1 The phenomenological imagination (Husserl) ‘What does phenomenology do for imagination? ‘The phenomenological movement clcidates potentialities of imag’ tion which Edmund Huscer ts inauguraor, belived were neglected tn moa previous philosophies. Whereas phenomenology dscloses and celebrates imaginations creative power of Intentional, a we sal sce below, waduonal theories tended to stigmatize X under twee main headings (1) dualiom ~ images were generally considered alles of the lower corporeal order and thus inimical tothe elevated pursuits ofthe incle, (2) represntationatiom ~ images were conaved a= rere copes of our sensible experience; and (3) reation = images ‘were ueaed as quastmaterial ngs (res) onthe mind rather than 208 oP living consciousness. Desplte the strenuous efforts of cern modern thinkers such s Kant and the German Idealist to restore a producive role 1 imagination, it was not unl phenomenology formally disclosed its funcion 25.2 dynamic and consinave act of intentionality that imagining was fly {eed from is Inherited concepual constrains. Only at this point ‘could what Sarre Identifies as the classical ‘ilision of immanence’ be definitely overcome: By revealing the image to be an intenuonal structure, Mussel fees A from the condition ofan inert content of consciousness. one stroke vanish, along with the immanent messes of images, all the dificukies concerning the relationship ofthe simulacram 1 Isreal objet, and of pure thought to the sumulacrum .. Huse] BPROBLEMS MODERN EUROPEAN Sis eons Jonathan Rée Jearacques Lecerce ‘Situation and Human "reese Sonia Krk Philosophy atthe Limit eid Wood, Poetics of imagining Richard Keamey POETICS OF IMAGINING From Husserl to Lyotard RICHARD KEARNEY R London and New Yorkreceding theores of imaginason. The phenomenological method ‘edreses tis error by dscosing the essence ofthe image to be an quantitative basi, the image was considered true when it fatally represented ts enema orginal and ‘se’ wien it fled 10 do $0. ‘Ths underaanding of the inage-areprescntation was, Huser args, Primary due oa confounding of ie role of imagination with ht of Perception The ssbsoquen problem of distinguishing the nage fom the perrpt was this rendered absurd and Insoluble For once oe begins by sang the qualizve sameness of two thing its of course impossible ler to exis the difeence bowen them. reveals the Ineo ature of imagine con- edoomeas br how iS very mode of consiuion ‘ctr bo the tings of the orld and rem the ‘ther modes of consciousnes~inpaicolar perceptions iflerent ‘nodes of itenoaly, image and peecpt ae aware fictive oF prereflecvely ofthe diference "This 0 since as phenomenology hows, ll modes of rmenoalty are conscious that ty exit 10 the fement that they are purposive determinations of a conscious eg. Consequery, ua Ineo of consciousness, images prove 10 be Spontancous ica which can no longer be misaken for mere resides of sensation serving asa background suppor fo though: Nor can they bbe mizaken fox unconscious rves~ which could besa {0 ‘aus’ ur itenonal sc ~ forthe simple reason tht they are themecives intentions. Images do not determine consciousness dey fare determining acs of consciousness > Phenomenology dispenses accordingly with the old mephyscal ‘worry about the reali or aberwise of tages and accepts the mode Ut betng ofthe image 3 ts made of appearing v0 consciousness To be aure dhe inage a an cof presenting something to consciousness {Sino be conse withthe someting ds presented. Returning 1 his example ofthe cemaur, Hse wis: ‘The Auteplaying centr which we freely imagine &s certainly 2 presentation we have oursves consrucied...but the centaur self [Snot paychic exits ner inthe soul nor in consciousness, not anywhere cle, in fact ‘noting, mere “imaginaon, or, 10 be 6 ‘ HENOUENCLOCIEA BUGINAON ‘more precise, the ving experience of imagination i the imagining (of a centaur. To this ement, indeed, the exnaur as intended, the ‘xntaur as imagined, belongs to the experience Iself as ved. But |e must also beware of confusing ths lived experince of imag rion with that in the experience whichis imagined qua object Imagiocd” In this pasage Huser s suggesting thatthe fact tha the centaur does ‘ot actualy exist does not entee us to dismisk it a 2 mere psychic nt. The abject ofthe centaur image intention le, quite obviously, an ‘real; bot qua ierealy cca, Musser wl age, still mainain| ‘transcendence Aba dhe mid We shall enum 0 this enigatic ‘aim below. “To perce my brother and wo lnagine ay brother are two diferent ‘way fitending the same transcendent objec The itetional percept ‘fers othe same object — my brother ~ as the interional age But the crucial dierence is thatthe fist itends him as ral the ber 38 unreal. this way, phenomenology rescues imagination from ‘naturalistic’ confusion with perception, and restores 0 ts essential role a 4 power capable of imending the unreal ast were Fel the absent as if were present, the possible at ff t were actual. Huser! thus sve to reverse the casa neglect of the unique character (of imagination by describing ie 038 an intermediary sorehouse (of imapesnpressions but a6 suf generis aciviy of our intentions relation othe world "Berween perception, on the one hand, and onthe oer, presentation {in the form of an image, there is an unbridgeable and essential diterence Throughout his many writings on the relationship of lage and percepe, Huss! sadamant on this pot In the Logical Imvesigaions (1900-1) Huser ist outines a basis for distinction between imagination and perception. Ina refuation of the tradional imagery theory’ which confounded the mode of resentation with the objec presented, Huser! retorts tha the image and the percept are diferent modes of presentation, even though ‘hey may be intending the same aby. Furthermore, snes the cee, Imagined is not iself the image, then i 6 of no fel imporance whether this object really exists or not Atti erly tage, omever, Huser! does nat deal with the possible objection that ithe image an intention of something (as every imetion must be) bow can the Image be of nothing, 0 atleast noting tha ext. ”feeed the peychic word of weighty burden ad eliminated almost alle dificulies that clouded the classical problem ofthe relations of images to thoughts! ‘The main aspect of tis clascal problem was the tendency 10 confise images with thoughts and perceptions Sach confusion made It virvaly imposable to dings the estental characteristics of the image tzel Against the erroneous Kentiicaion of images with faded copes of sensation, the phenomenologss strove to Feinsite imagining a8 & su genors acy of human consciousness. For phe rhomenology, any genuine account of imagination must sty atleast wo requirements: must account forthe spontaneous discriminations made by the Imind beeen is images and its perceptions. And it rust explain the role thar images ply in the Operations of thought. Whatever form it took the clascal conception of uages was unable ful these two essential functions To endow an image with a sensory content i to make Ha thing obeying the laws of things, not the laws of consciousnes. The mind is thus deprived ofall hope of > ‘This identification of pure estences 2 fictions of imagination seeks to overcome the hablual eclipse of exental meaning by empirical feformation. Foe Huser, fsions are nether impresions of fact nor by-producs of perception. They represent a things possible mode of cexitence a 2 fre intention of consciousness which paradoxically — ‘grounds the necessity of wuth In sho, fee creations of imagination promde the basis or necessary evidence Emancipaingestences from the ball and chain of fac. imagination opens phenomenology tO 23Fors oF mua to empirical experience; and (2) 0 pronde acces t0 a realm of ‘whose very freedom i the token of 4 necessary (Hat pode and transcendental) scence of essences © ‘We thus sce how the requirements ofthe phenomenological method Jed Huser w acknowledge imapinaton as one ofthe mos ital tors in the inition of essences. Though the hewisic nature of Huser’ forrest in imagining made fora fragmentary raber than 2 systematic treatment of this acy, iis possible to dlscemn a coherent thesis merging through his works. To delineate this thesis beter, we tur row f0.3 more detailed examination of the precise role played by Imagination inthe phenomenological method. aginatio i a prerequisite ofall phenomenological inquiry in so far asi reveals the feof human consciousness © sell How is this achieved? Feat, by backeung or nevtraliing ovr normal ‘perceptual ‘elation to things we enter an imaginauve perspective from which the teeming fux of consciousness may be apprehended in all is possible ermutaons Instead of viewing consciousness asthe cause ofan elect, ‘rthe promis fs conclusion, we now grasp i tan stesioal activity ‘onsanly drected toward the dings fk ife-work By reaching back tnt this deeper lyer of our conscious experience we locate a path 0 ‘send intuion inaccessible atthe surface level of everyday accidents. “ip phenomenology. Husserl explains, ‘images assume 2 privileged position over pereepuon’ Because they afford a freedom which opens Focthe fr ime an en sno the spacious eas essential posbiy with thei infinke Boros of essential knowledge Huser! mana, 26 we noted above, tat the image isthe conse- quence ofthe ‘neutaliztion ofthe postional cof representation’ > Ae such, K permis ut 1 contemplate what i being performed in the intentional acivty of representation It provides ts with 2 s- Postlonal (hati, neutralized) aitode with which to savesuigate the sional aude of our normal consciousness. This di-positonal kde of imagination views things as mere pictures without imparting to them ‘he amp ef being or not being oF the Ike” By using such Images 2 ool for us selfsvestigaions, consciousness frees isl rom the tranny offic and discovers the intentional nature ofits Own Ife. ‘These selovesigaions are not, Huster points out, ‘analyses In the usual sense anajses ito really immanent pars), but uncoverngs of ‘nterional inpicarions, advancing fom a factual experience tthe 2 system of experiences tat are delineated 2s posible'® Without the "idea depth and clit furnished by the proces of imaging, de nen tionality of consciousness could not be adequately dslosed. Because the image is nota copy of the dazu of being but a pure reat of ‘consciousness, I can best revel the essence of consciousness elf 13 3 perpen movement towards meaning Tn this way, the casi poles of consciousness as passive tabula ‘asa of acive inellection ae replaced by 4 more bipolar notion of Consciousness 26 reciprocal appor with wha other han Ase Is precisely beeause the imagination imparts nothing about being! hats ‘est capable of imputing something about consciousness as an ainude towards being” In short, neural with respect wo the existence of fs, Imagining is exemplary wih respect othe meaning of essences. @ [eis fortis reason hat Huser retums again and agalnto the dsincsion| between imagination and perception ® Wile perception is bound by the ephemeral conditions of the here and now, imagination is ee to prescind from given paculare and vary i intentional obects 25 unreal phenomena! This liberty of variation — ro which we wil eum Below ~ allows imaginauon (© detach itself fom perceptual ‘daa and reflect upon them in the form of an as f mode of con- ‘sciousness where they can be aternated and adused a wl for the ‘purposes of claray ac definition, This a fate of imagination is ‘ne ofthe central squistlons of Huss’ mous phenomenological “reduson By reduction Huser does not undersiand a postvsic narrowing ‘of meanings ofa but, on the contrary leading back to (reducore) the essential srucures of phenomena Is smaginaion which enables ‘eonsciousness to emancipate tall rom kt smmersion inthe worl Of ‘acuity (fst phase of feducton) and © return to 2 teal of pure Possbiiy (second phase of redvcion) where is own essence a8 {ntertionliy sven nan inition of immediate cerainy (third phase reduction). This was the indspensable role which Husserl assigned ‘0 imagination in the phenomenological method. But imagination i not ‘only indispensible fora dcosing ofthe essence of consciousness as ‘a of intending things. tis equally indispensable for disclosing the ‘essence ofthe intended things themselves Or, 0 se Hosters more technical terminology the imagination Is that which reveals nt oly the ‘noc’ But also the ‘aoematc’ essence of itenionly ~ thai, 3is nothing other than 2 cerain ype of consciousness at ply with ‘ossbiies, This point forcefully reterated by Donald Kaspit who “rgues thay, becauve phenomenology recognizes fiction as the Ibert {o lavesignte both sel and word in their essences, i recognizes the rity of art over science: "in art. de thing’s features stand out ‘ith fckious clay, because the thing’ factualiy — obscuring insight Into has ben en from iin fiction the dig’ essen Features aren longer unclear as they ae in the fatal things. * iaion, as deployed by phenomenologsts and arts alike, reveals not only hat things have unexpected essences bu alo that conscious hes san unexpected sty 2 proceso ee fancy Hussel makes this qute clear moreover, i a crucial passage in Ideas where he ates: itis naurlly imporant to make rich se of fon for the free ‘wansfocmaion of daa. and we can draw extraordinary profi om ‘what an and pariclatly pocty hae wo ofr us inthis regard © Imagination allows essences to present themsehes through multiple rather than merely single instances. To be sure, the @ prion essence [present in every single isance of is acual experience. But S| preset in a parual and implict way, Bat one moment of is ttl horizon, Fre variation allows this essence o present tel in afl and explicit way, by filing out the total horizon with onal instances. This Fling-oux proces is what Hostel calls 'consuton The essence does ‘ot scully exit prior to our consiuion off. Rather, comes © De through the proces of re varain. As Hussel puss ke The belag of the universal ins diferent levels estetally a being-corstitted In this process | ssences may be acquired by imagination in both a positive and nga fachion. Postel, exsences are reached by an indaion of the ‘ovarian paradigm emerging through a varie of individual instances. Burthere ir loa negative mode of ree varlaion based on the principle that removal or adation of cerain moment in a variant destroy an lnstance of the eds we re tying to iden, If we ty to imagine 2 material thing withow extension, oc 2 melody without time, fr ‘ample, we no longer have a mata thing oF 2 melody. Extension and temporality are thus shown ‘newatvey 10 be ofthe essence of thinghood and music respectively. Husserl concludes according that ‘declomure ofthe etdor takes place in Sagination ex because a pure ‘essence must be free ftom the conngency of percepal experience, % but because If our variation stayed within perception i could never ‘each beyond empirical generality wo eldeic neces. From percepuon alone we could never conclude that extension i integral thighood a an eidetc necesty, For if we were confined 10 our immediate Perception we could ot imagine instances where this might not be £0, and thereby (by a proces of negation) discover that ust be 9. In perception, we could not present the et varios that tn Of bbe Impossible and so mark the esenial mits of an obec. An eles | ot at eidas unl we have confirmed the impossibly of eliminating any of ts pars without eliminating the whole, Hence the paradox that freedom of Filon cin secre the necessity of things ‘Bu could not signification or conceprulization sie here? Husser is Incined to thine not In contra to concepts or signs which are ‘empry Intentions. imaginative variants provide an inttion ‘of the ‘objet. Imagination allows us 10 lok 10 the things themselves, nor Inst to our words or thoughts about dhem. It permits us oa things su tay were present To define time and tone abstract a nega {to musics not suficen. We must bein with insances of music and then freely vary these in the imagination und we ean reger the impossibly of i being what ici unless such atributes belong | « To cause the datum of conscousnest 10 vary imamate is 10 ascover noe only the aides of the experienced thing but also the fds of my consciousness an a prion possibly. The eldos of fonscioumness ~ what Hussel ell the edorqgo ~ ie intentional: ty. Batis my iterionaliy. For Ic 6 the purty of my conscious fess reached through tmagings of my own le. Here, however, jmserl finds himself confronted with the vexed problem of sol ‘pcm Nomatter how iberally i may vary the facto the world, imagination can never transcend self 25.2 wanscendentl consciousness. It beholden to the evidence ofthe fist person singular. The reduction of my conscious experience 0 4s mow uniersl essence cannot, ‘seems, secure acces t0 any self in general My most universal essence always remains my most unwersal essence ~ for there no access 10 the Uansindividual trough the transcendental. In ther word, the phenomenological imagination can save us from the anonymay of {acs but does noe appear capable of savings rom the excusvy ‘of our own transcendental subject! Paul Ricoeur states Huser! ‘lemma suena. nroms oF nucnane ‘the things intended by consciousness as well the Inending acs of ‘consciousness "When Huscerl first formulates this process of imagining estences in the Logical Investigations he calls free variation or ideation’ I ‘arses i the context of his refuation of Hume's notion of consciousness | a sum of discrete and contiguous impressions. Huser! wishes {0 show that consciousness 15 2 continuous and constuve acy ‘operating according to certain untweral anda prion laws of essences’ "He proposes ee variation’ atthe most effective method of dacovering these lve Beane it 3 proces of saginaion rather than of perception, Huser believes that i allows us (1) 0 see beyond the ‘cual mode of existence ofa thing 1 variations of ts cher possible ‘modes of being, and (2) 10 itl thereby an ideal urvarying parce Fur in another way, the phenomenolopet refahione the given data ‘of an object ~ sy, 2 table = by frely varying in is imagination, Hie or she allows the data to move continuously ffom the actual appearance of the able t0 is ‘real possibilities’ (Vermegiceten, {hat is, pessblites prevaling within our real worl) and finally 0 ix ‘cwenal posible” (Wensmdglceten which may transcend {his real world altogether) In so dong the imaginer becomes rare ‘of al the possible vaiauons which the Kentcal phenomenoa of the lable may be subjected to and such an awareness culminates in the Jenson of general estnce ofleness. BY defining imapination 23 the poral leading from the natural othe este real, Huser bound ‘enagraion and phenomenology in 2 Gordan knot @ Taginatio leads an innton of essences, which Husserl designates ‘a nverals not condioned by any fac’ Moreover thee fee and ‘esible nature prores infinkely more apc the proces of uninhubied seation ® This would Seem 10 be the basis for Huset's lcm that the science of pure possbilites precedes the scence of acualies and alone makes it possible as a Sclence:® And Wis 0 doubt this ‘sme phenomenological maim that Heidegger had in mind when he alfirmed in his introduction o Being and Teme that Yor phenomenclogy possbiliy stands higher than actualy Bysuspending a thng'sactual or empirical existence andallowingitto| fat rely a an imagaray irealty (phantasemdsige Unutrtie) amidst an infitely open series of pestis, ideation discloses the fisences of the uhings themselves. But ideation I not just @ sage ™ ‘The geometer when he thinks geometrically operates with imagery vasly more than he does with percepts of figures and models ‘Wheres in actual drawing and modeling he i rearied in imag ‘do be has perfec freedom nthe arbararyrecasing of the Figures he ‘ns imagined, in cunning over continuous series of possible shapes, {n the production there ofan Infinte number of new creations; 2 {feedom which opens up to him fo the it ime an etry ito the spacious rain of exceaal possibilty with their fine horizons of ewental knowledge = Huser seems to be suggesting here that geometrical imagining pre figures geometrical knowledge Geometrial Images adumbea the eomerca ewences of things while peomearcl models merely write ‘hese images lage Here We find a good example ofthe way in which _feon (as a possibility) serves to incarnate an eence (38a tuth of ‘eomeuy) in fact (as an experimental datum-model of science). “This leads 1 the view that ‘he freedom of esearch inthe region ofthe essence necessary demands tat one should operate withthe belp of imaginauon™ Fksions are ere regarded 2 the prerequisite free research 80 fa a they enable us to explore the Cg in 5 ‘essential evidence afer the natural tude as searched ‘apparent ‘evidence. This esenial evidence applies, as we have seen, not merely 10 things but to consciousness sel fr fiction, s Huser understands FoPhenomenology i a vicory over brute fat by the method of imag ‘atv variation... Ths even the Bgo must be imagined order {fo separae i from brute fac. This breaking away from my own ‘onsngency i estential to the bith of the Ago medians. The ‘emarlable thing is tha this passage to the eldosego brings into ply only variations of ey own ego and has no reference to the ‘er in the second person. Thus Fimagine myself a other wihout Imagining an other, This i quite necesary since before constiuing the other, my ego isthe only ego . in this way the eldec 90 ‘efntly has no reference 10 the smarty becween the frst and second person and wore variations on the solic planes Solipsem i the most serious obstacle confronting Huset's theory ‘of inagintion. It all the more surprising, then © discover him in the fih Caresian Meditation seeking to solve the problem by mers of Imagination. Huser arguments based onthe folowing programe (of tmaginatve variation: Iam bere (bi), the ether i there (le), but there (ii) i where 1 could be C1 were 19 move. From over there (ili) 1 would see the same things but under a diferent perspective. Hence, trough imagination I can co-ordinate the oer perspeaives| to my place and wo my perspective ® But because the life of the other {is nt given to me in a ‘orginal producuon'(Lessungn), but merely {na fave reproduction’ in the mode ofthe ‘as f were there’, the Iie ofthe eer can never bocome for me the equivalent ofthe one Ie fof which thave oxginary experience, that is, my own. Hussel cannot ‘cape the selkenclosing mesh which his own theory of unaginaion| has cat. And his closes cpl inthis area, Jean-Paul Sate, was = 5 we sll se ~ wo be equally roubed by this cilemma. © ‘The imporance Huse! atributes to imagining stems largely fom | power offre vartion which leads t the tution of both noetc| nd noematc exences. But thee is 2 thtd and more fundamental ‘sidor which the phenomenological imagination can disclose: what used describes asthe ‘ukimace tel (goa) forall our eidetc investigations, objective and subjecwe .. the elas ofa phulosophy athe all embracing science'*+ ‘This eleologaleidos motivates al of human culure. I, Huse! suggests, what frst leads us out from the solide of consciousness towards the ccbemest of 4 world Ks what regulates and presides {eal sought after by all great thinkers in dhe hisory of philosophy. And “does soby freely varying the posites ofthe ultimate ele sting ‘ich past philosophy as pardculr stp on the way and suggesting the bose posible means whereby this tels might be realized inthe fur. Jn imaginative variation the history of thought emerges 36 suggle towards the tos of absolute reason. Pilesephy s shown accordingly to be a vation of Western humanity which resulted at ove particular peri inthe geomeure objecism of Galle and Spinoza, tance In the more advanced transcendental subjecivsm of Descartes, ume ‘and Kant, and in this century, sl loser to the final eos, in bis own ‘phenomenology Bt philazophy docs not end wih phenomenology. Iebepins agun asf for the fist ume. Indced, is precely tough the Phenomenological method of imaginative variation that evn this final ‘eid s seen t imply the and so fort of endless possibiies © In his later thought, Huser became convinced that the teeo- logleal eas guides not only the philosophical world but also the prephilosophical Meworld (Labensuel) In the Cre and some Of his archival manuscrips, he atempted to explain ths correla tion of philosophy and life by locating the common source in 2 universal programme of intentionality which expreses islf la 8 series of intersubjecive operations (Lasungen). Musser! claims thatthe consituton of Ifewords evinces, despite is prima face felaiviny, cerain invariant tabis" (Gewobmbeien) and typicalves (Besensgeslicheppiien). The Imaginaion discovers these in fee ‘arlanon. By preseinding from any single Lebensuel, projects a ‘hole variety OF posible Labonte and thus dsclses the universal tides of ay Single ebensuel whatsoever Ando by wacnguve words ‘we live in back o thei common inentional source (Semignet) the »Imagination can divine the aids of human socket ad projet ways in ‘which i mighe be historically brought about ln Tbe Onion ef Geomeny, first published as an appendix tothe Cris, Huser! enunciaes this possibly: 1m imagination we have the capac of complete freedom to tans form our human historical existence and what is dere exposed 35 1s "Me world’ And precely in dis activity of free varation, and in ronning through the concelable posibliies for the fe worl, there arses with apodicic selfevidence, an essential general set ‘of element going through all the variants, and of ths we can ‘convince ourselves with truly apodicic certain. This freedom and the dein of our gize upon the apodice Invariant, resus nthe later again and again, and ean be fxd in univocal language asthe ‘Ssence consiandy implied inthe owing vial horizon” ‘To the extent then, that Huser recognized this prospecive power of lnapination, he may be sid to have founded an ontology Of the Iabensuelt. Treating the present world as but one of many posible feworis, imagination consives 1 discover the logs of being nd the telos of ts Becoming, Moreover, is precisely this alm of tage ‘aon that const, for Huser, the ulimate and highest problem ‘of phenomenology In his article forthe Bneyelopaedsa Branca he states this unequivocally 2 follows. Phenomenology recognizes ts paicular function within a posible Ife for man Ie recognizes the absolute noems which are to be Picked out from ths Ie of ma, and alo s primordial teleology ‘al-tendential suc in srving towards che universal idea of “bsolteperfecuon which les wo inky, a seiing which becomes ‘ree through te imapinave proces of disclosure” Here, agin, we confront the paradox of fredom and necessity which ‘50 deeply informs Husserl's treatment ofthe imagination imagination 1 tha which rs us by suspending our servity to the fac ofthe anual” worid and by reuring Us 10 the world of possibilty, 18 also that power of “ideaon’ which discloses the laws of eidec neces” Pree variation leads w necessary ination At this point « phenomenology of imagination poins towards a phenomenology of ‘eanscendence. But, even tough Huser! was well ware of thi, he was 0 “TH PBNOMENOLOIAL MAGINETON ceca to allow of aig which might asgres the inks of an nology” the ulimatetelos of consciousness a 4 super real ety) meant that fis treatment of imagination could aot escape the following impase- ‘imaginative consciousness wholly fee it runs the risk of relativism: and if wholly necessary i rans the oppose rik of determinism, ‘Towards a teleology of possibilty ‘The closest Huser! comes 10 addessing the question ofthe was Scendence of imaginative meaning is, seems, in his account of pare possibly Some incication of the relationship herween imagination 2nd possibly was impli i ll of Huser writings, bu it was not ‘nl the Cartesian Stediatons (3929) that he expla formulated Ws lmporance Inthe second Meditation, Husserl describes phenomenol (gy a5 an a prion science which concerns Itself with the realms of ore posal, pore imapiableness ™ Intend of adn about 2 Alles, e says, phenomenology uses imagination to judge abouts @| Prot posiblies and ths athe sare time prescesrules prior” ‘This Wentieaion of tmaginablenes and pasilty is made more explicit in dhe fourth Mediation when Hassel speaks of imagination 3 Inning the essence of perception by redicing kt 8 word of arf ‘We shit the actual percepsion ino the realm of nonacualites, he realm ofthe sf which supplies us with pure’ possiblities, pure of ‘venting that rears 1 this or that fact whatever We keep these ‘frend possibilities. jst as» completely free imaginablenes! of phantasy. Thus removed from all facualnes, we reach the pure dos of pereption whose Kel extension i made up of all ideally Possible perceptions, for every fact can be thought of merely 3s exemplifying 3 possi In his later works, Huser ended o speak increasingly of anscend- ent horizons of possibly which serch out beyond te given realy {nd mobilize consciousness a an intending beyond self” Bur there i an obvious ambigury here arto wheter this reaching ‘1 beyond the immediate presenness of our experience is mere 3projection of these or an encounter with Something oer than tbe S217" I imagination is merely concious of possblies fashioned ‘within i ow consciousness, we can no longer speak ofthe object (Of lmaginaion a 3 transcendence. And, Wf this be the case, we Bad ‘urseves once again prey tothe luson of immanence: Ie would vem lear, however, hat the Originality of Huser theory of imagination | lies in his interpretation of images as pure possibites revealed 10 consciousness rather than fabriced witor fc Huser! dhs finds himself back withthe old quesion: If possbily i ‘pure’ ~ that emancipated from all ves with realy ~ then how does its freedom Sold degenerating into arbitrariness? If on the other hand, possibly fs real, sno longer arbitrary, but surely atthe expense of being predetermined by an already gen worl? "This dilemma induced Huser wo search for some sort of ranscend- cat telos which could sats the requirements of both freedom and ‘necessity. Only ia terms of such atl, he believed, could possibilty be ald to remain pure and, tthe same ue, motated by some ‘foal towards which i ves. Such a felolopcal posabty would be that which nes all other possiblies n'a unwersal conse ‘synthesis: Hucsel defines ita an infinite regulative dea of wich every ‘resvpposable eytem of possible cbs of possible consciousness ‘would be the anicpatie idea’ "The movement fom actuality to possibility epitomizes, for Hussert the intrinsic dyamism of human conscioumess. On the level ofp losophy, as we Saw this takes the form oa movement fom the natal to the dete perspective This ‘unnatural movement must, however, ‘be motvated somebou And since itcannx be motivated bythe natural world of fs ~ being a surpassing ofall that i factual ~ ican only ‘be motiated by some telos which resides inthe world of possibility itself This telos,Husserl informs us, consitutes an essential neces ‘maniesting itself nthe way in which any fow of freely varied possibes Coberes into a certain ideal sructare’® Ae such, the telos I not st {projection of human consciousness but something which Iman consciousness coves: ‘Whar canbe varied, one ino acther inthe arbtrarines of imaging tion, becomes in self necesary structure, an eos; and therewith ‘necosary laws which determine what must necessarily belong an bj in order tha ican be an obec ofthis kind... We need not ‘urate bring about the overlapping coincidence, since, withthe x serene running through and the retaining in grasp of whats ran ‘hough Wakes place of sl This tleological necessity & not, therefore, a construction of the ‘go. I is, Huser tells us, prior to all concepts we, as eg05, may hnae off The acual ego's not the source Of is possibly a) ‘more than the actual word is: On the contrary, bath thee actalies (of ego and world find thie source in possibly. A actuals, they ‘remain but pata instances of thee total horizons of possible. Ths, for example, my ego's ukimate possbilty is the completion of my horizon projections ~the uhimate ulleat of ny pax, present and fue. Such, Husserl seems to suggest isthe telos which mouats all beings towards the condition ofessenes nd this confi imagination as the indispensable power ofntentonaley which allows us to move beyond our acual world to the world of pesibles where we rede 2% the possbilty of tal being n brie, rapnaion Is precisely that which can redeem us from our bonds of paalty by pefiguring the {els of cay = ‘Because we cn imagine we know that ely knot something given ‘but an infinite meamorphoss. The abyolte i nt real oe any ate ‘ot yet The absolute 1 possible and, as such can be insted only {though de imagination #” Husserts notion of the tlos ae possi tale fora free decison on the pan of each consciousnes to break through to the transcendence ofthe tel (be ithe telos of thing. 8 ego, phlosophy or history tse?) and vo disclose (enfalien) 35 task fr all Imagination lies atthe basis of such decison. In the ight of the above anaisis of teleology, we are surely in 2 beter postion to review Husserl's overiding iemma how ar the dete ws of posbilty, which operate on the bass ofan ‘ese necessity, 10 be reconcled withthe demands of eaginaion ae 2 fe intetonaly? This apparent zporla prompted Hussel to make ‘a important distinction between modaton anc eau ™ Whereas ‘ausaly operates as an impostuon of acces On things owraven, On the coiary operates san invitation to disclose the teeologeal laws of ‘meaning The lane alone allows fr feedom and choice And, aough Husserl himself rarely couches this diference in sich existentialist terms, his uncompromising rejection ofall forms of determinism in the {rb corroborates tis view. Certainly his was the interpretation which such close disciples a Levinas, Landgrebe, Heidegger and Sartre drew ‘ros his wetngs on the subjec. Moreover, this revealing quotation 2{om one of Huser’ unpublished manusrips would seem further to subwantate the point: So we undersand the absolue teleology which isthe inseparable ‘unity of al Finke beings s a meaning giving process which relates to each absolute subjecivty as the infinte way along which I moves iself towards #5 uniguely true being «This operses in the des consciousnes of authentic mani inthe form ofa chosen ideal” Bt, even if we accept that teleological ‘modaton’ is compatible withthe demands of freedom, we are sll left with the question of whether Ic our absolute sabjecvigy which gves meaning to the telor in the fst place, or vice versa In the Camesian Mediarions Hiuses! decared that since "ranscendenal subjeciviy 1s itself the ‘universe ofall possible sense, Le every imaginable being whether immanent of transcendent, den an ouside Is precisely nonsense’ Inthe Ideas on the ther hand, Hostel appears to contadi this ew. “The absolute of ranscendectal subject isin truth no ultimate he concedes it rather something which in a certain profound and ‘oly unique sense... hus is primera source in what is ukimately nd cul absolute ‘Al being Hussel tells us elsewhere again, 's fn the way’ (ater sagen) othe realization of'an ideal and abso possibly 9" tis precy this del telos which guides consciousness {nu consttwion of the wodd and calls each human subject 10 the cretion of ‘an absolutly perfect transcendental, total comm ‘ty’ Such a teleological communiyy would, fthermore, mark 3 {ack ranstion from subjective consciousness © an lnersbjecive ‘Communion with cthers based on the imaginative power of expathy (Einfablang) Here Huseers teleology takes an ela, and at momen ‘even theological tur Tn one oF two manuscript entries Hasse! acualy refers © ths telos ar “God” It dificult to deermine whether Huser means by this the deky of Wester monothesm or meaphysics™ But his Inaisence on the radical otras of the divine telos ~ he uses ‘such terme ae Uberwarbed, Uberutklichke and Wer schichet to define W ~ suggests tht be dd not belive twas reducible 10 2 projeion of human subjecivty?® On occasion, Huser even refers {oe telos power of motivation as ‘grace’ 5 The transcendent sais ‘ofthis teleological posi in no way jeopardizes Husser'sconviion| a ‘thatthe freedom of human imagination sal times preserved, Indeed, Ins ast writings hei caefl to speak of humans being mounationaly ‘directed rather than causally ‘determined’ by the tlos~ a sigicant suncion which indices tha the most sovercign poslliy of out transcendental consciousness Is such that we are ettly at ier 0 ale oF no “in fath we may experience the teleology which dices us.” Hse {nforms us (ait meaning here the imaginative consciousness ofthe ‘els as our sovereign possibly). Because we ate free wo intend ths Pasty imagine, we are also fee not to intend If there ‘vil in the word, i folows that we are entely responsible for it For evl oly ases when humans refase 1 tend the possibilty of an absolutely perfec trancendenal community ® Becuse we are Conscious ofthe posi which may (ori only a possibly) make all things necessary we are toully ree to Intend or counter iend this ‘elo. In shor. imagination Is what makes absolutely fee and, Dy ‘eeason, absolstely responsible” Tn many ways Man's comment that Hegel's phenomenclogy reached the idea! ut tbe mind ony could alo be applied to Huser!’ Phenomenology. With the exception of some ofthe later mankscrps, Hussei’s concern is almost invariably with 4 teloe of Reason rather than of History. Futhermore, tis telos proves 10 be a profoundly ‘contradictory one. This i, not only in the senses ourlined above, ‘but more particulary in the seas In wich Hassel claims that the elo ‘of phenomenology sa once (a) a presuppostionles and selFvident absolute, and (b) 2 goal which can never be reached “broly because ofthe ‘asymptotic’ nature of human incenonaliy.™® Inthe first instance, philosophical reaion is understood asthe posbly of {tsoum absolute foundation. Inthe second plosophicl reason is seen 2 an infin suing vowards some possibilty ater than set ‘Huser formulation of possibly as bod) a self grounding telos| land a never-ending horizon of imaginative freedom is ambivalent, ‘sy the least The fist part of this formulation was developed in an ‘ontological direction by Heidegger inhi Later on Humanism (3947) =a ten where he speaks of possibly’ as a potency (Vermeer) by ‘means of which Being ‘propriate’ (ergnet) what 6 other than ‘sel © what i the same as Hself™2 The second part of Hussec’s formulation was taken up by Sane n eng and Notbingnes (1943) in his notion of possibilty ata fee projection ofthe human inagination. uaser himself never Succeeded belive, in reconcing the opposing 6exigencies of ‘possibly His overall theory of imagination 2 the fetenion and inion of pestblty was aiogether 10 confused and too inconsistent to resoke Hs own contradictions. Nevertheless, a ‘Sarre july acknowledged: "Huser! blazed the tall and no study of limages afer im could afford w ignore the wealth of insights he Provided" conclusion Summarized in ts most basic terms, Hussers quandary is this: If imagination creates essential possibies out of sell how can it ‘ccape the charge of subjective idealism? And, fit doesnot $0 create them, who or what brings them about? “The cles Huser comes to offering hint ofa solution when he sugges that Imaginative varaton, as opposed t9 induction does not Consuct 3 universal eseence out of parila facts but discovers his ‘sence to be thea prio condition ofthese facts" This discovery is ‘what Hse elle ‘consinaton' Theres much confusion surrounding {he phenomenological theory of consieaon. The existentialist inter pression, based largely on the Unpublished manuscrips at Louvain, Iantains that Huser| mean consuraton asa ‘arfistion’ (kamen) (ofthe potentialities implick in being This is what Merieaw Ponty fas the miraculous parndox of consciousness’ which rings light Cferwards what was aieady there before I is in this sense also that Brand interprets Hussers statement thatthe imagination docs fot deny the world altogether, but only prevents me fom aiming that the sumed realty of the pregwen world has the value of fn absolute foundation, 20 that I may examine the laws by which this world is constnined in the frst place” Others ~ including Kockelmans, Splegelberg and Suzanne Bachelard — ay the emphasis ‘onthe more idealist poston of constitution asa pure creation unrelated to the experience of being ‘The aninomies of imagination 25a diclosure of esences notwh seanding, te fact remains that ould no ent MAO imagination One of Huse’ dacples, Felix Kaufnan, sums pis ‘significance inthe folloning portentous tems Phenomenology must be inutive ~ and shat means imaginative inthe sense of eldeic inion, ori will loses dentty a8 a % “THE PHENONENOLOGICA. MAGIA plllsophical movement... Phenomenology ventures Out into a few possibly of exence, an adventure of imagination whic submit, is the very destiny of man if be has imagination enough omni In conchsion we may sy that Huser’ greatest conibution to our philosophical undersancing of imagining, was to have Inaugurated ‘Phenomenological redesrition ofthe image asa intetonal activity ‘ther than a Sat representation. Its of course undeniable dat his tweament wat fragmentary in exccidon and olen iaconcisve ia ‘argument: one remains especially perplexed as © how, for example, the Husserlln account can succeed In reaing the ese 10 the ‘exhsential, the wanscondenal to the bétonkal, oF the subjective (0 the imesubjecive. These cetcsms side, however, Husset! Gi sere the indispensable function of outing the principal implications of an imercional theory of tmagieation, First, he showed thatthe image {san imation (hat, presentation) of consciousness, closer £0 perception than to either the concept othe sgn. Second, and perhaps ‘most significantly, he reveled the distinct and sul generis nares of Imagination and perception: dhe former asa asf Corea inion (of the Intended), the later at 4 real one. But Huss’ cam that Imagination and perception occupy two separate ontological rons ‘was not only resoluson of traditonal anomalies but aso the creation (of an entirely new one. The problem now was ao longer how 10 ‘isingush the image and de percept ~ intentionality had provided the hey here: It as how to us che view that the imaginary can Rave any mode of being at allo, more coreciy to discover what kind of being the image posseses it i no the being of natural realy. ‘We saw how Huser! went clase to providing an are with His notion ofthe imaginary as possibiy. But his discussion ofthis sub fect was vitiated by the opacity and Incompleweness of his treatment, and Ic never succeded in furnishing more than hints and guesses ata solution. Huser! himself was quite aware of this shortcoming Indeed, he repeatedly insted that his work was an appeal to fare sples of phenomenology and not in any sense a fait aecompl "The appeal Was not 1 fall on deaf ears, Subsequent reworkings of the phenomenology of imagining by thinkers as diverse a8 Sarre, Bachelard, Merleau-Pony, Ricoeur ae Lyceard are rock 2 we shall see In the studles which follow, of Huscet's lasing i tng highly cheq- a‘of possibilty where te intuition of ‘essential ts’ may ae place In answer the onolopica! question, he has suggested how the bracket ing of empirical acts an lead back othe transcendental experience of ‘lng themseves' (te Phenomenological atude) And, in answer tO the ebical question, though not dire addres, Huser! dscloses the capaciy’of empathic imagination to move from subjectivity 10 interubyectviy; and he intimates, funhermore, that this tanstion from self to other may uncover an utimiteteleologil mosivation, Notes 1.9 Sane, Pagination ts F Willams (Ann Aber, Mich: Urey “et Wihigan Pre 962 pp 385. ip a id 6 bad, pp. 27-30, Masel er Gomera araduction 1 Pre Pemomenoogy, ans ‘bean ew Yor Cater 162) sea 9 {bad pp 171-D oSae, Imagination, pp. oma scr fas, so 2. user he Ke of BORON ‘Su tine a imagined, becuse he faled "0 lberere ioween de aot “se and eget apprehended {Sime On the tat hs irene Has! dings beendor mean tat he flare cndisoned seen bythe dierent ‘ete ition faite ine be te fte we ae eh wth te ‘rein quion What determiner the inion a eter pret OF image ithe pce? Once aay the cre sel docs oer Hint o's Sluion When hese tha the de ofan age cals fr 2 "posancut inenton herent i of perp tnt (Th a ‘metal was to lcome 3 mar anideraon of Sarees decry of Imapnaion fren however, ntl he Cosa ean (1929) (Gat ttaner! developed thy wip mea compres erento ‘beween pie shes of peeepton (operating sein 1 2 econ avociaton) an an sche Shera mapmon (oper “cording wae spomane) (pp 80-1). 27 Tham ld pp. 300 « aeeeeeare ees op 26a8 wyaoues ¥ Re ase 8 eeees SBRssane 2 sure 2 see asree Pacman 3 Poesy of Edman Hacer (Now Yo hoch, 59) pe 50. «6104 ther. Ganesan Sedans, pp. 20,168. 105 tip. Mand R Boch. Tess concept of be aholuen ton (ca) The Poenomenogy of taser, pp. 177-2 106, {Meriens- Pony ‘ork Hamann Pree 190,938 407 Hse MS, D015. pp 2-8 ef Peron, aC Sith (New % 108 Kock, Py of mand Huser pp 257-67, I-A 109 Rastman ‘Om imap. pp. 3725 Suggestions for farther reading ss there sno single work by Edmund Huser on imation one trst cy on selected passage om act fey and ae tos, Faria megan, ol 2 Btn} day (ew York Fiamanates Pes, 190) lea wane. W. iba (ew Yok Caller 1902) carton Maun trane Cais (The Hague Nie 196D) Formal an Tramcondertal Lgl ars. cais ie Hague io. 19) The at says On Hes exe fe hd con are e-al Sartes condson to maga thn van Flame nbs, Mich: Users o Mica 192) tra two socuibe and engaging aces by Dot Ruspt. eon a phcroncnolyy Plonpy an Phenomenal Rea Yeu 5, (90, and cir Ratan On Image’, Posy and eenomenolpicalResarc vlc (16). Te ox comprehensive ‘econ source M sara i omenhat eh book, moat eo Fase (The Hague: Ni, 197), but tis nt er mala gh anton aaan atvty of consciousness but how such an activity informed cat ‘enya beingnhe word. “Although Huser never dedicated any single worko the imagination, Sarre devoted his first two major philosophical studies o this subj. The fist ofthese, LTmagination (ater wansited as Imagination). ‘experimentation and inductive procedures But eed the reged sing point The wy open for a penomenolog perchology? ‘This passage sates the inspiration and strategy of Sarees principal work on te imagination, LTmaginatre pycologe poonoménologique de imagination (1940) ~eansiatedas The Pycolog of Imagination = fod Wr 16 ip the controversial ‘Pestript to this book a Sane ‘urine, as we shall see, the most innovative existential Implications of imagining. Four characiertatis of the imaginative ‘consciousness ‘Sane’ inaugural move in The Pychology of Imagination iso amplify ‘he Husseran thes that the image 6 an ac of consciousness. TO {roid any misunderstanding, Sarr disinguishes between the property [Phenomenologia use of the tem ‘consciousness (Reuse) 10 Sesigate an active process of intentionality and the more haba ‘esignation ofthe term (For example, in emparcal psjchology) a6 2 fiven mental sate, Sartre elaborates here on is eater argument in| {imagination tat the esenil nature of imagining cannot be grasped ‘ntl we overcome the tational ‘illusions of immanence”~ that, thatthe image is (a) a mere representation having the se mare 8 the maerl realy represents; and (6)a mere payhiccootet subject {0 the same laws as all ther psychic contents. By providing concrete tnd convincing demonstrations of how images are unique intentions c= ‘onsciousnes,Sarve resohes to consolidate Husser's challenge 1 the ‘eadional understanding of images as second-hand senstions. ‘Sarwe thus sets ou to develop Husser's conenon Gut imagining {sto be disinguished from pereeWing no by relerence to the objoos [Kintends,bat by reference tote act of intending. The mental image fe not just a thing existing alongside other things: tsa unique orienation| (fconscousness towards things. "The evo words real and imaginary. 2 Sartre pus tare compose ofthe sae objec only the approach {these objec vares' What defines the imaginary worl, and also the ‘world ofthe rel isan ate of mind. The image and the percep re not therefore diferent objects of consciousness they are diferent ‘ys of being conscious of objec: *