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    network world architecture economy

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    100 views14 pages

    Mattelart Networking World

    Uploaded by

    Isaac Segura Jaubert
    network world architecture economy

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Networking the World, 1794-2000 Armand Mattelart Ea ‘Translated by Liz Carey-Libbrecht and James A. Cohen e 5 E University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London 3K chapters ‘The Bipolar Geopolitics of Technology The Cold War perpetuated the concept of communication as pro- pganda, and ls strategic scenarios guided the establishment of satelite systoms. As the harnessing ofthe third world became a ‘major isue inthe confrontation between the two politcal systems, north/south issues assumed an increasing role in the cast west rivalry. In the struggle against underdevelopment, communication ‘eeame syncnymous with modernization Winning Hearts and Minds After the Second World Wat, the OSS (Ofc of Strategic Services) was transformed into the CIA (Cental Intelligence Agency) and the OWI (Office of War Information) became the Office of Iter ‘national Information and then the USIA (US. Information Ager) 1953. Washington added two radio stations: Radio Pre Hacope {in 1950, which broadcast to countries in the Faster ble, and aco Liberty in 1953, which was aimed tacences inthe Soviet Union. Prom the outset oth were faded by the CIA and, ike Voice of America, whose journalists were American, were oper ated by immigrants fom the socialist boc. Despite Stalin's will- 50. % THEBIPOLAR GEOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY ingness to dissolve Kominter in 1944 in exchange for support fom the United States and England, and his eplacement ofthe ‘hymn of the worker's International by a hagiographic national anthem to his own glory, Radio Moscow coatinted to broadcast its porty-state propaganda abroad. ‘There were two radically opposed theories on the regulation ‘of intemational flows of information, On the one hand, the prin- iple of the “fee flow of information,” derived from the liberal doctrine of the fee circulation of goods, was atified by Congress land elevated t the rank of oficial doctrine by the US. Depart: ‘ment of State, whieh included iin ts war objectives starting in 1944, On the other hand, the Kremlin doctrine aimed to prevent ‘Soviet citizens from having any contact with Westerpgpedia con led its internal security needs behind the nation of national sovereignty, and interpreted unvranted international broadcasts as “interference by a foreign power inthe domestic affais of & ‘ationrstate” The idea of “ideological aggression,” as oli asthe ‘evolution, complemented the Soviet Unions salf representation 5a besieged citadel In 1947 the Interational Tlecomamunications Union (FTU) was attached asa technical body — Like the Universal Portal Union — to the new system of the United Nations. Debate on the uses of the airwaves took pace under the ITU's aegis. The Atlante City conference, held inthe same yea, simply ratified the “prior aim touse” concerning the distrbution af frequencies, which had been adopted by the world’s dominant naval powers atthe bepinning, of the century. Three years ater, the Soviet viewpoint, which legit mized the systematic jamming by states of foreign broadcasts, was defeated. This was merely the start of a debate that was to last unt the Berlin wall el. Blowing hot and cold, Moscove and. its satelites sought to penalize anyone who listened to foreign programs and to block the development of the cv adio commis ication industry. (On both sides of the Ion Curtain, theories of plots and manip- tlotion became catechimal references for deciphering the oppo- nent's deeds and gestures. Fach party satel! as being engaged fava battle to “conquer heats and minds,” to quote the phrase ined By the exports in psychological warfare. In early 1953, fimctionalist sociology of the media in the United States, recog: THE BIPOLAR GBOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY Si zing the importance of this question, founded a new field of study offically known as intemational communication. The “Manichaean character ofthe hypotheses formulated by many of is practitioners was largely due to their background, for many of them had worked for the O55 and the OW as experts in ps ‘chological warfare during the Second Weld Wat Infact some of| them resumed this type of work as permanent advisors to the Voice of America orto US. troops during the Korean War (1950 1953). That was the case, notably ofthe future founder ofthe f- ‘mous Institute for Communication Research at Stanford Univer- 1, Wilbur Schramm. In 1951 he coauthored the book The Rais ‘Take the City, on the role of psychological operations in the occupa: tion of Seoul by communist armies. in the east, doctrnarians of the pary-state categorized the agents of ideological aggression in abrolte terms by labeling al ‘Western media "bourgeois means of propaganda.” The linguls- sic plurality of Soviet broadcasts abroad (en 1970, 235 hours per eck of Broadcasting in filten languages to Africa, as op- posed to 130 hors in four languages by the Voice of America) id not, however offset the univocal character oftheir wooden language Increasingly ot of step with the realities experienced by thelr audiences, even inthe view of USIA advisors the Soviet me- sia wore already meaningless—except for those who had always been convinced ‘The Conquest of Space ‘The Military-Indusrial Comper Far the Soviet Union the imperative of defense against the for gr threat was, fom the egime’s inception, one fis nal legit [mizing arguments and one of the main driving forces ofthe ecor- ‘omy, bt forthe United States it represented a novelty caused by its entry into the Cold War From 1947 this unossal situation was insitutionalized by the [National Security Act, which provided the legal framework for maistaining the exceptional mobiization of the war years and prevented return tothe apathy that had characterized the de pression in the 1930s. I broke dovn divisions between private 52% THEBIPOLAR GEOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY and public cvil and military applied research and basic research, inchustrial laboratories and universities, thereby renewing the ex ‘Periences in synergy that had proven thei vale during the Sec- fond World War and had spavened, for eample, the development of ballistic systems based on large computers ofthe fist genera- ton. Here was a sign, among others, ofthe massive participation ‘of the US, state in research and development expenses of elec- tronic and aerospace firms, the cradle of information and com- ‘munication technologies, In 1930 the federal budgets share in private and public research was a mere 14 percent; by 1947 it Ihad shot up to 56 percent The inventor of cybernetics, Norbert, ‘Wene, in 1948 sav the advent ofthe “information society" asa _guarantce that there would be no return to the barbarity of World ‘Wir If the nev logic of global confrontation would soon make it necessary to fone down thie analysis, “The flow of funds from the Pentagon, renewed with each stage in the Asian wars, played a decisive part inthe invention ofthe first transistor based computers by IBM in 1959, Above all these subsidies made posible the constriction ofthe fist ntercontnen- tal networks, initally conceived in a context of close coordina tion between multary neads and industrial production. During fhe same decade, the continental defense network SAGE (Semi ‘Automatic Ground Environmen® was bul forthe US. Alt Force. By connecting each compute 1 a radar registering fight trajec- torles and by establishing a telephone link between all the com puters of the system, this apparatus brought ino existence the notion of real-time data transmission, ie, eleinformatics or data ‘communications, in 1958 the fist experimental computer Links ‘were established between laboratories working forthe US. Depart- ment of Defense. By 1968 the first dats transmission network, ARPANET (Advanced Reseach Project Agency Network), had ‘been set up under the same auspices It inked up the computer centers of universities that, in turn, were linked to Lendon by satelite and t areas ofthe Pacific via Hawai. From ts inception | inthe context of state sec this stem maintained the original idea ofa network of computers linked up in sucha way Ut dig data could be tranemitted via several different route. The system a8 a whole would therefore not be impaired by the de- THE BIPOLAR GEOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY 53 “struction of one or more computing centers. Inthe 1908 twas ‘to serve as an eseental reference forthe Internet Inteloat “The ft aril eel, Spunk launched in 1957 by the Sovket Union, pened ne front in he Cold Wa the pace race. To ‘nec this lenge, Present Ecerhower founded NASA Ne {tonal Aeronautics and Space Adminston in the flowing yeu The main aim was not only to conquer terion, But ale IStetablsha worldwide communication network {nt962the velit Teter Europe tothe United State in 195 ary Bird wasp ino ort was the fo gontionary Commerc fdecomamuizaton stl ofthe Ineretonal Tele omminkton SataliteConsriom otherwise oon Sat Thicortum was the instatonal fr, approved by Con- frees that NASA andthe US. aerospace industy propose to Countries ofthe “ee worl" fom 1964 as a mes of resting 8 system of global commision Italy the United States ha Complete scerdancy over ltt war managed by peclar tind of pate company, Comsat percent of the shares were owned by ATIC, ITT RCA, and GTE. The aher hal wes spread out among myriad of smal shareholders and the rennin 169 fine the US. communication industry, The meres of the bat ectors were White House delegates Furthermore, ‘he Unite States own 60 percent onset a go st cc ingtothe acta use made ofitby each country. The Uited King- dom, rae and West Germany own 2 percent an the rest tras shared between fifen otter indo nations, No thd trl coniry rs pre in the consortium eth ‘he doctrine ofthe interational welt in whi al shuld ‘ave eal acest the system of word conmrcation tlt cereal developing courte a eed rate abide by the itutilod nations In 1365 the Soe Union proposed acces tts on sat, Intercnon f tparter in he scat cmp, Sx yer ter itsetp a omer organiation Itespatk “Tnespce cea arate ofa New Fronts sted 9 litle more than en yer Inthe era tent, pret for eour 34 THE BIPOLAR GEOTOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY pling up the vessels of the two superpowers Soyus) flourished, ‘The US. space industry initiated its redeployment by favoring applications with shortterm goals. Although the Pentagon's spending on spy satelites remained stable, the bulk of NASA budget was henceforth to be devoted tothe launching of satel- Iites for communication, weather observation, air and maritime navigation assistance, and observation of nafural resources. In July 1972, NASA launched the fist civil earth observation satl- Ite, ERTS-1 Garth Resoures Technology Satelite, subsequently renamed Landsat ‘The Soviet authorities, by contrast, did not thnk in terms of eriving products for civilian use from their military systems ‘Based on the withholding of information the politcal system con- tinued tobe spured by the priority and exclusive logic of defense. Although the Soviet indusrlal machine was capable of producing, {in 1947, the famous Kalachnikow, the weapon used by guerilla fighters throughout the world, it was incapable of conceiving an object such a the wansistor, which once popularized in the latter half ofthe ities, was to change daly Ife and geopoliics. To pre- vent its cizens from listening to foreign broadcast, the Soviet assthorties promoted collective listening and produced wired re ‘eivers that were unable o pick up foreign radio stations, For along time, the conquest of space was controlled solely by the United Stales and the Soviet Union. It was only in the 1880s that Europe managed to compete withthe US. commun cation satelite and launching industries. The United States’ reac tion was immediate, President Reagan deregulated the intergov- cemmental Intelsat, placing it indirect competition with private stelites and deleting the clause granting reduced rates to third ‘world countries. In other area of space techy applications, ssuccesafal Inunches ofthe fmt civil earth observation satellites (Gpot-, 2, and 3) tok place betwoen 1986 and 193. In the mil tary old, European dependence on US. Secret Service satelits, suchas Keyhold and Laos lasted throughout the 197s and 158s. ‘e-was particularly clear during the Gulf War, in 1990-1991, and {in Bosnia, but Europe began to overcome this dependence in 1995, when the fist spy satelite ofthe Helios program sa Inmched ‘asthe initial stage ofa European space netork project fr etrate- {ic Intelligence gathering. In the meantime, the cub of non- European space powers had aso grown, incorporating in parte ul, Chia snd Tris Integrating the Third World Communication for Development {In 199, ina spooch on the state ofthe Union known as “Point Four” President Harty Truman prioritized the struggle against ‘underdevelopment. The notion of development, whch before the ‘war refered primarily 10 the degre of “culture” and “ciiliza- ton achieved by a nation, took on an economic connotation. It served to direct avast program for mobilizing energy and publi opinion in struggle against the great imbalances sen a likely {0 favor “world communism’ Inaugurated in the 1950s in the lrasenstive area of the Mile Bast where attempts were being made to nationalize oil wel, this program was fully deployed ‘nthe following decade in Latin America, To counter the Cuban revolution (1955), Washington feed its southern neighbors the ‘Alliance for Progress presented as a revolution with redom. Sodlologists at American universities derived numerous hy- posheses fom the lessons learned from their participation in wat- time peycologial operations abroad and from the progress made by industrial marketing at home. The question of development 35 defined as a process of difusion of innovation. The goal of “atgies of persuasion was tostimulate change inthe attudes of “underdeveloped” populations; that so say, to lea them from a so-called traditional culture and society toa so~alled modern ‘one, The Westernization ideal represented all the qualities char- fcteristic ofa “moder attitude” and “cosmopolitan tastes” Indexes of modernization were calculated in terms of tracy, Industilizaton, urbanization, and exposure to the media. The curves and typologies thus established placed third world coun tries on a scale of growth in evene per capita, For almost a quarter ofa century, this frame of reference governed all under- Standing of north South selatons i fit the sirt of the mes. Ik ay a the heart oF governmental development sid policies ond impregnated the philosophy ofthe United Nations. UNESCO has tened to translate the basic texts ofthis instrumental eociology into several languages, while its staf established catalogs of min 56% THE BIPOLAR GEOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY imal standards: to extricate itself from underdevelopment, t0 “takeoff” a country had to have en copies of newspapers, five wireleses, two television sets and two cinema seats for every fone hundred inhabitan'. As vehicles of modern behavior, the media were seen as key agents of innovation. As messengers of the “revoltion of rising expectations” they propagated the mod cls of consumption and aspirations symbolized by those soc ‘les that had already attained the higher sage of evolution. This Absolute belie in exponential progres and inthe modernizing virtue ofthe media merely updated ethnocentric conceptions of ninetenth-centry diffasionist theo. "Primitive" societies were ‘ow termed “underdeveloped” and thelr only option was to im itate the models oftheir elders. This conception permeated the ‘use ofthe audiovisual media for the purpose of “rationalizing” the attitudes of peasans (eg, toward th adoption of technology ar the ase of ferizas) and the behavior of working-class women ‘regarding birth contro. Relays by loesl authorities ie timulated ‘experiments inthe use of satlites for educational purposes in ‘very large countries suchas India and Brazil. An extreme casein point sas the Brazilian miltary dictatorship, which refused to Fenew the literacy campaigns based on mass mobilization inti ated by the regime it had overthrown and called upon education ‘engineers from Stanford, n the 1970s to launch short-lived satel- lite experiments in the poorest area ofthe Nordeste. At the same time it ejeted its own sociologists, educators, and anthropolo- Bist, forcing them underground or into exile. Revolt In Apail 1955, the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (Indonesia) {nilated the Non-Aligned Movement Thvee years eal, dog rapher Alfred Seuvy and anthropologist Georges Balandier had sven the name “thin worl” to this international “third estate.” adio became a weapon inthe hands of liberation movements. ‘The most well known was the voice ofthe pan-Arab revotin | (The Voie ofthe Arabs), inaugurated in 153 in Egypt by Colonel [Naster’sreglme. Broadcasting from Caio, became the mouth piece of the par-Arabrevolition. In 1956, La Voix de Algérie combattante (The Voice of Fighting Algeria) infiuenced Algerian "THE BIPOLAR GEOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY 57 society with broadcast from Tunis. The French authorities ret: ‘ated by systeratcaly atoning ts programs and prohibiting the sale of radios and even batteries Two years ater, Radio Rebelde (Rebel Radic) ofthe Casts guerilla a te ative of mest ‘Che Guevara himsel launched ts fist message fom the fred ferries of the Sera Mace “The Algerian conic proved to bes lesson in media practises French cotnterinsurrctionspciait discovered the role hat tbe soda had come to playin leptimizing the objectives of eve. Intionary movement vis-vis public opinion. Appaled by the behavior of certain maa in metropolitan France are ofthe iter "ational pres ring the Algerian wor they accused hem of Ra ing played the enemy’ game. “Aew years ater, atthe end of another countrrevolutonary war in Vea, many advisors of the Pentagon aged ins Tarte, Despite substantial vestments in overt and covert ay cologial operations, and other "pacification" campaigns, pro- agora srtegies were unable to outweigh publi opinion. Tha, {leat was what poltcl scent Samuel P. Huntington con- ‘luded in 1975, the yea Saigon fl In parca he Samed the new soureof national power composed of ntorrks news ma ‘nor, the Visshington Fan, and the New Yor Timer. Extrapolat Ing esons from this wat, Huntington incriminated the media's freedom of tone and accused them of belng a chit case ofthe isis aPlsigovernability in Western democracies These very no- tions ere eat in the ile ofthe report he rot with dich CCronierof France and Jo Watask of Japan, forthe Tatra (Commision. Formulating solutions to this exis was the main ‘Purpose ofthis group of supposed private liens, founded in {uly 1973 a the native of David Rockefeller, president of Chase ‘Mankttan Bank, and composed of over two hundred personal se rom the theo reions a he Triad (North Ameri, Western Burope, and Japa, BH chapters ‘Transnationalization and Geoeconomic Rationality ‘The geopltcal representation of the world nurtured by the Cold ‘War had the eet of weakening gooeconomie logics. The force ‘with which these logics structured the international sphere did rot become obvious until the 1970s, By questioning the interna- tionaf¥snemicand communication order, the new historical sub- ject constitated by dhe third world revealed the numerous mani- festations of unequal exchange. European nation states began to formulate a reaction tothe then of destabilization oftheir ctrl and technological polices by multinational corporations, ‘Toward the End of the Monopoly of Interstate Relations ‘The networks of nonstate interactions and transactions, as agents of worldwide integration, gained increasing importance as a re- sult of two types of processes: rst, the formulation of industrial policies in the context of rgional integration, primarily in the European Community secondly the opposition of major foreign companies to third work country’ attempts to nationalize the (60 TRANSNATIONALIZATION strategic sectors of their economies. An extreme case served t0 revel this trond the strategy of ecanamic and ideological encicle- ‘ment of the Chilean president Salvador Allende’ socialist regime, between 1970 and 1973, by an objective alliance between the forces of internal opposition, the armed forces, multinational corpo- rations including FT&T), and US. inteligence agencies. In the ‘months following the miltary coup d'état, this caution became public knowledge through the confessions of is protagonists at |earings organized before ad hoc commissions ofthe US. Senate. ‘The schemas for analyzing the trend toward worldwide inte- tion networks were in the foreground ofthis reformulation; only the new actors needed to be defined. Because the foreign activi- ties of most manufacturing firme were linked to the development oftheir exports, the notions of international enterprise and iter- nationalization had for along ime seemed to suffice for describ- ing the expansion ofthese firms outsce ther home countries. AS carly a the 1960s, however, these notions proved inadequate for tunderstanding the actors who fed the flow of investments by set ting up operations abroad —hence, the bith of the nodan of suk rational corporations. ‘The new awareness ofthe part played by these corporations ln international policy and economies changed the way of defi: ing the issue. Asked to study ways of regulating the activities of foreign firms, United Nations experts suggested replacing the tem “multinational” with “wansnational.” “Multinational” gives the impression that these firme were both the sum of several nation- alts and each nationality in particular n short that they were profoundly rooted in the host country. By opting for the term ransnationa,” he experts wanted to mark a poltal distinction, stressing the territorial noncoincidence and the centralized mode ‘of management of these companies. Striving fr flexi source of good performance, the transnational firm takes advantage of favorable conditions —natural, nana, political, and legal — prevailing n each host county an tiesto avoid these conditions cen as unfavorable tts interests, The erm “multinational” eli- inated the controversial nature of the expansion ofthese new TRANSNATIONALIZATION #61 ‘nits of supranational capital by making the worl economy a ‘mosaic of local economies, The term “transnational,” which in plies the existence of a broad movement toward integration at ‘the international level, taken to mean tha there iss potential source of confit between the interests of macro-enterprses and ‘the territories in which they operate. In 1974, aware ofthese I= plications, the United Nations created a commission on tan ‘ational companies, attached tothe Economic and Socal Counc, and a center for research onthe same subject, which reported di- rectly to the Secretariat. Their mission was cles, Formulated ia administrative terms, they ha to “acltate the conclusion of ef fective international arrangements concerning the activities of transnational companies, with a view to favoring their contrib ‘ion both tothe national aim of development ancl to worldwide ‘conomic growth, while simultaneously controling and eliminat- ing their negative effects” The center was thus called on fo pro- duce expertise on the strSiepes of a wide range of enterprises, from pharmaceutical and agro-indusrial food companies toad ‘vensing networks and transborder data flows Pragmatic and well removed from the conceptual controversy, international marketing manuals classified firms with foreign op- erations in three main categories, corresponding to thelr approach tommarkt ponezation A fem issaido be “ethnocentric” fr" mono- ‘when its foreign subsidiaries are cloely bound #0 the natiofal identity ofthe mother company. A “geocentric” firm is ‘one whose subsidiaries are “strongly integrated into the search fran optimum strategy in a cosmopolitan perspective.” Finally, a *polycenzic” firm has few foreign subsiaries; they are well Intograted but are managed ona decentralized basis. This nomen lature obviously covers multiple forms of tarsnationalization that have evolved overtime and applies to different secore of economic activity. ‘Transnational companies inthe communications sector were among the fst to take note ofthe conflictual relationship between the local national, and transnational evel. Active in the wasn sitive area of particular identities, they tied either to avoid thems ‘orto adapt to them like the good followers of social Darwinism that they son learned tobe (62. TRANSNATIONALIZATION Balance of Power and National Mediation ‘The Expansion of Advertising Netwoorks ‘While the Marshall Plan helped Europe ravaged by the war, back ‘onto the path of growth, it was als the Trojan horse tha bore the “Americanzation of society.” It opencs the way to the modern- {gation of the industrial apparatus of the countries concemed and served asa background f0 the reorganization of society As Luc Boltanski explains in his work on managers, was through this breach that systems of vals, social technologies, and models of excellence red and tested in the United States flowed in. Huan fnincring and management Deane important apes of bas ‘ess taining. 5 ‘The modernization of advertising in postirae Europe was a feature ofthese stractural changes. Is successive phases ilustate the twists and turns ofthe process of tansnatinalization of mar. keting, Advertsing, which intlly seemed litle more than a ‘oderized sales technique, gradually became the vector ofthe ‘commecilization ofthe entire mode of communication end, as such key feature ofthe public sphere. As the most significant locus of the production of “echnical events,” that so sa), events created from visual or sound artifacts, and which abruptly sever the continuity of apiece of information ad restiulate the aude ‘ence’ attention, i was the avant-garde laboratory of mass culture ‘With the exception of the networks founded during the Great Depression, the fist malar wave ofinterationlizaton of ever tising agencis in Europe started in the 1950s and reached peak inthe llowing decode, the era ofthe “American challenge to quote the title ofa bestseller written in 1967 by Frenchman Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber This was an imperial phase In which the main actors were from US. firms making direct invest ‘ments in industry: In most countries where their subsidiaries were established, their arial in force decimated local agencies. Faced with this reinforced US. presence, France was the only Eu ropean country to maintain a majority share of ts domestic mat ket owing to is two historical fgureheads, Havas and Publicis ‘tthe time subsidlares of US. agencies worked mainly for clients TTRANSVATIONALIZATION cf thr awn nationality; in many count, and particu in Franc thy received o Duss fom the lg slated fms and pubic ieitton. Very ile interaction exited be tween the varios national sibsiiaries, Throughout the word, these companies constituted centers for leering sie that they lone posteeed, Encouraged by this omnipresence, Advertsing ‘gr the moutpiece of OS ager award thr he te unofficial diplomats of the nation, for they represented the lifestyle {the country far more nec and reali han the Sate Department or embassies. "The second generation of international networks was born in the 197s: During tis dade of consolation of national adver. Ssng markets tore lol agencies tha ad sarin hampered US. network by vying forthe sme cients and Hnily egine zing their own irternaionalization. The growth of domestic mar- ets crated a ner balance of forces been Iocalpofessionals tnd US agencies Moreover thoughout the word governments trere adopting twanies gaint foreign agence to protect thee pb markets and safeguard their national languages and cultures: Zn even national moral standards. Paced with what they inter: preted ae new frm of nationalism, US. agencies propored Fartnertipe with mins prtpation and feculed Wc fal- Et They furthermore beg oak into accunt he existence of “tun eo Cota en al airs inmanaging the badges of rananational finns atthe eo or Inert eel wa, owe wl econ onerng thereof agencies it was only withthe advent fitter inthe 5 titan over pln emege Ts third genernon tray warrant being called he geo networks and grostrtei sco {A Strategy of Institutional Resistance: French Cinema In return forthe economic ald provided by the Marshall Plan, US. negotiators asked the French government to reduce the 1 striction on the impor of American films that had been applied since the late 1920s. In May 196 the Blum-Byrnes agreement — named after the French representative, Léon Blum and the US. (6 “TRANSWATIONALIZATION Secretary of State, James Bymes —was signed in Washington. The agreement annulled the measures ofthe Heriot decree It replaced the import quota by a socalled screen quota that reserved cinema screens for French films four weeks in every quarter This Was {indeed a substantial regression with respec f the previous men= sure because it allowed French filme on the screens 31 percent of the me compared to up t0 50 percent before the war The new {quota did not allow for all dh potential French production 4 be ‘Shown in cinemas. n 1946 France managed to prodce ninety films; in the following, year this figure dropped to seventy-four. ‘The crisis allected the entire sector, throwing actors, directors, and producers into the strets to resist the hres of losing their livelihood. The support they rceved from the press forced ahe National Assembly to reconsider the agreements NEW negotia- ons with Washington resulted in an amended agreement signed in September 1948. It restored the system of import quotas while ‘maintaining screen time criteria, OF the 185 films allowed entry into the country per yet, 121 could come from the United States Screen time for French productions rose from four to five weeks, fan increase from 31 t0:38 percent. The import of films other than those of US. origin was subjected to severe estictons. Only sity five per year were allowed, causing an outcry among British pro- ducers. These protectionist measures were accompanied in 1948 by a resolute strategy to encourage fl production. At the heart ofthe new system of support was the Centre national d acing imatogrphie (CNC). One ofits main missions was to ensure that 2 portion of the earnings obtained in France by foreign filme was feinvested in national production ‘Asa result ofthis strategy of protection and production of na- tional films, France became one of the rare countries in Europe and inthe world to maintain a cegre of pluralism on is screens. By making the opposite choice, Britain sae ism production virtually destroyed. Is lm industry was saved only because its :najor clients had for long time been the producers of adverti- ing fl. The only solution for British producers sich a8 Adrian Lyne, Tony Scot, Allan Parke, and Ridley Scot was to emigrate to California to make their ln, aftr gaining experience in pro- ducing ads in thelr own county Italy which had managed t0 keep its national film industry alive through an offical poiey of TRANSNATIONALIZATION 65 support for local production, was powerless to stop is decline during the 1980 duet the deregulation and privatization ofthe ssudiovisual sector. ‘The Flexibility of Magazines “The war had propelled Time and Nesuek into international obi, [In 1946 the former could boast of fourteen editions and the later ‘of fve though all in English. Only Reader's Digest had opted for publishing editions in diferent languages. Latin American edi- tons were followed by editions for France, Spain, and Portugal, land Sweden and Finland, For long time this magazin remained the paragon of the borderlee editorial prot ts editors soon Teared, moreover, to adapt the content suit the diversity of rational contents, with a skilful mix of articles (composed by a ‘world coordination center iocated ina suburb of New Yor), adap- tations to loca interests and culture, and material produced re- sionally or locally Forty years after the fst foreign ation, over thirty milion copies crcalated in abou forty editions published In approximately twenty languages, For nearly a quarer century, ‘Tine, Newsweek, and Reader's Digest were the only publications t defy national borders Other magazines including Scewfc American, Cosmopolitan, Fanily Cite Payboy, Glanow, and Goal Howsekepng, internation alized their publication in the 1960s by means of the so-called Franchise system. The company that owned the title othe right tots use toa national publisher under epecifc conditions, i cluding the payment of royalties. This system, an outcome of strategic refiection onthe tension between national and transis tional interests, allowed the franchisee to be Kinked up t9 a net ‘work, sharing common know-how, a bank of articles nd ais of advertisers, and sometimes to participate in brainstorming ses sions with the editorial teams of other loca editions. The procest "was a Mele one in which each publication established Specific forms of partnership with the head office, whieh ronetheless maintained strict control over the publication's evolution. Asin- ge publication didnot expand into all countries at once; there ‘were outposts and rearguards. Certain thint world countries had ‘editions even before some major industrial countries (ight years 6H TRANSNATIONALIZATION separated the fist Latin American editions of Cosnepolita, Taunched in 1966, adits French equivalend in other countries there were no editions at all. These Tocal editions were aimed es- Sentallyat the middle classes and sought to satisfy more exclu- sive tastes "nthe 1970s the diversification of national bases of editorial production caused aumerous publications from the United Stats {face competition with similar genres created locally. By the tend of the decade French and German groups started t0 carve tout a place for themselves in the world market. File created sev- tral foreign eitione and achieved the impossible: the conquest of the US. market itself Th core target everywhere was 8 “young, ‘Wester, and urban” audience. The nancial press also began its transnational expansion In 1976 the Pll Street Journal launched. fan Asian edition in Hong Kong, The frst European edition of the Bune! Times was produce i 1978 Its American rival foe Towed suit four years later. “The Awakening of Planetary Consciousness ‘Toward a New World Order of Information ‘and Communication ‘The 1970s marked a historical watershed in critical approaches to the industrial mechanisms governing the production af infor- imation end mass culture as wells the international imbalances {ntrade and communication lows. Infact, critic flourished. ‘One ofits frst sources was the Nor-Aligned Movement ts fourta sumeit, held in Algies in 1973, lad the foundations for the demand fora new word order of information and commu {ation The main platform fr debate was UNESCO, whose mis Son i to represent the community of nations in the field of ca fue, commnication, education, and science, These debates were 1 10 those conducted by the Group of 77 (he equiva- Tent of the nonaligned movement in the economic domain) in the UN General Assembly since 1974. The purpose ofthe later {Sebates was to obtain a revision of the international system of trade and ly the foundations ofa “new economic onder” Gclud- tng reform of monetary inaittions, a significant transfer of r= sources fo finance development, access fo markets in the north, TRANSNATIONALIZATION and technology transfer. Inthe aree of communication, a key idea underlay this approach: cultural imperialism was a reality, and the situation of cultural dependency that it spawned | ‘ot matter of manipulation or conspiracy, but a structural fc. ‘The effects of domination were at the ros of the principle of ‘unequal exchange between the enter and the periphery. in 1969 UNESCO, then presided over by Frenchman Jean Mi- ‘nu, called 2 meeting of experts in Montreal at the request fis smembersates. The intention was to draw up an inventory of knowledge on the subject and define new paths for research, At ‘he center ofthis meeting was a debate onthe one-way commun ‘ation characterizing relations between developing countries and the others, which was key to leed to problems of understanding between mations. in 1972, atthe initiative of the Soviet delegation, «proposal fora convention to regulate the transmission of direct ‘roueast satlits (which do not require ground rela) was sub- sited first to UNESCO and then to the UN General Assembly. In the vote on this principle, the United States found itself com: pletely isolated. “The debate on the new order began with criticism ofthe often tendentious,incorect, nonobjective, and unsuitable coverage by the four main news agencies inthe developed countries that o- nopolized the international dissemination of news. US agencies, ‘hich had demonstrated ther partiality through their opposition to the ifgime of the Chilean president, Salvador Allende, were among the chief targets. The debate became a forum for geiev- noes On isuos ranging from the allocation of radio frequencies to the construction of national commnieston infrastructures 1s 1977 a report was commissioned by the new director of UNESCO, ‘Amadou Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal. The tsk was entrusted to an intemational commission for research on communication prob: lems, presided over by Irishman Sean MacBside, a winner ofthe Nobel and Lenin peae prizes. The final report published in 198, ‘asthe first oficial document published by an international body that clearly raised the question ofthe unbalanced lows of agency dispatches, television programs, films, and other cultural prod ‘ets, as well as equipment The MacBrde report was the subject of extensive debate et the UNESCO general conference held in Belgrade in late 1980 (68% TRANSNATIONALIZATION [Namerous factors led toa stalemate. ntransigent inthe treme, the Reagan administration strove a all cost to impose ts int sibledoctrine ofthe “ree low of information” while the comm= ist bloc countries confused the issue by supporting the legitimate {demand for the cultural emancipation of the south while stead- faslly refusing to open their own mage communication systems. For authorities inthe Eastern bloc the moment was particularly ‘rucal To the specter ofthe direc broadcast satelite was added the palpable reality ofa system of social control that despite all the measures taken to jam the airwaves, was made increasingly porous by rose border media Relayed locally by dissident move- ments, Western radio stations and TV channels, and a itl later ‘videos, insidiously undermined the syste on a dally basis by reflecting lifestyle contradicting the economy of death and the ‘slogans chanted by pary-sate propaganda. Finally the nonalignet ‘countries were characterized not only by extreme technological Iheterogeneity but also by internal politcal contradictions, Some reglimes used this international tibune to point foreign sape- ‘ponte and to ty to cea their own names with regard to der shor comings in granting freedom of expression to jouralists and ere- ators. Notwithstanding these namerou limit the debates were ‘the frst ery of alarm concerning the unequal exchange of images and information. Apart from their sometimes virulent rhetoric, they were the expression of protest against the prevailing model ‘of development, and hence against a type of relationship between north and south, matersalized since the 19505 in modernizing, ‘rategis. Critical of the vertical schemata of communication dlcated by diffusions theory they raised the question ofthe rela tionship between democracy and development and between com ‘munication and clizene’dizet participation in their own develop- ‘ment. They also afforded an opportunity to bring up the buried memory of philosophies and thinkers fom the third world who ‘opposed the productivist and rationals view of development In terms of specific measures the pilosophy ofthe new order inspired the creation of national news agencies or pools of regional agencies. ls recommendations also gave rise o sectoral polices Ssh as those mentioned above, aimed at regulating foreign e- CRANSNATIONALIZATION 6 vetting agencies or establishing reserved markets and quota ys- tems to support national lm production In 1965 the United States denouncing the drift towand the “poltczing” of communication issues, walked out of UNESCO. 1 was soon followed by Singapore and England, then governed bby Margaret Thatcher. Washington threatened, for the same rea sons, to leave the Interationa Telecommunicaions Union, which from 1979 had been responsible for organizing the international ‘xdministrative conference on radio, For theft time, and to the reat displeasure ofthe United States, 142 delegations were urged to change the rule allowing countries to caim frequencies on @ first-come besis—a rule imposed at the beginning of the century by the handful of major martime powers, Discussions on the new order tndoubtedly had the function of awakening svatepe consciousness, For corporate lobbies, such 1s the Intemational Advertising Assocation (AA) and the Inter “American Press Assocation |APA—a press owners’ association), which were among the most active in defending corporate inter sts it was the starting point ofan inttutional reorganization witha view to meeting the challenge that they identified as globe and far fom conjunctural similar awakening took place among, nongovernmental organizations that, seeking to go beyond mere verbal commitments by states, took iittives on the fringes of ‘offi inttutions. cae in point was the networks of NGOs that, between 1974 and 1975, sucessfully orchestrate the inter- national boycott of Nes in onder to carbs obtrasive adverts. Ing and promotion campaigns for breastmilk substitute in the ‘hed world Europe: The Reverse Side of Cultural Policies The second source ofa doctrine onthe consequences ofthe inter- nationalization of cultural products was Europe, where France played a key ole, In late 1978, for the first time, the European ministers respon- sible for cultural afairs spoke explicitly of culture indsties that ‘vere multinational by nature and recognized tat the legal regu lations setup by the nation-state to curb them carried very litle ne ne 70 TRANSNATIONALIZATION ‘weight Shorty before that, the notion of culture industries had ‘bee introduced, by experts from the French Ministry of Culture, into the terms weed by the Council of Europe. This nation was bse on the premise ofan unequal battle between public policies aiming for the democratization of cultural goods and the inex: torable rie of another form of democratization by the market that 's, through the products of mas culture. Itwas also an observation ‘hata threat was posed tothe national dentty asa result af gow: Inggbreaches in the borders of the nation-state. In the 19708 no links were established between the cry of alarm from the south and the warnings of those in charge of cule ture in Burope. teas only withthe economic upturn during the cay years ofthe socialist presidency in France that a European government called openly fora policy capable of "gusrantecing the countries ofthe south the capacity to control their means of| ‘communication and the messages te convey” (speech by Pres- ident Frangois Mitterrand fo the summit of the seven most in- dlustralzed counteles, in June 1982), It also proposed a "true crusade aginst the domination of financial and intelectual impe- Halls’ (epeech by the French minster of culture, Jack Lang, to {he UNESCO world conference on cultural polices, hed in Mexico in July 1982). In October 1961, ering the North/South sumenit fn Canctin (Mexico), the French president had asserted that “the fee market allows for no growth other than that of the multina- ‘onal fim, which creat streams of wealth ane oceans of poverty Inthe third world” By the end ofthe 1970s, however, one thing was already clear: the answers to new problems provided by international institu- tions ovee likely to fal fa short ofthe expectations of al partes concerned. Few recommendations ever reached concrete form. A fase in point asthe code of conduct fr transnational corpore tions, drawn up by the United Nations. The increasing esitimacy ‘of neoliberal policies, which were averse to any kind of control or regulation ofthe activities of transnational firms by public bods,

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