also NLP I.25, 152; NLP I.8, 43; DOS XXXII.331, 117.303; DOS
LVIII.584, 201. See also. Cf. Aristotles De interpretatione I.9, 18a2829; Posterior Analytics
I.11, 77a30; and Topics VI.6, 143b1415.
349
NLP I.23, 143144. Cf. Grosseteste, CPA I.8, 157. These common first principles are not
premises in any demonstration of a particular science, but they are necessary for any
sound demonstration (NLP I.11). The study of the principles common to all sciences
belongs to metaphysics (DOS LXIII.638, 218.710). Elsewhere (NSLP 4, 16.1214) he calls the
dignitates common notions of the soul (communes animi conceptiones), an expression of
Boethian origin.
350
NLP I.9, 45. See also NLP I.23, 143. A supposition is further divided into supposition
simpliciter, which is indemonstrable and the supposition which is demonstrable and taken
as probable for the purpose of demonstration in a subordinated science (In prima primo
describit suppositionem, dicens quod si aliquid demonstrabile accipiatur a discente sine
demonstratione, et sit illi probabilitas, tunc est illi suppositio et non est simpliciter suppo-
sitio, quia simpliciter suppositio est quod est indemonstrabile, nec eius acceptio n[e]ces-
saria est apud omnem intellectum, NLP I.23, 144145.153157).
351
NLP I.23, 146. See also NLP I.9, 46.
352
Item, intellige hic quod non dicitur res esse sine uero et falso uel cum uero et falso
sicut intellectus, eo quod in re nichil est quod non sit uerum uel falsum. Quod patet per
hoc: sicut res se habet ad esse, sic ad ueritatem: ergo in eo quod est esse in re, ueritas est;
non esse, falsitas. Res igitur non potest esse sine uero et falso; potest tamen intelligi,
NSLPery I.2, M 46vb. See also NSLP 17, 130.13.
 intellectual cognition 227

definition.353 Things themselves, and the forms or intentiones through

which they come to be known, lack composition, and therefore are not
true or false in the way a declarative sentence is.354 The intellect is able to
consider things together and to separate what is not together in reality,
and truth and falsity are found in the composition and division of the spe-
cies of things in the soul and not in extramental things.355 Truth or false-
hood is said properly of complex expressions: these are true when things
are as maintained and they are false when things are not as maintained.
Thus, the operation of the intellect, composing and dividing, must be
done in conformity with the way the extramental things the terms signify
are in reality, in other words:
the composition and division that thought brings about must have reference
to the being and not-being of things outside thought (since in statements
one must consider the true and the false on the basis of which the reasoning
founded on those statements seeks the true and the false only in virtue of a
relationship to the being or not-being of things outside thought) (DOS
LIII.518, transl. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump)
The truth of a statement is defined as the conformity of things to under-
standing.356 Complex expressions are true when they conform/correspond
to the way the things signified by those terms and their combinations are
outside the combining mind.357 A proposition is true when the way the

353
Et [Aristotle] in [Metaphysics] 1.IX docet quod veritas incomplexa est essentia rei vel
quidditas per difffinitionem significata, QLIS 44, 141.1617. A definition is an expression
which indicates what a thing is (oratio indicans quid est esse) (NLP 12, 426.1712; LDB
410.345; LDB 410.345). The true definition is the definition of the species (NSLP 6, 28.31).
The genus and the diffference are the parts of the definition (cf. LSP 406.357). Falsity is a
defect in being (Falsitas ergo est defectus entitatis, et non est ens vel entitas, QLIS 44,
143.645.
354
intellectus () accipit res per suas intentiones; et intentio cuiuslibet rei est sim-
pliciter carens compositione, NSLPery I.2, M 46vb. See also NSLP 17, 124.22: nullum
incomplexorum est verum vel falsum.
355
compositio et divisio sunt in cognition, non in rebus, QLIS 90, 2845.602. See
also LPA I.13; QLIS 43, 139.568 (where he refers to the authority of Augustine); NSLP 2,
12.1822; NSLP 5, 20.257; NSLPery I.2, M 46vb; and DOS XXXV.348, 123.135: Ideoque bene
dicit Aristoteles in VI Metaphysicae quod sicut verum et falsum sunt in cognitione, sic
bonum et malum in rebus. See also Cannone 2002, 82, notes 346. Cf. Aristotle, De inter-
pretatione 1, 16a1015; and De anima III.6; Boethius, In Cat. 180C-D.
356
Intellige quod ueritas dicitur equiuoce: est enim in incomplexis entitas rei, et hoc
est quod dicit Auicenna, indiuisio esse, idest indiuisa rei entitas; et est ueritas in complexis,
et sic dicitur adequatio rei et intellectus, NSLPery I.9, M 54va/V 12v.
357
Et hoc est quod dicit Aristotiles, orationes esse ueras quemadmodum et res, idest
orationes sic se habere ad determinationem ueritatis uel falsitatis quemadmodum res ad
determinationem existentie et non existentie, NSLPery I.9, P 75va. Cf. Boethius, De difffer-
entiis topicis, in PL 64, 1174 B. See Kretzmann 1970.
228 theory of knowledge

terms (predicate and subject) are conjoined correspond to the way the
things the terms stand for are conjoined outside the mind.358 In this sense
truth is said to be in things as in a subject and in sentences as in a sign.359
The soul knows the things that exist in nature by means of their species in
the soul, but is also able to combine signs into a way which does not cor-
respond to things in nature. This is the source of falsity.360 The truth of a
predication is grounded in the correspondence between thought and
being.361
Kilwardby distinguishes between a proposition (propositio) and a state-
ment (enuntiatio): a statement must be true or false, whereas the proposi-
tion need not. A statement is composite of a name and a verb,362 whereas

358
A proposition correctly formulated expresses something essential about the reality,
displaying a reality correctly arranged. Cf. Thom 2007, 14. A predicate, Kilwardby says in
NSLPor 6, P 37rb, is a form whose unity with the subject is either essential or accidental.
These correspond to the two first types of per se predication: per se primo modo (the predi-
cate is included in the subject: homo est animal); per se secundo modo (the subject is
included in the predicate: hominem esse album). Cf. QLIS 90, 285.7486; NLP 124.2147;
DOS LIII.518, 177; and NLP 130, 37780. The essential unity is a definition, as in mortal
rational animal (animal rationale mortale), whereas the accidental unity of the complexum
consists in the attribution (predication) of an accident to the subject, as in white man
(homo albus); see NSLP 2, 12.239; and QLIII1S 16, 77.11922. Cf. Boethius, In Categorias
Aristotelis libri quattuor, in PL 64, 175D-176A. See Maier 1972, 55.
359
[ueritatis] est in re tanquam in subiecto, et in oratione tanquam in signo, et est
etiam in re tanquam efffectus in sua causa, et in intellectu tanquam in uirtute compositiua
uel diuisiuam, tanquam scilicet apprehensum in apprehendente. See also Item, uerum et
falsum sunt in oratione sicut significatum in signo, et in ipsis rebus sicut causatum in sua
causa, NSLPery I.5, M 50va. The same ideia appears in NSLPery I.5, V 7v (ueritas et falsitas
causantur in oratione a rebus significatis). Elsewhere he defines truth as the adequation of
the sign to what is signified (Item aestimo bene difffinitum sic: Veritas est coadaequatio
signi ad signatum, QLIS 45, 144.189). See Robert Grosseteste, De veritate, ed. Ludwig Baur,
in Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bishofs von Lincon, Mnster: Beitrge
zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 1912, 134.
360
NSLPery I.2, P 68ra.
361
Duo in praedicatione sunt; unum modus dicendi per vocem vel componendi per
mentem, aliud modus unionis vel adhaesionis significatorum in ipsa re. Et haec est causa
et fundamentum compositionis in mente et praedicationis in sermone, QLIII1S 17, 79.17
20; from this follows that non potest esse dissonus modus componendi et praedicandi
verus, ubi est dissonus modus unionis vel adhaesionis (QLIII1S 17, 79.267). See also
NSLPery I. 9, M 54va: Set intellige quod ueritas et falsitas est in oratione eo quod res est uel
non est; set non dico hoc rem subiecti termini set magis illud quod significatur per ora-
tionem, secundum quod dicimus Sortem currere significari per hanc enuntiationem,
sortes currit. And QLIS 74, 231.89: scientia refertur ad scibile non solum secundum dic-
tionem, sed etiam secundum esse.
362
NSLPery I.2, M 45va: name and verb are the material principles of the sentence
( nomen et uerbum, que sunt principia materialia enuntiationis). See also QLIS 71. A
name signifies apart from time; a verb together with time. A name signifies primarily a
form, in two ways: absolutely, as the universal (homo as it is said of many); and particu-
larly, i.e. individuals that instantiate that universal (this human being) (NSLPor 5, P 37ra).
 intellectual cognition 229

a proposition is a sentence that afffirms or denies something of something

else.363 If the proposition comprises non-significative terms (such A, B,
C),364 without an assertive force, it is not the same as a statement.365 For
instance, Omne b est a is a proposition but not a statement.366A statement
always comprises significative terms that are about extra-mental things
(i.e. things that belong to one of the ten categories of being), and can be
said to be true or false.367
The truth of a proposition often implies the existence of the things out-
side the mind, but the notion of existence outside the soul can mean two
things: (i) existing in an individual or (ii) a (common) nature.368 This view
of knowledge is grounded on Augustines notion of essential being. When
one is dealing with essential being, it is not necessary to assume actual
existence. When animal is predicated of human being or when one says
that an eclipse is the privation of light, these things are true even if there
are no subjects because a human being is necessarily an animal and an
eclipse cannot be anything else than the privation of light. A human being
is of necessity an animal because this is included in what a human being
is; thus, even if no human existed outside the soul, the proposition a
human being is an animal (homo est animal) would still be true. It is not
possible to conceive of a human being that is not an animal. Hence, the
actual existence of things outside the soul is not always required for a
(afffirmative) proposition to be true.369 This corresponds to Kilwardbys
statement that knowledge (scientia) is about three kinds of being: things

363
Propositio igitur est oratio afffirmatiua vel negatiua alicuius de aliquo, LPA 3vb. See
also NLP I.8, 43.2223: propositio est altera pars enunciationis, scilicet pars uera signifi-
cans unum de uno, et est difffinitio solum propositionis demonstratiue.
364
LPA 3ra. Kilwardby calls them, transcendent terms (ex termini transcendentibus) in
NSLPery, Prooemium, P 66va. See de Rijk 2005, 25.
365
LPA 3va; also LPA 4rb; and DOS LIII.521. See Thom 2007, 12.
366
Set dicendum quod non est hic enuntiatio, Omne b est a, neque est ibi nomen et
uerbum prout sunt partes enuntiationis; et ob hoc non potest dici neque uera neque falsa.
Propositio tamen potest esse, quia potest recipere diffferentias quas recipit supra se propo-
sitio in quantum est principium sillogismi, quia potest dici afffirmatiua uel negatiua,
uniuersalis uel particularis, que sunt diffferentie immediate disponentes ad sillogismus, ut
patet ex prehabitis, et ex iam dictis potest haberi diffferentia enuntiationis ad proposi-
tionem., NSLPery I.5, M 50rb. For the distinction in the commentary on the Prior Analytics,
see Thom 2007, 114; for the distinction in the Commentary on the Perihermeneias, see
Lewry 1978, 2978. See also Lewry 1978, 197; and Maier 1972, 12530.
367
NSLPery, Prooemium, P 66va.
368
NLP II.7, 379.
369
vnde concedit quod non semper exigitur actualis existentia rerum extra animam
ad hoc ut propositio sit uera. Et intellige de afffirmatiuuis ueris, NLP II.7, 381.2013. For the
same view in LPA, see Thom 2007, 245.
230 theory of knowledge

that have actual being, things that have potential being, and things that
have aptitudinal being (DOS 429). Knowledge is not necessarily about
what is actual, but even in potential and aptitudinal cases the principles
by which something is potential are there and they can be known. The
principles of an eclipse are there even though the eclipse is not a perma-
nent occurrence.370 There are things that exist only in actuality, such as
separated substances, whereas others exist in act and potency, such as
generable things, or only in potency, such as the infinitely divisible
continuum.371
Non-existents could be considered simply as non-existents that are nei-
ther in act nor in potency. There are impossible things, such as the chi-
mera, of which there is no knowledge or definition. Non-existents can also
be things in potency, and they have an aptitude to be in act. Of the things
that are potential but do not yet exist outside the soul there is knowledge
and essential definition,372 and about them there can be demonstrations in
that one can demonstrate about future eclipses or about the rising of the
sun and the sunset. According to Kilwardby, a thing of which one has
knowledge does not need to exist at the moment at which it is dealt with;
it is enough that it is not impossible.
Kilwardby argues, however, that even impossible things, such as a chi-
mera, correspond at least to something in speech or in the soul.373 This is
true about a chimera as a result of the combining of what is received in the
senses. For example, there is outside the mind no such thing as a (goat-
stag) yrcocerui, which is the result of the combination of the images of a
goat (yrcus) and a stag (cervus). It has existence in the composing mind.
The soul is able to combine sensory representations in a way that does not

370
DOS 429. This is reminicent of Kilwardbys three levels of instantiation of the univer-
sal in NSLPor 5, fol. 5ra; see Pich 2002, 132133.
371
quaedam sunt actu sine potestate, ut separate substantiae, et quedam sunt actu et
potestate, ut res generabiles, et quedam potestate solum, ut continuum diuidi in infinita,
NLPery II.6, M 63va-63vb.
372
NLP II.7, 380.
373
Set dicendum quod cum dico omnem enuntiationem esse alicuius de aliquo, sumi-
tur hoc ipsum aliquid communiter, siue fuerit aliquid secundum uocem tantum, siue
secundum rem: unde cum de non ente secundum rem enuntiatur, est enuntiatio de ente
ad minus secundum dictionem, ut cum enuntiatur de chimera uel de aliquo huiusmodi,
NSLPery I.7, P 72va. See also NSLPery I.3, M 47vb: Nec tamen oportet quod nomen infini-
tumnomen dico substantiuumponat aliquid quod sit in rerum natura set solum quod
sit secundum animam et apprehensionem, secundum quod dicimus quod chimera signi-
ficat aliquid, et negationes et priuationes sunt ad aliquid uel solum aliquid secundum dic-
tionem. See Braakhuis 1985, 11242; Lewry 1981a, 382; Lewry 1981b, 2456; Thom 2007, 14; de
Rijk 1980, 229.
 intellectual cognition 231

correspond to the existence of those things in nature. It is thus possible for

a word like chimera to signify what exists only in the soul. Chimera does
not have a real definition that shows the essence of a thing, but it has a
nominal definition that explicates what the name signifies. Thus, the
proposition vacuum is a place lacking any body is true because it means
that vacuum signifies a place lacking any body. It is true in composition
only, in other words as corresponding to something existing in the com-
posing mind.374 In sum, Kilwardby suggests that nouns are signs of con-
cepts that are likenesses of things, except those that signify things that do
not exist outside the soul. These words are only signs of concepts.
Logic is not about knowledge of extramental things, as truth and falsity
are remote dispositions of the syllogism. The logician considers things not
in their sensible nature, but in their common intentions or reasons.375 The
focus of logic is not on the nature of things, but on their accounts (ratio-
nes), and on predication.376 The logician is concerned with words insofar
as they act as subject and predicate in propositions.377 In this sense, logic is
distinct from metaphysics because, whereas logic considers being and its
properties insofar as being thought,378 and universals in connection with
language,379 metaphysics focuses on the being qua being, and universals in
relation to being (i.e. as the pure essence of things).380
It is in this context that the distinction between first and second inten-
tions is to be understood, a distinction that, as Giorgio Pini points out,

374
NLP II.7, 381382.212221.
375
NSLPor, Prooemium, M 1rb. See also LPA, II.27, f.165: Et ad obiectum dicendum quod
logicus sub intentione communi potest considerare res naturales: non tamen considerat
eas secundum veras naturas earum nec naturalia secundum quod huiusmodi. Sic enim
considerat hec in ratione communi de passionibus naturalibus: et non secundum quod
naturales sunt: siue existentes a principus naturalibus.
376
NSLP, Prooemium, 4. See also NSLPor 11, M 10ra: logicus non consideret naturas
rerum sed ipsarum rationes; and LPA 2rb: logica autem de rebus rationis determinat.
377
Et quia haec scientia est semocinalis, secundum Boethium, magis deciditur in
partes sui subiecti ab eo quod est dici quam ab eo quod est esse. Unde magis dividit incom-
plexum dicibile quam ens. Et iterum, non descendit sua divisio in duo membra, scilicet in
haec, subiectum et praedicatum, vel nomen et verbum, sed magis per X, ut sic faciat
constare quod haec doctrina non est magis ad syllogismum quam ad definitionem, et quod
subiectum huius non est terminus per se sed, ut dictum est, incomplexum ordinabilem,
NSLP 5, 20.1924. See also NSLP Prooemium, 04.1620. Cf. Pini 2002, 2122.
378
Logica vero considerat eadem [things] secundum quod rationabilia sunt, vel a
ratione componibilia et divisibilia, DOS LVIII.579, 199.12, (my italics).
379
CI 360.3852. Cf. Lewry 1978, 23940.
380
Ad secundum dicendum quod metaphysica considerat ens simpliciter secundum
rationem entitatis quae est in rebus et proprietates generales entis secundum quod ens in
ratione entitatis consideratur, DOS LVIII.579, 198.357; see also DOS LVIII.569, 195.245;
and CI 360.3852.
232 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby seems to be one of the first authors in the West to make.381

First intentions are the things themselves, whereas second intentions
(secundas intentiones) are the properties of things (and their relation-
ships) as conceived by the intellect.382 The distinction is made because
only after having knowledge of things (first intentions) is it possible to
mentally consider their way of being and their mutual relations (second
intentions).383
At roughly the same time, Bacon defined names of first intentions as
utterances that signify things outside the soul, and names of second inten-
tions as utterances that signify the concepts of things.384 Kilwardby is not
particularly clear about what those second intentions are, but it is plain
that they are not concepts of concepts or second-order concepts, and are
rather the modi sive rationes rerum, i.e. aspects of things that make us
think about them in a certain way.385 These aspects of things are what
make things capable of being reasoned about (faciunt res rationalibes).386
In other words, second intentions are the properties things have with
respect to other things that make us think about them according to those
properties: for example man not as the concept of man but as a univer-
sal, and as a subject in a proposition. Substance, quality, human being,
and animal, are names of first intentions; universal, particular, genus,
and species are names of second intentions.387 Second intentions belong

381
Pini 2002, 28; 2003, 378. Tachau pointed out (1988, 11, n.25; 12, n.28) that Kilwardbys
use of the term intentio in his semantical writings might be the source to Roger Bacons
use of the term. See Rosier 1994, 97.
382
rationes rerum et modi per quos res sunt rationabiles, DOS XLVIII.463, 1589.35-
02. See also CI 361.816. Here, Kilwardby distinguishes between two kinds of second inten-
tions: those added to the essence of things, and those added to the signs of things; logic
deals with the former, grammar with the latter.
383
Et dicuntur illae primae et istae secundae, quia primo comprehenduntur res et
deinde ex consideratione et collatione rerum ad invicem colliguntur rationes earum, DOS
XLVIII.459, 157.2932. See Green-Pedersen 1985, 2302.
384
Roger Bacon, SD, 4754, 226; transl. Maloney 2009, 128, 64.
385
van der Lecq 2008, 375; de Rijk 2005, 1921 translate it as the ontic aspects of things.
According to Green-Pedersen (1985, 227), Nicholas of Paris says that dialectic considers the
modi rerum.
386
DOS XLVIII.450. See also 451 and 463.
387
Res enim ipsae sunt primae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia, cuiusmodi sunt
substantia, quantitas et huiusmodi, sunt nomina primarum intentionum; sed rationes
rerum, cuiusmodi sunt universale, particulare, antecedens, consequens et huiusmodi, sunt
secundae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia nomina secundarum intentionum, DOS
XLVIII.459, 157.248. QLIS 90, 288.15761. See also DOS XLVIII.454, 156.248; and QLIS 85,
266.4950: Universale est nomen secundae intentionis cuius supposita sunt homo et ani-
mal. Cf. Knudsen 1982, 484.
 intellectual cognition 233

to the discipline of logic because they can be combined into propositions

and demonstrations, and in this way lead to scientia.
Kilwardbys meaning of first and second intentions should not be con-
fused with the meaning these terms acquired later on. His use of second
intentions as proper to logic shows how he understood this notion in the
context of his theory of reasoning and of logic as being the science of rea-
soning: in other words it studies the process of reasoning in such a way
that it can be used by all the other sciences as an instrument for the dis-
covery of truth.

5.9.Language

Kilwardby classifies signs into (1) natural signs, such as smoke is a sign of
fire and redness is a sign of heat, and (2) signs given by the soul, which he
divides into (a) those that have a likeness to the thing signified, and
(b) those that do not. The former are signs of something else, as spoken
words are signs of afffections of the soul and afffections of things.388 Signs
given by the soul having a likeness to the thing signified are utterances.
These can be further classified into utterances that signify and those that
do not. Signifying utterances signify either by convention (ad placitum) or
naturally.389
Human language does not signify by nature (naturaliter) but by conven-
tion. Words come to signify as the result of an original act of imposition, by
which a word is associated with a significatum.390 A word is a powerful sign
because it makes known itself and something other than itself, directing
the soul of the one afffected by it to the thing of which it is the sign.391 The
meaning is imposed on the word as a whole, hence the parts of it, the let-
ters and syllables, do not have any meaning on their own.392 Two things

388
QLIVS 42, 22526.96104. See Rist (1997, 345) on Augustine on given signs.
389
Naturally signifying utterances are not natural signs in that a living being produces
the former.
390
Omnis enim sermo est vox humana imposita ad significandum secundum placitum
humanum, DOS LII.488, 166.57. See also QLIVS 42, 224.5661; and NSLPery I.5, P 71rb.
Meaning can be understood as the relation of a sign to that of which it is a sign, the act and
form of signifying, and what is signified ( significatio dicitur tripliciter: aut actus et
forma significantis, aut ipsum significatum, aut comparatio signi ad significatum, NSLP 1,
8.1112). Cf. Lewry 1981a, 379; Maier 1972, 6970. Kilwardbys examination of significatio
here is aimed at showing that each utterance there is one form or perfectio; but this unity
is not found in the other senses of significatio: a word can have several significates
(NSLP I.1, 8).
391
DOS XLVII.442, 153.813. See Ashworth 1991, 44.
392
NSLPery I.3, M 47va.
234 theory of knowledge

must be taken into account in the act of imposition: the name and the
account (ratio) that is imposed on the name. The possible combinations
of identity and diffference of these two (name and account) explain the
so-called pre-predicamenta. Things that have the same name but a difffer-
ent account are equivocal, those with the same name and the same
account are univocal, and those that have a diffferent name and the same
account are synonyms.393
One consequence of the conventional nature of language is that a
change in what is signified by the sign does not require a change in the
sign.
It should be said that in those signs that signify by nature, such as redness
signaling shame and paleness signaling fear, a change in what is signified
means a change in the sign, whereas in those that signify by convention it is
not so, such as in the case of a circle and wine. [And] because an expres-
siondoes not signify the thing signified by nature but according to conven-
tion, a change in the thing does not necessarily imply a change in the
expression.394
In the case of natural signs, such as paleness from fear and redness from
shame, the change in the thing signified implies a change in its sign.
Of expressions signifying by convention, some are simple and others
are complex.395 Expressions without composition signify things that
belong to one of the categories. Only significative complex expressions
can be true or false; simple expressions are neither true nor false.396
Kilwardby notes the distinctive nature of human language. Only human
beings are able to produce meaningful utterances because an utterance
must be associated with a concept in the mind of the speaker, and because
only human beings have minds, only human beings produce significative
utterances.397 Moreover, an utterance can only be produced by means of a

393
NSLP I.2, 7.
394
Et dicendum quod in eis in quibus est signum significans de significato per naturam,
uerbi gratia, rubor de uerecundia, pallor de timore, sequitur transmutacio signi trans-
mutacionem significati, et hoc uidemus; in quibus autem signum est significans de signifi-
cato a uoluntate non est ita, sicut uidemus in circulo et uino. Quia ergo oracio est significans
de significato, de re scilicet, non a natura set secundum placitum, ideo non necesse est
transmutacionem rei consequi transmutacionem oracionis, LSP 405.3341.
395
NLPery I.2, M45vb.
396
NSLPery I.2, P 67rb.
397
Quod patet ex uerbis Prisciani dicentis quod uox articulata est que profectur copu-
lata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius qui loquitur. Si ergo sensus mentis est intellectus, ut uult
Priscianus dicens, sensibile idest intelligibile, et mens est solius hominis, et loqui similiter,
per hec tria manifestum est quod significatiua est diffferentia uocis humane, NSLPery I.2,
V 3r/M 46 ra. Cf. Lewry 1978, 351.
 intellectual cognition 235

certain control of the modulation of sounds, what Kilwardby calls the fig-
ure in the air, on a regular basis, in other words always the same figure for
the same utterance. This is done by the sensible soul under the control of
the rational soul.398
Kilwardby distinguishes between the sensible and the intelligible
aspects of spoken language. On the one hand, an utterance as an articulate
sound afffects the sense organs of the one hearing in a natural way.399 In
this regard, a spoken word afffects the sense organs just like any other sen-
sible form in order to make known that of which it is a sign.400 On the other
hand, by being meaningful, the utterance moves the mind of the one hear-
ing to convey the information intended by the speaker. The meaning it
conveys is its intelligible aspect.401 It moves the organ of sense in so far as
it is high or grave, whereas it afffects the intellect in so far as it is significa-
tive.402 In that sense, an utterance should be called a mark with respect to
the speaker, and it should be called a sign with respect to the hearer

398
NLPA 1.26, 124125.
399
DOS XXI.147, 58.1521; and QLIIS 56, 163.323: Si enim loquitur homini, fit efffectus,
scilicet impressio aliqua in audiente. See also NLPA 127128, for the material aspects of vox.
400
Verbum enim corporale proprie est vox litterata articulata expressa per instrumenta
vocalia ad passionem animi notificandam, QLIS 36, 106.44850; or, with respect to written
words, nihil aliud videtur esse oratio vel enuntiabile quam quaedam artificialis ordina-
tio characterum ad notitiam aliquam per visum corporalem percipiendam facta, QLIS 90,
287.1279. See also CP 381.67; QLIS 37, 106; and DOS XLVII.425, 148.1820: Item sermo
sensibilis est quia offfert se sensui aliud derelinquens intellectui sicut alia signa sensibilia.
The last one is the common definition of sign, a version of which it is found also in QLIII1S
30, 128.2021: Signum enim est quod se offfert sensui et aliud derelinquit intellectui. The
source of the definition is Augustine, De doctrina Christiana 2.1.1, ed. I. Martin, Turnhout:
Brepols (CCSL 32), 1962, 32; see also De dialectica 5. See Maloney 1983, 124. These two sen-
tences apprehend the main aspects of Augustines theory of signs: that words are articulate
utterances; that words themselves are sensible things which afffect the senses of vision
(written words) and hearing (spoken words); that words are intended to cause an act of
intellection in the one receiving it; that words are signs because they stand for something
other than themselves. See Sirridge 1990, 328.
401
See next footnote and footnote 390 above.
402
Item, intellige quod uox mouet naturaliter auditum, set non in quantum significa-
tiua set in quantum acuta uel grauis: unde in quantum est significatiua mouet intellectum.
Vnde est obiectum auditus in quantum est uox uel sonus; et intellectus in quantum est
significatiuus, et sic est hic sermo de uoce, et ob hoc non significat naturaliter set ad placi-
tum; in quantum tamen acuta uel grauis mouet naturaliter sensum, NSLPery I.2, V 3v. See
also QLIVS 39, 211.3058: Exemplum potest esse de voce sensibili et eius significato quae
per humanam institutionem sibi colligata sunt ad invicem. Vox enim sensibilis per sui
significatum movet mentem et ita per accidens; and NLSPery I.2, V 3v: [uox] in relatione
ad proferentem significat conceptum. This point is, at a general level, made by Marmo
1997, 140. See also Rosier 1997, 265.
236 theory of knowledge

because it refers to the capacity of the sign to produce an act of

understanding.403
Speech signifies an extra-mental thing through a concept (passione
mentis),404 but there is a diffference between the three kinds of speech
written (in scripto), spoken (in voce), and mental (in cognitione)in this
respect:405 whereas mental words are themselves signs of extra-mental
things by being their likenesses, spoken words only secondarily signify
things, primarily the concepts, in the mind of the speaker.406 Spoken words
are signs of the concepts existing in the soul, and the concepts are like-
nesses of things.407 The intentions or passiones in the soul are signs of
extra-mental things.408 Finally, these two aspects allow for a distinction

403
Et dicendum quod diffferunt nota et signum, quia nota est in quantum est in ore
proferentis, set signum est in quantum est in aure audientis: quod patet per hoc quod sig-
num est quod se afffert sensui, aliud derelinquens intellectui. Quia igitur species intelligibi-
lis in anima in quantum significanda est alteri dicitur passio in anima eius qui loquitur,
melius dicit, sunt note quam signa, NSLPery I.2, M 46ra/P 67va. See Rosier 1994, 9798;
Marmo 1997, 13940. This dual aspect or relation of the signfor whom it signifies and to
that which it signifiesis very important in medieval semantical theory. For a general
introduction to the medieval discussion on signs, see Maier 1981 (Maiers references to
Kilwardby are from the commentary on the Priscianus Maior, whose autorship to Kilwardby
is generally refuted). On the diffference between nota and signum, see also DOS XLIX.468.
404
QLIVS 11, 47.45. In this context, passio means the same as intellectus, that is, the
species insofar as understood (passio non est nisi species intellecta, NSLPery I.2, P 67va).
Cf. Lewry 1978, 289.
405
Cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione I, 16a38, and Augustine, DT 15.1011, In the NLPA
124.868, Kilwardby argues that not every spoken word is representable by a written word
but it must bear a certain similarity ( non quelibet vox representabilis per figuram est
litterata set que est representabilis per similem figuram in scripto qualem in sui forma-
tione habet in aere, et proptera non oportet quod quelibet vox sit litterata).
406
scriptura quae est signum intellectus primo, et consequenter signum rei, QLIII1S
30, 128.1516; also NLSPery I.2, V 3v: Et sic patet quod uox sit signum intellectus. See also
DOS XLVIII.464, 159.78: verbum mentale est de re cuius est verbum et in mente, et
verbum vocale est de mentali verbo; and NSLP 2, 12.189. See also LSP 396.179: ora-
ciones sunt note passionum, et passiones sunt note rerum, ergo a primo et sunt note
rerum. This is also his position in the Comentary on Priscian minor, according to Mary
Sirridge 1988, 13. According to Pini (1999, 356), Kilwardby must be counted among the
proponents of the theory of the primary signification of species. An expression can be
true with respect to the primary significatum, the concept, and false with respect to the
secondary significatum, the extramental thing (Exemplum de oratione quae licet falsa sit
per comparationem ad secundarium significatum in rebus extra, tamen est vera per com-
parationem ad primarium significatum in passionibus animi, QLIS 44, 143.7072).
407
sermo est signum intellectus, NLP II.7, 382.216; and NSLPery I.2, M 46rb: intel-
lectus est similitudo rerum. The intellectus is a likeness of the thing it is the intellectus of
(NSLPery I.2, P 67va). In the words of Lewry 1978, 290: It is the thoughts which are the
likenesses of the realities and not the utterances which signify them.
408
Et intellige secundum quod huiusmodi, quod ipsa compositio vel enuntiabile in
anima nihil aliud est quam compositio intentionis cum intentione secundum aliquem
modum coniunctionis ad designandum unionem quae est in rebus extra animam quarum
 intellectual cognition 237

between concepts, which are the same for all human beings, and spoken
and written words, which vary according to the diffferent languages used
by human beings.409
Kilwardby sketches a psychological-logical account according to which
the concepts in the soul relate to extramental things. What we say
expresses what we know of the reality. This intentionality of thought
points to the conception of an isomorphic relation between the world and
our mind in the sense that the intentions of the things in the soul corre-
spond to the intentions of the things in the things: intentions and their
combination in the soul must be founded upon the properties of the
extramental things for which they stand.410

5.10.Angelic Intellect

Two theological questions arise from the above discussions of human

knowledge: first, which are the similarities and diffferences between the
cognitive capacities of human beings, angels and God; second, what is the
role of divine illumination. The latter was a traditional theme in medieval
Augustinianism.
I shall start by presenting my reading of Kilwardbys answer to the first
question. Concerning the comparison between the cognitive capacity of

sunt intentiones. Et istae intentiones et earum compositiones qualitates sive passiones

animae sunt in anima quiescentes, et eadem sunt ad aliquid ut sunt rerum signa exterio-
rum, QLIS 90, 288.166171. In other words, these intentions belong to the category of rela-
tion because they are signs of extramental things. See also NSLP 1, 7.24.25; QLIS 90,
287.1369; and DOS XLIX.468, 160.1921. On mental terms as signs of extramental things,
see Pinborg 1984, 409. According to Kilwardby, the passiones animae are signs, and signs
belong to the category of relation. Kilwardby was, on placing signs in the category of rela-
tion, probably influenced by Fishacre. On Fishacre on this question, see Rosier 1994,
11417.
409
Set dicendum quod comparando uocem ad rem, dicitur non esse eadem. Similiter
littere comparate ad elementa quorum sunt signa, in quantum illa constituunt uocem
comparatam ad rem, non sunt heedem. Passiones autem et res heedem sunt apud omnes. Et
causa est quia res non sunt a nobis. Non enim est in nobis res facere, similiter nec facere simi-
litudines quascumque ad intelligendum ipsas res, immo si quis subtiliter inspiciat, uidebit
similitudinem in anima non omnino esse diuersam a re ipsa set aliquo modo esse rem ipsam.
Ex quo patet quod non dicemus ipsam uocem rem et intellectum significantem plura signi-
ficare. Littere autem et uoces, quia a nobis sunt, ideo non heedem sunt apud omnes set diuerse
apud diuersos, NSLPery I. 2, P 67va (emphasis added).
410
Et vult quod res dicibiles secundum quod huiusmodi et omnino res rationis super
res naturae fundentur, QLIS 90, 288.1756. See Thom 2007, 14: The contrast between acci-
dental ways of understanding and a correct arrangement that corresponds to the way
things are in reality bespeakes his realist ontology, which he regularly deploys in contrast-
ing the way things are according to grammatical appearance [secundum vocem, secundum
238 theory of knowledge

God and the creatures, I shall focus on the evidence discussed in QLIIS 37,
D43Q 16, and QLIII1S 47.411 The question deals with the cognitive capacity
of angels but it can be extended to the human rational soul, since the dif-
ference between them amounts only to the unibility with the body, not
the cognitive capacity. Kilwardby makes clear that in this question he is
talking about the cognitive capacity of creatures, human and angelic.
Kilwardbys general assumption is that a creature must have a finite
power because it is created,412 while both to create a thing and keep it in
being require an infinite power, which only God possesses.413 The crea-
tures cognitive powers cannot have an infinite power to know.414 The
creature can, however, know an infinite amount of objects, because knowl-
edge (scientia) is exterior to the nature of the things and can be directed to
various things without a limit. In the D43Q, Kilwardby names the power of
the creature as finite infinity, as opposed to Gods infinite infinity.415
Kilwardby starts by distinguishing two types of infinity (infinitas), one
according to intensity and the other according to duration.416 The first
(intensive infinite) refers to the power of creating and can only be attrib-
uted to God.417 The greatness of God is without end, as is his wisdom and
beauty.418 No creature can be compared in power to the Creator, since
everything created has limited power and goodness.419

sermonem] with the ways they are in reality. See also Lewry 1988, 96. On the intentionality
of signs, see Kelly 2002, 3945.
411
Much of the discussion in this section can be found in Silva 2007.
412
QLIS 89, 280.75; QLIII1S 45, 192.1921.
413
D43Q 16. See Braakhuis (1985), 127.
414
Quia igitur res in se finita potest assimilari rebus infinitis extra et ita fieri subiectum
infinitarum relationum, sed non potest habere naturalem potentiam immensam quae
intra est, ideo est creatura capax infinitae scientiae, sed non infinitae potentiae., QLIII1S
45, 193.458.
415
D43Q 16: Sextadecima questio est an angelus habeat uirtutem infinitam inferius.
See also QLIS 80, 256.3353. Kilwardby defines the infinite as that which does not have a
terminus (Infinitum enim est quod terminum non habet, DOS XXIV.174, 67.312.
416
D43Q 16, 2122.395415. Cf. Richard Rufus of Cornwall, In Physicam Aristotelis, ed.
R. Wood, London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy (Auctores Britannici
Medii Aevi 16), 2003, 2401 (8.3, 2). For the relation between Kilwardby and Rufus, see
Wood 1996a. Kilwardby remarks (QLIII1S 43, 183.9193) that according to Aristotle (Physics
III) there isnt an actual infinite. See his examples of flesh (caro) and fire (ignis) in NLPA
4.144, 154. He says that although flesh according to its quantity is divisible to the infinite,
when we actually divide it we arrive to a point where we cannot divide it more in such a
way that the form and species of flesh remain.
417
Sed creacio non procedit nisi a potencia infinita, E 1, 20.
418
The same idea is found in Kilwardbys QLIS 43, 139.789: quia proprietates nobiles
creaturae Deo conveniunt modo multum excellentiori.
419
Nichil autem creatum talem potest habere infinitatem: quicquid enim ex nichilo
procedit, in numero, pondere et mensura constitutum est, et ideo creatos limites potentie
et bonitatis habet, D43Q 16, 21.39799.
 intellectual cognition 239

The second type of infinite refers to the power to maintain the exis-
tence of beings. Although one might think this second type of infinity
belongs to angels, they as created beings do not possess it.420 Whatever is
created does not come into existence by its own power; in the same way, it
is not able to continue existing by itself,421 because the same infinite power
is necessary both to create ex nichilo, to pass from nothing into being, and
to maintain the being of created things.422
Kilwardby considers that it could be argued that when an angelic ratio-
nal soul contemplates the eternal wisdom, it understands everything
(omnia) God understands. In this case, angels must understand infinitely
(infinita) because God understands infinitely (infinita). However, in doing
so we commit a fallacy, more specifically the fallacy of figure of speech
(fallacia figure dictionis).423 While everything denotes what is known, infi-
nitely (infinita) in the first case signifies how much or how many things
(quantum) God knows (infinite), in the case of angels it refers to the the
quality (quale) of the angels power of understanding (infinitely).424 The
angelic power of understanding must be qualified.

420
An possit in rebus corporalibus aliquid effficere quod non potest exire in esse nisi per
potentiam infinitam, cuiusmodi pro certo est creare, et nisi soluat res creatas in esse.
Ostensum est quod talem potentiam non habet angelus, D43Q 16, 22.4258.
421
D43Q 16, 22.40815.
422
Sicut enim non potest aliquid de puro nichilo prodire in esse nisi per potentiam
infinitam, sic nichil potest <post> creationem in esse durare nisi per potentiam eandem,
D43Q 16, 22.4068.
423
This is also called fallacy of form of expression. Cf. Hamblin 1970; Schreiber 2003,
3840; 42. See also Krabbe 1998; Ebbesen 1981b; and Maier 1972, 72. The fallacy of figure of
speech applies, according to Kilwardby, because there is a change of category - mutatio
predicamenti (cf. D43Q 16, 23.4457; 24, 4745). In his QLIIS 148, 406.8183), Kilwardby
gives another example of figura dictionis: nihil dat quod non habet, parentes non habent
damnabile peccatum, ergo non dant (cf. Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi, 22, 178a318). (See
also QLIS 74, 234.968; QLIII1S 8, 412.1668; QLIII1S 13, 64.435.) I benefited greatly from
Miira Tuominens comments on this question.
424
Verumtamen dato quod intelligat omnia que Deus, non tamen sequitur, concesso
quod Deus intelligat infinita, quod angelus intelligat infinita, quia forma argumentandi est
secundum fallaciam figure dictionis: omnia enim uel omne in prima propositione distri-
buit pro hiis que dicunt quid, sed infinita que assumunt in minore propositione dicunt
quantum uel quale, D43Q 16, 23.4405. Kilwardby explains that the extensive infinite is
said quantum and intensive infinite quale (cf. D43Q 16, 234.4734). Kilwardby gives some
more examples: (1) Quos uidisti heri, hodie uides [What you saw yesterday, today you see];
heri uidesti decem, ergo uides decem. [Yesterday you saw ten, therefore you see ten]. And (2)
Quod uidisti heri, hodies uides [What you saw yesterday, today you see]; sed heri uidisti
iocundos, ergo hodie uides iocundos. [But yesterday you saw agreeable, therefore today you
see agreeable]. Similar examples are found in the Dialectica Monacensis (de Rijk 1967, 579
80). See also NSLP 7, 40.1920.
240 theory of knowledge

Our intellect is able to grasp God infinitude because it is able to grasp

that God is boundless.425 Only in this way can a created intellect be said
infinite, in a way inferior to Gods infinite understanding.426 The angelic
intellect is able to grasp the infinitude of Gods power to know an infinite
number of things: no thing and no aspect of any thing is left out of Gods
knowledge, but by itself is not able to know infinitely.427 Creatures have the
finite capacity to understand the infinite in a finite manner, that is, with-
out being able to comprehend it in the sense of circumscribing the object
of knowledge.428 The impossibility of a finite mind to know the infinite is
evident:429 in order to understand infinitely, the angelic intellect should be
extended as far as the infinite itself, which is impossible for a finite intel-
lect;430 from the point of view of the object, that which can be circum-
scribed by a finite mind cannot be infinite. In DOS (24.178) Kilwardby puts
the same view as follows:
the mind cannot circumscribe the infinite in the whole of its dimension.
And the cause is that human knowledge and the human mind are finite, and
therefore cannot circumscribe the infinite; and because, if the infinite would
be circumscribed by such a mind or knowledge, would not be infinite.431
The limitation arises from the impossibility of the power to come to know
an object that goes beyond the reach of the cognitive power. The limited

425
Intelligimus etiam Deum infinitum, alioquin enim non probaremus nec ratione per-
ciperemus; sed iste intellectus est per priuationem finis: quantum enim dilatauerit <se>
intellectus noster super infinitum non apprehendet finem, et per hoc cognoscit illud esse
infinitum, D43Q 16, 23.45862.
426
Sic igitur intellectus noster et angelicus infinitum capit, sed finite; infinite autem
capiuntur ab intellectu diuino, quia eius intellectus infinitus comprehendit et concipit
intellecta sua infinita et commensurat se illis, D43Q 16, 23.4635. Also QLIS 77, 248.556:
Comprehensio enim divina est capacitatis infinitae.
427
Si enim angelus contemplando eternam sapientiam intelligit omnia que Deus, et
omnes rationes ydeales siue causales que sunt in ea, cum ille sint infinite eius non est finis,
restat quod angelos habeat potentiam infinitam finita simul intelligendi, quod non posset
fieri nisi <per> potentiam infinitam, D43Q 16, 23.43044.
428
Literally to surround (circumcapitur). See QLIS 77, 248.469: Ad primum contra
dicendum quod comprehendi aliquid dicitur dupliciter, uno modo ita quod totum capian-
tur et amplius capi possit, alio modo ita capi ut nihil extra relinquantur. Simili modo
duplici dicitur comprehensione finiri. Primo modo est nostra scientia comprehensa et
finita, secundo scientia Dei. The same argument is repeated in QLIII1S 43, 182.6876. See
also QLIII1S 42, 179.10910.
429
QLIII1S 43, 184.111112.
430
Item, intellectus angelicus uideret infinita et sapientiam diuinam infinitam <si> ita
extenderet se commensurando cum infinitate ipsa, quod esse non potest; non autem
sequeretur quod esset infinitus intensione, D43Q 16, 23.4703.
431
in toto suo ambitu circumcapitur quod non potest mens de infinito. Et causa
est quia humana scientia et mens est finita, et ideo non circumcapit infinitum; et quia si
 intellectual cognition 241

power is incapable to fully understand that which is limitless this notwith-

standing, the mind is able to understand the infinite incidentally, by
understanding the infinitys lacking of boundaries.432 Kilwardby explains
this through another example: imagine an infinite line somewhere. The
eyes can see the (infinite) line but cannot see the ends of the line. This is
how a finite mind sees something infinite.433 The same reasoning is found
in Kilwardbys QLIS. When comparing the creature and the Creator, he
argues that the only way the creature is able to understand Gods infini-
tude (secundum tale est) is through recognizing the absence of limits.434 In
the poetic image he provides in question 4 of his QLIS, Kilwardby com-
pares our knowledge of God with someone looking into a mirror in order
to see as reflected what it couldnt see directly.435 We are able to under-
stand that God is infinite although our reason is not able to grasp the lim-
its of this infinite. The same mirror image is used in QLIII2S, where
Kilwardby argues that in this world we know God from the efffects of his
action.436 But this knowledge from the created efffects, which he qualifies

infinitum a tali mente et scientia circumcaperetur, non esset infinitum, DOS XXIV.178,
69.1821. Scientia, he says, is about what is finite (DOS XXIV.163). There is no knowledge of
what is infinite ( de infinitis non possit esse disciplina, NSLPor 5, M 4vb).
432
Sed tunc dicet aliquis quod mens non cognoscit infinitum in quantum infinitum est,
sed id quod est pro aliqua parte sui, et ita non cognoscit infinitum nisi accidentaliter. Et
dicendum quod immo, sicut enim finitum in quantum finitum cognoscitur per positionem
finis, quia finitum est cuius aliquid sumentibus non semper est aliquid extra sumere, sic
infinitum in quantum infinitum cognoscitur per privationem finis, DOS XXIV.179, 69.29
35. See also D43Q 16, 23.46062; QLIS 43, 138.325; and QLIII1S 43, 184.1256: Creatura
autem hoc habeat ex dono et per modum finitum, ita quod non sciat ipsam infinitatem nisi
per finis privationem (here Kilwardby contrast the positive knowledge of the infinite by
the soul of Christ and the human soul).
433
Exemplum accipe potius: pone lineam rectam infinitam cum latitudine aliqua; ocu-
lus recipiens uidebit lineam infinitam, sed non circumambit uisio eius extrema linee, et
ideo finite uidebit infinitum, D43Q 16, 23.46769.
434
Vel dic breviter quod finitum non facit cognoscere infinitum secundum quod
tale est nisi per privationem, QLIS 43, 138.334 (and ssg., especially lines 4042:
quia veritas existentiae creaturae et virtus eius in infinitum multiplicata numquam
pertingit ad veritatem existentiae et virtutis creatoris). In DOS XXVII, Kilwardby insists
that our knowledge of simple spiritual beings, in particular God, cannot take place in this
world.
435
See also QLIII2S 22, 73.1478: Per speculum dicitur cognosci Deus mediante
animarationali, quia in speculo nihil rei videtur nisi imago speciei quae transmittit ali-
quo modo ad speciem. The speculum example (of Pauline origin) is probably taken
fromAugustines De doctrina christiana, ed. J. Martin, (CCSL 32) Turnhout: Brepols, 1962,
2.7.11, to which Kilwardby explicitly refers in QLIII2S 38, 148.16974. See also Augustine, DT
15.11.21.
436
Sic in via Deum videmus, quia non videmus eum hic nisi per efffectum suum vel in
efffectu per collationem ad ipsum efffectum, QLIII2S 22, 73.1557.
242 theory of knowledge

as obscure cognition, is limited in scope, since the efffects resemble the

cause in an incomplete manner.437
Medieval accounts of cognition included an awareness of the limitation
of human cognitive powers, both in terms of what can be known and
ofthe degree of certainty that on its own human beings are able to achieve.
As creatures we are finite beings trying to grasp the truth out of a perma-
nently changing world of sensible things. Traditionally the overcoming
ofthese limits is made possible by the supernatural illuminative action
of God, but the new sources available in the thirteenth century raised
some diffficulties at the same time as they offfered new solutions to the
problem.

5.11.Divine Illumination

It was a common belief among authors in the Augustinian tradition, espe-

cially Franciscans, that the soul is aided in its cognitive efffort by the illumi-
native action of God.438 Kilwardby retained some Augustinian common
places even though he did not have any use for the action of divine illumi-
nation in the context of simple or complex cognition.439
Kilwardby refers in DOS, DSF and QLIIS 78 to the passage in which
Augustine quotes John I:9, which states that God created the eternal lights
that illuminate every man that comes into this world.440 How Augustine
and Kilwardby interpreted this is diffficult to ascertain. Does it mean that
God created human beings with a certain cognitive content, or that he
endowed them with an intellect that is the souls internal light (lux inte-
rior) and through which it is able to see (to continue the visual terminol-
ogy) the truth when it encounters it in a propositional and syllogistic

437
Sed haec obscura cognitio est, quia nunc sic Deum videmus, et creatura est simili-
tudo dissimilis valde necessario, QLIII2S 22, 73.15960. Kilwarby stresses repeatedly
(e.g., QLIII2S 38, 143.167) that our knowledge (notitia) of God is obscure and enigmatic
(obscura et aenigmatica). True and certain knowledge is acquired only in patria.
438
On the subject, see Gilson 1934. Marrone 2001a argues that only between 1250 and
1280 a systematic doctrine of divine illumination is developed, by Bonaventure, John
Pecham and Matthew of Aquasparta.
439
omnis cognicio fit per lumen et in lumine, vt oculus corporalis illustratur lumine
solis uel lucerne corporalis ut possit uidere, et oculus mentalis lumine intelligibili quod
illuminat omnem hominem, quod est Deus, ut docet Augustinus, DSF 164, 923.34-01.
440
DOS 1, 9.710: cum enim humana ratio supra se et intra habeat rationes aeternas
veri luminis quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. See also DSF
164, and QLIS 80, 255. Cf. Augustine, Confessiones 7.9.13. Pasnau adopted the same reading
for Aquinas (see Pasnau 2002, 305). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.84.5. In DOS LXIV.643, 220.12
3, this light is identified with God.
 intellectual cognition 243

form? In the same passage, Kilwardby contrasts this internal light with
God as the light from above that makes all things appear and be visible.441
Kilwardby draws an analogy between corporeal seeing and intellectual
seeing in QLIII2S: as in corporeal vision light makes it possible for color to
be seen, in intellectual vision one first sees the middle term, by means of
which one sees the conclusion. The middle term not only shows the con-
clusion, but also moves the mind to assent to the conclusion and to make
it worthy of assent. The conclusion, he concludes, is the terminus of the
act of intellectual cognition, but the middle term is what makes it possi-
ble, just like light in bodily seeing.442
Alternatively, should the illumination of every human being that comes
into this world be read as meaning that, as McEvoy argues in support for
Grosseteste, God makes the object intelligible to the soul through an illu-
minative action?443 It is clear that Kilwardby did not deny divine illumina-
tion altogether; what remains unclear from these passages is whether the
light from above operates in actual acts of cognition (as QLIIS 78 seems to
indicate)in other words, at every moment God illuminates the human
intellect, or things so as to be understood by the intellector whether it
operates by infusing intelligible contents when the soul was created.444 It is
not a question of whether or not there is some sort of divine illumination,
but of when this illumination takes place.
Reflecting on how the intellect acquires images of the kind of intelligi-
ble immutable and eternal truths that concern the liberal arts,445 such as
truths about geometrical figures or numbers,446 Kilwardby states that these

441
Ad primum obiectum dicendum quod lumen illustrativum est dupliciter. Unum est
intra, scilicet forma illustrans materiam et perficiens; aliud extra, scilicet aliquid desuper
infusum faciens rem visibilem et apparentem. Sic in anima est lux interior, scilicet perfec-
tio sua, et haec est diversa in diversis; et lux exterior desuper infusa, et haec secundum
Augustinum est ipse Deus lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc
mundum, sicut sol, QLIIS 78, 216.527. (See also DSF 212.) I infer that the intellect is that
part of the soul because the context of the quotation is the question of there being only one
intellect for all human beings. Kilwardby is answering that this is not so, because the intel-
lect is the perfection of the soul (which he qualifies similarly elsewhere) and as diversa in
diversis.
442
QLII2S 5, 1819.3035.
443
McEvoy 1982, 32122. A diffferent reading is found in Marrone 1983, 157214; 2001a,
38108. A conciliatory view is found in Van Dyke 2009.
444
In the DOS, Kilwardby says internal inspirations and illuminations (illuminationes)
come from within and not from the outside, as it is the case of prophecies (XXXIII.339,
121.78).
445
OI 35, 79 ( cum res uere de quibus sunt discipline sint immutabiles et eodem
modo se habentes semper, DSF 35, 63.267).
446
DSF 35.
244 theory of knowledge

truths are infused or impressed from above (desuper infusum uel impres-
sum).447 Such, he adds, is the position of Augustine and Plato.448 On the
same topic, he argues in QLIIS 37 that these intelligible truths are present
in the soul from the beginning.449 He could see no problem in postulating
the existence of such innate truths as he had only denied, explicitly and
repeatedly, innate knowledge of sensible things.450 I claim that he adopted
an illumination-at-creation theory. By this I mean that he believed that
God creates the intellective soul with a set of basic geometrical and arith-
metical truths that play a role in normal cognition, and that there is no
need to posit in addition special auxiliary acts of illumination.
Scholars have long been aware of the tensions between the Augustinian
illumination doctrine as an answer to the problem of certitudeon the
level of both concept formation and judgmentand the Aristotelian doc-
trine of abstraction in thirteenth-century epistemological discussions.451
These tensions eventually led to the progressive abandonment of strong
versions of the doctrine of illumination that is usually placed in the last
decades of the thirteenth century, first with Thomas Aquinas and then
with Henry of Ghent (ca. 12171293) and Peter John Olivi (12481298).452
A more recent trend in scholarly thought has been to downplay the role of
divine illumination in thinkers of the Augustinian hue in an earlier period,
and to favor an interpretation that stresses the natural power of the
individual human intellect as that which warrants the certitude of cogni-
tion. Kilwardby apparently took a middle path here too. He emphasizes
the continuity between sensory and intellectual cognition and the natu-
ral capacity of the intellect to form concepts through its powers of

447
DSF 26, 61.15. DSF 25, 60.268: Res enim intelligibiles, que sunt in disciplinis libera-
libus et non capiuntur sensu, perueniunt ad intelligenciam ita quod uideantur intellectuali
uisione absque alia uisione media. These intelligibiles are geometric figures, numbers,
principles of music harmony (rithmica), etc.
448
DSF 35, 63.168.
449
QLIIS 37, 121.1335.
450
Set hoc memorandum est quod non dixit superius ipsam nullas posse habere yma-
gines absque usu sensuum set nullas corporalium et sensibilium. Hic autem dixit eam posse
habere ymagines rerum intelligibilium et spiritualium, non determinans utrum ante usum
an post, et ita non dixit opposita, DSF 38, 64, (italics mine). See also DSF 213. Here,
Kilwardby discusses the existence of two kinds of species in the soul: acquired and innate
(DSF 21); and he denies that the sensitive soul has any images of sensible things prior to the
use of the senses (DSF 23).
451
Gilson 1934. See also Lynch 1972, 14958; Nash 2003; and Pasnau 2011. On the
Augustinian version of illumination that rested on the association of the agent intellect
with God, see Gilson 1926.
452
Marrone 2001a; Pasnau 1995.
 intellectual cognition 245

abstraction. He also acknowledges the capacity of the human intellect to

recognize the truth of human judgments without the need for any divine
intervention. On the other hand, he gives a role to divine illumination in
the endowment to the individual intellective soul of certain immutable
principles that play a role in cognition, as the background against which
sensory data is drawn.453
Kilwardby refers in QLIII2S to human cognitive power as the small light
from a candle, and to God as the eternal light and the immense sun. God
is full of knowledge that goes beyond the cognitive capacity of any crea-
ture (ultra omnem creaturae capacitatem).454 Human beings were created
as endowed with fully-fledged cognitive powers, able to know even the
Creator, but fail to do so by accident, due to their sinful condition.455 The
limitation of human cognitive power is the punishment for Original Sin.
Due to the connection of the human soul with the flesh and the influence
of concupiscentia, human beings are not ready, in this life (in via), for such
a light or for the full knowledge of the things it illuminates.456 Such a vision
and such illumination are possible only in the beatific state.457
It is in this state, he suggests, that the light that flows from being face to
face with God is as bright as the sun, and through this light our reason will
have perfect knowledge of both corporeal and spiritual objects through
the causal reasons and the exemplars (rationes causales et exemplares)
that exist in the mind of God.458 This knowledge includes simple and com-
plex cognition.459 In the afterlife our knowledge will improve not only in
quantity (of things known) but also in acuity.460 Through beatific vision,
our soul will contemplate an eternal wisdom that contains all things.461
Knowledge of that kind (in patria) cannot be compared to our knowledge

453
DSF 3940.
454
QLIII2S 24.3, 83.5660; QLIII2S 26.2, 96.263. See also QLIIS 165, 460.19.
455
Creatura per se et quantum est de se suum notificat creatorem, per accidens autem
solum errare facit. Dum enim creatura cognita inordinate amatur, praestat occasionem
erroris. Sed peccatum est per se causa erroris, QLIS 43, 138.535.
456
QLIII2S 26, 97.2748. The same reasoning seems to be present in Grosseteste; see
Marrone 2001a, 4950 and Van Dyke 2009, 69192. Kilwardby makes an explicit reference
to Grossetestes theory in NLP I.33, 2067.
457
QLIII2S 24.3, 83.
458
Ibi igitur mens videbit clarissime omnia tam corporalia quam spiritualia, quia ibi
sunt omnium rationes causales et exemplares, QLIII2S 24, 84.668.
459
visio in patria sit tantum circa verum aeternum quod est simplex incomplexum,
tamen in illo videbuntur certissime omnia incomplexa et complexa, QLIII2S 5, 19.4850.
460
QLIII2S 24, 84.612.
461
OI 12, 734 ( eternam sapienciam contemplabitur continentem omnia, DSF 12,
58.56).
246 theory of knowledge

in via, however, because it is dependent on grace.462 Actual divine illumi-

nation thus seems to be restricted to a state of beatitude in the afterlife.
There appears to be no textual evidence to decide for actual divine illu-
mination, in other words for the existence of particular acts of divine
intervention in the human cognitive process. Kilwardby seems to take
divine illumination to mean that God created the soul with some eternal
and immutable truths within, and bestowed upon the cognitive powers of
the soul the capacity to grasp truth when they see it, in other words to
grasp the truth of a proposition by grasping its terms and to understand
that certain premises entail certain conclusions. There appears to be no
need for external divine assistance for the grasping of that truth. The ver-
sicle from Johns Gospel should be given a temporal reading, that is, taken
as meaning that when every man that comes into this worldwhen his
rational soul is created by God and infused in an appropriate sensitive
bodyhe comes with the eternal truths by default. Sensible objects are
acquired through the senses, universals are abstracted from the species
acquired through sense perception, and intelligible objects are bestowed
(indita) upon the soul from its creation.

5.12.Demons

I would like to refer to an interesting question in the D43Q, where

Kilwardby discusses the diffferent ways human beings and spiritual crea-
tures (in the case, demons) come to know emotions.463 Kilwardby starts by
asking whether human beings are able to see what is happening inside
other human minds? He answers that we are not able through the senses
to see directly or recognize what someone is feeling inside, but that this
feeling reveals itself through expressions in the body. The body works as a
medium, through which thoughts and emotions become visible, not
directly but by their efffects.464 It is from these exterior signs that we are

462
QLIIS 37, 1613.
463
Tricesima nona questio est an homo potest uidere oculo mentis omnia que aguntur
in corde hominis habentia impressionem exterius in corpore, si haberet uisum ita acutum
sicut dyabolus, D43Q 39, 42.
464
Istorum autem signorum aut uestigiorum aut impressionum quedam fiunt occulte
interius, ita quod non percipiuntur sensu humano; quedam autem exterius, ita quod ab
homine percipiantur: sicut ira anime in aspectu et colore uultus nonnumquam ostenditur,
tristitia in uultus deiectione et pallore, iocunditas in luculentia et sic de similibus. De
humano autem iudicio, constat quod de interiore anime afffectione conicere potest per
signum datum exterius in corpore, sed non per signum interius occultum, D43Q 39, 42.85
92. See also QLIIS 42, 130.
 intellectual cognition 247

able to speculate on the afffections of the soul.465 Sometimes we succeed,

others we are deceived, by those efffects in the body.466
Kilwardby extends then the question to whether spiritual beings such
as demons can know our thoughts in the same way? As spiritual beings
they can be aware of exterior signs as well as men can, thus, being able to
form conjectures about our thoughts from visible signs and gestures.467 But
they can also enter our body and observe the movements of the soul and
its influence on the body. Again, they can be aware of the efffects but also
directly of the feeling or thought itself.468 They cannot however enter in
the soul itself.469
The degree of understanding that it is possible to achieve from bodily
signs depends upon experience, that is to say: in the same way that there
are human beings with better or worse vision, and with better and worse
use of their cognitive powers,470 there are also demons who are more or
less capable of drawing conclusions from the impressions made on the
body by the motion of the soul (impressiones factas in corpore ex motibus
anime). However, demons are certainly more capable than human beings,
not only because they are naturally cleverer, but also because they have
more experience.471 The human mind can have as much capacity and
experience as demons but not while it is united to the body.472
As we have seen in the section on language, Kilwardby distinguishes
between two ways of considering to speak:473 in and from itself and abso-
lutely within the speaker, i.e. mental speech; or in relation with another by
transmitting some information. It is this transmission or expression of

465
De afffectionibus aut appetitibus et studiis, non puto esse ambiguum quin faciant
impressiones organo corporali; unde probabiliter coniecturari posset de motibus anime, si
quis forte posset illas impressiones uidere in se ipsis et sciret collectionem talium signo-
rum ad suas causas, D43Q 39, 42.825.
466
D43Q 39, 42.935.
467
QLIIS 38, 124.316. Cf. Richard Fichacre, InIIS, d. 7, 135, lines 366373. The conjecture
is extended to their knowledge of future events (cf. QLIIS 42).
468
Cf. Peter Lombard, S II, dist. VIII, 46. A similar answer is found in Thomas Aquinas,
ST I.57, 4; Richard Fishacre (InIIS, d. 8, 171, lines 434437) says that sometimes they can
while others cannot. Demons cannot, however, produce new things or change on its own
without there being a correspondent active potency for what the thing is to become.
469
See Richard Fichacre, InIIS, d. 8, 174, lines 518525.
470
QLIII2S 60, 251.99130. See also QLIII1S 42, 177.6972.
471
D43Q 39, 43.1089: multa enim experientia et temporis diuturnitas multam adie-
cit eis sapientiam.
472
D43Q 39, 42.1145.
473
Solutio. Est loqui dupliciter, vel in se et absolute apud ipsum dicentem et haec est
cogitatio, vel relatum ad alterum secundum quod est manifestatum et sic superaddit ali-
quid super cognitionem, QLIIS 56, 162.235. These correspond roughly to the two first ways
of speaking Anselm presents in his Monologium 10. See Bonaventure, C II, d.10, a.3, q.1.
248 theory of knowledge

thought that spoken speech adds to mental speech. When angels speak to
human beings they cause an impression/afffection in the hearer; but when
they speak to another angel, the change (of a spiritual nature) takes place
first in the speaker, either by focusing its attention on the other, or by
describing in its own mind the images of the things he wants the other to
see, or by turning the attention of his soul (dirigit intentionem spiritus) to
those images which he naturally possesses within; through this, an efffect
is caused in the hearer.474
A closely following question concerns two particular cases of cognition:
how angels and Christ come to know sensible objects. Given that in the
case of human beings, we come to know the exterior object by reception
of its species, how can spiritual beings such as angels come to know sen-
sible objects, since they do not have a body and consequently they cannot
receive the species of corporeal things through the senses? Kilwardby dis-
cusses the question in QLIIS 37. The other option is for those species to be
endowed (inditas) to their souls, that is, to have them innately. There are
two objections to this solution. First, according to Aristotle, all sensible
knowledge comes from the use of the senses; second, in case the species of
all the corporeal things were present from the beginning in the soul of
spiritual beings, they would know everything there is and everything there
will be, which could amount to an infinite number of things. Kilwardby
promptly dismisses the last point claiming that there cannot exist an infi-
nite number of things (although potentially it could).475
One possible answer, assuming that angels do not have bodies (the
opinion he attributes to his contemporaries, modernis), is to hold that they
are not pure intellects either but also have a spirit,476 inferior to the intel-
lect, through which they receive the species of sensible objects.477 Another
way is to consider that they receive from God, when created (ab initio), the
species of all the past, present and future sensible things. However, to be
endowed with those species does not mean to have full knowledge of

474
Si autem loquitur ad alium angelum, adhuc superadditur aliquid ex parte loquentis,
scilicet aliqua actio spiritualis. Quia aut applicat se alii ut in ipso videat quod vult eum
docere, aut describit in mente imagines rerum quas vult eum scire, aut dirigit intentionem
spiritus ad intuendum ea quae in suo proprio spiritu naturaliter sunt indita, et ex hoc etiam
sequitur efffectus in audiente, QLIIS 56, 163.338. The last way, in italics, corresponds to
Aquinas position, as described by Rosier 2006, 383. The question here is not when angels
speak in an assumed human body (in corpore assumpto), but about spiritual locutione. Cf.
QLIIS 56, 162.56.
475
QLIIS 37, 122.1556.
476
QLIIS 37, 119.858.
477
QLIIS 37, 119.7880.
 intellectual cognition 249

those things, like the future ones.478 The species are in the angelic souls but
not as being known,479 in the same way human beings have in themselves
the intelligibilia and nevertheless are not actually thinking about them all
the time.480 Kilwardby seems to be saying that, although angels have all the
species by default, they only come to know the future ones when the
future arrives.481

5.13.Divine Ideas

I presented Kilwardbys dual consideration of universals in section 5.2: as

existing in the human soul and as the essence of individual extra-mental
things. There is, however, a third optionthat universals are ideas exist-
ing in Gods mind.482 This would explain the importance attached to divine
ideas in medieval epistemological discussion. Kilwardby followed this tra-
dition, influenced by Augustines definition of divine ideas as eternal rea-
sons of things existing in Gods mind.483 An idea is hence taken as the
cognitive and causal likeness of a thing.484 Such a conception of universals
as formal and exemplar causes of (the essences of) created things is a
guarantee of the order of things and at the same time justifies their
intelligibility.485

478
QLIIS 37, 120.1069.
479
Numquid ergo sic omnia novit semper? Si semper habet apud se omnium species,
non oportet. Etsi enim omnia sint in eius notitia abdita, non semper tamen in eius cogni-
tione, QLIIS 37, 120.1102.
480
Ex his collige quod intelligibilia omnia semper sunt in mente, sed non semper cogi-
tantur. Et ut actualiter cogitentur, proficit scientia nostra per tempus et locum. Similiter
videtur posse esse in angelis quod habeant apud se notitiam omnium corporalium, sed
non semper ea cogitent, QLIIS 37, 121.14750. Also QLIIS 37, 120.1014.
481
Sicut ergo nostra cognitiva proficit secundum locum et tempus, sic forte potest esse
in angelo quod licet habeat omnium species, tamen sic ei inditae sunt ut eorum locorum
et temporum certam habeat cognitionem in quibus fuerint, et in quibus non, non, QLIIS
37, 121.12731.
482
Lewry 1978, 245; NSLPor 2, M 2vb. See also QLIS 73, 229.24; and QLIS 76, 245.534:
Idea enim et exemplar idem dicunt,
483
QLIS 73, 229.58. Platos theory of ideas is presented through Seneca (cf. especially
QLIS 73).
484
Ergo est idea, quia ideam dicimus similitudinem cognitionalem et causalem QLIS
73, 229.1112; and Idea est ratio cognoscendi et causandi, QLIS 75, 241.17. Cf. especially
Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 46, 2. See also QLIS 81, 258.911: Sed
ideae rationes quaedam cognitionales sunt et causales in arte mentis divinae existentes, et
ideo nullam faciunt rerum compositionem vel multiplicitatem.
485
Nec sunt uniuersalia ydee solum in mente diuina, ut posuit Plato, quamuis sint
cause formales et exemplaria uniuersalium, CI, 245.
250 theory of knowledge

Kilwardby develops his theory of divine ideas in questions 73 to 95 of

QLIS, which correspond roughly to distinctions 3536 in Peter Lombards
work.486 Although divine ideas are important for the two above-mentioned
reasons (order and intelligibility), they raise some questions with respect
to divine simplicity. The issue of divine simplicity has a long philosophical
tradition seeking to establish an ontological distinction between the crea-
ture and the Creator. Only God is absolutely simple, which entails that
there is no composition in God,487 and no diversity.488 If ideas are exemplar
causes of created things, should we then conclude from the multiplicity of
created things that a multiplicity of ideas exists in Gods mind? To answer
positively casts doubts over Gods simplicity. If there is a plurality of ideas
as exemplar causes of all the created things in Gods mind, there must be a
multiplicity of relations tying Gods thoughts to extra-mental things. This
relates to the discussion on the ontological status of ideas and how ideas
are related to both the divine essence and the things of which they are
formal exemplars. Moreover, if there is a plurality of ideas in Gods mind,
God must know them, and if He knows each idea separately (i.e., as dis-
tinct), it implies a plurality of objects and, therefore, a plurality of cogni-
tive acts.
The latter is a problem only if we take Gods knowing to work in a
similar way as our own. In order for human beings to know something,
the thing to be known must make itself present by afffecting the sense
organs; in other words, our knowledge depends on the reception of the
likenesses (similitudines) of sensible objects in the soul.489 Gods knowl-
edge is very diffferent from ours, however: whereas God is the cause of
things, things cause our knowldge of them.490 God need not receive the
species of the thing to be known;491 He knows the thing in its kind and

486
In his Sentences commentary (ca. 12551256), Kilwardby does not deal with all the
distinctions, which can mean that this text is a version of his teaching. See Wood 2002, 290,
n.5.
487
E.g., DOS XXX.256, 96.36.
488
divina essentia in qua nulla omnino diversitas est, QLIS 85, 265.112.
489
QLIS 89, 279.289; QLIIS 60, 169.468: Nos enim quia tantum per species cognosci-
mus, non per rationem idealem, ideo imperfecte cognoscimus. Kilwardby stresses that it is
the thing itself, through the species it generates, which is the cause of itself being known
(Quia cum res ipsa per propriam speciem sit causa suae cognitionis mediante sensu,
QLIII1S 44, 188.7171).
490
DSF 77, 71.334.
491
Ad quartum quod nihil facit praesentia rei intelligibilis per suam essentiam ad
ipsam intelligendum, ubi non intelligitur per receptionem. In nobis ergo facit illa praesen-
tia ad rem intelligendum, in Deo nequaquam, quia Deus non recipit aliquid ab intelligibili
quo intelligit illud, nos autem facimus. Et ideo in nobis est quaedam contuitio intellectus
 intellectual cognition 251

nature,492 through the exemplar forms in His mind.493 The similitude

between ideas in the divine mind and real existing things is incomparably
greater than that between real existing things and their species afffecting
our senses.494 No aspect of the thing known is left out of Gods knowledge
of it: He knows the being of the thing (esse rei),495 the whole of its essential
and accidental properties,496 because all that is included in the idea in
Gods mind.497 Moreover, unlike ours, His knowledge is not temporally
bound. As everything that exists, exists by the good will of God,498 all
objects are simultaneously present in His immutable and eternal knowl-
edge.499 In God, therefore, it is not the question of a multiplicity of cogni-
tive acts directed to multiple objects. Kilwardby saw no problem with God
knowing particulars because the distinction between the particular and
the universal depends only on the way of being and considering the same
thing, in this case the same idea.500 In the same way as individuals of the
same species agree on the common species, divine ideas agree in a com-
mon reason, which is the universal idea.501

in rem ipsam intellectam vel similitudinem ab ea factam, in Deo autem nihil horum est,
QLIS 89, 281.97102. Also QLIS 88, 276.456; 276.58; 277.70; and QLIS 77, 249.71: tamen
divina scientia non est huiusmodi causalis ut nostra, although everything as God as its
cause.
492
QLIS 88, 276.456, 578, 634; Also QLIS 36, 118.8413: Sed ideae non sunt huius-
modi, quia ipsae sunt rationes cognoscendi res et causandi existentes in divina sapientia et
arte. See also QLIII1S 44, 188.718, for Christs knowledge through the ratio ideales.
493
QLIS 89, 279.4353; see also QLIS 89, 281.1156. Et illud intellexit non dirigendo
aspectum in aliud, sed in ipsam mundi in ideam causalem in se.
494
Sed incomparabiliter maior est similitudo inter quamcumque rem creatam et suam
ideam in Deo, quam inter eandem rem et suam similitudinem vel speciem quam facit in
nobis, QLIS 89, 280. 6870.
495
QLIS 89, 280.825.
496
nihil est rei quod non repraesentetur per ideam, neque substantiale, neque acci-
dentale, QLIS 89, 280.7172; and QLIS 94, 292.226: Similiter aliquo modo et in Deo idea
cuiuslibet rei est una simplex essentia, tot tamen rationibus numerosa () Et ideo in unica
rei idea simul omnia videntur quaecumque sunt rei essentialia et accidentalia et habitu-
dines omnium ad invicem et ad omnia alia. See also QLIS 89, 280.8291.
497
Ad quintum quod in ipsa rei idea non solum continetur quod res aliquando sit, set
quando et ubi et a quo et qualiter et quantum et quamdiu. Et omnia universaliter de ipsa
scibilia plene in idea relucent, QLIS 89, 281.1035.
498
Et quia haec omnia institutum habent in esse rei ex divino beneplacito, QLIS 89,
281.1056.
499
Et haec omnia simul novit et immutabiliter in sua scientia et beneplacito immuta-
bili, in quibus tale est esse rei dispositum et praeordinatum, QLIS 89, 281.10911.
500
Tertia secundum modum se habendi et considerandi, ut inter universale et particu-
lare, quia eadem res solum aliter et aliter se habens, et aliter et aliter considerata vel consi-
derabilis, modo est universale, modo particulare, QLIS 83, 261.169.
501
Sicut enim particularia in aliquo conveniunt, et hoc est eis species dummodo sit
essentiale illis, sic ideae particularium in aliqua ratione communi illis conveniunt, et haec
est idea universalis, QLIS 83, 261.2730.
252 theory of knowledge

This solution to the epistemological problem offfers a clue for solving

the problem of the multiplicity of created things entailing the existence of
a multiplicity of ideas as exemplar causes in Gods mind. In the same way
as the universe is one even though it has many parts, all ideas form as it
were a single idea.502 The example of the idea of a house in the mind of the
builder clarifies the reasoning: it includes many particular ideasof the
walls, the roof, and so on.503 Similarly, even though there are many exem-
plar and causal reasons in the mind of God as there are ideas of parts of a
house in the mind of a human builder, there is only one idea of the world
(universo) just as there is only one idea of the house. Against the possible
objection that there are nevertheless in Gods mind ideas of parts of the
world just as there are in the mind of a human builder ideas of parts of the
house, Kilwardby argues that the simplicity of the form of the house in
thehuman mind cannot be compared with the simplicity of the idea of
the world in the divine mind.504 Again, he seemed to be basing his answer
on the distinctive operative nature on the human and the divine mind.
The other aspect of the plurality of ideas in Gods mind that seems to
pose a threat to divine simplicity is the nature of the relation between God
and His creatures: there must be a relation between the divine ideas as
archetypes of individual existing things and those existing things.505 In
order for a relation to exist, there must be something in the two terms
directing them to one another. A relative depends on its correlative in the
sense of being ordered to it, as the father with respect to the son.506
However, if this were the case, then the Creator would be dependent with
respect to the creatures to which He was related,507 and God, as an
absolute being, does not depend upon anything other than Himself.508

502
Cum Deus totius universi sit conditor sicut unus artifex unius operis, quia univer-
sum quiddam unum est, cum etiam huius unius totalis artificiati multae sint partes specie
distinctae, quando quaeritur an sit unica idea vel plures, distingui potest quod unica est
quasi totalis quae respondet toti universo, sed multae quasi partiales quae respondent par-
tibus universi, QLIS 75, 242.3842. See also QLIS 85, 268.889.
503
Et potest poni exemplum in arte humana adquisita per operationem. Una enim est
totalis idea domus in mente artificis, plures tamen sunt diversarum partium eius, ut alia est
idea fundamenti, et alia parietis et alia tecti, et istae partiales unam totalem integrant,
QLIS 75, 242.426.
504
QLIS 85, 268.8594.
505
Creator enim est a quo res fit de nihilo, creatura res quae fit de nihilo, QLIS 74,
237.1978.
506
QLIS 73, 229.203.
507
Deus enim, nullum respectum vel ordinem vel relationem in se habere potest res-
pectu creaturae, QLIS 74, 236.1468.
508
QLIS 74, 231.137. See also QLIS 74, 233.813.
 intellectual cognition 253

From the point of view of the Creator, the ideas in Gods mind cannot be
related to the creature because for each relation there would be a relative
in His mind, and a thing outside Gods mind as the other relative. The mul-
tiplicity of relations would imply a multiplicity of relatives in Gods mind,
which would endanger His simplicity.509
However, Kilwardby refers to the distinction between the relation in
which the two correlatives are related essentially (i.e. the existence of each
depends on the existence of the other) and that in which one of the rela-
tives refers to the other essentially and the other refers to the first acciden-
tally (the existence of the latter does not depend on the existence of the
former).510 He claims that the relation between idea and creature is of the
second type. It is essential from the point of view of the creature and acci-
dental from the point of view of the idea. Furthermore, if there were a
relation in the Creator with respect to the creature, it would be either eter-
nal or temporal. In either case there is a relation of anteriority and poste-
riority, because God necessarily preceeds the creature in existence.511
However, it follows from this that the relation begins to exist at some time,
which means that there is a change in the subject that is the divine
essence.512 However, Kilwardby claims that nothing of this kind happens in
God,513 since nothing begins to be in God that was not before, and this
includes the relation with respect to creatures.514 God is immutable and no
accident inheres in His essence.515
Kilwardby denies any relation between God and the creature other
than that the creature imitates its idea in Gods mind. He explicitly denies
that there can be a relation without the standing towards another that
characterizes relation,516 and neither does God depend on the creature nor
is He ordered to it.517 The creature is made to be an imitation of the exem-
plar form or idea. Created things are related to divine ideas by imitating

509
QLIS 74, 232.503. Also QLIS 76, 244.34.
510
DNR 25, 11.2. Cf. Hanagan 1973, 87.
511
QLIS 74, 232.313.
512
QLIS 74, 232.578; 234.867.
513
non intelligo Deum esse relatum erga creaturam, neque aeternaliter neque tem-
poraliter per relationem in Deo existentem, QLIS 85, 267.6970.
514
Unde vult dicere ibi ut videtur quod nullum genus relationis adveniat Deo, quod
prius non infuit, sive sit tale quod adveniat per subiecti mutationem, sive sine mutatione,
et quod quamvis nihil ei incipiat accidere, tamen dicit quod incipit relative dici ad creatu-
ram, QLIS 74, 236.1614.
515
QLIS 74, 236.15961.
516
non intelligo quomodo possit esse relatio absque omnimoda dependentia vel
ordine, QLIS 74, 234.99100.
517
non dependet ab ea, nec ordinem habet ad illam, QLIS 74, 233.823.
254 theory of knowledge

ideas, which is to say that things come into being according to the way in
which they have been conceived and exist in the mind of God.518
Divine ideas as causal reasons are finite in number with respect to
the existing things, but infinite with respect to the possibilities that
could be actualized either simultaneously or successively.519 Although
such ideas are plural, their multiplicity is compatible with divine simplic-
ity because ideas are only conceptually distinct from the divine essence.520
The plurality of things that are distinct by reason only does not make it
composite.521 Kilwardby distinguishes between the quod est, the quo est
and the ad quod est of ideas. Plurality exists only in the quo est, that is its
formal aspect, insofar as it is the causal reason that is imitated by the crea-
ture.522 Ideas are plural only in relation to the things of which they are
exemplars, but such plurality cannot be accounted for in connection with
God.523 Ideas qua ideas in the mind of God and qua relatives are not
plural.524
Kilwardby argues that the relation in the creature exists only with
respect to the Creator, but not in the Creator with respect to the crea-
ture.525 Causal reasons or exemplars have a very special ontological status,
which explains how Kilwardby was able to maintain Gods simplicity.526
Referring to the authority of Augustine, he argues that nothing changes in
the Creator with the creation and coming-into-being of the creature.527
The creature, on the other hand, owes its existence to the Creator; it is

518
Et haec relatio est imitatio qua creatura imitatur vel habet imitari ideam suam.
Unde idea idem est quod forma, ad cuius imitationem natum est aliud fieri, et ideatum est
quod fit ad imitationem formae exemplaris sive ideae, QLIS 74, 235.12830.
519
QLIS 77, 249.7782; and QLIS 85, 269.1412: Unde multae sunt ideae secundum mul-
titudinem creaturarum entium vel possibilium esse. Cf. QLIII1S 43, 185.1367. See also
D43Q 16, 22.431.
520
QLIS 76, 245.312. The presence of a multitude of ideas in Gods mind does not alter
the simplicity of His mind (cf. QLIS 81, 258.712).
521
multitudo rationum in uno simplici non facit rem compositam, sicut patet in uni-
tate et puncto. Sed ideae rationes quaedam cognitionales sunt et causales in arte mentis
divinae existentes, et ideo nullam faciunt rerum compositionem vel multiplicatem, QLIS
81, 258.711.
522
QLIS 76, 245.3845. See also QLIS 85, 270.1645.
523
QLIS 75, 242.5962.
524
Et distinctio sive pluralitas non est ibi penes id quod est, nec penes id ad quod, sed
penes quo est, QLIS 76, 245.3940.
525
QLIS 73, 230.436, QLIS 74, 231.234; 237, 170 (appealing to the authority of the
Magister Sententiarum, Peter Lombard).
526
QLIS 85, 270.1625; QLIIS 85, 239.516; 85, 240.701.
527
QLIS 74, 236.15661.
 intellectual cognition 255

related to the Creator by imitating the causal reasons. The relation of the
things to the ideas is not one of participation but of imitation.528 By empha-
sizing that the nature of the relation is one-way only, from creatures to
God, Kilwardby avoids the plurality of ideas as such and as relatives in the
mind of God; plurality exists in the things created insofar as these imitate
their own causal reasons. A second solution to the problem of relation is
to be found in semantic analysis.
Signification establishes a relation between the word and what the
word signifies. A name is imposed on diffferent things according to difffer-
ent accounts. Both what is illuminated and what illuminates receive their
signification from light. In the same way, Creator refers to the cause that
makes something out of nothing, and creature refers to that which is
made out of nothing.529 Kilwardby reasons that to exist from another is the
reason why this name is imposed and, therefore, the Creator-creature rela-
tion stands in the creature and not in the cause or principle by which it is
made.530 Moreover, a name can have an absolute and a relative significa-
tion. It has absolute signification when it refers to a things essential predi-
cates and it is predicated of actual being; relative signification, on the
other hand, refers either to being, or to possible or future being, as it is a
case of ideas in the divine mind of things yet to be made.531 Created things
are posterior to God in this sense, and thus the divine essence is not
changed with their coming-into-being.532
As there seems to be a corresponding idea in the mind of God of every-
thing that is created, one could ask whether there is an idea of matter.533 If
God knows everything there is in His mind, how can prime matter, as
something that completely lacks form, be intelligible?534 Kilwardbys
answer is that there is an idea of the essence of matter, but not an idea of

528
Ad secundum quod est duplex convenientia, scilicet participationis et imitationis.
Primo modo non est inter Deum et creaturas convenientia, secundo modo est, non ita
quod idea imitetur creaturam, sed e converso, QLIS 73, 230.3840.
529
Creator enim est a quo res fit de nihilo, creatura res quae fit de nihilo, QLIS 74,
237.1978.
530
causa vel principium est res a qua existit aliud, et per quam causatum vel princi-
piatum quae existit aliunde. Ecce quod existere ab alio est utrobique ratio nominis a qua
imponitur, QLIS 74, 2378.199202.
531
QLIS 74, 238.21127. Please see the argument from essential being on pages 159160.
532
QLIS 74, 239.23642.
533
QLIS 79, 253.23.
534
Item quanto materialius aliquid, tanto minus intelligibile. Ergo quod est pure mate-
ria, omnino non intelligibile, QLIS 79, 253.145.
256 theory of knowledge

what matter is not or of what it lacks.535 A distinction is in order: whereas

for God everything is intelligible, whether material or immaterial,536 for
human beings things are intelligible because of their form and not their
matter.537 In this sense, matter is unintelligible for us, except through
privation.538
In this context of whether or not there is a divine idea of matter,
Kilwardby returns to a topic he had dwealt on extensively in other places:
the nature of matter. Here, too, he promptly states that it should not be
inferred from the materiality of something that it lacks being.539 Referring
to Augustine, he claims that to lack actuality is not the same as to lack
being: matter is not nothing simpliciter, but rather nothing actual.540
Matter lacks actuality on its own only incidentally.541

535
Respondeo: Materia dupliciter considerari potest scilicet secundum essentiam et sic
habet ideam, vel secundum privationem et imperfectionem et sic non habet, QLIS 79,
253.202.
536
QLIS 79, 254.335.
537
CI 361.201.
538
Si de nobis fit sermo [quanto aliquid materialius, tanto minus intelligibile], dis-
tinguendum quod aliquid est nobis intelligibile dupliciter, uno modo per se et positive et
sic intelligimus formas et formata, alio modo per accidens et per privationem et sic intelli-
gimus materiam et materialia secundum quod huiusmodi, QLIS 79, 254.358. See Wood
2002, 339.
539
Ad secundum potest inferri instantia talis: Quanto materialius est aliquid, tanto
minus habet de entitate. Ergo quod est pura materia, nihil habet de entitate. Hoc falsum
est, QLIS 79, 253.279.
540
Ad tertium quod unde caret materia omni forma, inde recte dicitur nihil, sed non
ideo dicitur simpliciter nihil, sed nihil actuale, QLIS 79, 254.401. See also DOS XXXI.309.
Cf. Augustine, Confessiones 12.6.6, and De immortalitate animae 2.2, (PL 32, 1022).
541
quia materia de se nihil habet de actualitate, sed per accidens solum, QLIS 79,
254.301.
PART THREE

DISCUSSION
 CHAPTER SIX

THE OXFORD PROHIBITIONS OF 1277

As stated in the Introduction, one of the main motivations for this book
was to understand the role of Kilwardby in the events of 18 March 1277 by
analyzing his own views on the prohibited topics, especially those related
to the human soul.1 Having done this in Part I, I now turn to look first
at some traditional views on the participation of Kilwardby in these
events, to discuss some of the general assumptions brought forward by
scholars, and to present some arguments for the designation given to the
event itself. Afterwards, I will try to present evidence for the claim that
Kilwardbys actions are not directed against Thomas Aquinas. In the first
half of this Part I will focus on external evidence for my claim, in which
I adopt largely the arguments of Wilshire; on the second half, I discuss the
problem from a more philosophical point of view.
To start with, we must consider how these events should be referred to.
I use the term prohibitions rather than condemnations. This is a sugges-
tion that has been made by Wilshire in an article of 1964 and stressed in
his article of 1997.2 He argues that the nature of the events of 18 March 1277
at Oxford is quite diffferent from the nature of those that took place in
Paris, eleven days earlier. His claim is that the authors taken to be defend-
ing the censured articles were prohibited from teaching at the University
but from this no condemnation, either religious or civil, would follow.3
Although the term condemnations is used in the ChartulariumIsti
sunt errores condempnati a fratre R. Kilewardebi, in his E Kilwardby pre-
fers to use the term prohibitions: Let me proceed to the seventh article,
whose prohibition Furthermore, in his answer to Peter of Conflans,
Kilwardby claims that the articles were prohibited because some are
clearly false, some philosophically incorrect, and some because they are

1
For the role of Kilwardby in the Oxford condemnations, see Sommer-Seckendorfff 1937,
13062; Sharp 1934.
2
Wilshire 1964; years later he wrote a revised version of this text without any significant
improvements: Wilshire (1997). I, therefore, refer primarily to the first text.
3
Hoc ergo Paternitati Vestre notifico, quod dampnacio ibi facta non fuit, qualis solebat
esse expressarum heresum, sed fuit prohibicio in scolis determinando vel legendo vel alias
dogmatizando talia asserendi, E Praefatio, 18.136, (my italics).
260 discussion

repugnant (repugnantes) to the Catholic Faith.4 Kilwardby states that he

regards the view of the unity of forms (de unitate formarum) to be intol-
erable (intolerabile) and impossible (impossibile), and to be against phi-
losophy and natural reason (contra philosophicam scienciam et racionem
naturalem).5 Kilwardby always refers to the articles as prohibited and even
corrects his correspondent (the disciple of Aquinas, Peter of Conflans)
saying that nothing was condemned but some theses were prohibited.
Ithink, therefore, that we should retain this terminology, since the term
condemnations seems too strong and misleading.
Doubts concerning the nature of some events of censure in the medi-
eval period have been raised by Luca Bianchi in his Censure et libert intel-
lectuelle lUniversit de Paris (XIIIe-XIVe sicles). Bianchi claims that
events of a very diffferent nature were included under the same name.6
One of Bianchis aims is to offfer a scheme of classification for the diffferent
types of censure. Now, since Bianchi questions the designation condem-
nations applied to the 1277 events in Paris, there is much more reason to
do so in relation to the events in Oxford. The reason is that what was
intended with those acts of censure was to stop the teaching of positions
viewed as false rather than heretical.7 In order to prove his argument,
Bianchi quotes a passage of Kilwardbys Epistola,8 where Kilwardby claims
that what is intended is not a true condemnation for heresy but prohibit-
ing the teaching of those positions at the University.
The traditional account of the events is severely criticized by Wilshire,
who argues that Aquinas was not the direct target of the prohibitions.
Among his arguments are that neither Aquinas nor any of his followers are
mentioned by name, and that no specific Thomist thesis was censured (an
idea that Wilshire stresses throughout the article), even those in naturali-
bus that concern the simple nature of the soul since, in his own words, that
is peculiar neither to Kilwardby nor to Aquinas.9 For the remaining part

4
tum quia quidam sunt manifeste falsi; tum quia quidam sunt veritatis philosophice
devii, quia quidam sunt erroribus intolerabilibus proximi, tum quia quidam sunt apertis-
sime iniqui, quia fidei catholice repugnates, E Praefatio, 189.16-03.
5
E 7, 50.8; 50.134.
6
Bianchi 1999, 4.
7
Des doutes encore plus fonds concernent lintervention de son collgue anglais
Robert Kilwardby, le 18 mars: en efffet, la seule chose certaine est que, dans les deux cas, il a
t interdit denseigner un mlange de propositions juges dangereuses. En dautres termes
il nest pas tablicontrairement ce qui est dit habituellementque les deux prlats
aient voulu condamner certaines thses, aristotliciennes, averrostes et thomistes,
Bianchi 1999, 7.
8
Quoted above in footnote 3 above.
9
Wilshire, 1964, 126; 1997, 155.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 261

of the article Wilshire deals with, and calls into question, the historical
evidence presented by earlier historians, and he does so quite admirably.
The succession of events show at best that the Dominican Order reacted
against the criticisms of Aquinas but that Kilwardby took no part in that
discussion. Moreover, the order of the events indicates that they follow
rather than precede Kilwardbys promotion to Cardinal. Wilshire ends by
offfering a reading according to which Kilwardby is an old man caught offf
guard, without enough knowledge of the newer philosophical discussions
of which Aquinas is the leading figure.
Because the textual evidence is scarce, E constitutes an important
source of information. Apart from the question of the designation of the
event, there are two other aspects that Kilwardby tries to impress upon his
reader in this text:
(i) The articles were prohibited with the agreement of all the Masters,
regent and non-regents alike, of the University of Oxford.10
(ii) The position on the unity of forms was not referred to in the prohib-
ited articles. He does not remember having heard of such a position,
which is unintelligible for him; but, insofar as he understands it from
Peters objections, it is an impossible view.11
All these aspects have been more or less extensively ignored by the schol-
ars who prefer to follow the mainstream thesis, according to which
Kilwardby issued the Condemnations as part of a plan against Thomism.
This interpretation was first put forward by Mandonnet and De Wulf, and
later formulated more sharply by D.A. Callus on his The Condemnation of
St Thomas at Oxford. Since then it has been repeated in many other
places.12 I do not wish to address here the motivations for this claim, which
derive mostly from a Thomist interpretation of thirteenth-century thought
that postulated two opposing sides on the philosophical-theological dis-
cussions, the Aristotelianism and Augustinianism. According to this view,
the condemnations at Oxford are the highest expression of the reaction of
the latter with respect to the former. Today, this distinction is of very little
value, as the borders between thirteenth-century philosophical and theo-
logical strands seem more blurred and it is less plausible to present them
as mutually exclusive.

10
Solus non fui in ista prohibi[c]ioni, imo, ut scripsistis, omnium magistrorum
Oxoniensium assensus accessit, et eciam multorum magis provectorum quam sum ego
theologorum et philosophorum suasio compulit ad hoc ipsum, E Praefatio 19, 811. Cf. CUP
I.558.
11
See footnote 46 below.
12
Callus 1955, 11; 1961, 25788; 1943.
262 discussion

Nevertheless, I would like to address two of the assumptions made by

Callus in his famous article. First, Callus claims that he can conclude from
Kilwardbys Epistola ad Petrum de Confleto that there was a preliminary
discussion with the Bishop of Paris. No reference is added and no such
evidence is found in the above-mentioned letter.13 Callus argues for his
suggestion by saying [t]his inference seems to follow from the fact that
Stephen Tempier was well informed on all the proceedings of the
Archbishop of Canterbury.14 This is also presented without further evi-
dence. Nothing of the kind is found in the letter. This could hardly be taken
into consideration as a proof. Moreover, following Ehrle Callus also men-
tioned a letter that would have been sent by the Pope to Kilwardby, asking
him to issue a Condemnation in the fashion of the one in Paris. Needless
to say, no such letter is known, and Callus and Ehrle fail to provide evi-
dence for its existence.15 Although there has been a growing literature on
the Paris Condemnations in recent years, there is no evidence which
points towards a connection between the Paris Condemnations and what
we should correctly call the Oxford Prohibitions.16 The second assumption
is that some kind of condemnation of Aquinas was already being thought
of in Paris.17 In fact, some of the articles in Oxford seem to suggest an attack
on Aquinas, and Callus and Ehrle promptly established the connection
between the two events. However, until further evidence is given, there are
no reasons to argue for a concerted action of Kilwardby and Tempier in
the Parisian and Oxonian Condemnation and Prohibitions of 1277.
These acts of censure difffer in style and in purpose. The actions in Paris
were directed by Tempier at the instigation of the Pope, as is well docu-
mented.18 They were mainly directed against the Arts Faculty (studentes in

13
The absence of common themes in those two events is understood by some as evi-
dence of the connection between the Condemnations of Paris and the Prohibitions at
Oxford. However, the opposite could also be argued to the same efffect.
14
Callus 1955, 12.
15
Callus 1955, 12.
16
This is the position of van Steenberghen (1977, 148), who takes the two events as inde-
pendent one from another. Van Steenberghen thinks there is more in common between
the Paris Condemnation of 1270 and the one at Oxford in 1277 than the latter and the one
in Paris 1277 (cf. van Steenberghen 1991).
17
Hissette (1977, 3146) thinks that Aquinas was among the targets, but not directly; see
also Wippel 1977, 197. There is an on-going discussion about whether there was a separate
process for Aquinas and whether some theses of Aquinas were going to be condemned but
were taken back before the issuing of the condemnations by Tempier. For the former dis-
cussion, see Wielockx 1985, 75120 and 21524 (for the latter, see Van Steenberghen 1977,
1478. See Thijssen 1998, 53, for the whole discussion.
18
The litterature on the topic is vast. Some important references are: Hissette 1977;
Wippel 1977. The state-of-the-art is presented by Bianchi 2003.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 263

artibus)19 and specific doctrines of philosophers that for the most part are
identified, such as Siger of Brabant or Boethius of Dacia.20 The aim was to
eradicate these professionals and to stop the statements against the
Christian faith. It is made explicit in the text of the condemnations that
those suspected of sustaining those theses were to be excommunicated.21
The confusing nature of the condemned articles shows that the list was, to
some extent at least, hastily prepared.22 The Oxford Prohibitions are cer-
tainly diffferent. Kilwardby pronounced them with the agreement of all the
masters and non-masters of the University of Oxford.23 It simply does not
seem adequate to dismiss this fact, as Callus does, by saying that Kilwardby
says so as if to make others share this responsibility with him.24 On the
other hand, doubts have been cast upon this kind of formulation used in
these circumstances, such as de consilio or de consensu omnium magis-
trorum.25 It could be said that, even if the expressions are only rhetorical,
the fact that the Prohibitions follow the theories that most theologians

19
CUP I.542. Cf. Thijssen 1997, 50. The Commission, charged by Tempier to investigate
the suspected theses, was constituted by Theologians (see Wielockx 1985, 7980). See also
Bianchi 2003: Therefore the Condemnation was doubtless an attempt by the faculty of
Theology to control philosophical teaching in the Arts faculty. According to Van
Steenberghens statistics, of the 219 articles condemned, 179 were philosophical mistakes
and 40 theological (1991, 4223).
20
Wippel 1977, 1967. This is not to say the authorship of the majority of the condemned
theses has been identified; see Hissette 1977, 3147.
21
CUP I.543: excommuninates omnes illos, qui dictos errores vel aliquem ex illis
dogmatizaverint, aut defffendere seu sustinere presumpserint quomodo, necnon et
auditores.
22
When one reads through the list of censured propositions, one is frequently per-
plexed. Repetitions abound. Perfectly orthodox views (at least by todays standards) are
condemned along with other most inimical to Christian Faith, Wippel 1977, 171; also 186
and 195. On the contrary, Thijssen takes such qualification to be somewhat gratuitous
(1998, 50). But a quick look to Godefrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 12, question 5, makes it
clear that already some authors in the medieval period understood that Aquinas was tar-
geted by the Prohibitions (see Les Quodlibets onze- quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines,
ed. J. Hofffmans, Louvain: Les Philosophes Belges, 100105).
23
Istis sunt errores condempnati a fratre R. Kilewardebi archiepiscopo Cantuarensi de
consensu omnium magistrorum tam non regencium quam regencium apud Oxoniam,
CUP 558, n.474. See also E, praefatio, 19.0811: Solus non fui in ista prohibiione, imo, ut
scripsistis, omnium magistrorum Oxoniensium assensus accessit, et eciam multorum
magis provectorum quam sum ego theologorum et philosophorum suasio compulit ad hoc
ipsum. Hissette (1980, 248) argues that Kilwardby a bien d recourir, lui aussi, au travail
dune commission denqute, although no evidence is presented of the existence of such
commission.
24
Callus 1955, 13.
25
Bianchi (1997, 116119) addresses the expression de bonorum virorum consilio used
in almost [t]out statut universitaire et toute condamnation doctrinale du XIIIe sicle,
related with the University of Paris. See also Bianchi 2002, 736; and 1999, 99101.
264 discussion

and philosophers alike would agree upon is certainly not rhetoric. To put
it another way, the positions prohibited on the 18th of March are such that
only a minority of philosophers and theologians would hold at the time.
Therefore, to say, as Kilwardby does, that the Prohibition is supported by
the regent and non-regent masters of the University is hardly surprising.
Moreover, the reaction to the Prohibitions was for the most part institu-
tional, that is, it was a corporative reaction of the Dominican Order rather
than a general uprising.26 Apart from Peter of Conflans letter, the earlier
reaction to Kilwardbys Prohibitions is the work of Giles of Lessines, De
unitate formae from 1278.27 As noted in the Introduction, the decision by
the Fransciscan General Chapter of 1282, in Strasbourg, to allow for the
reading of Aquinas text only when together with William of la Mares
Correctorium fratris Thomae from 1280 certainly contributed to the stimu-
late the institutional divide. This institutional connection may explain
why authors at Kilwardbys time and soon after identified Kilwardbys
actions as targeting Aquinas. From the fact that they understood it to be
against Aquinas does not follow that it was against Aquinas. Our historical
understanding cannot rest only on the perceptions of events by contem-
poraries of those events.
Two institutional events which took place soon afterwards were under-
stood as reactions to the March events: Pope Nicholas III nominated
Kilwardby Cardinal of Porto and Santa Rufina and in May 28, 1277
Kilwardby resigned as Archbishop of Canterbury in order to take his place
as Cardinal at the Papal Curia. As for the opinion that this promotion was
a way to punish Kilwardby and/or to get him away from the polemic, it
must be said that the same Pope nominated John Pecham to succeed
Kilwardby as Archbishop of Canterbury. Pechams criticism of Aquinas is
well known, especially his criticism of the doctrine of the unicity of sub-
stantial form. It seems more probable that the Pope was protecting
Kilwardby from the opposition in his Order. In 1278, the Dominican
General Chapter at Montpellier appointed two delegates to travel to
England and investigate suspicions that the thought of the Dominican
Aquinas was under attack; furthermore, it is said that the two delegates
were given powers to exile and deprive of offfice those who, as it were,

26
Callus himself (1959, 129), recognizes that only by 1284 did the Oxford Dominicans
definitively sided with Thomas Aquinas.
27
Giles of Lessines, De unitate formae, ed. M. de Wulf, in Le Trait De Unitate Formae de
Gilles de Lessines, Louvain: Institut Suprieur de Philosophie de lUniversit, 1901.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 265

would have done it.28 As Wilshire rightly comments,29 no member (even

delegates) of the Dominican Order had the power to remove an Archbishop
from offficeif indeed Kilwardby was the one aimed at by the expedition.
But the fact is that, at the time of the General Chapter, Kilwardby had
already been appointed Cardinal of Porto and Santa Rufina, and the
General Chapter could hardly ignore it. The document may indicate the
willingness of the Dominican Order to pressure Dominicans other than
Kilwardby not to follow the position of the Archbishop of Canterbury. It
remains to be explained why the General Chapter of the Dominicans
which met in Bordeaux in 1277, some two months after the Prohibitions, is
silent about the Prohibitions.30 If the case was truly scandalous, a reaction
should have been felt immediately.
Finally, John Pecham who was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in
1279 by Nicholas III, reissued Kilwardbys Prohibitions with an explicit ref-
erence to the unity thesis,31 first in a Visitation to the University of Oxford
in October 29, 1284, and afterwards in a Letter to the University dated
November 10 of same year. Pecham made it clear that he was targeting the
unicity of substantial form in the human compositea view he thought
to have unacceptable theological consequences with respect to resurrec-
tion, the veneration of relics, and the numerical identity of Christs living
and dead body. Pecham explicitly says he had no copy of the Prohibitions,
but one may wonder why he felt the need for the restatement. Pecham
makes notice in his letters of the opposition to his pronouncements by
Oxford Dominicans. They understood them as directed against their

28
Iniungimus districte fratri Raymundo de Medullione et fratri Iohanni Vigorosi lectori
Montispessulani, quod cum festinacione vadant in Angliam inquisituri diligenter super
facto fratrum. qui in scandalum ordinis detraxerunt de scriptis venerabilis patris fratris
Thomae de Aquino. quibus ex nunc plenam damus auctoritatem in capite et in membris.
qui quos culpabiles invenerint in predictis, puniendi. extra provinciam emittendi, et omni
offficio privandi. plenam habeant potestatem. Quod si unus eorum, casu aliquo legittimo
fuerit impeditus, alter eorum nichilominus exequatur. Quibus priores de sociis competen-
tibus, quos ipsi ad hoc offficium exquendum ydoneos iudicaverint, teneantur quando-
cumque requisiti fuerint providere, MOFPH III 1898, 199.
29
Wilshire 1964, 128.
30
Hanagan 1973, 17.
31
Unum vero illorum expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium in homine
esse tantummodo formam unam, Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Johannis Peckham
Archepiscopi Cantuarensis, ed. C.T. Martin, London: Longman and Trbner, 1885, vol. III,
841. See Glorieux 1927b, 26566. On more examples of Pechams criticism of Thomas
Aquinas unicity of substantial form, see Ehrle 1970, 1001, n.1. See also Wilson 1998,
42331.
266 discussion

brother Thomas of Aquinas. It is worth noticing how the 1284 uproar of the
Dominicans contrasts with the apparently innocuous reaction to the 1277
Prohibitions by Kilwardby. I think that the diffference results from the fact
that Pecham made the target of his discourse more explicit than Kilwardby
concerning the question of the unity of the human form.
Let us focus on the text of the Prohibitions. Although almost half of the
articles concern grammatical and logical questions,32 the central aspect of
the Prohibitions concerns natural philosophy (in naturalibus):33 Article 6
states that vegetative, sensitive and intellective forms exist at the same
time in the embryo;34 Article 7 that the intellective form, once introduced,
corrupts the vegetative and the sensitive forms;35 Article 12 that the vegeta-
tive, sensitive and intellective are one simple form;36 and Article 16 that the
intellective form is united directly with prime matter, corrupting every-
thing that precedes it, right down to prime matter.37 Three issues are
addressed: first, the nature of matter and of the potentiality existing in
matter; second, the simple nature of the soul; and finally, the question of
embryogenesis and the simultaneity of the three powers or forms.
With respect to the theory of the unicity of the soul, Articles 6, 7 and 16
concern the generation of the human being and how the three kinds of
soulthe vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectiverelate to
each other in the process. Article 12 is about the simplicity of the soul as a
form. Kilwardby had already argued against this in QLIIS 8, where he
mentions the position of some authors for whom the rational soul is a
simple essence that difffers only in terms of its operations: when it under-
stands it is called intellective, when it perceives it is called sensitive,
when it vegetates it is called vegetative. However, the essence is the

32
Both Lewry 1981b and Isaac 1953 investigated the latter.
33
See CUP 559, n. 474. I refer to the number of the articles that were being prohibited as
presented there.
34
Item quod vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sunt simul in embrione tempore.
35
Item quod intellectiva introducta corrumpitur sensitiva et vegetativa.
36
Item quod vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sunt una forma simplex.
37
Item quod intellectiva unitur materiae primae ita quod corrumpitur illud quod prae-
cessit usque ad materiam primam. Articles 2 (Item quod forma corrumpitur in pure
nichil), 3 (Item quod nulla potentia activa est in materia, 13 (Item quod corpus vivum et
mortuum est aequivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum, secundum corpus mortuum, sit cor-
pus secundum quid) deal with the nature of matter and Kilwardbys denial to accept mat-
ter as pure potentiality without any activity of its own whatsoever. These articles
presuppose Kilwardbys adoption of seminal reasons. Therefore, the defense of the activity
of matter seems to be motivated by Kilwardbys own philosophical theory rather than by
an intention to attack Aquinas. Article 13 raises the question of the form of corporeity.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 267

same.38 The editor of QLIIS identifies these authors as Richard Rufus,

Bonaventure and Richard Fishacre, but Kilwardby himself mentions the
pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima; furthermore, he probably knew
that John Blund also defended this thesis in his Tractatus de anima, writ-
ten around 1210.
We know for certain that Kilwardby had read John Blunds Tractatus de
Anima. There is evidence of this in two of his works. The first is his response
to a questionnaire sent to him in 1271 by John of Vercelli, the Master
General of the Dominican Order (for further details, see Silva 2007). To the
question of whether angels move celestial bodies, Kilwardby answers that
celestial motion is a natural motion and that natural motion must be
explained by a principle internal to the thing moved. This is also the case
with celestial bodies.39 He goes on to claim that there are three common
views on the cause of the motion of celestial bodies: (1) they move by the
power of their will, which means they are animate beings; (2) they are
moved by angels; (3) they move because of their own weight and inclina-
tion (D43Q 2, 14.152155). Kilwardby attributes this view to some, and as
James Weisheipl points out,40 this some can only refer to John Blund who,
some sixty years earlier, had argued that celestial bodies were moved by
nature rather than attributing their motion to a celestial intelligence.41
Second, in Commentary to the Perihermeneias, Kilwardby uses the expres-
sion intellectus formalis, which appears in the Tractatus of Blund as
equivalent to intellectus adeptus, as Lewry noted.42 In his thorough study,
Dag Hasse did not find the expression intellectus formalis in any work
other than Blunds Tractatus.43 Therefore, there are two places (one cer-
tain, the other probable) in which Kilwardby refers to Blunds Tractatus.
The question is relevant because Blund explicitly advocates the unicity of
the substantial form in human beings. Moreover, the terminology Blund
uses is close to that used by Kilwardby in the Prohibitions of 1277, as can

38
Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod anima racionalis sit una simplex essentia diffferens
solum secundum operationes quae cum intelligit dicitur intellectiva, quando sentit sensi-
tiva, quando vegetat vegetativa, QLIIS 8, 29.313.
39
Corpora uero celestia non uiolenter sed naturaliter mouentur, secundum
Philosophum, D43Q 2, 12.101102.
40
Weisheipl 1961, 317.
41
dicimus quod firmamentum movetur a natura, non ab anima, et alia superceles-
tia, John Blund, TdA, 10, 4.
42
Lewry 1978, 290. (Cf. Johannes Blund, TdA, 59, 337, 339, 342, 344.) Lewry adds
that this expression can be found in Pseudo-Avicennas Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis
and John of La Rochelles Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae.
43
Hasse 2000, 201.
268 discussion

be ascertained from a close reading of Blunds text. In chapter 24 of

Tractatus, Whether the soul is simple or composite, Blund discusses the
simplicity of both the soul and the rational soul. He does not rule out the
possibility of the souls composition in terms of matter and form, but con-
cludes with the words the soul and intelligence have simple being. (See
the section on unicity versus plurality above for a detailed examination of
his view.) Kilwardby would agree on the composition of matter and form;
what he disagreed with was the simplicity of the soul in terms of
potentiae.
Callus himself, in his highly influential article The Origins of the
Problem of Unity of Form, admits that the unicity thesis was current in
the schools as early as the first decades of the thirteenth century, for at
least half a century before St. Thomas time.44 Callus identifies Avicenna
and Gundissalinus as the originators of the unicity thesis. Paraphrasing
F. Kelley, it would be myopic to consider Kilwardbys concern as exclu-
sively devoted to Aquinas position.45 Thus, in claiming that John Blund
was one of the authors aimed at, I am not bringing in anything new, but
am simply giving another instance of that current thesis. I also wish to
make clear that I am not suggesting that Kilwardby was aiming directly at
Blunds Tractatus, a work written long before; I am rather reiterating that
Kilwardby he knew Blunds view and that he was probably aware that a
version of that view was circulating in his time, although he was not
informed of the specificity of such a version.
It is usual in this context to refer to Kilwardbys seventh article of E, in
which he refers to the position called de unitate formarum. He begins his
response to Peter of Conflans by describing the position, as he understood
it: that the last form arriving in the composite is the perfection of the com-
posite, that this corrupts all previous forms and performs on its own all the
actions they performed. He goes on to deny that such a position was pro-
hibited in Oxford. He states that with those words this article was not
forbidden in Oxford, nor do I recall having heard [such a position]. I do
not quite understand what is meant by the position of the unity of forms.
I know, however, [that there are] many corporeal and spiritual forms
which do not have any mutual unity.46 Callus quickly dismissed this

44
Callus 1961, 260.
45
Richard Knapwell, Questio disputata de unitate formae, ed. F.E. Kelley. Paris, Vrin, 1982,
10.
46
Iam ad septimum articulum procedatur, cuius prohibicioni secundum universi
modum licet videmini consentire, non multi tamen dicunt ipsum veritate subnixum, et ab
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 269

response, claiming that Kilwardby was just trying to avoid problems aris-
ing from the reactions. I find Calluss dismissal hasty. Kilwardbys state-
ments could be read either as a pretense of ignorance, motivated by his
fear of the reaction of his own Order in the person of Peter of Conflans or,
which seems more reasonable and as Wilshire argues, as an admission of
ignorance concerning a specific terminology.47 What I suggest is that we
take Kilwardbys words at face value, admitting that he probably was not
attacking the position Peter of Conflans was defending, and that Callus
argued Kilwardby was attacking, namely Aquinas position. If my claim is
valid, Kilwardbys discomfort with the expression de unitate formarum
was due to the fact that it was the simplicity theory and not the unicity
theory he was targeting in these Oxford prohibitions, even though the
Thomist unicity theory constitutes a particular case of the simplicity
theory.
The further evidence I would like to call upon in support of my claim is
the following: Richard Fishacre, who was Kilwardbys teacher at Oxford, in
the commentary on the Sentences he wrote in 1246, presented and criti-
cized the theory according to which there is only one substantial form in
the human soul, which is simultaneously rational, sensitive, and vegeta-
tive. In fact, when one compares the three theories about the human soul
that Richard Fishacre presents in Quaestiones in librum Primum
Sententiarum with the three theories Kilwardby mentions in E 5, one is
struck by the similarities:
(F1) The vegetative, sensitive and rational are one and the same sub-
stance and they difffer only in operation, in the same way as the sen-
sible soul is one substance that has many operations.48

his vocatur posicio de unitate formarum. Sub his quidem verbis articulus iste non erat
Oxonie prohibitus, nec illum memini me audivisse. Quare autem dicitur posicio de unitate
formarum, non satis intelligo. Novi enim multas formas corporales et spirituales, que nullam
habent ad invicem unitatem. E 7, 49.1522, (italics mine).
47
Wilshire 1964, 131.
48
Aestimant enim aliqui quod vegetabilis et sensibilis et rationalis sunt una et eadem
substantia et variantur tantum secundum operationem. Sic anima sensibilis est una subs-
tantia habens multas operationes, scilicet videre, audire, et huiusmodi., Richard Fishacre,
InIIS, d. 24, in Long 1968, *123. Fishacre mentions Genasius De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus
(*124) as holding this view, and Genasius text leaves no doubt: Neque duas animas esse
dicumus in uno homine () unam animalem qua animetur corpus, et immixta sit san-
guini, et alteram spiritualem quae rationem ministret; sed dicimus unam esse eamdemque
animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificet, et semetipsam sua ratione dis-
ponat, ed. Elmenhorst, Hamburg 1614, cap. 15, 984.
270 discussion

(F2) A human being has a soul that is numerically one substance. It

has a plurality of hierarchically ordered forms that are responsible for
diffferent operations.49
(F3) A human being has three essentially diffferent substances that
are responsible for the diffferent operations. A human being does not
have three souls but one soul constituted by three essentially difffer-
ent substances, in the same way as one hand is made of bones, nerves
and flesh, which are essentially diffferent from each other.50
Fishacre presents these three views but declines to take a stand.51 It is clear
that (F1) is the same view Kilwardby presents in E 5, in other words the
view of the human soul as a simple substance that performs all the func-
tions of human lifeliving, sensing and understanding. On the other
hand, (F2) is a version of Kilwardbys third theory positing that the human
soul is constituted by three potentiae that difffer essentially from one
another. (F2) also hints at unity by aggregation, which Kilwardby insists
on in E 5 with respect to the body and, by analogy, to the soul. Finally (F3)
relates to the second theory Kilwardby puts forward in E 5, and also to the
third (and Kilwardbys own) theory, that the human soul is constituted of
matter and three forms.
Fishacre (F1) explicitly represents the view of the human soul as a sub-
stance that is essentially simple and has three powers that difffer only in
terms of operations, a view that Kilwardby describes in E 5 and QLIIS 8. E
5 is, as Ehrle points out in his edition, Kilwardbys answer to Peter of
Conflans request for clarification on Articles 6, 7 and 16 of the Prohibitions,
in other words whether the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls
come to be at the same time in the embryo, and whether the rational soul
with all three potentiae is created and infused in the embryo corrupting
everything down to prime matter. Peter of Conflans clearly associated
these articles with the unicity theory of Aquinas. Kilwardby, however,
presents the three theories of the soul and strongly objects to the first one

49
Propterea alii posuerunt quod in homine est anima unica substantia numero, habens
tamen formas invicem ordinatas diversas; et ab una forma egreditur actus vegetationis, ab
alia actus quod est sentire, a tertia actus quod est intelligere., Richard Fishacre, InIIS, d. 24,
in Long 1968, *123.
50
Propterea tertii ponunt quod sunt tres substantiae et tria haec aliquid in homine a
quibus sunt istae tres operationes. Nec propter hoc sunt tres animae hominis, sed una
anima constans ex tribus substantiis essentialiter diffferentibus, sicut una est manus
constans ex nervis, ossibus, et carne quae essentialiter diffferunt., Richard Fishacre, InIIS,
d. 24, in Long 1968, *124.
51
Martin 1920b, 109; 112.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 271

advocating the simplicity of the human soul and the one he describes in
roughly the same terms in QLIIS 8, in which he attributes it to De spiritu et
anima. What the reference to Fishacre shows is that he could not have
been discussing Aquinas unicity theory because when Fishacre presented
his three theories (ca. 1246) the Thomist theory of unicity did not exist.
Kilwardby was discussing the theory of the simplicity of the soul, not the
unicity of the soul. Further evidence lies in the fact that at the beginning
of E 6in answer to the question of whether the rational soul is a simple
form and due to its simplicity exists wholly in any part of the body
Kilwardby suggests that this question should be addressed together with
the previous one (E 5) because they are about the same topic.52 He explic-
itly associates the simplicity of the soul with the discussion on the origin
and the unity of the diffferent potentiae. This leaves no doubt that his
emphasis is on the simplicity of the soul.
In these articles of E in which the soul is discussed (57), the common
feature is Kilwardbys insistence on the compositional nature of the soul
and his attack on the simplicity theory. In these passages, as well as in
other works, he argues against equating simplicity with unity: a thing can
be one even though it is not simple. The soul is not simple with respect to
matter-form composition or to a plurality of potentiae, and any theory that
opposes this is wrong. The soul needs to have matter, even if of a special
kind, in order to be receptive to change (see Part I, section 1), and it must
be composite of a plurality of potentiae due to the double-origin principle
and the diversity of the nature of its operations. (F1) and Richard Rufus
theological theory of the soul would fit into the description of the simplic-
ity theory with respect to the lack of diversity of potentiae, but it says noth-
ing about the matter-form composition. This was a hot topic in the
thirteenth century, and whereas some partisans of the unicity of the form
in the human soul, such as Roland of Cremona, accepted it, others such as
William of Auvergne, Philip the Chancellor and Hugh of St. Cher vehe-
mently refuted it.53 It is this later view, that of the absolute simplicity of the
soul, that I take to be the aim of Kilwardbys criticism in QLS, in the
Prohibitions, and in E. Indisputably, one of Aquinas most original contri-
butions to the debate was to move the whole discussion from the human
soul to the whole human composite. However, there is no criticism of this

52
E 6, 45.113.
53
See Lottin 1932 and Lottin 1957, 42746 for a detailed account of the simplicity of the
human soul prior to Thomas Aquinas. I cannot go into the details of the theory and its ver-
sions. It sufffices for my purposes to show that such a theory was common around 1240.
272 discussion

extension in the Prohibitions or in their justification in E. From the point

of view of Kilwardby, the debate, later described as the unicity versus the
plurality of substantial forms, seemed to be primarily about the simple
versus the compositional nature of the soul.
This is not to deny that unicity is discussed in E. In the seventh article,
in response to Peter of Conflanss question about the theory of the unity of
forms, he argues against it. Although no article about the unity of (sub-
stantial form) is listed in the Prohibitions, Peter questions Kilwardby and
this is the only place in which Kilwardby addresses the unicity theory. It is
also here that he gives three theological arguments against it, which are
absent from his criticism of the simplicity theory and focus on the form of
corporeity. Kilwardby seemed to be attacking a general theory of the soul
defined in terms of very broad tenets rather than particular partisans or
version of that theory: all those who comply with those very broad tenets
are targeted in the Prohibitions.
My argument is as follows. The real target of the Prohibitions in natu-
ralibus is the question of the simplicity of the human soul. Aquinas was
probably implicated, even though he was not Kilwardbys real target;
Kilwardby seems not to have been aware of the details of Aquinass doc-
trine and so he interpreted what he knew about it from the point of view
of the more familiar (to him) simplicity doctrine. He probably understood
Aquinas unicity theory as a special case of the simplicity theory. Further
evidence of this interpretation lies in the fact that of the eleven arguments
presented against the unicity theory in E 7, the first eight show striking
similarity to those he used to argue against simplicity in E 5. This is not to
say that Kilwardby, having become acquainted with Aquinas theory,
would not oppose it; on the contrary, it is clear in E 7 that from what he
knew of it,54 he refused to accept it. He was probably not familiar enough
with Aquinass view to distinguish his theory of the unicity of substantial
form from the simplicity found in Blund and Auvergne.
The interpretation I put forward has three main advantages. First,
it explains the emphasis on the simplicity of the in the Prohibitions
and Kilwardbys justification of it in E soul without requiring extra, often
non-proven, assumptions some of which, such as the anti-Aristotelian

54
I do not go, as stated before, into the argument that Kilwardby is pretending not to
know about it, by fear of upsetting his Order or his interlocutor, because not only the argu-
ment requires to contradict an historical source with no sound proof, but also because it
rests on a paradox: the same Dominican Kilwardby that fearlessly issues the Prohibitions
becomes suddenly afraid when answering a fellow Dominican, that was not even his supe-
rior in the Orders hierarchy.
 the oxford prohibitions of 1277 273

nature of Kilwardbys thought, are clearly false. Second, it assumes that

Kilwardby was a man wearing old shoes, a fact that becomes very clear if
one pays attention to the terminology he uses in a wide variety of topics: a
well-informed and acute thinker on matters to do with Aristotelian logic,
in the early stage of his career, he seemd to have lost contact with the more
up-to-date discussions that occupied his contemporaries as soon as he
became entangled in his ecclesiastic duties. Third (resting on the previous
two), it leaves untouched Aquinas contribution to the debate on the unic-
ity versus the plurality of substantial forms. It recognizes his indebtedness
to previous doctrines of the soul, of which his doctrine constituted a fur-
ther development, and at the same time raises the possibility that some of
his contemporaries may not have immediately or fully understood the
more extreme consequences of his theory. Once this possibility is acknowl-
edged, further studies on the discussion with this interpretation in mind
might bring us new data on how Thomism was immediately perceived.
An objection to this reading could be made with regard to the medieval
identification of Aquinas as the target of the Prohibitions. The letter writ-
ten by Peter of Conflans as a reaction to the Prohibitions seems to show
just that. Peter does not mention Aquinas but, as one of his students, Peter
must have him in mind when he asked Kilwardby why he prohibited the
position of the unity of forms. Peter assumed the identification of the the-
ses with Aquinas without explicitly saying that Kilwardby condemned the
articles as being by Aquinas. I believe this is relevant because my point is
to argue that Aquinas unicity theory was not the main target of Kilwardbys
Prohibitions, even though it was not excluded.
There is no evidence supporting Maurice de Wulfs claim that Robert
Kilwardby (.) had been leading the campaign against Thomism among
the English Dominicans.55 Nothing like this can be concluded. In 1270
when John of Vercelli consulted him, knowing that Aquinas was suspected
of unorthodox positions and having read his response, Kilwardby, while
not agreeing with him, did not offfer any criticism of him. Instead he com-
mented on what he knew to be Aquinas position as follows: I neither
understand nor wish to comment.56 Although this could be interpreted as
a rhetorical expression, it could just as well have been a statement of his
ignorance with respect to new philosophical developments.

55
de Wulf 1909, 350 (see 3502). See also Knowles 1988, 270.
56
D43Q 10, 19.30910. The same is said in D43Q 15, 21.3734: nec intelligo nec asserere
uolo.
274 discussion

It seems that Kilwardby was not well acquainted with Aquinas thought,
in particular with his theory of the unicity of the substantial form in com-
pound beings. Aquinas teaching was popular in Paris during the 1260s and
1270s when Kilwardby was in England. It is striking how few references
modern editors have identified as connected with Aquinas in Kilwardbys
Questions on the Books of the Sentences, whereas Bonaventure, Fishacre,
and Alexander of Hales appear throughout the text. Both Lewry and
Wilshire argue that Kilwardby did not know Aquinass thought well. The
picture that emerges from a close reading of his works is that Kilwardby
was struggling to make Aristotelian philosophy fit into the Augustinian
framework he adopted in his Dominican period. He was not well informed
on the latest theological developments. Similarly, one should take the
Oxford Prohibitions of 1277 as an episode of censure that was based on
philosophical disagreement rather than as an expression of a thirteenth-
century Augustinian anti-Thomism.
 CONCLUSION

The story of thirteenth-century philosophy is normally told from the view-

point of the emergence to dominance of the Aristotelian thought and the
constitution of one of its interpretations, that of Thomas Aquinas. Even if
there have been serious effforts to tell the story in a diffferent way, stressing
the plurality of interpretations and philosophical strands, the standard
account still dominates the overall picture. Why not tell the story from the
point of view of the thinkers aligned with the thought of Augustine, who
were challenged when the new Aristotelian corpus came to circulate in
the Latin West? I would like to contribute to this discussion by presenting
the thought of the Dominican Robert Kilwardby as an example of how the
struggle between two philosophical traditions was dealt with so as to high-
light their points of agreement rather than their incompatibility. This
means, however, that we cannot reduce the struggle to a dispute between
two fields, the Aristotelians and the anti-Aristoteliansor the conserva-
tives and the reactionariesand should rather think of the authors of the
Augustinian tradition as possibly having their own philosophical theories.
Such a claim is of course not new, but it makes sense to make it with
respect to Robert Kilwardby.
Robert Kilwardby is a well-known author due not only because of the
influence some of his logical works had on his contemporaries and succes-
sors but also because of the polemic nature of the Oxford censure of 1277,
of which he was the foremost promotor. The main issue covered in the
Oxford Prohibitions was the nature of the human soul. The present study
started as an attempt to explain the motivations that led Kilwardby to take
this action, and to identify the philosophical arguments that justified it.
The result is the first detailed analysis of Kilwardbys theory of the soul to
shed some light on what he envisaged with his censure. In taking his
action he definitively contributed to the medieval debate, not least by
mounting a last defense of a view of the human soul and the human com-
posite that was soon to be abandoned. The detailed portrayal of Kilwardbys
theory in this book gives a new insight into the debate, and calls for a re-
evaluation of Kilwardbys philosophical merits.
Kilwardby focused his theory of the human soul on its spiritual and
substantial nature, on the distinction between its three diffferent parts
or potentiae, and on the relation between these potentiae and the body.
276 conclusion

He advocated a view of the human soul as a composite substance, com-

posite in the sense of being made of matter and form, and in the sense of
being constituted of three diffferent forms: the vegetative, the sensitive
andthe intellective. Two issues in particular are addressed: the relation
between the three forms, and the relation between the forms and the
body. In both cases, Kilwardby considered it important to afffirm and to
justify the unity that results from the composition of diffferent things: the
unity of the soul and the body, and the unity of the soul. The former is to
be found in the concept of person: Kilwardby took Boethius definition,
which Peter Lombard adopted, and made it fit his own theory. The human
soul is created to exist together with the body, and this union is only tem-
porarily broken with the death of the body: the same body and soul will
resume their union in resurrection.
The unity of the soul, which Kilwardby took as axiomatic and supported
by the opinions of Aristotle and Augustine, is what I have called a compos-
ite unity. Kilwardby claims that the vegetative, sensitive and intellective
potentiae difffer essentially but nevertheless constitute one soul. He sus-
tains this essential diffference in terms of a diversity of operations that
could not, in his view, be accounted for by the same potentia. He under-
stood the potentiae or substantial forms as defining the functions of the
thing, and the totality of these operations defines what the thing is. The
soul is the principle of life, sensation, and understanding, but each of
these operations is performed by a diffferent potentia. Hence, the soul is
not simple because several determining principles or substantial forms
constitute it. Together they form a unity, which is the form of a living
human being. Kilwardby characterizes this as the unity natural things
have when they naturally tend to one another. The rationale for the poten-
tiaes natural inclination to one another and to the body is the desire of the
soul to know everything. Kilwardbys claim that sense data received
through sense perception are the starting point of knowledge strengthens
this pointeven in the case of intellectual cognition, except for pure
intelligible objects.
The diversity in the nature of the operations follows from the diffferent
origins of the constitutive potentiae of the human soul. Whereas the veg-
etative and sensitive souls are generated by natural agency, both in human
beings and in plants and animals, the intellective soul is created by God
and infused in the human body at a certain moment of foetal develop-
ment. The principle of the double origin is, I have argued, a keystone for
understanding Kilwardbys theory of the human soul.
 conclusion 277

In order to explain the process of natural generation, by means of which

the lower potentiae come into being, Kilwardby introduces the notions of
seminal reasons and active potencies, as well as of privation. He distin-
guishes between three notions of prime matter, of which the third is the
one that underlies change in corporeal things, and which he calls natural
or physical matter. The essential aspect of such matter is that it does
notexist without being endowed with active potencies, which he identi-
fies with the Augustinian seminal principles/reasons. Active potencies
account for matters having some actuality of its own, which is character-
ized by a certain desire for form. Two other aspects must be mentioned in
connection with active potencies: first, they relate to the fully actual forms
as the incomplete to the complete, in other words they share with them
the essence of what is to become, on diffferent levels of actuality; and sec-
ond, they are internal principles co-acting with exterior agents in order to
bring to full actuality that which exists as potentiality.
In the course of embryonic development, each supervening form is a
perfection of the existing composite of matter and form. However, being
perfection does not mean corrupting the existing forms, it rather means
completing them. The previous substantial forms continue to be respon-
sible for their own operations, and the result is Kilwardbys definition of a
human being as a composite of several substantial forms. He did not con-
sider plurality incompatible with unity, even though it is incompatible
with simplicity. This applies to the diffferent parts that are constitutive of
the human soul and to the parts that are constitutive of the human body.
The human soul is one substance made of three substantial forms that are
in a certain order, the lower disposing the composite in order to be per-
fected by the higher. The intellective form is qualified as the perfection
and accomplishment of human life because it makes the composite it
informs, the sensitive body, the kind of being it is: a human being. The
souls composite unity is attributable to the forms mutual natural inclina-
tion, and their nature of disposing and perfecting principles. Finally, the
unity of the living being is a composite of two (composite) substances,
body and soul. Kilwardby afffirms the plurality of substantial forms and the
dualism of substances in human beings.
Kilwardbys pluralist view of the human soul had obvious consequences
in terms of his understanding of human cognition. The most relevant of
these is his forceful presentation of a theory of perception that was based
on the operations of the sensory soul, in other words without appealing to
its intellective part. In doing so and notwithstanding the Augustinian
278 conclusion

nature of his theory, he went beyond Augustine. I have paid special atten-
tion to sense perception because this is where Kilwardbys originality is
more strongly felt. I have discussed in detail the way in which he under-
stood the theories of Aristotle and Augustine and what he borrowed from
them in forming his own solution. He built a relatively complex schema of
powers, brain cavities, neural and vascular systems and corporeal spirits,
all of which he took from medical and philosophical theories, and
attempted to give a physiological account of how the species received in
the sense organs proceeded to the common sense and from there to the
other sensory cognitive faculties. At the same time he gave a complemen-
tary or alternative account (he referes to them as such), which is based on
the activity of the soul and its immaterial nature.
Kilwardbys theory of sense perception rests heavily on the active
nature of the soul using the body and the mediatory corporeal spirit as
instruments for sensing. This is clearly shown in the following two exam-
ples: in sleep we do not perceive because the soul is not paying attention
to the afffections of the body, and in its the disembodied state the soul can
perform actual imaginative actsthis latter example is intended to show
that the corporeal spirit is required only when the soul needs to move the
body. Moreover, the existence of such a mediating instrumentthe
corporeal spiritmakes it clear that there is a separation of the physical
realm of sense objects and the body from the spiritual realm of the soul.
Nothing is received from the object during the process of sense percep-
tion because its influence is limited to changing the sense organ; rather,
the soul makes in and from itself the images of the sense objects through
its motion of assimilation to the species in the sense organ. I take this to be
a key diffference between the standard Aristotelian account and an origi-
nal contribution from Kilwardby, whose influence remains to be exam-
ined. Kilwardby took it for granted that the soul works correctly in
assimilating itself with the species and making the image, and therefore
the cognitive content corresponds to what the exterior thing is. This is a
clear assumption in his realist epistemology. He faithfully describes the
two contrasting positions of Aristotle and Augustine, and he believed in
and tried to demonstrate the compatibility between the two theories.
In addition to considering the way in which Kilwardby explains the
knowledge of sensory objects acquired through sense experience, I have
paid attention to his account of abstraction, as well as to the status of the
self-evident principles of demonstration, the immutable truths received
through divine illumination, and the nature of demonstrative knowledge.
 conclusion 279

I have dwelled on the related issues of the ontological status of universals

and the criticism of Averroess monopsychisman increasingly influen-
tial discussion in the thirteenth century. As far as intellectual cognition is
concerned, I have argued that although Kilwardby stressed the limited
cognitive capacity of the fallen creature in this life, he does not posit any
divine intervention in normal human cognitive activity. He held a double-
illumination principle, according to which God creates the rational soul
with certain intelligible and immutable truths, and God also bestows upon
the human soul the capacity to grasp the truth when presented with it
this is a capacity the individual human soul has by means of its own cogni-
tive powers.
Finally, in Part III, basing my arguments on (i) the theory of the soul
Kilwardby defended throughout his career, shown in its own light in Part
I, and (ii) an examination of the historical evidence surrounding the
Oxford Prohibitions of 1277, I suggest that Kilwardby probably was attack-
ing the simplicity theory of the soul rather than Aquinas unicity theory.
He strongly opposed the doctrine of the absolute simplicity of the soul,
and most likely included Aquinas theorywhat he knew about it, which
seems not to have been a lotas fitting the general description of what he
took to be simplicity theory. I consider this interpretation to have two mer-
its: on the one hand it does not lean on unproven assumptions such as
Kilwardbys personal dislike of Aquinas or the institutional connection
between the censure in Paris and Oxford, nor on clearly mistaken qualifi-
cations such as Kilwardbys anti-Aristotelianism; on the other hand, it just
fits better with our understanding of the debate over the unicity versus the
plurality of forms in the human composite, which is known to have peaked
in the 1280s and 1290s when Aquinas view was fully understood.
This book promotes a view of Kilwardby as a clear example of the unfit-
ting nature of the traditional classifications used for thirteenth-century
thinkers: whereas according to the traditional view Franciscans sided with
Augustinianism against Dominicans and their Aristotelianism, Kilwardby
was a Dominican who was an Augustinian and not an anti-Aristotelian.
Moreover, he upheld many doctrines often associated with Franciscans,
such as the plurality of substantial forms and the positive nature of prime
matter.
I have portrayed Kilwardby as a man of his time, and at the same time
as at odds with the spirit of the century and its philosophical alignments.
He was a first-hand witness of how Aristotles natural philosophy and
metaphysics became dominant in the philosophical discussions, and not
280 conclusion

only that, he contributed to the better understanding and integration of

Aristotelian thought into the philosophical discourse. In time, however,
Augustine increasingly influenced his philosophical views. One could
describe his philosophical commitments thus: he was an Aristotelian who
converted to Augustinianism without ever ceasing to be an interpreter of
Aristotlealthough he seemed to stick to the interpretation of Aristotle
he developed during his time in Paris, which soon became outdated.
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 INDEX OF NAMES
(Ancient and Medieval)
Adam of Buckfield5, 13n58, 101,
Albert the Great2, 2n10, 3, 8, 8n48, 40n61,
55, 56n92, 70n4, 82n65, 101n132, 122n232,
177, 193, 206n210
Alcher of Clairvaux73n17
Alexander of Hales8, 16, 31n20, 32n28,
59n121, 101n132, 136n32, 201n179, 274
Alhacen140n49, 167n199
Anselm of Canterbury71n9, 192, 195,
195n143, 196, 196n144, n148, n150, 197,
205, 247n473
Aristotlevii, viii, 3, 7, 7n45 8, 10, 11, 149,
16nn634, 17n67, 18n68, 213, 278, 27n1,
28nn45, 30n14, 31, 31n23, 35nn389,
36n45, 38, 38n53, 39n56, 45n12, 46n23,
49, 50n49, 51, 53n76, 54n78, 56n91, 60,
61n125, 62n134, 64, 64n145, 66n161, 71,
75n31, 76, 76n36, 81, 834, 88n88,
90nn934, n96, 91n100, 93, 94n114, 98,
98n124, 106n163, n166, 107nn1679,
11822, 122nn2289, nn2312, 125, 1278,
131n1, 132, 134, 135n23, 141n56, n58,
143n72, 144n83, 145n87, 148n105, n112, 151,
155, 158n154, 1613, 161n16971, 162n173,
163n179, 166n193, 167, 16970, 169n209,
1726, 172n220, 178n5, n7, n10, 179n11,
180n21, 181n27, 182n32, 189n86, 190n98,
199200, 200n173, 2057, 213n255,
21720, 222, 224n336, 225n339, n341,
226n348, 227n353, n355, 236n405,
238n416, 239n423, 248, 276, 27880
Augustinevii, viii, 1n8, 811, 14, 159,
15n62, 16nn634, 17n67, 18n68, 212, 27,
28n7, 30n13, 312, 34n33, 39n36, 42n72,
49, 49n46, 51n60, 52n69, 54n82, 567,
56n94, 57nn96100, 58n103, n105, n107,
60, 60n1212, 65, 65nn14950, 66n158,
n160, 67, 701, 70n4, 73, 73n17, 81, 81n58,
82n61, 934, 94nn113, 98, 98n124, n126,
118, 118n211, 120, 121n225, 125n248, 1278,
1312, 133n9, 134, 134n18, n20, 1378,
137n35, n40, 138n43, 141n57, 145n85,
146n98, 147n99, n1012, 148n110, n114,
150n1223, 151, 152n1323, 153n138,
155n146, 156n148, 157n152, 158, 1612, 164,
164n182, 16572, 165nn18690, 166n191,
n195, 167n197, 168nn2035, 169n206,
n209, 170n213, 1746, 189, 189n91, 191,
191n105, 195, 197n155, 198200, 200n172,
n176, n178, 202n187, 203n190, 204n195,
n197, n199, 205, 205n204, 2169, 217n277,
219nn2889, n291, 227n355, 229,
233n388, 235n400, 236n405, 237,
241n435, 242, 242nn43940, 243n441,
244, 244n451, 249, 249n484, 254, 256,
256n540, 261, 27480
Averroes89, 1415, 22, 27n132n24, 39n56,
445, 445n12, 54n77, 90, 90n95,
97n122, 108n172, 125, 139n47, 141n62,
1423n72, 150n118, 151, 152nn1289, 177,
180, 185n63, 189n86, 20610, 206nn210
11, 279
Avicenna8, 29n10, 33n30, 47n28, 88n86,
97n122, 98, 101, 140n49, 146, 147n101,
148n105, 149, 14950n118, 182n37,
223n322, 267n42, 268
Bonaventure89, 33n32, 34n36, 35n41,
37n48, 40n60, 42n73, 43n2, 44n4, 54n82,
545nn845, 56n92, 57, 58n106, 59n116,
n121, 5960nn1212, 62n133, 65n153,
70n4, 72n15, 76n33, 789, 79nn512,
80n57, 89, 89n90, 94n111, 101, 109, 111n183,
n185, 115n207, 116, 118n212, 125n246,
134n20, 143n75, 158n154, 1934, 201n179,
206n210, 211, 211nn23940, 212n249,
214n264, 242n438, 247n473, 267, 274
Boethius33n32, 90, 136, 137n34, 193, 211,
227n355, n357, 228n358, 263, 276
Costa ben Luca (Qusta ibn Lucca)146,
146n93, 147n101, 172
Dominicus Gundissalinus34n16
Euclid138n43
Galen91n101, 133n8, 138n43, 145n89, 146,
146n93, 172
Gennadius of Massilia73n17
Giles of Lessines122n232, 264
Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus)6n26
308 index of names
Henry of Ghent87, 244
Hugh of St. Cher33, 81n59, 100, 101n131,
271,
Hugh of St. Victor34n34, 40n64, 41n67,
133n9, 145n90, 147n104, 217n277, 223n324
Isaac of Stella148n114
John Blund27n1, 91n98, 1012, 101nn1334,
102nn1378, 105, 2678, 267nn412, 272
John Duns Scotus49n45
John Pecham4, 7, 9, 70, 70n5, 79n54,
82n62, 99n127, 111n185, 116, 121, 121n224,
123n236, 138n43, 201n179, 242n438,
2646, 265n31
John of La Rochelle5, 33n32, 71n7, 72n15,
101, 101n132, 116, 131n1, 134n39, 148n20,
267n42
John of Vercelli2, 5, 267, 273
Matthew of Aquasparta34n34, 134n20,
137n36, 242n438
Peter John Olivi87n81, 153n140, 244
Peter Lombard9n52, 40, 41n65, n66,
60n121, 645, 66n156, 111n183, 121n222n,
n225, 122, n233, 193, 193n128, 247n468,
250, 254n525, 276
Peter of Conflans45, 97, 105, 115, 25960
Peter of Spain117, 260, 264, 26870, 2723
Philip the Chancellor13, 13n56, 16, 29n8,
32n28, 42n73, 70n5, 71n7, 100, 116,
119nn2156, 271
Plato323, 32n24, 101n135, 138n43, 178, 185,
188, 188n83, n85, 200n176, 20910, 244,
249n483
Porphyry23, 185, 211n237
Ptolemy138n43
Richard Fishacre12, 1n9, 5, 7n45, 89, 16,
18n68, 32n28, 34n36, 36, 37n48, 41n69,
46n23, 47n30, 50n48, 51n57, 53n72,
56n93, 61n125, 61n145, 67n168, 70, 76n34,
90n95, 98n126, 101, 116, 125n247, 136n32,
137n35, 139, 169n205, 171n215, 189n92,
199, 199n170, 201n179, 237n408, 247n468,
267, 269, 269n48, 270, 270nn4950, 271,
274,
Richard of Campsall8
Richard of St. Victor191
Richard Rufus of Cornwall5, 8, 13, 70, 72,
136n32, 211n239, 238n426
Robert Grosseteste8, 8n45, 36n47, 41n69,
47n27, 55n85, 58n105, 136, 136n32, 178n8,
180n22, 184n47, 188n80, 189, 216, 217n276,
219, 221n304, 225n346, 226n347, n349,
228n359, 243, 245n456
Roger Bacon89, 8n49, 13, 43, 43nn23,
45n14, 46n23, 64n144, 70, 72n15, 73,
73n17, 92n105, 98n126, 101, 136,
136n27, n32, 139n47, 140n49, 142, 142n72,
148n105, 172n220, 207n218, 208n221,
209n230, 223n324, 225n340, 232,
232n381, n384
Roland of Cremona5, 31, 99, 101,
101n131, 271
Simon of Faversham8
Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron,
Avicenbron, Avencebrolis)33n32,
34n35, 39n56, 44n11, 47n27, n30, 90n96,
98, 98n126, 104n158, 142n72
Thomas Aquinas, viin125, 2n13, 10n54, 11,
13, 16, 16n63, 23, 312, 32n24, 36n44,
39n59, 42n73, 43n2, 50n49, 53n76,
61n125, 64n145, 68n172, 70n4, 76n36,
81n59, 87n84, 88n88, 90nn956, 99, 102,
105, 107n167, n170, 116, 119n215, 121,
122nn22934, 123nn2356, 124n242,
126n249, 138n41, 143n72, 144n82,
163nn17980, 165n189, 177, 194, 195n143,
206, 242n440, 244, 247n468, 259, 264n26,
265n31, 266, 271n53, 275
William de la Mare4, 39n56, 264,
William of Auvergne16, 31, 31n21, n23,
42n71, 53n73, 99, 1012, 102n140,
nn1424, 103nn14650, 104nn1512,
nn1549, 105, 137n35, 139n47, 153n140,
211n239, 225n346, 2712
William of Ockham49n45, 125n246,
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS
abstraction112, 137n35, 17781, 182, 182n35,
186, 186n68, 187n74, 199, 199n169, 208,
219, 222n315, 2445, 278
active potencies9, 29n8, 43, 48, 48n40,
506, 58, 60, 60nn1234, 778, 107,
107n169, 108, 108n171, 1267, 180, 180n22,
247n468, 277
actuality12, 27, 27n2, 30, 33, 40, 44, 46,
48n40, 49, 49n46, 506, 613, 67, 71, 74,
76n34, 81n58, 868, 92n104, 93, 95, 100,
1078, 110, 113, 122n234, 149n118, 1613,
167n198, 189n86, 204, 204n2012, 207,
230, 249n480, 256, 256n541, 277
afffections (of the soul)21, 29, 67, 68n173,
102, 134n14, 1501, 159, 1618, 200, 202,
233, 2468, 278
aggregation98, 1034, 121, 127, 270
alteration161n171, 1623
analogy313, 35, 44n4, 45, 47n26, 57,
57n99, 83, 86, 91, 93, 116, 141n59, 155,
155n146, 166, 221n304, 243, 270
angels345, 39n60, 401, 64n145, 75n28,
168n201, 192
animal28n3, 29, 29n10, 37n49, 38nn523,
55n88, 623, 64n145, 66, 67n168, 703,
75n28, 83n65, 85, 90, 98, 1034, 106,
106n163, 109, 109n177, 118, 122n228,
125n246, 1334, 133n7, 137n40, 138, 1434,
1467, 146nn912, 147n99, 149n118,
150nn11920, n122, 152n133, 157, 172,
172n2223, 1745, 175n252, 179, 179n16,
182, 215, 228n358, 229, 232, 276
annihilation51, 125
aptitude37, 37n51, 513, 55, 89, 1434,
186n68, 230
assimilatio16970
attention29, 150n122, 154, 1579, 1656,
168, 202, 248, 278
Aristotelianism10, 15, 17, 261, 279
Augustinianism10, 15, 17, 128, 237,
261, 27980
being19, 22, 27, 2930, 345, 39n56, 41,
447, 501, 53, 53n75, 56, 56n92, 5762,
64, 678, 705, 789, 836, 8890,
91n100, 93, 95100, 102, 112, 113, 1212, 125,
127, 139, 143, 153, 1668, 183, 184n50,
1856, 188n82, 189, 189n88, 192, 194n137,
195, 195n140, 208, 208n224, 210, 2123,
214n263, 2156, 222n349, 224, 226,
22734, 2389, 251, 2546, 268, 277
blind1434
body
composite bodies112, 29, 312, 36, 40,
62, 64, 74, 812, 89, 913, 99, 106, 1104,
1167, 1234, 1278, 265, 271, 277
heterogeneous bodies106
homogeneous bodies106
qua body27n2, 125
simple bodies106
brain133, 140, 1459, 1715, 278
category35n39, 46n20, n23, 76, 789, 197,
197n165, 213, 237, 239
cause2, 8, 18, 212, 35n41, 51n65, 55, 58, 66,
95, 109, 113, 123, 126, 132, 134, 138, 140n52,
1423, 147n99, 150, 1537, 1613, 165n187,
16770, 175, 182, 188, 188n80, n83, 192,
2067, 2103, 2201, 224, 235n400, 240,
242, 248, 24950, 252, 255, 267
chimera2301
Christ41, 92n102, 1116, 121, 121n224, 123,
126, 169, 188n84, 241, 243, 248, 251n492,
265
color29n12, 86n76, 92n104, 13941, 142n70,
143, 143n73, 160n165, 169, 208, 243, 246
common sense104, 132, 134, 137, 145, 1479,
160, 1716, 278
composition113, 33, 34n33, 81, 81n59, 82,
84, 912, 94n111, 100n130, 101n131, n136,
102, 103n145, 104, 114n201, 1167, 128, 179,
179n18, 221n314, 222, 227, 227n354,
228n361, 231, 234, 237n408, 249n484, 250,
254n521, 268, 2712, 276
condemnations
of Paris (1277)vii, 23, 10, 10n54,
127n259, 25960, 2623
conversion95n116, 203n190
corpse1223
corruption74, 99, 1089
creation18, 51, 53, 53nn723, 568,
64n146, 70, 723, 200, 218n287, 244,
246, 254
definition 12, 21, 278, 323, 49n46, 51,
51n60, 83n65, 85, 8990, 97, 111n185, 123,
310 index of subjects
165n187, 1835, 189, 194, 200, 223n322,
2268, 2301
demonstration186n68, 191, 203n192, 216,
21821, 2246, 230, 233, 278
desire30, 367, 39n59, 50, 53n76, 54, 64,
67n164, 68, 94, 94n113, 956, 14950, 175,
190, 190n98, 220, 2767
dualism11, 18, 31, 31n22, 36, 38n56, 39, 41,
42n71, 127, 277
eclipse220, 22930
effficient cause18, 21, 55, 132, 1535, 158,
1634, 167, 169, 212
elements18, 34n33, 47n30, 63, 69n1, 86n77,
89, 94, 97, 102, 1068, 122n228, n233,
1245, 1312, 225
embryo60, 63, 69, 714, 100, 104, 115,
143, 266, 270, 277
equivocal71, 78, 109, 109n177, 122, 226, 234
essence13, 22, 29, 33n32, 389, 446,
49n46, 52, 53n75, 54, 6971, 758, 90n93,
100, 101n136, 103n149, 104, 112, 134, 179,
1825, 1879, 1924, 1967, 210, 212, 214,
214n263, 226, 231, 232n382, 24950,
2535, 266, 277
Eucharist1146
experience18, 133, 135, 156, 164, 1778, 200,
222, 225, 247, 278
eye78, 86, 106, 108, 122, 122n229, 138n43,
139, 1401, 143, 143n73, 1545, 157, 159,
2025, 208n224, 217, 241
fallacy197, 239, 239n423
fetus61n128, 62
fictions183, 189
flesh656, 106, 108, 1112, 1145, 122n228,
123, 182, 238n416, 245, 270
form of corporeity31, 39n58, 42n71, 47,
47n27, 48, 52n70, 88n86, 109, 111, 115, 121,
125, 125n246, 266n37, 272
generation8, 1921, 43, 503, 5561, 635,
69n1, 834, 87n84, 97, 99100, 104, 126,
192, 202, 266, 277
geometrical figures83, 86, 2434
God301, 33, 33n32, 40n60, 42, 49n46,
53n72, 569, 645, 67, 74, 79n53, 81n60,
90n95, 104, 119, 1257, 133n8, 168n201,
169n205, 180n22, 188, 1912, 197n156,
198, 200, 211, 216, 2189, 23746, 24856,
276, 279
habitus50, 76n34, 77n42, 78, 78n48, 144,
144n82, 190n100, 199n170, 200, 200n173,
201n183, 203n192, 205n204, 220n300
heart121, 133n12, 134n14, 1456, 1715, 191
hierarchy22, 40n60, 45, 86, 88, 92, 978,
138, 1667, 168n201, 176, 191, 272n54
hoc aliquid33n32, 35, 35n39, 38n56, 39,
39nn578, 40, 40n64, 46, 71, 72n10, 80n57
homonymy122, 122n228, n232
human beingvii, viii, 4, 112, 14, 20, 28, 33,
35, 37n49, 3941, 567, 59, 647, 703,
75, 75n28, 81, 83n65, 856, 889, 90n93,
n96, 91n101, 934, 969, 1014, 1089,
1112, 1145, 121, 123, 125, 125nn2467,
126n259, 127, 137n40, 138, 158, 167,
169n205, 178, 181, 183, 186, 18990, 192,
199, 20610, 215, 219, 228n362, 229, 232,
234, 237, 2423, 245, 24650, 256, 2667,
270, 2767
human nature60, 65, 67, 89, 1114, 229
hylomorphism11, 16, 33n32, 34n33, 38,
38n56, 98n126, 110, 166
ideas
divine177, 216, 24954, 256
illumination
divine8, 17, 237, 2426, 2789
imagination77, 104, 120, 132, 134, 134n20,
138, 1479, 150n118, 174, 178, 201, 205, 209
immortality11, 32, 100, 128
incarnation1114, 116
inclination
natural3841, 74, 89, 94, 96, 116, 118, 276
individuation22, 35, 45, 113, 113n196,
2067, 2103, 214n266
infinite51, 136n30, 225, 230, 23841,
248, 254
instrument19, 21, 29, 63, 102n142, 120, 134,
146, 154, 160, 165, 166, 1701, 224, 233, 278
intellect
agent17980, 199, 244n451
formalis267
possible179, 199, 205n203
practical190
intellectus (as habit)200n173, 203n192,
220
intelligence18990, 1969, 201, 203,
204n196, 205, 2678
intelligible objects95, 133, 161n169, 180n22,
2001, 204n196, 205, 2179, 246
intentions
common180, 180n24, 231
first232
particular180, 232
second194n131, 223, 2313
language9, 133n8, 145n89, 183, 183n41, 231,
2335, 237, 247
 index of subjects
light29, 47, 58, 62, 13942, 150, 159, 167,
225, 229, 242, 242n440, 243, 245, 255
likeness60, 94, 94n113, 131n1, 1346, 143,
146, 1513, 158, 162, 169, 179, 187, 2023,
204n195, 205, 20810, 231, 233, 236,
236n407, 24950
logicvii, 3, 3n19, 5, 78, 101, 14, 1920, 22,
27, 46, 51n57, 56, 56n91, 85, 90, 90n96,
106, 128, 177, 1834, 188, 199, 2224, 2313,
237, 273, 275
matter
natural or physical334, 45, 4850, 52,
52n70, 56, 56n91, 58, 107, 277
prime12, 45, 45n14, 46n19, 489, 52n70,
54n77, 99, 111, 122n233, 213, 255, 266,
270, 277, 279
unity of9, 434, 46n19, 49n46, 96, 127
meaning133, 183, 222n319, 233, 233n290,
235
medium18, 136, 136n30, 138n43, 1404, 158,
1603, 171, 246
memory
sensory202
rational196, 198, 201
mindviii, 22, 57, 67, 71n7, 79n53, 118, 120,
133, 134, 137n40, 139, 151, 152n133, 153n140,
154, 156, 162, 165n190, 169n205, 174, 1789,
183, 183n40, 1846, 1889, 195, 198n162,
199, 2015, 2112, 214, 216, 218, 218n287,
219n288, 225, 22731, 2347, 2401, 243,
24555
motion
appetitive133, 134n14
celestial23, 267
circular47, 48n36
rectilinear47, 142n65
nature2, 812, 14, 212, 27, 29n12, 323,
34n36, 357, 39, 401, 55, 5761, 636,
67n168, 68, 69n1, 734, 76, 802, 845,
89, 91n101, 95n115, 96, 98, 102, 106, 10914,
1167, 11921, 128, 131, 1356, 137n35,
1389, 144n82, 145, 147, 150n122, 151, 153,
153n138, n140, 1567, 160, 162n173, 1647,
169, 171, 175, 179, 1813, 185, 187, 1925,
198n162, 2012, 206, 210, 2156, 225,
2289, 231, 2334, 238, 248, 2512, 2556,
25960, 2667, 2713, 2759
negation501, 222n319
nonbeing501
organs
qua bodily parts12, 30, 91, 95, 116, 120,
122n228, 133n14, 147
311
of sense21, 63, 95, 135, 137, 1417, 150,
152, 155, 155n146, 1589, 1624, 1678,
169n205, 1715, 235
of the common sense132, 137, 145,
147n101, 160, 1715, 278
original sin20, 40, 647, 245
perception179, 21, 28, 32, 63, 71n7, 95, 111,
119, 1312, 134, 134n18, 1367, 139n48,
1424, 147, 147n104, 14951, 1538,
159n157, 1607, 169nn2056, 1701, 175,
177, 179, 181, 187, 202, 202n189, 225, 246,
264, 2768
perfection27n2, 2932, 379, 512, 54,
64n146, 712, 76, 836, 889, 936,
99n128, 102, 105, 1078, 128, 190, 207,
243n441, 268, 277
person14, 22, 35, 3941, 43, 94, 1134, 117,
120, 123, 127, 1919, 205, 269, 276
plurality
of forms2, 4, 4n21, 9, 114, 19, 21, 29, 31,
31n32, 33n32, 34n33, 39, 42n71, 45, 69,
878, 902, 96101, 106, 108, 114n206,
1157, 127, 205, 270, 2723, 277, 279
possible68n173, 115, 127n161, 138, 141, 162,
175, 177, 179, 183, 199, 202, 205n203, 229,
2312, 234, 2423, 245, 247, 255
potencies
active29n8, 48, 526, 58, 60, 107,
107n169, 108, 126, 277
natural48, 107
potentia12, 20, 2932, 349, 42, 50, 535,
57, 625, 67, 6978, 80, 81n58, 825,
8790, 926, 103, 1058, 110, 1169, 127,
133n12, n14, 144, 155n161, 161n169, 163, 184,
18990, 200, 205n203, 207n218, 213, 230,
266, 268, 2701, 2757
potentiality12, 30, 49, 49nn456, 51, 535,
60, 73, 87n83, 99, 1078, 144, 155, 1613,
266, 266n37
powersviii, 202, 28, 29n8, 34n33, 378,
67, 71n7, 73, 7580, 81n59, 82, 84, 94, 96,
1035, 110, 120, 138n40, 143, 149, 1623, 171,
180, 18991, 195200, 201n183, 205, 238,
242, 2447, 264, 266, 270, 2789
premises156, 21921, 2246, 226n349
principles
first221, 2246
of geometry and arithmetic200, 244
privation44n4, 45, 4952, 69n1, 144,
144nn823, 229, 241, 256, 277
prohibitions
of Oxford (1277)viiviii, viin1, 34, 10,
14, 22, 51, 105, 128, 25965, 267, 269,
271, 2735, 279
312 index of subjects
propositionvii, 34, 82, 197, 218, 2202,
2269, 2313, 242, 246, 263
quality8, 76, 789, 124n242, 162n173,
232, 239
quantity47, 56, 81, 209, 238n416, 245
quiddity182, 226
rays138, 139n45, 1401, 142n65, 159
realism8, 90, 158, 187
relation6, 7980, 1927, 237n408, 250,
2525
relatives194, 194n137, 195n140, 2535
resurrection40, 42, 74, 111, 1157, 121,
123n240, 125, 125n247, 126, 265, 276
sailor313
scientia94n112, 95n115, 135n22, 178n5, n10,
180n25, 183n38, 18991, 200n173, 204n201,
205, 205n204, 215, 215n274, 216, 217n277,
218, 219n288, n294, 220, 220n296,
nn299300, 222n315, 223, 223n322,
nn3245, 224n327, n330, n333, 228n361,
229, 231n377, 233, 238, 238n414, 240n428,
2401n431, 249n480, 251n491, n499
semen58n111, 5963
seminal reasons (see active potencies)
signs228, 231, 232n382, 233, 233nn3889,
234, 235n400, 236, 236n403, 237n408,
238n410, 2467
simplicityviii, 123, 22, 42, 44n4, 802,
1015, 219, 250, 2524, 254n520, 266,
2689, 2712, 277, 279
smell142, 161n169, 173
soul
double origin of the21, 39, 43, 64,
64n144, 69, 72, 119, 271, 276
intellectivevii, 112, 201, 2833, 3640,
42, 64, 6971, 735, 81n58, 8390,
927, 106, 10812, 115, 1189, 128, 132,
134, 134n14, 180, 190, 200, 205, 207,
207n218, 2445, 266, 270, 2767
rational20, 22, 33, 35, 37n48, 3842, 46,
49, 56, 58, 648, 702, 7980, 83, 86,
935, 98100, 1034, 111, 1136, 118,
1223, 147n99, 189, 1956, 198, 201,
203n192, 204n196, 206, 211, 235, 2389,
246, 266, 268, 2701, 279
sensitive112, 202, 2833, 3542, 615,
68, 6975, 81n58, 8390, 937, 1001,
104, 10812, 11620, 125, 128, 1324, 144,
147, 149, 156, 164, 169, 172n219, 180, 190,
200, 205, 207n218, 244n450, 266,
26970, 2767
vegetative112, 2830, 32, 35n43, 36, 38,
42, 615, 6970, 724, 75n28, 81n58,
834, 86, 90, 94, 97, 1001, 1034,
10912, 11620, 125, 207n218, 266,
26970, 276
sound142, 235
space81n60, 214
species
sensible18, 126n259, 1312, 1348, 1407,
14964, 16771, 175, 178
intelligible137n37, 179, 199, 199n169,
203, 203n190, 204n196, n200, 205, 208,
208n224, 236n403
spirit
animal146, 1745
corporeal212, 61, 61n127, 623, 119,
1457, 150, 152n130, 15960, 169n209,
170, 174, 278
vital1456, 1745
statement222n316, 2279
substantial formviin1, viii, 2, 4, 9, 113, 21,
29, 34n36, 356, 38n56, 42, 42n71, 43, 55,
69, 747, 79n53, 8993, 96102, 1067,
11112, 11617, 121n224, 1223, 125, 1278,
201n183, 205, 2645, 267, 269, 2724,
2767, 279
substrate12, 489, 52, 56, 71
sun62, 220, 230, 245
syllogism21924, 231
terms
simple2212, 2269
traducianism65, 67n168
trinity
divine20, 22, 1912, 193n126, 1956,
1989, 205
of powers of the soul20, 22, 789n50,
189, 189n91, 1956, 1989, 205
truth14, 60n121, 67n164, 78, 177, 1901,
198n167, 2001, 206, 2167, 21920,
222n319, 223, 2259, 231, 233, 2426,
2789
unibilitas (unibility)37, 39n60, 40, 40n64,
116, 128, 238
unicityviiviii, 35, 114, 212, 28, 31n22,
42n71, 63, 6970, 96104, 112, 1157, 121,
205, 26474, 279
unity2, 9, 13, 18, 36, 39, 424, 45n12, 46n19,
49n46, 69, 75, 802, 85, 889, 914, 969,
102, 105, 110, 1148, 1201, 127, 127n262,
128, 145n87, 148, 178, 1878, 20810, 215,
221n308, 223n325, 228n358, 233n390,
2601, 26566, 268, 2703, 2767
 index of subjects
universal22, 33n32, 34, 34n33, n36, 43,
47n30, 54, 59n115, 98n126, 112, 125n247,
17789, 206, 208, 208n222, 209n226, 210,
210n235, 2125, 2189, 221, 222n315, n319,
225, 225n343, n346, 228n362, 230n370,
2312, 246, 249, 251, 251nn5001, 279
univocal712, 85, 85n72, 106, 138,
183, 234
utterance83n65, 148, 166, 2325, 236n407
313
ventricles14647, 147n101, 172, 175n252
verbum (mentis)22, 191, 204, 204n199,
236n406
wax155, 155n146, 163
will3, 35n43, 67, 81n59, 134n18, 18990,
196, 198n160, 205, 207, 267
word578, 183, 196, 198, 222n319, 231, 233,
233n390, 2357, 255