PIL CASES

North Sea Continental Shelf cases

Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands [1969] ICJ 1 (also known as The North Sea Continental Shelf
cases) were a series of disputes that came to the International Court of Justice in 1969. They involved
agreements among Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding the "delimitation" of areasrich
in oil and gasof the continental shelf in the North Sea.

Germany's North Sea coast is concave, while the Netherlands' and Denmark's coasts are convex. If the
delimitation had been determined by the equidistance rule ("drawing a line each point of which is
equally distant from each shore"), Germany would have received a smaller portion of the resource-rich
shelf relative to the two other states. Thus Germany argued that the length of the coastlines be used to
determine the delimitation.[1] Germany wanted the ICJ to apportion the Continental Shelf to the
proportion of the size of the state's adjacent land and not by the rule of equidistance.

The Court ultimately urged the parties to "abat[e] the effects of an incidental special feature [Germany's
concave coast] from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result." In subsequent
negotiations, the states granted to Germany most of the additional shelf it sought.[2] The cases are
viewed as an example of "equity praeter legem"that is, equity "beyond the law"when a judge
supplements the law with equitable rules necessary to decide the case at hand.[3]

Asylum case
Colombia v Peru [1950] ICJ 6 (also known as the Asylum Case) is a public international law case, decided
by the International Court of Justice. The ICJ recognised that the scope of Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice encompassed bi-lateral and regional international customary norms as
well as general customary norms, in much the same way as it encompasses bilateral and multilateral
treaties.[1] The Court also clarified that for custom to be definitively proven, it must be continuously and
uniformly executed.

The Colombian Ambassador in Lima, Peru allowed Vctor Ral Haya de la Torre, head of the American
People's Revolutionary Alliance sanctuary after his faction lost a one-day civil war in Peru on 3 October
1949. The Colombian government granted him asylum, but the Peruvian government refused to grant
him safe passage out of Peru.

Colombia maintained that according to the Conventions in force - the Bolivian Agreement of 1911 on
Extradition, the Havana Convention of 1928 on Asylum, the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Political
Asylum[2] - and according to American International Law, they were entitled to decide if asylum should
be granted and their unilateral decision on this was binding on Peru.[3]

Both submissions of Colombia were rejected by the Court. It was not found that the custom of Asylum
was uniformly or continuously executed sufficiently to demonstrate that the custom was of a generally
applicable character.
Nicaragua v. United States
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) ICJ 1 is a public international law case
decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the
United States and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated
international law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by
mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court
rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. also blocked enforcement
of the judgment by the United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from
obtaining any compensation.[2] Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta Chamorro,
withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 following a repeal of the law which had
required the country to seek compensation.[3]

The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations under customary
international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate
its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under
Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at
Managua on 21 January 1956."

The Court had 16 final decisions upon which it voted. In Statement 9, the Court stated that while the
U.S. encouraged human rights violations by the Contras by the manual entitled Psychological Operations
in Guerrilla Warfare, this did not make such acts attributable to the U.S.[4] INCOMPLETE

Qatar v. Bahrain
Brief Fact Summary. A claim to settle a dispute involving sovereignty over certain islands, sovereign
rights over certain shoals and delimitation of a maritime boundary was filed by Qatar (P) in the
International Court of Justice against Bahrain (D). The Courts jurisdiction was however disputed by
Bahrain (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted
by the signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged.

Facts. A dispute concerning sovereignty over certain islands and shoals, including the delimitation of a
maritime boundary were issues upon which Qatar (P) and Bahrain (D) sought to resolve for 20 years.
During this period of time, letters were exchanged and acknowledged by both parties heads of state. A
Tripartite Committee for the purpose of approaching the International Court of Justice.. was formed
by representatives of Qatar (P), Bahrain (D) and Saudi Arabia. Though the committee met several time, it
failed to produce an agreement on the specific terms for submitting the dispute to the Court. Eventually,
the meetings culminated in Minutes, which reaffirmed the process and stipulated that the parties
may submit the dispute to the I.C.J. after giving the Saudi King six months to resolve the dispute. The
Courts jurisdiction was disputed by Bahrain (D) when Qatar (P) filed a claim in the I.C.J.

Issue. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the
Minutes were only a record of negotiation and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.s jurisdiction, both
parties agreed that the letters constituted an international agreement with binding force.

International agreements do not take a single form under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
and the Court has enforced this rule in the past. In this case, the Minutes not only contain the record of
the meetings between the parties, it also contained the reaffirmation of obligations previously agreed to
and agreement to allow the King of Saudi Arabia to try to find a solution to the dispute during a six-
month period, and indicated the possibility of the involvement of the I.C.J. The Minutes stipulated
commitments to which the parties agreed, thereby creating rights and obligations in international law.
This is the basis therefore of the existence of international agreement.

On the part of the Bahrains (D) Foreign Minister, he argued that no agreement existed because he
never intended to enter an agreement fails on the grounds that he signed documents creating rights and
obligations for his country. Also, Qatars (P) delay in applying to the United Nations Secretariat does not
indicate that Qatar (P) never considered the Minutes to be an international agreement as Bahrain (D)
argued. However, the registration and non-registration with the Secretariat does not have any effect on
the validity of the agreement.

Held. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the
Minutes were only a record of negotiation and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.s jurisdiction, both
parties agreed that the letters constituted an international agreement with binding force.

Discussion. There is no doubt that language plays a vital role in influencing a courts decision as to
whether an agreement has been entered into and in this particular case, the language was the main
focus of the I.C.J and it was the contents of the Minutes that persuaded the I.C.J. to reject the Bahrain
foreign ministers (D) claim that he did not intend to enter into an agreement. Where this is compared
to general U.S. contract law, where a claim by one of the parties that no contract existed because there
was no meeting of the minds might be the ground upon which a U.S. court would consider whether a
contract did exist with more care and thought than the I.C.J. gave the foreign minister of Bahrains (D)
claims.

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is
scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05,
2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.

GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to
exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally
impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.

GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD
and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently
enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement
derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal
and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and
the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities;
and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada
declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed
office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and
MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the
parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-
AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-
AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro
homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the
land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to
ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which will be subject to plebiscite
not later than 12 mos. after the signing and B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP.
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall
have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations
for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall
be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of
judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that
there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse
of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective
does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province
of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs
which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for
the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score
alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And
lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim
Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to
be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been
suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates
that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review;
and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it
does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for
damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render
the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to
the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards
the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted
in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such,
respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he
cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Courts
order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that
would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral
domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed
to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince
they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be
all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in
crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international law,
association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated
state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the
principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution
can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such
concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that
contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court
disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who
voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the
MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of
the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the
ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas
which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the
BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere
passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court
was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise
new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested
to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to
negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also
be amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly,
associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of
unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro
people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a
clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference
of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determinationinternal, meaning the self-pursuit
of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing
states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in
the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule,
subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own
police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for
the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from
the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the
countrysuch was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from
this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel
to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The
legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such
power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President
cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not,
of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon
them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation
of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The Presidents
power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is
not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when.
Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework which
changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent
with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted
to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
Bayan vs Zamora
Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it
by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the senate.

ISSUE:

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

HELD:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in
the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by
the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however
require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to
the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is
also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the
country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of
the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment
in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country
is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part
of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A
treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because
it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing
the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this
be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic
sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum
for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Air France vs Saks
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable for injuries sustained by a passenger

"if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."

Respondent, while a passenger on petitioner's jetliner as it descended to land in Los Angeles on a trip
from Paris, felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear, and the pain continued after the jetliner landed.
Shortly thereafter, respondent consulted a doctor, who concluded that she had become permanently
deaf in her left ear. She then filed suit in a California state court, alleging that her hearing loss was
caused by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's pressurization system. After the case
was removed to Federal District Court, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that
respondent could not prove that her injury was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of Article
17, the evidence indicating that the pressurization system had operated in a normal manner. Relying on
precedent that defines the term "accident" in Article 17 as an "unusual or unexpected" happening, the
District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
language, history, and policy of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement (a private
agreement among airlines that has been approved by the Federal Government) impose absolute liability
on airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel; and that normal cabin
pressure changes qualify as an "accident" within the definition contained in Annex 13 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation as meaning "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft."

Held: Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger, and not where the injury results from the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which
case it has not been caused by an accident under Article 17. Pp. 470 U. S. 396-408.

(a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger's injury must be so caused. The
difference in the language of Article 17, imposing liability for injuries to passengers caused by an
"accident" and

Page 470 U. S. 393

Article 18, imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an "occurrence," implies that the
drafters of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean something different than the word
"occurrence." Moreover, Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to
an accident which is the passenger's injury. The text thus implies that, however "accident" is defined, it
is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition, rather than the occurrence of the injury alone.
And, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists, further guidance is
furnished by the French legal meaning of "accident" -- when used to describe a cause of injury, rather
than the event of injury -- as being a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event. Pp. 397-400.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating history of the Warsaw
Convention, the conduct of the parties thereto, and the weight of precedent in foreign and American
courts. Pp. 470 U. S. 400-405.
(c) While any standard requiring courts to distinguish causes that are "accidents" from causes that are
"occurrences" requires drawing a line that may be subject to differences as to where it should fall, an
injured passenger is only required to prove that some link in the chain of causes was an unusual or
unexpected event external to the passenger. Enforcement of Article 17's "accident" requirement cannot
be circumvented by reference to the Montreal Agreement. That Agreement, while requiring airlines to
waive "due care" defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, did not waive Article 17's
"accident" requirement. Nor can enforcement of Article 17 be escaped by reference to the equation of
"accident" with "occurrence" in Annex 13, which, with its corresponding Convention, expressly applies
to aircraft accident investigations, and not to principles of liability to passengers under the Warsaw
Convention.

Mijares vs Ranada
Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand
Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for
tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141,
Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of
Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial
Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary
estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum
of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper
filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue:

Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other
actions not involving property. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee
should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in
litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners erred in stating that the
Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners
state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have
jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang Pambansa 129, such courts are not vested
with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of
action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here,
the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the
complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is
one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is
Section7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa vs IRRI

FACTS:

GR # 85750- the Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) case.

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine government to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong, Bataan. That comes from an argument between the Philippine government and the
United Nations High Commissioner for refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be
established in Bataan.

ICMC was duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys consultative
status. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the
Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the international committee for migration and the
international of the red cross.

On July 14,1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied for certification with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the rank and file members employed
by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered
with the United Nations and hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.

The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for each of jurisdiction. On appeal by
TUPAS, Director Calleja, reversed the Med-arbiters decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a
certification election. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS petition for certification
election involving the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied. With intervention of
department of foreign affairs who was legal interest in the outcome of this case, the second division
gave due to the ICMC petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties.

GR # 89331- the IRRI case

The International Rice Research Institute was a fruit of memorandum of understanding between the
Philippine government and the Ford and Rochefeller Foundations. It was intended to be an autonomous,
philanthropic tax-free, non-profit, non stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of
conducting basic research on the rice plant.

It was organized and registered with the SEC as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations.
However, by virtue of P.D no. 1620, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities
of an international organization.
The Kapisanan filed a petition for direct certification election with regional office of the Department of
Labor and Employment. IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree no.1620 conferring upon it the
status of an international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal, and
administrative proceedings under Philippine laws. The Med-Arbiter upheld the opposition on the basis
of PD 1620 and dismissed the petition for direct certification.

On appeal by BLR Director, set aside the med-arbiters decision and contends that immunities and
privileges granted to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our labor laws.

ISSUES:

GR # 85750- the ICMC case:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the
application of Philippine labor laws.

GR no. 89331- the IRRI case:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
certification election filed by Kapisanan.

RULING:

The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of
Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective
purposes which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings.

Employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled because each specialized
agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Moreover, pursuant to article IV
of memorandum of abuse of privilege by ICMC, the government is free to withdraw the privileges and
immunities accorded.

No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to respondent secretary of labor in his assumption of
appelate jurisdiction, contrary to Kapisanans allegation, hence, any party to an election may appeal the
order or results of the elections as determined by the med-arbiter directly to the secretary of labor and
employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the secretary
of labor and employment for the conduct of the election have been violated.

Wherefore, petition granted in ICMC case and in IRRI case, the petition was dismissed.