(PHI403) Symbolic Logic

What is Logic?

Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning.
This definition must not be taken to imply that only the student of logic can reason well or correctly. To say so would
be as mistaken as to say that to run well requires studying the physics and physiology involved in that activity. Some
excellent athletes are quite ignorant of the complex processes that go on inside their bodies when they perform. And,
needless to say, the somewhat elderly professors who know most about such things would perform very poorly were
they to risk their dignity on the athletic field. Even given the same basic muscular and nervous apparatus, the person
who has such knowledge might not surpass the natural athlete." But given the same native intelligence, a person who
has studied logic is more likely to reason correctly than one who has never thought about the general principles
involved in that activity.

Logic is sometimes defined as the science of reasoning. This definition is much better, but it also will not do.
Reasoning is a special kind of thinking in which problems are solved, in which inference takes place, that is, in which
conclusions are drawn from premisses. It is still a kind of thinking, however, and therefore still part of the
psychologist's subject matter. As psychologists examine the reasoning process, they find it to be extremely complex,
highly emotional, consisting of awkward trial-and-error procedures illuminated by sudden-and sometimes apparently
irrelevant-flashes of insight. These are all of importance to psychology. But the logician is not interested in the actual
process of reasoning. He is concerned with the correctness of the completed process. His question is always: does
the conclusion reached follow from the premisses used or assumed? U the premises provide adequate grounds for
accepting the conclusion, if asserting the premisses to be true warrants asserting the conclusion to be true also, then
the reasoning is correct. Otherwise it is incorrect. The logician's methods and techniques have been developed
primarily for the purpose of making the distinction clear. The logician is interested in all reasoning, regardless of its
subject matter, but only from this special point of view.

TRUTH & VALIDITY

Truth and falsehood characterize propositions or statements, and may derivatively be said to characterize the
declarative sentences in which they are formulated. But arguments are not properly characterized as being either true
or false. On the other hand, validity and invalidity characterize argwnents rather than propositions or statements.2
There is a connection between the validity Or invalidity of an argwnent and the truth or falsehood of its premises and
conclusion, but the connection is by no means a simple one. Some valid arguments contain true propositions only,
as, for example,

All bats are mammals.

All mammals have lungs.
Therefore all bats have lungs.

But an argwnent may contain false propositions exclusively, and be valid nevertheless, as, for example.

All trout are mammals.

All mammals have wings.
Therefore all trout have Wings.

This argument is valid because if its premisses were true its conclusion would have to be true also, even though in
fact they are all false. These two examples show that although some valid arguments have true conclusions, not all of
them do. The validity of an argument does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.

When we consider the argument

If I am President then I am famous.
I am not President.
Therefore I am not famous.

we can see that although both premisses and conclusion are true, it is invalid. Its invalidity is made obvious by
comparing it with another argument of the same form:

If Rockefeller is President then he is famous.

Rockefeller is not President.
Therefore Rockefeller is not famous.

This argument is clearly invalid, since its premisses are true but its conclusion false. The two latter examples show
that although some invalid arguments have false conclusions, not all of them do. The falsehood of its conclusion does
not guarantee the invalidity of an argument. But the' falsehood of its conclusion does gu.arantee that either the
argument is invalid or at least one of its premisses is false.

There are two conditions that an argument must satisfy to establish the truth of its conclusion. It must be valid, and all
of its premisses must be true. The logician is concerned with only one of those conditions. To determine the truth or
falsehood of premisses is the task of scientific inquiry in general, since premisses may deal with any subject matter at
all. But determining the validity or invalidity of arguments is the special province of deductive logic. The logician is
interested in the question of validity even for arguments whose premisses might happen to be false.

A question might be raised about the legitimacy of that interest. It might be suggested that we ought to confine our
attention to arguments having true premisses only. But it is often necessary to depend upon the validity of arguments
whose premisses are not known to be true. Modern scientists investigate their theories by dedUCing conclusions
from them which predict the behavior of observable phenomena in the laboratory or observatory. The conclusion is
then tested directly by observation, and if it is true, this tends to confirm the theory from which it was deduced,
whereas if it is false, this disconfirms or refutes the theory. In either case, the scientist is vitally interested in the
validity of the argument by which the testable conclusion is deduced from the theory being investigated; for if that
argument is invalid his whole procedure is without point. The foregoing is an oversimpli6ed account of scientific
method, but it serves to show that questions of validity are important even for arguments whose premisses are not
true.
 SYMBOLIC LOGIC

It has been explained that logic is concerned with arguments, and that these contain propositions or statements as
their premisses and conclusions. The latter are not linguistic entities) such as declarative sentences, but rather what
declarative sentences are typically uttered to assert. However, the communication of propositions and arguments
requires the use of language, and this
for purposes of computation. It is easy to multiply 148 by 47, but very difficult to compute the product of CXLVIII and
XLVII. Similarly, the drawing of inferences and the evaluation of arguments is greatly facilitated by the adoption of a
special logical notation. To quote Alfred North Whitehead, an important contributor to the advance of symbolic logic:
... by the aid of symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by the eye, which otherwise
would call into play the higher faculties of the brain.

BRANCHES OF SYMBOLIC : LOGIC–PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND PREDICATE LOGIC

Symbolic logic contains two main branches, propositional logic and predicate logic.Statements in arguments may be
simple, compound or general.The two main branches of symbolic logic namely propositional logic and predicate logic
are classified according to the nature of propositions contained in arguments and the way in which they are
symbolized according to the structure of statements.
Propositional logic is a branch of Symbolic Logic which deals with the validity of arguments containing simple
statements and truth–Functional compound statements. Since the validity of arguments depending on the form of
arguments, the structure of arguments are very important.In propositional logic, the form of arguments are
represented using statement variables and logical constants. Simple statements are represented using statement
variables.Compound statements in which simple statements are truth-functionally related are represented using
statement variables and logical constants.

Predicate logic is a branch of symbolic logic which deals with the validity of arguments containing Singular and
general propositions. General statements represented using Predicate symbols, Individual constants and quantifiers,
and logical constants wherever necessary. In predicate logic, the inner logical structure of statements are taken into
consideration in representing the form of arguments.Individual constants and predicate symbols are used to
represent subject and predicate respectively of statements.

A Fundamental difference between the two branches of logic lies in analyzing the structure of propositions.
Propositional logic does not analyse the internal structure of propositions, whereas the predicate logic analyses the
internal structure of propositions. A fundamental difference between the two branches of logic lies in analyzing the
structure of propositions. Propositional logic does not analyse the internal structure of propositions, whereas the
predicate logic analyses the internal structure of propositions. This may be illustrated with the help of a proposition
such as ‘Ramesh is short’.It is symbolized with the help of a single letter ,in propositional logic. It may be represented
as‘ R ‘. In predicate logic the same proposition is symbolized as ‘Sr’, S stands for the predicate ‘short’ and ‘r’ stands
for the subject ‘Ramesh’. In the second case the two terms constituting the proposition are taken into account.

SIMPLE & COMPOUND STATEMENTS

Propositional Logic deals with arguments containing simple and compound statements. The two types of statements
dealt within propositional logic are, simple and compound statements.The modern logicians have broadly classified
propositions into simple and compound propositions. A Simple statement is one that does not contain any other
statement as a component. A simple proposition cannot be analysed into further propositions.
For example
, ‘Ramesh is honest’. A simple statement cannot be further analysedinto statement or statements.
‘Ramesh is honest’ does not contain any other statement as a component.
A compound statement is one that does contain another statement as a component. For example, ‘Ramesh is not
honest’.‘Ramesh and Dinesh are honest’.
A compound statement can be further analysed into a statement or statements. ‘Ramesh is not honest’ can be
analysed into ’Ramesh is honest’ which is a statement and ‘not’ which is a word. It contains ‘Ramesh is honest’ as a
component. ‘Ramesh and Dinesh are honest ‘can be further analysed into ‘Ramesh is honest ’which is a statement
and ‘Dinesh is honest’ which is another statement. It contains ‘Ramesh is honest’ as a component and ‘Dinesh is
honest’ as another component.

There are five types of compound propositions.They are, Negation,Conjunction, Disjunction, Conditional statement
and Bi-Conditional statement.

Use of new symbols : conjunction – Implication

Conjunction is a truth-functional connective similar to "and" in English and is represented in symbolic logic with the
dot " ".

1. Ordinary language definition of the dot: a connective forming compound propositions which are true only in
the case when both of the propositions joined by it are true.
 2. One way of expressing this definition is by way of truth tables. Consider the following examples.

1. "John left and Carol arrived" can be symbolized as " J C " (i. e., (without the quotation marks), so
long as we remember that the statement does not mean "Carol arrived after John left" which is a
simple proposition).

2. There are four possible states of affairs which might have occurred with respect to John leaving
and Carol arriving. These cases can be listed as follows in what is called a truth table.

p q p q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F

3.

3. Other ordinary language conjoiners besides "and" include some uses of "but," "although," "however "yet,"
and "nevertheless."

4. The dot as a truth functional connective doesn't do everything that the "and" does in English. It might be
thought of in terms of a "minimum common logical meaning" to conjoined statements.

1. I.e., the temporal or causal sequence "Bill tripped and fell" cannot be transposed as "Bill fell and
tripped." The clauses cannot be interchanged.

2. Truth functional connectives are more limited than their corresponding English connectives: the
whole meaning of the truth functional connective is given in its truth table.

3. So long as we do not expect more from truth-functional connectives, there should be few difficulties
in translation.

5. Some characteristics of conjunction (in mathematical jargon) include:

1. associative—internal grouping is immaterial

I. e.," [(p q) r] " is equivalent to " [p (q r)] ".

2. communicative—order is immaterial
I. e., " p q " is an equivalent expression to " q p ".

3. idempotent—reduction of repetition
I. e., " p p " is an equivalent expression to " p ".

Which brings us to an overdue additional convention: lower-case letters are variables, the small letters of the
English alphabet usually beginning with letters after " p "(toward the end of the alphabet).

1. A variable is not a proposition, but is a "place holder" for any proposition.

2. Think of a variable as a "labeled box" which can be filled with any proposition, so long as we set up a
correspondence between the "labeled box" and the variable.

3. E. g., just as "All S is P" is the form of statements like "All men are mortal" and "The whale is a mammal," " p
q " is the form of statements like "John left and Carol arrived" and " J C " (which symbolizes the statement
"John left and Carol arrived."

4. E. g., suppose Alice and Betty are in this room, but Charles is not. The form of the statement corresponding
to each person being in the room is
 [(p q) r]

and the statement "Alice is in this room and Betty is in this room, and Charles is in this room" can, itself, be
symbolized as

[(A B) C]

The truth of the compound expression is analyzed by substituting in the truth values corresponding to the
facts of the case, viz.,

[(T T) F]

so by the meaning of the " " the compound statement resolves to being false by the following step-by-step
analysis in accordance with the truth table for conjunction:

[(T T) F]
[( T) F]
[ T F]
F

Disjunction (or as it is sometimes called, alternation) is a connective which forms compound propositions which
are false only if both statements (disjuncts) are false.

1. The connective "or" in English is quite different from disjunction. "Or" in English has two quite distinctly
different senses.

1. The exclusive sense of "or" is "Either A or B (but not both)" as in "You may go to the left or to the
right." In Latin, the word is "aut."

2. The inclusive sense of "or" is "Either A or B {or both)." as om "John is at the library or John is
studying." In Latin, the word is vel."

2. It is the second sense that we use the "vel" or "wedge" symbol:

" "

3. The truth table definition of the wedge is

p Q p q
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F

4.

5. Consider the statement, "John is at the Library or he is Studying." If, in this example, John is not at the
library and John is not studying, then the truth value of the complex statement is false:

F F
F

Another truth functional operator is negation: the phrase "It is false that …" or "not" inserted in the appropriate
place in a statement.

1. The phrase is usually represented by a minus sign " - " or a tilde "~"

2. For example, "It is not the case that Bill is a curious child" can be represented by "~B".
 3. The truth table for negation is as follows:

p ~p
T F
F T
The general principles that govern parentheses for grouping are as follows.

1. A " ~ " standing in front of a letter negates only that proposition, while a " ~ " in front of an expression in
parentheses negates the whole compound statement within those parentheses.

Note the difference between: ~ A B and ~( A B ).

2. Each occureence of a connective has associated with it a set of parentheses which indicate what it is
connecting.

Hence, ( A B ) C is quite different from A ( B C )

E. g., let A and B be false, and let C be true. The resolution of the truth value of these expressions would be
as follows.

( A B ) C A ( B C )
( F F ) TF ( F T )
F TF T
T F

CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS & MATERIAL IMPLICATION

The word "implies" has several different meanings in English, and most of these senses of the word can be
conveyed in the ordinary language connection of statements with "If … then …" In symbolic logic, implication is
present for "If … then …" propositions which assert some logical or causal or other relationship.

1. Implication is a relation that holds for conditional statements—there are many types of conditionals:

1. Logical: E. g., "If all philosophers are thinkers and John is a philosopher, then John is a thinker."

2. Definitional: E. g., "If Carol is anemic, then Carol has a low concentration of erythrocytes in her
blood."

3. Causal: E. g., "If you strike the match, it will light."

4. Decisional: E. g., "If you donate to educational television, then the company you work for will match
the amount."

2. Material implication is the weakest common meaning for all types of "If … then …" statements.

1. By convention the first part of the conditional is termed the antecedent (also less often called the
"implicans" or the "protasis"), and the second part of the conditional is the consequent (less often
termed the "implicate" or "apodosis").

E. g., in the conditional statement "If you study diligently, then you might see positive results," the
antecedent is "You study diligently" and the consequent is "You might see positive results."

2. In general, the weakest common meaning is that (1) if the antecedent and consequent of a
conditional statement are true, then the conditional as a whole is true, but (2) if the antecedent is
true and the consequent is false, then the conditional as a whole is false.
 3. Thus, we can display these values in the following truth table:

p q p q
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T ?
4 F F ?

4.

If we assume completeness for our truth functionality, then lines (3) and (4) of the truth table for "p q" must have
truth values unique to the substitution instances for implication. Let's try out various combinations of truth values.

1. If the resultant truth values for "p q" on lines (3) and (4) of the truth table, were both false, then this truth
table would be the same truth table for conjunction (or the dot " "). Consequently, these two lines cannot
both result in false because conditionals mean something different from conjunctions.

2. If the resultant truth values were a T and a F respectively, for lines (3) and (4) of the truth table for "p q",
then the truth of the conditional would depend on the truth of the consequent regardless of the first
statement.

However, "If p then q" does not mean "q whether or not p."

3. If the resultant truth values were respectively a F and a T for lines (3) and (4) of the truth table, then a similar
objection would apply. This objection can be explained with the help of the following tentative truth table:

p q p q

1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T F?
4 F F T?

4.

Suppose we have the conditional statement, "If the match is struck, the match lights." By the above truth
table, if we do not strike the match and the match lights, then the conditional would be false. But surely the
match could light in many other ways than the method of striking.

I. e., The tentative truth table implies the match lights only in case the match is struck; we want to allow that
the match could light in other ways.

5. The final suggestion for the truth table for " " for is this:

p q p q
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T T
4 F F T

6.

This interpretation we shall adopt even though it appears counterintuitive in some instances.
 The conditional expressed by the truth table for " p q " is called material implication and may, for convenience,
be called a fifth type of conditional.

1. So we have the following main kinds of conditionals: logical, definitional, causal, decisional, and material.

2. Note two points:

1. The material kind of implication is not the only relation of implication.

2. Material implication does not somehow stand for all the meanings of the "If … then … "

3. But we can say that it has a common partial meaning with all of the other kinds of conditional statements.

Another way of expressing the relation of material implication in in terms of the dot symbol: ~ ( p ~ q ).

1. That is, these expressions are equivalent:

[ ~ ( p ~ q ) ] ( p q )

whatever the substitution instances for p and for q are, the truth values of each compound will remain the
same.

2. Another way of expressing this relations, is to say that this expression is a tautology—a statement form that
has only true substitution instances.

ARGUMENT FORMS

Refutation by logical analogy:- One way of proving invalidity of arguments is by the method of logical analogy. An
argument can be proved invalid by constructing another argument of the same form with true premises and false
conclusion. An argument with true premises and false conclusion cannot be valid, but can only be invalid. To
prove the invalidity of an argument, it is sufficient to construct another argument of the same form with true
premises and false conclusion. This method is based upon the fact that validity and invalidity are purely formal
characteristics of arguments. That is to say, any two arguments having the same form are either both valid or
both invalid, regardless of the subject matter of the arguments. The form of arguments are represented by
means of statement variables. A statement variable is a letter for which or in place of which a statement may be
substituted. Small letters from the middle part of the alphabet p, q, r, s ….are used as statement variables.
Compound statements as well as simple statements may be substituted for statement variables.

An argument form can be defined as an array of symbols containing statement variables but no statements, such
that when statements are substituted for statement variables-the same statement being substituted for the same
statement variable throughout – the result is an argument.

Since the statements of the propositional calculus are propositions, they can be combined to form logical arguments,
complete with one or more premises and a single conclusion that may follow validly from them. Thus, for example,
each of the following is an argument expressed in the language of symbolic logic:

A⊃B (D • B) ⊃ ~E (A ∨ E) ⊃ (D ≡ B)

A D•B A∨E
_______ _______________ ________________________

B ~E D≡B
What is more, notice that all three of these arguments share a common structure: the first premise of each is a
⊃ statement; the second premise is the antecedent of that statement; and the conclusion is its consequent. We can
exhibit this common structure more clearly by using statement variables to express the argument form involved:
p⊃q

p
 ________

q
Each of the three arguments above is a substitution instance of this argument form, since each of them results from
the substitution of an appropriate (simple or compound) statement for each of the statement variables in the
argument form. Notice that these substitutions must be consistent in each application; once we've put D • B in the
place of p in the first premise of the second argument, for example, we must also put it in the place of p in the
second premise. In the same way, the first and third arguments above—along with indefinitely many others—can be
shown to be substitution-instances of the same argument form. Most arguments are substitution-instances of several
distinct argument forms, each of which can be no more complex in structure than the argument itself.

Testing for Validity

Recognizing individual arguments as substitution-instances of more general argument forms is an important skill
because, as we've already seen, the validity of any argument depends solely upon its logical form. An argument in
the propositional calculus is valid whenever it is a substitution-instance of an argument form in which it is impossible
for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Since the argument form reliably leads from premises of a
certain general structure to a conclusion of a different structure, every substitution-instance of that argument form
must express a valid argument.

Thus, the same truth-tables we used to define the statement connectives provide an effective decision procedure for
determining the validity of arguments in the propositional calculus. We simply chart the truth-values of each premise
and the conclusion of an argument form for every possible combination of truth-values for the statement variables
involved, and look to see what happens on those lines of the truth-table in which all of the premises are true. If the
conclusion is also true on each of these lines, then the inference captured by the argument form is a valid one, and
arguments of this form must all be valid. If, however, there is even a single line on which all of the premises are true
but the conclusion is false, then the inference is invalid, and we cannot be sure whether arguments of this form are
valid or invalid. (They certainly are not valid because of this form, but of course some of them may happen to be
substitution-instances of other argument forms whose inferences are valid.)

Modus Ponens

Consider, for example, what happens when we construct a truth-table that lists each of the four combinations of truth-
values that the component statements could exhibit in the simple argument form that we identified at the top of this
page.

p⊃q 1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p p q p⊃q p q
_______ T T T T T
q T F F T F
This truth-table shows that (no matter what statements we substitute F T T F T
for p and q ) both of the premises of the argument will be true only
on the first line (when both component statements are true). But on F F T F F
that line, the conclusion is also true, so the inference is valid.
Whenever we come across an argument that shares this basic structure, we can be perfectly certain of its logical
validity. In fact, arguments of this form are so common that the form itself has a name, Modus Ponens, which we will
usually abbreviate as M.P.

On the other hand, consider what happens when we construct a truth-table for testing the validity of a distinct, though
superficially similar, argument form:

1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p q p⊃q q p
T T T T T
 p⊃q T F F F T
q F T T T F
_______ F F T F F

p
In arguments of this form, both premises are true on the first and on the third lines of the truth-table. While the
conclusion is true on the first line, on the third line it is false. Since it is therefore possible for the premises to be true
while the conclusion is false, the inference is invalid. This unreliable argument form is called the fallacy of affirming
the consequent. Although it might be mistaken for M.P. at a casual glance, the fallacy—unlike its valid cousin—does
not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.

Modus Tollens

Another common argument form with a valid inference is Modus

Tollens (abbreviated as M.T.), which has the form:

1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p⊃q
p q p⊃q ~q ~p
~q T T T F F
_______
T F F T F
~p F T T F T
As the truth-table shows, the premises are true only when both of the
component statements are false, in which case the conclusion is also F F T T T
true. There is no line on which both premises are true and the
conclusion false, so the inference is valid, as are all substitution-instances of this argument form.

As with M.P., there is an argument form superficially similar to M.T.

that yields entirely different results.

1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p⊃q
p q p⊃q ~p ~q
~p T T T F F
_______
T F F F T
~q F T T T F
This is the fallacy of denying the antecedent. As the truth-table to the
right clearly shows, it is an unreliable inference, since it is possible (on F F T T T
the third line) for both of its premises to be true while its conclusion is
false. Substitution-instances of this argument form may not be valid.

Hypothetical Syllogism

1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p q r p⊃q q⊃r p⊃r
T T T T T T
T T F T F F
T F T F T T
T F F F T F
F T T T T T
F T F T F T
A larger truth-table is required to demonstrate the validity of the F F T T T T
argument form called Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.), since it
involves three statement variables instead of two, and we must F F F T T T
consider all eight of the possible combinations of their truth-values:

p⊃q

q⊃r
_______

p⊃r
Despite its greater size, this truth-table establishes validity in exactly the same way as its more compact
predecessors: both premises are true only on the first, fifth, seventh, and eighth lines, and the conclusion is also true
on each of these lines. It follows that all arguments sharing in thisgeneral form must be valid.

Disjunctive Syllogism

Finally, consider the argument form known as Disjunctive Syllogism or

D.S.

1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p∨q
p q p∨q ~p q
~p T T T F T
_____
T F T F F
q F T T T T
The truth-table demonstration of its validity should look familiar by
now. Whenever the premises are true (on the third line of the truth F F F T F
table), so is the conclusion.

Once again, however, there is a similar form that embodies an invalid inference, the fallacy of affirming the
alternative:

p∨q 1st Premise 2nd Premise Conclusion

p p q p∨q p ~q
_____ T T T T F

~q T F T T T
F T T F F
F F F F T
In this case, the first line of the truth-table shows that (with our
inclusive sense of the ∨ ) it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.

STATEMENT FORMS

In exactly the same sense that individual arguments may be substitution-instances of general argument forms,
individual compound statements can be substitution-instances of general statement forms. In addition, just as we
employ truth-tables to test the validity of those arguments, we can use truth-tables to exhibit interesting logical
features of some statement forms.

Tautology

A statement form whose column in a truth-table contains nothing but Ts is said to be tautologous. Consider, for
example, the statement form:
 p ∨ ~p p ~p p∨~p
Notice that whether the component statement p is true or false makes no difference to the truth-
value of the statement form; it yields a true statement in either case. But it follows that any T F T
compound statement which is a substitution-instance of this form—no matter what its content— F T T
can be used only to make true assertions.

Contradiction

A statement form whose column contains nothing but Fs, on the other hand, is said to be self-contradictory. For
example:

p • ~p p ~p p•~p
Again, the truth-value of the component statement doesn't matter; the result is always false.
Compound statements that are substitution-instances of this statement form can never be used to T F F
make true assertions. F T F

Contingency

Of course, most statement forms are neither tautologous nor self-contradictory; their truth-tables contain both Ts and
Fs. Thus:

p ⊃ ~q p q p⊃~q
Since the column underneath it in the truth-table has at least one T and at least one F, this statement
form is contingent. Statements that are substitution-instances of this statement form may be either T T F
true or false, depending upon the truth-value of their component statements. T F T
F T T
F F T

Assessing Statement Forms

Because all five of our statement connectives are truth-functional, the status of every statement-form is determined
by its internal structure. In order to determine whether a statement form is tautologous, self-contradictory, or
contingent, we simply construct a truth-table and inspect the appropriate column. Consider, for example, the
statement form:

(p ∨ ~q) ⊃ ~(p • q) p q (p ∨ ~q) ⊃ ~(p • q)

Since the truth-table shows that statements of this form can be either true or false,
depending upon the truth-values of their components, the statement form is T T T F F
contingent. T F T T T
F T F T T
F F T T T

MATERIAL & LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE

Logical Equivalence

A particularly interesting and useful group of cases comprises those tautologous statement forms whose main
connective happens to be a ≡ . In order for the ≡ statement to be true on every line, the statement forms on either
side of it must always have exactly the same truth-value. Statements that are substitution-instances of these two
component statement-forms are then said to be logically equivalent: no matter what their content may happen to be,
the conditions for their truth or falsity are exactly the same. Consider a few examples that recur frequently enough to
warrant special names:

Double Negation

Double Negation (abbreviated as D.N.) has the form:

p≡~~p p ≡ ~~p
As the truth-table to the right clearly shows, this is a tautologous biconditional. No matter what simple
or compoud statement we substitute for p , the same statement with two ~ s in front of it will have T T T
exactly the same truth-value as the original statement. F T F

De Morgan's Theorems

A pair of more complex tautologous biconditionals are called De Morgan's Theorems

(DeM., for short).
p q ~(p • q) ≡ (~p ∨ ~q)
One form in which DeM. occurs is:
T T F T F
~(p • q) ≡ (~p ∨ ~q) T F T T T
As the truth-table at right shows, the statement forms on either side of the <⊃ always F T T T T
have the same truth-value.
F F T T T

p q ~(p ∨ q) ≡ (~p • ~q)

T T F T F
T F F T F
F T F T F
F F T T T

The other form of DeM. is:

~(p ∨ q) ≡ (~p • ~q)
The truth-table at right demonstrates the logical equivalence of these two statement forms.

Taken together, De Morgan's Theorems establish a systematic relationship between • statements and ∨ statements
by providing a significant insight into the truth-conditions for the negations of both conjunctions and disjunctions.

Material Equivalence

In similar fashion, Material Equivalence (Equiv.) provides alternative definitions of the ≡

connective.
p q p≡q ≡ (p⊃q)•(q⊃p)
Its first form defines ≡ in terms of ⊃ , justifying the use of the term "biconditional:"
T T T T T
[p≡q]≡[(p⊃q)•(q⊃p)] T F F T F
F T F T F
F F T T T
Its second form defines ≡ by pointing out its basic truth-conditions: p q p≡q ≡ (p•q)∨(~p•~q)
[p≡q]≡[(p•q)∨(~p•~q)]
T T T T T
T F F T F
Again, the logical equivalence of these three expressions provides us with a F T F T F
convenient way to comprehend and employ what is asserted in any statement of F F T T T
material equivalence.

PARADOX OF MATERIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are many kinds of implication. We may use the "if..., then..." construction to indicate definitional, causal, or
logical relations. Even among the logical relations that could go under the name of implication, not all are equivalent.
We name the kind we use "material implication". The first step in becoming comfortable with material implication is to
realize that, precisely because it's just one kind of implication, it cannot capture every use of the English "if...then" or
"implies". (For the same reason, no other specific version of implication can do so either.) However, it turns out that
when we translate the English "if...then" or "implies" with material implication, nothing of logical importance is lost.
More precisely, the validity of valid arguments in which implications occur is not lost in the translation.

The truth-table for material implication looks like this:

p q p q

T T T

T F F

F T T

F F T

There are two paradoxes of material implication. Both are evident from its truth-table column.

1. Whenever the antecedent is false, the whole conditional is true (rows 3 and 4).
2. Whenever the consequent is true, the conditional is true (rows 1 and 3).

For example, the first type is illustrated by: "If the moon is made of green cheese, then life exists on other planets."
The second is illustrated by: "If life exists on other planets, then life exists on earth." Strange as it may seem, as
compounds both these statements are true, the first because its antecedent is false and the second because its
consequent is true.

These are paradoxes in the ancient sense, violations of intuition. They are not contradictions. But, you may well ask,
why would we adopt a type of implication with such counter-intuitive results?

The price of truth-functionality

Primarily, the answer is that we want a truth-functional kind of implication. Remember that a connective is truth-
functional if we can figure out the truth-value of the statement solely on the basis of the truth-values of its
components. If we use a truth-functional form of implications, then we can construct truth-tables for our implication
statements. That means we can use the several truth-table methods of analysis to determine the validity of
arguments that contain implication statements, and to determine whether certain implication statements are
tautologies. That is a substantial benefit.

But to get truth-functionality we have to pay a big price. If the truth-value of a conditional compound is to be a function
of the truth-values of its antecedent and consequent alone, then it will look only to the truth-values, not to the content,
of the antecedent and consequent. So far this is consistent with our general desire to disregard content and represent
only the logical form of statements and arguments. But if the content of the antecedent and consequent is irrelevant,
then they may be utterly unrelated to one another. We have abandoned the requirement of ordinary implication that
antecedent and consequent be mutually relevant or somehow connected. Truth-functionality requires the loss of
relevancy.

The paradoxes disturb us because the truth-value of one component can determine the truth-value of the whole
compound, regardless of the truth-value or content of the other. That is, they disturb us precisely because of this loss
of mutual relevancy.

This state of affairs disturbs some logicians too. They have developed so-called "relevance logics" in which the
antecedent and consequent of conditionals must somehow bear on the same subject. The word "entailment" is used
instead of "implication" to describe this connective. Entailment is not truth-functional, and we will not deal with it in this
course. (If you're interested, see Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., Entailment: The Logic of Relevance
and Necessity, Princeton University Press, Vol. 1, 1975, Vol. 2 (with J. Michael Dunn), 1993.)

Only somewhat counter-intuitive

After saying all this, it is important to note that material implication does conform to some of our ordinary intuitions
about implication. For example, take the conditional statement, "If I am healthy, I will come to class." We can
symbolize it, H C. The question is: when is this statement false? When will I have broken my promise?

There are only four possibilities:

H C H C

T T ?

T F ?

F T ?

F F ?

 In case #1, I am healthy and I come to class. I have clearly kept my promise; the conditional is true.
 In case #2, I am healthy, but I have decided to stay home and read magazines. I have broken my promise;
the conditional is false.
 In case #3, I am not healthy, but I have come to class anyway. I am sneezing all over you, and you're not
happy about it, but I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.
 In case #4, I am not healthy, and I did not come to class. I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.

But this is exactly the outcome required by the "paradoxical" material implication. The compound is only false when
the antecedent is true and the consequence is false (case #2); it is true every other time.

Many people complain about case #4, when a false antecedent and a false consequent make a true compound. Why
should this be the case? If the promise to come to class didn't persuade you, here's an example from mathematics. "If
n is a perfect square, then n is not prime." I hope you'll agree that this is a true statement for any n. Now substitute 3
for n: "If 3 is a perfect square, then 3 is not prime." As a compound, it is still true; yet its antecedent and consequent
are both false. (I got this elegant example from a posting years ago on sci.logic; I'm sorry that I did not write down the
name of its author.)

Another way to show that the paradoxes are acceptable to some of our intuitions about implication is to consider
statements like, "If Congress passes serious campaign finance reform, then I'm a monkey's uncle!" Or, "...I'm a
Dutchman!" Or, "...I'm the Pope!" These expressions are flamboyant ways of asserting the antecedent to be false. But
note how we do it. We say that if this falsehood is allowed to stand, then anything follows —even the absurdity that
I'm the Pope. And this sarcasm exactly follows the logic of material implication. False antecedents create true
conditionals.
At least take comfort from this. (1) The perversity of material implication is deliberate, for it is the only way to get truth-
functionality. (2) But the perversity violates only our ordinary expectations, not any logical principles. (3) For material
implication, despite its perversity, suffices to capture the logically essential core of meaning in ordinary uses of
implication. The nuances of English that it does not translate do not affect validity (in standard logic). (4) Hence, the
price is worth paying, for the counter-intuitive material implication distorts nothing essential and, because it is truth-
functional, allows us to test the validity of arguments that contain implication statements.

Application to arguments

Conditional statements have corresponding arguments, just as arguments have corresponding conditionals. How far
do the paradoxes of material implication carry over to the corresponding arguments?

The answer is that they carry over only in a special sense, and not in a simple or straightforward way.

If there was a simple carry-over, then we would expect (1) that arguments with at least one false premise would be
valid, and (2) that arguments with true conclusions would be valid. But neither of these propositions is true in general.

We must make the transition from contingent to necessary truth (and falsehood) to make the carry-over. These
propositions do hold in general: (1) If the conjunction of the premises of an argument is a contradiction, then the
argument will be valid, and (2) If the conclusion is a tautology, then the argument will be valid. These are different
ways of saying, (1) if the premises are necessarily false, then the argument will be valid, and (2) if the conclusion is
necessarily true, then the argument will be valid.

FORMAL PROOF OF VALIDITY & RULES OF INFERENCE

Truth-table method becomes unwieldy as the number of component statements increases. A more efficient
method of establishing the validity of an extended argument is to deduce it’s conclusion from it’s premises by a
sequence of elementary arguments each of which is known to be valid.
The argument,
AϽB
BϽC
CϽD
~D
AVE
.˙.E
requires 32 rows in the truth-table method. But the argument can be proved valid by deducing its conclusion from
its premises by a sequence of four elementary valid arguments. From A Ͻ B and B Ͻ C , A Ͻ C is inferred by
Hypothetical Syllogism. From A Ͻ C and C Ͻ D, A Ͻ D is inferred by Hypothetical Syllogism. From A Ͻ D and ~
D, ~ A is inferred by modus tollens. From ~ A and A V E, E, the conclusion of the original argument is inferred by
Disjunctive Syllogism.
That the conclusion can be deduced from the premises by four elementary valid arguments proves the original
argument to be valid. The elementary valid argument forms, hypothetical syllogism, modus tollens, and
disjunctive syllogism are used as rules of inference.

The formal proof of the argument is written as,

1. A Ͻ B
2. B Ͻ C
3. C Ͻ D
4. ~ D
5. A V E / . ˙ . E
6. A Ͻ C 1,2, H.S
7. A Ͻ D 6,3, H.S
8. ~ A 7,4, M.T
9. E 5,8, D.S

A formal proof of validity for a given argument is defined as a sequence of statements each of which is either a
premise of that argument or follows from preceding statements by an elementary valid argument such that the
last statement in the sequence is the conclusion of the argument whose validity is being proved.
An elementary valid argument is defined as any argument that is a substitution instance of an elementary valid
argument form. There are nine elementary valid argument forms accepted as Rules of Inference. They are:

1. Modus Ponens (M.P)

PϽq
P
.˙.q

2. Modus Tollens (M.T)

PϽq
~q
.˙.~p

3. Hypothetical Syllogism ( H.S)

PϽq
qϽr
.˙.pϽr

4. Disjunctive Syllogism (D.S)

pvq
~p
.˙.q

5. Constructive Dilemma (C.D)

( P Ͻ q ) . (r Ͻ s)
Pvr
.˙.qvs

6. Absorption (Abs)
PϽq
.˙.PϽ(p.q)

7. Simplification (Simp)
P.q
.˙.p

8. Conjunction (Conj)
P
Q
.˙.p.q

9. Addition (Add)
P
.˙.pvq

RULES OF REPLACEMENT

We complete our development of the proof procedure for the propositional calculus by making use of another
useful way of validly moving from step to step. Since two logically equivalent statements have the same truth-
value on every possible combination of truth-values for their component parts, no change in the truth-value of
any statement occurs when we replace one of them with the other. Thus, when constructing proofs of validity, we
can safely use a statement containing either one of a pair of logical equivalents as the premise for a step whose
conclusion is exactly the same, except that it contains the other one.
Although this would work for any pair of logically equivalent statement forms, remembering all of them would be
cumbersome. Instead, we will once again rely upon a short list of ten rules of replacement in our construction of
proofs, and we have already examined five of them:
D.N. p ≡ ~~p

DeM. ~(p • q) ≡ (~p ∨ ~q)

~(p ∨ q) ≡ (~p • ~q)
 Impl. (p⊃q) ≡ (~p ∨ q)

Equiv. [p≡q] ≡ [(p⊃q) • (q⊃p)]

[p≡q] ≡ [(p • q) ∨ (~p • ~q)]

Trans. (p ⊃ q) ≡ (~q ⊃ ~p)

We'll add just five more, making a total of ten tautologous biconditionals to be used as rules of replacement.
Commutation
The rule of replacement called Commutation (Comm.) shows p q (p ∨ q) ≡ (q ∨ p)
that statements of certain forms can simply be reversed.
T T T T T
In one form, this applies to all disjuctions: T F T T T
(p ∨ q) ≡ (q ∨ p)
F T T T T
F F F T F
In its second form, Commutation establishes the same logical p q (p • q) ≡ (q • p)
equivalence with respect to conjunctions:
(p • q) ≡ (q • p) T T T T T
The truth-tables for these two varieties of commutation show that T F F T F
we can safely replace any disjunction or conjunction with another
in which the component elements of the original have been F T F T F
switched, since the truth values of the commuted compound F F F T F
statements do not change under any of the possible conditions.

Association
Association (Assoc.) permits modification of the parenthetical grouping of certain statements.

Applied to disjunction, it has the form: p q r [p∨(q∨r)] ≡ [(p∨q)∨r]

[p ∨ (q∨r)] ≡ [(p∨q) ∨ r]
T T T T T T
T T F T T T

This shows that the grouping of a string of disjuncts T F T T T T

is irrelevant to the truth-value of the compound T F F T T T
statement form.
F T T T T T
Applied to conjunction, it has the form: F p T q F r T [p•(q•r)] T≡ T[(p•q)•r]
[p • (q•r)] ≡ [(p•q) • r]
FT FT TT TT TT TT
FT FT FF FF TT FF

Used in tandem, the Commutative and Associative T F T F T F

replacement rules make it possible to rearrange any T F F F T F
series of disjunctions or conjunctions—no matter how
long and complicated—into any new order and F T T F T F
arrangement we wish to have. F T F F T F
F F T F T F
Distribution
The rule called Distribution (Dist.) exhibits the F F F F T F
p q r p•(q∨r) ≡ (p•q)∨(p•r)
systematic features of statements in which both
disjunctions and conjunctions appear. T T T T T T
T T F T T T
In one of its two forms, a conjunct is distributed over
a disjunction: T F T T T T
[p • (q∨r)]≡[(p•q) ∨ (p•r)] T F F F T F
F T T F T F
F
p T
q F
r F
p∨(q•r) ≡T F
(p∨q)•(p∨r)
TF TF TT TF TT TF
TF TF FF TF TT TF
In the other form, a disjunct is distributed over a T F T T T T
conjunction:
[p ∨ (q•r)]≡[(p∨q) • (p∨r)] T F F T T T
The truth-tables should make it clear that both forms F T T T T T
of distribution are reliable rules of replacement.
F T F F T F
Exportation F F T F T F
Exportation (Exp.) is a rule of replacement of the
F p F q F r F (p•q)⊃r T ≡ F p⊃(q⊃r)
form:
[(p•q)⊃r)]≡[p⊃(q⊃r)] T T T T T T
The truth-table at the right demonstrates that T T F F T F
statements of these two forms are logically equivalent.
T F T T T T
Please take careful notice of the difference between T F F T T T
Exportation as a rule of replacement and the rule of
inference called Absorption. Although they bear some F T T T T T
similarity of structure, the rules are distinct and can be F T F T T T
used differently in the construction of proofs.
F F T T T T
Tautology F F F T T T
Finally, there are two forms of the rule called p ≡ (p ∨ p)
Tautology (Taut.):
the first involves disjunction, T T T
p ≡ (p ∨ p) F T F

and the second involves conjunction: p ≡ (p • p)

p ≡ (p • p)
In each case, the rule permits replacement of any statement by (or with) another T T T
statement that is simply the disjunction or conjunction of the original statement with F T F
itself. Although such reasoning is rare in ordinary life, it will perform a significant
formal role in our construction of proofs of validity.

PROVING INVALIDITY

The invalidity of an argument can be proved by a truth-table to show that the specific form of that argument is
invalid. The truth-table proves invalidity if it contains at least one row in which truth values are assigned to the
statement variables in such a way that the premises are made true and the conclusion false. Truth value
assignment without constructing the entire truth –table is a shorter method of proving invalidity. The argument,
VϽO
HϽO
.˙.VϽH
can be proved invalid by making an assignment of truth-values to the component simple statements V, O and H
which will make the premises true and the conclusion false. The conclusion is made false by assigning true value
to V and false truth value to H, and both premises are made true by assigning true truth value to O.
The truth value assignments are written horizontally as follows:

V O H VϽO HϽO VϽH

T T F T T F
Making the indicated truth value assignment amounts to describing one row of the entire truth-table.
This method of proving invalidity is shorter than writing out a complete truth-table. This method will suffice to
prove the invalidity of any argument which can be shown to be invalid by a truth-table.

INDIRECT PROOF

Indirect proofs are also known as a “reductio ad absurdum” (i.e. “reduction to the absurd”). Indirect proofs can be
used to prove any argument is valid. Indirect proofs have three additional steps:
1. There’s an additional premise—a statement that is tentatively assumed to be true. This is the “assumption
for indirect proof” and “AIP” is written on the right-hand side of the line of the assumption. This statement is
one we will actually hope to prove to be false.
 2. The assumption is used to derive a contradiction (p ∧ ¬p). The contradiction must appear on a line, and it is
often explicitly derived on a single line using the rule of conjunction.
3. Once the contradiction is derived, the negation of the assumption is proven. “IP” is written on the right-hand
side of that line along with the numbers of all lines that use the assumed premise.
Once again, the lines of an indirect proof require tentative assumptions, and they are not proven to be validly
deduced from the original premises. They can’t be used by other parts of the proof for that reason. Only the final
line of an indirect proof is actually proven (and it is validly deduced from the original premises).
Note that indirect proofs often assume the negation of the conclusion. Once it is proven that assuming the
negation of the conclusion leads to a contradiction, the conclusion is actually proven to be true. For example, we
can assume that the conclusion of modus ponens is false. In that case we assume “p → q,” “p” and “¬q” to be
true. But “p → q” and “¬q” proves “¬p” to be true via modus tollens. We now know that the argument is valid
because assuming the conclusion is false leads to a contradiction (“p ∧ ¬p”).

Example

Consider the following argument:

1. Either killing people is sometimes wrong or always wrong.
2. If the killing people is always wrong, then killing people when necessary for self-defense is wrong, and killing
people when necessary for self-defense is not wrong.
3. If killing people is sometimes wrong, then not all homicide is murder.
4. Therefore, sometimes homicide is not murder.
The logical form of this argument is the following:
1. P ∨ Q
2. P → (R ∧ ¬R)
3. Q → S
4. ∴S
P: Killing people is sometimes wrong.
Q: Killing people is always wrong.
R: Killing people when necessary for self-defense is wrong.
S: Sometimes homicide is not murder.
A proof that this argument is valid using an indirect proof is the following:
1. P∨Q

2. P → (R ∧ ¬R)

3. Q→S /S
4. Q∨P 1, Com

5. ¬Q AIP
6. P 4, 5, DS
7. R ∧ ¬R 2, 6, MP

8. Q 5, 6, 7, IP
9. S 3, 8, MP
The indirect proof occurs on lines 5, 6, and 7. It was necessary to show that “Q” is true in order to use line 3 (Q
→ S) with modus ponens to reach the conclusion (S).
Note that the lines of the indirect proof are not actually taken to be validly deduced in the long run. They are only
tentatively assumed to be validly deduced. The assumption is actually the negation of what is proven.

PREDICATE LOGIC

Limitations of Propositional Logic

Both of the arguments below are clearly valid:

(A1)
If Socrates is human then he is mortal.
Socrates is human.
So: Socrates is mortal.
(A2) All humans are mortal.
Socrates is human.
So: Socrates is mortal.
It turns out, however, that only argument (A1) is valid in propositional logic. It becomes clearer when we symbolize
both arguments in propositional logic.

The symbolization makes the fact that [A1] is logically valid only clearer – the argument is simply an instance of
Modus Ponens.
p
→
q
p
q

Let’s turn to argument (A2). The second premise and the conclusion of the arguments are the same but what about
the first premise “All humans are mortal”? How can we symbolize it? Well, in light of propositional logic, the first
premise is simply another proposition that is quite unrelated to the others (this is what is problematic, as we will see in
a moment). We simply need another propositional letter and let it stand for the proposition. Argument (A2) can only
be symbolized thus:

[A2]
A: All humans are mortal
H: Socrates is human
M: Socrates is mortal

It is important to be clear about this.

The proposition “All humans are mortal” is a simple proposition in propositional logic because it is not composed of
any other propositions by means of any of the five logical connectives. If so, however, then [A2] does not instantiate a
valid reasoning pattern. The logical form of the argument is this:
p
q
r

What is the conclusion to be drawn from this?

Well, the conclusion is not to be that argument (A2) is invalid. The conclusion is that propositional logic is too weak a
theory to understand the validity of that argument. This is in part why a stronger theory, predicate logic, has been
proposed.
Acquiring a proper understanding of why argument (A2) is valid in predicate logic will require some time, but for now it
might be sufficient just to draw attention to the major point of difference between propositional and predicate logic.
Predicate logic differs from propositional logic in that it affords a special place to propositions such as “All humans are
mortal”, which are called quantified propositions and which are to be distinguished from propositions such as
“Socrates is human” or “Socrates is mortal”, which are singular propositions. It is this distinction that escapes
propositional logic. In other words, predicate logic provides us with finer tools to look at the structure of propositions.

SINGULAR & GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

“Socrates is human” is the simplest kind of noncompound proposition. It is called ‘singular proposition’.
An affirmative singular proposition asserts that a particular individual has a specified attribute. In the given
example, ‘Socrates ‘is the subject term and ‘human’ is the predicate term. The subject term denotes a particular
individual and the predicate term designates some attribute the individual is said to have.

In symbolizing singular propositions small letters ‘a’ through ‘w’ are used to denote individuals. Since these
symbols denote individuals, they are called ‘individual constants’. To designate attributes, capital letters are
used. In the example, the small letter ‘s’ is used to denote Socrates and the capital letter ‘H’ is used to symbolize
the attribute ‘human’. To express a singular proposition in symbolism, the symbol for predicate term is written to
the left of the symbol for subject term. Thus, ‘Socrates is human ‘is symbolized as ‘Hs’. Symbolic formulations of
Singular propositions having the same predicate term have a common pattern. For example, ‘Ha’, ‘Hb’ , ‘Hc’ ,
‘Hd’ ……….., the attribute symbol ‘H’ followed by an individual constant. The expression ‘Hx’ is used to
symbolize the common pattern. The small letter ‘x’ called an ‘individual variable’ is a mere place marker that
serves to indicate where an individual constant can be written to produce a singular proposition. ‘Hx’ is neither
true nor false. Such expressions as ‘Hx’ are called ‘propositional functions’.

Propositional functions are defined as expressions which contain individual variables and become propositions
when their individual variables are replaced by individual constants. Any singular proposition can be regarded as
a substitution instance of the propositional function from which it results by the substitution of an individual
constant for the individual variable in the propositional function. The process of obtaining a proposition from a
propositional function by substituting a constant for a variable is called instantiation. The negative singular
proposition ‘Aristotle is not human’ symbolized as ‘ ~ Ha ’ result by instantiation from the propositional function ‘ ~
Hx ’ , of which it is a substitution instance. General propositions such as ‘Everything is mortal’, ‘Something is
mortal’ differ from singular propositions in not containing the names of any individuals. They can be regarded as
resulting from propositional functions by a process called ‘generalization ‘ or ‘quantification’. The proposition
‘Everything is mortal’ can be expressed as, Given any individual thing whatever, it is mortal.

The relative pronoun ‘it’ refers back to the word ‘thing’ in the statement. By using the individual variable ‘x’ in
place of ‘it and the word ‘thing’, the general proposition can be written as, Given any x , x is mortal.
By using propositional function, it can be re-written as, Given any x, Mx

The phrase ‘Given any x’ is called a ‘universal quantifier’ and is symbolized as ‘(x)’. The general proposition can
be completely symbolized as, (x)Mx

The proposition ‘ something is mortal’ can be written as follows:

There is at least one thing which is mortal.
There is at least one thing such that it is mortal.
There is at least one x such that x is mortal. There is at least one x such that Mx .The phrase ‘there is at least
one x such that’ is called an ‘existential quantifier’ and is symbolized as, ‘( ∃x )′. The general proposition can be
completely symbolized as, (∃ X ) Mx.

A general proposition is formed from a propositional function by placing either a universal or an existential
quantifier before it. The universal quantification of a propositional function is true if and only if all of it’s
substitution instances are true. The existential quantification of a propositional function is true if and only if it has
at least one true substitution instance. If we grant that there is at least one individual then every propositional
function has at least one propositional function (true or false). The other two general propositions, ‘Something is
not mortal’ and ‘Nothing is mortal’ are the respective negations of the first two general propositions.

‘Something is not mortal’ is symbolized as,

(∃ x ) ~ Mx
‘Nothing is mortal’ is symbolized as,
(x) ~ Mx

The negation of the universal(existential) quantification of a propositional function is logically equivalent to the
existential(universal) quantification of the new propositional function which results from placing a negation
symbol in front of the first propositional function. Where the Greek letter phi represent any attribute symbol
whatever, the general connections between universal and existential quantification can be represented in terms
of the following square array:
(x) φ x Contraries (x) ~ φ x
(∃ x ) φ x Sub contraries (∃ x ) ~ φ x

Assuming the existence of at least one individual , the two top propositions are contraries; they might both be
false but cannot both be true. The two bottom propositions are subcontraries ; they can both be true but cannot
both be false. Propositions which are at opposite ends of the diagonals are contradictories, of which one must be
true and the other false. On each side, the truth of the lower proposition is implied by the truth of the proposition
which is directly above it.