CHANTAL MOUFFE’S RADICAL DEMOCRATIC APPROACH

TO EQUALITY

Leah Skrzypiec

Department of Politics, University of Adelaide

Adelaide, Australia
leah.skrzypiec@adelaide.edu.au

INTRODUCTION

Chantal Mouffe is often cited as one of the preeminent authors in discussions about radical
democracy (Little and Lloyd and 2009, 2; Norval 2001, 590), and Wenman even quotes Laclau as
saying that in their co-authored book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985),
radical democracy was “basically her contribution” (Laclau in Wenman 2003, 583). However,
despite decades of work within this field, there are elements within Mouffe’s work that expose
important theoretical lacunae. As an example, in this paper Mouffe’s failure to outline a radical
democratic interpretation of liberty and equality will be examined. It will be argued that, despite
her insistence on the importance of these principles, and of the fact that, according to Mouffe, they
are understood differently according to each different discourse (Mouffe 2005a, 84), Mouffe fails to
address her radical democratic interpretation of them. It will be shown that such a gap contributes
to the failure of Mouffe to achieve the objectives that she herself sets out. The ensuing discussion
will show that Mouffe fails to capitalise on the most radical elements of her approach and limits the
potential for the project of radical democracy.

In order to establish the importance of the principles of liberty and equality to Mouffe’s work, this
paper first looks at Mouffe’s conception of citizenship. By examining her comments on citizenship
and her adoption of Michael Oakeshott’s concept of the respublica, it will become clear that the
principles of liberty and equality form part of the foundation for Mouffe’s whole approach. Quoting
Aristotle who says that “participation in a common understanding of justice makes a polis”
(Aristotle in Mouffe 2005a, 57), it is evident that for Mouffe these principles are not idle values.
Therefore, for Mouffe these principles inform the practices which define the demos – a key element
in any democratic theory.

In the second part of this paper, I will look at the goals of radical democracy as set out by Mouffe.
The first example looks at Mouffe’s objective of making radical democracy a political project. As
much of Mouffe’s work is focused on re-theorising, there is a danger that it could be read as simply
providing abstract ideas. However, Mouffe clearly articulates that this is not where she wants her
work to be left. Instead she is adamant that this theorisation can be used to inform an actual and
practical project (Mouffe 2001, 11). Mouffe’s second, and related, goal is to ensure that radical
democracy is seen as providing a left alternative model. For Mouffe the current neoliberal
paradigm presents a major inhibitor to democracy and thus she wants radical democracy to provide
the alternative. The last intention explored in this paper is that of providing a different alternative to
the current models – a goal that is less clear in Mouffe’s work because she also advocates working
within liberalism in order to achieve her project. Such a position, I will argue, not only diminishes
the radicalness of her approach, but points to the many contradictions between the two models,
which may result in preventing Mouffe from facilitating radical democratic ends. By examining the
goals that Mouffe sets for herself, this paper concludes that they are severely hindered by the failure
of Mouffe to address the democratic principles. This lacuna is an important aspect that hinders the
“radicalness” of Mouffe’s approach and prevents it from being considered a viable alternative.

THE PRINCIPLES OF RADICAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

In Mouffe’s work, citizenship becomes the key element in determining the boundaries of inclusion
and exclusion within a demos. However, under Mouffe’s approach, citizenship does not rely simply
on legal classifications or territorial bounds; instead the conception is based on an allegiance to
ethico-political values. For Mouffe these values are the principles of liberty and equality as
determined by what Michael Oakeshott describes as the respublica. Despite his conservative
leanings, the use of Oakeshott is worthwhile for Mouffe as, she argues, his work provides a middle
ground that allows her to incorporate elements of both the communitarian and liberal approaches to
citizenship (Mouffe 2005a, 69). In outlining a radical democratic notion of citizenship, Mouffe
firstly distinguishes between two different conceptions of society formulated by Oakeshott. The
first is called a universitas whereby citizens are connected by a common purpose or outcome, much
like the communitarian notion of the public good or the Marxist notion of socialist revolution. In
the second version called a societas, participants ‘are linked by the authority of the conditions
specifying their common or “public” concern’ (Mouffe 2005a, 67). Basically, says Oakeshott,
citizens are connected simply through their “loyalty to one another” (Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a,
66). For Mouffe, this second term is far more useful for her reconstruction of citizenship. She
argues that a universitas is, in a similar fashion to the public good, far too concerned with trying to
achieve a universal outcome, the absence of which is what she takes to be the defining characteristic
of modern democracy (Mouffe 2005a, 64). From the concept of societas Oakeshott draws out a
theory defined as respublica whereby the moral “rules of the game” become the unifying
characteristics for citizens. It is, according to him,
‘the articulation of a common concern that the pursuit of all purposes and the promotion of
all interests, the satisfaction of all wants and the propagation of all beliefs shall be in
subscription to conditions formulated in rules indifferent to the merits of any interest or the
truth or error of any belief and consequentially not itself a substantive interest or doctrine’
(Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a, 68).

However, in using the concept of the respublica, it is not a prescriptive set of procedures that
Mouffe is outlining, as say in a Habermasian, deliberative model. Instead, the respublica offers the
“moral considerations specifying conditions to be subscribed to in choosing performances”
(Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a, 67). For Mouffe, these considerations are informed by a loyalty to the
principles of liberty and equality because, according to Mouffe, ‘it is not possible to find more
radical principles for organizing society’ (1992, 1). Mouffe is consistent in her claims to the
necessity of liberty and equality. However I argue that such appeals are not enough to inform the
respublica and guarantee the success of (radical) democracy because an interpretation of the
principles is also a fundamental element – an element drastically overlooked by Mouffe. By not
distinguishing what a radical democratic understanding of these principles would be, Mouffe not
only fails to capitalise on the radical potential of her approach, but she also creates inadvertent but
important consequences for her project.

The first issue relates to the establishment of the discourse radical democracy. In order to secure
the hegemony of the radical democratic position for a model of citizenship, a clarification of the
principles is key. Mouffe notes that the claims of social movements illustrate the weaknesses of the
other political alternatives, like liberalism and socialism (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 1), but the
radical democratic approach needs to address how its interpretation of the principles can better
provide for these needs. The struggle for hegemony is the struggle to make the radical democratic
position, the ‘common sense’ position, but this cannot begin without the definition of the principles
(Mouffe 2005a, 57). For Mouffe, her aim is to establish a “chain of equivalence” between the new
social movements, under the banner of radical democratic citizenship (Mouffe 2005a, 60). Mouffe
argues that these movements highlight where the principles of liberty and equality need to be
expanded and thus they help to establish the radical democratic discourse regarding these principles.
However, they do so while maintaining their differences. Instead of homogenising (and possibly
compromising) difference in order to secure a new political position, Mouffe believes that alterity
can be maintained and maximised through an allegiance to principles, rather than identity (Mouffe
2005a, 84).

Furthermore, for Mouffe these principles maintain a reflexive characteristic in the sense that the
radical democratic position is not trying to uncover the “true” or “essential” meaning behind the
principles. This is important to ensure so that they are able to respond to claims made by various
subject positions. As Smith writes, ‘[t]he rules and norms that lay the foundations for radical
democracy will always have to be re-examined in the light of new conditions and struggles’ (1998,
23). However, it is also vital to outline where this reflexivity ends. Mouffe herself has noted that
pluralism cannot be absolute and rather limits must be imposed, arguing that there must be limits to
pluralism (Mouffe 1996b, 135-6). However, these limits will be difficult to determine without the
radical ethos to inform such decisions.

Establishing the ‘grammar of conduct’ (Mouffe 2005a, 85) is also important for the radical
democratic discourse because it helps to establish the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion (who
are enemies and who are merely adversaries in a Schmittian sense) – a fundamental element of all
political processes according to Mouffe (Mouffe 2000, 43). Following Mouffe’s analysis, ‘there
will always be competing interpretations of the shared principles of equality and liberty’ (Mouffe
1992, 14), and this forms part of the agonistic debate. She writes, for example, that
[t]he adversary – with whom one has an agonistic relationship – is someone with whom
one agrees about the principles underpinning the organization of society, but with whom
one disagrees about their interpretation. The enemy is the person who disagrees with the
principles (2001, 12).
So, following Mouffe’s use of Schmitt, the liberals, deliberative democrats, and socialists, for
example, are adversaries, rather than enemies, of radical democrats, because they share an
adherence (at least) to the principles of liberty and equality. The debate between them is about
securing their own interpretation as the hegemonic one. However, for Mouffe, despite the
prevalence of agonistic debate, there can only ever be one hegemonic discourse established at any
one time because ‘[a]ntagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within one single political
association’ (Mouffe 1992, 11). Therefore, in order to provide for a radical democratic citizenship,
and the necessary ‘consensus on ethical-political principles’ (Mouffe 1996b, 135), the radical
interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality needs to be specified.

THE GOALS OF MOUFFE’S APPROACH

A Political Project

As a necessary component of the respublica and thus citizenship, a starting point for a radical
democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality is vital; it is also very possible.
By drawing out the claims made by the new social movements, for example, Mouffe acknowledged
that the socialist understanding of equality (through economic redistribution), while a necessary
condition for her approach, was not sufficient. For Mouffe, the new social movements of the 1980s
helped to clarify the
radical democratic interpretation of the political principles of the liberal democratic regime
[because] [s]uch an interpretation emphasizes the numerous social relations where
subordination exists and must be challenged if the principles of equality and liberty are to
apply (Mouffe 1996a, 24).
However Mouffe never specifies this interpretation. It is therefore difficult to utilise Mouffe’s work
in future projects and this diminishes the potential of the radical democratic approach. After all,
how does one apply the radical democratic principles if one does not know what this actually means
or entails? Although, at times, Mouffe has said that her approach should not be conceived as
providing a model on which to base a new society (Mouffe 1996a, 20; Mouffe 2000, 61), she
nevertheless specifies that the project of radical democracy is still an important objective (Mouffe
2001, 11). (It is also important to note that the final, absolute implementation of a radical
democracy can never be reached because conceiving it as an endpoint contradicts all that it stands
for – political reflexivity and fluidity as well as constant re-negotiation through sub-hegemonic
challenges. However, this simply requires a shift in perspective to what Derrida calls ‘democracy
“to come”’ (Mouffe 2005a, 8).) It is therefore clear that Mouffe does want her work on radical
democracy to provide more than abstract theorising.

Mouffe has made some comments regarding the type of equality and liberty she wants for her
project, saying, for example, that
[a] radical democratic interpretation will emphasize the numerous social relations in which
situations of domination exist that must be challenged if the principles of liberty and
equality are to apply (2005a, 84),
but very little time has been spent fleshing out what the implications are for such understandings.
In the new preface in the second edition of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Mouffe and Laclau
write that
[i]f one is to build a chain of equivalences among democratic struggles, one needs to
establish a frontier and define an adversary, but this is not enough. One also needs to know
for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to establish (2001, xix, emphasis
added).
However, the vision for this society is never articulated by Mouffe and I argue that this is because
there is not a substantial interpretation of the principles that could inform this project. Mouffe
makes claims about the project of radical democracy being anti-capitalist and also maintaining
certain liberal institutions. However, as I will show in the following sections, the implementation of
such goals is again hindered by Mouffe’s lack of detail on the principles.

A Left Alternative

As part of her political project, Mouffe wants radical democracy to be able to provide for a new
‘socialist strategy’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that can challenge the dominance of the neoliberal
hegemony. In terms of the alternatives offered by other “left” models, Mouffe argues that they fail
to deliver a democratic and economic alternative. Of Anthony Giddens’s Third Way approach
Mouffe writes that his position ‘resign[s] itself to accepting the present stage of
capitalism…degree[ing] that there is no alternative’ (2005b, 60). For Mouffe, such ‘post-political’
positions are “shallow” (Mouffe 2005b, 64) and she blames these centrist positions for causing the
rise in right-wing parties across Europe (Mouffe 2005b, 66-72).

However, when it comes to Mouffe detailing her economic alternative, or even critique of
capitalism, there is once again a substantial gap. In terms of one theorist providing all of the
elements for an alternative model, this is perhaps an unfair expectation. However, in the case of
Mouffe, she outlines that this is one of her goals. She says things like: ‘can one imagine a non-
capitalist liberal democracy? This is the most pressing question for the left today’ (1996a, 19); ‘The
most important task for the left today is to find alternatives to neoliberalism’ (Mouffe in Castle
1998); and
the problem today is not so much around the question of class but around a critique of the
capitalist system. And I think that is where the analysis has to be done. One of the reasons
why I think there is no hope today for future possibility is precisely because people feel
there is no alternative to the capitalist system, and even more to the neo-liberal form of
 capitalism which is dominant today. And the Left is in great part responsible for that,
because they seem to have capitulated to this dominance of capitalism and they are not
thinking of another alternative. What I think is really missing is an analysis of the problem
caused by capitalism and the neo-liberal form of globalization (Mouffe in Zournazi 2002,
135, emphasis added).

While there are some examples of Mouffe discussing the problems with capitalism (Mouffe 1998;
Mouffe in Castle 1998; Mouffe 2000, 15-17; Mouffe 2009a), these are few and far between. These
analyses also fail to provide the necessary detail to inform another, proper alternative to
neoliberalism. The objective of asserting an alternative to capitalism and neoliberalism is certainly
a difficult task for any theorist, but particularly for Mouffe after her deconstruction of the class
essentialism in Marxism. Although, in her critique, she concludes that post-Marxist analyses can
still provide useful tools for challenging capitalism, her main argument is that a focus only on class
misses other important dimensions (Mouffe 1988). With this critique, together with her formation
of discourse analysis, Mouffe illustrates that the ‘economy’ is not a separate field but is rather
always interwoven into other realms of life. Therefore, a critique of, and alternatives to, capitalism,
for example, can no longer simply address issues of labour and production; there are far more issues
involved and a new, radical democratic hegemony would have to highlight inequalities in spheres
traditionally considered separate to the economic. This makes the creation of a substitutive and
equivalent alternative difficult. Instead, Mouffe talks about redefining socialist goals in order to
challenge neoliberalism and drop the illusion of a completely new economic system (Mouffe 2000,
15). But the hegemony of neoliberalism continues to contribute to real and experienced inequalities
and is thus an area that needs to be addressed by Mouffe when discussing the effects of capitalism.

In order to address this lacuna, I propose that a radical democratic interpretation of equality,
particularly, could provide the foundation for such discussion on the economic alternatives. By
highlighting the way that subject positions are perpetually subordinated by the affects of
neoliberalism, radical democracy could be put up as an alternative. For instance, if Mouffe adopted
the challenges of the environmentalists, she could illustrate that (under radical democracy)
addressing economic equality would not simply be about a redistribution of funds. Instead, a
radical democratic approach would incorporate issues regarding equal access to the world’s
resources and address concerns regarding never-ending production with finite means. Alternatives
that propose to simply give a monetary value to natural resources could also be challenged by
showing that they do nothing to alter the paradigm of monetary profit and growth. In these simple
examples we can see that instead of merely addressing the subject position of the worker (a problem
Mouffe associates with socialism), radical democracy can aim to provide for future generations as
well as the sustainability of the planet. While this is just one possible dimension of a radical
interpretation of equality, it is an example that finds no parallel in Mouffe’s work. A possible
reason for Mouffe not addressing such issues is that she is at pains not to fall back into the socialist
paradigm of economism or class essentialism, arguing that the socialist dimension is a necessary but
not sufficient element (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 178). However,
the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not
engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic
horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end
up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (Žižek
and Daly 2004, 15).
Therefore, without adequate address, Mouffe’s aim to utilise radical democracy as a left alternative
is severely diminished. Mouffe is right to conclude that the anti-capitalist facet is but one feature of
her radical democratic approach. However, it is a fundamental element and thus its erasure spells
acute consequences for her left project. In regards to the Third Way models Mouffe writes that
‘[i]t is the current unchallenged hegemony of the neo-liberal discourse which explains why the left
is without any credible project’ (2000, 118), and yet her work contains the same gap. While not
completely solving the issue of a capitalist critique and alternative, a radical democratic
interpretation of the principles (or even the beginning of this conversation) could provide a much-
needed boost towards this direction.

A Different Alternative

Mouffe has always been adamant that liberalism is an essential element in the radical democratic
approach, arguing that ‘political liberalism must be a central component of a project of radical and
plural democracy’ (Mouffe 1996a, 21) and that radical democracy ‘is not an alternative to liberal
democracy’ because ‘[a] radical democratic society will still be a liberal democratic society’
(Mouffe 1996b, 145). Therefore, despite claims of “radicalness” (read as different and challenging)
one of Mouffe’s objectives is to work within liberalism. In this section I will argue however, that
this goal is misplaced. In fact, by following the implicit consequences of her work, I argue that the
aim of Mouffe’s approach should be to provide a different model, outside of the liberal paradigm.

Mouffe’s work is already vastly at odds with the presumptions of liberalism, particularly in regards
to the understanding of the subject. Where liberalism theorises that individuals exist a priori, and
that their identities are essential, Mouffe argues along poststructuralist lines to say that subjects are
in fact constructed by discourse. Mouffe states that
[p]sychoanalysis has shown that, far form being organized around the transparency of an
ego, personality is structured in a number of levels which lie outside the consciousness and
rationality of the agents. It has therefore discredited the idea of the necessarily unified
character of the subject (2009b, 333, emphasis in original).
Therefore Mouffe adopts a poststructuralist approach in which the subject cannot be seen as whole
and unified because it is always only precariously grounded, with the constitutive outside always
capable of (agonistic) disruption. This understanding therefore has major consequences for
Mouffe’s aim of working within liberalism. To begin with, what are we to make of a discourse of
human rights that puts an Enlightenment understanding of the subject at its centre? Mouffe has said
that, in addition to institutions like parliament and the judiciary (which have their own
contradictions with radical democracy – power structures and dealing with difference), human
rights would be an important (liberal) element within her approach (Mouffe 1992, 2). However, I
argue that this overlooks the important tensions between the two theories and may impinge on the
overall potential of radical democracy.

Mouffe does recognise the tensions with liberalism, but she sees them as being in relation to
democracy in general, not just her approach. For Mouffe, the principles of liberty and equality stem
from the traditions of liberalism and democracy, respectively, and their differences can never be
resolved (Mouffe 2000). She says that ‘the tension between equality and liberty cannot be
reconciled and…there can only be contingent hegemonic forms of stabilization of their conflict’
(2000, 5). For Mouffe this forms the paradox of democracy and is a source of constant re-
negotiation as, in one instance, liberty will take priority while in another, equality comes to the fore.

The recognition of this paradox is important because it highlights that no political decision can
provide comprehensively for both principles all of the time. A redistribution of resources through
progressive tax schemes in order to provide for equality, for example, can be viewed as impinging
on the liberty of workers’ earning rights or, at the same time, the interference of the state might be
viewed as impinging on the sovereignty of people. (In either case this highlights the importance of
determining what is meant by “liberty” and “equality”.) However, Mouffe’s conclusion regarding
the tradition of the principles, I argue, needs to be inverted. Mouffe argues that liberty comes from
liberalism, but it would be more accurate to conclude that it is liberty that informs liberalism while
equality is the basis of democracy – the principles come first. This is because, while the principles
may be necessary for these models, they are certainly not sufficient. Each political model will
understand and prioritise the principles differently, according to the interpretation, and the other
elements/values that it deems important. This is a seemingly small alteration to Mouffe’s argument,
but it can have profound implications, as will be discussed below.

According to Mouffe, liberalism provides

the protection of individual’s rights against the tyranny of the majority or the domination of
the totalitarian party or state [and that] [t]his is why political liberalism must be a central
component of a radical and plural democracy (Mouffe 1996a, 21).
However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an adherence to liberalism is the only
way to provide for this. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that it is the prioritisation of
individual liberty that ensures this protection, and other political models may incorporate this value.
It is not solely limited to liberalism because other theories may incorporate the use of liberty (to
varying degrees). Mouffe’s loyalty to liberalism is understandable and it stems from her analysis of
socialism – which she believes failed due to its inability to provide for difference (Mouffe in Castle
1998). For Mouffe these versions of socialism were far too homogenised and power too
centralised. Therefore her conclusion is that ‘socialist goals can only be achieved in any acceptable
way within a liberal democratic regime’ (Mouffe 1992, 2, emphasis added).

However, while Mouffe’s aim of providing for liberty is admirable and worthwhile, her conclusion
that liberalism is necessary to provide for this is not so straightforward; there are many
inconsistencies that need to firstly be addressed. As an example, Mouffe argues that she does not
adopt all facets of liberalism and rather she separates political liberalism from economic liberalism
in order to only utilise the former (Mouffe 2005a, 104-5). Detailing the process of how this
differentiation is defined, however, is never addressed by Mouffe, adding to the lacunae in her
work.

As another example, Mouffe notes that a liberal conception of equality reduces everything to rights,
but that this is unsatisfactory for her approach. She writes that
we need a new ideology that defines equality in a different way, not just on the basis of
rights. In a sense, we need the elaboration of a postindividualistic liberalism in which
rights are defined not as a personal possession but as a form of solidarity among all
oppressed groups (1988, 103).
Yet this is an area void of much attention. By arguing for liberal elements (despite their
inconsistency with her approach), but by failing to outline a radical democratic interpretation of
liberty and equality, Mouffe leaves an important aspect under-theorised. These problems, together
with the issues associated with a completely different conception of the subject, and Mouffe’s
critique of liberalism being unable to deal sufficiently with the political (Mouffe 1996a, 22), mean
that it is curious that Mouffe continues her steadfast support of the theory of liberalism.

In reformulating the analysis about the principles however, the contradictions between liberalism
and radical democracy are more workable. This is because the reliance on liberalism is lessened.
Reconfiguring Mouffe’s position so that the argument becomes that it is liberty, not liberalism, that
is the useful element is important. It can be shown that liberalism may in fact provide an
application for the protection of rights in a way that is at odds with a radical democratic approach.
For example, in protecting against the interference of the state, liberals may declare that the
collection of taxes infringes on liberty. However, this is at odds with the redistributive socialist
goals of radical democracy. Therefore, in providing a radicalisation of liberty and equality, the
radical democratic approach can set out its own interpretation and application of both these
principles, without the limitations of the liberal model.

By reformulating the argument so that it is the principles that are seen as providing value, rather
than liberalism, Mouffe would be able to capitalise on the most radical aspects of her work. As it
stands, Mouffe’s approach presents fundamental challenges to conceptions of power, the
construction of the subject, and ways to accommodate difference and the political – all of which are
in tension with the liberal approach. Therefore, by maintaining that the liberal paradigm is an
essential element for radical democracy to maintain, these challenges are left unfulfilled. By not
moving beyond the field of liberalism, Mouffe’s approach begins to look like a centre position for
democracy – somewhere between liberalism and socialism, a position that she attacks the Third
Way theorists for taking up. This is clearly not a position that Mouffe intends to advocate, despite
the fact that she says of herself that ‘I have become much more of a liberal than I used to be’ (2001,
12). However, if this is indeed the case, then the fact remains that this radical approach is not so
radical after all. A reconstruction, indeed a radicalisation, of the principles of liberty and equality
could provide the dimensions necessary for Mouffe’s approach, without the problems associated
with liberalism. In doing so, the goals of providing a left political project can also be
accommodated. Without this theoretical reworking, however, Mouffe’s approach is far too centrist
and, by Mouffe’s own judgement, ‘[r]adical politics cannot be located at the centre because to be
radical…is to aim at a profound transformation of power relations’ (2000, 121). Unfortunately,
with the current theoretical lacunae, this potential is unrealised.

CONCLUSION

While this paper has not been able to draw out what a radicalised version of liberty and equality
would look like, it has asserted the importance of this work. It has also argued that this dimension
is missing in Mouffe’s work to date. Mouffe acknowledges that
[t]he form in which liberty, equality, democracy and justice are defined at the level of
political philosophy may have important consequences at a variety of other levels of
discourse, and contribute decisively to shaping the common sense of the masses (Laclau
and Mouffe 2001, 174).
Therefore it is curious that she devotes almost no time in detailing and mapping what a radical
democratic interpretation of these principles would be. The consequence being that she is unable to
fully achieve the goals that she sets for her radical democratic approach.

In terms of what it can potentially achieve, Mouffe’s work has the ability to provide for a new
understanding of democracy through a reformulating of citizenship, but this entails an interpretation
of the principles of liberty and equality in order to inform the respublica. Likewise, it is possible to
use radical democracy as a project to provide for a new left alternative, but this also requires the
interpretation of the principles. Lastly, although Mouffe is content to stay within the liberal
paradigm, I argue that this diminishes the most radical elements of her approach and prevents her
from capitalising on the most radical aspects of her work. Similarly, as was argued, the necessity of
maintaining the adherence to the liberal paradigm is misplaced and, instead, the principles should be
the focus. This would help to prevent the many complications arising from the fundamental
contradictions between the liberal and radical democratic positions, and allow her to capitalise on
the radical aspects of her work.

REFERENCES

Castle, D. (1998) ‘Hearts, Minds and Radical Democracy’ (interview with Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe), Red Pepper, June 1, URL: <http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article563.html>,
consulted March 2008.
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics, Verso: London.
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics, Second Edition, Verso: London.
Lloyd, M. and Little, A. (2009) ‘Introduction’, in A. Little and M. Lloyd (eds.), The Politics of
Radical Democracy, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1-11.
Mouffe, C. (1988) ‘New Political Subjects: Toward a new concept of democracy’ (translated by
Stanley Gray), in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of
Culture, University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 89-104.
Mouffe, C. (1992) ‘Preface: Democratic Politics Today’, in C. Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, Verso: London, 1-14.
Mouffe, C. (1996a) ‘Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy’, in D. Trend (ed.), Radical
Democracy: Identity, Citizenship, and the State, Routledge: New York, 19-26.
Mouffe, C. (1996b) interviewed by C. Bayard, S. Isajiw and G. Madison (for PLURALT) ‘On the
Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe’, Studies in Political Economy,
49, Spring, 131-147.
Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox, Verso: London.
Mouffe, C. (2001) ‘Interview: Democracy – Radical and Plural’, CSDBulletin, (Centre for the Study
of Democracy, University of Westminster), 9(1), Winter, 10-13, URL:
<http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/CSDB91.pdf>, consulted January 2005.
Mouffe, C. [1993] (2005a) The Return of the Political, Verso: London.
Mouffe, C. (2005b) On the Political, Verso: London.
Mouffe, C. (2009a) ‘Democratic politics in the age of post-Fordism’, in J. Seijdel and L. Melis
(eds.), The Art Biennial as a Global Phenomenon: Strategies in Neo-Political Times, NAI:
Rotterdam, 32-40.
Mouffe, C. (2009b) ‘Post-Marxism: Democracy and Identity’, in G. Henderson and M. Waterstone
(eds.), Geographic Thought: A Praxis Perspective, Routledge: London, 332-337.
Norval, A (2001) ‘Radical Democracy’, in P.B. Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds.), Encyclopedia of
Democratic Thought, Routledge: London, 587-594.
Smith, A. M. (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary, Routledge: London.
Wenman, M. A. (2003) ‘Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the difference’, Philosophy & Social
Criticism, 29(5), 581-606.
Žižek, S. and Daly, G. (2004) ‘Introduction: Risking the impossible’, in S. Žižek and G. Daly (eds.),
Conversations with Žižek, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1-22.
Zournazi, M. (2002) ‘Hope, passion, politics: a conversation with Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto
Laclau’, in M. Zournazi (ed.), Hope: New Philosophies for Change, Pluto Press: Annandale,
122-148.