VII.

Special Civil Actions

A.
VIII. Interpleader
A.
B.
C. When Proper (Section 1)

Petra Carpio Vda. De Camilo, et al. v. Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, 1961

Facts:
Petitioner Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo, had been by herself and predecessor in interest in peaceful, open
and adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, situated in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur,
containing an area of about 400 square meters. A commercial building was erected on the property which
was declared under a tax declaration number and assessed. Respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one
of the apartments of said commercial building since June 1, 1957.

On August 1, 1957, Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against both De Camilo and
Ong Peng Kee with the Justice of Peace (JP) of Malangas. For failure of Bannister and/or counsel to
appear at the trial, they were declared in default and P100.00 was awarded to De Camilo on her
counterclaim. The motion for reconsideration presented by Bannister was denied.

The other petitioners, Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana, Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben,
all surnamed Francisco, the said minors represented by their mother Susana, had also been in possession
(in common), peaceful, open and adverse, since 1937, of a parcel of public foreshore land, about 185
square meters which is adjoining that land occupied by De Camilo. On this parcel, a commercial building
was erected by the Franciscos. On September 1, 1957, the two commercial buildings were burned down.
Two weeks thereafter, respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, constructed a building of their own,
occupying about 120 square meters. The building, however, was so built that portions of the lands
previously occupied by petitioner (De Camilo and the Franciscos) were encroached upon.
De Camilo filed a case for Forcible Entry against Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong with the JP of Malangas,
with respect to portion belonging to her wherein the building of Ong Peng Kee was erected. On August 8,
1958, Severino Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case. In answer to the complaints, the
defendants (Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong), claimed that the land where they constructed their building
was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas.

Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong filed a complaint for Interpleader against De Camilo, Severino Estrada,
the Franciscos, Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas. Interpleader plaintiffs
further alleged that they had no interest in the property other than as mere lessees.

Issue: Is interpleader proper?

Ruling: NO. Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides

Interpleader when proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants
to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was
separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her
property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with
Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas,
adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not
have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or
possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a
complaint of Interpleader do not exist.

Also, the complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of
the JP court, because the action would then necessarily involve the title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein over which the CFI has original jurisdiction.

Short Digest
X built a commercial building on a public foreshore land. X has been in adverse possession of
the foreshore land. Y also built a commercial building on the public foreshore land adjacent to
that of X. But fire burned down these two commercial buildings. Sub sequently, Z built his own
building encompassing some portions of X and Ys lands. As a result, X and Y filed a case for
forcible entry against Z. Z, on the other hand, filed a complaint for interpleader.

Question: Is interpleader proper?

Answer: NO. An essential requirement of interpleader is that the person who files as such must
have no interest in the subject-matter of the interpleader or must have an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the claimants. (Sec. 1, Rule 14, ROC).

Z had an interest in the subject matter. His interest was the prolongation of his occupancy or
possession of the portions he encroached upon. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a
complaint of Interpleader do not exist.

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT, VS. LEE
E. WON ALIAS RAMON LEE AND BIENVENIDO A. TAN, DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES.

G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976

Facts:
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines alleged that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case
26044 of the CFI of Manila entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf &
Country Club, Inc." and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued
on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila.
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc also alleged that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the
other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an
assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of
membership fee certificate 201.

The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and
litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the
two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and
cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the
trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the Corporation.

The Corporation's position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint, instead of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are
conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of membership fee certificate
201, and, as there is no identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil
case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been
dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.

Issue:

Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?

Ruling:

The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure,
except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of
the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the late, an interpleader suit is proper only
if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an
obligation.
There is no question that the subject-matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need
not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader.
He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen
without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by
laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that
it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the
conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before
it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It
was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead
Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As
a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been
executed. It is now therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he
had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.

The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for
interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered
against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be
entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee
under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.

In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been
made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case;
the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the
aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights
anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an
interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case
might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued
to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

Short Digest

Facts:

Won claims ownership over the memrbership certificate 201 by virtue of a decision rendered in a
civil case to which Wack Wack was a respondent. Tan also claims ownership over the same
membership certificate 201 by virtue of the assignment made by Swan, Culbertson, and Fritz.
Wack Wack filed an action for interpleader.

Issue:

Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?

Ruling:

NO! A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He
need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has
arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be
barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he
had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.

In this case, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case against Wack Wack. Hence, the
action for interpleader was filed inexcusably late.

Very Long Digest

Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Development Bank Commented [1]: Sorry, guys. Taas jud ni sya na
digest.
Facts:
The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank
(CB) bills with a total face value of P70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would mature on January
2, 1995. As evidenced by a Detached Assignment dated April 8, 1994, the RCBC sold these CB bills to
the BOC. As evidenced by another Detached Assignment of even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB
bills to the PDB. The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.

On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P70
million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order and a Confirmation of Sale.
However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as
evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94
referring to the Treasury Bills. Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments.
It is basically the nature of this April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.

On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it sold back to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn,
the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25,
1994, the BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these three
CB bills.

On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation
which transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). On September 30, 1994, All
Asia further transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.

On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused
to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill.
As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital and Insular
Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the RCBC
paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC ultimately, the BOC
acquired these three CB bills.

All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.

PDB informed Nuqui, OIC of BSP Government Securities Dept., of its claim over these CB bills based in
the detached assignment in its possession. However, it was denied invoking Sec. 8 of the CB Circular No.
28 which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books
of BSP. PDB clarified that it was not asking for the transfer of CB Bill rather to put BSP on formal notice
that whoever in possession of said bills is not a holder in due course thus BSP should not make payment
upon presentment. Nuqui responded that the BSP is not in a position to determine who is not a holder in
due course.

PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC. PDB
claimed that there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of
a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it
merely warehoused the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

The RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity.

On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia.
In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were consolidated. On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the
PDBs application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause
of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the other hand, the BSP
countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies
only to an owner and a person presenting the bond, of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not
presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSPs books, in its
favor to clothe it with the status of an owner. Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be
allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and
willing to pay the subject CB bills face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the
rightful owner.

PDB agreed that the various claimants should now interplead. Accordingly, on June 9, 1995 and August
4, 1995, the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate Escrow Agreements. The first agreement
covered the first set of CB bills, while the second agreement covered the second set of CB bills. The
parties agreed to jointly collect from the BSP the maturity proceeds of these CB bills and to deposit said
amount in escrow, pending final determination by Court judgment, or amicable settlement as to who
shall be eventually entitled thereto. The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion, submitting these Escrow
Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave its approval to the parties Joint Motion. Accordingly, the
BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB
and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow.

On May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to manifest their intention regarding the case and to inform
the court of any amicable settlement. Complying with the RTCs order, the BOC moved (i) that the case
be set for pre-trial and (ii) for further proceeding to resolve the remaining issues between the BOC and the
PDB, particularly on who has a better right over the subject CB bills. The PDB joined the BOC in its
motion.

On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSPs motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the
BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon. In October 2000, the
BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier
arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.

In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of the nine CB
bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as buyer in the April 15
transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19 transaction, either the
original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income that may have been earned during
the pendency of the case.

Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted the BOCs
Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.

In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion, questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the BOCs
additional counterclaims. The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to
determine who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide
holder for value. The RTC cannot entertain the BOCs counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is
the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills.

The BOC opposed the PDBs Omnibus Motion. The PDB filed its Reply.
In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDBs petition, the BOCs counterclaim and the
BSPs counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no
jurisdiction (i) over the BOCs counterclaims and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills.
With the denial of their separate motions for reconsideration, the BOC and the BSP separately filed the
present petitions for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:
No.

Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially assuming
jurisdiction over the PDBs petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction. While the RTC agreed
(albeit erroneously) with the PDBs view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only
the BOCs/the BSPs counterclaims but the PDBs petition itself as well, on the ground that it lacks
jurisdiction.

This is plain error.

Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the trial
court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDBs petition, its decision would have to be set aside
on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it dismissed the
PDBs petitions and the BOCs counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court
seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB bills falls within its
general jurisdiction.

Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDBs petition but on
the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer
plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining
conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section
1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:

SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter,
or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves.

The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect
of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to
pay more than once on a single liability.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises, where
the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated
merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides
an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action.

In granting the BSPs motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to resolve the
parties conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties conduct - and
accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly,
however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDBs
argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDBs petition - which means that it did not actually compel the
BSP to resolve the BOCs and the PDBs claims.

Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDBs petition
since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims not the BSP. Given
that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief
originally sought in the PDBs petition since the RTCs order granting the BSPs motion to interplead - to
which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal of the PDBs petition. This is
not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit against the public respondents because the grant of the order to interplead effectively
sustained the propriety of the BSPs resort to this procedural device.

Short Digest

Principle:
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect
of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to
pay more than once on a single liability.

Facts:

RCBC was the registered owner of seven Central Bank bills in which these CB bills were sold to BOC.
BOC, in turn, sold these bills to PDB as evidenced by detached assignment.

PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC treasury bills as evidenced by a Trading Order and Confirmation of Sale.
However, instead of delivering the treasury bills, PDB delivered the CB bills to BOC.

PDB now assails its claims to BSP. However, it was denied by the BSP. PDB filed before the RTC two
separate petitions for mandamus, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against Nuqui, BSP and RCBC. The trial court temporarily enjoined Nuqui
and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity. PDB also impleaded BOC and All
Asia. BOC prayed for the dismissal of the petition for lack of cause of action since PDB is no longer the
owner of the CB bills. On the other hand, the BSP asked for an interpleader suit be allowed between and
among the claimants to the subject bills.

PDB and BOC entered into two separate Escrow Agreements in which the RTC gave its approval.

The RTC granted the BSPs motion to interplead. BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. However, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion questioning the RTCs
jurisdiction over the BPCs additional counterclaims.

The RTC dismissed the PDBs petition, BOCs counterclaim and the BSPs counter-complaint/cross-
claim for interpleader holding that it has no jurisdiction.

Issue:
Was the trial court correct in dismissing the case?

Ruling:

No.

Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDBs petition but on
the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer
plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining
conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section
1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect
of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having
to pay more than once on a single liability.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises, where
the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated
merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides
an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action.

Ocampo vs. Tirona

Petitioner purchased the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject land's owner Alipio Breton
Cruz. Although TCT is not yet on P's name, he claims possession and administration over the property.
Respondent is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land. A formal written notice was given to
Respondent by P, and for some time, former made advances on his rentals to P. However on July 5, 1995,
P received a letter stating that the subject premises was declared under the area for priority development
and in connection thereto, R is invoking her right of first refusal, therefore she will temporarily stop
paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority have processed the pertinent
papers as regards the amount due to P by reason of the implementation of the law.

After refusing to heed on P's demand of rental payments, he filed a case for lawful detainer against R. R's
main contention (in her reply) is that e property in question is not owned by P. MTC ruled in favor of P.
On 4 March 1996, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, who claimed to be the owner of the subject land,
filed a motion with leave to file intervention before the RTC. At this point, RTC already issued a writ of
execution pending appeal for the enforcement of MTC's decision and denied the motion to intervene as it
would violate the 1964 Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
RTC considered the memorandum submitted by R as a manifestation of her motion for reconsideration
for the writ of execution, thus, it ordered to recall and cancel the execution. R, this time, raised that Alipio
Breton is the registered owner and her landlord since 1962 and claims that she never stopped paying her
rent to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola and that Rosauro Breton waived his right over the property to his
sister therefore, the latter cannot sell the land to P.
RTC still affirmed MTC's decision.

CA however set aside the ruling as it considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite
to P's action.
Issue: What is the proper remedy R should seek in this case?

Held: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real,
in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or
claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court
and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally
who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that
the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a
stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court.
Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to
pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.

Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful
detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from
Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos
terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

Quick Digest:

Facts: P purchased a land from Y, heir of the registered owner, lessor of R. R is a lessee of this property.
R is unsure with who to pay the rental fees to since the ownership of the land is not yet recorded in the
TCT and there were no manifestation of the change of ownership that binds the lease.

Issue: What is the remedy of Z.

Held: An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay
rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her
preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable
diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a
suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.

PASRICHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. G.R. NO. 136409, 14 MARCH 2008
FACTS:

Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease
whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the San Luis Building.

Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and
the use of telephone cables.

The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and
35 as subjects of the lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with
Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco
was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly
rentals until May 1992.

After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the
stipulated rent. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed
by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July
until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble
in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. To further justify their
non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms)
subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35.

To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the
check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.

The MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment. It considered
petitioners nonpayment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to pay the
rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should have deposited their
payment in the name of respondent company. The court, however, dismissed the complaint
because of Ms. Bautistas alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.

RTC reversed the MeTCs decision. It upheld Ms. Bautistas authority to represent respondent
notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied
from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.

CA affirmed RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).

RULING:

Yes. Interpleader or consignation is the proper remedy. (Consignation is another remedy in case
of conflicting rights to collect the rent. You may not read the discussion on Consignation)

The Courts discussion:

What was, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals because
ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify
their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They
should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of
payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just
cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the
thing or sum due.

Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:

xxxx

(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;

x x x x.

Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority,
before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of
the consignation in other cases.

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals.
The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more
onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they made
a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that
was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender,
still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the
rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of
payment may be produced.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

 Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to
whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the
right to collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to
protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.

Principle:

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy
is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double
vexation in respect of one liability.

Quick Digest

FACTS:

Petitioner (Pasricha) and respondent (Don Luis Dison Realty Inc.) executed two contract of
Lease.

Despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because
petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent
through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July
until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble
in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment.

To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the
check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).

RULING:

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect) The remedy
is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double
vexation in respect of one liability.

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.

D.
E.
F.
G.
H. Determination (Section 6)

Maglente v. Baltazar-Padilla

LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) owns a parcel of land. The same was leased to the
petitioner Maglente. In their leased contract, it provides that if PRC sell the property, petitioner
shall have a right of first refusal (given the first priority to buy it). When the leased contract was
about to expire, PRC sent letter offering to sell the property to petitioner. the latter response to
the letter, and intimated that she would exercise her right of first refusal. However, on a later
date, PRC receive an offer from respondent that they will buy the land.

PRC filed an interpleader action with RTC against the claimants. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner declaring that she had the right to purchase the land and order PRC to execute the
corresponding the contract of sale in favor of the petitioner.

At the rendition of said judgment, the respondents have been occupying the said property.
Petitioner then filed for the issuance of writ of possession. However, respondents objected on
the ground that the trial courts decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners
right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to
possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession being adjudged in the interpleader
case as the rightful parties to purchase the said land.

RULING:

No.
Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of possession.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings;
(2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property
provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution
sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.

Petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with
it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements
the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly
determined in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve
into that issue.

Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the
judgment but must strictly conform to it. It should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it
life and not exceed it. We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of
possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial courts
judgment in the interpleader case.

Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file
the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can
delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the
rules and processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

SHORT DIGEST
FACTS:
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) owns a parcel of land which was leased to petitioner
Maglente. In their leased contract, it provides that if PRC sell the property, petitioner shall have a
right of first refusal. When the leased contract was about to expire, PRC sent letter offering to sell
the property to petitioner and the latter respond to the letter, and intimated that she would exercise
her right of first refusal. However, on a later date, PRC receive an offer from respondent that they
will buy the land. PRC filed an interpleader action with RTC against the claimants. The RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioner. Respondents have been occupying the said property. Petitioner
then filed for the issuance of writ of possession. However, respondents objected on the ground
that the trial courts decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners right to
purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to possession.
 ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to a writ of possession being adjudged in the interpleader case as the rightful
parties to purchase the said land?

RULING:
No. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of possession.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings;
(2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property
provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution
sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.

Petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it
the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the
writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a
case directly relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

I.
IX. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
A.
B.
C. Where to File
Imbong vs. Ochoa

Facts (Long): Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the
RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
 2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to ones health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that
the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary
to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that:

1. there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination.;
2. some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and
3. the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.

Facts (Short):
RH Law was enacted by Congress.
Fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention, most of which are
praying for injunctive reliefs, were filed directly with the Supreme Court
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law.
Respondents argued that the Petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.

Issue: Does the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over the petitions?

Ruling: Yes.

As a rule, the original jurisdiction of Petitions for Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies rests with the Regional Trial Court as provided under Section 1 of Rule 63.
However, where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Supreme Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over the petitions.

LONG DIGEST
Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 BRAGAT

FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages against respondents. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a
parcel of land. Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the
subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable
of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a
cloud upon petitioners title to the property.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from
their title. Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dismissing
petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act
No. 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less
than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a
real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does
not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-
48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the
RTC Orders dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
 An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil
Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right
to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also
result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to
carry the judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require
that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an
action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief,
and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

QUICK DIGEST
MALANA VS TAPPA
G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009

PRINCIPLE: The mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
"shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which
involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.
FACTS:
Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (Danao heirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao
which they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family
member of Tappa) to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property.

Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might
need it. Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy the subject property
even after Consuelos death, building their residences thereon using permanent materials.

Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that
they already needed it, Danao heirs demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded.
Meanwhile, Danao heirs referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this, saying that the documents were falsified and
highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the heirs title to the property.
Thus, the heirs filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.

ISSUE: Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction? No .

Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC.

RULING: An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action for the reformation
of an instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase may be
brought under the RTC. These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief becau se they result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas the Rules of
Court uses may, the amended Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining
jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM)
or P50,000 (MM).

In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the
MTC, not the RTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, the case for quieting
of title was filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the subject property. Since
the heirs had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the
filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on
the value of the property involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.

OFFICE OF THE OMDUSMAN V IBAY

FACTS:
In connection with the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation investigation on the alleged
scam, petitioner issued an Order directing private respondent Lourdes Marquez branch manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines o produce several bank documents for inspection relative to Account Nos. 011-37270-5, 240-020718, 245-
30317-3 and 245-30318-1, reportedly maintained in the said branch.
Private respondent failed to comply with petitioners order and explained that the subject accounts pertain to
International Corporate Bank (Interbank) which merged with Union Bank in 1994. She added that despite diligent efforts,
the bank could not identify these accounts since the checks were issued in cash or bearer forms. She informed petitioner
that she had to first verify from the Interbank records in its archives the whereabouts of said accounts.

Petitioner reminded private respondent that her acts constitute disobedience or resistance to a lawful order and is
punishable as indirect contempt under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Section 15 (9) of
R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Petitioner issued an order to private respondent to produce the requested bank
documents for in camera inspection. In the event of her failure to comply as directed, private respondent was ordered to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and why she should not be charged for obstruction.

Instead of complying with the order of petitioner, private respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief with an
application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 135, presided by respondent Judge Francisco Ibay. In her petition, private respondent averred that under Sections
2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits), she had the legal obligation not to divulge any information
relative to all deposits of whatever nature with banks in the Philippines.

But petitioners Order cited Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the power to examine and have
access to bank accounts and records. Private respondent, therefore, sought a definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards
her rights as well as petitioners power to inspect bank deposits under the cited provisions of law. Meanwhile, private
respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing petitioners order to institute indirect
contempt proceedings against her.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter thereof. Public respondent denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner then filed an ex-parte
motion for extended ruling. Public respondent issued an order declaring that it has jurisdiction over the case since it is an
action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition assailing the Orders dated August 19, 1998 and December 22, 1998
of public respondent on the ground that public respondent assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued orders with
grave abuse of discretion and clear lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Did the respondent acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in the aforesaid petition for
the declaratory relief?

RULING: No.
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not
among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under Section 15 (8)
of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to deposits of
whatever nature. The interests of the parties are adverse considering the antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one
hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by
private respondent who refused to allow petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The issue invoked is ripe
for judicial determination as litigation is inevitable.
2 SENTENCE RULING:
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not
among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
OMBUDSMAN (petitioner) conducted an investigation on the alleged scam on PEA-AMARI. It issued directing MARQUEZ
(respondent) to produce several bank documents for inspection relative to certain accounts maintained in the said bank.
However, she failed to comply and explained that despite diligent efforts the bank could not identify the bank accounts.
OMBUDSMAN issued another order to MARQUEZ to produce the documents requested for in camera inspection. Instead
of complying the requested order, MARQUEZ filed petition for declaratory relief with an application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati, presided by JUDGE IBAY (respondent).
OMBUDSMAN moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE: In what court does petition for declaratory relief be filed?

RULING: The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is
not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

D. Requisites

LONG DIGEST

G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent is a lessee of the Ponciano, father and husband of herein petitioners. The contract of lease contained a
provisions which gave rise to the instant case, that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment
on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located and in case an extraordinary
inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment; 6

During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Hence, the respondets have been dealing with the respondent. The
petitioners advised respondent that they will increase its monthly rental adding VAT. The respondent refused to pay the
VAT but instead, continued to pay the amount stipulated in the contract.

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for determining the interpretation of the contract.

Issue: WON the action for declaratory relief is proper.

Ruling:
Yes. The action for declaratory relief filed by the respondent is proper. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an
action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent
was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. Respondent did not breach the contracts because
despite pendency of the case, they continued to pay the monthly rentals stipulated in the contract.

SHORT DIGEST

Y entered into a contract of lease with X. The contract of lease contained that the rental rate stipulated is based on the
presetn rate assessment, in case the assessment is increased, the rent will also be increased. X later on died and was
substituted by Z. Z informed by that the rental price will be increased. The respondent refused to pay but instead,
continued to pay the amount stipulated in the contract. Y instituted an action for decla ratory relief for determining the
interpretation of the contract. Respondent alleged that the remedy of prohibition is not proper because he breached the
contract. Is prohibition the proper remedy?

Yes. The action for declaratory relief filed by the respondent is proper. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an
action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of action or proceeding. In the case at hand, all are present.

Edades vs. Edades

In his complaint, the Juan Edades alleges that he is an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades with Maria de Venecia, having
been born when said Emigdio Edades was legally married to Maxima Edades with whom Emigdio had eight legitimate
children; that he had always enjoyed the continuous and uninterrupted possession of the status of illegitimate child by
direct and positive acts of his father and of the legitimate children of the latter; that as such illegitimate child he is en titled
to share in the inheritance of his father under the law; and that as the legitimate children of his father will deny, as in fact
they have denied his right to inherit, and such denial may ripen into a costly litigation, he brought the present action for the
determination of his hereditary rights.

Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the motion holding that "An action for declaratory relief just for the
purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the plaintiff's status or rights would seem to be improper and
outside the purview of a declaratory relief. Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of compelling recognition of such
rights, if disputed or objected to." Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint, without costs. From the order of
dismissal, plaintiff has appealed and the case was certified to this court because only questions of law are involved in the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an action to determine hereditary rights and established status of child are within the purview of
declaratory relief.

Ruling: No.

Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is interested "under a deed, will, contract or othe r
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance" in order to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule
66). Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination. (Tolentino vs. Boar d
of Accountancy, 90 Phil., 83).
The present case does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither
concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or
validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of
inheritance which plaintiff desires to assert against the defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking for have not yet
accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father Emigdio Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein
defendants. And the law is clear that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent" (Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in the
meantime, the law may change, the will of the testator may vary, or the circumstances may be modi ed to such an extent
that he who expects to receive property may be deprived of it. Indeed, the moment of death is the determining point when
an heir acquires a de nite right to the inheritance (5 Manresa, 5th ed., 324). This action therefore cannot be maintained if
considered strictly as one for declaratory relief.

One Liner:
Action to determine hereditary rights and established status of child are not within the purview of relief.

SHORT CASE DIGEST:

A brought an action before the CFI (now RTC) seeking a declaratory relief judgment on his hereditary rights in the
property of his alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. Is the
action of declaratory relief proper for the determination of hereditary rights and established status of child?

No. The action of declaratory relief is not proper for the determination of hereditary rights and established status of child.

Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is interested "under a deed, will, contract or othe r
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance" in order to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, R ule
66). Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination.

As action seeking to determine his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father and incidentally the recognition o f
his status as an illegitimate son can not be maintained as one for declaratory relief because it neither concerns a deed,
will, contract or of her written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is
involved. Nor is it predicated on any justifiable controversy, for the alleged right of inheritance which plaintiff desires to
assert has not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father has not yet died. And the law is clear that "the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent" (Article 777, new Civil Code).

TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY(long digest)

FACTS:
An action for declaratory relief was filed in the CFI by Tolentino, a Filipino CPA against the Board
of Accountancy and two foreign nationals (Ferguson and Hausamann) also CPAs practicing the
profession under a trade name (Felming and Williamson), and that the provision in the Philippine
Accountancy Law as amended authorizing accountants to practice their profession under a trade
name is unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes persons engaged in other professions
from adopting or using a trade name, hence it is a class legislation.
In the defendants answer, they allege that the plaintiff has no right or interest adversely affected
by the said Accountancy Law and that he is entitled to the benefits and may use a trade name or
firm name in the practice of his profession as accountant.
The defendant Board of Accountancy did not appear or answer notwithstanding service of
summons upon it and upon the Solicitor General. By agreement of the parties, the case was
submitted for decision upon the pleadings presented and the memoranda filed by the parties.
The CFI dismissed the complaint holding that the disputed law is not unconstitutional. From that
decision the plaintiff appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
W/N the plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of the Phil.
Accountancy Law

RULING: NO
Plaintiff, has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him
the right to secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question.

Requisite facts or conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief is lacking. Therefore, the
complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
RATIONALE
His action for relief was to test the constitutionality of the Law, according to him it constitutes
class legislation for the Law is exclusive in character which extends benefits only to those
engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not f or
his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other
professions, who are not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or
damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed firm
name by the defendants. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the
herein defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the
unconstitutionality of the law in question. This case, therefore, does not properly come under rule
66 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the institution of an action for declaratory relief.

Requisite facts or conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Justiciability; its requisites. Except that accomplished physical wrong need not be alleged in a
petition for declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all the usual conditions of an
ordinary action.
There must be
(1) real parties in interest
(2) asserting adverse claims and
(3) presenting a ripe issue.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarized its exhaustive opinion on the requisites of
justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by saying that the court must be "satisfied that an
actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are sui juris
and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the
controversy." Justice Brandeis thought that "the fact that the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its
own doubts, or by the fears of others does not confer a cause of action." But the doubt becomes
a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.

Bar Q:

P, a Filipino CPA, filed an action for declaratory relief against the Board of Accountancy and X
and Y, 2 foreign nationals also CPAs practicing the profession under a trade name. P argues
that the provision in the Philippine Accountancy Law as amended provides authorizing
accountants to practice their profession under a trade name is unconstitutional on the ground that
 it excludes persons engaged in other professions from adopting or using a trade name, hence, it
is a class legislation. X and Y answered that the plaintiff has no right or interest adversely
affected by the said Accountancy Law and that he is entitled to the benefits and may use a trade
name or firm name in the practice of his profession as accountant. Is X and Y correct?

Ans:
(1st paragraph) Yes, X and Y is correct. P has no actual justiciable controversy.
(2nd paragraph) Requisite facts or conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief is lacking.

Requisite facts or conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Justiciability; its requisites. Except that accomplished physical wrong need not be alleged in a
petition for declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all the usual conditions of an
ordinary action.
There must be
(1) real parties in interest
(2) asserting adverse claims and
(3) presenting a ripe issue.

(3rd paragraph) In the case at bar, requisite facts or conditions for an Action for Declaratory Relief
is lacking.
His action for relief was to test the constitutionality of the Law, according to him it constitutes
class legislation for the Law is exclusive in character which extends benefits only to those
engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for
his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other
professions, who are not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or
damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed firm
name by the defendants. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the
herein defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the
unconstitutionality of the law in question.

(4th paragraph) This case, therefore, does not properly come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court
which authorizes the institution of an action for declaratory relief.

E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
X. Review of Judgements of COMELEC and COA
A. Scope (Section 1)
 Sabdullah T. Macabago v. COMELEC and Jamael Salacop, 2002

Facts:
On May 22, 2001, petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner had a lead of 198 votes over his adversary, Jamael M. Salacop.

On June 1, 2001, Jamael filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against
petitioner and the proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the members of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, docketed as SPC-01-234, to annul the elections and the proclamation of
candidates in the Municipality of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. Jamael alleged that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in Precincts Nos. 19, 20,
28 and 29, and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of
Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election
process in those precincts a sham and a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity.
Jamael further averred that if his petition were to be given due course, he would win by a margin of one
hundred ninety-four (194) votes over the votes of petitioner.

Jamael appended thereto photocopies of random Voters Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the
fraud and deceit that allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that
serious irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts.

The Commission characterized the petition as one for the annulment of the election or declaration of
failure of election in the municipality, a special action covered by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

After its examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded that there was
convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four (4) precincts that
necessitated a technical examination of the original copies of the VRRs and their comparison with the
voters signatures and fingerprints.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. But private respondent insisted that, under Rule 64, a special civil action
for certiorari is proper only for the nullification of a final order or resolution of the COMELEC and not of
its interlocutory order or resolution such as the assailed order in this case.

Issue: Is the recourse to SC under Rule 65 (not Rule 64) proper?

Ruling: YES. Admittedly, Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads: Scope. This Rule shall govern the
review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit.
But Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed order of the
COMELEC declaring private respondents petition to be one for annulment of the elections or for a
declaration of a failure of elections in the municipality and ordering the production of the original copies
of the VRRs for the technical examination is administrative in nature. Rule 64, a procedural device for the
review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court
under Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the exercise of its administrative
function.

And, although, as a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a
special civil action for certiorari. But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved
party may seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

Short Digest
X lost to Y in the mayoralty elections. X filed a petition with COMELEC alleging massive
substitution of voters, and rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures. Based on
the submitted Voters Registration Records (VRRs), COMELEC found proof of massive fraud in
the conduct of elections. COMELEC ordered a technical examination of the originals copies of
the VRRs and their comparison with the voters signatures and fingerprints. Y filed a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

Question: Is Ys recourse proper?

Answer: YES. Admittedly, as a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a
proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. But when the COMELEC acts capriciously
or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND

CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor
of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.
The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of
votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with
163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.

Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010, the petitioner averred as his special affirmative
defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not
render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

The COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the
protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section
2, paragraph 2, Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, requiring all decisions to clearly
and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based; and that it also
contravened Section 7(g), Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to
the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC.

The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas motion for reconsideration,
prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC

Ruling:

Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

Ambil v. Commission on Elections are enlightening, viz:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division,
certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the
Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc
along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order
of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the
COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of
the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the
1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the
resolution and determination of election controversies. The breadth of such powers encompasses
the authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest and to
decide based on such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to
outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804.

Short Digest
Facts:

C won in the election and was proclaimed the Governor of Cagayan De Oro. B filed a protest
alleging vote buying and violation of election laws. C filed an affirmative defenses that B did not
make the requisite cash deposit. The Comelec First Division denied the defense of C.

C filed an MR but was later denied by the Comelec First Division. This prompted C to file a
special civil action of certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Can the court take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

Ruling:

Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc
along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits

B. Who May File

Long Digest
X.B Ibrahim vs. COMELEC

Facts:

On December 1, 2009, Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of Datu-Unsay in
the May 10, 2010 elections. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election
Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the
names of 20 candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.

The Law Dept. brought the names to the attention of the COMELEC en banc and recommended the
retention of the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motu propio
institute actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws. The COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution approving, but with modification, the Law Dept.s recommendation stating that
to disqualify the candidates for not being registered voters and to file election offense cases against said
candidate for violation of Sec. 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ibrahim and the other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition to assail the said resolution but the
COMELEC en banc denied the same.

In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained
finality, Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay.
However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended
Ibrahims proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Hence, petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions. Petitioner contends that MBOC is a ministerial body
created merely "to take the returns as made from the different voting precincts, add them up and declare
the result." Since he received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of his eligibility.

Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for Ibrahims petition be granted on the
lack of proper proceedings by the COMELEC on their issuances because IBRAHIM was disqualified as a
candidate. Further, jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy pertains to the
COMELEC sitting in division and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only take
cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions for
reconsideration are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.

On the part of the COMELEC, it assails that Ibrahims immediate resort to the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is improper. COMELEC argued that despite the issuance of the
assailed resolutions, Ibrahims name was not stricken off from the certified list of candidates and the
votes cast for him were counted. Thus, there is no actual prejudice caused upon him because the
COMELEC did not direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. Also, Ibrahim should have instead
filed a pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed illegality of the
MBOCs proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant petition filed under Rule 64 to assail the
resolutions of the COMELEC en banc dated December 22, 2009 (disqualification of the candidates) and
May 6, 2010 (denial of the petition/opposition).

Ruling:

Yes. Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail
the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or
ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powerFurther, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of
final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued
with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said
resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised
do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers.
What the instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and
of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not
qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The December 22,
2009 and May 6, 2010 Resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the suspension by the MBOC of Ibrahims proclamation on the basis of the herein assailed
resolutions is likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Short Digest

Principle:
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or
ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of
final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

Facts:

Ibrahim filed his Certificate of Candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay. However, as per
COMELECs resolution, he was disqualified as he was not a registered voter. He filed an opposition but
the same was denied. Pending the finality of the denial of his opposition, the elections continued where he
won as the Vice-Mayor. The Municipal Board of Canvassers suspended his proclamation.

Ibrahim then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions. He contended that MBOC as a ministerial body created
merely to take the return as made from the different voting precincts, add them up and declare the result.
The COMELEC contended that Ibrahims immediate resort to the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 is
improper.

Issue:
Was the contention of COMELEC correct?

Ruling:
No. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order
or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of
final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

Reblora vs. Armed Forces of the Philippines

Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy. Prior to entering military service, P rendered
civilian government service at DILG from Jan 6 1969-July 20 1974. P entered military service as a
Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy on 21 May 1973 and was called to active duty effective 26
August 1974. On 25 January 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially confirmed the
incorporation of petitioners civilian government service at the DILG with his length of active service in
the military.
On 22 May 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active service, the petitioner
was compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No. 142. He was, at that time,
already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy.
For his retirement benefit, P chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in
advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3) years worth thereof for the first three years
after his retirement. The AFP granted petitioners claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the
latter the sum of 722,297.16 as advance lump sum. In computing for petitioners retirement benefit,
however, the AFP did not include petitioners civilian government service at the DILG. P disagreed with
computation of the AFP. He insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include the
period of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service.
After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the
petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement
benefit.
COA denied P's claim on the ground that although his civilian service at the DILG should and ought to be
included as part of his active service in the military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits
under PD No. 1638, P shouldve retired on 22 May 2000 to comply with the compulsory retirement. With
this, the COA found that, applying the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually
underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount of 77,807.16.
Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the present Rule 45 petition
before this Court.
Issue: Whether or not COA's decision is reviewable under Rule 45

Held: No, Petitioner Availed of Wrong Remedy

This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions
and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this:

Section 2. Mode of Review.A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial lawthe most profound of which, arguably, is the
difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by
restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari
before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry
in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewedeven by this
Court.
That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave abuse of jurisdiction nor any
jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the
part of the COA and the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioners case.
For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account, an improper invocation of this
Courts power of review over the judgments and resolutions of the COA.

Quick Digest:

P retired from military service at the age of 59, of which he served 34 years in the military including 3 yrs
of service in DILG. AFP calculated his retirement benefits excluding the civilian service. Thus, P filed a
petition to COA. COA denies the claim although admitting that the 3 yrs must be included in the
computation but P should have retired earlier as mandated by law. P seeks to annul the decision of COA
for denying his retirement benefits discrepancy under Rule 45.

Issue: Is COAs decision reviewable under Rule 45

Held: No. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 X.B. SAHALI V. COMELEC,

G.R. NO. 201796, 15 JANUARY 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Sahali and private respondent Matba were candidates for governor in the
province of Tawi-Tawi in the 2010 Automated Elections. The provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor of the province. Alleging that
said elections in the province were attended by massive and wide scale irregularities,
private respondent filed an election protest with the Comelec and moved for a technical
examination of the Election Day Computer's Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration
Records (VRR), and the Book of Voters for the contested precincts in the province of Tawi-
Tawi by comparing the signatures and the thumb marks appearing on the EDCVL as
against those appearing on the VRRs and Book of Voters.

The comelec first division issued an order which granted the motion and thus directed its
Election Records and Statistics Department to conduct the said technical examination. The
petitioner filed with the Comelec first division a Motion for Reconsideration of said order
granting the technical examination. However, the Comelec First division issued an order
(interlocutory) denying the motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved by such order, petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court via certiorari
assailing the interlocutory order issued by the Comelec first division.

ISSUE: Is petitioner correct in resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to

question an interlocutory order issued by the Comelec first division?

HELD:

NO.

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a division of the Comelec in an

election protest may not directly assail the order to the Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal
of the decision of the Division in due course.

The power of the Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC
EN BANC, not to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
Quick Digest

FACTS: Jun Lacobo, a defeated candidate in the 2010 governatorial elections for the
Province of Bundok Tralala, filed with the COMELEC an election protest against the duly
elected governor, Elsie Lacsa, and moved for recounting of election returns. The Comelec
first division issued an order granting the motion and directed its concern officers to
conduct the recount. Elsie Lacsa filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting
recount to which the Comelec first division denied.

ISSUE:

Can she assail the interlocutory order issued by a division of the Comelec directly to the
Supreme Court via certiorari?

HELD:

No.

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a division of the Comelec in an

election protest may not directly assail the order to the Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal
of the decision of the Division in due course.

The power of the Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC
EN BANC, not to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.

C.
Pates v. COMELEC

LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
a. February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the petition);
b. February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (petitioner) received a copy of the February
1, 2008 Resolution;
c. February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008
Resolution (4 days from receipt of theFebruary 1, 2008 Resolution)
d. September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also
assailed in the petition).
e. September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18,
2008

Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition for certiorari fell on a Saturday (October
18, 2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4
days in preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was
October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner
filed his petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of
November 11, 2008.

The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was
seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases
decided beginning the year 2005.

The fresh period refers to the original period provided under the Rules of Court counted from notice of
the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the period for the
preparation and filing of the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be used for review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC.

Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise
apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.

RULING:
No.
As a Matter of Law
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court
provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition
for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They
exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference
between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a
special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en
banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible
from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to

warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his filing
was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should
adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us any reason specific to his
case why we should act as he advocates.
SHORT DIGEST

FACTS:
On September 22, 2008, the petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18,
2008. So, the last day for filing of a petition for certiorari was October 20, 2008 the following Monday
or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition on October 22, 2008 or
two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. The petitioner asks us in his
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under the fresh
period rule.

ISSUE:
Should Rule 65 of the Rules of Court be used for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC?

Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise
apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.

RULING:
No.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court
provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition
for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They
exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference
between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a
special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc.
The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides),
with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to

warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his filing
was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should
adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us any reason specific to his
case why we should act as he advocates.

C. Osmea vs. Commission on Audit

Facts (Long): In preparation for the 1994 Palarong Pambansa (Palaro), the City
engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc. (WTCl) and Dakay Construction and
Development Company (DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu City Sports
Complex. Osmea, then city mayor, was authorized by the Sanggunian of Cebu to
represent the City and to execute the construction contracts.

While the construction was being undertaken, Osmena issued a total of 20

Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI and to DCDC. These Change/Extra Work
Orders were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior
authorization from the Sanggunian.

Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in
the construction and renovation of the sports complex, but the other Sanggunian
members refused to pass the resolution authorizing Osmea to execute the supplemental
agreements with WTCI and DCDC to cover the extra work performed. Thus, the extra
work completed by WTCI and DCDC was not covered by the necessary appropriation to
effect payment, prompting them to file two separate collection cases before the RTC of
Cebu City. The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the
extra work performed. To satisfy the judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the
required appropriation ordinances.

During post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of
litigation expenses, damages, and attorney's fees to WTCI and DCDC. The City
Auditor held Osmea, the members of the Sanggunian, and the City Administrator liable
for the P2,514,255.40 and P102,015.00 awarded to WTCI and DCDC, respectively, as
damages, attorney's fees, and interest charges.

Osmea and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration of the disallowance.
The disallowance was modified declaring that the payment of the amounts awarded
as damages and attorney's fees should solely be Osmea's liability, as it was him
who ordered the change or extra work orders without the supplemental agreement
required by law, or the prior authorization from the Sanggunian. The COA
Regional Office's Decision was sustained by the COA's National Director for Legal and
Adjudication.

Osmea filed an appeal against this Decision. COA issued a Decision which affirmed
the notices of disallowance on May 6, 2008. Osmea received a copy of the Decision
on May 23, 2008 and filed a motion for reconsideration eighteen days thereafter. The
COA denied Osmena's motion on June 8, 2009. The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City
received said Resolution on June 29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmea left for the
United States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery and returned to his
office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmea filed the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COA's Decision of May 6,
2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009.
Osmea argues that the remaining period should be counted not from the receipt of the
COA's June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City on June 29,
2009, but from the time he officially reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after
his trip abroad. Since he is being made liable in his personal capacity, he reasons that
the remaining period should be counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he needed time to hire a private counsel who
would review his case and prepare the petition.

Facts (Short):
Mayor engaged the services of Company X and Company Y to construct and
renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex and 20 Change/Extra Work Orders
which were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior
authorization from the Sanggunian.
COA issued a Decision making Mayor solely liable to the amounts awarded
as damages.
Mayors motion for reconsideration which was filed 18 days after the receipt of
the COA Decision, was denied.
Since Mayor was in the US for a mandatory medical check-up, he was only able
to file a Rule 64 petition 28 days from receipt by his Office of the denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration or 12 days from the date he returned from the US
and actually took notice of the Decision.

Issue: Was the petition filed with the reglementary period provided for under Section 3,
Rule 64?

Ruling: Yes.

As a rule, Section 3 provides for a 30-day period, counted from the notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, to file the petition for
certiorari. The Rule further states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
said judgment or final order or resolution interrupts the 30-day period. However, the
Supreme Court have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than
serve the ends of justice.

We find Osmea's reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the
service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009
through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15,
2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective date when he was actually
notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to
rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmea of his right to appeal the Decision of the
COA, despite the merits of his case.
 Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition
should be counted from July 15, 2009. The present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was
filed within the reglementary period.

D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
XI. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
A.
1. Certiorari

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287,
July 1, 2014

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The
World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. S o
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth
was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request
of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

RULING:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both
are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos
v.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery,
or the Kings Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to
determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts judgment was rendered without authority.
The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to
whom no other remedy was available.
If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of
certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common
law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by
laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of
certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the
requirements for that purpose, viz:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is
a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on
the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi -legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits
of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to
it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can
be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court
is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected
parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.

OTHER ISSUES
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of
the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects
may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition
of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings
as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law,
such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
QUICK DIGEST

ARAULLO VS AQUINO

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office the then Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) to speed up the funding of government projects.
However, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expose claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona which was taken from the DAP. It turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive but some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson
of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP.

ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

RULING:
XI.A.1
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. The sole office of the writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of
the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious
or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for
want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding
in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain future
action, and is directed to the court itself. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

XI. B. Distinguished from each other

ARAULLO, id
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings
when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi -legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law,
or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and
not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the
court itself.
The writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.

TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC. V PNB-REPUBLIC BANK

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action for annulment of contract, mandamus and damages against the
respondents PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders. Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two
parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to
compel PNB-Republic Bank to award instead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioner's
claim was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of the properties to Solid Builders, Inc.
After the rejection of petitioner's bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker whose services
were engaged by petitioner for its negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the
Tagaytay properties, obtained a legal opinion from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel that the authority given to the Committee/SMCC to dispose of and approve the sale of
acquired assets is subject to Board approval if the amount is over P3 Million. The absence
therefore of the required Board approval on the sale of the subject properties to Solid Builders
did not perfect the contract to sell the subject properties, that the Bank may now entertain
other offers to purchase the subject properties but any disposition of the subject properties
must be with the prior approval of the Board of Directors of the Bank.
During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify. When Roque's testimony was offered
specifically with respect to the legal opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents objected to
its admission for being violative of the rule on attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and
PNB-Republic Bank.
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for certiorari proper regarding the admissibility of evidence?
RULING:
No.
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law.
The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial
court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order
in cases where the tribunal has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the
application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of
evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in
making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the
rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence
during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate
appeal or review on certiorari . They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal
properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
2 SENTENCE RULING:
The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a
determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings
of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of
a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on
certiorari .
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES (petitioner) filed an action for annulment of contract, mandamus and
damages against PNB-REPUBLIC BANK and SOLID BUILDERS INCORPORATED (respondents) to
annul the sale of two parcels of land in Tagaytay City and to compel PNB-REPUBLIC BANK to
award the sale to it. TRIPLEXS claim was rejected by PNB-REPUBLIC BANK.
TRIPLEX engaged the services of ATTY. ROQUE for its negotiations concerning the Tagaytay
properties and obtained a legal opinion that the absence of the required Board approval of
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK to SOLID BUOLDERS did not perfect the contract to sell.
During trial, TRIPLEX called ATTY. ROQUE to testify but disallowed as it will violate the rule on
privileged communication between the lawyer and the client. TRIPLEX was aggrieved and filed
for petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for certiorari proper regarding the admissibility of evidence?

RULING:
No.
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law.
 When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the
application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal.
The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a
determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings
of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of
a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on
certiorari .

2. Prohibition

G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004

TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S. DAVID,PACIFICO S. DAVID, NEMESIO S. DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID, CRISTINA S. DAVID,
PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S. DAVID-DE LEON, Petitioners,
vs.
AGUSTIN RIVERA, Respondent.

LONG DIGEST

Facts:

Claiming to be the owner of the disputed property, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners before PARAB. While petit ioners
in the case filed a complaint for ejectment before the MCTC. During the pendency of the ejectment ca se, PARAB rendered its
decision in favor of respondent. Hence, petitioners appealed the case to the DARAB. Later on, the MCTC rendered its decision in
favor petitioner. The respondent did not appeal the MTCs decision but instead he filed a petition for pr ohibition and preliminary
injunction and/or TRO, seeking the nullification of the MTCs decision. The petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made a substitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal.
But to no avail. Petitioners appealed the cas to the CA, which upheld the decision of the RTC.

Isuse: WON the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

NO. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In this case, where two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases
involving the same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for
prohibition. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper,
speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy
to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction i n handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained." The purpose of a writ of prohi bition is
to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.

SHORT DIGEST

X and Y had a dispute over an agricultural land. Y filed a case before the PARAB for peaceful possession but while the case i s
pending in PARAB, X filed for ejectment in the MTC. Before the MTC could render its decision, the PARAB rendered in favor of Y.
Later on, MCTC, rendered a decision in favor of X. instead of appealing the case of the MCTC, Y filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction and/or TRO, seeking the nullification of the MTCs decision. Was the petition for prohibition the pr oper
remedy?

Yes. In this case, where two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and pa rties,
and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdi ction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is
no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained."
 Esquivel vs. Ombudsman

Facts:
P02 Eduardo and SP01 Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio P. Esquivel, municipal payer of Jaen and his brother, Eboy
Esquivel, barangay captain of Apo, Jean, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, an d grave
threats. After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their
companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit, petitioners and their companions denied the
charges against them.

The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain
Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats.
The Ombudsman Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.

Thereafter, the separate informations for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Eboy Esquivel, and for grave
threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied .

Petitioners, before the Supreme Court, argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider
the exculpatory evidence in their favor. They also prayed for a writ of prohibition.

Public respondents, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari ac tion. They further
postulate that this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against them and being evidentiary in nat ure, its
resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition be granted.

Ruling: No.

First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdi ction to which it
has no legal claim. As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the criminal cases in question is clearly founded on
law.

Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law
are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. T hat the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying
the issuance of the writ. In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a
motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this procedur al lapse
as they have not shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a
motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed arraignment, but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorar i or
prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order.

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought
to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The foundation of this rule is the respect and co nsideration
due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation; it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not
properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it. The records show that petitioners only raise d the issue of
the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.

SHORT CASE DIGEST:

A & B are public officials; A is a municipal mayor, while B is a barangay captain. Acting on various charges filed against th em, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending As and Bs indictment, and thereafter, proper Informations
were filed against them in the Sandiganbayan. A & B prayed for a writ of prohibition before the Supreme Court on the ground o f lack
of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan. Should writ of prohibition be granted?

No. The writ of prohibition be denied.

First, a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no
legal claim; Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies
provided by law are adequate and available; and Third; a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unl ess the
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction

In the case at bar, Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the criminal cases is clearly founded on law. Furthermore, A & B could have
filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance (now RTC) but they did not. Lastly, A & B only raised the issue of the
alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before the Supreme Court.

3. Mandamus
Militante vs CA
Facts:
Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land. The three parcels are covered by TCT
Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
[2]
In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315 expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and 73960, and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and
2018. Section 1 of said P.D. reads:
"Section 1. The real properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 70289, 73960 and a portion of 71357
identified as Lot Nos. 3593, 3594 and 3629 in the name of Maria B. Castro and Lot No. 3206 in the name of
Bonifacio Co as Tax Declaration No. 25395 with an aggregate area of 403,799 square meters, more or less; Lot Nos.
3591 and 3592 containing a total area of 1440 square meters in the name of Abdon Chan as per Tax Declaration
Nos. 24853 and 24854 and Lot Nos. 3603, 3605 and 3607 containing a combined area of 1,590 square meters in the
name of Pio [sic] Militante as per Tax Declaration No. 24876 all of which were previously covered by Transfer
Certificate [of] Title No. 71357 and the adjacent real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 2017
and 2018 registered in the name Leonora Carriedo containing an area of 141,133 square meters, more less and all
located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, having been identified as a blighted area and included in
the SIR Program established under Letters of Instructions No. 555 and ZIP Program as provided by Executive Order
No. 6-77 dated 21 July 1977 of the Governor, Metropolitan Manila, are hereby declared expropriated. The National
Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as the "Authority" is designated administrator for the national government
and is authorized to immediately take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the
power of demolition of their improvements. Pursuant thereto, the Authority with the government of Caloocan City
and in consultation with the Metro Manila Commission shall evolve and implement a comprehensive development
plan for the condemned properties." Jlexj
The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the upgrading of basic facilities and
services and the disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants in accordance with the national Slum Improvement
[3]
and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP). It set aside P40
[4]
million as the maximum amount of just compensation to be paid the landowners.
The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, undertook the implementation of
P.D. 1315 in seven (7) phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were
acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid
for in 1978-1979.
On September 11, 1979, Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land
Reform Zone. Proclamation No. 1893 was amended on May 14, 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 which identified
244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
Meanwhile, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the
[5]
NHA under the supervision of said Department. On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the
regulatory functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body
[6]
attached to the DHS.
On September 24, 1981, petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land
Reform Program of the government. On October 2, 1981, HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a
certificate declaring petitioners lots "outside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the request, General
Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., of
[8]
Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families occupying petitioners lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem
and/or to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the removal/ demolition of all the illegal structures in
[9]
the said property." The squatters did not attend the meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano,
Acting Division Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager,
[10]
Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures
on petitioners property within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted for the
relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement Project.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor
Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioners properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. On
December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistio replied that "considering the said properties are private in character, the City has
[12]
no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or underwrite the development of said properties."
Jjjuris
Four (4) years later, in 1986, BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation under the
[13]
governments Community Self-Help Program. The NHA, through General Tobias, approved an emergency fund
of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots. NHA started negotiations with petitioner. In 1987, petitioner,
through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made a counter-
offer of P175.00 per square meter. Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA General
Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHAs maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by
[14]
petitioner, through his lawyer, in a letter dated March 20, 1989.
On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and
[15]
relocation of the squatters.
On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed
Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement
Project for the 24 families
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to
eject the squatters on petitioners land. At the conference of February 13, 1991, Carangdang claimed that petitioners
land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA and Carangdang

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ANNABELLE CARANGDANG CAN BE COMPELLED TO

EFFECT THE DIRECTIVE/ MEMORANDUM OF RELOCATION/ RESETTLEMENT SUBJECTING THE
SAID 24 SQUATTER FAMILIES FROM UNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING PETITIONERS SUBJECT PROPERTY
WITHOUT DECLARING P.D. 1315 AS VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Ruling: In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to desist from
relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdangs refusal to implement the demolition
clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus,
not prohibition.

Second. The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
[22]
defendant."

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it
or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
[23]
other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the
[24]
writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the
NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the
subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to
Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob
was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.

Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamusis premature if there are administrative
[25]
remedies available to the petitioner. If superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special
[26]
civil actions are generally not entertained. In the instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative
remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to
[27]
respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government Corporate Counsel asserts
that petitioner should have brought Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no
extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged
[28]
failure to act. The General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over
[29]
the operations and internal affairs of NHA.
The petition is dismissed.

Bar Q:

P had a parcel of land which were occupied by squatters. He requested NHA to demolish the improvements made
thereon and relocate the squatters. NHA issued an order addressed to the Mayor of Caloocan; however, the Mayor
did not implement such order. P filed a case for prohibition and mandamus before the CA against NHAs project
manager. Will the prohibition and mandamus be available?

Ans:
(1st paragraph) No prohibition is not proper.
(2nd paragraph) Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to
be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamusis premature if there are administrative
remedies available to the petitioner. [25] If superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special
civil actions are generally not entertained

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the
writ of mandamus.

(3rd paragraph) In the case at bar, He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order
from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their
shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was
addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager
Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
In addition, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from
the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA
representative. In fact, the Government Corporate Counsel[27] asserts that petitioner should have brought
Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her superiors.

(4th paragraph) There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative set-up could
have easily corrected the alleged failure to act. [28] The General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has
the power of supervision over the operations and internal affairs of NHA.

B. Distinguished from each other

PAMANA v. CA, 2005

Facts:
2 separate complaints, both for forcible entry with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, were filed
by the petitioner against the respondents. The complaints uniformly alleged, inter alia, that petitioner is
the owner and in lawful possession of parcels of land located at barrios Bocal and Lecheria, Calamba,
Laguna its ownership thereof being evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title that respectively covered
Lot 2-B-3-D-2, Lot 2-B-3-C, Lot 8, Lot 3 and Lot 4 of the subdivision plan. Sometime in 1995,
respondents, by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied said parcels and
built their shanties thereon.
Respondents: the lots they are in occupancy of are not owned by the petitioner because what they are
occupying are Lot 5 and Lot 7, both owned and registered in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Corporation which gave them permission to occupy the same.

RTC eventually ruled in favor of petitioner. Since no appeal was taken, the decision became final and
executory. RTC issued a writ of execution and followed by a writ of demolition, ordering the sheriff to
destroy and demolish respondents houses and constructions, it appearing that despite the earlier writ,
respondents refused to vacate the lot subject-matter of these cases.

Respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, praying the appellate court to restrain the sheriff from implementing the writ of
demolition.

The Court of Appeals set aside the MTCs Order of Execution, Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition
insofar as Lots 5 and 7 are concerned, and directed petitioner and the sheriff to desist from implementing
said writs against the respondents.

Issue: Was the application for prohibition (instead of appeal or certiorari) proper?

Ruling: YES.

As to appeal:
Appeal as a remedy is available only in cases where there is an error of judgment on the part of a court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency. An error of judgment is one which a court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction and which error is reviewable only by appeal. It is, therefore, an instance where a court
having jurisdiction on the subject matter of the case renders an erroneous decision.

Here, respondents do not impute any error of judgment on the part of the MTC when it ordered them to
vacate the premises in question. Neither do they question the correctness of the RTCs order dated August
22, 1997, affirming en toto the appealed decision of the MTC. As it were, respondents merely prayed in
the petition they filed that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding the sheriff to cease and desist from
further enforcing the Writ of Demolition because, according to them, the properties whereon their houses
stand are not among the parcels of land involved in the ejectment suits filed against them by the
petitioner. Appeal, therefore, is not the remedy they ought to have availed of under the circumstances.

As to certiorari:
The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. It is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff
during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but are purely ministerial
functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Likewise, certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose. For while certiorari is aimed at annulling or
modifying a proceeding, prohibition is directed at commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified in the petition.

Precisely, in the petition for prohibition filed by respondents, they did not seek to annul or modify the
Order of Execution, Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. What they there
assailed was the sheriffs power and authority to implement said writs vis-a-vis the lots actually occupied
by them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 7, then registered in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Corporation. It is as regards those lots that they want the sheriff restrained and prohibited
from implementing said writs, more particularly the writ of demolition. Consequently, prohibition, not
certiorari, is the appropriate remedy for them.

Short Digest
X filed a complaint for forcible entry against Y with respect to Lot A. Y rejoined that he
occupied Lot B that was owned by a corporation allowing him to do so. RTC ruled in Xs favor,
and, without an appeal, the decision became final and executory. The Court issued a writ of
execution, and followed by a writ of demolition. Y filed a petition for prohibition to restrain the
sheriff from implanting the demolition.

Question: Was the petition for prohibition (instead of appeal or certiorari) proper?

Answer: YES.
First, appeal is not proper because it is a remedy to correct an error of judgment. But Y does not
question the trial courts decision. Y wants to stop the sheriff because his house stands on a lot
not involved in the ejectment suit filed against him.

Second, the special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not available as a remedy for the correction of
acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial but are purely ministerial functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.

G.R. No. L-2422, September 30, 1949

MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, JUDGE OF

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, MELITON YBURAN, AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
E allegedly bought the subject property at an execution sale, but despite that, the judgment
debtor, as supposed owner of said property, subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine
National Bank and refused to surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter
brought suit to have himself declared owner of said property and placed in possession thereof.

The defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among
others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros
Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having
been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
judge to dismiss the action.

Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to be
ordered involves the exercise of judicial discretion and that petitioner has another adequate
remedy, which is by appeal.

Issue:

WON mandamus is the proper remedy in this case.

Ruling:

Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property be commenced and tried in the province where the property lies. As
the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and the redovery of possession of real property
situated in Negros Oriental, it is obvious that the action was improperly brought in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should have been
granted.

But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus is
not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." (Sec. 3, Rule 67,
Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court
by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be maintained in his court. The remedy in such
case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case because
the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.

Short Digest

Facts:
E alleged that he bought the subject property from an execution sale. Notwithstanding, the M
mortgaged the same property to PNB. E filed an action to have himself declared owner of the
subject property and to have in his possession the said property. M moved for the dismissal on
the ground of improper venue. The court denied Ms motion which prompted him to file a petion
for mandamus.

Issue:

WON mandamus is proper in the case.

Ruling:

NO! While the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus
is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right."
(Sec. 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of
the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be maintained in his court.
The remedy in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the
present case because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not
appealable.

C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Mandamus distinguished from injunction
Long Digest
XI. G Morabe vs. Brown

Facts:

The original petition filed in the Court of First Instance alleges that the respondent Brown had dismissed
Pablo S. Afuang because in an investigation conducted by the petitioner Morabe of charges against the
respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602, the said
Afuang was one of the complainants; that the respondent discharged the said employee in violation of
section 13 of said Act. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo
S. Afuang, and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his reinstatement. The court
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Thereafter, the respondent presented a petition asking
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Pablo S. Afuang had presented a letter asking excuse or
apology from the respondent for having taken his case to court.

On May 2, 1952, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from the service
of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage Law, because the fact that
he testified at the investigation is not a valid ground for his dismissal from the service. The court,
however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this
remedy, which it considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to be committed or,
actually being committed, and not against past acts; that injunction is preventive in nature only; and that
as the law has already been violated, the remedy now available is for the prosecution of the employer for
the violation of the Minimum Wage Law, and not for the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. It, therefore,
dismissed the action, as well as the petition for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and that
which was theretofore granted was dissolved. Against this judgment an appeal has been prosecuted to this
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate Afuang in the service.

Ruling:
Yes. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the
performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary
mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character. In the case at bar,
Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue in the service of respondent, because his act is expressly
provided to be no ground or reason for an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 602
states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this Act, * * *." Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his
right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or
illegal. Having been deprived of such right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel
the respondent to admit him back to his service.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the respondent William Brown is hereby ordered to
reinstate Pablo S. Afuang to the position he held prior to his dismissal.

Short Digest

Principle:
The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in
character.

Facts:
Brown dismissed his employee Pablo Afuang for testifying at the investigation conducted by Morabe for
the charges against Brown for paying his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602.
Morabe prayed Brown be ordered to reinstate Afuang, and that a preliminary mandatory injunction issue
for his reinstatement.
The Court rendered a judgment finding that the dismissal from the service of Afuang is unlawful.
However, it refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of Afuang on the ground that this remedy,
which it considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to be committed or, actually being
committed, and not against past acts.

Issue:
Was the trial court correct in denying the mandatory injunction?

Ruling:
No. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the
performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary
mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character. In the case at bar,
Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue in the service of respondent, because his act is expressly
provided to be no ground or reason for an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 602
states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this Act, * * *." Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his
right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or
illegal. Having been deprived of such right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel
the respondent to admit him back to his service.

H.
I.
J.
K. Jurisdiction and Exercise of Jurisdiction distinguished
Herrera vs. Barretto

Private Respondent believed that he is entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the
municipality of Caloocan. Upon the refusal of the authorities, R brought an action to obtain a mandamus
compelling the municipal president to issue cockpit license, it being his duty.
The plaintiff, herein the private respondent asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to
the defendant, to issue a provisional license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the
pendency of the action. The court granted and issued such order ex parte without notice of the defendant.
Thereupon defendant filed for a writ of certiorari alleging that the court acted without jurisdiction in the
following particulars: (1) in issuing mandatory injunction against the Municipal President, the judge
exceeded jurisdiction as the duty to issue cockpit license pertain to municipal council and not the
municipal president pursuant to the Municipal Code; (2) in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte
without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be
issued, (3) that the cockpit license has already been annulled and cancelled by virtue of a municipal
ordinance, (4) that there being another action pending between the same parties, CFI had no jurisdiction
to issue the mandatory injunction for the reason that such injunction tends to render inefficacious and
null the final decision which this honorable court will render.

Issue: Whether or not writ of certiorari is proper.

Held: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is Commented [2]: Hi guys, I wont make a shorter
directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter version na ha, kay i think if i make one, it may impair
some pertinent facts. char!
and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot
be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve
all matters arising in question.
Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court
no matter how irregular or erroneous it is.

Distinction between Jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction?

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power
to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon
the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

Distinction between lack of Jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction? (Topic: XI.P)

In the first instance, all acts of a court, not having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter, voidable
only. A court, then may act, first without power or jurisdiction; second, having power or jurisdiction, may
exercise it wrongfully; or third, irregularly. In the first instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly
void, and is as though it as though it had not been done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon
error; the third is irregular and must be corrected by motion.
In Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435), the court said: "The distinction is between a lack of power or
want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the first instance
all acts of the court, now having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter voidable only.

L.

M. Conclusiveness of courts finding as to its Jurisdiction

Campos v. Wislizenus

LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
Nemesio Campos filed an election protest against Adolph Wislizenus and Teodoro Aldanese.
The service of protest made to Nemesio was made to Isidoro, the winners brother asserting that they live
in the same house. HOWEVER, the MUNICIPAL PRESIDENT was NOT SERVED a copy of the
protest. (In 1916, there was a different rule in election proceedings).
The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the facts submitted, no service of the protest had been made on the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese in the manner requires by law and that, therefore, the court acquired no
jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.
FINDINGS of the court: As regards the rules of the Courts of First Instance, it does not appear that the
service has been made in accordance therewith; for it does not appear that the person who signed and
acknowledged receipt of the notice was residing in the house of the respondent and was in charge thereof.
CASE DISMISSED.
From the Court of First Instance of Sibonga, petitioner filed a CERTIORARI to Supreme Court and ask
the lower court to change its decision of dismissing the case.

ISSUE:
Is certiorari proper?

RULING:
NO.
We said in the case of Navarro vs. Jimenez (23 Phil. Rep., 557):
After the entry of the judgment in favor of the defendant, a motion was made by the plaintiff to vacate
and set aside said judgment and to dismiss the whole proceeding upon the ground that not all of said
candidates had been notified of the protest as required by law. The motion was heard. The question was
litigated. The evidence was discussed and considered. The arguments of counsel were presented. The
court found form the evidence that all of the candidates had been notified of the protest and that the notice
was in the form and served in the manner and within the time required by the statute. That question
having been raised before the court below and passed upon there, we are unable to see at this moment
how an action of quo warranto can be maintained, based upon the theory that such notice was lacking.
That question having been determined in the court below, and the decision never having been questioned
in the only manner in which such a decision can be, we must hold it conclusive in this action, quo
warranto not being a method by which that decision can be reviewed. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the action must be dismissed.
In that case we also said:
We have to say, in amplification of our former opinion on this question, that the general rule is that,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially
considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are
necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a
collateral proceeding.

Even though it be conceded that the court should have given the petitioner an opportunity to
present further evidence on the question of service the fact that the court held that the petitioner
had had his day in court with regard to that matter and that he was not entitled to another
opportunity at the expense of the respondent and the delay which would necessarily follow does not
go to the jurisdiction of the court and does not subject him to a revision of his orders on certiorari.

SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an election protest against repondents. The service of protest made to petitioner was made
to Isidoro, the winners brother asserting that they live in the same house. HOWEVER, the MUNICIPAL
PRESIDENT was NOT SERVED a copy of the protest. The court held that, under the facts submitted, no
service of the protest had been made on the respondent in the manner requires by law and that, therefore,
the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest. From the
Court of First Instance of Sibonga, petitioner filed a CERTIORARI to Supreme Court and ask the lower
court to change its decision of dismissing the case.

ISSUE:
Is certiorari proper?

RULING:
NO.
We said in the case of Navarro vs. Jimenez (23 Phil. Rep., 557):
After the entry of the judgment in favor of the defendant, a motion was made by the plaintiff to vacate
and set aside said judgment and to dismiss the whole proceeding upon the ground that not all of said
candidates had been notified of the protest as required by law. The motion was heard. The question was
litigated. The evidence was discussed and considered. The arguments of counsel were presented. The
court found form the evidence that all of the candidates had been notified of the protest and that the notice
was in the form and served in the manner and within the time required by the statute. That question
having been raised before the court below and passed upon there, we are unable to see at this moment
how an action of quo warranto can be maintained, based upon the theory that such notice was lacking.
That question having been determined in the court below, and the decision never having been questioned
in the only manner in which such a decision can be, we must hold it conclusive in this action, quo
warranto not being a method by which that decision can be reviewed. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the action must be dismissed.
In that case we also said:
We have to say, in amplification of our former opinion on this question, that the general rule is that,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially considers
and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give
it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.

Even though it be conceded that the court should have given the petitioner an opportunity to present
further evidence on the question of service the fact that the court held that the petitioner had had his day
in court with regard to that matter and that he was not entitled to another opportunity at the expense of the
respondent and the delay which would necessarily follow does not go to the jurisdiction of the court and
does not subject him to a revision of his orders on certiorari.

M.
N. Without jurisdiction; lack of jurisdiction; excess of jurisdiction; grave abuse of
jurisdiction defined

Ireneo Abad Santos and Jose V. Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 1939
Facts:
In an action instituted by the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain parcels of land for the
construction of the Capas-Murcia Diversion road, a compromise was entered into between said province
and the petitioners herein for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of their lands. The respondent
judge approved the compromise in a partial decision rendered by him on September 27, 1937, and ordered
the parties to comply with the conditions therein set forth.

On October 2, 1937, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of the Province of Tarlac, moved for the
reconsideration of the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under
the mistaken belief that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the appraisal committee of the
provincial government, composed of the provincial treasurer, district engineer and provincial auditor, and
that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the compromise, had no longer any authority to expropriate the
lands, because in virtue of Executive Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was declared a
national highway under the authority of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The respondent judge
acceded to this motion and, setting aside its decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authorized the
substitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in
accordance with the petition of the Solicitor-General to that effect.

Petitioners contend that the respondent judge was without power to set aside his partial decision which
was founded upon a compromise duly approved by him.

Issue: Was the decision final and executory, and did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling: NO, to both.

It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed because
the fiscals motion for reconsideration thereof was presented five days after its rendition. Not having
become final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice
require.

The fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been
rendered after a trial. It stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened
or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or absence of real consent.

No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Short Digest
Province X and Y entered into a compromise on the construction of a diversion road. Judge
approved the compromise. But Xs fiscal moved for reconsideration because he assented to the
compromise based on a mistaken belief. Judge acceded to his motion.

Question: Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion?

Answer: NO. Abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. But the decision has not become final and executory yet.
Fiscals motion for reconsideration was presented five days after its rendition. Thus, the lower
court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require.

O.
P.
Q.
R. Erroneous exercis of Jurisdiction

NAPA VS WEISSENHAGEN

Doctrine: Erroneous Exercise of Jurisdiction (effect)

The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be
corrected no longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains
jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that method (APPEAL). The writ in this country has been
confined to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose.
If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losing party
might have been able to rid himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially
the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of a
justice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is any
other.

Facts:

In February 1913, an action for the summary recovery of the possession of land under section 80 and
following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in the case at bar being the defendant there
and the defendants Julian Larong and Hermenegildo Bayla being the plaintiffs.

The Court of First instance found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered delivery of possession. The decision
was rendered on the 14th of April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.

The defendant filed for an appeal but was dismissed upon motion by the appellee on the ground that it had
not been perfected within the time required by law.

Issue:

Whether or not a writ of certiorari was proper for the revocation of the judgment entered upon the order
granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court having found that the contention of the respondents is correct, the petition is dismissed.
A mere statement of the case is sufficient to deny the relief prayed for:

It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a motion to
dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having
been exercised in accordance with the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed
by the practice of the country.

A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of.

Further, if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question
pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be,
they cannot be corrected by certiorari.

The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's
court and, therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto.

In the case at bar, the consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof
are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of
the fundamental question before it does not, except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question,
deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it may decide. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
cause, the right to act in a case. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is
what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of
all other question arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected
no longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its
errors can be corrected only by that method. The writ in this country has been confined to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose.

QUICK DIGEST

NAPA VS WEISSENHAGEN
FACTS:
An action for the summary recovery of the possession of land was filed by Julian Larong and HermenegildoBayla
against Agapito Napa.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and ordered delivery of possession.The decision was
rendered on the 14th of April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.
The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance for determination on the appeal, a motion was made by
the appellee to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within the time required by law.
The court entertained this motion, granted it, and dismissed the appeal.
The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ of certiorari for the revision of the record of the court below,
the revocation of the judgment entered upon the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set
aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari is proper in this case.
RULING:
NO.It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the
appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in accordance with
the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country.
We have held in numerous case that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court
to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We
have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question
pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they
cannot be corrected by certiorari.
A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's court and,
therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto. This being the case, the consideration of
the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may
be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the fundamental question before it does not,
except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it may
decide.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no
longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors
can be corrected only by that method. The writ in this country has been confined to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose. (Id.)
If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losing party might
have been able to rid himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same
footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of a justice's court
and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is in any other.

S. Plain, Speedy, Adequate Remedy (B. Lost right of Appeal)

SAN PEDRO V HON. ASPALA

FACTS:
Private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court a Complaint against herein petitioners San Pedro and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for
Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
Private respondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed
value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners,
with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that
encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from
entering, possessing and using subject property was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and
Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners
of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents had allegedly
been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The MeTC then issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property of small
value.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied in an order.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MeTC Presiding Judge.
The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for Accion
Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real property located in Quezon
City, with an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioners, but was denied in an order.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the
MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not
ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same.
The CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they
should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal.
ISSUE:
Is petition for certiorari a proper remedy in this case?

RULING:
No.
The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been entertained from the very
beginning.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be by a
verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded as follows:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was,
therefore, the correct remedy.

For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition
for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal
instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at
all.
2 SENTENCE RULING:
Rule 65 is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. A
petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct
remedy but a petition for review in certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

QUICK DIGEST:
Heirs of spouses APOLONIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO (repondents) filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court a Complaint against SAN PEDRO (petitioners) for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and
Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
WOOD CREST RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (respondent) that subject property was titled in the name
of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but SAN PEDRO, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed
that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property.
WOOD CREST RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing
and using subject property was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but SAN
PEDRO with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that
encompasses and covers subject property.
 Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The MeTC then issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss, ruling that, MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property of small value.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MeTC Presiding Judge.
ISSUE:
Is petition for certiorari a proper remedy in this case?
RULING:
No.
Rule 65 is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this
case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore,
the correct remedy. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at
all.

G.R. No. 181642 January 29, 2009

RUFINO S. CAMUTIN, EDDIE P. CAMUTIN, GINA P. CAMUTIN, represented by NOMINARIO SARIA, as Attorney-in-fact,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. NORBERTO POTENTE, and PASCUALA POTENTE, Respondents

LONG DIGEST

Facts:

Petiioners are the registered owners of the land in dispute. Petitioners are residing abroad. Upon their arrival in the Phili ppines, they
learned that the house of respondents were erected to the subject lots. Thereupon, they agreed that respondents would pay monthly
rent and in case, petitioners were to sell the land, repondents have the right of first refusal. However, respodnents failed to pay the
monthly rents and buy the lots. Consequently, the petitioners sold the lot and had it fenced. After the fence was erected,
respondents filed a complaint for partition before the RTC dated October 17, 2006. They alleged they had a right over one -half of
the property by virtue of the acknowledgment of rights allegedly executed by petitioners deceased mother. Later on, petitioners filed
a complaint in the barangay to have respondents warehouse removed from the properties. During the conference, the parties
agreed to wait for the outcome of the 17 October 2006 hearing on the case for partition before the RTC.

Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents before the MTC. It was countered by the respondents w ith a
motion to enforce the agreement entered into before the barangay, which is the agreement to wait for the outcome of the 17 Oc tober
2006 hearing on the case for partition before the RTC. The MTC then ruled that there was an amicable settlement.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss thereto, allegi ng that the
petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss in the assailed Order.

Petitioners thus come before this SC, arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and that the MTC likewis e
erred in suspending the proceedings in the case for unlawful detainer until the final resolution of October 17, 2006 Civil Ca se before
the RTC.

Petitioners contention: They allege that the MTC erroneously interpreted the barangay agreement differently from the clear
testimony of the Barangay Chairperson and acted capriciously and whimsically in ordering the case archived without basis.
Consequently, it was only proper for them to file the petition for certiorari before the RTC, which should have exercised its authority
over the MTC and corrected the error that the inferior court had committed instead of dismissing their petition. P etitioners thus
prayed that the RTCs order be annulled and declared null and void.

Respondents contention: Petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy. Since the assailed Order was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, respondents argue that the correct mode of review is an appeal to the Court of Appeals under
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: WON the petition for certiorari file by petitioner is the proper remedy.
Ruling:

The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allo wed
against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a
petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. However, on the
contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the
rules objective of speedy disposition of cases.

The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could
have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading. Ho wever, the
MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the
resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification
of the RTCs orders and the subsequent recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and
archiving it. The suspension of the unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus
no more need for the Court to decide the present petition on the merits.

In this case, if the petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the RC, a special
civil action for certiorari was, therefore, not the correct remedy.

SHORT DIGEST

X and Y owned a lot in the Philippines. Upon arrival, they learned that Z has been using the land. Thereupon, they agreed that Z
would pay monthly rent and in case, X and Y were to sell the land, Z have the right of first refusal. However, Z failed to pay the
monthly rents and buy the lots. X and Y sold the land and had it fenced. Aggrieved, Z filed a case for partition in the RTC. Due to the
inability of X and Y to deliver the said lot, X and Y filed a complaint in the barangay to have respondents warehouse remove d
During the conference, the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the case for partition.

X and Y filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the RTC assailing the decision of the MCTC where it noted the penden cy of
civil case for partition before the RTC and the existence of an "amicable settlement to await first the resolution of the Court on the
said pending civil case." Thus, the MCTC ordered that the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely suspended and
archived subject to its revival upon the final resolution of civil case for partition.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss thereto,
alleging that the petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading.

Is the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the right remedy?

No. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful
detainer or ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders cannot be deemed a
dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. However, the merits of the case was not actually decided. Hence, there is nothing to
appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a
prohibited pleading.

Sim vs. NLRC

Facts:

Sim filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank as Italian
Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to Manager positio n, until
September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David the Senior Officer, European Head of PCIBank, and Managing
Director of PCIB-Europe informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged
mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.

Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them, and sought the dismissal of the complaint.

The Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of m erit.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision and dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certior ari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA dismissed the petition due to petitioners non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the CA.

Ruling: Yes.

Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or any p lain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A plain and adequate remedy is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari .

There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
1. where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. In fact, the Court notes that the petition led before the
CA failed to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. It was only in her motion f or
reconsideration of the CA's resolution of dismissal and in the petition led in this case that petitioner justified her non -filing of a
motion for reconsideration.

SHORT CASE DIGEST:

A filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter but the case was dismissed. He appealed to the NLRC but the latter
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Consequently, without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, he went to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to
petitioners non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. Is CA correct in denying the petition?

-Yes. CA is correct in denying the petition.

Under Rule 65, the remedy of ling a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the ass ailed
order or resolution, the ling of which is an indispensable condition to the ling of a special civil action for certiorari. There are
exceptions to the foregoing rule. However, the instant case does not fall to the exception.

T. ALCANTARA versus ERMITA

FACTS:

On August 19, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 453
entitled "CREATING A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO PROPOSE THE REVISION OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION ON CONSULTATION WITH VARIOUS SECTORS OF SOCIETY."
Petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for prohibition in their capacity as Filipino
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that under Article XVII of the Constitution, President Macapagal-
Arroyo has no authority to participate in the process to amend or revise the Constitution. Likewise,
she has no power to create a Consultative Commission to study and propose amendments and
allocate public funds for its operations.

On December 16, 2005, the Consultative Commission submitted to the President its report
recommending changes in the charter. Then the Consultative Commission ceased to exist.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for prohibition is proper.

RULING:

The instant petition has been overtaken by subsequent events. The Consultative Commission is now
defunct. Hence, there is no longer any issue to be resolved by this Court. This case has become moot
and academic.

The mootness of the case is evident in the relief prayed for by the petitioners, namely, a writ of
prohibition. Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the writ of prohibition is one which commands the person to
whom it is directed not to do something which he is about to do. If the thing is already done, it is
obvious that the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act, and the
only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in
the prohibited direction. In other words, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future action.
Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. The Consultative
Commission has been dissolved. Consequently, we find no more reason to resolve the constitutional
issues raised by petitioners.

QUICK DIGEST

FACTS:

The President issued an Executive Order creating a Consultative Commission. The Petitioners filed a
Petition for Prohibition, alleging that the President has no power to create a Consultative
Commission to study and propose amendments and allocate public funds for its operations. A report
 has been submitted by the Commission recommending changes on its charters to the President. Then
the Consultative Commission ceases to exist.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition was proper.

RULING:

No, the petition is not proper.

Under Sec.2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the writ of prohibition is one which commands the person
to whom it is directed not to do something which he is about to do. In other words, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain future action.

In the case at bar, since the law is already defunct, the Consultative Commission has been dissolved
and the case has already become moot and academic, there is no longer any action to be restrained.
Consequently, the Court finds no more reason to resolve the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners.

U.

V. Ministerial Acts

The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. CA and GSIS, 2013

Facts:
COA created the Special Audit Team under its Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) order,
which was issued by COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Ramirez-
Habitan. Tasked to conduct a special audit of specific GSIS transactions, the SAT had the
avowed purpose of conducting a special audit of those transactions for the years 2000 to
2004. Accordingly, the SAT immediately initiated a conference with GSIS management and
requested copies of pertinent auditable documents, which the latter initially agreed to
furnish. However, due to the objection of GSIS to the actions of SAT during the conference,
the request went unheeded. SAT then issued subpoena duces tecum.

The GSIS, through its President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, said that while it
did recognize the authority of COA to constitute a team to conduct a special audit, that team
should not be the SAT, whose members were biased, partial, and hostile.

The then-COA Chairperson Guillermo N. Carague denied the request of GSIS on account of
the restructuring of the commission under a COA Resolution, which formed the basis for
the SATs creation. However, through a subsequent letter of Atty. Claro B. Flores and Atty.
Nelo B. Gellaco, the GSIS alleged that the SATs creation was not supported by a COA
Resolution, which was without force and effect.

Allegedly, the 1987 Constitution did not give COA the power to reorganize itself. The
commission only had the power to define the scope of its audit and examination, as well as
to promulgate rules concerning pleading and practice. Even if the COA were allowed to
reorganize itself, the GSIS claimed that the subpoena required a case to have been brought
to the commission for resolution.

SAT claimed that due to the continued refusal of GSIS to cooperate, the team was
constrained to employ alternative audit procedures by gathering documents from the
Office of the Auditor of GSIS, the House of Representatives, and others. Meanwhile, some of
the audit observations made by the SAT appeared in the newspaper Manila Times,
resulting in the refusal of GSIS management to attend the SATs exit conference.

GSIS filed with the COA itself a "Petition/Request to nullify Special Audit Report dated 29
March 2005 on selected transactions of the GSIS for CY 2000 to 2004." The GSIS also filed a
Petition for Prohibition before the CA, whose Resolutions therein led to this present
Petition.

Issue: Was the prohibition the correct remedy?

Ruling: NO. A Rule 65 petition for prohibition can only be aimed at judicial, quasi-judicial,
and ministerial functions. But COA was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions when it issued LAO Order No. 2004-093.

LAO Order No. 2004-093 reads as follows:

SUBJECT: SPECIAL AUDIT/INVESTIGATION ON SELECTED TRANSACTION OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) FROM CY 2000 TO 2004.

This was obviously not an exercise of judicial power, which is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court and such other courts as may be established by law. Neither was it an
exercise of quasi-judicial power, as administrative agencies exercise it to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The Court has made this point clear:

In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.

Yet issuing the Order was not ministerial, because it required the exercise of discretion.
Ministerial acts do not require discretion or the exercise of judgment, but only the
performance of a duty pursuant to a given state of facts in the manner prescribed. The
Order obviously involved discretion, in both the choice of the personnel and the
powers/functions to be given them.

Since the issuance of the LAO Order assailed was not characterized by any of the three
functions, then it follows that the GSIS chose the wrong remedy. Moreover, where it is the
Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the
presumption of validity, such discretion to enjoin must be exercised with utmost caution.

Short Digest
COAs audit team conducted a special audit of GSIS transactions. Its teams authority sprang
from COAs order LAO order to conduction such special audit or investigation. GSIS refused
to cooperate with the audit team. So the team had to use alternative audit procedures.
When it published its Special Audit Report, GSIS filed a petition before COA to nullify the
report. GSIS also filed a petition for prohibition to restrain the team from implementing its
report.

Question: Was the prohibition the correct remedy?

Answer: NO. A Rule 65 petition can only be aimed at judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial
functions. But to conduct audit or investigation is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. It is
administrative in nature. Nor is it ministerial because the choice of personnel and the
powers/functions to be given them require discretion.

G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL,
RESPONDENT.

Facts:

On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National
Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical
documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National
Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her
possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library.

The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose
M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS Secretary
in the administrative case while respondent was represented by her own private counsel.
On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of
the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the
national library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in
general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
Respondent did not appeal the judgment.

Respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report
purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under
the circumstances." Her petition was, however, denied.

As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996
dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished
a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be
enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
action, but the trial court denied his motion.

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.

Issue:

WON the Secretary may be compelled to produce the committee report to

respondent by mandamus.
Ruling:

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a

ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The
writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which
is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a
clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial
duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is
not entitled to the writ prayed for.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held
in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and
the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.

Short Digest

Facts:

Moral was charged by Sec. Gloria with pilferage of some historical documents. After
investigation, Moral was ordered dismissed from government service. Moral did not file
any appeal to the said order. Moral filed a petition for the production of the DECS
investigation committee report puportedly to guide her on what action to take. Her petition
being denied, Moral instituted an action for mandamus.

Issue:
WON the Secretary may be compelled to produce the committee report to
respondent by mandamus.

Ruling:

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a

ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The
writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which
is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a
clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial
duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is
not entitled to the writ prayed for.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report

W. Mandamus to direct exercise of judgment in a particular way

Long Digest
XI.X Hipos Sr. vs. Judge Bay

Facts:
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The Informations were
signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.

On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused.
Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed
that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations
filed against petitioners and their co-accused. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and
approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case
as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack
of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus.

Issue:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?

Ruling:
No.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City
Prosecutor's Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay's
exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of
mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations
can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already
acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay
committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the
proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Short Digest

Principle:
While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the
ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required
to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the
case at bar.

Facts:
Two information for the crime of rape and one information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against Hipos,
et.al before the RTC-Quezon City. AAA and BBB, private complainants, filed a motion for reinvestigation asking Judge Bay
to order the City Prosecution to study if proper informations had been filed against Hipos, et.al. The latter filed joint
memorandum to dismiss the case before the city prosecutor for lack of probable cause. However, the Office of the City
Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against Hipos, et.al. De Vera, treating the joint memorandum as an appeal to
the resolution affirming the information, reversed the said resolution and held that there was a lack of probable cause and
filed a motion to withdraw informations before Judge Bay. But the Judge denied the same. Hipos, et. Al then filed a petition
for Mandamus.

Issue:
Can Mandamus lie to compel the judge to act in a particular way?

Ruling:
No. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either.[6] In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same.

Y. Mandamus to enforce contractual obligations

COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla

LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996, this provided for the modernization and computerization
of the voters registration list, and appropriated funds therefor. Pursuant to the said RA, COMELEC promulgated a Resolution
approving the Voters Registration and Identification Project (VRIS) which envisions a computerized database system for the
May 2004 elections. COMELEC issued invitations for bid and it was awarded to PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation, which
received the highest total weighted score and declared winning bidder. (BID was 6.58 B Pesos). HOWEVER, RA 8760
provided that the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only 1B and actual available
funds under Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA requested the execution of the contract, but to
no avail. PHOTOKINA filed a petition with the RTC and was granted, it directed the Commissioners to resume negotiations to
formalize the execution of the contract for the VRIS project. COMELEC filed a complaint against respondent judge.

ISSUE:
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

RULING:
No.
PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid
is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC
and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not
dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where
disbursement of public funds is concerned.

No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.[34] As
early as 1924, Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,[35] already set forth the justification of this rule, thus:

Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an admissible
remedy. It is manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the
city; and no rule of law is better settled than that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. x x x
The petitioners remedy, if any she has, is by an original action in the Court of First Instance to compel the city to pay the
agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.

SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 which provided for the modernization and computerization
of the voters registration list, and appropriated funds therefor. COMELEC promulgated a Resolution approving the Voters
Registration and Identification Project (VRIS) which envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 elections.
COMELEC issued invitations for bid and it was awarded to PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation. HOWEVER, RA 8760
provided that the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only 1B and actual available
funds under Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA requested the execution of the contract, but to
no avail. PHOTOKINA filed a petition with the RTC and was granted, it directed the Commissioners to resume negotiations to
formalize the execution of the contract for the VRIS project.

ISSUE:
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

RULING:
No.
PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is
beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and
is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not
dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where
disbursement of public funds is concerned. No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the
performance of contractual obligations.

Z. Continuing Mandamus

Long Digest
XI.Z MMDA vs. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

Facts:

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set
by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay.
Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most
probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and
other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The RTC ordered the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to
SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and
perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court's decision did
not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

Issue:
Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

Ruling:
Yes. The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that
"requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they
are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDA's duty in the area of solid waste disposal,
as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty
of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience. A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform." Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties
ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped
from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all,
the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and
other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus
and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards
cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as "continuing mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River
from industrial and municipal pollution.

Short Digest

Principle:
Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.

Facts:
Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC-Imus against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. They alleged that
the water quality of Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law. The RTC ordered the
government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB
classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. However, the CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition under Rule 45 before the SC.

Issue:
Can the government agencies be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

Ruling:
Yes. The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. The cleanup and/or restoration of the
Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the
bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay.
Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality
would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus
behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay
and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing
mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing
mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and
municipal pollution.

Z.
Dolot v. Paje

LONG DIGEST:
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated September 16, 2011 and
Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 on Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorneys
Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO).

Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed the aforesaid petition with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted
by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore puts the municipality of Matnog in
environmental dangers and despite this fact, Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a
small-scale mining permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did nothing to protect the interest of
the people in same community, thus, respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act
of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Dolot, et al primarily prayed for
the shutdown of said mining operations through issuance of TEPO as well as the rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return
of the iron ore mined in the area.

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.
However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7
and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to
violations of environmental laws within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar,
Castilla, Casiguran and Juban.

ISSUE
Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.

RULING
The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No.
23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the
petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred
by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 also states that jurisdiction over special c ivil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction shall be exercised by the RTCs.
Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to accord convenience to the
parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Therefore, RTCs motu proprio dismissal
of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omiss ion
occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant
the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not
criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case to the RTC of Irosin, Branch 55, for further
proceedings with dispatch.

SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS
Petitioner filed a petition with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted by respondents put the
municipality of Matnog in environmental dangers and despite this fact, Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally
Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did
nothing to protect the interest of the people in same community, thus, respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government
Code. Petitioner primarily prayed for the shutdown of said mining operations through issuance of TEPO as well as the
rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return of the iron ore mined in the area. The case was referred by the Executive Judge to
the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power of
such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to violations of environmental laws within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban.

ISSUE
Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.

RULING
The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No.
23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the
petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred
by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 also states that jurisdiction over special c ivil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction shall be exercised by the RTCs.
Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

AA. Clear and Defined Right

G.R. NO. 146531, March 18, 2005

DOMINGO R. MANALO, PETITIONER, VS. PAIC SAVINGS BANK AND THERESE V. VARGAS, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Therese Villanueva Vargas, impleaded as a respondent,
obtained a P3,000,000.00 loan from PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank, also a respondent. As security for the loan,
respondents mortgaged two (2) lots situated in Pasay City.

However, respondent Vargas failed to pay the loan. Consequently, the mortgage was foreclosed and the lots were sold at
public auction to respondent bank, being the highest bidder.

On December 4, 1984, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent bank and eventually registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City.

On October 14, 1991 or seven years later, respondent Vargas filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for
annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure against respondent bank. In due course, the RTC rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC Decision, sustaining the
legality of the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. The Decision of the Appellate Court then became final and
executory.

Earlier or on December 23, 1992, respondent Vargas sold to Armando Angsico the lots for P18,000,500.00. Then on
August 24, 1994, respondent Vargas leased to Domingo R. Manalo, petitioner, a portion of the same lots consisting of 450
square meters for a period of ten (10) years with a monthly rental of P22,500.00. Later, or on June 29, 1997, Angsico
assigned and transferred to petitioner all his rights to the property as shown by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of
Rights.

On May 7, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages. Impleaded as defendants
are respondent bank, its liquidator and/or receiver PDIC, and respondent Vargas. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that
he has legal interest in the subject lots, having initially leased a portion of the same from respondent Vargas and then
purchased the whole area from Angsico. He prayed that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent
bank (1) to allow him to redeem and/or repurchase the subject lots for P18,000,000.00; and (2) to release to him TCT No.
6076.

On September 4, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of an enforceable cause of action.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dated December 21, 2000 affirming the RTC Decision and
holding that petitioners complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Issue:

WON mandamus may lie.

Ruling:

We hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioners alleged right of redemption. To begin with,
mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In
varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights
are well-defined, clear and certain.

On December 4, 1985 or when respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of redemption within the one (1) year
redemption period, respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots.

Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4, 1985, respondent Vargas could no longer
legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner.

Moreover, mandamus cannot be availed of as a remedy to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. In
Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla, we held:

No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual
obligations.

Short Digest

Facts:

V obtained a loan from PAIC. As security of the loan, V mortgaged two lots. By reason of failure of V to pay the obligation,
PAIC foreclosed the securities. The bank acquired title to the lots, being the highest bidder.

V sold the a part of the property to A. A assigned and transferred the right over the property to M.

M filed a complaint for specific performance and damages. He prayed also that the court issue a writ of mandamus to
compel PAIC to allow him to redeem the property and for PAIC to release the title of the property.

Issue:

WON mandamus may lie.

Ruling:

Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In
varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights
are well-defined, clear and certain.
On December 4, 1985 or when respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of redemption within the one (1) year
redemption period, respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots.

Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4, 1985, respondent Vargas could no longer
legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner.

AB. When and Where filed ( Section 4, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC)

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION V CAALAM

FACTS:
This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against
petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC). The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents and found
that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the
decision of the labor arbiter. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.
Counsel for private respondents received resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. Counsel for private
respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within
which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.
Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no
power to grant something that had already been expressly deleted from the rules.
ISSUE:
Is extension of time for filing a petition for certiorari no longer allowed?

RULING:
Yes.
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond
the 60-day period, the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a
petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.

With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a

board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts
appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning.
It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the
meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from
that previous to its amendment.

2 SENTENCE RULING:

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the
paragraph that previously permitted such extensions. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable
delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
QUICK DIGEST

CAALAM (respondent) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter and decided in favour of
LAGUNA METTS (petitioner). LAGUNA METTS appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission and the
decision was reversed.

CAALAM filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Counsel for private respondents received resolution
of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. Counsel for private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave CAALAM a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to
file their petition for certiorari. LAGUNA METTS moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming
that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.
ISSUE:

Is extension of time for filing a petition for certiorari no longer allowed?

RULING:
Yes.
Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion
of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions. The period was specifically set to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their
case.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA

FACTS:

Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology
of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her
dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism.
However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a
passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed
her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request
the exclusion of Celines name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board
of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against
her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's
doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree
recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was
denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive
due process.

RULING:
No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent
had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party
who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied
due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to
answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met
with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition,
she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the
Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the
attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

QUICK DIGEST

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA

FACTS:
Respondent was a student of UP. She already completed the units of course work required and
finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.
However, she was accused of plagiarism with the Dean. Despite the accusation against her, she was
able to graduate.
Subsequently, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE:

Should the writ of Mandamus be issued?

RULING:
No. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
[23]
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In University of the Philippines
[24]
Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P.
from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty
and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and
obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the
order of suspension. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injustice to the
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good
paying job.
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part
of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom. Hence, writ of mandamus should not be granted.

AC. Material Dates Rule

G.R. No. 139607 October 28, 2002

RAMON ISIDRO P. LAPID and GLADYS B. LAPID, in behalf of their minor child CHRISTOPHER B. LAPID,petitioners,
vs
HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, Presiding Judge of RTC, BR. 169, Malabon,
ST. THERESE OF THE CHILD JESUS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners are the parents of a 7 yr. old child who is a student of the respondent school. The petitioners filed a complaint agaisnt
respondent before the RTC. According to the Lapids, the schools malicious imputation against their son tarnished their good name
and reputation.

In their answer, the school officials stated that as early as June 1997, Ms. Cruz had been sending them letters regarding
Christophers mischief in school. According to them, Christopher had committed serious infractions when he h urt not only his
classmates but also his classroom teacher, Ms. Cruz, and one school employee. They also averred that on several occasions, th e
parents of students offended by Christopher lodged complaints with the school against Christopher, urging the ad ministration to
impose appropriate disciplinary action on him. After most of these incidents, Ms. Cruz had called up the Lapids house to acq uaint
them with these complaints. Said phone calls were received, often by Mrs. Gloria Manapat Bautista, grandmothe r and guardian de
facto of Christopher. All their efforts to reach the Lapid spouses personally turned out to be futile.

On November 18, 1998, the Lapids filed a motion to declare St. Therese as in default, which was denied by the trial court. MR was
likewise denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for failure to i ndicate the
material date, particularly the date of filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC, as required by Supreme Court Circular No.
39-98, amending Section 3 of Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Lapids filed an MR of the CA resolution, but sti ll
without indicating the date as to when their MR of the RTC order was filed. CA denied the MR.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the Lapids on the ground of formal and procedural
deficiency, i.e., their failure to state a material date in their petition for certiorari.

HELD:

No. SC found no reversible error in the assailed resolutions of the CA because in filing a special civil action for certiorari without
indicating the requisite material date thereon, the Lapids violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsi deration
was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. The petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the
second date, particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration. As explicitly stated in the Rule, failure t o comply with
any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

SHORT DIGEST

X filed against Y university a complaint before the RTC. According X, the schools malicious imputation against their son tar nished
their good name and reputation. During the pendency of the case, X filed a motion to declare Y university as in default, which was
denied by the trial court. MR was likewise denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which dismissed the petition for
failure to indicate the material date, particularly the date of filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC. X then file d an MR of
the CA resolution, but still without indicating the date as to when their MR of the RTC order was filed. Did the CA err in dismissing
the case for failure to state the material date in his petition for certiorari?

No. SC found no reversible error in the assailed resolutions of the CA because in filing a special civil action for certiorari without
indicating the requisite material date thereon, X violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when n otice of
the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed;
and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. The petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the sec ond date,
particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration. As explicitly stated in the Rule, failure to comply with any of the
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

AF. PARTIES
1. PERSONS AGGRIEVED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. COMELEC

Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798. Under the said resolution, No barangay official shall be appointed as
member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or any
socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members. The appointment of
barangay officials, employees, and tanods, who are members of accredited citizens arms, as Chairman/person and/or
Member of the BEIs or as official watcher shall also be prohibited. The barangay officials, employees and tanods are also
prohibited from staying inside any polling place, except to case their vote. Accordingly, they should leave the polling place
immediately after casting their vote.

The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the
Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC.

The Accreditation of NAMREL was granted but subject to the condition that Conception must first be removed both as a
member and overall Chairman of said organization because Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Forbes, Maka City, cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL.

Soon thereafter, NAMFREL Filed a "Manifestation and Request for Re- Examination" that: (1) contains information
regarding NAMFREL's reorganization and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as National
Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFREL's acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition
for accreditation; and (3) includes NAMFREL's request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2,
2007 Resolution as it speci cally affected the petitioner's membership with NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request
for Re-examination, NAMFREL outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution 7798.

The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the information relating to NAMFREL's current of cers, and denied the
request to examine its (COMELEC's) interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting petitioner's direct
participation as member and National Chairman of NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned out that the April 2, 2007
Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented any convincing argument to warrant the requested examination.

Jose Concepcion filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April
2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of respondent COMELEC.

The present petition is the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL, the direct party in the COMELECs April 2, 2007, has
no absolutely no participation.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Conception has the personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling: No.

The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which provides
that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from the receipt of a copy thereof. This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional
commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by an act of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.

An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceeding that gave rise to the
original action for certiorari under Rule 65.

The features of the petition render it fatally detective. The defect lies in the petitioner's personality to file a petition for
certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct
party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution. It would have been another matter if NAMFREL had led
the present petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could
have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in NAMFREL's Manifestation and Request for Examination.
As a last recourse, the petitioner could have expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems he faced and
asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed out. None of these actions,
however, took place. Instead, the petitioner simply questioned the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution without
explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack the validity of
COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize the petitioner as a party-
in-interest who can directly assail the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this
Court.

SHORT CASE DIGEST:

NAMFRELs Accreditation for to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEc was granted by the latter with the
condition that their current chairman, A, being a barangay chairman of Makati City, must first be removed since, under the
law, barangay officials are not allowed to be appointed as member of Board of Election Inspectors or as a watcher of each
duly registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they
may be members. NAMFREL complied all the conditions and did not question the resolution and order of the COMELEC.
However, A, in his individual capacity, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the aforecited
Resolution and order. Should the said petition be granted?

-No. The Petition for Certiorari be denied.

Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari. In the case at bar, an aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule
65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.

In the case at bar, A was not the party of the original proceeding between NAMFREL and COMELEC, hence, he is not
considered an aggrieved party as contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

4. Indispensable Parties

Golangco v Fung

FACTS:
The petitioner, as the complainant, initiated a prosecution for libel against the respondent in 1995. The
Prosecution had presented only two witnesses after almost six years. The Prosecution requested that a
subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos to compel him to testify in the
criminal case on February 20, 2001 which was, however, reset to May 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of
Atty. Ramos. The Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been
issued to and served on him for the purpose. Consequently, the RTC judge issued an order terminating the
Prosecution's presentation of evidence.
A special civil action for certiorari was commenced by the petitioner to assail the order issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in the said Criminal Case. The petitioner assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the
order of RTC, claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the
subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his
prior request for the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing
request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena
again should it not be served in the first time.
The Court of Appeals, however, rebuffed the petitioner and dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.

RULING:
The court finds no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

The court points out the gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective
being to set aside the trial court's order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case
No. 95-145703. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for
certiorari .

Even on the merits, the Petition for Review fails.

The criminal case had been pending since 1995 and the petitioner as the complainant had presented only two
witnesses as of the issuance of the assailed order. The trial court had not been wanting in giving warnings to
the Prosecution on the dire consequences should the Prosecution continue to fail to complete its evidence.

The court finds that the trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the assailed
order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari . The petitioner now needs to
be reminded that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law is not available. In this regard, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner was to proceed in the action until judgment, which, once
rendered, might then be reviewed on appeal, along with the assailed interlocutory order. As long as the trial
court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounted to
nothing more than an error of judgment that was reviewable by a timely appeal, not by a special civil action of
certiorari.

Quick Digest:

Facts:

The petitioner, as a complainanant, filed a criminal case against the respondent. The RTC judge issued an
order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence for the latters failure to present the witness.
Petitioner assailed on certiorari the order of RTC, claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave abuse
of discretion for not issuing subpoena to require the witness to appear and testify on the hearings. CA
dismissed the petition, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.

RULING:
Yes, the CA correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari.
Sec 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; xxx
In the case at bar, the objective is to set aside the trial court's order that concerned the public aspect of
Criminal Case. The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties. The
omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari .

XI. AK - DOJ and Ombudsman Ruling

G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013

WILLIAM C. DAGAN, VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of several racehorses that participated in horse races at the Philippine Racing Club,
Inc. and Manila Jockey Club, Inc., while respondents were the former Chairman and Commissioners of the
Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom).

Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; malversation; violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees; falsification of public document; dishonesty and
grave misconduct.

Thus, the assailed Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman dealt with the following administrative charges:

1. overpayment
2. improper hiring of media consultant
3. oppressive scratching [out] of race horses
4. malversation/illegal use of funds
5. unlawful purchases of employees' uniform and Coggins tests equipment and medicines
6. conflict of interest and non-divestment of business interest, and
7. refusal to implement the law on drug-testing
On 30 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman's Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau rendered a Decision absolving respondents of charges of grave misconduct, oppression,
dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of laws.

Ruling:

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

xxxxxx

xxxxxx

xxxxxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

The above-quoted provision logically implies that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. Although the provision does not mention absolution, it can be
inferred that since decisions imposing light penalties are final and unappealable, with greater reason should
decisions absolving the respondent of the charge be final and unappealable.

It was thus clarified that there are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman
arising from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved of
the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary.

In the instant case, the respondents were absolved of the charges against them by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Such decision is final and unappealable.

However, petitioner is not left without any remedy. In Republic v. Francisco, we ruled that decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject
to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error
of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to
compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of
the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

There is no showing that the assailed Decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Considering that a special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. We reiterated in Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito,
that concurrence of jurisdiction should not to be taken to mean as granting parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. It is an
established policy that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special, important and compelling reasons, clearly and specifically
spelled out in the petition.
Short Digest

Facts:

X filed a complaint against Y, the former chairman and commissioner of Philracom. X alleged that that Y is
guilty of violation of Anti-graft and corrupt practices, malversation, RA 6713, falsification of public document,
dishonesty and grave misconduct.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision absolving Y of charges of grave misconduct, oppression, dishonesty,
serious irregularities and violation of laws.

X filed a certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of court to the Court of Appels but it was dismissed by the court
on the ground that it ould have been filed in the Supreme Court.

Ruling:

It was thus clarified that there are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman
arising from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved of
the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary.

In the instant case, the respondents were absolved of the charges against them by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Such decision is final and unappealable.

However, petitioner is not left without any remedy. In Republic v. Francisco, we ruled that decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject
to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error
of law.

Considering that a special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

However, there is no showing that the assailed Decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence,
certiorari shall not lie.