Kremikovtzi AD ( ) was Bulgaria's largest metalworking company.

The company was privatised in 1999, 71% of it was acquired by a Bulgarian owned
company Daru Metals (later to change its name to Finmetals Holdings). In 2005 Valentin
Zahariev and Kiril Zahariev sold 100% of Finmetals Holdings for US$110 million to Global
Steel Holdings Limited (GSHL), owned by Pramod Mittal, brother of the highly successful
Lakshmi Mittal. Kremikovtzi is not related to the Arcelor Mittal group. In November
2006, the debt obligations of the company were subject to extreme price volatility as
speculation mounted about the depth of commitment to the business by GHSL. Pramod
Mittal, the company's owner, issued a statement to reassure investors of his ongoing
interest in Kremikovtzi's success; but this was not sufficient to dampen the ongoing
volatility of the debt price. At the beginning of December 2006, GSHL issued another
statement, this time committing to inject cash into the business on an ongoing, quarterly
basis.
Mittal withdrew from the company a year or so later, and since then the company is being
kept afloat by the socialist government, desperately seeking for a potential investor. All
negotiations ultimately failed, but fuel and salaries were not being paid during that
period, creating additional debts for the company. Since December 2008 the factory is
virtually non-functioning, kept in a safe-standby mode.
On May 15, 2009, the coke production plant - one of the most controversial symbols of
the company - has been shut down forever. Gas supply (main fuel for the factory's
operations) has been cut off, although it can be restored. The fate of the company is
unknown, but prospects are gloomy. The factory is now destroyed and only few of the
facilities that can work are renovated and ready to start work again.

The Irish Steel was established in 1947 after the nationalisation of a private company,
Irish Steel Ltd., which went into receivership in 1946. As a commercial SOE, Irish Steel
performed reasonably well during the 1950s and 1960s. It benefited from a government
ban on the export of domestic scrap metal that provided the company with cheaper raw
material, and, by 1971, employment reached a high of over 1200 workers. However after
Ireland entry into EEC in 1973 the company began to suffer losses for a number of reasons
which included: 1) increased competition due to the free trade conditions it now had to
operate under as part of EEC; 2) its out-dated steel plant and equipment; and 3) a
downturn in the European steel industry after the first oil crisis of 1973. A project to
restructure the companys operations by replacing the old planet with a modern efficient
steel mill began in 1978 and was completed in 1981. The company continued to
experience severe financial difficulties during the 1980s. In the two decades prior to 1995,
the company made a profit in just three out of the 20 years.
The poor performance of Irish Steel during the 1980s and 1990s can be attributed to
several factors, including a costly overhead structure and uncompetitive labour cost. Irish
Steels position as a small player on the European and international steel industry was
not helped by a downturn in the worldwide steel market. In the 1980s selling prices were
driven lower than they had been for over 20 years. In addition, a rise in the price of raw
material put immense pressure on profit margins. Most European steel companies
suffered from the downturn in the industry during the late 1980s and early 1990s and, as
a result, the EC implemented a large-scale restructuring of the European steel industry.
In June 1994, Irish Steels accumulated losses stood at 176.5 million, with the company
incurring a net loss of 26.25 in that year alone. Irish Steel was sold to the Indian steel
company, ISPAT, in April 1996 for a nominal sum of IRP1 due to the large amount of
debt on the companys balance sheet. As part of the sale, the government agreed to write
off a substantial amount of debt and provide an exchequer contribution to compensate
ISPAS for future restrictions on production and sales imposed by the EC. ISPAT, in turn,
agreed to employ a minimum of 300 workers for at least 5 years and invest approximately
30 million in the company in the first six years.
Post-privatisation results, which are only available up until 1999, do not show any
turnaround in performance after the change in owner-ship. Despite a slight improvement
in labour productivity as measured by VAE, the company continued to incur operating
losses and, consequently, ROS and ROA remained negative. In June 2001, only days after
its fire-year deal with the government expired, ISPAT announced that it will be
closing its Irish operation with the loss of over 400 jobs. The company blamed the closure
on increasing labour and electricity costs and the mounting losses incurred as a result. A
last-minute rescue package proposed by the unions consisting of substantial cost-cutting
measures was rejected by management and the company was put into receivership with
workers only left with statutory redundancy payments. ISPAT was also accused of asset
stripping after it sold a large portion of land just prior to its closure.
The privatisation of Irish Steel failed to turn around the companys performance and was
marred by controversy. ISPAT failed to invest in the plant as promised and had a poor
safety record, with a number of tragic deaths occurring during its period of ownership.
In addition the liquidation of Irish Steel by ISPAT left the government with a large
environmental clean-up bill of approximately 30 million, after the government lost a
High Court bid in 2004 to have the ISPAT liquidator pay the cost of cleaning up the 20-
acre former factory site on Haulbow-line Island in Cobn, Co. Cork.
In conclusion, the case of Irish Steel does not provide support for the hypothesis that
privatisation results in improved enterprise performance, even taking into account Irish
Steels extremely poor performance under public ownership. The small scale of company
operations allied to the severity of market conditions faced in the 1980s and 1990s were
such that a change in ownership was not sufficient to engineer a turnaround in the
companys fortunes.

Bord Gais Energy (Gas and Electricity supplier)

In Ireland one of the biggest privatisations to date has been the sale of the state owned
utility company Bord Gais Energy (BGE) to a consortium comprising Centrica plc,
Brookfield Renewable Power Inc and iCON Infrastructure. The Troika pressurised
Ireland to sell off its lucrative energy supplier to alleviate the precarious financial
situation it faced in 2012. Valued at roughly 1.5 billion, BGE eventually sold for only 1.1
billion, because no reserve auction price had been set.2 Ultimately, due to additional
costs, the state was able to cash about 1 billion.46 The sale included a brand new power
station, for which just four years previously in 2010, BGE had paid 400 million. Bord
Gais, the mother company of the energy supplier, was forced to change its name to Gas
Networks Ireland. In addition, the state-owned company lost its profitable wind farms,
plants and the right to supply gas to nearly a million customers in Ireland.47 As a state
asset BGE had yielded rising profits with an EBITDA3 of 91 million in 2013.48 Despite
the disappointing result of the privatisation, adviser fees for the process amounted to 27
million

Portugal EDP and REN

The partial sale of two of Portugals biggest utility companies is another good example of
the controversial role played by some financial advisers and the benefits they reap from
privatisation processes. In 2011 and 2012, the Portuguese state began its privatisation
programme by selling a 21.35% and a 40% stake in its energy companies Energias de
Portugal (EDP) and Redes Energticas Nacionais (REN). The 21.35% stake of EDP was
sold to the Chinese SOEs Three Gorges Corporation while 25% of the 40% of REN was
sold to State Grid Corporation of China. Both these privatisation cases were marred by a
serious conflict of interest. The Portuguese bank Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento
was asked to assess if a privatisation of both companies was possible. Later, however, the
Portuguese investment bank financially advised both Chinese companies attempting to
buy the assets. This means that the Chinese companies could have possessed potentially
crucial inside information during the bidding process. According to a 2015 report by a
Portuguese Court of Audit, the banks dual role in the privatisation of the electricity
sector failed to safeguard the national interest. The report condemned Parpublica (the
government agency in charge of the privatisations) and stated that it neglected to take
the necessary measures to ensure that advisers of the state would not later change sides
and offer their 19 | The Privatisation Industry in Europe transnational institute services
to interested buyers. Moreover, the report also concluded that the Portuguese state, by
selling off its remaining stake in the energy companies, would be deprived of substantial
future dividends. The government would lose out on roughly 1.6 billion with the sale of
EDP and around 400 million with the sale of REN. In September 2014, only three years
after these deals were made, the Portuguese government passed a law aimed at
protecting strategic state assets in the future, including those in the energy sector.
Former Athens Int. Airport Hellinikon land property
In 2014 the sale of a plot of land known as Hellinikon, formerly accommodating the
International Airport of Athens was drawn up. Hellinikon is a 6.2 million square metre
area located in one of the most affluent suburbs of southern Athens. For more than a
decade inhabitants of the area were promised that the land would be turned into a park.
However, the then Greek government eventually decided to sell it to a private
company.40 Although the HRADF originally valued the site at no more than 700 million,
the Technical Chamber of Greece later published a report asserting that the true value of
Hellinikon was over 3 billion.41 In 2014, a consortium led by Lamda Development
(owned by Spiros Latsis, one of the richest men in Greece) and the Chinese private
investment giant Fosun, won a 99- year lease of the entire area and obtained direct
ownership of 30 % of the area. The deal included the payment of a mere 915 million,
spread over ten years. Because Lamda Development was the only bidder according to the
HRADF, this meagre bid was the only option. However, the agency is now 16 | The
Privatisation Industry in Europe transnationalinstitute under investigation for setting
unduly restrictive criteria for the participation of investors.42 In other words: only
Lamda Development was allowed to bid at the auction while other potential investors
were excluded because of dubious conditions set by the HRADF. Thanks to these unduly
restrictive criteria the Greek taxpayer was potentially deprived of privatisation proceeds
exceeding 2 billion.

Extra: Romanian cases

Carom a fost singurul productor de cauciuc sintetic din Romnia, dar care fabrica i alte multe

produse adiacente sau complementare. Combinatul a fost privatizat n iunie 2003, cnd fosta

Autoritate pentru Privatizare i Administrarea Participaiilor Statului a vndut 51% din aciuni

societii Tender din Timioara, pentru 5,5 milioane de euro. Un an mai trziu, Tender a predat

printr-un contract de novaie combinatul companiei Balkan Petroleum, firm controlat de

Marian Iancu i care deinea i Rafo. n 2005, Balkan Petroleum a preluat efectiv 75% din Carom.

Dar, n 2008 Carom a fost vndut companiei austriece Energy Bio Chemicals, pentru aproximativ

17,5 milioane de euro. Acum, ns, Carom se afl n faliment conform datelor de la ANAF. n

anul 2016 nu mai figura cu nici un salariat, iar cifra de afaceri era zero.
Industria Srmei Cmpia Turzii (fost Mechel Cmpia Turzii) este o companie
metalurgic din Romnia, parte a grupului rus Mechel. Combinatul Industria Srmei
Cmpia Turzii a fost privatizat n 2003, fiind preluat de firma Conares Trading,
nregistrat n Elveia[1]. Valoarea tranzaciei a fost de circa 27,2 de milioane de euro[1].
Conares a devenit ulterior parte a grupului rus Mechel[1]. n luna aprilie 2013 compania
Mechel Cmpia Turzii a intrat n insolven n urma unei decizii a Tribunalului Comercial
Cluj. [2] La acel moment n uzin mai lucrau 380 de angajai. n luna februarie 2013 grupul
rus Mechel a vndut toate proprietile sale din Romnia, inclusiv combinatul de la
Cmpia Turzii, cu preul simbolic de 230 de lei firmei Invest Nikarom din Bucureti iar
combinatul a revenit la numele vechi de Industria Srmei Cmpia Turzii.[3]

Rafo
Rafinria din Oneti a fost construit n 1966 i avea o capacitate de preluare de 3,5 milioane de
tone. La nceputul anilor 2000, a trecut prin mai multe probleme n urma procesului de
privatizare, n care au fost implicai numeroi oameni de afaceri romni sau strini, precum
Corneliu Iacobov, Ovidiu Tender, Marian Iancu i alii.