IV.

Powers and Structure of Philippine Government in General

Separate opinion of Justice Puno in Macalintal vs. COMELEC

Is section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to section 4 of the same Act
in contravention of section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?

Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 allows all qualified Filipinos overseas to vote
for President, Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives while
section 18.5 thereof empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of
winning candidates.

On its face, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to
section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It gives the impression that
Congress abdicated to COMELEC its constitutional duty to canvass and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I agree with
the majority that the impugned provision should be given a reasonable
interpretation that would save it from a constitutional infirmity. To be sure,
Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, section 18.5 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
should be construed as limited to the positions of Senators and party-list
representatives. In like manner, I agree with the majority that section 18.4 of
Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:

18.4…. Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the
Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or
any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of
Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission,….(emphasis supplied)

should be construed in harmony with section 4, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution. Hence, with respect to the position of the President and the Vice-
President, the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes must be
submitted to Congress and directed to the Senate President.

Does Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

created in section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, have the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?

Both the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) agree with the petitioner that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No.
9189 are unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the independence of
the COMELEC.[73] The impugned provisions require the public respondent
COMELEC to submit its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee for review, revision, amendment, or
approval.

The majority sustains the petitioner as it holds that “[b]y vesting itself with the
powers to approve, review, amend and revise the IRR for The Overseas Voting
Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC.”

I agree with the majority but wish to add my humble thoughts on this all
important constitutional issue--- the extent of the exercise by Congress of its
oversight powers in the implementation of Rep. Act No. 9189. The resolution of
the issue entails a two-tiered discussion of the following: (1) whether Congress
has oversight functions over constitutional bodies like the COMELEC; and (2)
assuming that it has, whether Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its
oversight functions.

In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke advocated the proper
division of the legislative, executive and federative powers of the
commonwealth. He defined legislative power as “that which has a right to direct
how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it.” He viewed executive power as involving
“the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self, [and] upon all
that are parts of it” and federative power as concerned with “the management of
the security and interest of the public without” including “the power of war and
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth.”

It is now beyond debate that the principle of separation of powers (1) allows the
“blending” of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one body;
(2) does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs of
the other branches to maintain the balance of power; (3) but ensures that there is
no encroachment on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other
branches.

For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other branches of
government through judicial review. It is the final arbiter of disputes involving
the proper allocation and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution.

Congress checks the other branches of government primarily through its law
making powers. Congress can create administrative agencies, define their
powers and duties, fix the terms of officers and their compensation.[124] It can
also create courts, define their jurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long
as it does not undermine the security of tenure of its members.[125] The power
of Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant with
its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it
enacts are faithfully executed. As well stressed by one scholar, the legislature
“fixes the main lines of substantive policy and is entitled to see that
administrative policy is in harmony with it; it establishes the volume and
purpose of public expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; it must
be satisfied that internal administrative controls are operating to secure economy
and efficiency; and it informs itself of the conditions of administration of
remedial measure.”

Concept and bases of congressional oversight:

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by

Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d)
to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived “exponential accumulation of power” by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated
an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure
that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them.

The oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability
of regulatory commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Federal Reserve Board, often referred to as representing a “headless fourth
branch of government.” Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these
bodies are independent from the executive branch and are outside the executive
department in the discharge of their functions.

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers
may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and
supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other
branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions
for consideration of the agency involved.

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the

facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more
intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI.

As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate

is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its
legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their
constitutional rights.

c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. “Supervision” connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the
exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part
of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the
regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.

Congressional Oversight and COMELEC

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional

body exclusively charged with the enforcement and administration of “all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall,” and is invested with the power to decide all questions
affecting elections save those involving the right to vote.

Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage, the
COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Originally, the power to
enforce our election laws was vested with the President and exercised through
the Department of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco, however, the view
ultimately emerged that an independent body could better protect the right of
suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an
executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially during
budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can in case
of other agencies under the executive branch.

Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto power or

congressional oversight power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules
and regulations in order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional.

The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the

constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is
endowed with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the
discharge of its responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations
in order to administer our election laws belongs to this category of powers as
this has been vested exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It
cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.

Legislative veto can be done thru

- It may provide

B. Doctrine of Non-delegation of Legislative Powers

Edu vs. Ericta

For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law
and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the
imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.

As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and
that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an
invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process
clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he
sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would
hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the
Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.

It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the
Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to
legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, security of tenure,
minimum wages, compulsory arbitration, the regulation of tenancy as well as the
issuance of
securities, and control of public services. So it is likewise under the Republic
this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws,
nationalization of the retail trade, limitation of the hours of labor, imposition of
price control, requirement of separation pay for one month, and social security
scheme.

3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official
capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers

that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of
the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance
of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe
transit upon the roads."

It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated
except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to
determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to
fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law
itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard
which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so
that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will."

t bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together

with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of
which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and
emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life
to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative
Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of
preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9,
1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside.
Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo,
there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to
be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.

ACCFA vs. CUGCO

The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)
was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural
Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No.
3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the
ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to as the Unions, are
labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file
employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition
of collective bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of
Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for
certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government
office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These
functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent"
(as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the maintenance
of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property
rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of
political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign
relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being
ministrant the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to
say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative
and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course
this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.

With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under
the Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental
character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the respondent Court
dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor
practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present
review in G. R. No. L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly
insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the respondent Unions is
concerned.

In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent

Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the
Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of
bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a
coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike
in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824).6 This is contrary
to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:

SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government —

The terms and conditions of employment in the
Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is
declared to be the policy of this Act that employees
therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing
changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor
organization which does not impose the obligation to strike
 or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section
shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.7

With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into

the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling
as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA,
the decision of the respondent Court dated March 25, 1963, and
the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice
case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the
present review in G. R. No. L-21484, has become moot and
academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain
collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.

On July 24, 1963 the ACCFA Board of Governors ratified the

agreement thus entered into, pursuant to the provision thereof
requiring such ratification, but with the express qualification
that the same was "without prejudice to the pending appeal in
the Supreme Court . . . in Case No. 3450-ULP." The payment of
the fringe benefits agreed upon, to our mind, shows that the
same were within the financial capability of the ACCFA then,
and hence justifies the conclusion that this particular condition
imposed by the Office of the President in its approval of the
bargaining contract was satisfied.

We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already

paid are concerned, there is no reason to set aside the decision
of the respondent Court, but that since the respondent Unions
have no right to the certification election sought by them nor,
consequently, to bargain collectively with the petitioner, no
further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any
collective bargaining agreement.

The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or
modified in accordance with the foregoing pronouncements. No
costs.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her
husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground
that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed
in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages
under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable
not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction
and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under

Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor
the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the
National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in
1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases,
according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued
by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising
out of such employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that
no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided

shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as
earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially
the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to

the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law
shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to

the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major

powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more
frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model

contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases
without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there
is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes". 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the
life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our
economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer
the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative

power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable
for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable
to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard
to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners
assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for
emphasis, viz.:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation � Pursuant to section 5(e) of

Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than
March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil
prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US
dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that
they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of
full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor.

The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled
by this Court. As early as 1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs.
The Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice
Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship
became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating
the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two
tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to
execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our

constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has
become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of
government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the
constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative
powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States 23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the
courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 24

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down
section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot
prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180
that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported
reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to
guide the judgment of the President � he is to time it as far as practicable when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and
"stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set
determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant
consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and
cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as
meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a
downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. 25 The fear of
petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity
of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared
unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void. ON OTHER GROUNDS.
Santiago vs. COMELEC

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for
an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to

assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and
on the dates designated for the purpose.

ISSUE

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this bsustantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act.

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in
a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of

Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable - to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,

R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and
blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of
the people under that system.
The doctrine of “Potestas delegate non delegari potest”; Exception

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr.

The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of
certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among others,

(a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and
without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and
reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and

(b) establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates

of public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving
that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec.
16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating
that fares should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules
of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative
allegations.

The offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out by

petitioner, have resulted in the introduction into our highways and thoroughfares
thousands of old and smoke-belching buses, many of which are right-hand
driven, and have exposed our consumers to the burden of spiraling costs of
public transportation without hearing and due process.

Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with
the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of
the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve
and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related
charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided
by motorized vehicles."

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in

order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for
governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the
laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the
task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory
body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority,
an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature
may neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the
aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or
other public service.

In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed
constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate
mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus
operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a
chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding
public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour,
every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever
they deem it "necessary" to do so.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED.