ADDITIONAL CIVIL LAW CASES

VENTURA, JR. VS. SPS. ABUDA, GR#202932, 10/23/2013

FACTS: Without her marriage first being annulled, Socorro Torres married widower Esteban with whom
she had no children. From their first marriages however, Socorro had a son (Petitioners father) while
Estaban had a daughter Evangeline (Respondent). Petitioner later discovered that Esteban sold to
Respondent the business establishment he operated in Manila (Delpan property) along with a lot (Vitas
property) which he acquired and registered in his name married to Socorro Esteban. Petitioner
represented by his mother Socorro filed a petition to annul the deeds of sale to Respondent claiming that
Estebans signatures thereon were forged. Respondent countered that, since Socorro was previously
married, her later marriage to Esteban was void. RTC dismissed the Petitioners complaint and appeal to
the CA was also denied.

RULING: Petition DENIED. In unions between a man and a woman incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over properties acquired during the subsistence of their relationship shall be based on actual
contributions of the parties. This is a reiteration of Art. 148FC. The subject properties can be considered
common if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry.

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase married to Socorro
Torres is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.
The Delpan property was also acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.

BRAZA VS. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, GR#181174, 12/4/2009

FACTS: At the wake of Pablo (Petitioners husband), Lucille (Respondent) introduced her child Patrick
Braza as Pablos child. Petitioner later obtained Patricks birth certificate with annotation of being
acknowledged by Pablo and later legitimated by his subsequent marriage with Lucille, a copy of which
marriage contract Petitioner also secured. Petitioner then filed a petition for correction of entries in
Patricks birth certificate with respect to his fathers name, his acknowledgment and use of the last name
Braza requiring said child also to submit to DNA testing. Petitioner contended that Patrick could not be
legitimated by Pablos subsequent marriage to Lucille as said marriage was bigamous due to the
subsistence of Pablos marriage to Petitioner. Trial court dismissed the petition ruling that, in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court not acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction over an
action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn Patricks legitimation and order Patrick to submit
to a DNA test. After denial of her motion for reconsideration, Petitioner went to the SC arguing that the
trial court could pass upon the validity of the marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 109, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. The allegations of the petition
before the trial court clearly show that Petitioner seeks to nullify Lucille and Pablos marriage for being
bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation asking the court to order Patrick to undergo DNA testing. Such
causes of action are governed by AM#02-11-10-SC (effective March 15, 2003) and Art. 171, FC,
respectively. Hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court. The validity of a marriage as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party and
not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

CABATANA VS. CA, GR#124814, 10/21/2004

FACTS: After her husband abandoned her, Florencia Regodos (Respondent) worked as Petitioners
household help. Florencia claimed that Petitioner brought her to a motel and had intercourse with her
with the promise of support if she got pregnant. She discovered 27 days later that she was pregnant.
Petitioners wife sent Florencia home suspecting her pregnancy. Florencia later gave birth to Camelo in
whose behalf she filed for recognition as an illegitimate child with claim for support. Trial court granted
the petition adding that the child, presented before it, was no doubt Petitioners based on personal
appearance. CA affirmed the trial courts decision, hence, the petition before the SC.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity is established by clear and convincing
evidence. The applicable provisions of law are Arts. 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. While a baptismal
certificate is considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.
Thus, birth and baptismal certificates are, per se, inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and cannot
be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them
gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before courts of law.

DELA CRUZ VS. GRACIA (CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR), GR#177728, 7/31/2009

FACTS: 21-year old Jenie (Petitioner) and 10-year old Dominique lived together as husband and wife
without being married for several months in 2005. In September that same year, Dominique died. Two
months later, Jenie gave birth to Christian in whose behalf she applied for registration of his birth using
Dominiques surname, Aquino. For said application, she submitted to LCR (Respondent) her affidavit to
use surname of father (AUSF) with Dominiques handwritten biography acknowledging her as his wife who
was then pregnant and an affidavit of acknowledgment signed by Dominiques father. After LCR wrote
denying Jenies application, Jenie filed a case against LCR to compel registration of name. RTC dismissed
the case for lack of merit reasoning that the unsigned autobiography was not proof of acknowledgment.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the SC.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Art. 176FC as amended by RA9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his father if the latter had expressly recognized him as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument.
The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. That a father who
acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly
implied in Art. 176FC. Paragraph 2.2 of AO#1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did
not unduly expand the import of Art. 176.

The present case however has special circumstances to hold that Dominiques autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of law. First, Dominique died 2 months prior to
the childs birth. Second, relevant matters in the autobiography unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie offered. Third, Jenies
testimony is corroborated by the affidavit of acknowledgment of Dominiques father and testimony of his
brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
autobiography that JENIE IS MY WIFE AS WE FELL IN LOVE and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER.

GOTARDO VS. BULING, GR#165166, 8/15/2012

FACTS: Petitioner courted his bank officemate Respondent in 1992 and became sweethearts in January
1993. In September 1993, they started sexual intimacy resulting to Respondents pregnancy in August
1994. They then applied for a marriage license and even inquired about costs for a wedding reception and
bridal gown. However, Petitioner backed out of the wedding plans prompting Respondent to sue for
damages for breach of promise to marry. The suit was later amicably settled. After Petitioner gave birth
to Gliffze and Petitioner ignored demands for child support, Petitioner filed with the RTC a case for
compulsory recognition and support pendent lite. Petitioner denied paternity. While the trial court
dismissed the case, the CA reversed the trial courts decision, hence, petition before the SC.

RULING: Petition DENIED. SC held that, filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this
case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child. One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof (admissible) under
Rule 130 (Rules of Court).

There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative
proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts
to the putative father. The two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability
of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency; or (2) that the mother
had sexual relations with other men at the time of the conception.

In this case, Respondent established a prima facie case that Petitioner is Gliffzes putative father through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man Petitioner, at the time of her
conception corroborated by a witness testimony that they had intimate relationship.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

SPS. LIM VS. LIM, GR#163209, 10/30/2009

FACTS: Respondent (Cheryl) married Petitioners son (Edward) with whom she had three children. They
all lived in Petitioners house. Respondent later left with the children after finding Edward in a very
compromising situation with his grandmothers in-house midwife. Cheryl sued Edward for support. The
trial court ordered Edward and Petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to Cheryl and the
kids. CA affirmed the trial courts order. Before the SC, Petitioners contest their concurrent liable with
Edward for support.

RULING: Petition DENIED. In affirming the order (with modification by limiting Petitioners liability to the
amount of monthly support for the three children), SC held, by statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the
liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Neither the text of
the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports Petitioners severe constriction of the scope of familial
obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of
the Civil Code, as amended, on support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both
areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among
relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligees lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertain to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.

DE CASTRO VS. DE CASTRO, GR#160172, 2/13/2008

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent became sweethearts in 1991. By October 1994, they started sexual
intimacy after securing a marriage license in September 1994. In 1995, they got married using an affidavit
of cohabitation in lieu of their expired marriage license. Respondent then gave birth to Reinna In
November 1995. While Respondent supported Reinna since birth, in 1998 Respondent filed a complaint
for support against Petitioner who, unfortunately, denied the marriage claiming it to have been facilitated
by a fake affidavit. The trial court declared the marriage void due to absence of a marriage license but still
declared Petitioner as Reinnas natural father and thus obliged to give support. CA denied Petitioners
appeal reasoning that the marriage was presumed valid until a judicial declaration of nullity was made in
a separate action.

RULING: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Trial court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support. The validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked. Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, the court may
pass upon the validity of the marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
Under the Family Code, absence of any of the essential or formal requisites renders the marriage void ab
initio.

The falsity of the affidavit of cohabitation cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The false affidavit which they executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Reinna is Petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Here,
the certificate of live birth listed Petitioner as the father. In addition, Petitioner in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of Respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child.

GERONIMO VS. SANTOS, GR#197099, 9/28/2015

FACTS: As only remaining heirs, Petitioner and his brother extrajudicially settled a real property owned by
their deceased brother. Respondent later claimed to be the deceaseds legitimate daughter and filed a
case to annul the extrajudicial settlement and recover the property from Petitioner. The latter however
denied Respondents claim of being the only child of the deceased insisting that the deceased was
childless. Petitioner claimed that Respondents birth certificate was a simulated document. RTC and CA
decided in favor of Respondent.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Mere registration of the child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the stats of an adopted child and
the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the childs birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document. A record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made thereby
the interested parties.

GANDIONCO VS. HON. PENARANDA, GR#79284 11/27/1987

FACTS: Petitioner sought to suspend the proceedings related to the legal separation case filed by his wife
on the ground of the subsequent filing by his wife of a criminal complaint for concubinage. Petitioner
contended that the civil action for legal separation, grounded as it was on concubinage, arises from or is
inextricably tied to the criminal case for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation
should be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for the criminal case of concubinage

RULING: Petition DENIED. A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, criminal action for concubinage because said civil action is not one to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with
the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. A decree
of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof of preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

LIYAO, JR. VS. TANHOTI-LIYAO, GR#138961, 3/7/2002

FACTS: Petitioner filed a case for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and compulsory heir of
deceased William Liyao against Respondents deceaseds legitimate children. Petitioner alleged that he
was the product of the cohabitation between his mother (Corazon) who had been separated in fact from
her husband for more than 10 years and William. Petitioner claimed continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased who supposedly supported his schooling, paid for his
needs and even introduced him to friends as deceaseds son. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed the
trial courts ruling saying that the law favors legitimacy rather than illegitimacy of a child and the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between
husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Art. 257 in relation to Art. 255 of the
Civil Code.

RULING: Petition DENIED. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy. The fact that his mother had been living separately from her husband, at
the time Petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the childs legitimacy mentioned in Art. 255CC may only
be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Art. 262CC.
Impugning the childs legitimacy is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his
heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.

It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow
Petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid
and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.

REPUBLIC VS. HON. VERGARA, GR#95551, 3/20/1997

FACTS: Samuel Dye and his wife Rosalina, a former Filipino filed a petition to adopt Rosalinas two minor
siblings. After the trial court granted the petition, the Republic filed a petition contending that Spouses
Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt the subject minors.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Samuel who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from
adopting the minors because he does not fall under any of the three exceptions laid down by law. He is
not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his
wifes legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, since Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition
was filed, thus excluding him for the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien
who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule.

GRANDE VS. ANTONIO, GR#206248, 2/18/2014

FACTS: Grace (Petitioner) and Antonio (Respondent) a married man, cohabited and had two sons. When
their relationship turned sour, Grace left with the kids to the United States. Antonio executed a notarized
deed of voluntary recognition of paternity and filed a petition for judicial approval of such recognition
seeking parental authority and physical custody with correction of the childrens surname to Antonio. RTC
granted Antonios petition, not only correcting the surname but, granting him sole parental authority and
physical custody of the children. Graces motion for reconsideration having been denied, she appealed to
the CA. The latter partially granted her appeal ruling that, despite Antonios recognition of the kids, the
mother could not be deprived sole parental custody over the children, absent the most compelling
reasons. Grace filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the change of the minors surname to
Antonio. Said motion was denied, prompting her to go up to the SC.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her mother. Central to the core issue that is the fathers right to compel use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of filiation, is the application of Art. 176FC (later amended by
RA9255 An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) providing that,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by their father. The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to sue the surname of his illegitimate father. The word may is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children
also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

DAVID VS. CA, 250 SCRA 82, 11/16/1995

FACTS: Daisie (Petitioner) was the secretary of Ramon Villar (Respondent) a married man. Out of their
intimacy, a son (Christopher J) and two girls were born. Their relationship became known to Ramons wife
when Daisie brough Christopher to Ramons house and introduced the child to Ramons wife. After that,
Daisies children were freely brought to Ramons house. Ramon asked Daisie to allow their son to go with
his family to Boracay. Unfortunately, Ramon refused to return Christopher J to Daisie following the
Boracay trip. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC decided in her favor but the CA reversed the
trial courts decision and awarded temporary custody of Christopher J to Ramon, reasoning that, as a
businessman, Ramon was financially well.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. The subject child was an illegitimate child since, at the time of his conception,
his father, was married to another woman other than his mother. Pursuant to Art. 176FC, Christopher J
was under the parental authority of Daisie, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. The fact that Ramon recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213FC, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. That Ramon is well-off is not a reason for depriving Daisie of custody of her children, especially
considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born.

LUCAS VS. LUCAS, GR#190710, 6/6/2011

FACTS: Jesse (Petitioner) filed a petition to establish illegitimate filiation with motion for submission of
parties to DNA testing against Jesus (Respondent). Jesse alleged that he was the product of intimate
relations been his mother and Jesus. From the trial court order setting the case for initial hearing, Jesus
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The latter revered the trial courts order reasoning that Jesses
petition to establish illegitimate filiation specifically seeks DNA testing in order to abbreviate the
proceedings which should not be allowed since Jesse failed to establish a prima facie case. From this CA
ruling, Jesse went to the SC after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. It was not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--
vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by Petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court, the latter has just set the case for
hearing. The question is, whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order.

The rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity, the possible sources of error, available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, and shall not be
misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice
and protects, rather than prejudice the public. Not surprisingly, Sec. 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing,
the said conditions are established. Issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court.
The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

SPS. DE MESA VS. SPS. ACERO, GR#185064, 1/16/2012

FACTS: In 1984, live-in partners Ernesto and Araceli (Petitioners) jointly bought a piece of land (the subject
property) then registered under Aracelis name. They built a house on said land and occupied it as a family
home after their wedding in January 1987. Araceli later mortgaged said property for a P100,000 loan from
Claudio who later filed a B.P.22 case against Petitioners following the dishonor of a check payment.
Despite being acquitted, Petitioners were ordered to pay Claudio the amount loaned. The subject
property was later levied and auctioned to satisfy Petitioners civil liability with Claudio as the highest
bidder. A year later, a final deed of sale was issued and new title was issued to Claudio. Claudio however
allowed Petitioner to lease the subject property but later filed an ejectment suit after Petitioners
defaulted in rental payments. In their defense, Petitioners claimed that Claudio had no right over the
property as they were not mere lessors but the lawful owners of the property. MTC rendered its decision
ordering Sps. De Mesa to vacate. In the intervening, Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to nullify
Claudios title over the subject property claiming that it was a family home exempt from execution under
the Family Code. RTC dismissed this complaint and the CA denied their appeal. Petitioners elevated the
matter to the SC.

RULING: Petition DENIED. The rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, are as follows: (a) if constructed before the Family Codes effectivity or before August 3, 1988
must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code; (b) if constructed after Family Codes effectivity on August 3, 1988, they are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; (c) if not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered
family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence in January 1987 without any showing however that
the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as such in accordance with the Civil Code. Still, when
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, it became a family home by operation of law and
prospectively exempt from execution. Thus, Petitioners were correct in asserting that it was a family
home.

However, despite it being a family home it cannot claim exemption from execution because Petitioners
should have asserted its exemption from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property
before the sale thereof at public auction, Petitioners are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so
estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

HONRADO VS. CA, 512 PHIL 657 (2005)

FACTS: In 1997, Premium Agro-Vet (Premium) filed a collection suit for P240,765.00 against Petitioner
(doing business as J.E. Honrado Enterprises). Turns out that Petitioner (and his wife) filed a petition for
judicial constitution of a land registered in his name and the house thereon as their family home declaring
its value to be not more than P240,000.00. Meanwhile, the trial court in the collection suit ordered
Petitioner to pay Premium. After Petitioners notice of appeal was dismissed, the trial court granted
Premiums motion for execution. The sheriff then levied Petitioners land and on auction, Premium was
the highest bidder. Meanwhile, the other court declared the property as a family home. Petitioner then
moved for the property to be declared exempt from execution in the collection case pursuant to Art. 155
of the Family Code. The trial court denied Petitioners motion deeming Petitioner to have waived the
exemption for failing to object to the sale of the property on execution. Later, when Premium moved for
issuance of a final deed of sale after the 1 year period of redemption expired, Petitioner opposed citing
the court declaration of the property as a family home. From the trial courts order directing a final deed
of sale in favor of Premium, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Both his petition and
motion for reconsideration with the CA having been denied, Petitioner sought review from the SC.

RULING: Petition DENIED. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot form the
time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Art. 153FC,
such exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

RAMOS VS. PANGILINAN, GR#185920, 7/20/2010

FACTS: Respondents were awarded by the labor arbiter P1,661,490.30 in the illegal dismissal case they
filed against E.M. Ramos Electric (a company owned by Ernesto, the patriarch of Petitioners). When the
decision became final and executory, levy on execution was made against the Pandacan property titled in
Ernestos name. Petitioners motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that Pandacan property
was a family home exempt from execution under the Family Code was denied by the labor arbiter. CA
dismissed Petitioners appeal from the NLRC decision likewise denying their appeal.

RULING: Petition DENIED. The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain
with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

Here, since Petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as
1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof
that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the
laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Petitioners.

SANTOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR#113054, 3/16/1995

FACTS: Santos (Petitioner), an army lieutenant and Julia, a nurse by profession were married and begot
one child, Leouel Jr. who, from birth, had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Sps.
Bedia (Respondents). Julia left to work in America. In 1990, Santos visited the Bedia household where 3-
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. According to Sps. Bedia, through deceit and false pretentions, Santos
abducted the boy whom he clandestinely spirited away to his hometown in Negros Oriental. Spouses
Bedia filed a petition for care, custody and control over minor Leouel Jr. which the trial court granted. CA
affirmed the trial courts decision reasoning that such was in the childs best interest as the grandparents
are not only well-off financially to care for the child, but have demonstrated their love and devotion to
the child as against Petitioner who, being a military man has pressing and compelling duties which may
prevent him from attending to his son at times.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose
of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship, and surrender to a childrens home
or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The childs welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

Sps. Bedias demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents. While their attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for
the past three years is understandable, still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents. The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by Sps. Bedia as
grandparents should not be seen as incompatible with Santos right to custody over the child as a father.

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF ANGELINE CERVANTES, GR#79955, 1/27/1989

FACTS: Minor Angelie was born to live-in partners Conrado and Gina (Respondents) who later offered said
child for adoption to Ginas sister and brother-in-law , Sps. Cervantes (Petitioners). Gina executed an
affidavit of consent for the adoption which was later judicially approved. Respondents later sent a letter
to Petitioners threatening to get back the child if P150,000 would not be paid to them. Gina even went to
Petitioners house and took the child from the yaya. When Petitioners demanded for the childs return,
Gina refused saying she had no desire to give up her daughter for adoption and the affidavit of consent
she signed was not fully explained to her. She however would return the child if she was paid P150,000.00.
Petitioners instituted a petition for habeas corpus with SC.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. In all cases involving child custody, care, education and property, the childs
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of monitors, the foremost consideration is the moral physical and social welfare of
the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

It is undisputed that Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina, and his relationship with her
is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with her will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, Gina had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived
for almost 3 years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor like Angelie to grow up with a
sister whose father is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Upon the otherhand, Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother who
is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with Respondents full knowledge and consent.
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in the natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of
the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.

BRIONES VS. MIGUEL, GR#156343, 10/18/2004

FACTS: Joey (Petitioner) had an illegitimate son Michael with Loreta (Respondent) who is already married
to a Japanese national and residing in Japan. Joey claimed that, assisted by his parents he caused the
minor to be brought to the Philippines so he could take care of him and send him to school. Francesca and
Maricel (Respondents) who are Loretas mother and sister, respectively, visited the minor and requested
to take the child for recreation at the SM, promising to return him in the afternoon but did not do so. Joey
went to Respondents house to get his son but was given the run-around. He sought police and DSWD
assistance to locate his son, but all efforts were futile. He filed a petition for habeas corpus to obtain
custody of his minor child being the biological father. Loreta contended that she not only brought their
child to the Philippines, but also took custody of him with Joeys consent. CA dismissed Joeys petition and
awarded custody to Loreta until the child reaches 10 years of age during which he may choose which
parent he prefers to live with, reasoning that, though Joey truly loved and cared for his son and
considering the trouble and expense he spent in instituting the legal action for custody, nevertheless,
applying Art. 213FC, there is no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Joey brought
the matter up to the SC.

RULING: Petition DENIED. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate
child of Joey and Loreta. Art. 167FC explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
the Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. An illegitimate child is under
the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child
in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her
unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

TONOG VS. CA, GR#122906, 2/7/2002

FACTS: Dinah (Petitioner) gave birth to Gardin, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar Daguimol
(Respondent). When Dinah went to the U.S. to work as a nurse, she left the child in the care of Edgar and
his parents. Edgar filed for guardianship and was appointed legal guardian of the minor. Upon learning of
the guardianship case, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its decision
and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to the petition and upon her motion, was granted custody. Edgar
petitioned with the CA and was granted custody of Gardin with the CA discerning a good ground to let
physical custody of the subject child continue under Edgar with whom the child had been living, since
birth. Before the SC, Dinah appealed the CAs award of temporary custody arguing that, as a matter of
right, she is entitled to custody of Gardin since the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother
of the illegitimate minor and the latter had not yet attained the age of seven (however, the child was by
that time already 12).

RULING: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child. In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take
into account the respective sources and social and moral situations of the contending parties. In turn, the
parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Art. 220FC thus provides that parents and
individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other
rights, to keep them in their company. In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child
relationship encompasses much more that the implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the
other.

Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children
are concerned, Art. 176FC provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the
their mother. Likewise, Art. 213FC provides that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Art. 213 where it may
be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. This is not intended, however, to
denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized
that both parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. Neither
does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is separated from his
child.

In the case at bar, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of said minor as the controlling factor, the father should retain in the
meantime parental custody over the child. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.

SILVA VS. CA, GR#114742, 7/17/1997

FACTS: Carlos (Petitioner), a married business cohabited with Suzanne Gonzales (Respondent), a local
actress. They had two children. Their relationship had a rift when Suzanne resumed her acting career over
Carlos objection. When Suzanne refused to allow Carlos to have the children on weekends in violation of
their previous understanding, Carlos filed a petition for custodial rights over the children. Despite
Suzannes opposition alleging that Carlos engaged in gambling and womanizing which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children, the trial court rendered judgment directing her to allow
Carlos visitorial rights to his children during weekends. Suzanne appealed this decision to the CA. The
latter reversed the trial courts decision reasoning that, with the childrens welfare being the paramount
consideration, it would be more wholesome morally and emotionally for the children if it put a stop to
the rotation of custody of the children. Allowing them to stay with their mother on weekdays and then
with their father and his live-in partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal upbringing of
children of tender age. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having to live with it,
witnessing their father living with a woman not their mother may have a more damaging effect upon
them. From this CA decision, Petitioner went to the SC.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. The issue here is not really a question of child custody, but instead, merely
visitation rights of a parent over his children. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough
recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Art. 150FC expresses that
family relations include those x x x(2) between parents and children x x x Art. 209 in relation to Art. 220
states that it is the natural right and duty of parent and those exercising parental authority to, among
other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the natural and primary
rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions
are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees,
the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent
marriage, Art. 49FC provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children. There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the SOLGEN, who recommended due course to
the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children.

VANCIL VS. BELMES, GR#132223, 6/19/2001

FACTS: Bonifacia (Petitioner) filed for guardianship over the property and persons of Valeria and Vincent
who were the children of her deceased son, a US Navy ServicemanPetitioner (Bonifacia) with his common-
law wife Helen (Respondent). The petition was granted with Bonifacia named guardian. Claiming that she
had filed a similar petition, Helen filed opposition to Bonifacias guardianship. Helen moved for Bonifacias
removal as guardian and appointment of a new one asserting that she is the natural mother in actual
custody and exercising parental authority over the subject minors whereas, Bonifacia was a resident of
the United States and a naturalized American citizen. After the trial court denied her motion, Helen
appealed to the CA. The latter reversed the RTC decision citing Art. 255FC which considers the parents,
father or in his absence, the mother as the childrens natural guardian. Petitioner elevated the matter to
the SC.

RULING: Petition DENIED. Petition with respect to Valerie became moot and academic since she is already
of legal age. The basic issue for resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be the guardian. Helen, being the natural mother of the minor, has preferential right over that of
Bonifacia to be his guardian. This finds support in Art. 211FC which states that, father and mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement,
the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. x x x

Parents right to custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the court, but derives from the nature of parental relationship.
Bonifacias cliam to be Vincents guardian can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority
pursuant to Art. 214, FC. As surviving grandparent, Bonifacia can exercise substitute parental authority
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen.

LUNA VS. IAC, GR#L-68374, 6/18/1985

FACTS: Maria and Sixto (Respondents) were married and had a daughter named Shirley whom they gave
to the childless couple Horacio and Liberty Luna (Petitioners) Horacio was Marias biological father.
When Petitioners sought their consent for Shirleys passport application for a Disneyland vacation trip in
America, Respondents refused. As a result, Shirley was left behind and remanded to Respondents
custody. Upon Petitioners return, Respondent however refused to deliver Shirley, prompting Petitioners
to file a petition for habeas corpus. The trial court granted the petition but on appeal, the CA returned
Shirleys custody to Respondents. SC likewise denied Petitioners petition for review from the CA decision.
Upon remand to the trial court for execution, Petitioners vigorously opposed and despite Shirleys
declaration during the conference set by the trial court that she would either kill herself or run away if
forced to live with Respondents, the trial court denied Petitioners motion to set aside the writ of
execution. Later the CA denied Petitioners injunctive petition seeking to stop the implementation of the
decision. Petitioners elevated the matter to the SC.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Shirleys manifestation that she would kill herself or run away from home if
taken away from Petitioners and forced to live with Respondents, made during the hearing on Petitioners
motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to the SC Justices and during the
hearing of this petition, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment inequitable,
unfair and unjust, if not illegal.

Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that, in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latters welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor
can override procedural rules and even the parents right to custody of their children. Since, in this case,
the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an
intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that
choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will
provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling and moral and material security.
But what if the threat is for real?