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International Journal of Finance and Economics

Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169188 (1998)

SURVEY ARTICLE

The FeldsteinHorioka Puzzle and


Capital Mobility: A Review
Jerry Coakleya,*, Farida Kulasib and Ron Smithc
a
London Guildhall University, London, UK
b
Primark Decision Economics, London, UK
c
Birkbeck College, London, UK

This paper reviews how economists responded to the Feldstein Horioka


(FH) view that a high saving-investment association across OECD countries
implied low capital mobility. This posed an uncomfortable puzzle since the
conventional wisdom in most exchange rate and open-economy macroeco-
nomic models was that capital mobility was high. In the face of a variety of
replications, the FH result of a high cross-section association between sav-
ing and investment rates in OECD countries has remained remarkably ro-
bust. The debate over whether saving-investment comovements are
informative about capital mobility is still unresolved although the sceptics
appear to be in the ascendancy. 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEY WORDS: saving-investment association; FeldsteinHorioka puzzle; capital mobil-
ity; current account

SUMMARY since the 1970s was that capital mobility was high.
The issue of capital mobility is significant for di-
This paper reviews the extensive literature on how verse policy issues such as the single currency
economists responded to the Feldstein and Horioka debate within the EU or for questions of taxes on
(1980) (FH) claim that capital was relatively immo- capital and saving.
bile. They based this claim on the results of cross In this paper we have organized our review of
section regressions of investment on saving (both contributions to the FH puzzle in relation to the
expressed as shares of GDP) across 16 OECD generic comments suggested by Stigler (1977). The
countries for the 1960 74 period. FH reasoned that majority of the models and explanations reviewed
saving and investment would be perfectly corre- oppose the FH view of low capital mobility by
lated in a closed economy but should be unrelated attempting to construct models which reconcile a
in an open economy since saving could seek out the high saving-investment association with high phys-
highest global returns. The FH view of low capital ical and financial capital mobility and/or by provid-
mobility posed an uncomfortable puzzle since the ing plausible econometric and other data-based
conventional wisdom embodied in most exchange refutations of the FH view. These include general
rate and open-economy macroeconomic models equilibrium, real business cycle models and, nota-
* Correspondence to: Department of Economics, London Guild-
bly, intertemporal models of the current account.
hall University, 84 Moorgate, London EC2M 6SQ, UK. E-mail: Against a background of ongoing debate we
jcoakley@econ.bbk.ac.uk draw some interim conclusions. Firstly, the FH

CCC 1076 9307/98/020169-20$17.50


1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
170 J. Coakley et al.

result of a high saving-investment association has funds. By contrast, zero capital mobility implies a
remained remarkably robust in OECD cross-sec- one-to-one relationship between saving and in-
tions although the coefficient on saving has shown vestment, since saving has to be invested domesti-
some tendency to decline over recent years. The cally. In this case we have a world of segmented
result persists in panels and average time-series capital markets in which each countrys interest
and has been remarkably robust to the addition of rate is determined domestically and domestic
other variables and different estimation methods monetary and fiscal policies are relatively effec-
in the OECD. However, there is less evidence for a tive.
close relationship between saving and investment In cross-section regressions for 16 OECD coun-
in non-OECD samples, particularly in LDCs. Sec- tries FH failed to reject the null hypothesis of a
ondly, using the FH regression for policy purposes one-to-one association between saving and invest-
is questionable because both saving and invest- ment. They interpreted this as implying zero capi-
ment are endogenous and the FH regression can- tal mobility. This conclusion was unpalatable both
not distinguish exogenous shifts in saving from because most theoretical, open economy models
endogenous shifts reflecting factors which may had assumed perfect capital mobility and because
also impact on investment. it appeared that financial integration in the indus-
Thirdly, the FH result may not be informative trialized world was high and increasing, particu-
about capital mobility since a range of theoretical larly since the introduction of floating exchange
models can generate high saving-investment corre- rates in the early 1970s. The question of capital
lations even under perfect capital mobility. This mobility in contemporary economies is not an
now seems to be the emerging consensus in the arcane issue since it is of critical import for policy
literature. Nonetheless the FH puzzle is by no issues such as saving and investment subsidies
means resolved and recent contributions by Bay- (Summers, 1988; Feldstein, 1994, 1995; Devereux,
oumi et al. (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (1996) 1996; Peeters, 1996) or the EU single currency
establish high capital mobility within FH-related debate (Bayoumi et al., 1996).
frameworks. Finally, the debate surrounding the The high saving-investment association is un-
FH puzzle has shown that the notion of capital usual among stylized facts insofar as it is based on
mobility itself is not analytically straightforward. an econometric result. Regression coefficients are
Obstacles to the movement of financial, physical rarely sufficiently robust to become established as
and human capital may have quite different impli- stylized facts. However the attempts to show that
cations. Assuming perfect capital mobility may the FH result was fragile did not succeed as un-
produce plausible conclusions in one set of models
derlined by the recent assessment of Baxter and
and not in another.
Crucini (1993):
In the field of international macroeconomics, tempo-
INTRODUCTION rally robust stylized facts are few and far between.
One of the most stable regularities observed in the
data is the fact that national saving rates are highly
Economists often use the term puzzle to refer to correlated with national investment rates, both in
awkward empirical facts that refuse to comply time-series analyses of individual countries and in
with their established theoretical frameworks. The cross sections in which each country is treated as a
equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott single data point. High saving-investment correla-
tions arise in small economies as well as large
(1985) is a well known example. In this survey we economies (Ibid. p. 416).
review the responses to the puzzle posed by
Feldstein and Horioka (1980). FH argued that, While the high saving-investment association is
under perfect capital mobility, there is no neces- accepted, debate about its interpretation remains
sary association between national saving and in- polarized around one major issue: is the high FH
vestment since saving can globally seek out the coefficient informative about capital mobility as
highest returns. The implication is that an exoge- FH argue? Although subsequent work has demon-
nous increase in investment in any country can be strated that the FH result is consistent with perfect
financed by a perfectly elastic supply of global capital mobility in a variety of theoretical models,

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 171

a number of both theoretical and empirical contri- subtle, technical points and in summarizing them
butions continues to offer support for the FH we may not have accorded them full justice.
approach. The resolution of this issue is not helped
by the fact that empirical econometric work is
subject to a considerable degree of variability and FH REGRESSIONS AND CAPITAL
is often interpreted within competing theoretical MOBILITY
frameworks. For instance, within the FH frame-
work the consensus is that capital mobility has S2. Unfortunately, there is an identification problem
increased since the 1980s but is higher in particular that is not dealt with adequately in the paper.
samples such as the EU. Such inferences are anath-
ema to the many sceptics of the FH approach to Background and Definitions
capital mobility.
The FH controversy puzzle is illuminating about The origins3 of the FH puzzle lie in the 1980
the various ways in which economists respond to Economic Journal article in which they estimated
uncomfortable results. The classic compendium of cross section regressions of the form:
generic responses is given by Stigler (1977) who (I/Y)i = a+b(S/Y)i + ui i= 1, 2, 3,N, (1)
provided a numbered list of typical comments
elicited by (conference) papers. It is striking how where, I is national investment (public and pri-
many of the responses to FH fall within his cate- vate) by country i, S is national saving and Y is
gories of criticism, and we have used his com- national income. We call such relationships be-
ments to organize the responses. We needed to tween national investment and saving shares of
make only one addition, comment 33, Have you GDP (hereafter saving and investment unless oth-
tested for unit roots and cointegration? We intro- erwise specified), including variants such as first
duce sections with his relevant comment(s). In so differences, FH regressions and call b the FH coeffi-
doing we do not intend to be postmodernist, ironic cient or the saving-investment association. The iden-
or relativistic1, since a less relativistic economist tification problem relates to what exactly the FH
than George Stigler is difficult to imagine. Rather coefficient measures. FH interpreted the coefficient
we would emphasize that economists tend to use as an index of capital mobility. Their results for 16
particular lines of attack to confront difficult prob- OECD countries for the 196074 period indicated
lems and that Stigler identifies these lines with a very high saving-investment association and
humour. they could not reject the null hypothesis of b=1
The literature on the FH puzzle is enormous or zero capital mobility. FH concluded:
and, in mid-1996, shows no sign of abating. The [a]lthough there may be perfect arbitrage of short-
original FH article was quoted some 142 times in term yields and substantial flows of long-term direct
economics and related journals between 1988 and and portfolio investment, there appear to be sufficient
1995.2 This article differs from related reviews in rigidities and locational preferences to keep most of
that it is more narrowly focused on the FH debate any incremental saving invested in the country of
origin (FH p. 323).
than the reviews of Frankel (1992) or Obstfeld
(1995). It is organized as follows. The first section Of itself, the FH finding is not controversial and
outlines the FH framework in the context of com- has been replicated with only minor modifications
peting approaches to capital mobility. The next for OECD countries many times. Despite the ap-
section summarizes a variety of extensions, updat- parent robustness of the FH result of a high sav-
ings, and tests of the FH result of a high saving-in- ing-investment association, the FH view or
vestment association. The section after addresses interpretation that the FH coefficient (b) can be
interpretational problems impinging on the valid- identified as a measure of international capital
ity of the FH approach. The final section gives our mobility has been widely challenged since it is not
conclusions. Two caveats should be borne in mind. obvious what structural parameters this equation
First, since the debate is ongoing, this review prob- measures.
ably already is or quickly will become incomplete. The FH equation can also be parameterized in
Second, many of the responses have depended on terms of the current account, B =S I:

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
172 J. Coakley et al.

(B/Y)i = a + (1b)(S/Y)i +ui. (2) reduced form equation which raises an identifica-
tion problem. Although the original FH (1980)
In this framework, the FH interpretation is that,
paper did not provide an explicit theoretical
given zero capital mobility, changes in saving are
framework, we use a linear version of the partial
reflected in changes in investment and have no
equilibrium model of Feldstein (1983) to examine
effect on the current account. This runs counter to
the identification problem. This is a classical model
the tradition of exchange rate and open economy
in which national saving and investment and for-
models. For example, all contemporary exchange
eign investment (the balance of payments) are
rate models, with the exception of portfolio bal-
functions of the real interest rate (r) and stochastic
ance and some Mundell-Fleming models, assume
shocks. An open economy equilibrium condition
perfect mobility (Taylor, 1995). Dornbusch (1991)
determines the real interest rate. The S, I and B
sums up how the open economy parameterization
variables are implicitly expressed as shares of GDP
above links with the original FH regression:
and, together with r, are measured as deviations
Feldsteins discovery of the tight link between na- from their means. For a sample of countries, j =
tional saving and investment rates continues to baffle 1,2,,N, the model is as follows:
the profession. Ample research over the past few
years has failed to reject the basic finding The Ij = frj + e1j , (3)
Feldstein finding runs counter to the spirit of the
open economy literature in which, under of condi- Sj = crj + e2j , (4)
tions of perfect capital mobility, changes in national Bj = hrj + e3j . (5)
saving rates are primarily reflected in the current
account, not in investment. (p. 220). Equilibrium is given by equilibrium on the
The FH puzzle is further exacerbated by the high world balance of payments:
degree of capital mobility implied by some interest Sj Ij Bj 0, (6)
parity studies4 and casual empiricism. The 1980s implying that:
saw widespread deregulation of financial markets
involving the removal of impediments to cross- e1j + e3j e2j
rj = . (7)
border trading of financial instruments, and infor- c+ f+h
mation and communication technology (ICT) The FH coefficient is estimated as:
advances which facilitated the international trans- N
fer of capital. Even where formal exchange con- % Ij Sj
b. = N
j=1
trols survive, agents seem able to avoid them as is , (8)
evidenced by the flight of capital from many % Sj
2

developing countries.5 j=1

which is a function of all six elements of the


variancecovariance matrix and the three struc-
Approaches to Capital Mobility
tural parameters. Feldstein (1983) gives the de-
The FH puzzle has emphasized that defining and tailed formula.
measuring capital mobility is not straightforward. In the case of perfect capital mobility, there is no
Capital is not homogenous and the obstacles to the difference between the country interest rate and
mobility of financial, physical and human capital the world average (rj = 0) and real interest parity
may be quite different. Here we briefly place the holds. The implication is that testing for capital
FH approach in context by outlining three compet- mobility using the FH approach involves testing a
ing approaches to capital mobility. joint hypothesis of a high saving-investment asso-
ciation and real interest parity. Frankel (1991) ar-
gues that the failure of real interest parity is the
FH Quantity Approach
most likely explanation for the positive covariance
The attractions of the FH approach are its intuitive between saving and investment. The FH coeffi-
simplicity and data availability. However its sim- cient measures the effect of an exogenous shock to
plicity proves deceptive since the FH regression is saving on investment but will be close to zero only
neither a structural model of investment nor a if the covariance between investment and saving

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 173

shocks is close to zero. This will not hold if com- the country premium or covered interest parity
mon factors (such as technology shocks, popula- which captures all barriers (such as transaction
tion growth and the like) move both saving and costs, information costs, capital controls, and vari-
investment. FH readily admitted that the high ous taxes) to integration of financial markets
saving-investment association may be explained across national boundaries. Obstfeld (1995) shows
by common factors but put the burden of discover- that, although the offshoreonshore money mar-
ing statistically significant common factors on their ket links (equivalent to CIP) increased in a sample
critics who have largely failed in this respect. of leading economies in the 1980s, the risk of
Under imperfect capital mobility, interest rates government intervention, particularly in times of
differ from country to country and, using (3) and exchange rate crisis, remains significant. Another
(7), investment is given by: complicating factor is that financial markets are
e1j +e3j e2j less well integrated at long term maturities than at
Ij = f + e1j . (9) 3 month maturities which are typically used to test
c +f + h covered interest parity (Dooley et al., 1987; Frankel,
If the covariances between e2, e1 and e3 are zero, 1991, 1992).
the effect of a shock to saving (e2) on investment is The second bracketed term on the right of (11) is
given by: the currency premium which consists of the ex-
change risk premium (fd DS e) and expected real
f
b= . (10) depreciation (DS e DP e + DP e*) where DS e is ex-
c+f +h pected depreciation. Frankel argues that a cur-
This shows that the estimate of b will not be unity rency premium exists due to real and nominal
even under low capital mobility (h :0) unless exchange rate variability. Even with equalization
saving is interest inelastic, c =0. In the latter in- of covered interest rates (i i* fd= 0), large dif-
stance, the FH coefficient reduces to f/(f + h) but ferentials in real interest rates may persist due to
is less than unity for h\ 0.6 Thus, even within volatility in both components of the currency pre-
FHs own framework, it is only under strong iden- mium. The failure of RIP is also highlighted by
tifying assumptions that the FH coefficient has the Lemmen and Eijffinger (1995). In brief, RIP re-
requisite properties for the FH interpretation. A quires not only perfect capital mobility but also
related difficulty is the absence of a benchmark the integration of goods markets and efficiency of
value for b corresponding to perfect capital mobil- exchange markets.
ity. Either perfect capital mobiity or infinitely in-
terest elastic saving (or both) imply b tending to
Consumption Smoothing Approach
zero and we cannot distinguish these cases.
The basis of this approach is that, in a world of
integrated capital markets, consumption risks can
Interest Parity No ArbitrageRelations
be traded to improve welfare. One implication is
These relations can be classified into three separate that consumption paths should be correlated
components: covered interest parity (CIP), uncov- across countries as agents smooth consumption in
ered interest parity (UIP), and real interest parity the face of shocks. However consumption smooth-
(RIP). We focus on RIP since it is implicitly as- ing is possible only if there is no credit rationing in
sumed in the FH approach. We follow Frankels financial markets (Bayoumi, 1990; Artis and Bay-
(1991) decomposition of RIP into two components oumi, 1992).7 Bayoumi and MacDonald (1995) ar-
(note that the variables below such as r, i and P gue that their approach has the benefit of allowing
now denote levels): tests of RIP without assuming ex ante purchasing
power parity. Their conclusion that Japan is the
r r* =(i i* fd) + (fd DP e +DP e*), (11)
only advanced economy for which capital market
where r is the real and i the nominal interest rate, integration is not rejected typifies the negative
DP e expected inflation and fd is the forward dis- findings on capital mobility found using this ap-
count (starred variables refer to their foreign coun- proach. Since the consumption-smoothing ap-
terparts). The first bracketed term on the right is proach is surveyed elsewhere (Obstfeld, 1995) we

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
174 J. Coakley et al.

focus here on a recent variant found in Ghosh is that that Ghosh does not provide either an
(1995) and Ghosh and Ostry (1995). empirical or theoretical reconciliation of his con-
Ghosh (1995) starts from Sachs (1981) observa- trarian results with alternative approaches which
tion that the current account acts as a buffer or use the saving-investment association. The second
that countries borrow and lend abroad in order to is that one may question the manner in which
smooth consumption in the face of temporary Ghosh constructs his optimal consumption series,
shocks. Since saving and investment seem to be upon which his results hinge.
non-stationary processes and the current account
might be expected to be a stationary process, he
focuses on current account volatility rather than MEASURES OF THE
saving and investment correlations to test for per- SAVING-INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
fect capital mobility. Ghosh constructs a bench-
mark time series of the optimal consumption S3. The residuals are non-normal and the specifica-
smoothing, current account given perfect capital tion of the model is incorrect.
mobility and shocks to the economy. A low vari- S8. Have you tried two stage least squares?
ance of the actual to the optimal current account
S22. What happens when you extend the anlaysis to
implies that the degree of capital mobility is in-
the later (earlier) period?
sufficient to allow the actual current account to
S33. Have you tested for unit roots and cointegra-
absorb shocks to smooth consumption.
tion? 8
Ghoshs null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of
perfect capital mobility and the consumption- Econometric results are notoriously fragile since
smoothing motive. The optimal current account estimates are sensitive to such issues as specifica-
path is defined as: tion, estimation method, sample and the particular
measures used to proxy the theoretical variables.
CA*t = Et % (1 +r) 1 D(Qt + i It + i Gt + i ), The initial response to FH was to target economet-
i=1
(12) ric errors as the explanation for their finding (To-
bin, 1983; Westphal, 1983; Murphy, 1984; Frankel,
where Q is national output or GDP, I is invest- 1986). The problems of the FH regression include
ment, and G is government expenditure. This identification discussed in the previous section (it
states that the optimal current account path is
is not clear what theoretical parameter the FH
equal to the expected present value of changes in
coefficient measures), misspecification (relevant
future national cash flows (Qt + i It + i Gt + i ). He
common factors may have been omitted), simul-
compares the variance of the optimal and the
taneity bias (saving may be endogenous), perma-
actual current accounts of five major OECD indus-
nent and transitory effects (was the FH coefficient
trialized countries from 1960 88. If the two vari-
ances are equal, then the null hypothesis is measuring short or long-run impacts discussed in
accepted and we have perfect capital mobility and the previous section), sample sensitivity, and non-
consumption smoothing. For four out of five coun- stationarity. In general the FH results have been
tries the volatility of the actual current account robust to these empirical critiques in OECD sam-
exceeds the optimal current account by statistically ples.
significant margins. He attributed this excess
volatility to speculative capital flows. Ghosh and Replicating the FH Regressions
Ostry (1995) apply similar methods to a sample of
LDCs for various periods, ranging from 195091. The main evidence provided by FH and the bulk
The results of Ghosh and Ghosh and Ostry stand of the subsequent work has been based on cross-
out in suggesting excess capital mobility in both section regressions. FH conducted time-series anal-
advanced and developing countries. These find- ysis but pointed out that: [s]imultaneous
ings run counter not only to those of FH but also equations bias makes these time-series estimates
those of the consumption-smoothing approach. too unreliable to warrant serious attention (fn. 1,
The Ghosh approach has two difficulties. The first p. 327). Other researchers have mainly followed

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 175

the FH lead in focusing on cross sections but some (1996) use this insight to construct a new measure
have also produced time series and panel esti- of capital mobility based on GNP/GDP ratios.
mates of the saving-investment association. Note
that as long as the deviations of the time-series FH
Cross-Section Results
coefficients from their mean are independent of
the saving rate, the cross-section estimate will The FH result based on cross-section data has
provide an unbiased estimate of the mean of the proved remarkably robust. Table 1 reports on a
time-series coefficients for each country (Zellner, selection of cross-section estimates of the saving-
1969). investment association (b) for different samples of
OECD countries using a variety of time periods.
Luxembourg has been identified as an outlier in
Data
most recent studies and the FH result collapses if
FH used gross rather than net national saving and it is included. The first part of Table 1 considers
investment flows for two reasons. Firstly it is gross the evidence in favour of the FH result. The origi-
not net saving flows which respond to world wide nal FH result was updated by Feldstein (1983) who
yield differentials. Secondly, the measurement of extended the FH sample period from 196074 to
depreciation is inaccurate, in particular in the pres- 196079. He confirmed that the saving-investment
ence of high inflation rates. Removing depreciation association estimates had not declined by extend-
from gross saving and investment may cause a ing the sample period. More recently Feldstein and
spurious correlation between net saving and in- Bachetta (1991) re-estimated the FH equation for
vestment, biasing the FH coefficient upwards. The the 196086 period using a sample of 2311 OECD
actual FH estimates of the coefficient on saving in countries. They found that the saving-investment
Equation (1) using annual data for 16 OECD coun- association had only marginally declined over the
tries for the 1960 74 period9 were 0.89 and 0.94 for longer sample period.
gross and net measures, respectively illustrating The rest of Table 1 presents the other replica-
that the difference between the two estimates is tions of the FH result in approximately chronolog-
small when the FH coefficient (b) is close to one. ical order. The empirical work in the 1980s
In more recent studies in which the FH regression appeared to confirm the original FH result and
is estimated using gross and net measures, the net indicated that estimates of the saving-investment
measures invariably produce a larger coefficient association did not decline when the estimation
on saving (see Feldstein, 1983; Feldstein and Ba- period was extended to 1980 and beyond (Mur-
chetta, 1991; Tesar, 1991, 1993). phy, 1984; Penati and Dooley, 1984; Obstfeld, 1986;
The OECD publishes net rather than gross mea- Dooley et al., 1987; Golub, 1990; Artis and Bay-
sures for public and private saving and investment oumi, 1992; Sinn, 1992; Coakley et al., 1994, 1995a;
in the National Accounts for its member countries.10 Obstfeld, 1995). The only studies which show an
Net saving is derived by deducting government estimated value of b less than 0.7 for OECD sam-
and private final consumption from national dis- ples are those where saving and investment are
posable income. Net investment is defined as gross averaged over periods of less than one decade (e.g.
fixed capital formation less stock building and Artis and Bayoumi for 197480 period).12 Coakley
depreciation. Gross investment and saving are cal- et al. (1994) and Coakley et al. (1995a) use the most
culated as the net measures plus depreciation. recent data which yield an estimated b of 0.75 for
Obstfeld (1986), Baxter and Crucini (1993), the 196092 period and 0.63 the more recent 1980
amongst others, argue that the OECD measure of 92 subperiod.
saving and investment does not reflect true saving
and investment. The difference arises when for-
Time Series
eign ownership of firms is extensive. Obstfeld
(1986) argues that foreign ownership in open Table 2 presents selected time series estimates of
economies may artificially increase the correla- the FH coefficient and, where applicable, of the
tion between measured national saving and do- correlation coefficient between saving and invest-
mestic investment (ibid. p. 84). Bayoumi et al. ment. Only a relatively small number of time

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
176 J. Coakley et al.

Table 1. Cross section estimates of FH regression

Author Period b (S.E.) R2 OECDa sample

Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 1960 74 0.887 (0.074) 0.91 16b


Feldstein (1983) 1960 79 0.796 (0.112) 0.75 FH 16 plus Fra
Feldstein and Bachetta (1991) 1960-86 0.833 (0.094) 23
1960 69 0.848 (0.063)
1970 79 0.671 (0.121)
1980 86 0.868 (0.126)
Murphy (1984) 1960 80 0.90 (0.09) 0.85 FH 16 plus Fra
Penati and Dooley (1984) 1971 81 0.88 (6.12) 0.71 19
Obstfeld (1986) 1970 79 0.858 (0.806) 0.07 FH 16 plus Fra
1.422 (0.456) 0.41 FH 16
Dooley et al. (1987) 1960 73 0.746 (0.104) 0.79 FH 16 minus 2
1974 80 0.736 (0.173) 0.57
Artis and Bayoumi (1992) 1974 80 0.53 (0.18) 25 plus Yugoslavia
1981 88 0.79 (0.12)
1960 88 0.76 (0.12)
Golub (1990) 1960 86 0.74 (0.12) 0.75 FH 16
1960 88 0.76 (0.12)
Tesar (1991)c 1960 86 0.84 (0.13) 0.73 FH 16
1960 74 0.89 (0.10) 0.85
1975 86 0.81 (0.18) 0.58 23
1960 86 0.84 (0.10) 0.74
1960 74 0.87 (0.07) 0.86
1975 86 0.85 (0.15) 0.59
Obstfeld (1995) 1974 90 0.715 (0.131) 0.60 22 minus Lux, Tur
1974 80 0.867 (0.170) 0.56
1981 90 0.636 (0.108) 0.64
Coakley et al. (1994, 1995a) 1960 92 0.752 (0.079) 0.80 23
1960 74 0.883 (0.063) 0.89
1975 92 0.649 (0.104) 0.63
1980 92 0.628 (0.090) 0.69
a
The full list of OECD countries (with abbreviations in parentheses) comprises: Australia (Aus), Austria (Aut), Belgium
(Bel), Canada (Can), Denmark (Dnk), Finland (Fin), France (Fra), Germany (Ger), Greece (Grc), Iceland (Isl), Ireland (Ire),
Italy (It), Japan (Jap), Luxembourg (Lux), Netherlands (Nld), Norway (Nor), New Zealand (Nzl), Portugal (Prt), Spain
(Esp), Sweden (Swe), Switzerland (Che), Turkey (Tur), UK, and the US.
b
The FH sample excludes Fra, Isl, Lux, Nor, Prt, Esp, Che and Tur. We refer to these as the FH 16.
c
Tesars results are based on net saving and investment rates.

series as compared with cross section replications similar range. Over the entire 196092 period, the
of the FH result has been undertaken. Nonetheless time series estimates of b by Coakley et al. (1994)
time series estimates are important especially as a ranged from 0.025 for Luxembourg to 1.182 for
guide for pooling time series observations from Switzerland.
different countries as Obstfeld (1986) has argued. If the interest sensitivity of saving is not zero
The distinguishing feature of Table 2 is the consid- and the covariance between the error terms is not
erable degree of heterogeneity in estimates for zero, then saving will be endogenous and the
individual countries coefficients. In Obstfeld estimates of the FH coefficient will suffer simul-
(1986) the correlation coefficients vary from 0.13 to taneity bias. FH were aware of the potential simul-
0.92 while those of Tesar (1993) vary over a very taneity problem and employed instrumental

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 177

Table 2. Selected time series estimates of the FH regression

Time period b (S.E.) Correlation coefficient Country

Obstfeld (1986) 1960I 84IV 0.194 (0.106) Aus


1970II 84I 0.132 (0.195) Aut
1959I 84I 0.550 (0.125) Can
1960III 84II 0.649 (0.133) Ger
1959I 83IV 0.846 (0.140) Jap
1959I 84II 0.604 (0.166) UK
1959I 84II 0.908 (0.143) US
Miller (1988) 1946I 87III 0.571 US
Tesar (1993) 1960 88 na 0.848 (0.102) Can
0.929 (0.071) Fra
0.886 (0.091) Ger
0.063 (0.196) It
0.592 (0.154) UK
0.752 (0.124) US
Afxentiou and Serlitis (1993) 1947 89 0.335 (2.2) Can
Alexakis and Apergis (1992) 1955I 73V 0.796 (10.76) US
1974I 90V 0.657 (1.94)
Coakley et al. (1994, 1995a) 1960 92 0.580 (0.087) Aus
0.910 (0.086) Aut
0.678 (0.073) Bel
0.710 (0.086) Can
0.745 (0.112) Dnk
0.857 (0.102) Fin
0.843 (0.045) Fra
1.019 (0.092) Ger
0.770 (0.050) Grc
0.741 (0.145) Isl
0.160 (0.319) Ire
0.753 (0.078) It
1.043 (0.106) Jap
0.025 (0.054) Lux
0.308 (0.318) Nld
0.469 (0.193) Nor
0.293 (0.121) Nzl
0.293 (0.121) Prt
0.758 (0.133) Esp
0.740 (0.055) Swe
1.182 (0.242) Che
0.717 (0.89) Tur
0.401 (0.147) UK
0.586 (0.096) US

variable estimators. They reported that this did Panel Estimates


not alter the main thrust of their original A few researchers have employed pooled and
findings. This finding has been supported by oth- other panel data estimators (such as the Swamy
ers who have used instrumental variable estima- (1971) random coefficients estimator) to obtain al-
tors (Dooley et al., 1987; Bayoumi, 1990; Tesar, ternative measures of the saving-investment asso-
1991). ciation (Feldstein, 1983; Amirkhalkhali and Dar,

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
178 J. Coakley et al.

1993; Coakley et al., 1994, 1995b). However, since Harberger (1980) argues that the FH result
the cross-section variance dominates the total reflects large country bias rather than low capital
variation and the time series estimates of b are mobility. He considers whether capital flows
very heterogenous, the pooled estimates are (which he estimates as the current account as a
largely similar to the cross section estimates for ratio of gross investment) are less variable and
the OECD sample, 1960 92. The conclusion from smaller in absolute size for large countries than
the limited number of studies undertaken seems for small or poor countries. A large country will
to be that FH cross section, panel, and average finance most investment projects from domestic
time series estimates are close to unity for OECD saving and thus will have less need to borrow
but not LDC samples. The cross section estimate from abroad. He finds that gross capital flows are
matches the average time series levels estimate indeed more variable and greater in absolute
(Coakley et al., 1995a). Pesaran and Smith (1995) value for smaller countries. The views of Murphy
discuss the relationship between cross section, and Harberger on the large country effect are
panel, and time series estimates. echoed elsewhere in the literature (Obstfeld,
198613; Tobin, 1983; Baxter and Crucini, 1993).
Sample Sensitivity
Although the finding of a high saving-investment EU Effect
association seems relatively robust for the OECD Feldstein and Bachetta (1991), Artis and Bayoumi
group of countries as a whole, some researchers (1992) and Bayoumi et al. (1996) argue that, due
have found anomalies when the sample is disag- to informational and institutional links, financial
gregated or changed in various ways. Below we flows between EU countries should be greater
focus on the main anomalies.
than among OECD countries and thus these
countries should experience a lower saving-in-
vestment correlation. Feldstein and Bachetta split
Large Country Effect the 23 OECD country sample into the then EU (9)
Murphy (1984) argues that the FH regression tests and non-EU country samples for the 196086 pe-
two hypotheses, perfect capital mobility and riod. Using net figures they show that the EU
small open economies. Small countries are unable countries experienced a small decline in the sav-
to influence world interest rates and prices but ing-investment association from the 1960s to the
large countries are and so can bias the saving-in- 1970s, followed by a sharp decline in the 1980s.
vestment correlation towards one even under By comparison, the coefficient for the 14 non-EU
conditions of perfect capital mobility. FH did rec- countries declined much more slowly. These re-
ognize the large country effect by arguing, that sults suggest that capital mobility has been en-
if a country is large, it will behave like a closed hanced over the years amongst EU countries,
economy: particularly in the 1980s. Using gross measures,
the coefficient on saving for the EU countries is
while the link between domestic saving and invest-
ment may vary among countries, we found no evi- substantial throughout the period even though it
dence that it varied in relation to either the size of the falls somewhat in the 1980s. However the decline
economy or the importance to international trade. in the corresponding coefficient for non-EU coun-
(Ibid. p. 323). tries is much sharper, suggesting, according
Murphy divided his sample of 17 OECD coun- to the FH interpretation, that capital mobility
tries into ten small and seven large countries. He has increased more in the non-EU countries.
found that his group of large countries had a These conflicting findings indicate that the
response coefficient on saving of 0.98 while the FeldsteinBachetta results must be interpreted
small country group had a coefficient of only with caution.
0.59. He argues that these results are consistent Artis and Bayoumi (1992) also claim to have
with the expected effect of country size when discovered an EU-type effect by focusing on the
capital is mobile between countries. six core members of the exchange rate mechanism,

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 179

the ERM-6. The coefficient on saving for the origi- Other


nal ERM-6 countries decreased throughout the
A number of other disaggregations of the FH
sample period 1960 88 and was insignificantly
equation has appeared in the literature. FH them-
different from zero (0.58, S.E.=0.33) for the 1981
selves divided national saving and investment into
88 period. For the same sample period, Artis and
three separate components for nine OECD coun-
Bayoumi found the entire OECD group produced
tries: the government, household and corporate
a coefficient on saving of 0.78 (S.E.= 0.12). They
sectors. Their main result is that (gross) corporate
concluded that within the FH framework, the
investment appears responsive to corporate rather
ERM-6 countries are substantially integrated. Fi-
than other forms of saving. Although they claim
nally Bayoumi et al. (1996) confirm a higher sav-
that this is consistent with their general results, it
ing-investment association for EU economies than
has to be treated with caution in view of the
for either Europe as a whole (excluding Luxem-
limited degrees of freedom of their regression
bourg) or for the OECD sample.
equation.
A number of studies has used the FH approach
Developing Countries to investigate the question of regional or intra-na-
tional capital mobility. For instance, Bayoumi and
Dooley et al. (1987) examined 62 countries, 48 of
Rose (1993) used regional UK data over the 1971
which were developing countries and the remain-
85 period and found regional saving and invest-
ing 14 OECD countries. They split the sample into
ment rates were uncorrelated. They concluded that
two sub-periods, the fixed exchange rate period,
their results were consistent with the hypothesis of
196073, and the floating exchange rate period,
perfect regional capital mobility but this could also
197484, when many countries removed capital
be interpreted as lack of default risk since there is
controls. They find that the saving coefficient is
no solvency constraint. Similar results have been
greater for the OECD countries than for the devel-
reported for other regional studies: Dekle (1996)
oping countries and that the coefficient is greater
for Japanese prefectures and Bayoumi and Sterne
in the floating rate period for both groups. They
(1993) for Canadian regions. Finally Bayoumi et al.
divided the heterogeneous developing countries
(1996) use a novel approach to confirm that re-
into 21 market borrowers and 14 countries which
gional capital mobility is higher than international
depend solely on official financing. The saving-in-
capital mobility by comparing GNP/GDP ratios
vestment correlation was positive and significant
across EU countries with equivalent ratios across
for both groups combined and the relationship
UK regions.
was stronger in the second sub-period and for the
market borrowers than for the official borrowers.
They attribute the lower coefficient on saving for
Non-stationarity
the developing countries to the country size fac-
tor, since the sample of developing countries com- In recent years it has been recognized that national
prises small countries which cannot influence the saving and investment rates are very persistent
world interest rates and therefore their savings-in- series since the null of a unit root cannot be
vestment correlation is not biased upwards. rejected (Miller, 1988; Ballabriga et al., 1991; Leach-
Mamingi (1994) investigated the FH regression man, 1991; Gulley, 1992; Gundlach and Sinn, 1992;
using time series estimation for 58 developing Afxentiou and Serlitis, 1993; Alexakis and Apergis,
countries. Overall he found that the saving-invest- 1992; Argimon and Roldan, 1994; de Haan and
ment coefficient was much weaker for developing Siermann, 1994; Ghosh, 1995; Lemmen and Ei-
countries than the corresponding coefficient in jffinger, 1995; Coakley et al. 1996a,b; Coakley
studies of OECD countries. He reached a similar and Kulasi, 1997). Coakley et al. (1996a) note
conclusion to Dooley et al. and argued that devel- that although saving and investment shares of
oping countries are essentially small open GDP are I(1) variables, the difference between
economies where fiscal policy used for demand themthe current account balanceshould be
management purposes will be unable to crowd out stationary or I(0) as a result of solvency con-
private sector investment. straints. In the latter case, saving and invest-

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
180 J. Coakley et al.

ment will cointegrate with a unit coefficient and between saving and investment despite perfect
the time series FH regression in levels will yield capital mobility. Because labour is assumed to be
super-consistent estimates of b. immobile across national boundaries, productivity
Note that evidence in favour of a stationary shocks to labour in the domestic economy cannot
current account or cointegration of saving and be absorbed by foreign labour markets. In order to
investment can be interpreted in two diametrically maintain the equality between the marginal
opposing manners. On one hand it can be inter- product of capital and the rate of return on capital,
preted as confirmation of the FH result; on the namely the world rate of interest, firms must in-
other it can be interpreted as evidence of open crease their capital stock. Obstfeld (1986) argues
capital markets imposing a solvency constraint on the essential reason for this co-movement [be-
countries. The empirical evidence on the stationar- tween savings and investment] is again the fact
ity of the current account employing conventional that labour is not mobile across national
cointegration techniques is mixed (Miller, 1988; boundaries (ibid. p. 74). If labour was perfectly
Gulley, 1992; Gundlach and Sinn, 1992; Argimon mobile across national boundaries, the impact of
and Roldan, 1994; Ghosh, 1995). Some recent ap- productivity shocks to labour in the domestic
proaches have employed panel unit root tests to economy would be eliminated since excess domes-
test for the stationarity of the current account tic workers would be absorbed abroad. Saving
(Coakley et al., 1996a,b; Krol, 1996; Coakley and may increase but domestic investment need not
Kulasi, 1997). The panel tests of Im et al. (1995) increase since the marginal product of capital re-
have higher power than individual, pairwise tests mains unchanged.
and the general conclusion is that the current
Tesar (1993) links the FH result to the low
account is a stationary series in both in developing
cross-country consumption correlation and the
and OECD countries.
dominance of domestic assets in national portfo-
lios. She reports cross-country consumption corre-
lations for five OECD countries, ranging from
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
0.35 between Canada and France to 0.58 be-
tween France and Germany, with an average cor-
General Equilibrium Approaches relation of only 0.09. French and Poterba (1991)
find that for the five largest national stock markets,
S29. The problem cannot be dealt with by partial domestic ownership range from 79% in Germany
equilibrium methods: it requires a general equi- to 95.7% in Japan. Tesar argues that these empiri-
librium framework. cal regularities imply a lack of consumption
The implicit FH theoretical framework previ- smoothing, even under conditions of perfect capi-
ously set out, was a partial equilibrium frame- tal mobility. She develops a simple two country,
work. Several authors have constructed general exchange model with investment and productivity
equilibrium models which simultaneously incor- shocks to non-traded goods. The model demon-
porate a high saving-investment correlation and strates that these empirical regularities can be ex-
high or perfect capital mobility (Obstfeld, 1986; plained by productivity shocks to non-traded
Engel and Kletzer, 1989; Finn, 1990; Cardia, 1991; goods and agents preferences particularly vis-a-
Mendoza, 1991; Backus et al., 1992; Baxter and vis the composition of traded and non-traded
Crucini, 1993; Tesar, 1993; Stockman and Tesar, goods in consumption smoothing. In such cases,
1995). One drawback of the general equilibrium domestic investors will bias their portfolios to-
models is that they are mainly theoretical in nature wards assets in domestic non-traded goods.
and generally lack supporting econometric evi- Tesars theoretical model is illustrated by simula-
dence.14 tion results where productivity shocks are gener-
Obstfeld (1986) constructs a simple intertempo- ated from real data from five OECD countries.
ral model of a small open economy in which Baxter and Crucini (1993) (BC) set out to resolve
temporary shocks to the productivity of domestic the conflicting results reported by Sachs (1981) and
capital and labour cause short run comovements Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and to offer an expla-

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 181

nation for the large country effect put forward by ilar results are reported in Sachs (1982), Table 5.2,
Murphy (1984). Their model shows high time se- for slightly different samples of countries and
ries correlations between saving and investment where the data were averaged over different sam-
under perfect capital mobility, higher correlations ple periods. Sachs finds that changes in the bal-
for larger countries, and a negative relationship ance on the current account are much more closely
between current account deficits and investment correlated with changes in investment than
as found in Sachs. BC base their conclusions on a changes in saving rates. He concludes that the
two country, one sector growth model driven by responsiveness of world capital to changes in in-
exogenous shocks to productivity where the effects vestment in the domestic economy implies that
of government fiscal policy are assumed neutral. world capital markets are integrated to a great
extent15.
BC conclude:
Sachs results sharply contradict the FH result.
Sachss empirical findings have traditionally been Penati and Dooley (1984) (PD) hypothesize that if
interpreted as evidence in favour of international Sachs results are valid, then Sachs equation
capital mobility, while high values of saving and
investment correlations have been interpreted as evi-
should strengthen over time as international finan-
dence against capital mobility. Our model starts from cial markets become more integrated. They repli-
the assumption of highly mobile capital and simulta- cated both the FH and Sachs equations using 19
neously accounts for both of these phenomena. (p. industrialized countries. They showed that, while
428). the FH equation remained robust over time, Sachs
relationship breaks down when the sample period
Note however that Penati and Dooley (1984) found
is extended to include 1980 and the number of
that the relationship between investment and the
countries is increased to 19. The results led PD to
current account was statistically insignificant.
reject capital mobility. In fact Penati and Dooley
found that Sachs results depended heavily on
Current Account Explanations outlier countries, and once these were removed
from the sample, an estimate of the slope coeffi-
S21. The central argument is not only a tautology, it cient not significantly different from zero was ob-
is false. tained.
The tautology is the identity that saving minus Another strand of this literature is that the sav-
investment equals the balance of payments on ing-investment correlation is high because govern-
current account. A number of authors has sug- ments target the current account using appropriate
gested that, if, in response to balance of payments policy instruments (Bayoumi, 1990; Artis and Bay-
disequilibrium, public or private decision-makers oumi, 1992 (AB)). For instance, AB argue that
governments target the current account using
react in such a way as to restore equilibrium, this
monetary rather than fiscal policy. To examine this
would induce an association between saving and
they estimated the following reaction function:
investment even under high capital mobility. Sev-
eral variants of the current account explanation are
found in the literature (Bayoumi, 1990; Ballabriga Dr =a+ b Dy +g Dp +dCA/y + u, (13)
et al., 1991; Artis and Bayoumi, 1992; Argimon and
Roldan, 1994; Ghosh, 1995; Glick and Rogoff, 1995; where r is a discount rate administered by mone-
Coakley et al., 1996a,b). tary authorities, Dy is growth, Dp is inflation, CA/y
Sachs (1981, 1982) argued that changes in invest- is the current account balance as a ratio to GDP or
ment opportunities rather than oil price changes GNP, and u is a random error term. If govern-
were the main determinant of current account ments targeted the current account, d should be
imbalances in the 1970s. Sachs (1981) regressed the negative. Since there was a decline in the saving-
average current account (as a proportion of GDP) investment association in the 1980s, AB hypothe-
for 15 industrial countries on their average invest- sized that current account targeting by
ment rates and found that the slope coefficient was governments had declined in the 1980s. They con-
negative and significantly different from zero. Sim- clude that their results:

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
182 J. Coakley et al.

appear to confirm that the current account was a about capital mobility in growth models. Perfect
significant policy target for monetary policy in the capital mobility carries the implausible implication
1970s, but that its importance diminished somewhat
of immediate convergence to steady state levels of
in the 1980s. This behaviour appears to correspond to
a reduction in the correlation between saving and per capita output, physical capital and human
investment among OECD countries... it seems likely capital. To avoid this problem, they consider a
that government targeting of the current account case of partial capital mobility where only physical
helps account for the high correlation. (Ibid. p. 303). and not human capital can be used as collateral on
Coakley et al. (1996a) propose a resolution of the international financial markets. On this basis they
FH puzzle based on the current account which assert:
differs from the previous explanations in several (a)lthough the credit-constrained open economy con-
ways. First it stresses capital market constraints verges faster than the closed economy, the speed of
rather than government targets for the current convergence is now finite for the open economy and
the difference from the closed economy is not large
account. Unlike the Ballabriga et al. (1991) model, for plausible parameter values (p. 112).
the Coakley et al. model does not rely on endoge-
nous government policy responding to private sec- Barro et al. develop a modified Ramsey, infinite-
tor behaviour or to shocks. Instead it relates saving horizon optimizing model. They analyse the opti-
and investment behaviour to the current account mal economic growth path using a one sector
via a market determined risk premium on borrow- model with Cobb-Douglas technology, in which
ing. Secondly, their approach does not rely on output is produced with three inputs, physical
capital controls. They argue that, even under per- capital (k), human capital (h) and non-repro-
fect capital mobility, the interest rate faced by a ducible labour. They demonstrate that the conver-
country will contain two components, the world gence implications of the partial capital mobility
rate and a risk premium/discount which averages model are similar to those of the closed economy.
to zero across countries. The risk premium/dis- Both models demonstrate that output is an in-
count will respond to the balance of payments creasing function of capital stock under conditions
thus ensuring long-run solvency and making the of diminishing returns. They argue that the world
current account as a share of GDP a stationary rate of interest, which is the same as under the
process. Since saving and investment rates are closed economy, implies that perfect capital mobil-
integrated processes, a stationary current account ity does not affect the steady state values of k and
implies that they cointegrate with a unit coeffi- h which are the same as for a closed economy.
cient. It is this solvency constraint that the FH However, capital mobility does affect the speed of
coefficient measures. They adduce empirical evi- convergence. The Barro et al. model predicts a high
dence for panels of both OECD countries and correlation between saving and investment irre-
LDCs to support their theoretical model (Coakley spective of the degree of physical or financial
et al., 1996a,b). capital mobility. Thus in this model the high
FH coefficient sheds no light on physical or finan-
cial capital mobility, only on human capital mobil-
Human Capital ity.

S16. Of course if you allow for investment in human


Transitory versus Permanent Influences
capital the entire picture changes.
S12. The analysis is marred by a failure to distin-
The FH puzzle about capital mobility has also
guish between transitory and permanent compo-
been investigated within the framework of
nents.
neoclassical growth models (Mankiw et al., 1992;
Barro et al., 1995). Human capital plays a central FH largely relied on cross-section estimates. Ini-
role in many of these models. Barro et al. (1995) tially time-series estimates seemed less supportive
use a modified neoclassical growth model to in- of the puzzle, though Coakley et al. (1994) show
vestigate the implications of various assumptions that the average across countries of the long-run

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 183

time-series estimate of the FH coefficient is almost cantly higher than the long run correlation as
exactly the same as the cross-section estimate. predicted by the FH approach. Thus transitory
However, the time-series estimates, particularly in increases in saving are more likely to remain in the
first differences, are more likely to pick up the UK while permanent changes tend to flow abroad.
short-run transitory responses of investment to They conclude that their results indicate a high
savings while cross-section estimates are more degree of capital mobility in the UK especially
likely to capture the long-run permanent response. following the removal of exchange controls in
It is a fairly general result that the short-run esti- 1979.
mates of the FH coefficient tend to be much
smaller than the long-run ones (Coakley et al.,
Public and Private Saving-Investment Gaps
1994). At first sight this seems inconsistent with
the interpretation of the FH coefficient as a mea- Some authors have disaggregated national saving
sure of capital mobility. Suppose there is a transi- and investment into their public and private com-
tory increase in saving. Given the frictions ponents to focus on the role of public and private
involved in international transactions, it may not saving-investment gaps. The general conclusion in
be worth incurring the costs of finding out about this approach is that capital is relatively immobile,
foreign investment opportunities or evading ex- mainly due to the operation of capital controls.
change controls. Thus transitory increases in sav- Ballabriga et al. (1991) argue that correlations be-
ing would tend to be invested nationally. tween private and public sectoral gaps have direct
However, if there were a permanent increase in implications for the FH view on the degree of
savings, then it may be worth incurring those costs international capital mobility. If the sectoral gaps
and one would expect part of a permanent in- have a unit root, this implies a high correlation
crease to flow abroad. The finding that transitory between public and private gaps and thus low
changes to saving tend to go abroad and perma- capital mobility since public and private intertem-
nent ones stay at home, an implication of the poral budget constraints impose a long run exter-
short-run estimate of the FH coefficient being nal solvency condition on countries. They find that
smaller than the long-run estimate, suggests that the null hypothesis of a unit root for sectoral gaps
the explanation is not frictional obstacles to capital is not rejected, thereby violating the government
mobility. To deal with this issue Feldstein (1983), budget constraint in a large number of EC coun-
p. 147, first disparages the time-series estimates, tries. Since public and private sector gaps tend to
commenting that Coefficient estimates based on offset one another, the external solvency of the
annual variations in savings and investment are country is preserved by the use of capital controls.
subject to potentially severe simultaneity bias. Ballabriga et al. demonstrate that, although the
Instead he provides a theoretical explanation long run external solvency condition has not been
based on a portfolio balance model of why the violated, domestic intertemporal budget con-
short-run effect of saving on investment should be straints have been, implying a high correlation
smaller than the long-run one. His explanation is between saving and investment. They argue that
that, when short-run portfolio adjustments are the associated low capital mobility is the result of
complete, capital flows revert to a lower level. governments imposing capital controls to target
The Feldstein explanation has not found favour the current account.
in the literature but there has been little work on Argimon and Roldan (1994) base their explana-
the difference between long run and short run FH tion of the FH result on governments targeting the
coefficients. One notable exception is Sarno and current account and saving-investment gaps. For
Taylor (1996). Rather than using the usual short five of the nine EU countries in their sample, they
and long-run estimates of the FH coefficient they found that private and public sector saving-invest-
employ the Blanchard and Quah (1989) decompo- ment gaps were cointegrated and that four of these
sition to distinguish between temporary and per- countries imposed capital controls in the period
manent shocks to saving and investment shares of under investigation. Since the capital account is
GDP. Using quarterly UK data, they find that the the mirror image of the current account, any con-
short run saving-investment correlation is signifi- straint on the former, such as exchange controls,

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
184 J. Coakley et al.

will necessarily impact on the latter also. This hold a disproportionately high share of domestic
implies that capital is immobile and so saving and securities or not to diversify their portfolios inter-
investment turn out to be highly correlated. van nationally. Feldstein offers two rationales for such
Wincoop and Marrinan (1993) (VM) develop a behaviour. One is the political and currency risk of
partial equilibrium, perfect capital mobility, real overseas securities holdings. While he concedes
business cycle model which is driven by technical, that political risk may be negligible for OECD
fiscal and interest rate shocks which are correlated countries, currency risk may not be16 and this is
across countries. Under conditions of zero capital consistent with the Coakley et al. solvency argu-
mobility, the correlation between total saving and ment. Feldsteins second rationale is that hedging
investment should equal one and the correlation behaviour creates offsetting capital flows so that
between public and private saving-investment net capital flows may be zero or negligible. This
gaps should be exactly minus one. VM find that, links in with a more general weakness of the FH
when they control for income movements, the approach which is that it focuses on net rather
correlations between total saving and investment than gross international capital flows.
and public and private saving-investment gaps are However Feldsteins hedging example of invest-
0.78 and 0.81 respectively. They assert that we ment in German government bonds is rather spe-
cannot understand the significant correlation be- cial in that (coupon) income flows in foreign
tween total savings and investment by referring to currency can be perfectly anticipated whereas in-
technology shocks in the context of a model with come from overseas equities cannot be similarly
perfect capital mobility (ibid. p. 22). They con- predicted. Feldstein also overlooks a potentially
clude that it is the immobility of capital across more significant source of under recording of cap-
countries which is the key factor to the high corre- ital flows. Increasingly fund managers use futures
lations found in the data. and other derivatives for tactical (short term) inter-
In a different but related vein, Peeters (1996) national asset allocation. Such flows are not fully
carries out estimation and simulations on the recorded in balance of payments data. For exam-
Global Econometric Model (National Institute Lon- ple, the only aspect of investment by an UK fund
don) using a general equilibrium modelling ap- manager in overseas stock index futures contracts
proach. Her results for the US, Japan, Germany recorded in the balance of payments statistics are
and the UK indicate a lower estimate (compared the variation margin flows which typically are but
with partial equilibrium models) of the saving-in- a small fraction of the total investment. The
vestment association and would therefore suggest recording of derivatives flows in the balance of
higher capital mobility in both the short and long payments statistics is currently under consider-
run. More importantly she finds that private and ation by central banks and the IMF.
public saving gaps largely offset one another in
the short run. She concludes that increasing pri-
vate saving would have little effect on the USs CONCLUSIONS
twin deficits since it would be almost fully
reflected in an increase in the government deficit In this paper we have reviewed the way
and thus its impact on the current account economists have responded to the FH puzzle, us-
negated. ing Stiglers generic comments to introduce their
lines of attack. In the process we have examined a
large number of competing interpretations of the
Revised Feldstein Approach
FH coefficient. It will be apparent that the general
Feldstein (1994) has provided an informal but tone of contributions is largely but by no means
more sophisticated justification of the FH view. He unanimously negative toward the FH interpreta-
supports the original FH view by linking it to tion of low capital mobility. The approaches which
another puzzle, the home country bias puzzle offer support for the FH view of capital mobility
(Lewis, 1995; Tesar and Werner, 1995) The high include sectoral gap models, the Barro et al. (1995)
saving-investment association is consistent with modified neoclassical growth model in which hu-
the documented propensity of fund managers to man capital is immobile, and Sarno and Taylors

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
The FeldsteinHorioka and Capital Mobility 185

(1996) support for the FH short and long run Feldstein Horioka finding provides no basis at all for
findings. However the majority of the models and dismissing the basic premises of the intertemporal
approach.
explanations oppose the FH interpretation by at-
tempting to construct models which reconcile a Nonetheless the FH puzzle is by no means re-
high saving-investment association with high solved and recent contributions by Bayoumi et al.
physical and financial capital mobility and/or by (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (1996) claim to estab-
providing plausible econometric and other data- lish high capital mobility within FH-related frame-
based refutations of the FH view. These include works.
general equilibrium, real business cycle models Fourthly, the debate surrounding the FH puzzle
and intertemporal models of the current account. has shown that the notion of capital mobility itself
There is no doubt that the FH debate has been is not analytically straightforward. Obstacles to the
very productive, provoking a wide range of theo- movement of financial, physical and human capi-
retical analysis and empirical work and has in- tal may have quite different implications. Assum-
creased our understanding of the issues. Although ing perfect capital mobility may produce plausible
the debate continues, we can draw some interim conclusions in one set of models and not in an-
conclusions. Firstly, the FH result of a high saving-
other. Thus while it may be sensible in open-econ-
investment association has remained remarkably
omy macroeconomics to assume perfect capital
robust in OECD cross-sections although the coeffi-
mobility, it is certainly not in neoclassical growth
cient on saving has shown some tendency to de-
models where it would result in all countries
cline over recent years. The result persists in
jumping immediately to their steady state. In such
panels and average time-series for OECD coun-
tries, but not for individual countries where there circumstances it seems sensible to treat perfect
is a wide dispersion of estimates. The main result capital mobility as Friedman (1953), p.36, treated
has also been remarkably robust to the addition of perfect competition:
other variables and different estimation methods Everything depends on the problem; there is no
in the OECD. However, there is less evidence for a inconsistency in regarding the same firm as if it were
close relationship between saving and investment a perfect competitor for one problem, and a monopo-
list for another, just as there is none in regarding the
in non-OECD samples, particularly in LDCs.
same chalk mark as a Euclidean line for one problem,
Secondly, using the FH regression for policy a Euclidean surface for a second, and a Euclidean
purposes is questionable because both saving and solid for a third.
investment are endogenous and the FH regression
cannot distinguish exogenous shifts in saving from
endogenous shifts reflecting factors which also im- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
pact on investment. In any event, government
measures that promote saving are likely to be part We are grateful to two anonymous referees for
of packages that may also promote investment. helpful comments on an earlier version. We accept
Thirdly, the FH result may not be informative responsibility for any remaining errors.
about capital mobility since a range of theoretical
models can generate high saving-investment corre-
lations even under perfect capital mobility. This NOTES
now seems to be the emerging consensus in the
literature. Baxter (1995), p. 1842) says: These re- 1. This was how an earlier version (Coakley et al.,
sults show that the time-series savings investment 1995a) was often received. We are grateful to an
correlation is not an informative statistic concern- anonymous referee who responded in kind by
ing the degree of international financial integra- pointing out that Stigler also provided apt responses
tion. Similarly Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), p. to this paper in his introductory remarks a) and c).
2. Source: Social Sciences Citation Index.
1779, observe: 3. For a non-technical overview of the FH puzzle see
Taken together, however, and combined with other Feldstein (1994).
evidence indicating substantial international mobility 4. For an excellent survey of this literature see Obstfeld
of capital, the arguments below suggest that the (1995).

1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 3: 169 188 (1998)
186 J. Coakley et al.

5. Dooley and Kletzer (1994) argue that the increased Artis, M.J. and Bayoumi, T., Global Capital Market
flow of funds to emerging country markets since the Integration and the Current Account, in M.P. Taylor
late 1980s may be explained by reductions in the (Ed.) Money and Financial Markets, Cambridge, MS and
stock of capital flight rather than capital exports by Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, 297 307.
the industrial countries. Backus, D.K., Kehoe, P.J. and Kydland, F.E., Interna-
6. Feldstein (1983) gives identifying restrictions in the tional Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence, Journal
context of his real flows (quantity) model (pp. 141 of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 745 75.
45). Murphy (1984) modifies the Feldstein model to Ballabriga, F.C., Dolado, J.J and Vinals, J., Investigating
incorporate a country effect and discusses appropri- Private and Public Saving-Investment Gaps, CEPR
ate identifying restrictions (pp. 33031). Working Paper, Number 607, 1991.
7. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this Barro, R.J., Mankiw, N.G. and Sala-i-Martin, X., Capital
insight. Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth, American
8. The quotation marks denote that this is our sug- Economic Review, 85 (1995), 103 15.
gested addition to Stiglers original list. Baxter, M., International Trade and Business Cycles in
9. The countries excluded were Iceland, Portugal, G.M..Grossman and K. Rogoff (Eds.), Handbook of In-
Turkey, and (former) Yugoslavia due to lack of data,
ternational Economics, vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier,
and France, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, and
1995, 1801 64.
Switzerland due to a change in methods of national
Baxter, M. and Crucini, M.J., Explaining Saving-Invest-
accounting over the sample period.
10. Note that the terms national saving and investment ment Correlations, American Economic Review, 83
are employed in the literature to include both public (1993), 416 36.
and private saving and investment. Bayoumi, T., Saving-Investment Correlations: Immobile
11. Their sample excluded Luxembourg (an outlier) and Capital, Government Policy, or Endogenous Be-
the former Yugoslavia. haviour?, IMF Staff Papers, 37 (1990), 360 87.
12. Sinn (1992) and Coakley et al. (1994) show that the Bayoumi, T. and Rose, A.K., Domestic Saving and Intra-
FH coefficient is much lower and more volatile national Capital Flows, European Economic Review, 37
when cross sections based on annual data are esti- (1993), 1197 202.
mated. Bayoumi, T. and Sterne, G., Regional Trading Blocs,
13. Note this effect is not evident in the annual data Mobile Capital and Exchange Rate Coordination,
estimates of Obstfeld (1989). Mimeo, London: Bank of England, 1993.
14. Many of the general equilibrium models are cali- Bayoumi, T. and MacDonald, R., Consumption, Income
brated to match some typical empirical results but and International Capital Market Integration, IMF
these cannot be afforded the same status as econo- Staff Papers, 42 (1995), 552 76.
metric studies. Bayoumi, T., Sarno, L. and Taylor, M.P., Saving-Invest-
15. The coefficient in the Sachs regression would mea- ment Correlations, European Capital Flows and Re-
sure (1 b)/b in a determininstic model. So b close gional Risk Discusssion Paper, Department of
to unity in the FH model corresponds to the Sachs Economics and Accounting, Liverpool: University of
regression coefficient being close to zero, ignoring Liverpool, 1996.
the different exogenity assumptions. Blanchard, O. and Quah, D., The Dynamic Effects of
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Frankels (1991) exposition. Cardia, E., The Dynamics of Savings and Investment in
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