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\Voodson) plt!d guilty t) J'Obhery. ln. pleading gu il). t he o;ixtc n year-old MI. Gol<Ernilh
3dmiued to robbing auuthc:r juvcJu e uf mnncy Jnd an i Pod. Bib~d on lh~ nutun; of the offense
and lr. Gold:.mith's hi~tO I') ofjuv~n i lc tld l uJi ~.:a!iuns. 1\fr. Ciold m.ith".; felony COt\\ il:tion felJ
inLO Box 6B on the "~l u ter <lrid'' creu:~<.l b~ :he Dio;t r ct ofColwnbiu's Volunl:tl) ~cntcncing
-
Guiddinc:'\ (hereinafter .. the (juid .. lines" or I.>(' \ "iCJ").
con idered the Presentence Report prepared by the C l)Urt Services and Offend r Supen ision
Agency, the Youth Act Study prepared by Rebt!~tu Auwman-Rh as. and the preMmtut1ons of
counsel.
The Guidclinc:s arc, of ooursc, \olumary. See OC'\ "SG ~ 1.2.1. The statute authorizing
the creation tJf lhc Guideline' explicitly state that they :-.t :til not be binding ..m j 1dges," and that
"[nlonvithstanding the guidelines, th~ judg. . in an indhidual ca-.e m.Jy impose tJ'JJ' sentence thar
does not exceed the maximum term pr ~.: rib~-d by law and is not otherv.ise pr()rubitc::d by tht
Constitution or Ia\\ .._,fthc nited ratr.: .. or the Di trict t' f Columbia. U.C. Code 3-lOS(n). {b)
(emphasis added). (n this case. the Colll1 did ont adhere to the Guidelines with regard LO Mr.
t'ld mith's sentence on the robbl"f}' count. ~cntencing him under the Youlh Rehabilitation Act.
DC' Code~ 24-9UJ L'l .\~q. (200 1) to twemy-t\.1ur months in pri on and three years of upervi ed
relc.:asc. with the execution of that sentence suspendt:d in its cntirt:ty in lieu nf eightt:en month of
supcniscd probation. l'hc Court is uc~ thi Memorandum Opinion to delineate on the record the
The relation hip bctwt'en Chc Youth Rehabilitation Act and the Voluntary cnteocing
Guidelines
...i\.5 set forth below. the Coun foWld dtis to be a compelling ea~t: for sentencing under the
Youth Rehabilitation Act 1hereinattcr Youth. cC): ind~cd. the go\cmmt:nl <.liJ not oppose n
Youth Act semcncc. 1 Having made that deteunjnation. the Court. had it applied a Guidelines
compliant sentence. would nonethclcs..;; have been ' cquired to inc.;.arcernte this sixteen year-old
Defendant in an adult prison for no less than two year.:-;. For a nutnbel' of reasons relating to the
purposes and dl' ts. of )' outh Act ~cntc-n~in,1. l h~ Court reached the conclusion that strict
adheren e to the Guidelines is incomptltible v:ilh -~ntencing under the \' outh Act, and thus
elected not to sentence ~-fr. Goldsmith pursuant to the Guidl!lin~ in lhi ~ cast:.
sentencing range -placing each sentencing decision in a bo determined only by the nature of
the ofl'ensc and the defendant's prior criminal history- ullows no room fo r the Youth ct"s
I 1 he government also advocated for a ntcncc beneath the G idclint:s range, a5king the C\lut1to '~ntc:nce Mr.
(ioldsmrth to thiny months of incarC'erarum. with all but ,jx month -;pend~. to be fC'llov. C'd by Clhl n IIlftnth.-.
ofprobauon
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anphasi on promoting the rehabilitatil)n of eligible youthful offend en. and of permitting
flexibility in sentencing.
Congre~s adopted the Youth Acfs prcdecessor.lhc Federal Youth Corrections Act
(hereinafter FY ").~with the principal purpose of n:huhilitat[ing] p rson who arc unusuull~
vulnentble tl1 the danger of recidivism because of their ~outh. Tu/t?n v, United States. 440 A.2d
I 00 I 012 (D.C. 19H2). Accordingly. the I YCA emphasized '"llcxibility and individualized
attention." I d. In '"a departure from trJditional emencing ... focused primarily on correction and
rehabilit:uion. Dor.=JnJ..i '' Unitc'tl State,... 4H~ U.S. 424,433 ( 1974), tht FYCA p~:nniucd
judge to determine sentences according to the needs of the particular offender. rather than
according to the type of crime involved." Tlltl!lr, 440 A.2d at I 012. To accomplish this
objective. federal di. tricl judges wen: given two ncv. u/ternative'i to add \o the array of
sentencing options previous!) available to them ..: probation or conunitmeut up to the statutory
maximum for treatment. Dol:'izynski. 418 U.S. ut433 (emphasis addt:d). otnbl), the FYCA
pem1ittedjudgcs to sentence ~outhful oftcndcrs "under li th~ I YCAl insl cui ofunder the existing
law: Jd. at 437-38 {quotations and citations omitted and emphasis added)~ sc:>e alm id. at 440
(noting the virtual unanimit) of opinion in the legislative histor) that tht! Act was inlendt:d to
increase the sentencing opLions of federal trial judges"): .".-fnore " Unilt:tl Stat , 468 A.2d I ~31,
1334 (D.C. 1983) (a sentence undt:r the FYCA differs from the usual (rlminal entence" in both
l The Youth A t i ..largely modeled"' after the: FYC.\. Set. Browral". Umtuf Sat~?,). 579 A.2d 11 )I\, i 159 (D.C.
1990): s~~ also ArJ,"Ueta '' Umred Stale , 759 A.2d I067. I068 (D.C. 2000) 1noting that the FYC A h .."irtwll}
identical.. &o the Youth CIJ. Smith~. Unired .\rar,~ , 597 A.2d 77, 3 0 n.2 (D.C. 1991) (purposes and e feel' of
Youth Act are virtual I)' 1dentical to tho ohhc FYCA) (cnatio ~and quot.atio11' omitted). Passed hy Congrc~" in
1950 and adopted in the Di trict in J967. set. Act of Dec. 27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-126. title \TIL sec-ion Ol(a).
(b). 81 ca. 741 ( 1967). the FYCA was repealed in the Di~trict iu 1984 merely as a result ofan accident caused by
the District's ties wuh rhc federal government." St1 ~ D.C. Council, Committee of the l 1Jdit:ilU)'. Report on Bill6-47,
..Youth Rehabilitation Act of 1985... at 2 (June 19, t985) (hcreinafic:r th~ commincc Report.. ). Tht: D.C. Council
quickly ttplaccd the FYCA ~irh the Youth Act, which y,-as enacted m 1985. S~e D.C. Law 6-M, '\2 OCR 4587
{Dec. 7, 198S)(oodified as amended at D.C. Code~ :!4-901 et s q.): si.'l' IJlw Jlollo...al \'. Umttd Stares. 9.Sl A.2d
S9. 60 (D.C. 2008) (noting that the Youth Act wa..'i enacted ''to fill the \'Oid .. created by the repeal of the fVCA)
(quotataon and citations omitted). Giv~n rhi~ hastory. imcrprc:tation of the FYCA ha e bec:n ~een as in tructh e
wben construing the Youth Act. ~,. Fmua '' Unir~d Statr.J, 615 A.2d 213. 217 n.lO {D.C. 1992).
it purpose and c:Oect): 1'o!.lotr ,.. United Stat<'~. 448 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C. 1982) rthe purpose of
The Youth Act ~hares the FYCA's purp 1se. of .. rchabilitation. treatment. segregation,
and expungement,'' Smith. 591 A.2d ot 3 0 n.2 (citations omined). and similarly ~t:tks .. to give
the ourt tlexihility in sentencing u youth otlcndcr according to hi~ indi"idual nted~."
Committee Repon at 2: ~c a!Jo Brow,, 579 A.:!d at 1159 (''sentencing flexibility in order to
addrcs~ the particular needs of a }Outh otTcndcr wa'i n ~~cilic objec.:ti\'t: of d1e [Youth .:\clr)~
D.C. Coclt: ~ 24-903(1) {noting th1.1t the pro\'i ion' of the Youth Act ''provide sentencing
a/rcmativcs in addirjon tv tlu! oprjum ulreadr a' aUable to the court") (ernphasi~ added). In
addition to tti-. ing the t:ourt the flcxibi lity nccdtxl to impost: individualizoo sentences, th Council
designed the statute to "separate! e) ~outh offenders from more mature, elCpt.:rit:nc~J otlende";'
and to pro";dc an .. opportunit) tbr a tl~:-.c:r\ ing yuULh l)tl~ndt::r to ~tart anew through
repeatedly reiterated by the! Di!ouict ofColwnbia Court of Appeals. Stt, t>..g lfnlloH (1)'. 951
A.2d at 64; Smith, 597 A.2d at 380 n. 5~ Brcm n, 579 A.2d at 1158-59.
In ntencing a defendant under the Yt,uth Act, a lria1 court thu~ must I{'ICu on the
defendant's individual needs and on crafting a sentence geared toward rehabilitation; the Youth
Act demands flexibility in order to m~.:t these goals. and docs not focus the sentencing judge
excJusivcJy on the need for punishm~nt or the nature of the charged oftensc:. Application of the
Guidelines, ho"evcr. involves a fundamentally different approach: a grid with the nature of the
lead offense on the vertical axis and the defendant criminal hi~tory cure on d1e hori7.ontnl axi
detennines the ..box'' that dictates the sentencing range. Set DCVSG Appendix A. \\bile the
application of aggravating or mitigating factors may lead to a sentcm:e "oubide or the: box: the
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deftnd::mts indi' idual. treatment. or rdtahilitati\ e needs do not constitute a bu is for ~entencing
outside of the Guidelines range. S(c IXVSG 5.2.3. This disparity between the philosophical
approa hcs to sentencing un lerlying the Youth AcL and the Guideline- indicates. at least to this
judge. that ~1rict lhcrencc to the Guidelines is not appmpriate wht:n sentencing a defendant
The: n)lc: of the Youth Act in allowing judges to sentence youthful ofic..-ndcn:; without
regard to some :-,tatutorily-imposed mandatory minimum sentences further impacts the analysis
of whether the Court should rely on tlte Guidt:lines lo detemnru.! the lm\ end of poss ible
sentences during a Youth Act scmcndng. The inapp1icahi1ity of <:ertain statutory mandatory
minima to n Youth Act sentence stron!!IY suggests ro Ult: urul~rsigned that a sentencing coun
In 1970. the United States Court of ApJ>eals for the: Oistrict ofColwnbia 'ir~ui l
examined whether the fYCA granted trial judge discretion to sentence below a statutory
mandatoryminimwn. In Unirt!dStme.s ' ' /Joward.449 F.2d 1086(0.C. Cir. 1971 ), the
go\ emmc:nt argued that the defendant's l:Onviction tor first degree murder barred any . entc:ncing
under the Youth 'orn:ctions Act. !d. at I 092. Morco\'er. it claimed lhat because the first-degree
murder statute pecitied that an indiv,idual convicted of that ofTen e must be punished by death
or life imprisonment. the entcncing j udgc had no diS\:retion to impose any other sentence." !d.
Rejecting the government's argument. the D.C. Circuit rea oned that individuals sentenced under
the FYCA were not subject to offense-specific sentencing pwvisions: .. if the defendant qualifies
under the Youth Corrections Act, IS lJ.S.C. 5010. then the judge i. not 'ubjectlo the
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puni\hm nr prmi.,wn" reneral~J' prescrib<:.dfor the crime. wth.!~' he; has made a prior
determination that he "ill not impo-;e ~ t=ntc:ncc under the Youth Corrections Act: ld. {noting
oll. ) that "a sentence under the Youth Corrections Act usually provide:-:; tor Clmfmement shorter
than that a corded adult ()n~nder. .. , (t!mpha is nddc:d). The cout1 ohs..:rvcd that "[i]t is not the
place of this coun to a1vc an exception into the statute not written in it~ l8fib'Uagc: and added
lh:lt Congres.. had not intended those s~nten~etl under the 1- 't C A to be bound by the traditional
dub ~entcncing statutel-1. Sc.c id. at 1092-93 (c:xpluining tl1at Congress would have included an
ex~cption, a it did inn :timilar scntencin..; l ~tw for slightly-lc:ss-youthful ofTe11dc:r~ between the:
age~ oftwcnt}-two and twenty-five, if it had intended fLlf trial judges to he con tntincd by
The Di trict of Columbia Court of Appeals rcJchcd a parallel conclusion in United Stale.s
\'. Sroke.,, 365 A.ld 615 (D.C. 1976). :tiler the govt:mmcm appealed the imposition of a ~ntcncc
und r the FYCA folio" ing the appellee's conviction for first-degr~ murder. Stoke.. 365 A.2d at
619-10. Jbe tatute at issue in th:n case. D.C. Code: s 22-2404 (1973). stated that
..fn)ot" ithstanding uny other prO\'ision of Ia"..' a person Clmvictcd of Jir!)t-degree murder ...
shall be eligible for parole vnly after thl: expiration or twenty years ... : Jd. at 6 I 6 n.4. There.
the go\'emmcnt argued lhat the not\\ ithstanding language ''must prevail ~ s the cleare!-it
e pre-ssion of legis lath c intent" over the FY ..A language permitting probationary sent\!necs. !d.
at 618. 1be Court of Appeal disagrc:ed. stating that it would be "more logical to a sumc" that if
Congress had ..intended the exclusion of first-degree murder from Youth Act c;on:ragc.'' it would
have expressed such an intent at the time the FYCA was extended to th~: District. /d. Cf. 18
U.S.C. 4209 ( 1959) (repealed 1984) t' making Youth Act treatment available ro 'young adult
offenders" ages twenty-two through tv.:enty-five and c:xplicitly excluding ..any offense for which
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th~ is pro\ ided 8 mandator) penalty"). Relying on its interpretation of the FYCA and on
'"Congress' broad remc!dial purpose in affording certain )OUng offenders the o pportunity for
rehabilitation under the Youth ct... the Court of Appeals held that it was ''Cl'mpellcd to adopt a
con~"trUCtion of the tatutes which imposes the more lcnitnt punishment" and pcm1ittcd ofTc!ttders
convicted offirst-degree murder to receive sentences under the FYCA. /d. at 619~ see alSo id. at
6 19-620 (""In the absence ofpcrsuasi\'c evidence of legislative intent to th~ contrar)', we would
not be ju.\tificd in th"arting this lcgislathe design with respect to a single offense." ).
Like the FYCA. the Youth Act has been r-ead to pennitjuclges not to impose certain
mandatory minimum sentences imposed by st.arutc. In Grt"t'n ~. Unit<:d Stutes. 974 A.2d 248.
262 n .43 (D.C. 2009). the District of Columbia Court o f Appeal" pennittcd th~ re-sentencing of
an individual convicted of possession o f u tir~arm during tht: commi siun of a crime: o f violence
could rccci\e a sentence of less than tl\ c: years under the Youth Act. ( .. [The: appellant] rcqu ts,
.
and the government does not oppose. a remand f()r re-sentencing. The trial coun senknccd him
under [the Youth Act] , and. at th~ government's rcttuest. the trial court imposed m ndatory
minimwn tenns. In light of its review of the legislative history of[the Youth Act]. however. 'the
govc:mmenl ... [now) accedes to appellant' claim that the five-year mandatory minimum terms
required by D.C. Code 22-4502 (a) and -4504 (b) do not have to be imposed when sentencing
under the (the Youth Act].,.,) (fourth alteration in original). Moreover. the District of Columbia
Coc.ancil's Committee on the Judiciary explicitly stated when considering the elimination of
parole and indeterminate sentencing that mandatory minimum sentences did not apply to
iDd.ividuals sentenced under the YRA, declaring that the District's now-adopted sentencing
ICbeme ..does not require or result in any extension or application of mandatory minimum
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men\,;cs t , categories of ofi"c:ndcrs. indudi11 , p ,.,,om rclllenccd under the Youtlr RchabilitalioiJ
A ~. w ulri~ 1r mandatory minima do not appl currrlll(!l under Di.)trict ofColumbia l.aw." 0 C
Coun il. Comnuttee ol the Judid31), Report on Hill 12-523. <'fruth ttl Scnh:ncing Amendment
ntenc-c~, t'f .:oursc. eompeb a judge hl ignore the Guidelines simply because she is ~t."Tllcncing
a defendant pu~-uant to the Youth A t. However. the amc reasoning that drives th~ conclusion
that impositi''" of mandatory minimwn ~cmences docs not cohere: " ith pplicnrion of the Youlh
ct ~plies with equal. if not greater. force again~t at,Jh.,matic deference to the Gunldin1.."S range
when sentencing under the Youth Act. Indeed, it would ~et:m imttional to bold that a judge:
scnten ing a deft:ndant under the Youth Act is not hn md by certain mandarory minimum
sentences c~atcd by .!tlututc. but must be- constraim:d by the mimma construckd through a
vo1unuuy guidelines system. In the end. tht: impac of tht: Youth Act un tatutory mandatory-
minimum ::;cntcnce provides a compelling a.rgurnt:nl against . trict adher~ncc to the Guidclin
In this case_, the Court did nm 'it:w the decision as to whether to scntcn~c Mr. Goldsmith
under lhe Youth Act as a panicularly difli~uh one. Sec. D.C. Code s 24-903(c) (directing the
court to make a statemmt on the record of the reasons tor its dc:tcnnination that a YllUlhful
offender will bc...-ncfit from the provisions of the Youth Act . Mr. Goldsmith is an extremely
young man: he was on I)' ixtccn years old at the time of .scmencing. and reportc.-d that he was one
of the youngest prisoners during the brief p~riod in which he ''as in the custody of the
8
Depanment nfCorrcctions in this case. As the numerous report-. onsidcrcd by the Coun. prior
t0 sent en ing make abundantly dear, Mr. Goldsmith is murkedly imm:.uur~. and has f::1ccd a
\ariety ()f educational difficulties and cognitin-: issues. The crime in thi ~asc - while
immature a t. one that did not hwohc a fm:ann and that did not re-.;ult in an injury to another
person. Perbap most importantly. Mr. Goldsmith is already ~ubjcct to a treatnu:nt plan imJX>sc:d
upon him "a result of another ~ase, and was uctively participating in thut Lreatment pl:m in order
I() address his educational. psychological, and otller n~d:> lndc ...xt. the government did not
oppose a Y(\Uth A~:t scmen~e in this ca~c. For these rea~01~. the Coun found that Mr. Gold!tmith
would dcri,c benefit from trcauu\,;m as a youthful off4."Tldcr. and ~cntcncc:d him under the: Youth
Act Sc 24-903(c).
For the reasons sel fhrth above. once the Cow1 opted to sentence Mr. Goldsmith undet
the Youth Act. it did not feel it appropriate to adht!rc strictl. to the -;c:nh:ncing nmge imposed by
the Guidelines- wh.i h would have n:quiretl a prison h:nn of between twenty-four and sixtysix
months- to determine the appropriate sentence in this case. lni>tead, t(.cusin on many of the
same factor.-; lhat led ir to sentence ~lr. Goldsmith under the Youth Act (and. in patticular, on
resources. and the disruptit.)n to those .service that would t'ccur houJd the Court incarcerate
him) the C..oun concluded that u uspendcd scntcm:c best balanc<..-d the Youth Act's goals of
punishing Mr. Goldsmith while also taking into account his youth. flexibly add~sing his
individualized needs, and seeking to prevent him trom re-otfending at a future dute. Set' 0 C.
Code 24-903(a (I) rIf the court is of the opinion that the! youth uffcndcr doe not need
commitment, it may uspend the imposition or execution of ~c:nlence and pla c the Y'1uth
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offender on probation."). Accordingly. the Court cntenccd Mr. Gold mith to twenty-four
months of incarceration and three years of supervised release, with the sentence suspended in its
entirety in lieu of eighteen months of supervised probation conditioned upon Mr. Goldsmith (i)
compl}ing with the tem1s of the treatment plan set lbnh in his oth~r case: {ii) attending school;
and tiii) participating in mental health treatment and counseling as dccm<..-d necessary by me
Asooc~a~c Jud~e
(~itned 1n Clumbers)
Copin To:
.
.Attorneyfor Co-Defondmrl William Wood~on