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Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 02, 2001 PDF
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 02, 2001 PDF
Atty. Agapito P. Pagayanan and Tañada Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
SYNOPSIS
According to the Supreme Court the issue on whether the check was issued as
guarantee or as payment for the petitioner's unremitted collections was a factual
issue, which had been settled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Although
Manuel Limtong, owner of the LPI, was the sole witness for the prosecution, his
testimony was found sufficient to prove all the elements of the offense charged.
Despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, the Court found no error in the
Court of Appeal's affirmance of his conviction for violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law. However, pursuant to policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,
the penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified to a fine not less than but not
more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22; WHEN COMMITTED. — There are
two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check
to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not
sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein or credit with
said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank
within a period of ninety (90) days.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR 11856 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on three (3) counts of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) violations and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay private respondent the
amounts of P5,500.00, P6,410.00 and P3,375.00, respectively, corresponding to the
value of the checks involved, with the legal rate of interest from the time of filing of
the criminal charges, as well as to pay the costs.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00,
all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI, as follows:
These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers
who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI
refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the
checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to
P18,077.07. 3 LPI waived the P52.07 difference.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the
checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged
on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason
"account closed." The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip.
On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notified the petitioner of the
dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5)
banking days.
On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 4 under three separate Informations for the three checks amounting to
P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00. 5
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of
issue of the check she/he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then
and there issue, make or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No.
660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T.
Limtong which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said
accused, but when the said check was presented with said bank, the same
was dishonored for reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite notice and
demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and
refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of P5,500.00
Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No.
660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC
Check No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to the same trial
court.
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee
the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the
checks not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his
customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the
total amount of the calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused, namely,
Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn Mill
(P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia
Restaurant (P3,375.00), and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these
customers had already paid their respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not
return the said checks to him.
On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as follows: 7 CTHaSD
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28, 1994, it
affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. 9
Hence, the present petition. 10 Petitioner raises the following questions of law 11 —
Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated, is
it not then the duty of complainant — knowing he is no longer a holder for
value — to return the checks and not to deposit them ever? Upon what legal
basis then may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?
Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason
for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account long after 90 days
from maturity of the checks?
Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase
orders (PO's) of his customers. He contends that private respondent is not a "holder
for value" considering that the checks were deposited by private respondent after
the customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the checks, private
respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner further assails the
credibility of complainant considering that his answers to cross-examination
questions included: "I cannot recall, anymore" and "We have no more record."
In his Comment, 12 the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been
initially intended by petitioner to guarantee payments due from customers, but
upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per company policy, the
parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay off petitioner's unremitted
collections. Petitioner's contention that he did not demand the return of the checks
because he trusted LPI's good faith is contrary to human nature and sound business
practice, according to the Solicitor General.
The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for payment
of petitioner's unremitted collections is a factual issue involving as it does the
credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by the trial court and
Court of Appeals. Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the
purchase orders of customers, they found the checks were eventually used to settle
the remaining obligations of petitioner with LPI. Although Manuel Limtong was the
sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was found sufficient to prove all the
elements of the offense charged. 13 We find no cogent reason to depart from
findings of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases elevated from the Court of
Appeals, our review is confined to alleged errors of law. Its findings of fact are
generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court
are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. 14 The
lack of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly
held, this Court is not a trier of facts. 15 Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 16
we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum ." Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under
B.P. Blg. 22.
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that
the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds
therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when
presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. 17
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case,
are: 18
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were
not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation
from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued
as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already
paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled
that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee.
Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. 19
As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present. 20 Thus, the maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds. 21
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or
157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him.
He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account active
and funded beyond the ninety-day period.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a
maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear
import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the
maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time
thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, 23
or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date
of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that
he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit
the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of
such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking
days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge
of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, we find
no error in the respondent court's affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is hereby
MODIFIED so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is ORDERED
to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check
involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent to double the
amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00,
equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-
12055, with subsidiary imprisonment 24 in case of insolvency to pay the aforesaid
fines. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered to pay to LPI the face
value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon from the time
of filing the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. Records, p. 119.
3. Id. at 130.
4. Otherwise known as "An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a
Check without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,"
5. As to the three (3) remaining checks, petitioner was also charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 3 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 25078-R, 25079-R, and 28440-R. The MTC convicted petitioner but on appeal,
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, acquitted him for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Records, p. 89.
9. Id. at 88-108.
14. Bunag Jr. vs . Court of Appeals , 211 SCRA 440, 447-448 (1992); Morales vs .
Court of Appeals, et. al., 197 SCRA 391, 401(1991).
20. Sycip Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 125059, March 17, 2000, p. 8.
24. Lim v. People, G.R No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 11.