Specpro Case Digests PDF

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests
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RULING: (Not for this case.)
SANDOVAL v. SANTIAGO (83 Phil 784) 1. Under Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “the
jurisdiction assumed by CFI for settlement of the
VDA DE MANZANERO v. CFI of BATANGAS (61 Phil 850) estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
FACTS: the person or location of his estate, shall not be
1. Esteban Manzanero (“Esteban”) died in the provincial contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
hospital of Albay. from that court, in the original case, or when the want
2. His brother, Fortunato filed a sworn application with of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
CFI of Batangas (“CFI”) praying for a summary 2. The want of jurisdiction, in this case, does not clearly
settlement of Esteban’s estate. He likewise alleged that appear from the pleadings and records of the CFI.
Esteban had no property except a life insurance policy 3. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Albay
worth PhP5,000 and that Esteban was indebted to him stating that Esteban was a registered voter therein,
for PhP500. More importantly, he alleged that Esteban and that he resided there before his death, does not
had legal residence in Batangas. form part of the record of the CFI.
3. CFI issued an order for hearing and directed that notice 4. Since lack of jurisdiction does not appear from the
be published in a newspaper in Batangas. records, certiorari does not lie.
4. Petitioner (wife of Esteban) did not appear at the 5. Under the law, petitioner has a plain, speedy and
scheduled hearing. Nevertheless, the judge ruled that adequate remedy for the enforcement of her rights.
Esteban was a resident of Batangas, and that his
property (insurance policy worth PhP5,000) be BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (10 Phil 197)
distributed after payment of PhP500 to Fortunato. Facts:
5. Thus, Filipinas Assurance Company was directed to pay MAXIMO Jalandoni- testator; will provides:
the heirs of Esteban, the proceeds of his insurance Hacienda Lantad- divided, ½ to Maximo and other ½ to
policy. Net proceeds of the insurance policy were sent sisters. On the entire estate, an obligation was
to the heirs, pursuant to the order. imposed that all debts shall be paid, provided that ½ of
6. Petitioner prayed that the money be returned and
the products which each parcel may yield shall be
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delivered to her.
devoted to the payment of debts and should the ½ be
ISSUE: Whether questions of jurisdiction by reason of insufficient, 2/3 or total amount shall be applied; in
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residence may be raised by means of certiorari
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
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case of balance of such products, it shall remain with - The niece and nephews executed an extra-judicial
the administrator for settlement of other charges. partition of Adriana’s estate which was approved by
MAXIMINO- petitioned the administrator Javellana the court on 3/21/64, and each got ¼ share each
- On 4/1/67 a document dated 1/3/40 surfaced
that he be directed to pay MAXIMINO a sum in lieu of
purporting to be Adriana’s Will, which shows that the
land donated to him; products of the land had already niece and nephews still as heirs, but with Aldina and
been applied to payment debts and liabilities Constancio getting a bigger share (w/ Asiso de Molo,
Issue: W/N MAXIMINO is entitled to payment in lieu of land Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor as
donated? devisees/legatees)
Held: - Aldina and Constancio (together w/ the other
The will of MAXIMO must be complied with. All those devisees/legatees of the Will) filed an MR to the
who are benefited have not received from the testator previous special proceedings No. 1736 for annulment
a universal succession to his estate but merely as of such proceedings and allowance of the Will, this of
course was opposed by the other 2 nephews Panfilo
legatees without right to receive their share of the
and Felino
property of the deceased until after his debts have
- The court denied the MR for being filed out of time,
been paid. and the petitioners (Adriana, Constancio etc.) filed a
Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection petition for certiorari and mandamus which was
to the authentication and every demand or claim likewise denied by the SC because the more
which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a appropriate remedy is to initiate separate proceedings
testate or intestate succession may make, must be for the probate of the alleged will in question
- Thus, the petitioners filed for the probate of the will,
acted upon and decided within same special
now special proceedings No. 2176, and the oppositors
proceedings, not in a separate action. contested claiming the testatrix had revoked and
destroyed the will, and the previous intestate
CASIANO v. MALOTO (70 SCRA 232) proceedings constitute res judicata. The Probate Court
Facts: dismissed the proceedings on the ground of res
- Adriana Maloto Died in Iloilo City on 10/20/63 her judicata, and the finding of the court in the previous
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place of Residence, and her niece and nephews special proceeding No. 1736 that the will had been
(Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino) commenced destroyed and revoked.
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intestate proceedings believing their aunt died
intestate.
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Issue: Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with

the will of Eusebio which however was opposed by
Whether the court in intestate, special proceeding No. 1736 Hermogena’s relatives. They submitted their own project of
had jurisdiction to rule on the discovered will? partition claiming that ½ of the properties mentioned in the
Whether the finding that the will was revoked and destroyed will of Eusebio on the theory that the properties belonged not
in special proceeding No. 1736 constitutes res judicata in to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This
special proceeding No. 2176? was questioned by Bernardo claiming that the properties
belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal
Held: partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her half
No to Both. share of such partnership.
This Petition is meritorious. The motion to reopen proceedings The probate court then issued an order declaring the donation
was filed out of time, and it is not proper to make a finding in void as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects
an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will had of partition, ordering the executor to file another dividing the
been revoked, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition property of Eusebio according to the will noting that such
for probate of the alleged will. Thus, the finding in special properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition, and
the lower court is directed to proceed to hear the petition in Issue:
special proceeding No. 2176 Whether the probate court erred in applying the exception to
the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate title in a
CUIZON v. RAMOLETE (129 SCRA 495) probate proceedings?
BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367) Held: NO

Facts:
Eusebio Capili died before her wife Hermogena Reyes. Ratio:
Eusebio’s will was admitted to probate wherein he left his The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as
properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then to title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or
during the pendency of the probate proceedings died intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays
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intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebio’s estate property, in which case the probate court may pass
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provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
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determination in a separate action. It has also been held that

when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition
optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in
to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to
may definitely pass judgment thereon. Provided that interests commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona,
of third persons are not prejudiced. the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding
No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document
In this case the matter in controversy is the question of alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite,
ownership of certain properties involved – whether they and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344
belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed
conjugal partnership in order to determine the state of the with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte
decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
of course the widow represented by her collateral relatives proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared decedent.
voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss
to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased
are all heirs claiming title under the testator. Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The
URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252) Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to
Facts: dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the pending before it.
CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding
alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
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heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding.
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acknowledgment as such natural son. This motion was denied by said court.
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will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace

the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
Held: administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
Proceeding No. 6344 - NO possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should
While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue, proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted
or the particular Court of First Instance where the special to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time 2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing of Special
of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court - NO
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non- the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
resident alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or
in provinces where the deceased left any property have is precluded from doing so by laches.
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper  Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case executed by Don Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte
before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
the Manila Courts - province and city where the deceased left Proceeding No. 6344;
considerable properties.  Vicente Uriarte likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a probate with the Manila Court since 1962 when Juan
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
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for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if Special Proceeding No. 6344.
in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court  All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he
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of first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
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51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to whatever s/he pleases, with the condition that when the
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all surviving spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate
the proceedings had therein up to that date. shall pass on to the surviving brothers/sisters of the (first)
decedent [and if brother or sister dies, the corresponding
To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the heirs shall represent, etc.]
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all - LINNIE Hodges died ahead of CHARLES. CHARLES was the
the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would named administrator in LINNIE’s will.
put a premium on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to - As administrator, CHARLES was allowed by the probate court
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the to do several acts of administration, including continuing the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result business run by CHARLES and LINNIE.
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some - CHARLES made annual reports to the probate court and at
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the some point he allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised from LINNIE *in favor of LINNIE’s siblings+.
too late. - Shortly after this alleged renunciation, on December 25,
1962, CHARLES died.
Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 - CHARLES died without having ever liquidated or closed or
until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding distributed LINNIE’s estate.
No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for - Upon CHARLES’ death, AVELINA Magno was named
its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to administratrix of LINNIE’s estate and as Special Administratrix
submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment of CHARLES’ estate. Nothing else happened in LINNIE’s estate
as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in henceforth. (AVELINA was assigned because she was the one
its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are employee closest to the spouses and she had been with them
the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a for more than a decade.)
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged - AVELINA carried on acts of administration in both estates
natural child. until she was joined by CHARLES’ brother, JOE Hodgens, as co-
administrator in CHARLES’ estate.
PCIB v. ESCOLIN (56 SCRA 266) - AVELINA and JOE were subsequently replaced by several
FACTS: other individuals until only PCIB was appointed sole
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- CHARLES Hodges and LINNIE Hodges were spouses. administrator (there were no records of why the changes took
- Both executed similar wills, whereas the decedent’s entire place and why PCIB ended up the sole admin)
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estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that spouse may do
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- Both proceedings in LINNIE’s and CHARLES’ estates

proceeded independent of each other — AVELINA acting as (2) LINNIE’s siblings (or representatives) are entitled to
admin for LINNIE’s estate and PCIB for CHARLES’. LINNIE’s estate which should not be less than one-fourth of the
- Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay community estate at the time of her death, minus whatever
substantial amounts out of the estate. Both proceedings went CHARLES may have gratuitously disposed of during his
on independently until such time that conflicts arose between administration and as sole heir. If CHARLES sold the properties
administrators with respect to safekeeping the properties, for consideration, such consideration shall continue to form
liquidating the estate, etc. part of LINNIE’s estate.
- The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by With regard to the alleged substitutions, there was no
PCIB against the court which handled both estate proceedings. legal substitution to begin with. CHARLES being named by
The judge (ESCOLIN) kept approving motions apparently from LINNIE as her sole heir (they had no other heirs), albeit subject
both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues. to the condition that LINNIE’s relatives would inherit whatever
is left, but CHARLES not having to preserve anything for the
ISSUE: (1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIE’s estate (on the subsequent heirs — this setup is not the substitution
theory that her estate is practically closed since she contemplated under the Civil Code. Neither is this prohibited
bequeathed everything to her husband)? by law.
(2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to
her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the The Supreme Court stated that two hanging issues are better
theory that the will contained substitutions)? left to the trial court since these are issues of fact: (a) whether
CHARLES indeed renounced LINNIE’s inheritance and (b)
RULING: whether there is a conflict of applicable laws (laws of the
(1) Yes, LINNIE’s estate still exists and the proceedings Philippines and that of Texas, where the couple has
therefor have not closed. properties), applying the renvoi doctrine and Art. 16 of the
While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate to Civil Code.
CHARLES, she still had her own estate for which the
proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed. For the meantime, the Supreme Court advised both
LINNIE’s estate consists of those properties which are her part the administrators to act in conjunction with the other and
in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual never proceed with one estate independently.
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circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination
which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652)
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LINNIE’s estate. FACTS:
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Whatever law might be applicable — the intestate of

- RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and RAMON del Rosario not having been commenced upon his
FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in 1933. death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega also died in
- RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega
the conjugal properties. having been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other
- FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the
of the conjugal ones. deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made — the
- After RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased
and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same
FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At
proceedings were initiated and are now in progress. any rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these
- The heirs of both spouses brought this action to proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and
recover their share not only in the conjugal properties partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
left by RAMON but also in those acquired by
FLORENCIA with the products of said properties. DOLAR v. ROMAN CATHOLIC (68 Phil 727)
- A demurrer (by other heirs) was interposed to the FACTS:
complaint on the ground that there is another action 1. The deceased had two wives. He had 5 children from
pending between the same parties and for the same his first marriage, and another 4 children from the
cause of action; that there is a defect of party plaintiffs second.
and party defendants, and that the complaint does not 2. He left a will, setting out his properties and distributing
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. the same to wife #2 and his children by both
- The (probate) court sustained this demurrer and marriages. He also left a legacy of PhP8,000 to be
dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was spent for the altar of the church in Dumangas, ordering
taken. that the sum be taken from the fruits of all the
properties before partition.
ISSUE: Whether granting the demurrer was proper. 3. Wife #2 was appointed administratix. She filed a
project of partition which was not approved because
RULING: of opposition of certain heirs. Another project of
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Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed. partition was filed which was also not approved
because of the opposition of the Bishop of Jaro, who
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represented the Church of Dumangas. It should be
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noted that the second project of partition was not f. As there are forced heirs (yeah!), the legacy
concurred in by the heirs of the first marriage. should be taken from the free portion only
4. In disapproving the 2nd project of partition, the court (remaining 1/3). The heirs may deliver to the
ordered Wife #2 to take immediate possession of all legatee (Bishop of Jaro) properties equivalent
the properties and pay from the proceeds thereof, the to the 1/3 free portion since the legacy is by
legacy of PhP8,000. Wife #2 and the heirs (by the 2nd way of usufruct.
marriage) appealed the disapproval of the project of g. The fruits of the property already received or to
partition. be received shall answer for the legacy with
respect to 1/3 portion only. The remaining 2/3
ISSUE: Distribution of the estate shall accrue to the heirs.
h. The legal usufruct of wife #2 shall be taken
RULING: from the “third available for betterment”.
1. Unless wife #2 and the heirs by both marriages, as well 3. After partition, the properties corresponding to the
as the Bishop of Jaro and other creditors of the estate, heirs as legitime shall be delivered.
come to an agreement, the partition should be made 4. As to the free third, it shall belong to all the forced
with the intervention of all the interested parties heirs in equal parts, subject to the legacy as to its
according to law. fruits.
2. Thus –
a. All debts and administration expenses shall first ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (6 Phil 240)
be paid Facts:
b. Conjugal properties of 1st marriage must be Alfonso: administrator of the estate of Pedro ANGELES;
liquidated to determine the shares of the sued NATIVIDAD and FLORES for the recovery of 2
children (as heir of wife #1) and the deceased. separate parcels of land
c. Conjugal properties of 2nd marriage must also
NATIVIDAD land:
be liquidated to determine the share of wife #2
and that of the deceased. - ANGELES and wife obtained a loan from
d. Properties corresponding to the deceased NATIVIDAD and as security pledged the title deed.
(from process (b) and (c)) constitute his estate. Upon death of ANGELES and subsequently the
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e. Estate shall be partitioned among the ff heirs – wife, NATIVIDAD waited for heirs to appear and
i. Children by 1st and 2nd marriage pay the debt.
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ii. Wife #2 - Claims that the property belonged wife
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FLORES land:
- Land belonged to conjugal partnership. Land was CRUZ v. DE JESUS (52 Phil 870)
sold to Alejandro with right to repurchase. Facts:
ANGELES failed to exercise right of repurchase. - This is an appeal made by the petitioners (including the
surviving husband) in which the court denied their
After his death, wife (TOMASA) repurchased land
complaint to liquidate and partition the property left
and sold to FLORES. by the deceased Juliana Nabong
Issue: W/N Alfonso is entitled to maintain the action for the - The petitioners claim that Juliana Nabong left no debts,
recovery of the lands? and partition is asked for in the regular court
Held: - This court ruled that the proper action for property
FLORES land: the repurchase of land by TOMASA gave belonging to the conjugal partnership (especially since
her the sole ownership; heirs of husband acquired no the surviving spouse is a party) should be in an
rights by her repurchase. intestate/testate proceeding for the settlement of the
NATIVIDAD land: in the absence of proof that money deceased’s estate
with which land was bought belonged to the wife,
Issue:
declared to be conjugal property.
o Conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of Whether or not an action lies for the liquidation and partition
the husband. As to settlement of partnership of the property of a conjugal partnership dissolved by the
affairs: debts and obligations of the partnership death of the wife, said property having been in the possession
affairs shall be discharged, then ½ of the net of the surviving spouse for many years, without his having
proceeds be considered as the exclusive made any inventory thereof, nor liquidated and partitioned it,
and it not appearing that there is any debt to pay?
property of the deceased spouse. It is necessary
to that the executor or administrator appointed Held:
is the one entitled to the custody of the Yes, an action lies for liquidation and partition.
property while settlement is being made
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o No lien in favor of NATIVIDAD over the land nor Sec 685 of Act No. 190 established two methods of liquidating
entitle him to retain it until his debt was paid— the property of a conjugal partnership, if the marriage is
all other property of the partnership will be dissolved by the death of one of the spouses:
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a) by testate/intestate proceedings
held for payment of debts.
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b) by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him.
The sisters then after partitioned the properties, this was also
When the marriage is dissolved by death of the wife, the thumbmarked by their stepmother Macaria.
husband’s power of management ceases and is shifted to the
administrator in the testate/intestate proceedings to the end he Court then concluded that the three documents were valid
that there are any debts to be paid. If there are no debts, as in and binding and that as a consequence the Calimon sisters are
this case the liquidation and partition may be made in entitled to continue possessing the land and properties
ordinary proceedings for that purpose. assigned to them.
DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745) Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the properties
VILLACORTE v. MARIANO (89 Phil 160) belong to the sisters without previously requiring an inventory
Facts: and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased
Leon Calimon married thrice. With his first wife Adriana Carpio Leon and Macaria.
he had three children Canuta, Tranquilina, Maria and
Enriqueta. He then married Venacia Inducil who has a child by Held: NO
previous marriage, Tiburcio Villacorta. Venancia and Leon did
not have any children. Leon thenafter married Macaria Ratio:
Mariano, they did not have any children as well. It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and make the
liquidation because the parties interested – the widow and
Petitioners here are the widow and daughter of Tiburcio the children, already reached a compromise. Macaria cannot
seeking to recover 38 parcels of land from Canuta and her get away from her commitment and claim that she did not
sisters and Macaria Mariano. Mariano in her answer claimed know the contents of the documents she signed. The said
that the lots were owned exclusively by Leon Calimon but documents are valid and binding, and it was shown that only
later on filed another answer asserting that all the realities has when there was delay in the delivery of one of the properties
been acquired during her coverture with Leon and she also assigned to her did she question the validity of the
filed a cross claim against Canuta and her sisters demanding documents.
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the recognition of her rights as surviving spouse. She claimed
that through deceit, the sisters made her sign three CALMA v. TANEDO (68 Phil 594)
documents assigning to her a riceland, a fishpond and 2,400 Facts:
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and renouncing her interest and rights in the estate of Leon as
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The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
owners of a certain property. They were indebted to thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate
Esperanza Tañedo, and these debts were chargeable against proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will provisions of this Code relative to the administration and
wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being
administratrix of her properties. all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right
granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma partition and liquidation of said property.
was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community
Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for collection against Eulalio property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations
Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with
of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the
third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or
property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as disposition of said property effected without said formalities
administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and
be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be partition was made.
declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.
The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having
Held: been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be
the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other
of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, proceeding for the same purpose.
is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the
legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to
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The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or
Act No. 3176: intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal
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husband or wife, the community property shall be administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 73
Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him 5) Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by
for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said filing cross-complaint alleging that option to purchase null and
conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in void as to share of their dead mom because they inherited her
the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta share and as to their dad, Victor and Lourdes were exercising
Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first right of redemption as co-owners of property.
with the committee on claims.
6) Paz amended complaint:
OCAMPO v. POTENCIANO (89 Phil 160)
FACTS: a) pacto de retro sale was really a mortgage
1) Edilberto Ocampo, husband of Paz Yatco (plaintiff Ocampo), b) option agreement was really extension of the mortgage
executed a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro on a town lot w/
house in favor of Conrado Potenciano (defendant) and his c) valid tender of payment w/in the period
wife. Edilberto also made a document where vendees where
leasing to him house and lot during the redemption period. 7) CFI gave judgment in favor of Paz and kids (sub after her
death). CA found that pacto de retro sale was really a
2) House and lot conjugal property in reality, even if reg in mortgage so Potencianos had no right to consolidate title over
husband's name only the property. However, CA said that mortgage novated by
option agreement for the repurchase of mortgaged property.
3) One year repurchase period was "extendible to another Potenciano siblings argue that this was error because
year" but extensions were granted. Period lapsed w/o Potenciano dad had no authority to enter into agreement
repurchase so defendant Potenciano consolidated title w/ RD after wife's death. SC agrees.
of Laguna.
ISSUE: W/n CA erred in supposing that surviving spouse had
4) Potenciano gave plaintiff Paz Ocampo option to repurchase such authority as de facto administrator of conjugal estate?
property w/in 5 years + 5 yr lease. Paz sought to exercise
option by tendering payment to Potenciano but tender was HELD: YES, CA erred, Potenciano dad no authority to enter
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rejected. Paz deposited money in court and brought action as into option ag'mt.
administratrix of husband's estate to have property reinstated
to them. 1) The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the
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dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs, are now
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 73
obsolete. PRESENT RULE: when the marriage is dissolved by  Appeal to the SC of US resulted in upholding the
death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must decision of the lower court as to granting the divorce
be liquidate in the testate or intestate proceedings of the prayed for by the plaintiff. However, as to the other
deceased spouse (Rule 75, Sec. 2) issues (alimony, share in the conjugal partnership) the
case was remanded back to the SC of the Phils for
2) Option agreement was nothing more than mere extension further proceeding.
of time for payment of mortgage debt since the real  Plaintiff insists that SC of the Phils should merely affirm
transaction was the equitable mortgage the judgment of CFI as per SC of US judgment.
 Defendant on the other hand states that error was
3) Tender and consignation of Paz must be held to produce incurred in fixing the amount of the half of said alleged
their legal effect, to relieve debtor from liability. conjugal property at P81,042.75, without having
examined the necessary antecedents and data
4) Thus, Victor and Lourdes (appellant children) Potenciano Held:
acquired nothing because ownership of property never passed  SC of US merely decided on the issue of adultery and
to their parents did not touch on the issue regarding division of the
conjugal partnership. It remanded the case to SC of
PRADO v. NATIVIDAD (47 Phil 776) Phils precisely to decide on the issues it did not
address.
DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (25 Phil 437)  CFI erred in fixing the amount at P81,042.75.
Facts:  Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases, an
 The plaintiff Agueda charged her husband with inventory shall at once be made.
adultery and prayed for a divorce, alimony pendente  We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad that
lite and division of the conjugal partnership. when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the
 Defendant Esteban denied the charge of adultery and husband this inventory must be made in the
countered by charging his wife with adultery as well. proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
 Judgment was rendered in favor of Agueda granting  In the case of Prado vs. Lagera we ruled that the
her the sum of P81,042.76 as her share in the conjugal inventory thus formed must include the bienes
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share. parafernales of the wife.
 Upon appeal to SC of the Phils, the decision was  It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code
overturned based on the reasoning that the evidence that the inventory includes the capital of the husband,
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showed both spouses were guilty of adultery and the dowry of the wife, the bienes parafernales of the
therefore divorce was not available to either party.
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 73
wife, and all the property acquired by the partnership FULGENCIO v. GATCHALIAN (21 Phil 252)
during its existence. Facts:
 After this inventory has been made it is provided by Plaintiff Josefa Fulgencio was the administratrix of the
article 1421 that there shall be first paid the dowry of intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio (deceased).
the wife, in the second place the bienes parafernales of Defendant Gatchalian was the second wife of deceased.
the wife, in the third place the debts and obligations of Gatchalian and the other defendants had control of the
the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth place the properties of the deceased and were sued by Fulgencio in
capital of the husband order to be compelled delivery of the said properties to the
 Conjugal property which is to be divided when the latter (Fulgencio, who was the administratrix).
partnership is dissolved is determined not with Fernando Fulgencio, legitimate son of the deceased by the
reference to the income or profits which may have latter’s first marriage, intervened in the suit in order to
been received during the partnership by the spouses, protect his rights in the estate of the deceased.
but rather by the amount of the actual property Gatchalian claimed that she should not be compelled to
possessed by them at such dissolution after making the deliver the entirety of the properties demanded because
deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively some of it were her own and not part of the conjugal
provided by article 1424. partnership.
 An examination of the decision of the Court of First Note that there was an agreement between the parties
Instance shows that no attempt was made to comply conceding that certain properties (drygoods store, bakery,
with any one of these statutory provision. (No cigar and cigarette stand, bazaar) were paraphernal properties
inventory, no paying of the wife’s bienes parafernales, of the deceased.
etc.) and their decision was based on the profits made
by conjugal partnership after its formation. Issue:
 The theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal Whether Gatchalian could be compelled to deliver all the
property is the actual property which is left at the properties demanded from her.
dissolution of the partnership. It can, therefore, never
be determined by adding up the profits, which had Held:
been made each year during its existence, and then YES.
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saying that result is the conjugal property. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: “All the property of the
The case is remanded to the court below for the purpose of marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is
liquidating the conjugal partnership proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
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wife.”
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 73
If it be not proven conclusively that the property claimed by

the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs exclusively to Held: No. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s
the defendant Benita Gatchalian, it must be deemed to be husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration
conjugal partnership, and therefore, by virtue of the cannot be made in a special proceeding, much less can the
preinserted agreement, the administratrix has a right to be court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this
placed in possession of the same for the purpose of its matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the
inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence,
rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in relation to her own but not to decree that he is presumed to be dead.
property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once The philosophy behind this ruling of the Court is that “judicial
the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executor,
made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the would still be prima facie presumption only. It is still
exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively and that disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of
of the nature of paraphernalia. judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
LUKBAN v. REPUBLIC (98 Phil 574) competent court has to pass. It is therefore clear that a
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with judicial declaration that a person presumptively dead, because
Francisco Chuidian on Dec. 10, 1933. On dec. 27 of the same he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarreland since presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
by her. She believes that he is already dead for he has been Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on the Hagans vs. Wislizenus,
absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to alleging that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in
marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in the present proceeding—while it is true that a special
order that she be relieved of any liability under the law. proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the
A petition was filed in the Court of first instance of Rizal for a status, right of a party or a particular fact, that remedy can be
declaration that petitioner Lourdes is the widow of her invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of
husband Francisco who is presumed to be dead and has no the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a
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legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that
the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a
Issue: Whether or not the petition filed be Petitioner Lourdes declaration to that effect.
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has merit.
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
RULE 74
UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302) Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator
Facts:  As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave

a will or he had left one but failed to name an
 Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate leaving his spouse executor, the competent court should appoint a
Leona and 3 children Juan, Patrocinio and Luz qualified administrator
 During the pendency of the administration  Exceptions: (1) when all the heirs are of lawful age and
proceedings of the father’s estate, Luz died w/o any there are no debts due from the estate of the
legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition
her mother and husband Pablo Utulo of the property without instituting the judicial
 The only property Luz left was her share in her father’s administration; (2) where the property left does not
estate exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had
 Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of without instituting the judicial administration and the
Luz’s estate; he asked the court to be the appointment of an administrator
administrator  In these instances, the heirs are not bound to submit
 Leona opposed saying that since the deceased left no the property to judicial administration or to apply for
indebtedness, there was no occasion for judicial the appointment of an administrator in court – it is
administration; and if there is, she had better right costly, superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs
 Pablo claims that it was necessary for him to be named own the property from the moment of death of the
the administrator so that he may have legal capacity decedent
to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan  Pablo’s appointment as administrator was not
 Pablo was named administrator; Leona’s appeal was necessary in order that he may have standing in the
granted; thus the petition proceedings of Juan’s estate; he could appear by right
of representation
Issue:
HERNANDEZ v. ANDAL (78 Phil 196)
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whether there was a need for appointment of Facts:
administrator -PF (Cresencia Hernandez), intervenors (Maria and Aquilina
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Hernandez) and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in [2.]W/N appeal should be dismissed since the findings and
common from their father a parcel of land. conclusions in the appealed decision were not assigned as
-Intervenors sold 1800 sq. m. of this parcel to DF Zacarias errors.
Andal and his wife for P860. This portion purports to be the
combined share of the intervenors in the larger parcel Held:
pursuant to an alleged verbal partition among the siblings. [1.] Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an
-After the sale, PF attempted to repurchase the land sold to agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be
Andal offering P150 which she said was the amount DF had in writing under the statute of frauds. The reason for the rule
paid for intervenors’ shares, but it is alleged that DF refused. that excludes partition from the operation of the SOF is that
-PF filed a supplemental complaint wherein she announced in partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and
open court that she was willing to repurchase said property designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
for P860 plus expenses. tenant in common.
-However, on a certain date, DF executed a deed of sale for -the law has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to
P970 in favor of intervenors. executory and not to completed or executed contracts.
-In trial, when asked whether the land described in PF’s Performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of
complaint was the object of partition among the co-owners, the statute. SOF does not declare the contracts therein
PF’s counsel objected on the ground that the best evidence enumerated void and of no legal effect but only makes
was the document of partition itself, asserting that under ROC, ineffective the action for specific performance.
agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by -On gen. principle, courts of equity have enforced oral
means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
proof is offered. -Sec. 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that
-Court ruled that under Rules 73 and 123 of the ROC (statute the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of
of frauds) and art. 1243 of Civil Code, parol evidence of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
partition was inadmissible. It declared that the resale of the effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a
land by DF to intervenors were illegal and in bad faith. To this, partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
DF and intervenors appealed. purpose the protection of the creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Hence, the intrinsic validity
Issues: of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is
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[1.]W/N lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence not affected when there are no creditors or the rights of the
for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the creditors are not affected, as in this case.
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ground that it was not admissible.
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
[2.] No. An unassigned error closely related to an error “1. That they (ALBERTO, ANGEL, EDUARDO
properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the and CONCHITA, all surnamed Torres) are
question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, the only legitimate children who survive the
will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;
failure to assign it as error. xxx xxx xxx
-in this case, the evidence on parol partition tendered by DF “3. That the said decedent died without
and intervenors was ruled out and the complain of this leaving any will and her only surviving heirs
exclusion as error. In this manner, the assignment of error are the aforementioned parties who are her
squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the legitimate children;
trial court. An analysis of the case will show that on the “4. That the deceased left no debts;
validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire xxx xxx xxx
litigation and on the validity depends in turn the competence “6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
of the excluded evidence. the Rules of Court and in view of the
difficulty of making a physical division of the
TORRES v. TORRES (10 SCRA 185) above properties, the parties have agreed to
FACTS: settle the aforementioned estate by
- PAZ E. Siguion Torres died intestate on December 18, continuing the co-ownership on all the
1959. above properties in the following
- ALBERTO S. Torres (petitioner), claiming to be one of the four proportion:
legitimate children of Paz, petitioned to be administrator of ALBERTO Torres — ¼ undivided interest
the properties left by the decedent (aggregate value of about ANGEL Torres — ¼ undivided interest
P300,000.00). He also claimed he was not aware of any debt EDUARDO Torres — ¼ undivided interest
left by the decedent. CONCHITA Torres — ¼ undivided interest”
- ALBERTO’S petition was opposed by CONCHITA Torres, one (Emphasis supplied.)
of the heirs, on the ground that on January 27, 1960, the heirs - ALBERTO, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition
of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual
into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing
pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74. the court's intervention. He also claimed that some properties
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- The extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial
contains the following provisions: partition. In another pleading, he claimed that the decedent
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had an outstanding debt of P50,000.
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
- On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial ARCILLAS v. MONTEJO (26 SCRA 197)
settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, FACTS:
dismissed ALBERTO’S petition. 1. 2 petitions were filed in relation to the LOT owned by
the decedent Arcillas.
ISSUE: Whether administration or a special proceeding 2. Petition #1 was filed by Geronimo (one of the heirs) in
for the settlement of the estate is necessary. order to cancel the TCT covering said LOT and the
issuance of a new TCT in the names of the heirs in the
RULING: No. corresponding portions alleged in the petition. This
The claim of the decedent’s debts is unsubstantiated. petition was based on a claim that several other heirs
ALBERTO did not specify from whom and in what manner the executed separate sales of their respective shares and
said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate participation in said LOT to Vicente (one of the private
has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot respondents).
be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of 3. Petition #2 was filed by the other children of the
action. deceased praying for issuance of letters of
If other properties are not included in the deed of administration in favor of PETITIONER preparatory to
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the the final settlement of the deceased’s estate.
questions such as the titles and their partition — if proven to 4. PETITIONER opposed Petition #1 inasmuch as the
belong to the intestate — can be properly and expeditiously subject matter thereof was included in the estate of
litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an the deceased for which a petition for administration
administration proceeding. was awaiting resolution (Petition #2).
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or 5. Geronimo, on the other hand, opposed Petition #2
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for arguing that inasmuch as the LOT was the only
the institution of special proceedings and the appointment property of the deceased, and that the deceased left
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because no debts, the petition for administration was improper.
the same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an 6. Court denied Petition #2 and instead, gave due course
ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for to Petition #1.
court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an 7. PETITIONER filed for certiorari with mandamus and
agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically, preliminary injunction.
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the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for
partition under Rule 74.
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3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
ISSUES:
1. Whether the administration proceedings (Petition #2), However, said relief can only be granted if –
upon the averment that the estate left no debts and all a. There is unanimity among the parties, or
the heirs are of age, was properly dismissed b. There is no adverse claim or serious objection on
2. Whether the cadastral action (Petition #1) was the the part of any interested party
more proper proceeding under the circumstances
Absent the foregoing, the case becomes controversial
RULING: The Special Proceeding (Petition #2) should be and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in
reinstated. the case where the incident properly belongs.
1. No. Section 1, Rule 74 provides that if the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)
all of age, the parties may, without securing letters of Facts:
administration, divide the estate among themselves by Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a
means of a public instrument filed in the Register of parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by
Deeds. In case of disagreement, they may do so in an heirs
ordinary action of partition.
MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary
The aforementioned rule is not mandatory or settlement of the estate.
compulsory, as may be seen from the use of the word ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of
“may”. Thus, the rule does not preclude the heirs from settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and
instituting administration proceedings despite the fact his wife.
that the estate left no debts and that all the heirs are Issue: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid
of legal age. despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action?
Held:
2. No. Petition #2 was premised on Section 112 of Act The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for
496, which authorizes a person in interest to ask the
the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons
court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title “upon the ground that registered with the least loss of time.
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interests of any description, whether vested, o Small estates: summary procedure dispensing
contingent, expectant or inchoate have terminated with appointment of administrator
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and ceased”.
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RULE 74
Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a declared as one of mortgage and to recover one half
deceased person just because an heir or a third person pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint,
claims that certain properties do not belong to the they claimed that Agcaoili was in bad faith knowing
that Celerina was not the only heir of her husband, and
estate; properly ventilated in an independent action
thus he was holding the land in trust for them
and probate court should proceed to the distribution - Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment upon
of the estate (subject to the results of suit). the plea that the main averments of the complaint
Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens even if admitted do not constitute a cause of action
and supported their plea with certain documentary
CARREON v. AGCAOILI (1 SCRA 521) evidence. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoili stating
Facts: the petitioners averments had no basis
- During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina
Dauag the registered land subject of this case was Issue: Was Agcaoili a buyer in bad faith? Using Sec 4 Rule 74,
acquired. After the death of Carreon, his widow do the petitioners have a lien on the title?
Celerina executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself
alone the said land Held: No to Both
- She declared she was the only heiress of her husband. Agcaoili is not expected to know Celerina’s relatives even if he
The OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in her is a townmate. There is no clear proof he knew of the
name. existence of petitioners.
- There was however annotated on her certificate a lien
to the effect that her title was subject to Section 4 of The lien petitioners speak of is effective only for a period of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (if within 2 years an heir two years. From September 28, 1946, when a TCT was issued
deprived of his share in the estate reappears such heir to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in
may compel settlement) favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two
- Celerina mortgaged the property for 1,200 to PNB, years had elapsed
when her loan was due she sold the property for 3,000 The right to have such lien cancelled became vested on
to Agcaoili, thus the mortgage was paid and the land appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus
oficio.
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transferred to herein respondent
- the children of Celerina with the deceased husband
filed a complaint against the spouses Agcaoili seeking Also, there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of
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to have the deed of sale executed by their mother Agcaoili, nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
title of his vendor, he is not deemed to be holding the land in and their are no debts due from the intestate estate,
trust for the children of Celerina Dauag or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs
may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law,
McMICKING v. SY CONBIENG (21 Phil 211) or by agreement between themselves, duly executed
FACTS: in writing, apportion and divide the estate among
- When Margarita JOSE died, his estate was administered by themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in
PALANCA with Dy CUNYAO and Mariano Lao SEMPCO as court.
sureties.
- When Mariano LAO SEMPCO died, his estate was SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But
administered by Doroteo VELASCO, and Mariano VELASCO and if it shall appear, at any time within two years after
BARRETO were the sureties. such settlement and distribution of the estate, that
- When BARRETO died SY CONBIENG administered his estate. there are debts outstanding against the estate which
- Along the way PALANCA absconded with about 4/5 of JOSE’s have not been paid, any creditor may compel the
estate. settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
- The court then appointed MCMICKING who then tried to hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid,
claim on the surety LAO SEMPCO. with interest; and the administrator appointed by the
- But since LAO SEMPCO’s estate cannot pay, MCMICKING court may recover the assets of the estate from those
brought an action to claim against LAO SEMPCO’s surety who have received them, for the purpose of paying the
BARRETO (whose estate is administered by SY CONBIENG). debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased
- Trial court ruled in favor of SY CONBIENG and dismissed shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for
MCMICKING’s claim. Hence this appeal. the full period of two years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have
ISSUE: Whether MCMICKING can claim from BARRETO’s been made.
estate.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.
HELD: No. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo
The court based its ruling on these: Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto
was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action
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SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable
proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
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a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity,
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
- For the court ruled that VELASCO having performed his administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered
original obligation partitioning the estate was from that point and presented within two years.
on free from liability; and so it follows that his sureties were The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a
also free. certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The
- And that any new claim arising within the two years sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.
necessitates the appointment of a new administrator and new The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case
sureties. For the original sureties secured only one obligation at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged
and not two. creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or
- The court then explained that MCMICKING seemed to argue present his claim. He knew of the death of OCAMPO very soon
that if the estate has any outstanding debts after partition after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities
that the partition itself is invalid. It is not so. that OCAMPO'S estate might be called upon to respond for
the failure of PALANCA to perform his duty as administrator. It
In answer the court explained: was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that
“as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of OCAMPO to be
appointment and administration, the claim must be presented partitioned and distributed without protest and without the
within two years [it was presented in 5] from the date of the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive
partition and distribution. for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very
Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, probable that the property of the estate was being consumed,
either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it
failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the had been distributed.”
sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so
far as the validity of the partition is concerned. PERIERA v. CA (174 SCRA 154)
We have also seen that the fact that there were debts Facts:
outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is Andres Periera died intestate, with no debts. He was survived
of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is be his wife of 10 months Victoria Periera who is a nurse in
concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which London and his sister Rita Nagac. Rita instituted as special
we have already adverted and left undecided. proceeding for the issuance of letters if administration in her
We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased which is said to
B-8
valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence include his death benefits from PAL, bank accounts in PNB and
whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an PCIB and a 300 sq mt land in Las Pinas. Victoria filled a motion
Page
to dismiss the petition alleging that there is no estate of the
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
deceased for purposes of administration or that if there is an It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
estate letters of administration be issued in her favor as leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
surviving spouse. The trial court appointed Rita as age of not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administrator which Victoria is now questioning. administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
Issue: uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case? unnecessary proceedings.
Held: NO In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and
sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no
Ratio: debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is
As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants
same should be judicially administered and the competent to administer the estate because she wants to take possession
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which will
established in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An deceased.
exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts JEREZ v. NIETES (30 SCRA 905)
due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the Facts:
property without instituting the judicial administration or In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the
applying for appointment of an administrator. settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and
his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In
Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs from 1966, a project of partition and final accounting was
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has submitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the
no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good same.
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural
B-9
burdened with an administration proceeding without good child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de
and compelling reasons. Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought
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to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
3D (2008-2009)
RULE 74
preterited in the project of partition which they would have There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to
respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Judge show the interest of the private movants. In the absence
Nietes allowed intervention and reopened the proceedings to thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be
permit the movants "to present whatever evidence they may considered premature. "No one may quibble over the
have to show their right to participate in the estate of the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or
deceased." The widow and legitimate children of Nicolas reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."
Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
CA, which denied such petition to annul and set aside the
order of respondent Judge.
Held:
Judge Nietes is directed to require private respondents Lucilo
Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present
evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.
Jalandoni pending before such sala.
Doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention: rather than

require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest
was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file
a separate and independent action, he may within the
reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and
final accounting had been approved.
Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared

to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they
B-10
were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of
partition. However, the verified motion on the part of private
respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not suffice to call into
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play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
RULES 75 — 76 testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428) unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final
FACTS: and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of
1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal
of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of may be taken in specpro)
deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed 2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel
opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent, cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and
laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale. probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred designed to protect the testator’s expressed wishes , w/c are
resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent’s ownership
validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non
revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedicta’s will was estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is
unrevoked by deeds of sale. still appealable or not , the defense is patently meritorious.
3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of 3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any
opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered
of revocation, affirmed CFI. doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in
favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid “no consideration
ISSUES: whatsoever,” making it more doubtful that in conveying property
1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in
of appeal? advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom.
2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?
3) w/n Benedicta’s will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds
of sale?
HELD:
C-1
1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final.
Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and
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definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215) 1. Whether the probate of petitioner’s deceased wife’s will is a
FACTS: bar to prosecution of forgery.  YES.
Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of 2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy
will of deceased wife Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon trial.  YES.
testimony of witness Gabino (attesting witness), admitted to
probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parte to HELD:
reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because Several foreign decisions were cited. Can go either way. Others
of ex parte. Second filing of the motion to open the proceeding, saying that can be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code
again denied. of Civil Procedure said that in an action or special proceeding, the
SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL, judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will
intervenor Basa de Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San or administration or condition or relation of the person provided
Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against Mercado for falsification that only be a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator…
or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken
withdrew complaint. almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont. Conclusive as to its due
THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado execution against the whole world (in rem), reason why
for same offense in Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was publication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that
dismissed after investigation, at the instance of complainant due judgment or order of a court when declared by this Code of Civil
to his poor health. Procedure are conclusive. State v. McGlynn (U.S. case). Although
NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person. in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the
This time filed by fiscal of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A
Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation because will was SUBTLE DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and
already probated. declaring probated will to be forgery. You would still disturb the
Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for decree.
reinvestigation. CFI Granted. FOURTH TIME, Mercado was No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court
arrested. chose the most consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is
Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of probate. discovered after probate and prosecution before the prescription.
Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction. Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely
CA issued injunction. affected by probate — application for relief within reasonable
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time but no case exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.
ISSUES:
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3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Criminal action will not lie against forger of a will which resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic
had been admitted to probate by a court of competent validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the
jurisdiction. legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid)
SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSA (21 SCRA 1369)  To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for
Facts: all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities
 Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of alleged last will required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa. make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for
 The petition was opposed by two sets of oppositors, the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings
appellants herein, who questioned the due execution of determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et
the document. al. vs. CFI of Manila)
 After petitioner presented evidence and rested his case,  True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal
oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the
ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of validity of the testamentary provisions is another.iThe first
law six years before his death by selling the parcels of land decides the execution of the document and the
described therein to his brother. testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates
 On the other hand, petitioner moved to strike out to descent and distribution
oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors  The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not
have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts
relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree. of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of
 The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
the allegations of the oppositors goes to the very intrinsic concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the
value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.
to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers,
their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record.
Held:
 The petition below being for the probate of a will, the
court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452)
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thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the Facts:
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
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prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was
survived by her husband and six children. In her will, she stated Issue:
that: 1. Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity
(a) That she was the owner of the “southern half” of 9 of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.
conjugal lots; 2. Whether the probate court was correct in declaring that
(b) That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding
which she inherited from her father; into an intestate proceeding.
(c) That it was her desire that her properties should not be 3. Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without
divided among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime and first appointing an executor or regular administrator.
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of
her properties. Held:
(d) That after her husband’s death, that her paraphernal and 1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the
all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity has
will. been established. The probate of a will might become an
In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husband’s conjugal idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
assets. void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr. (Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate is probated, the court should meet the issue.
of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and 2. NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its
Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, alleged defects have been cured by the husband’s
undue influence, and preterition. Balanay Sr. later withdrew this conformity. The husband’s conformity had the effect of
opposition through a “Conformation of Division and Renunciation validating the will, without prejudice to the rights of
of Hereditary Rights” wherein he “waived and renounced” his creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs.
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. The rule is that the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
The probate of the will was further opposed by Atty. Montaña invalidity of the other dispositions if the first invalid
(who purported to be a lawyer of Balanay Jr) and two others, disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will
saying that the will was void because it effected a compromise on render a testamentary disposition operative takes
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future legitimes and that no notice to creditors were issued. The precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision
probate court listened to them and converted the testate of the will.
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proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Thus, with respect to provision (a) above, the illegal While the action for reconveyance was still pending, the probate
declaration does not nullify the will. It may be disregarded. court issed an order of executionand garnishment on August 20
As to provision (c), it would at most be effective only from 1980, resolving the issue of ownership of the royalties payable to
the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons Atlas and granting the legacy to Quemada. The probate court
for terminating the co-ownership. issued an order on Nov. 1980 declaring that the probate order of
3. NO. A notice of creditors is not in order if only a special 1972 indeed resolved the issue of ownership and the intrinsic
administrator has been appointed. It is the executor or validity of the will.
regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the
claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly Issue: whether or not the probate order resolved with finality the
allowed. questions of ownership and intrinsic validity as stated in the Nov.
1980 order
PASTOR v. CA (122 SCRA 885)
Held: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
Facts: the deceased Alvaro Pastor Sr. Was survived by his wife, issue is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, that is
two legitimate children, Pastor Jr. and Sofia and an illegitimate whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
child, Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate of the will in accordance with the formalities required by law.
alleged will of the deceased. The will contained only 1 As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
testamentary disposition, which was a legacy in favor of Quemada which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
consisting of 30% of the $2% share of Pastor Sr. In the operation purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. Of some should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
mining claims. probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
Quemada was appointed special administrator. As such, Quemada determination is only provisional and not conclusive, and is
filed an action for reconveyance against Pastor Jr. and his wife, subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
regarding some roperties allegedly forming part of Pastor Sr.’s Without a final authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
estate, including the property subject of the legacy. properties compose the estate of Pastor Sr. In the face of
Pastor Jr. and his wife files their opposition to the petition for conflicting claims involving properties not in the name of the
probate and the order appointing Quemada as special testator and in the absence of a resolution as to the intrinsic
administrator. However, the probate court admitted the will to validity of the will, there was no basis for the probate court to
C-5
probate in 1972. In 1980, the probate court set a hearing on the hold that the 1972 probate order that Quemada is entitled to
intrinsic validity of the will and required the parties to submit payment of the questioned legacy.
Page
their position papers as to how the inheritance would be divided.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
US v. CHIU GUIMCO (36 Phil 917) In 1915, Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan
and her child, made inquiries and urged Chiu Guimco to
Facts: produce the will
When he refused to do so, a criminal complaint against
Joaquin Cruz (aka Piaua) lived as a Chinese merchant in the him, was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil
municipality of Gingoog , Misamis Procedure
In 1898, he visited China wherein he was married to a The court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a
Chinese woman Uy Cuan and had one child fine and imprisonment until he delivers the will
In 1902, after his return from China , he was married to a
Filipino Maria Villafranca Issue:
In 1910, Joaquin again visited China , leaving his brother,
defendant Chiu Guimco, in charge of his property and his whether the judge had jurisdiction to impose the sentence
business; he died during this visit to China of imprisonment on the accused
Apparently, before he left for China , he executed a will
before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Held: Judge had NO jurisdiction
Guimco and Co-Iden were named executors
The executors filed a petition for the probate of the will. 629 can only be applied when a court is acting in the
However, the will itself was not produced and nothing exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the
further was done in the matter of the probate estates of deceased persons
Chiu Guimco entered into an agreement with Maria Where administration proceedings are not already
whereby in consideration of the conveyance of a certain pending, the court, before taking action under 629,
property she relinquished in favor of other persons should require that there be before it some petition,
interested in the estate all her other claims information, or affidavit of such character as to make
In 1914, Uy Cuan came to the Philippines for the action by the court under 629 appropriate
settlement of Joaquin’s estate; it was agreed that Uy Cuan Furthermore, it is not permissible in a prosecution under
and her child were to receive 40 percent of the estate, 40 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
to Chiu Guimco and 40 to another brother in China named prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment
Chiu Tamco prescribed in 629
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They also entered into a contract wherein Chiu Guimco And, the order for the accused to produce the will is an
shall pay P350 per quarter for the rental of Uy Cuan’s infringement of the right against self-incrimination – the
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interest in the real estate of Joaquin mere production of the will by him would be conclusive
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will
complaint being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps
to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
RODRIGUEZ v. BORJA (17 SCRA 418) corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of
Facts: the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: “When a will is deliver to, or
-Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan (respondents) delivered having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place
testatment of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez to be published xxx”
and Angela Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a -where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of
petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, Bulacan on March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate
petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a petition for the proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day, and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable
(March 12), defendants filed a petition for the probation of the -As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have
will delivered by them on March 4. jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court
-petitioners contend that the intestate proceedings in the CIF of ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred
Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the petition for by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects
probate in the CIF of Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court.
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. -Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in
-defendants contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over Bulacan court ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume
the case upon delivery of the will, hence the case in this court has jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
precedence over petitioners’. case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73.
-CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied. -Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction? – CIF of Bulacan Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.
-Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to
C-7
Held: testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
-The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the and operative will (Art. 960 of Civil Code).
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delivery of the will of the Fr. Rodriquez on March 4 even if no
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
TEOTICO v. DEL VAL (13 SCRA 406) Manila. Hearing was set after publication and notice were
FACTS: made.
- MARIA Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July - ANA del Val Chan — claiming to be an adopted child of
14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth FRANCISCA Mortera (deceased sister of MARIA) as well as
P600,000.00. an acknowledged natural child of JOSE Mortera (deceased
- She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at brother of the MARIA) — filed an opposition to the
her residence. probate of the will alleging that: (1) said will was not
- She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto time of its execution; (3) the will was executed under
Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the duress, threat or influence of fear; and that (4) the will is
attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every inoperative as to the share of RENE Teotico because the
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix
other. during her last illness.
- Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public - VICENTE B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the
Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses. opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
- In said will the testatrix stated that she was possessed of personality to intervene.
the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from - The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of FRANCISCA
beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or Mortera.
threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said - After the parties had presented their evidence, the
will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to
of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of
estate. RENE Teotico void with the statement that the portion to
- MARIA left P20,000.00 to RENE A. Teotico, husband of be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
her niece JOSEFINA Mortera. heirs by way of intestate succession.
- JOSEFINA was also instituted as the sole and universal ISSUES:
heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise (1) Has oppositor ANA del Val Chan the right to intervene
C-8
disposed of in the will. in this proceeding?
- On July 17, 1955, VICENTE B. Teotico filed a petition for (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to
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the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of probate?
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on relationship between her and her adoptive parents. She
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in does not have a relationship with the decedent.
determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated
by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. RENE (2) Yes the will has been duly admitted to probate.
Teotico? All three instrumental witnesses testified, among
other things, that it was the testatrix herself who asked
RULING: that they act as witnesses to the will and that it was the
With the exception of that portion of the decision which testatrix who first signed the will and they signed
declares that the will in question has been duly executed successively in the presence of each other and of the
and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision testatrix. This evidence which has not been successfully
is set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed
quo for further proceedings. because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the
(1) No, the oppositor has no right to intervene. manner provided for by law.
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person The claim that the will was procured by improper
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. The
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the mere claim that JOSEFINA Mortera and her husband RENE
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such years prior to the execution of the will and that she was
as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a old and suffering from hypertension in that she was
creditor. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to
civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
required in order that a person may be a party thereto witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of
contingent. the occasion executed the will under consideration. The
Under the terms of the will, oppositor ANA del Val exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must
Chua has no right to intervene because she has no interest be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a
C-9
in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator. She kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
is also not a legal heir because her adoption only created a testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her
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express the will of another rather than her own. The
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
burden is on the person challenging the will that such the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased
influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a should also be set aside for the same reason.
matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the FERNANDO v. CRISOSTOMO (90 SCRA 585)
testimony of the instrumental witnesses. FACTS:
1. Hermogenes Fernando (“GUARDIAN”) was appointed as
(3) The pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring guardian of Crisostomo and his minor children.
invalid the legacy made to Dr. RENE Teotico in the will 2. When Crisostomo died, GUARDIAN filed a motion for the
must be set aside as having been made in excess of its approval of an extrajudicial settlement of the minor
jurisdiction. children’s parents (Crisostomo and his wife, who also
The Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of died).
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in a 3. The court denied the motion and the extrajudicial
probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to settlement was declared null and void. (ORDER 1)
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with 4. Germano Crisostomo (brother of deceased and one of the
the requirements of the law. private respondents) filed a petition to open the instate
The authentication of a will decides no other proceedings of the deceased spouses and the
questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the appointment of himself and his sister as co-administrators
testator and the compliance with those requisites or of the estate.
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of 5. GUARDIAN (ever bibo!) opposed and moved for the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication dismissal of the instate proceedings, arguing that the
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these properties left by the deceased spouses were already in
may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding his possession as guardian. The court denied his motion to
its authentication. The questions relating to these points dismiss. (ORDER 2)
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after 6. Germano Crisostomo and his sister were appointed co-
the will has been authenticated. administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Another reason why said pronouncement should 7. GUARIAN appealed from ORDER 1 and ORDER 2.
be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
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opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was ISSUES:
not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, 1. Whether the court should have denied the petition for the
the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of opening of the intestate proceedings (or dismissed the
Page
same upon motion of GUARDIAN)
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
2. Whether the project of partition submitted by GUARDIAN 2. There is no error in the appointment of German
should have been approved Crisostomo and his sister as co-administrators, no
evidence having been presented by the GUARDIAN why
RULING: they should not be appointed, either on account of their
1. The Court had actually issued several resolutions which incompetency or lack of moral qualifications.
constitute res judicata with regard to the present appeal, 3. The claim of GUARDIAN, by virtue of the previous
to wit - resolutions of the court, that the instate proceedings
a. The judge acted within his jurisdiction in appointing should be dismissed, has to be denied.
petitioners (Germano and sister) as administrators,
inasmuch as said petitioners have interest, as next ARAUJO v. CELIS (6 Phil 459)
of kin, to petition for letters of administration. The Facts:
guardian of the minor children of the deceased is ROSARIO: inherited hacienda Pangpang and other
not, as such, administrator of the estate of the property from her mother; subsequently married Jose;
deceased until and after said estate has been died leaving no descendants or ascendants but only
acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper
collateral relatives
proceedings.
b. The jurisdictional facts are the death of the CELIS: father-in-law of ROSARIO; in possession of property
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in claiming that ROSARIO bequeathed all her property to
the province where probate court is sitting, or if he husband and he died without a will so CELIS succeeded to
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left all his property, lawfully acquiring that the belonged to
his estate in such province. The name and ROSARIO
competency of the person(s) for whom letters of
o Presented parol evidence claiming that the original
administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional
had been lost
fact. The guardian of the minors has no right to
administer the properties of the deceased until ARAUJO: claiming as heirs
said properties have been adjudicated or awarded Issue: W/N ROSARIO executed a valid will entitling CELIS to the
to them either by extrajudicial or judicial partition. land?
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Since no partition has yet been made, the Held:
properties of the deceased have never been placed Witness Delgado: an action was brought against her by
under the administration of the guardian of his Jose Araujo involving the hacienda and as solicitor there
Page
minor children. came into possession a copy of the will duly recorded and
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
probated; never saw the original because it was retained - The will was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go
by the notary; signed by two witnesses only; loss due to Toh, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting
burning of the papers and archives of the court of Pototan witnesses.
- On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the
by insurgents
petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the
o Will signed by two witnesses could not be valid envelope and its copy Exhibit B.
under the law in force at the time and could not - While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio
have been probated and recorded Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the
Testimony was absolutely insufficient to establish deceased, they snatched and opened it, after getting its
satisfactory manner of loss of alleged will and the court contents and throwing away the envelope, they fled.
should not have allowed secondary evidence introduced Respondents deny that they have the will.
as to the contents of the will. Issue:
Whether or not the alleged will was lost? And if can still be
LIM BILLIAN v. SUNTAY (63 Phil 793) probated?
Facts:
Held:
- On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, Yes to both
China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz
with whom he had several children (including Apolonio, The evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document
Respondent herein) and the second time to Maria contained in the envelope. Respondents’' answer admits that,
Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son. according to Barretto (attesting witness) he prepared a will of the
- Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go
marriage, filed for intestate proceedings Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an
- Later, and in the same court, Maria Lim Billian (Petitioner envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the
& 2nd wife) also instituted the present proceedings for the instrumental witnesses. (Also Go Toh and Lopez corroborated the
probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased. statement that the brothers Suntay took the contents of the
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- Lim Billian claimed that before the deceased died in China envelope, and the brothers did not adduce evidence to the
he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing contrary)
his will and, also another document (Exhibit B of the
Page
petitioner) said to be a true copy of the original contained In court there was presented and attached to the case an open
in the envelope. and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto,
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is undeniable that this envelope HELD: Yes, it had.
Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the
deceased and drafted by Barretto. It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three
publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the
The loss of the will justifies the presentation of secondary administrator’s final account was set for December 19 of that
evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all year, only 15 days after the date of the first publication.
the essential and necessary legal formalities.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in Sec.
BASA v. MERCADO (61 Phil 632) 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice,
FACTS: referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks
- The estate of Ines Basa was allowed in probate by court, and before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words,
eventually adjudicated it in favor of the administrator who was the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
also the sole heir. before the day appointed for the hearing.
- The petitioner contests the jurisdiction of the probate court
alleging that there was failure to comply with the notice DE ARANZ v. GALING (161 SCRA 628)
requirements in Sec. 630. Facts:
- “Sec. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate
delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat R-
appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses
contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice of the petitioners as lagatees and devisees. The probate court
thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. This order
newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the was published in “Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation
province, three weeks successively, previous to the time once a week for three consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then
appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed
given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, executor.
reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.”
- They allege that notice was only published for the first two The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no
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weeks and the hearing conducted on the third. notices were sent to them as required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and
they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This
ISSUE: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction over the was denied.
Page
estate.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Issue: of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in

Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to
mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibañez:
being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2
children with Simeona Ibañez: Eleonor and Alberto.
Held: YES
He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by
Ratio: himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses,
It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing was not executed in conformity with Philippine law. A petition
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated, was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on
or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of
Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was
be known. duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here.
In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of
the petitioners are known to the probate court. The requirement The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks
of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were
publication of the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in examined relative to the execution of the will; and thereafter the
a newspaper of general circulation. document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.
Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate.
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON (39 Phil 156)
Facts: The will gives to his brother Victor shares of the corporate stock in
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother,
emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, P5,000; to Alejandra
1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately Ibañez, P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez,
afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is
daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their left to the testator's five children - Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
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marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the Eleonor and Alberto.
service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines.
In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the About three months after the will had been probated, the
Page
ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois
to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
orders in the case.
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Held: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country,
1. Whether the court had jurisdiction – YES which is executed in accordance with the law of the state
or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state
the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.
"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in
rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide 3. Whether the will should not have been probated because it was
latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to void – NO (will was validly probated)
be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute
possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards
property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly the due execution of the will.
in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably
short." (Citing In re Davis) If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear
that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein
2. Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must
proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. The
that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined
C-15
the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. - by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes,
NO by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in
the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared
Page
that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order
of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated notified of the pendency of proceeding by the publication of the
by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in notice.
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the 3) Jurisdiction over persons interested, how acquired: A
country where it may be situate." proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
ABUT v. ABUT (45 SCRA 326)
settlement of the estate of the deceased. All that sec. 4 of Rule 76
FACTS:
provides is that those heirs (additional heirs names in the
1) Generoso Abut (petitioner), child of deceased Cipriano from 2nd
amended petition but not included in the original petition) be
marriage, executor in deceased’s alleged will, filed a petition for
notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either mail or
approval of will and letters testamentary. Court set hearing.
personally.
2) Opposition was filed by Felipe Abut (oppositors) and other
4) Effect of absence of notice to individual heirs: Service of notice
children from 1st marriage . Generoso Abut died before Court
on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of
could start formal hearing so Gavina Abut (sister) asked Court to
procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so
substitute her.
that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been
3) Court dismissed Generoso’s petition w/o prejudice to filing
omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore
another pursuant to Rules of Court.
were not advised -- the decree allowing the will does not ipso
facto become void for want of jurisdiction
ISSUE: w/n the probate court correctly dismissed the petition
simply because the original petitioner (executor Generoso) died
before the petition could be heard and/or terminated (did death
of Generoso divest the court of jurisdiction on the theory that
amended petition of substitute sister required new publication)?
HELD: NO, probate court incorrect in dismissing petition.

1) When court vested w/ jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court
became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon
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compliance with Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of Rules of Court
2) Jurisdiction of the court continues until termination of the case
and remains unaffected by subsequent events. Parties who could
have come in and opposed the original petition as what Felipe, et.
Page
al. did, could still come in and oppose, having already been
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
RODELAS v. ARANZA (119 SCRA 16) GAN v. YAP (104 Phil 509)
FACTS: Facts:
Rodelas filed a petition with CFI Rizal for probate of
holographic will of Bonilla and issuance of letter of administration  Fausto Gan initiated probate proceedings on the
to her. It was opposed by the appellees on grounds that — holographic will of Felicidad Yap.
stopped from claiming deceased left a will after failing to produce  Idelfonso Yap, husband of decedent opposed the
will within 20 days as required by RULE 75, alleged copy does not proceedings on the ground that his wife never executed a
contain a disposition and not a will, only a copy of the holographic will.
will (using Gan v. Yap), deceased left no will. Petition to dismiss  The holographic will was never presented in court. Instead
saying that the will was proved using secondary evidence unlike a description of its contents was testified by the
ordinary will. MTD denied. decedent’s niece along with the following narration:
o Felicidad confided in her cousin Vicente that she
ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be desired to make a will without the knowledge of
found cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic her husband. Upon consultation with a law
copy. YES. student, Felicidad found out that it could be done
by without any witness, provided the document
HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated
other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the by her. So Felicidad made a holographic will in the
only and best evidence is the handwriting of the testator in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra. Felicidad let
said will. Comparison is necessary. But a photostatic copy or Xerox Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro
may be allowed because comparison can be made with the Olarte to read her will.
standard writings of decedent. Footnote 8 of Gan v. Yap says o When Felicidad was confined in the hospital for her
“perhaps it may proved by a photographic or photostatic copy…” last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was
Order of the lower court (dismissing order) was set aside. contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few
hours later, the Felicidad’s husband, asked Felina
for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of
his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to
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him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap
returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the
next day shortly before the death of Felicidad.
Page
Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and

read the will for the last time. Issue: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
 The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
as to the existence of a holographic will on the following in the handwriting of the testator?
grounds: (these grounds were upheld by the SC upon
appeal) Held: No!
o if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted  The Rules of Court (1940) allow proof (and probate) of a
to keep her will a secret, so that her husband lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony
would not know it, it is strange she executed it in of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such
the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
that witnesses were unnecessary which could not then be validly made here.
o in the absence of a showing that Felina was a  Holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its
the latter would have allowed the former to see execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not
and read the will several times; have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state
o it is improbable that the decedent would have whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of
permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret presented to the Court and to them.
during her lifetime;  the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased
o it is also improbable that her purpose being to in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
conceal the will from her husband she would carry shown his handwriting and signature.
it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which  we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
could for one reason or another be opened by her contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
husband; proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
o if it is true that the husband demanded the purse and/or read such will.
from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will  In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish
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was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
without destroying the will, the theory of the submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
petitioner being precisely that the will was improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
Page
executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, Action to obtain probation of the will of Miguel Mamuyac.
sec. 6 Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probate of the will
(dated 1918) of Miguel Mamuyac. This petition was denied on the
Why may ordinary wills be proved by testimonial evidence ground that the deceased executed a second will (dated 1919).
unlike holographic wills? The petition for probation of the second will was disallowed on
the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the
Ordinary Wills Holographic Wills year 1920. It was also proven that the said second will presented
The gurantee of aunthencity is The only guarantee of to the court for probate was a mere carbon copy of its original
the testimony of the authenticity is the handwriting which remained in the possession of the testator, who revoked it
subscribing or instrumental itself before his death. There were also testimonies and other evidence
witnesses to establish that Mamuyac executed another will in 1920
if the ordinary will is lost, the The loss of the holographic will (purportedly a third will).
subscribing witnesses are entails the loss of the only
available to authenticate medium of proof Issue:
it is quite hard to convince if oral testimony were Whether the second will can be denied probate on the ground
three witnesses (four with the admissible only one man could that it has been revoked and cancelled.
notary) deliberately to lie. And engineer the fraud this way
then their lies could be checked Held:
and exposed YES. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
in the case of a lost will, the the witnesses would testify as cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes
three subscribing witnesses to their opinion of the difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
would be testifying to a fact handwriting which they The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
which they saw, namely the act allegedly saw, an opinion which either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing
of the testator of subscribing can not be tested in court, nor that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a
the will; directly contradicted by the will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
oppositors, because the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
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handwriting itself is not at
hand. cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
GAGO v. MAMUYAC (49 Phil 902) be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has
Page
Facts: been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, on the ground that being residents of the City of Manila, said
being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never witnesses were unable to appear personally before the CFI of
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not Cebu. The motion was granted.
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. This was opposed by the filing of the opponents of a motion
asking that the order authorizing the taking of the depositions be
In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the revoked. Such motion was granted, revoking the first order which
proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its allowed the taking of the deposition on the ground that it has not
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. appear personally before the court, therefore, their depositions
Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great would be inadmissible as evidence.
caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a
will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with Issue: Whether or not the depositions were admissible as
all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate evidence
may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the Held: The depositions in question would appear to be in due form
testator. and would ordinarily be admissible. But the record indicates that
the failure of the opponents to be represented at the examination
ALDANESE v. SALUTILLO (47 Phil 548) of the witnesses was due to the fact that they were mislead by
Facts: Salome Avila, a widow and resident of Cebu, died in the the petitioner’a action in seeking special authorization from the
Province of Rizal on May 4, 1924. The subject will in the case is court for the taking of the sdeposition. In the interest of justice,
dated May 3, 1924, which appears to be executed in due form and the court thinks that the deposition should be retaken and the
is witnessed by Moreta, Borromeo and Rafols, all residents of the opponents given another opportunity to examine the witnesses.
City of Manila. The deceased left no descendants not ascendants It is true that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a
and under the will, the greater part of the estate will go to will is contested, the attesting witnesses must be called upon to
Petitioner Vicente Aldanese and his sister Enriqueta. prove the will or a showing must be made that they cannot be
The petition for probate of the will was presented in the CFI of had, but that does not necessarily mean that they must be
C-20
Cebu and was set down for hearing by order the court. After due brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is
publication of the order, Canuto, Teodora, Feliciano, and needed and not their actual personal presence in the courtroom.
Raymundo, all surnamed Salutillo and Valeria Llanos appeared as When an attesting witness to a will resides outside of the province
Page
opponents. The petitioner presented a motion asking the court to where the will is offered for probate and 30 miles or more from
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
the place where the probate proceedings are held, his testimony Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of
may be taken in the form of a deposition in accordance with sec. the 3 subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called.
406 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the
same. And as such, we may therefore call to our aid the
CABANG v. DELFINADO (34 Phil 291) decisions of the SC of that State and the law upon which
those decisions rest in determining the intention of the
Facts: Philippine Legislature
The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to
Martin Delfinado appeared through his attorney and files prove a will for probate is one of preference; not to be
an opposition to the allowance of the will of his father confused with quantity
Celestino Delfinado alleging that the will was not signed Where the will is contested, it is necessary that the 3
by the deceased nor by any other person, in his presence subscribing witnesses be present to testify as to the due
and by his express direction, and the attestation does not execution of the will; exceptions are that the witnesses
comply with law were dead, beyond the jurisdiction of the court or insane
Petitioner, widow of the deceased, presented as witnesses There was failure to explain the absence of the other 2
herself, Antonio Flor Mata (a justice of the peace of witnesses to the will
Tayug) and Paciano Romero; Opposition had only 1
witness- Martin AVERA v. GARCIA (42 Phil 145)
The will was probated despite the fact that 2 of the Facts:
witnesses were not present -In the probate proceedings instituted by Avera for the will of
Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marno Garcia and Juan
Issue: whether the court erred in admitting the will to probate Rodriquez. During hearing, the proponent of the will introduced
without having 2 of the subscribing witnesses called, although one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will
they were living within the jurisdiction of the court or for not was executed with all necessary external formalities and that the
requiring any showing why they were not produced testatpr was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties.
The witness was collaborated by the person who wrote the will at
Held: Court erred in probating the will? the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were
C-21
not introduced nor their absence accounted for. On the other
Our code provides that noncontested wills may be hand, opponent introduced a single witness who testified that at
admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the the time the will was made, the testator was so debilitated as to
Page
subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in be unable to comprehend what he was about. Trial court found
which they shall be proved when contested
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
that testator was of sound mind and the will was properly placed, while they are engaged in other discussions more
executed, hence admitted will to probate. simulated than real.
Issues: [2.]No. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the

[1.]W/N a will can be admitted to probate upon the proof of a requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the that the paginal signatures of the testator and the attesting
absence of the others witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left.
[2.]W/N the will is rendered invalid due to the fact that the -The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the
signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses are written wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
on the right margin of each page instead of the left margin. substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. So when an interpretation already given assures
Held: these ends, any other interpretation that adds nothing but
[1.] Yes. When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
proponent should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if frustrative of the testator’s last will, must be disregarded.
alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the
execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by SOLIVIO v. CA (182 SCRA 119)
the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation of the Facts:
failure to produce the other two. Nevertheless, where the -This case involves the estate of the Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
attorney for the contestants raised no question upon this point in novelist, who died a bachelor and survived by the ff relatives: (1)
the court below either at the hearing upon the petition or in the Petitioner, his maternal aunt; (2) Private Respondent, sister of his
motion to rehear, as in this case, the objection to the probate of deceased father.
the will on this ground cannot be made for the first time. - Esteban Jr. was raised by his mother and petitioner. When his
-reasons why appellate courts are disinclined to permit questions mother died, she left all her properties to her only child, Esteban
raised for the first time in the second instance: (a) it eliminates Jr. and titles to the properties were transferred to the latter in
the judicial criterion of the CIF upon the point there presented due time.
and makes the appellate court in effect a CIF with reference to -During his lifetime, Esteban Jr. expressed to petitioner his plan to
that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial; (b)if place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help
C-22
permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the poor but deserving students obtain a college education.
administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without fulfilling such.
from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is -Petitioner filed Spl. Proceeding for her appointment as special
Page
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Jr., and later filed an
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued *1.+ No. Branch 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s
to her; the she be declared the sole heir; and that after payment action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate while
of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate probate proceedings for settlement of the estate were still
be adjudicated to her. After due publication and hearing, she was pending in Branch 23 of same court, there being no orders yet for
declared sole heir. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to the submission and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and
pay for taxes and proceeded to set up the foundation. accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
-4 months later, Defendant filed an MR o the court’s order terminating the proceedings. It is such order that brings to a close
declaring petitioner as sole heir because she too was an heir of the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and
the deceased. MR was denied for tardiness and instead of relieves the administrator from his duties.
appealing, Defendant filed case for partition, recovery of -the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate
possession, ownership and damages. Court rendered judgment in court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
favor of defendant, and upon the latter’s motion, court ordered distribution of the estate.
the execution of judgment pending appeal and required
petitioner to submit inventory and accounting of estate. [2.] No, but the charge of extrinsic fraud was unwarranted: (1)
-in her MR, petitioner averred that the properties were already Defendant was aware of the Spl. Proceeding intended to be file by
transferred to the foundation. MR denied. On appeal, CA petitioner as admitted in her complaint. Evidently, she was not
affirmed TC judgment. Hence this petition. prevented from intervening but she stayed away by choice. (2)
Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time
Issues: and place of hearing is required to be published. The publication
[1.]W/N RTC Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain civil case for was constructive notice to the whole world. Defendant was not
partition and recovery of defendant;s share of the estate even deprived of her right to intervene for she had actual and
while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23. constructive notice of the same.
[2.] W/N defendant was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proceeding through extrinsic fraud [3.] No. The property of the deceased is not reservable property
*3.+W/N decedents’ properties were subject of reserve troncal in for he was not and ascendant, but the descendant of his mother
favor of defendant from whom he inherited the properties in question. Reserva
[4.]W/N defendant may recover her share of the estate after she Troncal (Art.891) applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
C-23
had agreed to place the same in the foundation from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a
brother or a sister.
Held. -Since the deceased died without descendants, ascendants,
Page
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews,
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are  Subsequently, Laureana and Justina submitted to the court
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code. Hence, the CA correctly an agreement which stated that Justina is withdrawing her
held that petitioner and defendant being relatives of the application for probate and that said will be held not
decedent within the third degree in the collateral lines, each shall allowable to probate. Justina acknowledged that the
succeed to the estate without distinction and is entitled to ½ deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs
share and share alike. than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two
adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that
[4.] No. However, in as much as defendant agreed to deliver the the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance
estate of the deceased to the foundation, as confirmed and with said agreement.
ratified in her motion to reopen and/or reconsider order which  The court on October 25, 1924, approved said agreement
she filed, she is bound by that agreement. Though it is true that and rendered judgment accordingly.
she did not waive her inheritance in favor of petitioner but she did  On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to
agree to place all of the estate to the foundation. Being a judicial be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to with the court a new application for the probate of the
prove the agreement. same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
Held:
MANALO v. PAREDES (SEE case under JURISDICTION)  The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in
Facts: rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the
 Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of decedent, filed for persons interested through the publication of the notice
an application for letters of administration of the estate prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
left by Villegas, who, according to the application, died and any order that may be entered is binding against all of
intestate them.
 Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta and  Through the publication ordered by the lower court of the
Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, filed a application for the probate of the supposed will of
motion with the court, praying for the probate of the Francisco Villegas said court acquired jurisdiction over all
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his such persons as were interested in the supposed will,
property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, including Gelacio Malihan
C-24
the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the  All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any
deceased Francisco Villegas. of them or other persons interested were not satisfied
 Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal
Page
the will to correct any injustice that might have been committed,
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
and cannot now through the special remedy of Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased person,
mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from
application for the probate of the same will in order to opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme Court,
compel the respondent judge to comply with his under Sec. 513 of the Code of CivPro, an order for rehearing in the
ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of CFI, it being alleged that the will was not executed with the
Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, formalities required by law and hence was improperly admitted to
cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error; especially probate?
when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the
testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they Held:
pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him. NO. The reliefs provided by Sec. 513 are not applicable to probate
proceedings. Sec. 513 reads:
RIERA v. PALMAROLI (40 Phil 105) Sec. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First
Facts: instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of
Juan Pons y Coll, a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines, died a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
in Manila. Palmaroli, the Consul General for Spain in the and the CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
Philippines, filed a petition to admit his will for probate. An order that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so
admitting the will to probate was entered on May 20, 1918. deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
Riera, the widow of Pons, was residing in Palma de Mallorca in the judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying
Balearic Islands at the time of the death of Pons. She only learned to have such judgment set aside.
of the probate proceedings on November 14, 1918. Her lawyers
appeared in the CFI on November 29, 1918 and moved that the Upon default
order of probate be set aside to allow Riera to enter opposition, Though the action taken by a CFI in the probate of a will is
invoking Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was denied properly denominated as a judgment, it is not a judgment
by the CFI on the ground that more than six months had elapsed rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose
since the date of the probate. the probate.
C-25
Riera questioned the formal validity of the will, and that the By fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
document produced was not the original. It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed,
or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary
Page
Issue: memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
desires with regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud as the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing
had been alleged—as, for instance, if it were alleged that the and the necessary notice required by law was published
purported will is a forged document—the remedy, if any exists, accordingly. On the hearing day, no opposition was filed, and after
would not be found in a proceeding under Sec. 513, but in an the presentation of evidence, the court admitted the will to
original action in the CFI. probate.
1 yr. And 7 months later, Appellant Engracia Manahan,
The CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that deceased’s sister, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new
no adequate remedy exists in that court trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
The Supreme Court will not entertain a petition filed under Sec. vacated and the authenticated will be declared null and void. It
513 to set aside a judgment and obtain a new trial in a CFI where was denied. Appellant Manahan then appealed from the
the latter court can still grant relief upon the same state of facts judgment admitting the will to probate. She alleged that (1) she
under Sec. 113. The jurisdiction of the SC depends upon the lack was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and as
of remedy in the CFI. such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will, (2) that the court, in its order, did not really
When, however, the CFI has, be the expiration of six months, lost probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication
the power to relieve from its own judgment under Sec. 113, the and (3) the will is void on the ground that the external formalities
remedy conceded by Sec. 513 may be resorted to, under prescribed by law were not complied with.
conditions stated in that section; and apart from the restriction
that the petition shall be filed within sixty days after the party Issues:
aggrieved first learns of the rendition of judgment, there is no 1. Whether or not Appellant was an interested party, thus,
positive limitation as to the time within which the petition may be should have been notified of the probate
filed in the SC. 2. Whether or not the court did probate the will and not just
limit itself to decreeing its authentication
Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot grant relief because the 3. Whether the will is void
remedy conceded in Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
no application to orders admitting wills to probate. Held:
1. No. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of
C-26
MANAHAN v. MANAHAN (58 Phil 448) the will neither had she the right to expect it for she was
Facts: Petitioner Tiburcia Manahan, niece of the testatrix, not an interested party. The testatrix died leaving a will in
instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the which the appellant has not been instituted as heir and
Page
deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan. She was named
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any

successional right.
2. Yes. The court really decreed the authentication and
probate of the will, which is only the pronouncement
required of the trial court by law in order that the will may
be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with
law. Authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case.
3. No. It is valid, once a will has been authenticated and
admitted to probate, questions relative to its validity can
no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding.
C-27
Page
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
RULE 77 Acts 1882, c.84 as found in an annotation of the West Virginia

Code.
SUNTAY v. SUNTAY (95 Phil. 500)
Facts: Jose B. Suntay died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Issue: Whether or not the submission of the will and the copy of
Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the the annotation is sufficient to allow probate of the will.
Philippines and a house in Amoy. He was survived by hi children
by the first marriage (9) and his surviving widow (2nd wife). Years Held: No. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do nor prove
after Jose’s death, Silvino (son) filed a petition for intestate themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
proceedings praying for the probate of the will. The will was in not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
Chinese characters executed on January 4, 1931 and was allegedly States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as a fact.
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court. The CFI of Here the requirements of the law were not met. First, there is no
Bulacan disallowed the probate. showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed and published under the authority of the State of West
Issue: Whether or not the will should be probated. Virginia. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original. No evidence
Held: No. The fact that the municipal district court in Amoy, China was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In
in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal addition, the due execution of the will was not established. Lastly,
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 it was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had
should also be established by competent evidence. In this case, his dominical in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. All
there is no proof on these points. Therefore, the will and the of these are required to be proved under the Philippine Code of
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in Civil Procedure.
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts
and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. MICIANO v. BRIMO (50 Phil. 867)
Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo
FLUEMER v. HIX (54 Phil. 610) filed a scheme of partition with the Philipppine Courts. Andre
Brimo, of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it, saying that
C-28
Facts: A.W. Fluemer, special administrator of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix filed a petition for the probate of the latter’s last the partition puts into effects the provision of Joseph Brimo’s will
will and testament allegedly executed in Elkins, West Virginia on which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
November 3, 1925. Fluemer submitted a copy of Section 3868 of nationality. The court, however, approved it.
Page
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 75 to 77
Issue: Whether or not the scheme of partition should be this petition for probate so that she can get hold at once of the
approved. entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the
motion.
Held: Yes. The fact is that Andre did not prove that said
testamentary disposition are not in accordance with the Turkish Issue: Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the properties of Butler.
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence o n such laws, they are presumed to be the same as Held: No. The general rule is that the administration extends only
those of the Philippines. There is therefore no evidence in the to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country
record that the national law of the testator was violated in the where it was granted. Hence, the funds in question (annuity) are
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having
to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed
in that country, Canada is the situs of the money. There is no
LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90 showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or
Phil. 459) removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the
Facts: Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in hands of the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butler’s
New York leaving a will which was duly probate in the Surrogate’s estate and is beyond the control of the court because it has
Court of New York country on August 3. The estate having been passed completely in the hands of the company by virtue of the
settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estate contract of annuity.
and personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the
Philippines) but since Mercedes is not of sound judgments and
discretion in handling of money (she is a minor at the time she
became devisee), she will only be given a sum o fmoney sufficient
for her current needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity
from Manufacturer’s Life Insurance where a monthly payment of
$57.60 will be given to Mercedes during her lifetime. On
September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butler’s will for probate
C-29
in the CFI of Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator
(Ghezzi) filed a motion for the citation of the manager of
Manufacturer’s Life Insurance , Manila Branch to render a
Page
complete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
RULES 78 to 87 handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or

loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her.
GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212) However, she may have a right of action against such persons for
Facts: any loss occasioned by their negligence or corruption.
Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts
Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an claimed by the plaintiff arose during the time while the said
action against Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. defendant was administering their interest therein, only the sum
The amount represents the amount due by the estate of Antonio of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower
Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to the minors court as his liability)
Munoz.
The lower court found from the evidence that the estate Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians
of Antonio Munoz owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
Issue: residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the
Whether Teran is liable. courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
Held: the jurisdiction of our courts here.
No Teran is not liable.

Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711)
Antonio Sanchez and guardian of the minors Munoz only for the Facts:
period September 17, 1901 to March 17, 1902. However, from
March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by Maria Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an
Munoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz. order of the Court of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose
Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible to said minors for Garcia as the administrator of the estate of Geronima Uy. He
the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio maintains that he should be appointed as administrator instead of
D-1
Sanchez from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on Jose Garcia.
March 18, 1902 up to the time of her removal on October 6, 1906
based on the ground that she was not a resident of the Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as
Page
Philippines. If during this time she allowed other persons to administrator.
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
The heirs of Maria, Telesfor and Ceasaria opposed the order

Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error. appointing Father Mercado as executor. Their opposition was
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily based on the alleged unfitness and incapacity of Father Mercado
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the to discharge his duties as executor for the following reasons: (1)
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the Notwithstanding their opposition, Father Mercado contracted the
person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court services of 2 lawyers to represent him in these proceedings for
may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s the sole purposes of repaying the obligations he owed to one of
suitability as administrator rest, to a great extent, in the sound the lawyer. (2) He cannot be impartial because the church of San
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and Nicolas is one of the legatees named in the will. (3) The estate has
such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it no debts and the heirs are all of age and are willing to secure
appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. payment of all the legacies, thus there is no necessity of making
In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant the estate incur unnecessary expenses such as executor’s fees. (4)
had adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to Appellants are better able to protect the interest of the estate. (5)
render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may Atty. Revilles, husband of Cesarea is willing to render services free
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those of charge.
immediately interested in the estate.
Issue: Whether the lower court committed an error in denying the
opposition to appoint Father Mercado as executor.
MERCADO v. vda. de JAEN (64 Phil. 75)
Facts: Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error.
The reasons advances by the appellants do not seem to
Monsignor Gorordo, a retired bishop of Cebu, died leaving a will carry sufficient weight to warrant the reversal of the appealed
instituting his sister Maria as the universal heir to his estate, and orders. The evidence shows that when the deceased bishop made
in case of her death, his nieces Telesfor and Cesarea. He named his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was
Father Mercado as executor, and in the absence of the latter, in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the
Father Espina. circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with
his last will because it is to be assumed that he had good reasons
for so doing. While the court should not be deprived of its power
D-2
The will of Monsignor Gorordo was probated and the Court of
First Instance of Cebu confirmed the appointment of Father not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is unworthy of the trust,
Mercado as executor. notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the
Page
testator; it is also true that for this to be done, the unworthiness,
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be heirs. The court then appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the
manifest and real and not merely imaginary. heirs, as special administrator.
With regards to the reasons espoused by the heirs, the Subsequently, the court admitted the will to probate and
court ruled that: Reason 1 – The court accepted the explanation appointed Ozaeta as regular administrator.
of Father Mercado as to why he engaged the services of the Pending the appeal of the order admitting the will to
lawyers (i.e., he has confidence in them). Reason 2 – The parish of probate, the court appointed BPI as special administrator.
Father Mercado is not a legatee in the will. Moreover, the will Ozaeta claims that the reason why the judge refuses to
does not give Father Mercado, as executor, even the right to appoint him as special administrator is due to his personal dislike
intervene in the distribution and disposition of the P10,000 of him. However, the judge contends Ozaeta as biased to one
legacy. Reason 3 – There is a necessity to name an executor since group of heirs.
the will contains so many provisions and it is premature to assert
that the estate has no obligation to pay. Reason 4 and 5 – The Issue: Whether a probate court, which had already admitted a will
heirs and Atty. Revilles is not in a better position to protect the to probate, may appoint as special administrator any person other
estate since it would be no more immune from irregularities. In than the executor named in the will.
addition the interest of the legatees is more than that of the heirs.
Held: No, the executor named in a will should be appointed.
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the
OZAETA v. PECSON and BPI (93 Phil. 416) probate court to appoint, or not to appoint, a special
Facts: administrator. It is silent as to the person who may be appointed
as special administrator, unlike Rule 79 which expressly gives the
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will appointing Roman Ozaeta, order of preference of the persons who may be appointed regular
former associate justice of the SC, as executor if Manuel Roxas administrator. The appointment of special administrators is not
fails to qualify. Upon Palanca’s death, and Roxas having died governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
previously, Ozaeta presented a petition for the probate of the will, administrators. But the fact that a judge is granted discretion does
at the same time praying that he be appointed special not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes
administrator. Some of the heirs of Palanca opposed the petition. and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. And
The court then appointed Philippine Trust Company, a there is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
D-3
non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings special
administrator. Later on, Philippine Trust Company presented a taken into account in the appointment of the special
petition to resign as special administrator due to incompatibility administrator.
Page
of interest since it had granted a loan to Angel Palanca, one of the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Based on US Jurisprudence, since the will appointing him The principal consideration reckoned with in the
regular administrator has been admitted to probate by the trial appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
judge, he should now be appointed special administrator during person is the interest in said estate of the one be appointed as
the pendency of the appeal against the order admitting the will to such administrator. This is the same consideration which the law
probate. Mandamus lies to compel such appointment. takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to
administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death,
because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner
DE GUZMAN v. LIMCOLIOC (68 Phil. 673) in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law
FACTS: is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the
This is a case regarding the intestate estate of PROCESO de appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse.
Guzman, which was substantially comprised of fisheries situated If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the
in the provinces. The heirs of PROCESO — NICOLASA and preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate
APOLINARIO — have been appointed as co-administrators of the of a deceased person, and if, under the circumstances of each
estate. The court ordered APOLINARIO’S appointment but he shall case, it develops that there is another who has more interest
not receive compensation for his services. therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in
The instant case (procedurally) is an appeal by oppositor- the latter's favor falls to the ground.
appellant ANGELA Limcolioc (de Guzman children’s half-sibling)
from the said order of the court. She assails APOLINARIO’s fitness RULING: Appeal denied. Trial Court’s appointment of APOLINARIO
as co-administrator. She alleges that APOLINARIO is not is upheld.
trustworthy (because when PROCESO was alive, PROCESO filed a “The lower court having been of the opinion that
complaint against APOLINARIO on the ground that the latter, as APOLINARIO de Guzman deserves appointment of co-
administrator of PROCESO’s estate, misappropriated from administrator, and it being discretionary on its part to determine
P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De Soto sedan, and a duck who should be appointed administrator of the properties of a
farm in Los Baños, and loaned money and made deposits in the deceased person, We believe it unjustified for us to meddle in the
Philippine National Bank). ANGELA also alleged that APOLINARIO exercise of such discretion, it not appearing that said court has
has a great interest in PROCESO’s estate. committed a grave abuse thereof.”
In the case of Nicolas de Guzman vs. Angela Limcolioc, G.R. The same reasons are applicable to the case under
consideration, inasmuch as the appointed co-administrator,
D-4
No. 46134, wherein the parties are the same as those in this case,
this court, in a judgment rendered on April 18, 1939, stated as Apolinario de Guzman — as brother of Nicolasa de Guzman whom
follows: the latter needs to help her in the administration of the
Page
properties left by their deceased father, many of which consist in
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
fisheries situated in the provinces — is as interested as his sister 3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties
in that said properties be duly administered and conserved for the to file their opposition. The other child of the deceased,
benefit of the heirs. Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of
It is true that Apolinario de Guzman's father, Proceso de GONZALES.
Guzman, in life, filed a complaint against his son on the ground 4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to
that the latter, as administrator of his father's estate, GONZALES was cancelled. It was held that although it
misappropriated from P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two
Soto sedan, and a duck farm in Los Baños, and loaned money and children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently
made deposits in the Philippine National Bank, but said complaint absent and left OLBES to manage the estate, there should
was dismissed at the instance of the father himself. be now only one administrator of the estate.
In the present case, aside from the fact that Apolinario de 5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was
Guzman, as co-administrator, will administer properties in which subsequently denied.
he has a greater share than that of the oppositor, the childless
widow of the deceased by a second marriage, and will act merely ISSUE: Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration
as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he granted to GONZALES should be nullified on the ground of grave
would squander said properties and the products thereof. abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be anchored
on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court
GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)
FACTS: RULING: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES
1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona reinstated.
Gonzales, two of her four children – GONZALES and OLBES 1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal
were appointed as co-administratrices. consideration reckoned with is the interest of the estate.
2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
husband who was receiving medical treatment there, who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as co- administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
D-5
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts
and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
and the heirs. 2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of
Page
their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Husband,
the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an brothers and sister remained—all were residents of
administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally Singapore except for Alfred (brother) who lives in Manila.
before it, in order to justify a removal.
B.E. Johannes (husband) was named as administrator of
3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the
causes specified in OLBES’ motion. Neither was there a the property within the jurisdiction of the Straits
determination of the validity of the charges brought Settlements [under the British Law, the husband is entitled
against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was to the whole of the estate of his wife if she die intestate
based on the fact that conflicts and misunderstandings Upon petition, Alfred was appointed administrator of the
existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the Manila estate consisting of sum in the Manila banks.
former had been absent from the country for a little less
B.E. contends that the appointment of Alfred was in excess
than a year.
4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and of its jurisdiction and administration in Manila jurisdiction
incompetence, it was shown that despite being in the US, is unnecessary.
GONZALES continued to perform her duties (sending a Issue: w/n the appointment of Alfred was made in excess of the
letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests Manila court’s jurisdiction?
accruing from Land Bank). Also, temporary absence in the Held: No. It is often necessary to have more than one
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the administrator of an estate.
estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs country of domicile as well as in a foreign country,
do not wish to reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal administration is had in both countries.
of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices
Principal administration: that which is granted in the
and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor
on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile; other
and efficient administration. administration, subsidiary to the principal administration is
called ancilliary administration
A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have
D-6
JOHANNES v. HARVEY (43 Phil. 175) any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is
Facts: granted
Page
Ancilliary administration: proper whenever a person dies
leaving in a country other than that of domicile, property
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
to be administered in the nature of assets, liable for his

individual debts or to be distributed among heirs Issue:
o PROPER PROCEDURE: ancilliary administrator to Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the appellants to
intervene?
pay claims of creditors, settle accounts and remit
the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction Held:
Universal rule giving surviving spouse preference when an No.
administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon,
the spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility (non- granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated
residence is a factor to be considered) to take property under the will of their father. The CC provides
that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all
his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire.
GUTIERREZ de OCAMPO v. VALERA CALDERON (59 Phil 631)
Facts:
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased
- Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a citizen of the
and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the
Philippine Islands, and at the time he made his will was
testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them
residing temporarily in France and that at the time of his
were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case
death he left no ascendants.
and protect their interest in so far as they may have been
- The appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of the
prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not
deceased and have filed an opposition to the project of
been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only
partition of their deceased brother Calderon, the lower
forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to
court denied their intervention
intervene in a case of this character.
- Appellants are not the deceased’s forced heirs. Article 763
of the Civil Code reads: "Any person who has no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of
it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. . . . TRILLANA v. CRISOSTOMO (89 Phil 710)
- The appellants contend that the beneficiaries
D-7
(respondents herein) under the will of Francisco Varela
Calderon are illegitimate children and that they are not GUTIERREZ v. VILLEGAS (5 SCRA 313)
qualified to inherit from the deceased, but are only
Page
entitled to support.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
DURAN v. DURAN (20 SCRA 379) The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and
Facts: settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person"
 Pio Duran died intestate. His alleged heirs are Josefina (See. 2, Rule 79). Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
Duran (surviving spouse) and brothers and sisters, partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does
nephews and nieces. not need court approval to be effective as between the parties.
 Cipriano Duran, Pio's brother, executed a Deed of An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even
Assignment renouncing his hereditary rights to Pio's estate if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are
in favor of Josefina. He filed a petition for intestate not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding
proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended
that he be named the administrator. He also filed an ex that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy
parte motion to be appointed special administrator. of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action
 Josefina opposed, saying Cipriano is not an "interested for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot
person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment
renunciation; she asked to be appointed administratrix. In is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against
response, Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not the him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate
decedent's wife and that the deed of assignment was required to petite for settlement proceedings. Also, since there
procured thru fraud. Another brother, Miguel Duran, filed was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the
a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. petition to intervene must be denied.
Josefina moved to strike as an improper attempt to
intervene in the case. Difference with Santos doctrine: Santos case held that the
 CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for his lack of assigning heir remains an interested person. That case involved an
interest in the estate, based on the deed of transfer assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of
executed by Cipriano. The court declared itself without settlement proceedings. Given that the settlement court had
power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate, any
alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court.
render it rescissible or voidable. Miguel's petition was also And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the
dismissed. Cipriano and Miguel appealed to the SC. estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in
proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is
D-8
Held: SC affirmed the dismissal order. given. In the instant case, the assignment took place when no
settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject
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3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a  Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the
settlement court. appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or
special co-administratrix
 Respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the
De GUZMAN v. ANGELES (162 SCRA 347) petitioner Natividad as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging
GARCIA FULE v. CA (supra, Rule 73) exclusively to the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the

ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407) court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of
Facts: the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas?
 Upon Pablo Roxas’ death, Maria his sister and Pedro his
brother (private respondents in this case), filed a petition Held: YES
for the administration of Pablo’s estate in a special  It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the
intestate proceeding in Bulucan. prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
 Maria was appointed special administratrix appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as
 However, a few days later, Natividad the widow well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
(petitioner of this case) filed a petition for the probate of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
Pablo’s alleged will and for her appointment as executrix 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
of his estate. or removal of special administrator.
 The intestate proceedings were dismissed upon  As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
agreement of the parties. administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
 Maria and Pedro opposed probate of the will and objected have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of
to the appointment of Natividad as special administratrix. the person to be appointed, discretion which must be
However, since she qualified, the widow was appointed to sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice
the position. or equity.
 There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
D-9
 CFI refused to admit the will to probate on the ground that
the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that
in the presence of the testator. The case is now pending of a deceased husband as in the present case, for
Page
on appeal. according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, Q: Is the preference accorded by Sec 6 of Rule 78 in the
charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have appointment of an administrator applicable to the appointment
been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband of a special administrator?
may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried
estate may reach A: It may not be amiss to note that preference accorded by the
 If two separate administrators are appointed as done in aforementioned provision of the ROC refers to the appointment
the present case, in every action which one of them may of a regular administrator not to the special administrator and
institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of
the defendant may raise the question or set up the the Probate Court.
defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because
the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is
being administered by the other administrator, which can
not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only PIJUAN v. vda. de GURREA (18 SCRA 898)
one. Facts:
 As under the law only one general administrator may be Maria Ruiz Vda. De Gurrea (Mrs. Gurrea) married Carlos Gurrea in
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the Spain. They had one child, Teodoro. Carlos abandoned Mrs.
estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only Gurrea and went to the Philippines with their son Teodoro. Here
one special administrator may be appointed to he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez. When Mrs. Gurrea came
administer temporarily said estate, because a special over, Carlos refused to admit her to his residence so Mrs. Gurrea
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is stayed with Teodoro in Bacolod City.
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator
 "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of Mrs. Gurrea then instituted a case for support and annulment of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the some alleged donations of conjugal party in favor of Rizalina. In
allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, due course, the court granted her a monthly alimony, pendente
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect lite, of P2,000, which was later reduced to P1,000.
and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
D-10
Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a will in which he named Marcelo
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81) Pijuan as executor, and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son.
Pijuan instituted proceedings for the probate of the will, and he
was thereafter appointed special administrator of the estate.
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3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Mrs. Gurrea opposed the probate proceedings, saying that as administrator, and that order appointing the latter lies
widow, she claims a right of preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said appealable.
preference exists “if no executor is named in the will or the 2. YES. The lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature
give bond, or a person dies intestate.” Mrs. Gurrea also moved or character of the property now under the custody of the
that in light of the suspension of the support and annulment case Special Administrator. Precisely, however, on account of
by reason of Carlos’s death, support previously awarded to her such lack of proof thereon, the Court is bound by law to
should be continued pending the final determination of the case. assume that the estate of the deceased consists of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of
The lower court denied both motions by Mrs. Gurrea. which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from
such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership
Issues: as may belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs.
1. Whether Mrs. Gurrea should be appointed as
administratrix of the estate.
2. Whether support previously awarded to Mrs. Gurrea TAN v. GO CHIONG LEE ((46 Phil 200)
should be continued. FACTS:
During the lifetime of the deceased Go Bung Kiu (Kiu), defendant
Held: Go Chiong Lee (Lee) was his encargado. In 1920, Kiu died and Lee
1. NO. None of the conditions stated in the Rules obtains in was appointed as special administrator of the estate, with Liok,
the case at bar. Carlos Gurrea has left a will, so it cannot Changco, Manuel Go as sureties on his bond in the sum of
be said that he has died intestate. Said document names P30,000. Subsequently, Lee’s status changed to that of
Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is administrator. Lee continued continued to discharge his duties as
incompetent therefor. He has not only not refused the administrator until he was relieved by Plaintiff Maximina Tan
trust, but has also expressly accepted it by applying for his (Tan). Lee filed 3 reports all in all covering the periods within
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as which he acted as the administrator. The committee on claims
special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It rendered its report, admitting as proved, claims amounting to
D-11
may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by P69,029.91. The court issued an order stating that administrator
the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the Lee is ordered to pay out of the funds of the estate of deceased
surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular Kiu to each of the persons mentioned in the report of the said
Page
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special committee. Plaintiff Tan sought to recover from defendant Lee
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
and the latter’s sureties on four causes of action, amounts Guardian of the minor children of Francisco asked
totalling to P54,700.39. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the permnission to intervene wherein he alleged that the
sum of P42,849.08 but limiting the liability of the sureties to estate of Francisco did not owe the plaintiffs anything
P30,000. Defendants appealed. An amicable settlement wherein the defendants shall (1)
recognize the indebtedness of the estate (2) mortgage all
Issue: Whether or not the defendant Lee and his sureties are the property of Francisco and of Felicisima and (3)
liable to pay the amount of P54,700.39 to plaintiff? mortgage the carabaos was reached
Held: No. The plaintiff shall only have and recover from the The settlement was approved by the court but was not
defendants jointly and severally the amount of P6,375 with legal recorded in the registry of property up to the time of the
interest from the date when the complaint was presented. institution of the suit
The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best Plaintiffs filed the present action (1) for failure of
measured as in essence the responsibility of the bailee. Like any defendants to pay 2 installments (2) for refusal of
bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, defendants to mortgage the carabaos and (3) on the
or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in allegation that defendants were about to transfer their
the estate, for waste, conversion or embezzlement. But where an property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in Attachment order was granted by the court; on appeal,
good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods judge decided in favor of defendants and ordered plaintiffs
obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses to pay damages
incurred.
The supreme court found that the personal responsibility of the ISSUE:
former administrator Lee and the sureties on his bond for losses whether the amicable settlement was binding: NO
incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been
proved. whether the court could approve such an agreement: NO
 court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate
LIZZARAGA HERMANOS v. ABADA (40 Phil 124) debts it never owed
FACTS: to give effect to the compromise as written would result in
D-12
Francisco Caponong died owing the plaintiffs Sociedad de great wrong and destroy every chance the minor children had to
Lizarraga a sum of money participate in the inheritance of their father
Seven years after the death of Francisco, plaintiffs filed a
suit against Felicisima personally and as administratrix of whether the estate owed the plaintiffs the amount being
Page
Francisco’s estate for the collection of money claimed: NO
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
 the estate owed the plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the conditions of her bond (i.e. failed to file inventory, failed to pay
commissioners passed on their claim part of which has already approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and just
been paid account of her administration); and that defendant, as surety
 where the plaintiffs, originally holding a claim originally for less failed to pay plaintiff notwithstanding the latter’s demand.
than P13,000 let the administratrix have money and effects till -CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to
their claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to charge pay plaintiff P6000, P900atty’s fees + costs.
this amount as expense of administration (they may be allowed to
charge the same to the current revenue of the hacienda) ISSUE:
 administration expenses would be the necessary expenses of [1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability
handling the property, of protecting it against destruction or of defendant under the bond in question
deterioration, and possibly producing a crop [2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the
deceased administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of
whether the administratrix can mortgage estate properties the Rules of Court.
 no mortgage can be placed by an administrator on the estate
of descendant, unless it is specifically authorized by statute (no HELD:
such statute in the Philippines) [1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
 the mortgage of the properties is foreign to the policy and pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is
purpose of administration; it aims to close up, not to continue an only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any
estate breach by the administratrix of her duty.
-Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over
the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrator’s bond, the
WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924) same matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought
FACTS: before the Court of First Instance.
-Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI -Though nominally payable to the Rep. of the Phils, the bond is
against defendant, Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the
costs and P1500 for attorney’s fees. The basis for the complaint Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason
why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in
D-13
was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as
administratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in so far as he is concerned.
Special Proceedings No. 452of the CFI of Negros Occidental.
-The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim [2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim
Page
against the estate of P6,485.02; that administratrix violated the against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule 87 providing that “where the Pertinent objection is that Wilson was neglectful and imprudent
obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another and he committed waste and should therefore be held liable.
debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were
the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the state to Issue: Whether or not Wilson should be held liable for the loss in
recover contribution from the other debtor.” the estate.
-Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it Held: Yes. When Wilson was appointed special administrator, he
appears that even as the present complaint was filed, there were never made any report or file any account of any kind until 1927.
no proceedings for the administration of her estate. Where there Neither did he apply to or obtain an order from the court of any
are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the nature during that period to settle the debts of Charles Rear,
deceased administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond which, at the time of his death amounted to P1,300.00. It was the
against the surety which bound itself jointly and severally in the legal duty of Wilson to at one apply to the court for an order to
case where the bond was filed. sell the property to pay the debts of the deceased and the
expenses of administration. If the property of the state had been
promptly sold, when it should have been, and sold for its
WILSON v. REAR (55 Phil 44) appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs
Facts: Charles Rear was murdered by some Moros on his and expenses of administration would have been paid and the
plantation in Cotabato on July 14, 1925. J.J. Wilson qualified as estate would have a balance left, instead of going negative.
special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925. Later, Instead of doing that, and without any order, he continued the
the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800.00 of which operation of the plantation and employment of a manager, the
the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also net result of which was that all of the property of the estate was
signed by Wilson. ON January 4, 1927, the commissioners made consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate.
and filed a report of claims against the estate but by reason of the
fact that it was claimed and alleged that the administrator did not (other salient parts of the case… might help)
have any funds to pay, the court ordered the administrator to sell  When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator
a portion of the property. Later, a petition was made for authority to administer, settle, and close the administration in the
to sell all the property of the estate with a view of closing the ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary
D-14
administration which was granted by the court. Public sale took delay. Neither does he, in particular, without a specific
place and the property was sold for P7,600.00. Wilson filed his showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
final account which was approved by the court despite objections. continue the operation of the business in which the
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3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets - Petitioner files suit for the payment of premiums from the
of the estate in the payment of operation expenses. 2nd year until 8 years later, when the respondent
 Exception – when the continuing of the business is petitioned the court to cancel the bonds since all the heirs
necessary to settle the estate of the deceased. have received their inheritance
 The law does not impose upon the administrator a high
degree of care in the administration of an estate, but it Issue: w/n the bonds were in effect from the 2 nd year onwards
does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want considering the respondent’s failure to pay premium, and that the
of which he is personally liable. In this case, the court said court has approved the plan of partition as early as the 2nd year of
Wilson should have wound up the estate within 8 months the administration of the estates
from the date of his appointment.
In the end, Wilson was made liable for the loss in the amount of Held: yes
P3,839,22.
Ratio:
LUZON SURETY v. QUEBRAL (127 SCRA 295) - The proper determination of the liability of the surety and
Facts: of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon
- petitioner Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in the language of the bond itself.
the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the - The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in the Rules of Court.
2 testate proceedings - While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is
- In consideration of the suretyship, respondent Quebrar, required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed in
executed two indemnity agreements, agreeing jointly and the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and
severally to pay petitioner P300 in advance as premium the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed
thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or in the statute.
any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect and to - The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a
indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages, part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions
losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and prescribed by the statute.
expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount - Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
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involved in any litigation, for attomey's fees administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose
- Respondent paid for the 1st year; however, for the of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the
succeeding years, respondent failed to pay the premium estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of
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the administrator's trust.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
- Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of
long as the administrator has duties to do as such the bond by the defendants-appellants.
administrator/executor. - It must be remembered that the probate court possesses
- Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and
of the administrator and embraces the performance of over the administration proceedings and it cannot be
every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond
administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty answerable for the every purpose for which it was filed.
bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into - The contention then of the defendants-appellants that
by him in consideration of the suretyship both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity
- The contention of the defendants-appellants that the Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the
administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project
with the approval of the project of partition and statement of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the
of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. non-payment of the stated premiums, is without merit.
- The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease Such construction of the said contracts entered into would
as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is render futile the purpose for which they were made.
for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and - To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. under the Indemnity Agreements by non-payment of the
And liquidation means the determination of all the assets premiums would ultimately lead to giving the
of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It administrator the power to diminish or reduce and
appears that there were still debts and expenses to be altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator's
paid after June 6, 1957. Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and
- An estate may be partitioned even before the termination purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's
of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of bonds for the protection of the creditors, heirs, legatees,
the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the and the estate.
administration proceedings.
- The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a
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rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO (64 Phil 134)
bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until FACTS:
the administration has been closed and terminated in the -Manuel SORIANO was former administrator of the estate of
Page
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court Baldomero Cosme.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
-He filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario PACHECO and

Raymundo CORDERO as sureties. RULING:
-SORIANO'S account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.
estate in the sum of P23,603.21. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so
-Unable to turn said amount over to the estate upon demand of many words that such court has power to execute the bond of
the new administratix ROSARIO Cosme, the CFI ordered the an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the
execution of SORIANO’s bond after notice was served upon the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal
sureties. term.
-Sometime later, the CFI approved a settlement had between It is thus clear that a CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
ROSARIO and SORIANO, whereby SORIANO ceded certain real empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix
properties to the estate, thereby reducing his indebtedness to the the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of
estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000. the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing
-Subsequently, ROSARIO had the public sale thereof to collect this power over the administrator's bond and over administration
amount of P5,000. proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of
-Separate motions to be discharged from the bond were filed by legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the
PACHECO and CORDERO. very purpose for which it was filed.
-Both motions were denied, as well as an MR therefor. It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil
-This dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the SC Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of
dismissed (according to the SC, the order for executing the bond an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person
was made in 1932 and the motion for discharge was filed in 1933: liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application,
LATE!) be admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right
-Upon resumption of the case in the lower court, PACHECHO and to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
CORDERO filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an
jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order for executing the administrator's account the right, upon application, to be
bond. admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not
-CFI denied. Thus, the instant case. unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the
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ISSUE: process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the execution of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from
SORIANO’s bond, given that the trial court was only sitting as such proceedings.
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probate court.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
We take the view that the execution of an administrator's that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property
bond clearly stands upon a different footing and is as necessary a without due process of law. "The usual method of enforcing the
part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of liability on an administration bond is by an action brought on the
such bond or the fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true in bond in a court of law, although in some jurisdictions other forms
the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in the of remedy are provided by statute, . . . ."
amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is The only procedure by which the liability of an executor or
conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to administrator and his sureties be enforced on their bond is,
see that said amount was turned over to the estate. therefore, by an ordinary action in court.
The failure of the sureties to appeal from the order of
Justice Villareal’s Dissent summary execution issued by the court below on their bond after
Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a mere service of notice did not legalize said summary procedure
headed "Wills and the allowance thereof, and duties of and the order of summary execution issued by the lower court,
executors", contains no provision concerning the enforcement of which were otherwise illegal and ultra vires.
the liability of an executor or administrator on his bond and of The order appealed from ordering the summary execution
that of his sureties. According to Art. 1853 of the Civil Code, "the of the bond filed by the sureties-appellants, together with the
guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses former administrator Ramon Soriano, was issued not only in
available to the principal debtor and which may be inherent in the excess of jurisdiction but without it, because it was not authorized
debt; . . . ." In an administration bond the executor or by law.
administrator stands in the place of the principal debtor; his
sureties may, therefore, set up all the defenses to which he may
be entitled, and which are inherent in the obligation. The GUSTILO v. SIAN (53 Phil 155)
procedure by which such defenses may be set up is the ordinary FACTS:
one established by the said Code of Civil Procedure by means of 1. GUSTILO was appointed administrator of the estate of his
an action in court wherein may contain general or special denial, a deceased father. He filed his accounts (as administrator)
special defense or a counterclaim. The said Code has not for the years 1923 to 1925.
established any special procedure by which an executor or 2. The widow, along with other heirs, sought to remove
administrator with a mere notice to his sureties does not afford GUSTILO as administrator, alleging that he was negligent,
D-18
them an adequate opportunity to set up the defenses which the inefficient and self-serving, and that he falsely included in
law guarantees to them. To enforce the liability of an the accounts exorbitant and illegal expenses.
administrators and require them to file an adequate bond — is 3. GUSTILO subsequently filed a motion asking for a salary of
Page
not only ultra vires but a violation of the constitutional inhibition PhP3, 000 annually. He also presented therewith the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
accounts for the years 1925-1926 and 1926-1927. In both not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the
of these accounts, there appeared to be a deficit (around rights of other persons in interest.
PhP400 for the former and PhP3, 000 for the latter). 2. GUSTILO should be removed and required to render his
4. One of the creditors of the estate (Leocadia Majito) accounts as administrator.
opposed the accounts presented as well as the salary
sought to be granted. Later, Majito included in his
opposition the allegation that certain debts of the estate DEGALA v. CENIZA and UMIPIG (78 Phi 791)
were charged twice with no adequate vouchers. Facts:
5. Court of Iloilo (where the intestacy proceedings were held) UMIPIG was appointed special administrator of the estate
disapproved the accounts and ordered GUSTILO to file of Placida Mina.
amended accounts. Despite the extension of time granted
DEGALA is complaining claiming the UMIPIG should be
to him, GUSTILO failed to file these amended accounts.
Rather, GUSTILO presented the old accounts without removed as special administrator for:
change. o Adverse interest; stranger to the estate, not being
6. Later on, another judge of the same court (other judge a beneficiary in the will; failed to include some
was absent) reconsidered the disapproval of the previous property in the inventory; failed to pay taxes due
accounts. Two of the accounts filed by GUSTILO were then from the estate; failed to render accounting
approved. Creditors of the estate did not seem to receive Issue: w/n UMIPIG should be removed as special administrator
due notice of this approval. based on the claims?
7. A creditor, SIAN then filed a motion to reconsider the
approval of the accounts as well as for the removal of
Held: No. the removal of an administrator lies with the appointing
GUSTILO as administrator and the forfeiture of his bond. court’s discretion.
This motion was denied.
Sufficiency of any ground for removal should be
determined by the appointing court.
ISSUE: Whether the decision approving the accounts filed by
GUSTILO was proper Adverse interest: any interest of the previous
administrator (lawyer of UMIPIG) is exclusively personal,
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RULING: No UMIPIG can have nothing to do with it; not beneficiary:
1. The activities revealed in the case of GUSTILO, as can represent his father as trustee under the will; other
administrator, convinces the court that he is not a fit grounds: not willful omissions
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person to be administrator of the estate and that he has
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
necessary. Sec 643 of the aforesaid code in providing for the

CHUA TAN v. DEL ROSARIO (57 Phil 411) appointment of an administrator where there is no will or the will
Facts: Benedicta Santa Juana, as adminsitratrix of the intestate does not name an executor seeks to protect not only the estate of
estate of Chua Piaco, instituted a civil case against Lucita del the deceased but also the rights of the creditors in order that they
Rosario as adminsitratirx of the intestate estate of Chua Toco. may be able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees
Said action was a petition for the rendering of an accounting of in order that they may receive the portion of the inheritance or
certain funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the late legacy appertaining to them after all the debts and expenses
Chua Piaco to his adopted son, the late Chua Toco. The CFI chargeable against the deceased’s estate have been paid. Under
dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the SC on appeal. the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is
Subsequently, the presumptive heirs of the late Chua Piaco the legal representative not only of the estate or intestate estate,
instituted a 2nd petition against the same defendant Lucita del but also of the creditors, and heirs and legatees inasmuch as he
Rosario, this time for partition between the same funds together represents their interest in the estate of the deceased.
with its fruits which was allegedly delivered by Piaco to Toco in A final judgment upon the meals rendered against the
trust. The heirs alleged that the sum of 20,000 which was judicial administratrix of an intestate estate (Chua Piaco), as such
deposited in a bank bearing interest was not the exclusive in a case where she is a plaintiff and the administratrix of another
property of Toco but the exclusive property of Piaco and Toco, intestate estate (Chua Toco) as such, is the defendant, in which
Father and son. she seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been
The LC dismissed this 2nd petition on the ground of res delivered in trust by the deceased to the other deceased,
judicata as having been already decided by the SC in the civil case. constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the
Issue: What is the duty of the administrator? WON the 2 nd supposed trustee (Chua Toco) is defendant and in which the
petition is barred by res judicata partition of the same funds and the products thereof is sought
between the heirs of both, under the same allegation of trust, the
Held: It is the duty of the executor or administrator to present an alleged trustee being the adopted son of the donor.
inventory of the real estate and of all the goods, chattels, rights,
and credits of the deceased which have come into his possession
or to this knowledge in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 668 ADAPON v. MARALIT (69 Phil 383)
of the Code of Civil Procedure and to manage them according to
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Sec. 643 of the code of civil procedure; and in order that he may Facts:
have in his power and under his custody all such property, sec 702 On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the
of the aforesaid code authorizes him to bring such actions for the last will and testament of his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon
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purpose of obtaining possession thereof as he may deem in the CFI of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate and
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Pedro was appointed as administrator by the court. He then filed administrator and the oppositor without necessarily declaring the
an inventory of the property and assets of the estate. However lawful ownerhip of the properties involved. Such a declaration is
the surviving spouse of the deceased from a 2nd marriage, Felisa necessary and inevitable and without it the probate court cannot
Maralit, filed to the court to order the administrator to pay her a properly proceed and dispose of the petition submitted by the
monthly allowance of P50 as well as to include certain properties oppositor. However under Sec 599 of the code of civil procedure,
to the inventory which was omitted from the inventory (1k cavans the probate jurisdiction of the CFI only relates to matters having
of palay, credit in favor of deceased, carabaoes etc.) to do with the settlement of estates and probates of wills of
deceased persons the appointment and removal of guardians and
The Administrator in his answer, claimed ownership over the trustees and the powers, duties and rights of guardians and
properties. Thus the oppositor Maralit, during the hearing moved wears, trustees and cestuis que trust. As may have seen the law
that in view of the claims of ownership made in the answer, the does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
administrator should be relieved of his duties and another be determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
appointed to act in his place. proceeding.
LC ruled that the allegations in the motion of the oppositor widow

is not sufficient to warrant the removal of the administrator. The MOORE & SONS MERCANTILE CO. v. WAGNER (50 Phil 128)
court however ordered the administrator to include certain FACTS:
properties in the inventory, To this the administrator appeals, Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the
contending that the court erred in ordering the inclusion of such settlement proceedings petitioned the court to require the
properties. Thus this case. administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter
Avelina Allen an allowance of P80.
Issue: The special administrator appointed in the case objected
WON the probate court could, upon petition of oppositor to to the allowance of the widow upon the ground that the
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and
administrator, to some of which the said administrator had laid approved by the committee on appraisal and claims.
claims of ownership determine the question of ownership and Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several creditors also
thereby meet the issues as thus presented.
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entered his opposition to said order.
There is no question that the estate is insolvent.
Held: Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the
No. It is not seen how the probate court can determine the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5,
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respective merits of the conflicting claims made by the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code and partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same
section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure. before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just
because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the
ISSUE: Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
and daughter valid? uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality.
The judge or the administrator, as the case may be, must
HELD: NO grant the support referred to in article 1430, when the
same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they
RATIO: are prejudiced by such an action, by separating from the
Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving estate a part of its income, they can appeal to the court
spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no
for their support out of the general estate, pending the property or asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the
liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share interested parties.
has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from In this case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed
their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his
been entitled to as fruits or income. widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property
As to the question of granting allowance from an insolvent to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to
estate, The SC of Spain had rendered a decision granting grant the support, having the character of an advance payment to
allowance to the widow from the general inventoried be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when
estate at the time of the death of the husband until the there is no property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis
delivery of her share. provided by article 1430.
Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to
the said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That
the support does not encumber the property of the SANTERO v. CFI CAVITE (153 SCRA 728)
deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the FACTS:
general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the  Pablo Santero had 3 illegitimate children with Felixberta
Pacursa (Princesita, Federico and Winy) while he also had
D-22
dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the
indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife 4 illegitimate children with Anselma Diaz (Victor, Rodrigo,
can always be allowed support as part payment of the Anselmina and Miguel).
income of her property. In any case, the support is given  A Motion For Allowance filed by Anselma (as guardian of
Page
prior to the termination of the liquidation of the V,R,A,M) for support which included educational expenses,
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
clothing and medical necessities. The oppositors said that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero
contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought did not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance.
are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so
that they are no longer under guardianship. They also Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the
alleged that the administrator did not have sufficient funds assailed order.
to cover the said allowance. Anselma admitted some of
her children are of age and not enrolled for the first The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New
semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as
as they are given the requested allowances, citing Art. 290 follows:
of the Civil Code: “Support also includes the education of Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
the person entitled to be supported until he completes his sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
education or training for some trade or vocation, even according tothe social position of the family.
beyond the age of majority.” The court granted the motion
and the children were given an allowance. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to
 Later, the children (V,R,A,M) filed another Motion for be supported until he completes his education or training for
Allowance to include an additional 3 children (Juanita, some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
Estelita and Pedrito). The court granted the motion. majority.
Anselma clarified that in her previous motions, only the
last four minor children as represented by the mother, Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be
Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
her first three (3) children who were then of age should liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs
have been included since all her children have the right to to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that
receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
the inheritance of Pablo Santero. But an Order was issued pertaining to them.
by the court directing the administrator of the estate to
get back the allowance of the three additional recipients The fact that Anselma's children are of age, gainfully employed, or
or children of Anselma. married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
D-23
 Felixberta's children (P,F,W) filed a petition for certiorari, determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
arguing that Anselma's children are not entitled to any While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor
allowance since they have already attained majority age, or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code
Page
two are gainfully employed and one is married. They also gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
distinction. Hence, Anselma's children (V,R,A,M) are entitled to deceased but that they actually belong to, and were held
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The
their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code court granted the petition.
(substantial law) gives the surviving spouse and to the children  Later, Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of
the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing
the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms
the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the
that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate subdivision. Only after this was he issued letters of
spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the administration.
children here).  Now as a regular administrator, Tan filed a petition with
the respondent court, alleging that the deceased was the
manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and
CONCEPCION JOCSON de HILADO v. NAVA (69 Phil 1) that he had been engaged in the business of selling the
lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the
power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the
SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE (11 SCRA 165) intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to
sell the lots. The court granted the petition.
 Petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders granted
JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008) by the court: 1. Allowing the withdrawals from PNB and 2.
Facts: Approving the power of attorney.
 An intestate proceeding was commenced by Antonio V. A.
Tan (private respondent in this case) for Carlos Abrille’s Issue 1: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of
estate. discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by allowing the special
 One of the properties left by Abrille was his 19% share in administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name
the co-ownership known as Juna Subdivision. of the decedent?
 Tan was appointed special administrator by the court.
Held: Yes.
D-24
 Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the
sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from PNB, which  In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
sums were not listed in his petition for administration as and duties of a special administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule
among the properties left by the deceased. He alleged 80 for powers and duties)
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that these sums were deposited in the name of the
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
 In the second place, the order was issued without notice

to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. Held: Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving
 The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a an improper contract or transaction.
taking of possession and charge of the credits of the  Section 4 of Rule 89 of ROC requires "written notice to the
estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the
special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did
intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co- not furnish such notice.
owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly  It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her
claiming the same. testator's estate as a trustee
 The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased;  It is equally well settled that an executrix will not be
they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any
death. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence transaction concerning the trust property
at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in  Note that auto-contracts may be permissible but should
the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is not be made to apply to administrators of a deceased
without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and
the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be
estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is too late to correct it.
not the owner thereof.  In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan
 If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the to be an agent or attorney-in-fact for two principals: the
estate requires prior written notice of the application to court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and
the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other.
of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable  This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him
for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests
favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was given, against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
and without it the court's authority is invalid and undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and
improper. administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of
D-25
Issue 2: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by approving the him.
power of attorney executed by Tan appointing and authorizing  A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to
Page
himself to sell the lots? the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
administration nor can he borrow money without authority of the

Q: What acts can the executor or administrator NOT perform court even if it is for the benefit of the estate. He has no
validly? authority to speculate with funds of the estate or place them
A: where they may not be withdrawn at once by order of the court.
1. Art 1491 (3) of the NCC prohibits the executor or The deposit by an administrator of the funds of the estate in a
administrator to buy property under his administration. current account with a bank instead of a fixed account at a high
2. He cannot borrow money even if it is for the benefit of the rate of interest, with a view to having such funds subject to
estate. withdrawal at a moment’s notice is NOT improper and he is not
3. Nor can he continue the business in which the deceased was answerable for the low rate of interest thus obtained. An
engaged in at the tome of his death without order of the court administrator, without order of the court, has no authority to
as his duty is to settle the estate as soon as possible and not to continue the business in which the deceased was engaged in at
prolong his administration. the time of his death. If he does so with the funds of the estate,
4. He has no authority to speculate with funds of the estate or he is chargeable with all the losses incurred thereby without
place them where they may not be withdrawn at once by allowing him to receive the benefits of any profits that he may
order of the court. This is true even if said funds would have make. The administrator of a deceased spouse shall also
to be deposited in a low or no interest earning account administer, liquidate, and distribute the community property,
(current account) as compared to a high earning interest because the estate of a decease spouse consists not only of the
account (fixed account). exclusive properties of the decedent, but also ½ of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, if any, which pertain to the deceased.
Q: What is the extent of the powers of an executor or
administrator? Q: What is the care required in the management of the estate by
A: An executor or administrator has all the powers necessary for the executor or administrator?
the administration of the estate and which powers he can A: The law does not impose upon an executor or administrator a
exercise without leave of court. The constitution of a lease over a high degree of care in the administration of the estate but an
property of the estate is an act of administration and leave of ordinary and usual care for the want of which he is personally
court is not required. Any interested party who desires to impugn liable.
the same must do so in an ordinary civil action as the probate
D-26
court has no jurisdiction over the lessee. It has been broadly Q: When is the property of the executor or administrator liable
stated that an administrator is not permitted to deal with himself for his debts?
as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. The A: In case of death of an executor or administrator who has
Page
executor or administrator cannot buy property under his contracted debts, his own property which he left at death is
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
directly liable for payments of such debts. The creditor may direct
his action against said executor’s or administrator’s heirs. For Garcia brought an action seeking to be declared as heirs; to have
until all the creditors of a deceased person have been paid, there the properties under Escudero delivered to them; and to order
can be no net inheritance divisible among the heirs. Escudero to render an accounting of the properties in the latter’s
custody. The trial court granted these reliefs, but Escudero only
Q: What if a lease contract exceeds one year? rendered an accounting and asked for stay of execution for the
A: If the lease contract exceeds one year, the same is no longer other judgments. In his statement of accounts, he explained that:
considered a mere act of administration and leave of court is 1. Certain personal properties were destroyed by fire
required. A view held however, that Art. 1878 of NCC on agency (supported by evidence).
should not apply to leases entered into by an executor under the 2. Cattle died due to rinderpest of 1898.
theory that they represent not only the estate but also the parties 3. Coconut lands were seized by revolutionists during a
interested therein, that they are required to file a bond, and that certain period.
their acts are subject to specific provisions of the law and orders 4. He charged for “Sundries” for travelling expenses.
of the probate court, which circumstances are not true with
respect to agents. (look at San Diego v Nombre, 11 SCRA 165). Garcia impugned the statement of accounts submitted by
Escudero, and the trial court ordered Escudero to be responsible
for such properties, i.e., that Escudero should pay for the items
GARCIA v. ESCUDERO (43 Phil. 437) which were “not properly” (based on the trial court’s opinion)
Facts: accounted for.
Verdejo died, leaving an open will wherein he named as heirs his
three sisters (Garcia, et al), and Escudero and Marasigan as Issue:
administrators. W/N the administrator’s (Escudero’s) explanations were sufficient
to absolve him from liabilities over the properties under his
Intestate proceedings were commenced in the justice of the administration.
peace court of Dolores for the settlement of the deceased’s estate
undisposed of by will , and testamentary proceedings leading to Held:
YES. The account rendered by defendant should be approved.
D-27
the settlement of the estate covered by his will were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas by whose order said justice As to the first item: It was not shown that such properties were
of the peace delivered to administrator Escudero the properties destroyed by the negligence of Escudero.
of the deceased, such as furniture, jewelry, cattle (1 black horse, 1 As to the second item: Although no written evidence of the death
Page
black mare, 5 female carabaos), coconut lands. of such cattle was introduced in accordance with the laws then in
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
force on large cattle, the fact of the death of those animals was orders, decrees and judgment in the record on appeal
proven by the testimony of Escudero based on personal alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the best
knowledge, and that such testimony was not timely objected to. evidence of the services rendered by him and his attorney.
As to the third item: There was evidence proving such seizure, and
that it was also proved that there were no substantial produce What section 779 of the code of Civil Procedure requires to be
after possession was reverted to Escudero. transmitted to the court in case of an appeal from a decree or
As to the fourth item: duly proven by evidence, not overthrown order approving or disapproving the accounts of an administrator,
by contrary evidence. in accordance with the provisions of sec. 778, is a certified
transcript of the appeal, order, decree or judgment appealed from
and of the accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any
NICOLAS v. NICOLAS (63 Phil 332) other order, decree or judgment from which no appeal has been
FACTS: taken being unnecessary and superfluous.
What is involved in this case is the intestate estate of the The accounts partially disapproved from the appealed order are
deceased Santiago Nicolas. Ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas those submitted by Domingo, which accounts appear in the
appealed from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of record on appeal, as amended by the order of the court. Thus, the
Tarlac, which provided that the court approved the two accounts court a quo did not commit any error in ordering the elimination
submitted by Domingo with amendments and with a balance of from the record on appeal of the other pleadings, decrees, orders
P726.01 in favor of the administration, which sum said Domingo or judgments not appealed from, which, according to Domingo,
must turn over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the are nothing more than evidence of the services rendered by him
clerk of court. In case of non-compliance, the bond given by and his attorney.
Domingo will be attached to satisfy the payment due him. As regards the alleged error that the court a quo erred in
not submitting Domingo to an examination under oath
ISSUE: and in not holding a hearing on his accounts, records show
Whether the court a quo committed the errors alleged by
that upon calling for hearing the accounts of ex-
Domingo in its order in question – NO
administrator Domingo, the latter appeared in his own
HELD: behalf and a certain Palarca opposed the approval thereof.
D-28
The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the Under the heading PAYMENTS in Domingo’s alleged errors,
court erred in disapproving the record on appeal which include “money advanced to attorney Bartolome D.
presented by the appellant and in ordering the P400, Partial payment of the debt of deceased in favor of
Page
amendment thereof by eliminating certain pleadings, Julian and also to Commissioner Gabriel, and expenses
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
incurred during the anniversary of the deceased, the Almost 2 months later, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as
supreme court ruled that the court a quo correctly guardian ad litem of minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco,
rejected them on the ground that they had not been sons and only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion
for reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified
authorized by said court and because they had already
of the motion for allowance and the grant thereof; denied
been discussed in Judge Ocampo’s order, from which no
Yangco gave notice of his intention to appeal
appeal was taken. The item consisting in expenses Meanwhile, Panis, through Wijangco, filed a motion for
incurred by Domingo on the occasion of the anniversary of execution of ¾ of the P15,000; he claims that since Bruno
the deceased cannot be considerd a part of the funeral Uy was already dead, his share will go to his father
expenses nor as the erection of a mausoleum which forms (petitioner) who did not appeal the decision of the court
part of the sepulture of the deceased, because it bears no and consequently, only the ¼ share of Pedro Uy should be
relation to the funeral. withheld
Yangco objected but the judge ordered the payment of ¾
The law only authorizes the administrator to collect for his of P15,000
services as such the sum of P4 for every day actually and
necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the ISSUES, HELD and RATIO:
estate of the deceased, not for every act or task he might
perform, as indicated by the great majority of the tasks performed Whether the orders were valid and final
by him. Thus, P4 is reasonable. (18 days was granted to Domingo  court said that they need not be determined in the case at
to serve as administrator) hand, but they are appealable
 there is no provision of law authorizing the lower court to
enforce the immediate execution of such orders in probate
UY TIOCO v. IMPERIAL (53 Phil 802) proceedings after an appeal has been perfected
FACTS:
Respondent Panis, counsel for the administration of estate what is the character of liability for attorney’s fees in
of the deceased, before final settlement of the accounts, probate proceedings?
D-29
moved for the allowance of attorney’s fees in the sum of  the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees;
P15,000 such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator
The judge, over the objection of the petitioner  the services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have
administrator Uy Tioco, granted the same; Uy Tioco did been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in
Page
not appeal the execution of his trust; thus, liability for the payment of
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
attorney’s fees rests on the executor or administrator (if the fees was approved by the court. The heirs of Bienvenida excepted to
are beneficial to the estate, then executor or administrator is such decision, hence this appeal.
entitled to reimbursement from the estate)
Issues:
[1] W/N the administrator of the estate is entitled to the
DACANAY v. HERNANDEZ (53 Phil 824) reimbursement of counsel fees.
Facts: [2]W/N the administrator is entitled to per diem compensation for
-Justiniano Dacanay died, leaving only one legitimate child, his services
Bienvenida, and three acknowledged natural children,
Hermenigilda, Tirso, and Paulina. Bienvenida married Silverio and Held:
died leaving three children. [1] No. The fees being claimed by the administrator all relate to
-Deceased Justiniano left a will naming Tirso as the services rendered for the benefit of the administrator himself and
executor/administrator. It greatly favored the natural children at for that of the other natural children of Justiniano Dacanay and
the expense of Bienvenida. not for the benefit of the estate. In this case, the administrator
-Will was duly probated; Tirso qualified as administrator; various deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents (i.e.
schemes of partition were submitted by commissioners. Even inventory) for the purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs of
both parties, Tirso and Silverio, submitted their own plans of the deceased and through his own breach of trust, brought the
partition but the Court found all of them unsatisfactory. litigation for which he now demands reimbursement for counsel
Therefore, Judge rendered own decision which provided for a fees.
complete and apparently fair distribution of the estate. -The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees
-Tirso filed a motion for new trial on the ground that such decision arising out of litigation between the beneficiaries thereof among
was contrary to law but was denied. Appeal was perfected but themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular
Tirso filed a motion for reopening the case on the ground of newly persons, but an administrator may employ competent counsel on
discovered evidence—an inventory of property alleged to have questions which affect his duties as administrator and on which
been donated to Bienvenida on occasion of her marriage. SC he is in reasonable doubt, and reasonable expenses for such
granted motion and ordered remand of case to the CFI. services may be charged against the estate subject to the
-CFI Judge found that inventory was genuine and directed approval of the court.
D-30
commissioners of partition. Several plans of partition were again -An administrator who brings on litigation for the deliberate
submitted, but the last one which was submitted by the estate’s purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit
administrator pursuant to the parties’ stipulation in open court, is not entitled to reimbursement for counsel fees incurred in such
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litigation.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Held: No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not
[2]No. the prolongation of the settlement of the estate was due acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules of Court provides that an
entirely to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary
legitimate heirs, and the Court cannot allow him to profit by his expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover
own fraud. Moreover, his services for the period in question attorney’s fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the
would have been unnecessary if he had not, by his fraudulent rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executor’s or
acts, prevented the settlement of the estate. administrator’s commissions, and never as attorney’s fees. Where
-Where an administrator is acting as such for his own benefit and the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter
not for that of the estate, he is in a position analogous to that of who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorney’s fees in the
bailee for his own sole benefit and is bound to exercise great care amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not
and attention in the conservation of the property under from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
administration and will be held liable for losses. Per diem
compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for
necessary services, and where the prolongation of the settlement ROSENSTOCK v. ELSER (48 Phil 708)
of the estate is due entirely to the efforts of the administrator to Facts:
defraud the heirs, he is not entitled to compensation for the - Upon the death of Henry W. Elser, petitioner C. W.
services rendered in connection therewith. Rosenstock filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the probate of Elser's will, and that he,
Rosenstock be appointed as executor of the estate.
LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729) - Petitioner files a motion asking for a monthly allowance of
Facts: Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of P1,000 considering that the work of administering the
the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as above-entitled estate is such as to require an unusual
counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will. Granted. He amount of time of the executor, owing to the size and
then filed a “motion for attorney’s fees” against the heirs, alleging involved condition of the estate and all parties involved in
that the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services the case agreed that this amount was just a reasonable;
rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and the court approves allowance.
alleged that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00 which was - 2 years later, the widow of the deceased filed a petition
D-31
already paid. Lower court granted the motion. asking that the order for P1,000 allowance be revoked and
that the compensation of the executor should be based
Issue: Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorney’s fees. upon the provisions of section 680 of the Code of Civil
Page
Procedure.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
- Court revokes the order and fixes the compensation of the - Although by mutual consent his compensation was fixed at
executor of P400 per month. P1,0000 per month at the time of his appointment that
- From this order the widow appeals contending that the was not valid or binding contract continuous throughout
trial court erred in failing to reduce the compensation of the whole administration of the estate.
the executor to the statutory amount allowed under - It was always subject to change and the approval of the
section 680. court and to either an increase or decrease as conditions
Issue: w/n the courts erred in fixing the compensation contrary to might warrant
Sec. 680 - The original order and the last order were both made in
Held: no the court in which the probate proceedings were pending,
Ratio: and all matters pertaining to the estate were peculiarly
- The record speaks for itself. At the time of his within the knowledge and province of that court, by which
appointments all parties agreed that the executor should all orders were made and in which all accounts were filed.
have and receive P1,000 per month for his services. - That is to say from the date of the appointment of the
- The order fixing the allowance at P1,000, among other executor until the 2nd order was issued, the lower court
things recites the agreed facts, and is largely founded upon had before it all of the records orders and proceedings
that stipulation. growing out of the administration of the estate.
- The present order reducing the executor's fee to P400 per - Based upon such records it found as a fact that under all of
month from which both parties have appealed was made the existing circumstances the fee of the executor from
more than nineteen months after the original order was June 1, 1925 should be P400 per month.
made, Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the
estate for more than nineteen months and as such had
been administering the affairs of the estate with the JOSON v. JOSON (2 SCRA 83)
ultimate view of winding up may have existed for allowing
him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the time of
his appointment have ceased to exist. PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122)
- During that period all of the assets and liabilities of the Facts:
estate should have been legally ascertained and
D-32
PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate
determined.
Estate of James Burt; filed an administrator’s bond with
- In other words the character and class of the work which
LUZON SURETY as his surety—subsequently dismissed and
devolves upon the executor is of a very different type and
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nature now than at the time of his appointment. replaced by Philippine Trust Co.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an - The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon
amount with the PNB as part of the inventory of the estate long before the present intestate proceedings were
of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for having commenced
- the administrator of the estate moved the court for an
disbursed funds of the estate without authority.
order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the estate's two-
Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the forths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the
administrator’s bond should not be confiscated. crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar
Issue: w/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00.
administrator’s bond? - Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction
Held: Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the over his person
same probate proceeding. - The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be
A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not made "by mere motion by the administrator but by
only in requiring but also in fixing the amount and independent action."
executing or forfeiting the administrator’s bond; execution - Dela Cruz the administrator appealed
or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of
Issue:
the administration proceedings Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided
Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the upon by the Probate Court?
principal, as Picard failed to faithfully execute the orders
and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full force Held: No. It must be decided in a separate action
and effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental over the subject matter herein is beyond debate.
of the accounts of the executor or administrator, privy to
However, acting as a probate court, said court is primarily
the proceedings against his principal.
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate.
With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the
DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886) administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The amount
D-33
Facts: demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the
- Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of
owner of two-fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to
Page
Rosario in Negros Occidental.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
defeat the administrator's case and should be threshed out in a accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no
full trial on the merits. such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos
Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs'
demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing
whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The
administrator, but by an independent action against the third plaintiffs amended their compliant to include the heirs of
person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case gives us a correct the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss which
perspective in the present. The demand is for money due was granted by the court on the ground that the legal
allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the representative, and not the heirs, should have been made
administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for
the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings
the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters should be initiated and the claim filed therein.
affecting property under judicial administration" may not be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the
proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced" complaint?
HELD: NO
QUIRINO v. GOROSPE (169 SCRA 702)
RATIO:
Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are:
AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959) (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
FACTS: sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3)
Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from
compliant for recovery of damages from Hermogenes contract express or implied". None of these includes that
Llemos averring that Hermogenes served them by of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claim
against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise
D-34
registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of
possession, with notice that the same would be submitted from "contract express or implied" which according to
to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 Leung Ben vs. O'Brien include all purely personal
a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs obligations other than those which have their source in
Page
proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila delict or tort.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive presence in the passenger bus.
against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they  Felicidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on
are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or the children liable for the alleged negligence of their
property. The present suit is one for damages under the deceased mother. They said what was proper was to sue
last class. the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last
portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means
that the creditor should institute the proper intestate
MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196) proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose
Facts: his claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
 A passenger bus owned by the Felicidad Balla and driven Important note: there were no intestate proceedings to
by Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and collided settle Felicidad's estate.
head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) owned by Mateo  Felicidad's children filed a MR. The spouses Prades filed
Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from their comment and motion to admit amended complaint
the opposite direction. The bus swerved further to the left together with an amended complaint, amending the title
this time colliding head-on with another passenger bus of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late
owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in
Felicidad Balla and Domingo Casin died on the spot. the original complaint. The court issued an order denying
Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades also died. the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's
 The spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades, the only children then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the
surviving forced heirs of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint denial of the MTD.
against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla for
damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the
a reckless and imprudent manner which was the sole, assailed order.
direct and proximate cause of the incident which resulted Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are
abated by death are:
D-35
to the death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of
deceased Felicidad Balla should be held liable for damages, (1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to drive contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
recklessly and not observing the required diligence in the not due or contingent;
Page
selection and supervision of her employee, despite her (2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
sickness of the decedent; and that is, the executor or administrator of his estate, would still be
(3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v. futile, for the same reason that there appears to be no steps
Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]). taken towards the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of the estate been
Actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the appointed. From the statement made by Felicidad's children that
defendant survive the death of the latter. "many persons die without leaving any asset at all", which
insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to
The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, believe that Felicidad's children will not take any step to expedite
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an executor or the early settlement of the estate, judicially or extrajudicially if
administrator. The rule provides: only to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note however
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought the deceased Balla apparently left the bus).
against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for
the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be Under the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the place of the
to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, deceased. Thus, in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment
from the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to of an executor or administrator of the estate or in case where the
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court
personal, may be commenced against him. may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to
be substituted for the deceased.
The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate
proceedings exist for the reason that her children had not filed PAJARILLO v. IAC (176 SCRA 340)
any proceedings for the settlement of her estate, claiming that
Felicidad Balla left no properties.
BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367)
Thus, while Felicidad's children may have correctly moved for the Facts:
dismissal of the case and the spouses Prades have forthwith Eusebio Capili died before his wife Hermogena Reyes. Eusebio’s
corrected the deficiency by filing an amended complaint, even
D-36
will was admitted to probate wherein he left his properties to his
before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then during the pendency of
reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the the probate proceedings died intestate, thus she was substituted
action under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which by her collateral relatives as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor
Page
allows the suit against the legal representative of the deceased, of Eusebio’s estate.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate

Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with the court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted
will of Eusebio which however was opposed by Hermogena’s said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
relatives. They submitted their own project of partition claiming Provided that interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
that ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio should
be awarded to them as those properties did not belong to Eusebio The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased
but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This was person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to
questioned by Bernardo. He claimed that the properties his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts.
belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is
partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her share of the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among
such partnership. the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.3
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation as void Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated
as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects of estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The
partition. The court ordered the executor to file another project proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each
partition dividing the property of Eusebio according to his will, party is required to bring into the mass whatever community
however noting that such properties were conjugal properties of property he has in his possession.
the deceased spouses.
In this case the matter in controversy is the question of ownership
Issue: Whether or not the probate court had jurisdiction to of certain properties involved – whether they belong to the
determine that the properties belonged to the conjugal conjugal partnerships or to the husband exclusively. This is a
partnership? matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
Held: YES determine the state of the decedent which is to be distributed
The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to among the heirs including of course the widow represented by
title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate her collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself and
proceedings, except when one of the parties prays merely for the who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose
D-37
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which rights may be affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one
case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question belonging to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. It with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested
Page
has also been held that when the parties interested are all heirs of are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
Q: When may an heir sue to recover his share? Q: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to pass upon
A: Where there is an order of the court assigning a particular land questions of ownership of real properties forming part of the
to an heir or devisee or when the time allowed for payment of estate of the deceased?
debts has expired, such or for the damaged done. In other words, A: No. Note the following rulings:
there must first be a partition of the estate and delivery of latter However, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land
to the heir. cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no right
to determine with finality the ownership thereof. (Ortega v CA)
Q: What is the reason behind the above rule? The case was instituted for the purpose of having Yap
A: The reason for this rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran declared owner of the parcel of land in Leyte, asserting her title as
as follows: “An executor or administration who assumes trust, against decedent Ortega himself. The subject matter being
takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu sitting as a probate
purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and court, it was proper that the issue of ownership of a specific
unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the property was raised in a separate ordinary action. (Cuizon case)
heirs and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or
before any residue is known, the heirs or devisees have no cause
of action against the executor or administration for recovery of GUANCO v. NATIONAL BANK (54 Phil 244)
the property left by the deceased.” FACTS:
-Guanco obtained credits from PNB and as security pledged 250
Q: May the heirs attack the validity of a project of partition duly shares of the capital stock of Binalbagan Estate and 6,196 shares
approved by the court? of capital stock of Hinigaran Sugar Plantation.
A: No. The court has stated that where a partition had not only -After Guanco’s death, the administrator of his estate filed a
been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but petition in the intestate proceedings asking that the CFI issue an
distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had been order requiring the manager of the bank to appear in court for
fully carried out and the heirs has received the property assigned examination as regards the shares of the Binalbagan Estae under
to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
validity or any part of the partition (barred further litigation on
D-38
-The Court ordered the manager of the bank to appear but he did
said title and operated to bring the property under the control not, instead the attorney of the bank filed an answer and it was
and supervision of the court for proper distribution in accordance asserted that the pledge of shares was still in force as security for
to the tenor of the partition). The parties cannot attack the the debts of Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
Page
partition collaterally.
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
-Thereupon, the Court in the same proceedings and without any

trial, ordered the manager of the bank to deliver the said shares ALAFRIZ v. MINA (28 Phil 137)
to the administrator of the estate within 30 days from notice of Facts: Gregorion Navarro died. Upon a petition presented for that
the order. purpose, Prospero Alafriz was appointed as administrator of the
estate. After qualifying as administrator, he presented a motion in
ISSUE: the CFI alleging that Pia Mina had in her possession a certain
-W/N the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery document or paper or receipt for certain jewelry deposited by
of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding under section Gregorio Navarro before his death as security for a loan. The court
709 of the Code of Civil Procedure. issued a n order citing Pia Mina to appear in court and to deliver
to the clerk of the court the paper or document mentioned. Mina
HELD: presented her exception to the order alleging that she and her
-YES. Section 709 only provides a proceeding for examining mother were the real owners of the jewelry pawned. After the
persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed document was delivered to the clerk, the court directed the clerk
away property of the deceased or withholds information of to redeem the said jewelry and to keep it deposited in his office
documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the until the final settlement of the estate. Mina presented a motion
deceased to such property or to disclose the possession of his last asking that the jewelry be excluded from the inventory presented
will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit by Alafriz.
evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court
to enforce delivery of possession, recourse must be had to any Issue: Whether or not the court can order Mina to appear in
ordinary action. court.
-The bank maintains that the pledge is still in force. It may have Whether or not the jewels can be included in the inventory.
documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third Held: Yes. Section 709 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
party, on the strength of a citation under section 709. The provides that the court may cite a suspected person to appear
possession of the certificates of the shares in question is a part of before it, and may examine him on oath on the matter of the
that evidence and it is obvious that if they are surrendered to the complaint. However, the lower court also ordered the
administrator of the estate and possibly disposed of by him, the administrator to pay to the clerk the sum of P160, with which to
D-39
bank will lose its hold on the shares as a pledge. The bank, hence, redeem the jewel. This was done without permitting Mina to be
is entitled to its day in court, and its rights can only be determined heard upon the question of her alleged ownership. Nothing in
in a corresponding action. Section 709 justifies the second order for it does not authorize the
Page
court to take possession of the property, if any should be found in
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
the possession of the defendant or of the person cited. In the - In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the
present case, Mina was entitled to retain possession of the pawn administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting
ticket, until the question of ownership of the jewels should be therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements
determined in the proper way. The court had no right to deprive thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers
her of her evidence relating to the property until the question of above mentioned.
ownership had been settled. - The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land
considering that without it the estate would be insolvent,
Yes, the jewels can be included. Placing them in the but later on reversed
inventory does not in any way deprive Mina of her property - Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by
therein. She is entitled to be heard upon the question of her Ankrom of the equity of redemption of the latter in the
ownership, when that question is properly presented to the court. tract of land above mentioned was affected in fraud of
It in no way prejudices the rights of Mina in her property. creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to
retain the possession of this tract of land and thereby
place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the
HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75) burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to
Facts: maintain the rights of the transferee under said
- One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included assignment.
in the estate a tract of land worth P60,000 Issue: w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is
- Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the the remedy of the creditors?
estate of Ankrom for about P70,000, which was allowed Held: yes
- Later on the respondent administrator discovers that Ratio:
Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in - The precise remedy open to the appellants in the
question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in
secure that company from liability on a note in the amount section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had made follows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands
itself contigently liable; Two days after this mortgage had of an executor or administrator to pay debts and
been executed Ankrom appears to have made an expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-
D-40
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal
one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the
consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by
Page
valuable considerations. license of the court, if the executor or administrator has
3D (2008-2009)
RULES 78 to 87
not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to

final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and
may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or
personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such
action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in
court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the
judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
administrator against the costs of such action. Such
creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so
recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses
as the court deems equitable.
- The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify
the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to set
aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to
have been made in fraud of creditors.
VELASQUEZ v. GEORGE (125 SCRA 456)
D-41
Page
3D (2008-2009)

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

Issue: Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with

BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367) Held: NO

determination in a separate action. It has also been held that

will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace

- Both proceedings in LINNIE’s and CHARLES’ estates

Whatever law might be applicable — the intestate of

DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745) Issue:

If it be not proven conclusively that the property claimed by

Facts:  As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave

Doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention: rather than

Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared

Issue: of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in

HELD: NO, probate court incorrect in dismissing petition.

had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and

Issues: [2.]No. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the

not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any

RULE 77 Acts 1882, c.84 as found in an annotation of the West Virginia

RULES 78 to 87 handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or

No Teran is not liable.

The heirs of Maria, Telesfor and Ceasaria opposed the order

to be administered in the nature of assets, liable for his

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the

-He filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario PACHECO and

necessary. Sec 643 of the aforesaid code in providing for the

LC ruled that the allegations in the motion of the oppositor widow

 In the second place, the order was issued without notice

administration nor can he borrow money without authority of the

the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate

-Thereupon, the Court in the same proceedings and without any

not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to

VELASQUEZ v. GEORGE (125 SCRA 456)

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