Partition
half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the
JLT Agro vs. Balansag
Don Julian
Facts: Teves
Antonia Baena
Milagros
Donio
Josefa Teves Maria Evelyn Jose Catalino Milagros
Emilio Teves
Escao Donio Teves Donio Teves Reyes Teves
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia,
and after her death, with Milagros (Please refer to the chart
above for his children).
The case involves a parcel of land covering 94sqms (Lot 63)
which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia (1st wife).
When Antonio died, the subject property as well as the
property of Don Julian has been the subject of an action for
partition where the parties agreed to entered into a
compromise agreement.
The CFI rendered a decision whereas
o tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property
owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first
marriage - was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don
Julian.
o Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais,
including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial
areas, and the house where Don Julian was living.
o The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian,
including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the
present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don
Julian vis--vis his heirs:
o 13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties
hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escano and Emilio B.
Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they
inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other
successional rights which would correspond to them of the other
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves
(not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa)
shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage
of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros
Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros
Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated
children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio
Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, Don Julian, Emilio and Joseda executed a Deed of
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of
petitioner which was followed up by a Supplemental Deed.
Pedro Reyes
The instruments state the deed of assignment transferred ownership
Teves over Lot. No. 63, among other properties in favor of petitioner.
However, Miligros (2nd wife) and its children already take possession
of the property after the execution of the Compromise Agreement, to
make it worst, they entered into a lease agreement with Sps.
Balansag.
Subsequently, Milagros and her children executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate where the Lot No. 63 was
allotted to Milagros, Maria and Jose.
Unaware that the Lot. No. 63 was already registered in the name of
petitioner, respondents bought the subject property from Milagros.
The respondents upon registration of the subject property then knew
that the lot was already registered to petitioner. Hence, they filed a
case for declaration of nullity and cancellation of title and to transfer
the title to their names.
RTC: dismissed the complaint
CA: reversed
Issues:
1.) WON future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved
prior to the death of Don Julian.
2.) whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject
lot during his lifetime.
Ruling: No.
Future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
 ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including
future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception
is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and
the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article
1080.
For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have
been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a
contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the
exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that
if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by
the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does
not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition
that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a
donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the
ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the
mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is
merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056
of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate
by act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine
that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make
a will with all the formalities provided by law.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this
partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It
derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the
owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the
legitime of the forced heirs.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to
the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the
interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the
interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
2) No. In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the
court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant
to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will
depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which
the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of
Don Julians desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance
of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition
to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the
petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer
effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the
president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage,
Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition
against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order,
especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the
estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged
transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have
to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
1. Dizon- Rivera v. Dizon Lesava, Anna
Doctrines:
The right to partition is subject only to the right of the compulsory
heirs to their legitime.
Heirs cannot compel payment of their legitime in real estate
instead of money as specified in the will.
Facts: On January 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in
Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six
legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon,
and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate
child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
Naming as beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs,
together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly
Jimenez and Laureano Tiamzon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the
sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company
valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to
probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the
testatrix' estate.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of
Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties
of the estate. In his report of appraisal, the total appraised value was
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs
amounted to P129,362.11. (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the
legitime of legitimate children and descendants).
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and
bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of
her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
In the project of partition filed by the executrix, it was determined that (1)
Marina (executrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered
to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest
of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime; that (2) each of the latter are
adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash
and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in
the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced
legitime mentioned in number 2 above; (4) the adjudications made in the will
in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.
Oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14,
1964, wherein they proposed a different distribution of the estate.
LC: sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition.
Reasoning of court: (T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper
adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes
which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

Issues:
1. WON the manner of the partition in the will is valid?
2. WON the value of the legitimes of the forced heirs initially given in cash
could be completed with real property?
Held: Yes as to the manner of partition and No to substitution of cash with
intended real property.
Valid partition
the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her -
estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness
and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular
heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to
partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their
legitime.
Thus, in the project of partition submitted by the executrix, the 5 oppositors
were validly given the property intended to them as provided in the will plus
the remaining balance of their legitime taken from the cash and/or properties
of executrix- appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will
more than their respective legitimes.
Note:
Adjudications and Assignments of Specific Property cannot be considered all
devises that may only be taken from the free portion of the estate
it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the
testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value
already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words I
bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such
as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half
disposable portion of the estate.
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of
compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." Fundamentally, the dispositions by the
testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not
prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Completion of Legitime
The forced heirs may not legally insist on their legitime being completed with
real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash as provided in the
will. The properties are not available for the testatrix intended it to be for the
real properties were intended to be transferred to her named beneficiaries,
principally the executrix-appellee.
The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has
greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix.
The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value
thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be
settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in
the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
That oppositors who are to claim cash of lower value is at fault for they could
have collected their cash prior to the appeal which had a higher purchasing
value.
 2. Alsua-Betts v. CA Miguel, Therese 4. Spouses then executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils
Petitioner: FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE amending and supplementing their holographic wills in which the
MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR codicil also provided that one half of all the properties(
ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioner conjugal and paraphernal) is being conveyed to and portioned
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, among the legitimate heirs, but they are reserving the other
FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, half and they reciprocally bequeathed to each other as well as the
CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents properties they are to acquire subsequently and that the
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979 surviving spouse would be named executor in properties or
DOCTRINE: Partition inter vivos is void even if a subsequent will is executed administrator.
in conformity with the provisions of the prior partition.
5. Dona Florentina died, upon the death of Dona Florentina, Don
FACTS: Jesus was named executor. Don Jesus cancelled his
holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper/secretary.
1. Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella together He instructed his new lawyer to draft a new will duly signed by
with all their living children entered into a duly notarized agreement, Don Jesus and the attesting witnesses . The will had three
over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and
Jesus and Doa Florentina annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
2. Don Jesus and Dona Florentina separately executed their provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four
respective holographic wills in which were in conformity and living children by virtue of Extrajudicial Agreement of 1949,
in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November and that such properties be taken into account in the partition
25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to
the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently
constitute their legitime among their four living children in the acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to
Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve
without a bond.
3. It was also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of
other properties by either of them, one-half would belong to the 6. After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate
other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among of Dona Florentina had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus,
the four children. Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of
holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly partition, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on
the same terms and conditions of the will of his wife. January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the
Spouses Don Jesus and Dona Florentina filed before the CFI of estate of Dona Florentina. Don Jesus Alsua died.
Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their 7. Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was
respective holographic wills in two separate special opposed by her siblings Pablo and Fernando, on the ground
proceedings. that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the will. The will was disallowed. The daughter
argued that the other children, Pablo and Fernando, are in
 estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus by virtue of the
agreement previously entered.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the respondent court erred in not
allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus
Alsua.
2. Whether or not extrajudicial partition is valid
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES
The findings of the lower court declaring the contested will as having been
executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the
evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter,
review or revise the same. Hence, there is no further need for Us to dwell on
the matter as both the lower court and the respondent appellate court have
declared that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and supported
by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at that the contested
will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned
last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal
requirements of the law.
2. NO.
The Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article
1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of
the law may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts
inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In
other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope
as to include in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Under both the old and new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is
permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even before as long as he
mentions this fact in the will, to partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code
was expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by
the holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil
of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who
executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will
as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted.
3. Chavez v. IAC Vargas,Sha
FACTS
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuela
Buenavista who had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion,
Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and
the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in this case.
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, with the conformity of their mother, sold
their 1/6 undivided share of the same land to their sister who became the
owner of 4/6 share of the subject land.
In all the deeds of sale, there was the stipulation wherein the owner , Manuela
Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso
shares, her paraphernal property.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her
conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, sold the entire property in
favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez.
On October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed a civil case
against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela
sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 with right to
repurchase.
ISSUE
Whether the deeds of sale were considered as a partition by an act inter vivos
RULING
YES.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of
his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory
heirs.
While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the
parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law.
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a
partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person
makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed
in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even
be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the
partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing
the existence of the partition.
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in
favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in
question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not
only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
are not contracts entered into with respect to feature inheritance but a contract
perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who
signed the same and gave her consent thereto.
Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
Thus, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de
Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she
herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of
the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter
to the doctrine that no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at
the expense of another.
4. Arrogante v. Deliarte Angeles., Louis
FACTS
The lot in controversy, Lot No. 472-A, was originally conjugal property of the
spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria Placencia who had nine children,
including herein respondent Beethoven Deliarte and petitioner Fe Deliarte
Arrogante.
The other petitioners, Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr., all surnamed
Arrogante, are the children of Fe ( nephews of Beethoven). Respondent
Leonora Duenas is the wife of Beethoven.
On 1978, the Deliarte siblings agreed to waive and convey in favor of
Beethoven all their rights, interests, and claims to the subject lot in
consideration of P15,000.00.
Bernabe, the parties ailing father, died on November 7, 1980.
From then on, respondent Beethoven occupied and possessed the subject lot
openly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner. He exercised full ownership
and control over the subject lot without any objection from all his siblings, or
their heirs, until 1993 when the controversy arose. In fact, on March 26, 1986,
all of Beethovens siblings, except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of sale in
favor of Beethoven to ratify the 1978 private deed of sale.
Sometime in August 1993, petitioner Lordito Arrogante installed placards on
the fence erected by respondents, claiming that the subject lot was illegally
acquired by the latter.
Respondents filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the
petitioners.
Petitioners averred that Beethoven does not own the whole of the subject lot
because Bernabe was still alive in 1978 when Beethovens siblings sold to him
all their rights and claims to and interests in that lot. Thus, the siblings could
sell only their respective inheritance from one-half of the subject lot,
representing Gregorias share in the conjugal property.

ISSUE
Whether or not the private deed of sale executed in 1978 is a valid conveyance
of the entire lot 472-a to petitioner beethoven deliarte. - NO
RULING
Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a contract entered
into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following
requisites concur:
(1) the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the contract was entered into, succession to Bernabes
estate had yet to be opened, and the object thereof, i.e., Bernabes share in
the subject lot, formed part of his childrens inheritance, and the children
merely had an inchoate hereditary right thereto.
True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future inheritance admits of
exceptions, as when a person partitions his estate by an act inter vivos under
Article 1080 of the Civil Code. However, the private deed of sale does not
purport to be a partition of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the
application of Article 1347. Nowhere in the said document does Bernabe
separate, divide, and assign to his children his share in the subject lot effective
only upon his death. Indeed, the document does not even bear the signature
of Bernabe.
Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe undertook an oral partition
of his estate. Although we have held on several occasions that an oral or
parole partition is valid, our holdings thereon were confined to instances
wherein the partition had actually been consummated, enforced, and
recognized by the parties. Absent a showing of an overt act by Bernabe
indicative of an unequivocal intent to partition his estate among his children,
his knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private deed of sale does
not equate to an oral partition by an act inter vivos. Besides, partition of
property representing future inheritance cannot be made effective during the
lifetime of its owner.
Considering the foregoing, it follows that the 1986 deed of confirmation of sale
which sought to ratify the 1978 sale likewise suffers from the same infirmity.
In short, the 1986 deed is also void.
5. alejandrino v. CA - Aricheta, Paula
Alejandrino v CA
Doctrine: Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.
Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together
with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Facts:
The late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children
named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-
square-meter lot. Upon the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the property
should have been divided among their children with each child having a share
of 36.50 square meters.
However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance
with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square
meters of Gregorios share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriacos share and 12.17
square meters of Abundios share thereby giving her a total area of 97.43
square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square meters. It turned out,
however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private respondent in this
case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square meters
from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio through Laurencia, 12.17
square meters from Abundio also through Laurencia and 36.50 square meters
from Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino
property.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters
of the property) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and
damages against private respondent Nique. The RTC decided in favor of
respondent. Laurencia elevated the case to CA, but later on withdrew.
Mauricia filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties with
damages against private respondent Nique.
Issue: whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may
validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party
Ruling: Yes
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to
his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right under Art.
493. With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance,
alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article
1088.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her
pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular
portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object
of the sale.
`The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares,
but the DIVISION of the common property of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it.
The legality of Laurencias alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case
had become final and executory with Laurencias withdrawal of her appeal.
When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of
the property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect
calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the
estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves
extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the
course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by
the third person designated by the testator.
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for
quieting of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the
property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs
themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to private
respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity
on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-
publication thereof.
By Art. 1082, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the
co-ownership, he expresses his intention to put an end to indivision among
(his) co-heirs. Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt
act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the
form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co- likewise be deemed as a clarification of its decision that had become final and
ownership by selling her share to private respondent. executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper execution of the decision
be rendered futile.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically
divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers 6. Ancog v. CA Bacani, Roy
and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The Doctrine:
fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end
regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should
embodied in a public document. purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
Facts:
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal
evidence their intention to partition the property. It delineates what portion of property of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez.
the property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is immaterial in Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent
view of Mauricias admission that she did execute the deed of extrajudicial Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog
settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only mentioned the existence and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his
of such document in its decision in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. That document heirs.
was formally offered in evidence and the court is deemed to have duly Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured
considered it in deciding the case. The court has in its favor the presumption by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated on
of regularity of the performance of its task that has not been rebutted by its Original Certificate of Title No. 622.
petitioner Mauricia. When Rosario Diez applied again for a loan to the bank,
offering the land in question as security, the banks lawyer,
Neither may the fact that the other heirs of the Alejandrino spouses, named Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio did not participate in the extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a
extrajudicial settlement of estate affect its validity. In her amended complaint means of facilitating the approval of her application.
in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia herself admitted having The suggestion was accepted Atty. de la Serna prepared an
acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her brothers. extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old, signed.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her rights The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna and as a
over portions she had acquired from her brothers to private respondent Nique. result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
The sale was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement No. 3447.
of the estate that private respondent himself witnessed. The extrajudicial Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the
settlement of estate having constituted a partition of the property, Laurencia loan was approved by the bank.
validly transferred ownership over the specific front portion of the property with Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land.
an area of 146 square meters. She brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order for Ancogs husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of
the segregation of the property. In so doing, it was merely reiterating the the house built on the land for failure to pay rent.
partition of the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that
was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The order may private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
 Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, of the Civil Code, which provides: When land passes by
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put
their mothers plan to sell the land. in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of
They filed this action for partition in the Regional Trial Court of law for the benefit of the true owner.
Bohol.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was
simulated and therefore void. 7. Tuason v. Tuason Baldonado, Guila
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Doctrine: The contract is far from violating the legal provision that forbids a
co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the
extrajudicial settlement and sustained the trial courts community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of
dismissal of the case. the sale among the co-owners.
Issue:
Facts: the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their
1. Whether or not there was a partition of property between brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, in
the heirs? common owning 1/3 portion each. Nieves offered her share to her sibling and
2. Whether the cause of action of petitioner is barred by laches? her mother but the same was declined. Later on she sold her portion to
Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation. The three co-owners agreed
Held: to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds
of the sale to be later divided among them.
1. Yes. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found no
evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement was Before, during and after the execution of this contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta
required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I.
from the Bank of Calape. What the record of this case reveals is Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a
the intention of Jovita Ancog and Caridad Yap to cede their member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
interest in the land to their mother Rosario Diez. It is immaterial that
they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and
Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small lots
put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a for sale. Duties of Araneta
partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an to finance the whole development and subdivision prepare a
exchange, or any other transaction. schedule of prices and conditions of sale
Has authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be
2. No. In accordance with Rule 74, 19 of the Rules of Court, subdivided
as he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale to pay the
settlement. It is uncontroverted that, at the time the extrajudicial real estate taxes due on the property
settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio
reason, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and
Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diezs name rents and collections made thereon
created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451
The court also noted the importance of par. 9, 11, and 15 of the contract.
9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it
may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the
said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase
prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be
rented while there are no purchasers thereof;
11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby
given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners
of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which
this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF
THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any
of its powers under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third
persons;
15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell,
alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without
first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the
same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other
prospective purchaser.
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on
her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. The revocation was due
to alleged breach of the memorandum of agreement that is why she is decided
to rescind said contract and the property questioned partitioned.
Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the property in
question and that said contract would be similar to another contract of
subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio
Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. Tuason, but it turned out that the two contracts
widely differed from each other, the terms of contract being relatively much
more favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.
RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the two contracts have substantially
have the same terms and are practically the same hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the partition was valid.
Held: No.
Art. 400 of the Civil Code is not applicable. The contract is far from violating
the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to
the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the
co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and
dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation
imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-
owners. By virtue of the document, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most
expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said
partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the
other agreement or contract referred to by appellant where the parties thereto
in express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not
expressed in so many words in The contact. There is no violation of Art. 400
of the Civil Code in the parties entering into the contract for the very reason
that Art. 400 is not applicable.
The court find the evidence was was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6
sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m.
or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the
year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well
observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being
dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the
Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree
to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should
be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the
four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.
8. Bautista v. Grino-Aquino Beunaventura, Marie
Doctrine: an extrajudicial settlement of the estate applies only to the estate
left by the decedent. Property that does not belong to the decedents estate
cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
Facts:
 The land in question was registered in the name of the petitioner
Manuel Bautista. He inherited this land from his father Mariano
Bautista.
Manuels first wife, Juliana Najadera, is the decedent in this case.
Manuel married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo, and they had a
child named Evangeline Bautista.
Petitioner Manuel and private respondents executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, and the land in question was the subject matter
of the said extrajudicial partition of Julianas estate.
Private respondent, with the exception of Manolito, executed a deed
of absolute sale in favour of Manolito. The latter executed a deed of
sale in favour of the other private respondents.
Petitioner Manuel filed an action claiming that the extrajudicial
partition and the deed of absolute sale was null and void.
RTC: dismissed the complaint.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition is null and void.
Held:
YES. Under Sec. 1 rule 74 of the ROC, an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and
with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives.
In this case, It appears that in the document that petitioner Manuel
and the private respondent executed, Manuel waived his right or share in the
property in favour of the private respondents. However, the property subject
matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to the estate of Juliana
Najadera. It is the exclusive property of petitioner Manuel who inherited the
same from his father. Hence, the extrajudicial partition is null and void.
It was also added that such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a
partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel. Partition of
future inheritance is prohibited by law.
Also, the said partition effectively resulted in the preterition of the
right of Evangeline as a compulsory heir of Manuel. It is difficult to believe that
Manuel would overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to
share in the said property. Thats why it is not surprising that he denied signing
the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline who is
their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. Therefore, it was found out that
Evangelines preterition was attended with bad faith.
Prescription cannot also be invoked in this case as the
petitioners right to sue their co-owners for partition of the property is
imprescriptible.
As said extrajudicial partition was null and void, it follows
that all subsequent transactions involving the same property between and
among the private respondents are also null and void. Therefore, the
extrajudicial partition and the deed of absolute sale are null and void.
Legal Redemption
1. Hermoso v. CA- Cartagena, Nikae
Hermoso v CA
Doctrine: In applying Article 1623 of the Civil Code on the exercise of legal
redemption to certain facts, the interpretation must be in favor of justice and
equity. This Court explained x x x. We test a law by its result. A law should not
be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice x x x. There are laws which are
generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances.
Facts:
Emilio Hermoso, now deceased, and plaintiff Clarita Hermoso were husband
and wife whose union was blessed with the following children: Rogelio,
Victoria, Agustinito and Danilo Ciriaco, all surnamed Hermoso. Emilio
Hermoso died, leaving as his surviving heirs, his wife Clarita, and the four
above-named children. Among the properties left by Emilio Hermoso is an
undivided one-third portion of a parcel of land.
The property was originally owned by Agrifina Francia and the ownership
thereof was transmitted upon her death to her three (3) children, to wit: Isidro,
Consolacion, and Emilio (herein appellees predecessor-in-interest) in the
proportion of one-third (1/3) each. Consolacion Hermoso, married to Manuel
Cruz, later bought the one-third (1/3) undivided share of her brother, Isidro
Hermoso. Thus, as indicated in OCT, Consolacion Hermoso owns two-thirds
(2/3) thereof and the remaining one-third (1/3) is in the name of the Heirs of
Emilio Hermoso.
the Heirs of Emilio Hermoso executed a duly notarized agreement that the
share of CLARITA P. CARIN shall in all cases be adjacent to the properties
adjudicated to CONSOLACION HERMOSO CRUZ; then following by the
shares pertaining to DANILO CIRIACO HERMOSO, VICTORINA P.
HERMOSO, ROGELIO P. HERMOSO and AGUSTINITO P. HERMOSO,
respectively, except in the partition of the parcel of land situated in
Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which is the subject of the DEED OF
EXCHANGE above-mentioned, in which case the share pertaining to
CLARITA P. CARIN shall be adjacent to the stonewall that segregates
the share of CONSOLACION HERMOSO CRUZ, then followed by the
shares pertaining to ROGELIO P. HERMOSO, DANILO CIRIANO
HERMOSO, VICTORINA P. HERMOSO, and AGUSTINITO P. HERMOSO,
at the extreme end, respectively
Agustinito hermoso and Danilo Hermoso offered to sell their respective shares
to the land in dispute to one Benjamin Palaganas, brother of appellees
Ceferino Palaganas and Amanda Palaganas, who are old family
acquaintances of the Hermosos since the lifetime of their late landlord, Don
Marcos Hermoso.
Upon being shown a copy of the duly notarized Agreement, Ben Palaganas,
together with the Hermoso brothers, approached Atty. Ireneo E. Guardiano
concerning the preparation of a contract of sale, with the latter noting that the
shares offered for sale are separated by the share of Victoria Hermoso; hence,
it would be more feasible for Danilo Ciriaco to execute a deed of exchange
with his sister, Victoria m. A Deed if Exchange was thereafter drawn and
signed by Danilo Ciriaco Hermoso but the same was not however signed by
Victoria Hermoso.
Nonetheless, this transaction did no materialize for the reasons that Clarita
Carin subsequently offered to redeem the shares sold by her children by
returning the amount already received by her son, Agustinito. By reason of
their good relations and it appearing that the sale was made without the
knowledge and consent of Clarita Carin, Ben Palaganas accepted the offer
without suspiration.
In the month of October of the same year, Agustinito, then reviewing for the
Bar Examinations, and Danilo, in dire need of money, for the second time
offered to sell their respective shares to Ben Palaganas who acted for and in
behalf of his brother, Dr. Ceferino Palaganas, and sister, Dr. Amanda
Palaganas (Palaganases, for brevity), this time giving assurance that their
mother (Clarita Carin) had already consented to the transaction and that they
could convince their sister, Victoria, to finally agree to an exchange of shares
with Danilo. Elated with this development, the Palaganases even offered a
higher price [P500,000.00] for the sale.
Thus, with these assurances, the parties executed a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale Over Two Undivided Shares To A Parcel of Land with the
Hermoso brothers receiving P300,000.00 upon the execution of the contract,
P100,000.00 to be paid upon the eviction of the squatters/tenants thereon,
and the balance of P100,000.00 to be paid upon the issuance of title in the
name of the vendees.
Upon the commencement of the present action the Hermoso brothers have
already received a total amount of P401,500.00 with the last condition---
transfer of title---not having been yet fulfilled.
Contrary to the assurances made by the Hermoso brothers, plaintiffs-
appellees allegedly came to have known of the transation only sometime
between May, 1983 and January, 1984 (Complaint, par. 8 in relation to TSN,
21 Nov. 1984, p. 32, Victoria Hermoso). Thereafter, plaintiffs-appellees
allegedly made arrangements to negotiate for the redemption of the shares
sold by the Hermoso brothers. This time, however, the Palaganases were not
so open to the idea of the offered repurchase for the value of the property in
dispute had considerably increased and that they have already set foothold
on said property by reason of their investments and the plans made for its
development. Furthermore, they relied upon the assurances made by the
Hermoso brothers that the transaction is known to Clarita Carin and Victoria
Hermoso.
Consequently, considering the adamant refusal of the private respondents to
resell the disputed lots, petitioners on October 8, 1984 filed a complaint for
legal redemption before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the period for legal redemption had prescribed?
Ruling: No
Article 1623 stresses the need for notice in writing in three other species of
legal redemption namely: (1) redemption in a case where the share of all the
other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third person; (2) redemption by
owners of adjoining lands when a piece of rural land not exceeding one
hectare in area is alienated; and (3) redemption by owners of adjoining lands
in the sale of a piece of an urban land so small and so situated that the portion
thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose within a reasonable time,
having been bought merely for speculation.
In this case, the land has not been validly partitioned between Consolacion
Hermoso, who owns 2/3 and the heirs of Emilio Hermoso who own 1/3
regardless of the sentiments of Consolacion on the land in dispute may later
have been. There has been no subsequent distribution among the co-heirs of
their specific shares. But even granting that the heirs divided the properties
owned in common in the May 29, 1974 Agreement, the right of legal
redemption under Article 1620 of the Code, would still subsist in their capacity
as co-owners. For, if a co-owner has offered to redeem the land within the
period fixed by law, he has complied with the law. He may bring the action to
enforce the redemption after every offer has been rejected. This is exactly the
situation in this case.
The respondent court found that the petitioners already had notice of the sale
in January 1984. Considering that the letter, coursed through Atty. Sandico,
offering to redeem the property was made only in September 1984, the
appellate court was of the view that the action to enforce redemption had
prescribed. A perusal of the record, however, shows that after Ben Palaganas
had confirmed the transaction, the petitioners confronted the two brothers who
were compelled to admit they have sold their shares. The vendor-brothers
never took the initiative of informing their co-heirs in writing that they have
alienated their shares. As found by the trial court, the petitioners immediately
started negotiations with Ben Palaganas to redeem the alienated share. At
this time, the payment for the shares had not yet been completed neither by
Ben Palaganas nor by the private respondents.
Article 1088 of the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. But whether it
is under this article 1623 of same Code, the period of 30 days has not began
to run.
It was error for the respondent court to rule that the right of the petitioner to
redeem the alienated share had long proscribed. This finding fails to take into
account that the period of legal redemption is not a prescriptive period. It is a
condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption. It is a period set
by law to restrict the right of the person exercising the right of legal redemption.
It is not one of prescription.
The written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code was enacted to
remove all doubts and uncertainty that the alienation may not be definite.
The co-owners must know with certainty the circumstances of the sale by his
co-owners and the terms and the validity of the alienation. Only after said
knowledge is the co-owner required to exercise the right of redemption given
to him by law.
While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it does not state any
particular form thereof, so long as the reasons for a written notice are present.
The records of the case show that the sale of the brothers share was
deliberately hidden from the petitioners. For sometime after the sale, the
petitioners were ignorant about its execution. When they somehow heard
rumors about it, they had to take one step after another to find out if the
information was true.
It is to be noted that in the case at bar, not only were the petitioners
intentionally kept in the dark for several years but even after knowledge of the
act of the two brothers, they still had difficulty in ascertaining and confirming
its veracity. Far from giving the notice required by law or giving information on
the history and details of the sale, Agustinito and Danilo gave the petitioners
the run-around until the brothers were practically forced to admit it and the
petitioners immediately went to see Ben Palaganas. In their dialogue with Ben
Palaganas, petitioners offered to redeem the property, but this time, unlike the
first, the offer was rejected.
In applying Article 1623 of the Civil Code on the exercise of legal redemption
to certain facts, the interpretation must be in favor of justice and equity. This
Court explained x x x. We test a law by its result. A law should not be
interpreted so as not to cause an injustice x x x. There are laws which are
generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them in
slavish obedience to their language.

The standards and conditions of legal redemption provided under Article 1623
of the Civil Code have not been met in this petition. Furthermore, there is the
fact that justice and equity, as the law provides, are also on the side of the
petitioners. As we said, the righting of an injustice is the key to the resolution
of this case and thus would be the end result of our decision.
The two brothers, Agustinito and Danilo Hermoso, were still students when
they sold their shares in their inheritance. In 1979, Agustinito was already a
graduating student of law. According to the trial court, it was sometime in
October of that year, he and his younger brother Danilo separately needed
cash which they could not easily secure from their mother, Clarita Carin, one
of the plaintiffs herein. However, if they were strapped of cash, considering
that their allowances were insufficient for their needs, they could have pleaded
with their mother for additional funds instead of selling the still undivided
property without her knowledge and against her known will. They knew that
their mother was against the very idea of selling a portion of the undivided
property considering that Consolacion Hermoso cancelled the prior sale made
by them in July 1979 by redeeming the property. From the records, one gets
the impression that the two brothers, Agustinito and Danilo, were irresponsible
and self centered, failing to consider the wishes of their mother.
Ben Palaganas, who represented the respondents in a transaction, admitted
a debt of gratitude to the Hermoso family. Yet, apparently he took advantage
of the situation. Through several years he doled out funds in installments to
the two brothers in partial payment of the disputed property until the
indebtedness had reached an amount that Agustinito and Danilo had no other
recourse but to sell their inheritance and practically compelled them to execute
the deed of sale in dispute.
Again, we reiterate the salient fact that Clarita Carin, their mother, and Victoria
Hermoso, their sister, were kept in the dark about the sale. Considering the
factual background of this case, the honorable and expected step for the
Palaganas was to inform the petitioners about the action taken by Agustinito
and Danilo. Instead, as the record reveals the parties to the sale concealed
the transaction from petitioners for four (4) years. It was only after hearing
rumors about the sale when petitioners started to investigate and search for
evidence to confirm their hearsay knowledge about the transaction. Even
then, the two brother and the Palaganas gave them a hard time.
The Palaganas clan knew all along the strong feelings of the petitioners
against the alienation of share in the still undivided property. This was their
second attempt to buy the property. As a matter of fact, they knew that in 1979
when the land was first sold, the petitioner immediately took steps to cancel
the sale upon discovery thereof. In 1980, the private respondents and Ben
Palaganas still did what the petitioners vigorously opposed and did not want
to happen. They also hid the sale from the petitioners until confronted with
facts that they could no longer hide or deny. The impressions of the trial judge
is worth quoting hereunder thus:
It is obvious that the acts of Ben Palaganas or his principals would be
considered as done in bad faith. Ben Palaganas should not be allowed to say
that he had relied merely on the impressions given by the vendors, the
Hermoso brothers. Aside from what was obvious in the documents executed
by the Hermoso brothers, he should have inquired or verified said impressions
made by the vendors from the plaintiffs or any of the co-owners to the property.
The evidence in the record shows that it was their intense desire to own a
property in the place where the land is located because of the business
potentials thereat stated herein above. They did not exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family because they did not want to, what with their
experience with the first transaction affecting the share of the third party
defendant, Agustinito Hermoso which took place only in July, 1979 a few
months earlier to the transaction in question.
There can be no doubt that the Palaganas clan were in bad faith at the time
they bought the disputed property from the Hermoso brothers. We cannot thus
close our eyes to the injustice which would befall the petitioners considering
that this is not the first time that they have expressed their desire to redeem
the property sold by the Hermoso brothers. Under the circumstances, it is just
and equitable to rule in favor of the exercise of legal redemption.
2. Garcia v. Caliman Clemente, Jerick
Facts:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land.
On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces,
grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro,
Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
 The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having
Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive,
Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia. though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor
signed a document entitled, Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
Sale.
Heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners
herein, filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia 3. Alonzo v. IAC Custodio, Shi
Trabadillo, private respondents an action for legal redemption of the PARTIES:
3/4 portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late Petitioners: Carlos Alonzo and Casimiro Alonzo
Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to the Private respondents: Tecla Padua and other co-heirs
defendants.
The petitioners ask for a written notice but the defendant refused. DOCTRINE: Where co-heirs filed an action for redemption of co-heirs sold
They only came to know about the information of the sale when they share only after thirteen years had elapsed from the sale, they are deemed to
went to the registry of deeds. have been actually informed thereof sometime during those years although
Defendant said that the right to legal redemption lapsed because no written notice of sale was given to them.
they personally notified them and that they knew the sale happens
when they check it to the registry of lands FACTS:
Issue: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land.
Whether or not the right of legal redemption lapsed One of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share
Held: to the herein petitioners for P550.00 by way of absolute
sale.
No because there is not notice of sale A year later, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the
same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger Retro Sale.
before the partition, any or all of the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied an area
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the
so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of portions sold to them.
the sale by the vendor. They subsequently enclosed the same with a fence.

If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means Also in 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and
of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil area.
Code that the said notice be made in writing for On May 27, 1977, Tecla Padua, a co-heir, filed a complaint
invoking the right of redemption under Art. 1088.
Court had stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of
the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
 for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by HELD:
the vendor. The petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there
It must be noted that the other co-heirs, including Tecla was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs.
Padua, lived on the same lot.
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
petition. spirit or intent.
RTC: It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
of the sales and that they thought; that the area occupied by the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
Eustaquia; it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the redemption.
area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by In this instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not
them from the other. days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964.
CA: the notice required by the said article was written notice and
that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years
after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale.
Citing the case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals; stressed the
need for written notice although no particular form was required. Private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales
made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964 cannot be
Butte v. UY: the written notice should be given by the vendor accepted.
and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
under Article 1623. eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the redemptioners are duly notified.
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of The Court is satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
redemptioners... sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
It is apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice and that When the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other
notice must be deemed exclusive. co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired.
ISSUE/s: By 1977, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
Whether or not there was a valid notice pursuant to Art. 1088? redemption had already been extinguished because the period for
YES. (Although not in writing.) its exercise had already expired.
Assuming there was, did the 30-day period for redemption It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977? YES. the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
 portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong appears that the signatories in the Deed of Sale were Amparo, Antonia,
materials. Carlos, and Severino.
This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a Sometime in 1982, Grace (respondent) learned the sale of the
property and went to the Brgy. Captain and asked for confrontations with the
mere mortgagee, but looked like an act of ownership.
petitioners and present her claims to the property. On November 27, 1982,
being there no settlement, the Brgy. Captain issued a certificate to file action.
Yet, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to On December 8, 1982, petitioner sold the same property to his
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. children.
It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the On December 21, 1982, respondents filed a complaint for recovery
right of redemption, but then it was already too late. of possession and legal redemption with damages against petitioners.
The doctrines of the cases of De Conejero and Buttle are not ISSUE: (1) WON respondents can validly exercise legal redemption as co-
heirs / co-owner of the property; (2) Whether Article 1088 or Article 1620 is
abandoned.
applicable.
This case is merely adopting an exception to the general rule, in DOCTRINE: YES. The respondents can validly exercise legal redemption
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. under Article 1088.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the Redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures
sales although no notice in writing was given them. to the benefit of all other co-owners.
There is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between 1088 and 1620
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the is that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property of the
inheritance, the right of redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is
filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
that of 1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular object, the right
recognized in 1088 exists. Hence, 1088 here is applicable.
Written notice of sale is a requirement under 1088. In this case, there
4. Mariano v. CA Ferrer, Marrion was no written notice of sale being given whatsoever to the respondents.
Petitioners: Leonardo Mariano, Avelina Tigue, Lazaro Mariano, et. al. Although petitioners allege that respondent Grace was given a copy of the
Respondents: Grace Gosiengfiao, Emma Gosiengfiao, et. al. deed of sale at the Office of the Brgy. Captain, there was no evidence
DOCTRINE: presented to support such claim. Written notice is indispensable, to remove
FACTS: all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt
Decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao owns a residential lot at that the alienation in not definitive.
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, which was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of It was also shown that respondents tendered the repurchase money
Tuguegarao. After dying intestate, he was survived by his heirs: wife Antonia to petitioners on October 1982, but they refused. Consequently, respondents
and children Amparo, Carlos, Severino, respondents Grace, Emma, Ester, exercised their right of redemption at the first opportunity they have. The
Francisco Jr. complaint filed before the Brgy. Captain and then the RTC was necessary to
The loan being unpaid, the lot was foreclosed by the Rural Bank and assert their rights. The Court stated that reimbursement to purchaser within
sale was held on December 27, 1963, the bank being the highest bidder. the period of one month from notice in writing is a requisite or condition
On February 7, 1964, Amparo Gosiengfiao redeemed the property precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption; the bringing of an
by paying mortgagee bank. action in court is the remedy to enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses
On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that the redemption. The first must be done within 1 month period; the second
of her minor children Emma, Lina, Carlos, and Severino executed a Deed of within the prescriptive period provided by law.
Assignment of the Right of Redemption in favor of Amparo. Thus, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the
August 15, 1966, Amparo sold the entire property to Leonardo absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period
Mariano (petitioner) who subsequently established residence on the lot. It has not even begun to run.