Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN,
Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante
assailing the Decision2 dated January 31, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated June 23,
2006 of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87563. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60, denying their motion to dismiss the complaint
for damages filed by respondent Vita Kalashian against them.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for
damages4 against petitioners. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R,
respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad,
Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner
Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows, "How
many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’
bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one (1) of her hired
personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the
killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around
Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held
liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses;
and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the
case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more
than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

On June 24, 2004,6 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in
Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation.7
The trial court held that the total claim of respondent amounted to P420,000.00
which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The
trial court also later issued Orders on July 7, 20048 and July 19, 2004,9 respectively
reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition,10 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, before the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended
Complaint11 increasing the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam
and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order 12 dated
September 17, 2004.

Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition13 before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, claiming that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint
to increase the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The
case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.

On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a

decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of [the] Regional

Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 60, in rendering the assailed Orders dated June 24,
2004 and July [19], 2004 in Civil Case No. 5794-R the instant petition for
certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5794-R for damages is ordered DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the
MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional
amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule
used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the
instant case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not a separate
and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely
incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total amount of the claim.

On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563,
rendered a decision affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying
petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam. In the said decision, the appellate
court held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes
the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners’
posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are merely
incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of the
total claim.

The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint
by increasing the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00,
on the ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint and
respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.

Unable to accept the decision, petitioners are now before us raising the following
issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART
OF THE (FORMER) SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT RESOLVED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE FOR DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO
P300,000.00;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO BRANCH 60 FOR ALLOWING THE
COMPLAINANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT (INCREASING THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO 1,000,000.00 TO CONFER JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY
OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED AT THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SEVENTH DIVISION, DOCKETED AS CA G.R. NO. 85465. 15

In essence, the basic issues for our resolution are:

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and

2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the

amendment of the complaint?

Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTCC. They maintain that the claim for moral damages, in the amount of
P300,000.00 in the original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages
being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount. And having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the amendment of the
complaint to increase the claim for moral damages in order to confer jurisdiction.

In her Comment,16 respondent averred that the nature of her complaint is for
recovery of damages. As such, the totality of the claim for damages, including the
exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the
complaint, such as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, should be included in
determining jurisdiction. The total claim being P420,000.00, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint.

We deny the petition, which although denominated as a petition for certiorari, we

treat as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in view of the issues
raised.

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 17 as amended by Republic Act No.
7691,18 states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first
adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila
from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the
second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February
22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the
Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the
complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted
to P300,000.00.

But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral
damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court
has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of
kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s
fees, etc., be used?

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 is instructive:

xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court. (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery
of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally
sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by
reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It
is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. 20 It is clear, based on the allegations of
the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or
consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint.1avvphi1

In Mendoza v. Soriano,21 it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the
respondent’s claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorney’s fees plus
P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for
compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount of
monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the
jurisdictional amount.

Also, in Iniego v. Purganan,22 the Court has held:

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is
the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction
of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different
causes of action.

xxxx
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court
of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the
Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the
original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a
petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic
jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has
no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to
confer jurisdiction on the court,23 here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the
original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of
right.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2006 and June 23, 2006,
respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60
is DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. 5794-R
with deliberate dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November
16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235.
The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City,
Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the
partition of the subject property.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage
of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were
able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house
and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March
15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the
property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on
January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise
moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,
the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying
Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered,
ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta
Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco,
Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant
Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain.

Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay

defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary
inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additional P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages to deter others from following suit; and attorney’s fees of
P2,000.00 and litigation expenses of P575.00.

SO ORDERED.4

Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the
Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the
MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the parties:

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount
advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-
140361 with Philippine National Bank;

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo
Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.5

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held
that since the property’s assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within
the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of
the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still
correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She
assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD
TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND
NONATO.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE
PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6

The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of

real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on
real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A.
No. 7691)9

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount
which certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions
outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the

procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147

specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.
Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party.1âwphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage.14 Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.15

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to
the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work
or industry.17

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed
to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.The
Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article
147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions
on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are
set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during
the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal
shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question
is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the
title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said
document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted
that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be
converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution
and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position
paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato
and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-
ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated
January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson