Chapter 1 ON BEING OTHER: Towards an Ontology of Otherness Isrronuctioy The theme of otherness is a fundamental aspect of theology. Being. ‘other is part of what it means to be oneself, and therefore to be at all, whether reference is made to God or to humanity or to anything that is said to exist. Connected with thisis the subject of freedom. Freedom is, not to be restricted to the psychological and moral sense traditionally attributed to it, that is, to the idea of the ‘freedom of the will’ and of ‘making moral decisions; it should be related to the fundamental ques- tion of bving. Being other and being free in an ontological sense, that is, in the sense of being free to be yourself, and not someone or son thing else, are two aspects of one and the same reality. The problem of the Other has been central to philosophy in our time.! In the twentieth century, it particularly preoccupied the philo- sophical schools of phenomenology and existentialism, culminating in the thought of philosophers such as M. Buber and E. Levinas, who. made the idea of the Other a key subject of philosophical discourse. Its, in fact, a subject as old as Greek philosophy itself, as is evident fiom the place it occupied in the Platonic dialogues, particularly Par menides, in Aristotle and even in the Pre-Socratics. There can hardly be any philosophy worthy of the name that does not involve, directly or indirectly, a discussion of this subject Theology cannot remain indifferent to the subject of otherness. As I shall Uy (0 show in this essay, Patristic theology is penetrated Mt, Thcunisen, The Oller (Rnglsh erans, Wy <. Macann), HKG, po “The problem of the Orr has cevtainy never penetrated as ep as tla inte the frndasens of philosophical hgh“4 Communion and Otherness by it, and so is Christian doctrine in general, What is even more significant, the subject of otherness is present today, implicitly or explicitly, in many areas of Christian, or religious in general, expe rience andl discourse. In the first place, itis an intra-Chtistian prob: lem, as it appears when we consider the issue of the balance etween inity and the individual, or between the one Church and the mazy Churches? Communion seems to strike a se sitive chord in a Christian world fed up with individualism and inst tutional rigidity. Yet if the idea of communion is not qualified by that of otherness, it can lead to many problems, The task of working out an understanding of communion linked organically with an under- standing of otherness appears to he imperative in theology toclay The same significance of the subject of otherness is evident at the cultural level, Respect for otherness is becoming a central ethical principle in civilized societies today. ‘This clashes very often with tr ditional norms which have enjoyed authority for centuries, It also becomes problematic in so far as it can lead ¢o individualism, with which modern man is not éorally happy. If otherness is not some- how qualified with communion, it can hardly produce a satistactory culture. In any case, neither otherness nor communion can be valid solely on ethical grounds: they have to be related to the truth of exist- cence. The crucial question has to be not simply whether otherness is acceptable or desirable in our society — the ethical principles of societies are usually teansient — but whether it isa sine qua now con dition for one’s very being and for the being of all that exists. This is what an ontology of otherness is about. And this is what an existe tially relevant theology cannot but be concerned with, In the lines that follow, the problem of otherness will he approached. rom different angles, all of them corresponding to fundamental aspects, Of the Christian faith, In all these aspects, the ‘other’ will be shown to be ontologically constitutive for the being of God, both in his i nent and in his economic’ existence, including the person and work of (Christ and the Spirit, as well as for the being of creation and the hum being in their actual condition and their eschatological desi 1. Ottenyr5s AND THE BEING OF CRESTION 1. The Gulf between Unereaed and Created Being The assumptions on which ancient Greek philosophy rested created theologians of the first centuries, “Ftv deal extensively with thie ny Being Common, 1985, psi On Being Other 15 who had to reconcile them with their biblical faith. ‘Thus, che assump tion that nothing can come out of nothing,’ which accounted for the priority of unity and the One over against otherness and the Many in ancient Greek thought,' clashed with the Christian view that the world did not always exist but came into being out of a fiee act of the free and transcendent God. ‘The doctrine of creation was, therefore, the first occasion for a drastic revision of Greek ontology by Christian the- ‘ology. That this revision invoked the introduction of the dimension of otherness and freedom into the concept of being is what concerns us directly here Is the being of the world real? Or is it a gawopsvov, a disclosure of the only truly real being, which is God? If the world ic real only by virtue of its participation in the mae being (in this case, God), it "This sve hae by i ncient Greek philosophers. Nething could have tebe ont otitis theve must e something presen a nes as te the prinkipe ig HPve dla yt aiserve this Pa menie principle, we generate being fam i See des he Gon, of Conrap. S17A 94 SIA. L2H CL. Rit, The Mind of frst, 198, p. 208; anal EM. Copnton, Plat dt ormrnids, (89, p. ML: All Gueeks would ace that nothing can cone tat !vthing alo advance ca be male om the pe that al that eins was ce ina state of nonexistence ot that oemtity can exe "That the real is ultimately one had been seme fom the very beginning "he extreme view of Parmienils (Bg, 880 that he isa shal hen ees (io) besides wha spe e375 wa ut argue that the many or exher"exs, yet nya eependent onthe One. Has ate, unm, USSEE, i his last of eight Iypaateses conch that i Here fs One, tt ‘nly thingsotey than ene, what mist follow? The rs wl not ne ill they be many. ari they ate tee many, there nse one awn Ul imme of then icone thing. they wil all he t+-ing (OG), als yt pny cither.. Therefine, i thee ise One the eller neither ae axined lw he one oF many... I here ine One, deve is nothing at all. CL EM. Cornel, ato ad omens, avid RA: Ae, Pats omens, TAD, pp. 6 aid. Aver tone te, al insist on the reality of the many yet what survives thet estates is alinsatey the sulstrate tom whicl dhey ae generated. Dr ton af Cine RANA 1A. del, Aviat und his Ply, 12, AB. Fo Avot, tn, whatever is ‘onc, aid whatever is ne i. Being ad nity are terms wang above ‘ion of eatexoies and applicable tr every category: WD, en, dre, 19 seme inaey ofthe One sures anient Greek phikswply wel int the time of Newplatonism. Sew K. Keener, De enplene Sep wd ie Worden anf Thoms Again, VTL, p. 9 In the ease of Playa el sp onic Stati, 1, SL) i ae ‘of degrees of reality” (Gee G. Vast, Phe wih the dating of participation inthe inca oly the ikea ane Gets Sve: the work's henge ate wav Ove, it all ‘aor ace with the Chrstian understorey since eee isunder stoning the wo i tay ater: Daven vane at vt Te Panic ew16 Communion anit Otherness 131 follow that God and the world are somehow joined together with an ontological affinity (evpyéveta). This would make God a Cre ator by necessity and the world not ultimately other than God. The absence, therefore. of freedom inthe act of eration would amount atomati- cally othe loss of ontological othernes, for bath the Caeator and his reation Otherness as an ontological category for both che Creator and his creation emerges asa logical imperative when creation is conceived an act of freedom, that is, as an act that cannot be explained by being itself; it cannot be attributed axiomatically to being itself, but toa factor other than being itself which causes being to be. Creation «ex nillo implies that being does not come from being, which would make it necessary being. This, therefore, isthe reason why other ness and freedom are interwoven in ontology with regard), i the ease under consideration, to the being of creation. Otherness in this case has to be ontological in character or else freedom in the ontological sense disappears: the Creator would be bound up ontological with fis creation, That the question of ontological freedom is ted up with ontolog- ical otherness in any doctrine of creation is illustrated well by Pla- 10's idea of creation, as expressed in the Timaets. In this work, Plato professes faith in God the Creator and even goes 2¥ far as 10 attri- hnute the act of creation to God's tree will. This has led many people, including early Christian theologians such as Justin. fully to endorse the Timeeus from the Christian viewpoint, But Plato's Greator acted according to his will Qekjoen.” in a way that was not ontologically five: the Demiurge had to create out of pre-existing matter and to do so with absolute respect for the ideas of Beauty and Goodness, while A pre-existing space (jépa) dictated to him the circumstances and conditions under which the world he ereated ought to exist tn this case, therefore, creation was an oatologically constrained and unfree act. This was so hecause there was no absolute otherness between the Creator and his creation, in an ontological sense, oF, vice-versa, there ‘was no absolute otherness because there was no ontological freedom; the two things, freedom and otherness, are interdependent. The Christian theologians of the patristic era had to cope with t problem, Origen, following the alterations applied to the plat vine of degrees of reatty wold aot fr Chris om the onological pricy atta hy the Latter to theres “fast Af. 20 (PG: 6, 37C). 6A (PG 8 ATTAY, Dal (PG 8 AAN). Plat, Tn 38 ato, Yi. 2, On Being Other 7 doctr 1e of creation by Philo, Albinus and other Middle Platonists,” rejected the restrictions imposed on the Creator by the pre-existence of mater and the ideas, but together with these philosophers he understood these ideas as the thoughts of God, eternally existing in hhim, in unity with his eternal Logos." Thus, in a subtle way, God's freedom was taken away from his act of creation," and so was the radical ontological otherness of the world. As a consequence, Origen hhad to assume that there was something eternal in ing a cer iy between Coc and the world." the soul and of she intelligible world contained in the Logos, which had to beginning in time and will have no end,"* was in reality noth- ing but a way of removing both otherness and ontological freedom from the act of the creation of the world. It was not until St Athanasius and Nicaea stepped in that the posi- tion of the Church on this matter was clarified, Between God and the world there is total ontological otherness: God's being is uncre- ated, while that of the world is created, that is, contingent." Does this make the work!’s being somehow less real? Does otherness amount cation, express The eternity of "See RM. Jones, “The leas as Thoughts of Gant Clase Phillogy 21 Dp. 817-26, 1LA, Walton, Thr Philaopiy of the Chan Father, 97, ye shes ths view freon the wean Ariel's ileasas sell-sbsistent rel corporeal hein, an ic i inti with Contain in the ‘cate by hin. Onin joann 1222 (0G 14, SBC): NING (NG 4 SONBC), ete HL Core Pigene 1 Plt, OL, y. 5%, sts apy Origen position i the falling ‘ete création caster Ice MbapOs VOM, 8 Hi, sti par Tes ieee, wwnicien et les rigs, tt ses stich om Alas le Fils extant pi ext Le Sess "GA, G, Flonwsky. Gratin mad Reefton (604 of Callested! Wonks 1476, 1p. 2. “Origen hal to adit the necessity oa conyjntlyexereaisent ae ein ingles “HOUT” as a convespondang prerequisite al orvelative of the Divine ompletenes at fife. Hh Goal cates ot af ecesiy, Tor the sake of the bk is eg hen the woe nist exists thew it st pase thatthe ‘werd nights hae existe fp 4) niger, De Prine 12.10 (PG 11, 188: 8 (PG LLL Ae ma AT OG 28); 6. Ca B80 (PG 11, 072). CEH. Cruel, Orig f Pain, p40: Tent on imellectuelle: payee & a tune nxemie da Pere. dy Fly el Fyprit ya ame certaine pave entre et Dien Mee H. Couzel, Origine ot Plain, p. 340, sympathetic tr Ori i, iin vertigo the Ph vine Inset Go al then 16a b a iferet interpret rm see J. Rebeca, Chitty ad Comal, is, Aria, 20-21 52, 55 22 Oe 15, 152), 60 (BG 26,18 Communion andl Otherness to ontological diminution? ‘The anywer would be ‘Yes in the context of Greek philosophy, bur itis net so in the case of patristic thought A totally other being can exist side by side with God's being, because being does not necessarily come out of heing itself; rather, it results {om freedom, Since something ran come out of nothing, ¢* nihil it ‘ean he both real and other in the absolute sense. The doctrine of en tion out of nothing was about othe in ontology. Now, for the Fathers, the world’s being was fully and truly being, but it was, ofits nature, a perishable being: having come out of noth- ing, it could return to nothing and perish." Such 2 position would he scandalous to the ancient Greeks, who eould never conceive of being s ultimately perishable; even in the Platonic idea of non-being (jt ivay), there is eternal survival of being thanks to participation in the being of the One. Did the Greek Fathers depart from this ple entirely? Had they done so, they would have ceased to be Greek since the hallmark of Greek thought is concern with the survival of being. ‘The world’s being is, for them, perishable by nature. However since being «loes not emerge from being naturally but rather through the intervention of personal freedom. ie is not fogically bound to be ultimately perishabfe. Contrary to what the Greeks believed, what thas had a heginning does not necessary have an end."*So the world's being can be eternal in the end without having been eternal in the beginning, that is, in its nature, Nature does nor determine being. By the logic of the possihitity of having a being emerge not from being fy necessity but by a free act, the beginning of being does not dictate its end: the end can be more than the beginning." Itisin this way that otherness and contingency can be conceived as true heing. ‘The world isa reality ia che ultimate ontological sense not ecause of a natural necessity of some kind, but because being does not depend on nature but on freedom, having truly come out of a free ofa fice person, IF the world is based simply on its own nature, 3 is bound to perish, for itis part of its mature to be perishable, having ‘come ont of nothing (Athanasius). Had itheen imperishable by nature, () it would have come not out of nothing but out of ar something: (b) its being would he due to necessity, Adhanasiny 2 fairy 45 (2G 25.104) CG, Flenesky, Craion and Redempion, pe 216: Boe the Grceks “nly that sic ade einige fst forever Clvstiang ea ot ony et this plushies asumptin i Peyssky. Craton nad Redemption, 239 woe ea a roninget ei table will of Gad ung, y ne, Wane oy On Being Other 19 (© itwould not he on tially and ult ologically ‘other’, since its being would be essen- mately identical with the nature from which it has come forth. Its end would have been like the heginning by necessity, and if the beginning was nothing, it would return by necessity to nothing, whereas if its beginning was ‘something’, it would return by necessity to that ‘something’ from which it came forth. Being would then have tobe cyclical iit were to survive, as was in fact conceived by the ancient Greeks. In that case, ontology would be ‘totalitarian’ reealling Levie ‘nas’ accusation against Greek philosophy. Once being was liberated from itself, as the Christian doctrine of creation implies, being could survive eternally in spite of ies perish: able nature. The truth of the workt’s being would be located not in nature but in personhood. Contingency toes not logically imply a false ontology, an untrue being, once the axiom of ry being is removed or abolished, Ie can therefore be concluded that one of the fundamental con sequences of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo has been the logical possibility of making the ‘other’ a true being without linking it up With its cause through nature, that is, by necessity. God's nature and the world’s nature could never coincides there is absolute ‘abysmal’ otherness between these v0.” in this way, otherness acquires full ‘ontological status, thanks to the intervention of freedom in ontol- ogy — something the ancient Greeks had never thought of, By sganting being to something naturally othe e ti reely ell, Goel sanc- ran hi ied otherness and raised it to full ontotogical status. 2. Bridging the Gulf of Otherness ou