Berga cama un colwe Rentrovertiat. Kon Etope. untvk meng ere monsuatnys Deercciaaurarecteen ance Ga cules x8 fekenan porte antideret nengruseret perazabace kongtruber, Kecya Komese tem precuket tender i Sema tat dianggett sho wine Kelucr Pobre oi Ue, Aemeivamseciabonsdi pecokshon Bieme 39 Hdake mensertongic uw excavator at porusalnacin thal! , Pl Se a Seas Ag tests burton periona ingots ‘omnis. or GM AE mes ee cgeuer terol (Orchant eagle Mee orca ta 3 some ten Deplie, acter AG wecke, baka wereke mereka menoiper lovee: InEu politcal ed EMU ote6 Gorse, Gece © Ge FAL untuk pasar 5epang re fe 4 AS. 198%. Kowalse okcargs tama so/se market—the | 49 towadenen diver al Presser. KDC (temaatsu dresser corp) made by Perk tn tuaM USD do 4 pabrite di Brown (UK) beaail 1 memercctuksr excautrr under its own ie c. leader, = clump trate In the i US. company t that had acquired International Harvester’s construction equipment business in 1983, ‘The new $1.4- billion company (Komatsu Dresser Corp., or KDC) combined the US.-based finance, engineering, and ‘manufacturing operations of both companies, while maintaining separate sales and marketing organizations in KDC, Using all four of the two parent companies’ plants in the United States and Braail, the joint venture produced most major construction products including hydraulic excavators, bulldozers, wheel loaders, and dump trucks. The joint venture was controversial within Komatsu, partly because many within the ‘company had heard the industry speculation that Dresser entered the joint venture as a means of exiting this money-losing business segment in which it had a neglected product line, lagging quality, and out-of-date plants. Furthermore, it represented a radical departure from several of Komatsu’s closely held strategic maxims and traditional management policies: centralized production, total control over product development, whole ownership of subsidiaries, and Japanese management throughout the Komatsu group. In this way, the KDC deal served notice that the company was ‘committed to a major change in the way it managed its international operations. Entering the 1990s Jn June 1989, Masao Tanaka stepped down as president and was replaced by his intemationally oriented vice president of corporate planning, Tetsuya Katada. With a degree from Kyoto University of Law, Kaiada had risen through Komatsu’s ranks in personnel, labor relations, and corporate planning, After 36 years in the company, Katada was well-known. Colleagues saw hhim as a “quiet and cool-headed commander,” who spoke freely and honestly with superiors and subordinates alike. His introduction in the press signaled that he intended to take bold action. In response to questions about yet another change in Komatsu’s leadership, the new president differentiated his strategy and style from his predecessor's: Mr. Tanaka placed defense above anything else in his management policy. [Defense] was necessary because of the persistent high-yen environment. I, however, swill be on the offensive in my own management policy. When pressed on his relationship with Ryoichi Kawai, Mr. Katada added: “I have never hesitated to talk straight with my superiors. ... [Chairman] Kawai is indispensable at Komatsu. He is, however, nothing more or nothing less than an important advisor.” Questioning the Past ‘The situation Katada inherited was anything but promising, Despite Komatsu’s recent yet belated internationalization, sales were virtually unchanged from their level seven years prior, and 5 This document is for use only with the Harvard Business Publishing ‘Case Analysis Coach’!