Professional Documents
Culture Documents
5
c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
RICHARD E. PALMER
Department of Philosophy, MacMurray College, Jacksonville, IL 62650, USA
Abstract. Husserl received from Martin Heidegger a copy of his Kant and the Problem
of Metaphysics in the summer of 1929 not long before Husserl had determined to reread
Heidegger’s writings in order to arrive at a definitive position on Heidegger’s philosophy. With
this in view, Husserl reread and made extensive marginal comments in Being and Time and
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This essay by the translator of the remarks in KPM
offers some historical background and comment on the importance of the remarks in KPM and
attempts to describe Husserl’s counterposition to Heidegger on six issues that divided the two
major twentieth century philosophers.
Part of this article will appear in the author’s translation (in Edmund Husserl Collect-
ed Works), Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with
Heidegger, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.
6 RICHARD E. PALMER
Spileers and introduced by Roland Breeur, both on the staff of the Archives
– from which the French translation was made was published in Husserl
Studies.2 Now these marginal remarks have been translated into English by
Thomas F. Sheehan (those in SZ) and myself (those in KPM).3 The English
translation places the relevant sentence or sentences in the Heideggerian
text alongside Husserl’s remark, which the Husserl Studies publication of
them simply indicated by giving the page and line number in the Heidegger
text where the remark appeared. The present essay was originally written to
serve as an introduction to its author’s translation of Husserl’s remarks in
KPM to be published in a volume titled Psychological and Transcendental
Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, but essay grew far too
long for a subsidiary introduction in that volume. By Husserl Archive orders
the introduction had to be cut to ten manuscript pages plus notes, about one-
fourth of its original length. Man and World, however, has arranged to offer its
readers the original introduction here as a more fully annotated prolegomenon
to Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM.
Admittedly, Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM do not reflect the same
intense effort to penetrate Heidegger’s thought that one finds in his marginal
notes in SZ.4 In terms of length, Husserl’s comments in the German text as
published in Husserl Studies occupy only one-third the number of pages.5 In
addition, pages 1–5, 43–121, and 125–167 contain no reading marks or notes
by Husserl at all – over half of the 236 pages of KPM. This suggests that
Husserl either read these pages with no intention of returning to the text, or
that he skipped large parts of the middle of the text altogether.6
Nevertheless, we will in the first major part of the present essay attempt to
show that Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM are of continuing importance
for several reasons. First, many of Husserl’s notations respond substantively
and at length to Heidegger’s text and dispute his statements, articulating a clear
counterposition to that of Heidegger on many points. Second, they are impor-
tant because of the place in which they appear, for the content of KPM was to
have served as a further part of SZ, but shortly after publishing it Heidegger
abandoned altogether the project of a “fundamental ontology,”7 although he
did not abandon the quest for the “meaning of Being.” Published on the heels
of his famous “Davos Lectures” with Ernst Cassirer, KPM represents at least
a certain closure in Heidegger’s public dialogue with NeoKantianism, and
by extension also in relation to the NeoKantian tendencies in Husserl’s phe-
nomenology after the Logical Investigations. Third, the remarks in KPM are
important because Kant is a key figure for both Husserl and Heidegger. This
essay cannot do justice to an elaboration of the two relationships to Kant,
but it will offer some remarks on it and refer the reader to primary and sec-
ondary sources in which the two relationships are explored.8 Fourth, KPM is
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 7
important as an example – indeed, a prime example – of Heidegger’s method
of Destruktion or “deconstruction.” In KPM Heidegger is “deconstructing”
Kant’s First Critique. This raises in Husserl’s mind (and in a few others’ also)
the issue of violence in text interpretation. Unfolding these four dimensions
of significance will provide the organizational structure of part one.
The second major part of the present essay will sort out several points of
Husserl’s counterposition in the margins of KPM. Six themes in the “debate”
will be discussed. Readers who wish to do so may skip the first part and
read only part two. But readers who wish an annotated discussion of the
importance of the marginalia that goes into the historical and philosophical
background may find part one of interest. Prefacing both discussions we offer
some notes on when the texts in question were written.
Heidegger probably gave KPM to Husserl shortly after its publication in late
June or early July of 1929. No exact date is included with the inscription, “Mit
herzlichem Gruß. M. Heidegger” [“With heartfelt greetings. M. Heidegger”],
but in a letter from Karl Jaspers to Heidegger dated July 14, Jaspers thanks
him for sending the Kant book and also acknowledges receiving his rather
flowery encomium of April 8, celebrating Husserl’s 70th birthday.9 About the
speech Jaspers remarks that he has a few “impertinent questions,” presumably
about the sincerity of Heidegger’s lavish praise of Husserl.10 In any case, since
we know Jaspers received his copy of KPM during the week or so before July
14, we can assume that Husserl also received his copy about the same time –
i.e., middle to late June or early July, 1929.11
It cannot be known with any certainty when Husserl wrote his marginal
remarks in KPM. However, Husserl states in his letter to Pfänder of January 6,
1931, that he decided he must in 1929 arrive at “a sober and definitive position
on Heideggerian philosophy,” so when he finished readying his Formal and
Transcendental Logic for publication that year, he devoted two months of
his summer vacation “to the study of Being and Time as well as the recent
writings.”12 It would seem reasonable to assume that the “recent writings”
to which Husserl refers in this letter would have included KPM, that had
appeared just a month or so before, and also Heidegger’s essay, “Vom Wesen
des Grundes,” which was included in the Festschrift Heidegger presented to
Husserl on April 8, earlier that year, celebrating his 70th birthday. On the
other hand, Heidegger’s inaugural address in Freiburg, published as Was ist
Metaphysik?, was given on July 29, and not published until December 1929,
so it was probably not among the “recent writings” to which Husserl refers.13
In any case, Was ist Metaphysik?, the topic Heidegger chose for his inaugural
address, had absolutely nothing to do with Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed,
Heidegger’s choice of subject was a glaring insult to Husserl.14
8 RICHARD E. PALMER
Towards the end of this same preface, Heidegger states: “The Kant book
remains an introduction . . . to the further questionability which persists
concerning the question of Being as set forth in Being and Time.” Then, in
a gesture characteristic of the later Heidegger, he adds toward the end of the
preface, “The growing and unacknowledged anxiety in the face of thinking
no longer allows insight into the forgetfulness of Being which determines the
age.”20 So it is quite clear that KPM was to have been a continuation of the
project of SZ.
There are other links of KPM to SZ. The substance of the Kant book
took shape just after SZ was published – in the semester lecture course
during the winter of 1927–1928. Heidegger’s statement of the “theme” of
the investigation both in the table of contents and on the opening page of
the text: “The Unfolding of the Idea of a Fundamental Ontology through
the Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a Laying of the Ground
for Metaphysics” explicitly links it with SZ because the goal of KPM, like
that of SZ, was a fundamental ontology.21 Yet Heidegger chose not to wait
and make this highly original and controversial interpretation of Kant part of
his projected continuation of SZ; rather, right after the Davos lectures, and
perhaps even because of them,22 to publish it immediately as a separate work.
KPM basically marks his last major effort in the whole general approach to
the “meaning of Being” that was undertaken in SZ. A comment written by
Heidegger in his own copy of KPM during the 1930s reads: “Ganz rückfällig
in die transzendentale Fragestellung” – “[This] falls back completely into the
transcendental standpoint.”23 Heidegger was about to desert even his own
effort to come to terms with transcendental philosophy. Historically, then,
KPM marks a certain point of closure in the project of SZ – at least in the
form in which it pursued the question of Being in that volume.24
KPM is important, however, not just because it constitutes a continuation of
SZ, and indeed marks the virtual closure of that project, but also because KPM
focuses on Kant. This is our next major point. Both Husserl and Heidegger
relate importantly to Kant, so a contrast of their relationship to Kant sheds
light on the Husserl-Heidegger relationship and its breakdown. An exhaustive
10 RICHARD E. PALMER
and detailed study of Husserl’s relation to Kant is offered in Iso Kern’s lengthy
study, Husserl und Kant.25 Given this study, we will only make a few general
observations. First, for Husserl, it was Descartes rather than Kant who was
the truly revolutionary figure in modern philosophy. Kant failed to live up
to the promise of his philosophy, and it is precisely the failures of Kant
that Husserl seeks to remedy with his phenomenology. Thus, even Husserl’s
rapprochement with the NeoKantians in his middle period remains basically
a tactical effort to interest them in phenomenology. In the Krisis, however,
Husserl is quite frank about the shortcomings of Kant.
Heidegger’s evolving grasp of Kant is also relevant in this connection
because KPM represents an effort by Heidegger to come to terms with Kantian
philosophy. This complex story cannot be adequately rehearsed here, but we
will discuss a few major factors and refer the reader to some key sources. The
posthumously published lectures of Heidegger during the Marburg period (to
be discussed subsequently) and books by Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren,
and others now give us a far full picture of Heidegger’s relation to Kant. Also,
in his preface to the fourth edition of KPM Heidegger himself refers us to the
detailed article by Hansgeorg Hoppe on his evolving relation to Kant.26
While Husserl viewed his phenomenology as going beyond both Kantian
and NeoKantian philosophy, indeed as a “breakthrough,” Heidegger saw
Husserl’s philosophy, especially after Ideas I (1913) as falling back into
NeoKantianism. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, for its part, is an excel-
lent illustration of his interpretive violence and Destruktion (deconstruction).
For Heidegger, Kant represents a position in the history of the Western meta-
physics that he is trying to dismantle and reconstruct – or “deconstruct” – in
developing his own project of a fundamental ontology. In keeping with this
strategy, Heidegger here carefully goes inside the Kantian text and analyzes
the inner workings of the schematism. At the Davos debate with Cassir-
er which just preceded his publication of KPM, he went so minutely into
Kant that Cassirer professed not to understand where Heidegger diverged
from NeoKantianism. Cassirer asserted there: “I have found a neo-Kantian
here in Heidegger!”27 Cassirer then asked Heidegger: “Who are the Neo-
Kantians?”28 Heidegger, after listing a number of obvious names, explicit-
ly said: “In a certain sense, Husserl himself fell into the clutches of neo-
Kantianism between 1900 and 1910.”29 This shows that Heidegger’s effort to
take a definitive position on Kant within the horizon of his own ontological
philosophy is also taking a position on Husserl’s perceived NeoKantianism.
It is of interest that at the end of his Kant lectures (in GA 25 but not in
KPM itself in GA 3), Heidegger asserts that his study of Kant “had confirmed
for him the correctness of the path he had chosen” – the way of grasping
phenomenology hermeneutically and preliminarily arriving at an ontological
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 11
conceptuality through “formal indications” of the lifeworld.30 Otto Pöggeler
reminds us that Husserl also played a role in Heidegger’s relation to Kant.
“The formally indicating [formal anzeigende] hermeneutic,” says Pöggeler,
“could become a schematization because Husserl had stimulated Heideg-
ger to a temporal interpretation of the component moments of the Kantian
‘power of the imagination’ and thus directed him to Kant’s doctrine of the
schematism.”31 So, against his previous plans, Heidegger in his 1925–1926
lectures on logic, “went into Kant and showed how the three Ekstasen of time
are related to the schemata.”32
Yet in spite of his debts to Kant, Heidegger was also critical of him, but
in a distinctive way. In keeping with his method of Destruktion, he argued
in KPM that Kant himself wanted to overcome the metaphysics of idealism
but did not have the means, the conceptual tools – die Mittel. Which is to
say, he did not have a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” In ontological terms,
Kant did not explore the Being of Being [das Sein des Seins] but only the
being of existent beings [das Sein des Seienden]; this “fundamental ontology”
had to wait for SZ. Heidegger’s later public account of why he deserted
Husserl’s phenomenology involved Kant, also. He stated: “Phenomenology
in the Husserlian sense was developed into a position prescribed by Descartes,
Kant, and Fichte.”33 That is to say, it became a transcendental and idealist
philosophy that took human subjectivity as its starting point and sought to
uncover the intentional structure of the transcendental ego.
But already in SZ Heidegger had been attempting to avoid the traditional
language of subjectivity and consciousness which had led Husserl to take
a form of transcendental psychology as the propaedeutic to transcendental
phenomenology. Even the Husserlian slogan, “Zur Sachen selbst!” – which
Heidegger reinterpreted in SZ – still entailed, in Heidegger’s view of Husserl,
that things themselves were objects of consciousness and thus Husserl retreat-
ed to the standpoint of Kantian idealism.34 Instead of using such terms as
consciousness and transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger employed an onto-
logical terminology centered on the being of Dasein human being-there] and
its finite, temporal, caring, future-oriented being-in-the-world. Like Husserl,
Heidegger returned to the unobtrusive life-world, but this is an ontologically
defined life-world. And it is in terms of the ontological project in SZ that Hei-
degger interpreted Kant with a deconstructive violence that drew widespread
protest.35
Today, with the posthumous publication of Heidegger’s early lectures from
the Marburg period in the Gesamtausgabe, it becomes possible to gain a more
nuanced picture of Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung not only with Kant but
also with Husserl in the Marburg years.36 Franco Volpi, in an extensive and
illuminating article on this latter topic, finds in these early Marburg lectures a
12 RICHARD E. PALMER
Like intentionality, categorial intuition and the apriori – the two other great
“discoveries” and anchors of Husserlian phenomenology – have also been
“covered over,” Heidegger argues, with traditional concepts and need to be
liberated. “Categorial acts,” he argues in these lectures, “constitute a new
objectivity, which is always to be understood intentionally and certainly does
not mean that you just somehow let things arise.”43 That is to say: “to constitute
does not mean constructing as making and getting ready but the entity allowing
itself to be seen in its being as an object.”44 Volpi shows Heidegger in the
Marburg years working through and transforming Husserlian insights and
terminology but always with a show of respect, treating Husserl as a classical
philosophical thinker to whom he is deeply indebted.
In his discussion of “the apriori” in the 1925 Marburg lectures, Heidegger
again formally maintains the Husserlian and Kantian term while transforming
its context and its meaning. He discusses “the threefold presentation of the
apriori” in a phenomenological context in terms of the following dimensions:
First, its universal breadth and indifference over against subjectivity, sec-
ond, the access to it (simple grasp, originary intuition), and third, the
preparatory determination of the structure of the apriori as a character
of the being of beings and not of beings themselves – discloses to us the
originary meaning of the apriori, and this is of essential significance, that
it in part depends on the clear grasp of ideation, i.e., on the discovery of
the authentic sense of intentionality. (GA 20: 102–103)
But is this the right way to pose the question philosophically? Isn’t here
an entity already presupposed whereby the presupposed Being already
presupposes subjectivity? Is not man himself already pre-given, etc.? . . .
This is already Heidegger (39, e.a.)
As Husserl sees it, Heidegger is really arguing in a circle, relying on his own
presuppositions. One does not need to posit infinite knowledge to understand
and describe perception phenomenologically, nor does one need traditional
ontology; and human existence does not require an “ontological synthesis”
to enable it to take place. It may seem to Husserl, who elsewhere reproaches
Heidegger and Scheler with anthropologizing, that a certain anthropologizing
lurks behind the reference to something that Dasein requires “in order to exist
as Dasein.”
The fourth issue has to do with the nature of the transcendental self: How
is the transcendental self to be conceived? Here we should go back to Hei-
degger’s objection in SZ that Kant failed to grasp the transcendental ego as a
factical, essentially temporal existing entity; rather, while it was not thought
of as substance, it was described in substance-based terms as something
vorhanden [on hand], and as an abiding, unchanging entity. In this regard,
Kant made the same mistake as Descartes, who did not think the “I am” in
an originary way but rather with the tradition of the metaphysics of presence.
Thus, according to Heidegger, both Descartes and Kant failed to think the
temporality of the self in an originary way. In Husserl, however, the transcen-
dental ego becomes not just the center of the self but the ultimate anchor for
his phenomenology. Heidegger recognized that Husserl had already taken a
step beyond such a Kantian transcendental ego in his 1907 lectures on inter-
20 RICHARD E. PALMER
and asks in the margin: “What does ‘original essence’ mean?” He wants to
know how one could know what the “original” nature of time was. When
Heidegger asserts that “it is contradictory to want to determine the essence of
what time itself is originally with the help of a product derived from it” (187),
Husserl writes in the margin, “The origin of time is not original time.” Is
this a critical rephrasing of Heidegger’s point or a counterassertion? It seems
more like the latter. The following sentence of Heidegger asserts, “Because
the self in its innermost essence is time itself, the ego cannot be conceived as
something temporal, that is to say, within time” (187), so one is wont to ask
for the difference between innermost essence and original essence. Next to
this sentence Husserl seems to be offering his alternative formulation when
he writes, “The immanent life of the ego as, rather, originally temporalizing.”
Earlier in the margins, Husserl had remarked that for Kant, on anthropological
grounds, everything whatsoever is within time. Still, Husserl, as he writes
that “an immanent temporal horizon is necessary,” seems to be agreeing
with Heidegger. What Husserl seems to be saying here is that of course
time is a component of the transcendental ego; what bothers Husserl is all
this talk about what time is primordially. The question of the “primordial
essence” of time seems unnecessary to him. Why is it so important here, he
wonders. Heidegger seems to answer this question in the next section when
he asserts that “primordial time makes possible the transcendental power of
the imagination” (188, e.a.), but Husserl underlines “makes possible” and
asks in the margin: “What does this ‘makes possible’ [ermöglich] mean?”
Perhaps Heidegger is using it in a Kantian transcendental sense as being that
which makes something possible. In any case, for Husserl, Heidegger is not
describing the experience of time phenomenologically, or even accounting for
it philosophically, but rather doing metaphysics right along with Kant. Yes, of
course there is an immanent temporal horizon for transcendental subjectivity,
but that does not make the transcendental ego “time itself”! Whether time
makes possible the transcendental power of the imagination would seem to
depend on what “makes possible” means. If Heidegger only means that it is
the “condition for the possibility” of the transcendental imagination, yes. But
Heidegger seems here to be claiming more than this. He seems to be making
claims about the metaphysical nature of Dasein. This brings us to the question
of the nature of man: anthropology, a topic we have reserved for the sixth and
final question.
The fifth question raises the issue of Heidegger’s interpretive method: Is
Heidegger’s interpretive violence justified in relation to this text of Kant?
Responding to strong objections, Heidegger in 1950 still defends his inter-
pretive violence in the forward to the second edition of KPM, which he
explains he is republishing unchanged. He acknowledges that readers have
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 23
“constantly taken offense at the violence of my interpretations,” but he argues
that such violence is unavoidable “in a thinking conversation between think-
ers” (all citations of the preface are from GA 3: xvii). A “thinking dialogue”
[Zwiesprache], he says there, must operate “under quite different rules than
those governing historical philology.” After all, philology has a different task,
and in the adventurousness of a thinking dialogue, “the risks of going astray
are greater, and the errors are more common.” Of course, between 1929 and
1950 a lot had happened in terms of mistakes and going astray, perhaps more
blatantly on his political path than on the forest paths of his adventurous
thinking. Philosophically, his thought had taken a “turn,” a turn away from
metaphysics, and he seemingly scrapped his whole project of a “fundamen-
tal ontology” that was begun in SZ and continued in KPM as having “gone
astray.” This assertion applies specifically to KPM is clear from his statement
in that preface: “The errors and going astray have in the meantime become
so clear to me that I refuse to make this writing into some kind of patchwork
by supplements, appendixes, and postscripts.” This writing was not like a
scientific or even philosophical treatise that could be added to and patched
here and there. By then, KPM was more an historic record of his thought than
a foundation to build on. His concluding sentence in the second preface is
very Heideggerian: “Thinkers learn from their errors to be more persevering.”
Yes, thinking is a risky business, and Heidegger more than others came to
know this.
But Heidegger did not wait until 1950 to defend his interpretive violence.
Already in Division Three of the Kantbook Heidegger offered a pragmatic
justification of interpretive violence: “Certainly every interpretation, if it
wants to wring from what the words say what they want to say, must use
violence. Such violence, however, cannot simply be a roving arbitrariness. The
power of an idea that sheds advance light must drive and lead the explication”
(KPM 193–194).51 Next to this assertion Husserl underlines the words “every
interpretation must use violence” and in the margin he puts three exclamation
points followed by three question marks. This is very rare among his markings.
Clearly Husserl is astonished that Heidegger would make such a provocative
statement. We may note that Heidegger himself hastens to qualify it in the
next sentence, cited above. Husserl comments in the margin, “I differentiate
between what they [the words] wanted to say and what they ultimately aimed
at and wanted to say as they were said” (193). But this falls far short of
Heidegger’s requirements. Heidegger feels that in KPM, the light that his
ontologizing interpretation sheds on the fundamental ontology of SZ justifies
his interpretive violence. Needless to say, “wringing” from a text what it
really wanted to say but could not do so because it was constrained by the
thought-forms of the time is more than a little risky. The idea that a text
24 RICHARD E. PALMER
can “want to say” [in French, vouloir dire is translated as “means,” a usage
possibly on the side of Heidegger] something but be “constrained” by the
thought-forms of the time, such that it has to wait more than a century in
order to be understood in the context of an existential ontology of Dasein
must have seemed strange to Husserl. Still such a view would seem to find
support in the Habermasian concept of a speaking that is distorted by a “false
consciousness,” or even such Freudian concepts of censorship and repression.
In this case, interpretation becomes a bit like psychoanalysis, a discovering
not of what the patient intended consciously to say but repressed; rather it
ferrets out what the text unconsciously wanted to say. But as Heidegger points
out, the thinking dialogue between thinkers is a risky business. And it gets
more risky when one is willing to use interpretive violence.
The larger issue is Heidegger’s whole project of Destruktion, of finding
what has been “covered over,” of saying what a thinker admittedly did not say
but might have said if only he or she lived two hundred years or twenty-five
hundred years later. It is hard enough to grasp what a thinker did say, or what
he or she intended to say, but to grasp what a thinker did not say and could not
say because of the thought-forms of the times – but was “on the way” towards
saying – certainly requires the extraordinary art of “a thoughtful conversation
between thinkers.” And, as Heidegger rightly says, in this risky business
of thinking one can go astray and make mistakes. Still, if it sheds light on
the forgotten question of the meaning of Being, he holds, such thinking is
justified. Husserl can only be shocked at such leaps of thought.
The sixth issue concerns Heidegger’s reference to philosophical anthropol-
ogy and his characterization of “finite” Dasein as possessing a preconcep-
tual understanding of the “being of beings.” Philosophical anthropology is
a bone of contention between Heidegger and Husserl and the issue is com-
plicated by Heidegger’s close friend Scheler’s advocacy of a philosophical
anthropology.52 Without this, one has the impression Heidegger might have
taken a different position in relation to it. Heidegger’s discussion of philo-
sophical anthropology occurs in the fourth and final division of KPM, and it
provokes a major response from Husserl. About half of Husserl’s comments,
in terms of total number of words, occur in Part Four, although it occupies
only the last forty pages of the volume (pp. 296–336). In these pages, Hei-
degger, having “retrieved” in Part Three the ontological synthesis implied in
the transcendental imagination, now turns to Kant’s assertion that the first
three of his famous four questions – What can I know? What ought I do?
What may I hope? What is man? – are summed up in the fourth. For Hei-
degger, “What is man?” raises the issue of a philosophical anthropology and
whether a philosophical anthropology can be the foundation of metaphysics,
or whether metaphysics should serve as the foundation of anthropology. In
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 25
briefest terms, for Heidegger the answer is no, if the anthropology is an
empirical anthropology of the usual sort. What is needed is a thinking that is
rooted in the finitude of Dasein and its comprehension of the being of beings.
But perhaps this is a kind of philosophical anthropology? To explore this
line of thought, Heidegger’s three sections of Part Four are devoted first to
the question of whether and in what way, in his retrieve of the problematic
of Kant, metaphysics could be grounded in man; second, the significance of
the finitude of man in relation to the metaphysics of Dasein; and third, “the
metaphysics of Dasein as fundamental ontology.” To understand Heidegger’s
argument, we will need to go into section 37, “The Idea of a Philosophical
Anthropology.”
In section 37, Heidegger basically follows Husserl in rejecting an empirical
anthropology in favor of a transcendental position. Still, some of his analysis
further confirms Husserl’s suspicion, long held, that Heidegger and Scheler
do not really understand the transcendental reduction. For instance, when
Heidegger says that anthropology “describes a fundamental tendency of man’s
contemporary position with respect to himself and the totality of beings”
(KPM 199), Husserl underlines these words and writes in the margin: “In
other words, it is the prejudgment of Scheler, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the
whole anthropological Richtung [direction, line of thought].” But Heidegger
himself later acknowledges that “perhaps there is a difficulty in the very
concept itself” (201). Husserl again underlines these words and puts NB in
the margin. Husserl seems to be noting that even Heidegger recognizes the
problems in this concept. When Heidegger goes on to assert, “If the goal of
philosophy lies in the working out of a world-view, then an anthropology
will have to delimit the ‘place of man in the cosmos ’ ” (the title of a well-
known book by Scheler), Husserl writes scornfully in the margin above it,
“The goal of philosophy as the working out of a worldview.” What Husserl is
implying is that is the sort of philosophy one can expect within the horizon
of a philosophical anthropology.
Of course, Husserl knows very well that neither he nor Heidegger wants to
be lured into the perspectivism of a philosophy interpreted simply as a quest
for a worldview. Heidegger goes on to observe that now and again the temp-
tations of an anthropology do attract philosophers, and after all Kant himself
found all his questions leading back to the fundamental question, “What is
man?” Thus, when Heidegger asks (and Husserl underlines the words here
italicized) the following question, “If anthropology in a certain sense gathers
into itself all the central questions of philosophy, why do these allow us to
follow them back to the question of what man is?” (203), Husserl asserts in the
margin: “It is just this that is not correct.” But in the end, Heidegger cannot
base his thought on an anthropology. He himself concludes that the “indeter-
26 RICHARD E. PALMER
It is therefore not surprising that, when Heidegger says, “We understand Being
but as yet we lack the concept,” Husserl exclaims, “We lack it? When would
we need it?”
We conclude our review of six topics in Husserl’s marginal remarks, and
our remarks, with a glance at two of the last three comments he makes in
the book – this time very short ones. First, next to Heidegger’s sentence, “If
the essence of transcendence is grounded in the imagination, then the very
idea of a ‘transcendental logic’ is a nonconcept” (233, e.a. to indicate words
Husserl’s underlined), Husserl simply puts a “?” Of course, he had just finished
preparing his Formal and Transcendental Logic for publication shortly before
turning to this reading of KPM, so he is presumably unimpressed with the
idea that a transcendental logic is a “nonconcept.”
Finally, to Heidegger’s question, “ – or is there not within our own endeavors
. . . also in the end a hidden sidestepping of something which we – and not
accidentally – no longer see?” (235, e.a.), Husserl simply answers “Yes.”
But this is a “yes” pregnant with meaning – and finality. The sidestepping
Heidegger alludes to here is not what Husserl has in mind when he writes
his final “Yes.” And Husserl’s “yes” closes the door on a relationship initially
filled with hope and promise but doomed to end in disappointment and despair.
Acknowledgement
Notes
1. The book that contains the French translation of the marginal remarks in [Sein und Zeit]
and [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik] – Edmund Husserl, Notes sur Heidegger
(Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1993) – also offers translations of the three earlier drafts of
the Britannica article and an interpretive essay by Denise Souche-Dagues, “La lecture
husserlienne de Sein und Zeit,” pp. 119–152.
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 29
2. See “Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik” in Husserl Studies 11, 1–2 (1994): pp. 3–63.
3. Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confronta-
tion with Heidegger: The Encyclopedia Britannica Article, The Amsterdam Lectures,
“Phenomenology and Anthropology,” and Husserl’s Marginal Notes in Being and Time
and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated and introduced by Thomas F. Sheehan
and Richard E. Palmer. “Husserl in English” series. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press,
1997.
4. For discussion of Husserl’s remarks in SZ see Sheehan’s introduction in the work just
cited.
5. As presented in Husserl Studies (see note 2 above) Husserl’s marginal remarks on SZ
occupy pages 9–48, while the marginalia in KPM take up only pages 49–63.
6. Roland Beeur’s “Einleitung” for the “Randbemerkungen” as they are presented in Husserl
Studies cited above, pp. 3–8, notes that we have no way of knowing whether Husserl ever
read these other parts of the text. Breeur helpfully divides Husserl’s remarks in SZ and
KPM into three categories: the first of these is basically index words to tag the content of
a passage for future reference. He notes that there are very few notes of this type in KPM
but quite a few in SZ, suggesting that Husserl read SZ much more analytically than KPM.
Page references in this introduction will be to the original edition, since that is the edition
in which the remarks appear. My translation of the marginal notes gives the corresponding
pages in GA 3 and in the recent English translation by Richard Taft.
7. Ironically, Heidegger states in the preface to its fourth edition (1973) that he undertook
KPM precisely because by 1929 he saw that the Being-question as put forward in SZ
was misunderstood. Later in the same preface he says that the Being-question was also
misunderstood as it appeared in KPM, so he abandoned the project of a reinterpretation of
traditional metaphysics as a means profiling the question of Being.
8. A detailed tracing of Heidegger’s changing relation to and interpretation of Kant can be
found in Hansgeorg Hoppe, “Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffasung Heideggers,” pp. 284–
317 in Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. V. Klostermann. Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1970.
9. This speech has some substance and anticipates the later Rektoratsrede. A penetrating
analysis of Heidegger’s “ethics” in this speech – and ethics in Heidegger in general – may
be found in Christoph von Wolzogen’s “Die eigentliche metaphysische St örung: Zu den
Quellen der Ethik bei Heidegger und Levinas,” in Zur Grundlegung einer integrativen
Ethik: Für Hans Krämer, ed. Martin Endreß (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1995),
pp. 130–154, esp. 137–138. For Heidegger’s speech itself see his “Edmund Husserl zum
70. Geburtstag,” Akademische Mitteilungen, die Organ gesamten Interessen der Studen-
tenschaft an der Albert Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Br., 4th volume, 9th Semester,
Nr. 3 (14 May, 1929), p. 47.
10. Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel: 1920–1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans
Saner (Frankfurt: Klostermann/Zürich: Piper, 1990), letter of July 14, 1929. Editors Biemel
and Saner suggest that Jaspers, because of his strong anti-scientific understanding of
philosophy, would have strongly disagreed with Heidegger’s praise of Husserl. Private,
disparaging remarks about Husserl on both sides occur in their correspondence during this
period.
11. Professor Gadamer referred me to a lengthy unpublished letter from Heidegger to Hannah
Arendt, dating from before this final period, in which Heidegger expresses to her at length
his excitement as he works on the Critique of Pure Reason. This would be an important
document in future research on this topic. The translator did not have access to this letter,
and could not verify its present existence.
12. See Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, vol. 2: Die Münchener Phänomenologen (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1994). This volume is part of a scrupulously edited magnificent edition of Husserl’s
voluminous correspondence: Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel. 10 volumes. Edited by Karl
Schumann in cooperation with Elisabeth Schumann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993–1994). A
30 RICHARD E. PALMER
translation of this letter appears in the appendix of our volume containing the English
translations of the marginalia.
13. Sheehan states in note 44 of his introduction to Edmund Husserl, Psychological and
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, cited in note 3
above, that in any case there are only two “insignificant” marginal notations in Was ist
Metaphysik?
14. Karl Schuhmann notes this in his extensive essay on the Husserl-Heidegger relationship,
“Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gespräch über Husserl,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
32 (1978): 602, article 591–612. See especially section 3: “Die Entwicklung der Differen-
zen bis 1931,” pp. 595–603. It was shortly after hearing this inaugural lecture that Husserl
undertook to come to a definitive position on Heideggerian philosophy. Cf. his letters to
Ingarden (2.12.29) and Misch (8.3.29).
15. In a letter dated December 2, 1929, from Malvine Husserl to Roman Ingarden, Malvine
wrote that “in our summer vacation on Lake Como, he carefully worked through Heideg-
ger’s book [SZ ].” Briefwechsel, vol. 3. Also, Boyce Gibson in a letter dated September
10 of that year, refers to several weeks “am Comersee (Tremezzo)” from mid-August
to early September (Briefwechsel, vol. 6), and we know that Husserl’s stay at Tremezzo
ended about September 5. The availability of Husserl’s voluminous correspondence makes
the process of dating events in Husserl’s life much easier and also makes available many
more of Husserl’s later comments on Heidegger. For a lively collection of these sometimes
frank and salty comments in Husserl’s correspondence, see the “Einleitung” to the German
publication of the marginalia in Husserl Studies.
16. Davos is not a famous university but rather an international health spa and sport center
in the Swiss Alps. A Swiss doctor, Peter Müller, arranged and sponsored this special
“Hochschule” lecture course. The Davos Lectures were a series of seven lectures given at
Davos, four by Cassirer and three by Heidegger, plus questions and answers each addressed
to the other.
17. A summary of the lectures and a transcript of the important disputation between Heidegger
and Cassirer, derived from notes taken at the time, appears as an appendix in the 4th edition
of KPM (1973) and this is included in its English translation by Richard Taft, Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp.
169–185. These and also other relevant documents are contained in a 68 page appendix
in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991). They
include: “Aufzeichnungen zum Kantbuch,” pp. 249–255; Heidegger’s review of the second
volume of Cassirer’s three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Cassirer also reviewed
KPM in Kant Studien 1931), pp. 255–270; Heidegger’s reply to reviews by Cassirer and
Odebrecht, pp. 297–303; and also a short article from 1927 that describes (according
to the “Nachwort,” p. 316) “the rise, development, influence, and transformation of the
NeoKantianism of the Marburg School to which Cassirer belonged”: “Zur Geschichte des
philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866,” pp. 304–311. GA 3, of course, closely parallels
the lecture course in GA 25: Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kant’s Kritik der
reinen Vernunft: Marburger Vorlesung WS 1927–1928, ed. Ingtraud Görland (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1977).
18. Martin Heidegger/Elisabeth Blochmann Briefwechsel: 1918–1969 (Marbach am Neckar:
Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), letter of April 12, 1929. Also, he mentions in this
letter that Husserl’s birthday was “very worthily celebrated” on April 8: “Elfride had
arranged among the admirers and friends of Husserl to buy a bust of Husserl that the
young Rickert [the son of philosopher Heinrich Rickert] had sculpted a number of years
ago. Husserl was pleased and surprised. Finally, I presented a Festschrift volume to him
[a surprise], with a little speech which you will receive. And now [April 12] I am sitting
down to the final working out of the manuscript for my Kant interpretation, which will be
printed in May by Cohen in Bonn.”
19. See Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers (in the Heidegger-Jaspers Briefwechsel) of April 14,
1929, also, written from the “schönen Haus am Lande,” which states that they must put
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 31
off a visit because he must finish preparing KPM “by the end of April.” We also know
that on May 14 Heidegger was writing the preface, so by that time the manuscript had
probably already been transmitted to his publisher Cohen in Bonn. See Tom Sheehan’s
general introduction, cited in note 3 above.
20. Ibid, p. xvi.
21. GA 3: vii and 5. For an extensive summary and discussion of KPM, see Richardson’s
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. 106–160, and for a less extensive but
still enlightening discussion, see Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 2nd,
revised edition (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983 [3rd ed. 1990]), pp. 80–87, [Martin Heidegger’s
Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1987)].
22. The Preface to the fourth edition suggests this. Whether the Kantbook itself was written
against Cassirer is an “open question,” according to Iso Kern in Husserl und Kant: Eine
Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1964), p. 198, footnote 4. See also pp. 188–191. This 448-page volume is a
valuable resource on the Husserl-Kant relationship.
23. Cited by Gadamer in “Der Weg in die Kehre,” GW 3 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), p. 279.
Gadamer borrowed Heidegger’s copy of KPM in 1940 (his own was lost) and noticed this
sentence written in it. Also, a luminous sentence in a letter from Heidegger written to
Hans-Georg Gadamer in Marburg in the early 1930s reads: “Es kommt alles in Rutschen”
– “Everything is on the skids.” (cited in “Die Kehre des Weges,” Gadamer, Gesammelte
Werke 10 [Tübingen: Mohr, 1995]: 74.) This and many other letters of Heidegger to
Gadamer remain unpublished. When I asked him (in an interview in Heidelberg, October
23, 1995) to explain this remark, Gadamer said, “Heidegger meant that everything he held
before was sliding. Nothing was firm anymore – a clear mark of the turn.”
24. It would be tempting to say that Heidegger was also through with Kant, but he did
later publish two other works on Kant. The first was GA 41 – Die Frage nach dem
Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen. Edited by Petra Jaeger.
Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984. 254pp. (written 1935–1936, published 1962). The second
was Kants These über das Sein. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963. 36pp. (written 1961,
published 1963), and also published in the GA 9: Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976).
25. See note 22.
26. “Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers,” in Durchblicke (1970), pp. 284–317
cited above. In English, see the volumes on the early Heidegger by Theodore Kisiel and
John Van Buren cited in footnote 37 below.
27. See Cassirer’s opening salvo, Appendix IV to GA 3: 274 – p. 171 in the English translation.
28. Heidegger was well equipped to answer this particular question because he had published
an article in 1927 on the history of the Marburg Neo-Kantians, “Zur Geschichte des
philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866,” in Die Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 1527–
1927 (Marburg: N.G. Elwer’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927), pp. 681–687. This article
is included in the appendix to GA 3: 304–311.
29. See KPM, pp. 246–247; Eng. trans., p. 172, and GA 3: 275. For an extensive and well
documented critical analysis of the Heidegger-Cassirer encounter, see Massimo Ferrari,
“Cassirer e Heidegger, in margine ad alcune recenti pubblicazioni,” Revista di storia della
filosofia, 2 (1992): 409–440. Andreas Graeser, in his Ernst Cassirer (Munich: Verlag C.H.
Beck, 1994), says that Cassirer and even more Cassirer’s wife, felt that Cassirer had gotten
the best of Heidegger in the debate. Also, Gadamer mentioned to me (in a tape-recorded
conversation of May, 1992) that Heidegger was caught off guard by Cassirer’s extending
the debate beyond the First Critique into the issue of freedom, and later Heidegger even
(in Die Frage nach dem Ding lectures) tacitly acknowledged that Cassirer was right.
30. See Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, rev. ed., p. 176.
31. Ibid.
32 RICHARD E. PALMER
32. Ibid. Pöggeler points out that Heidegger’s own path, which is to unfold a hermeneutic
oriented to “formal indications” from the doctrine of the schemata, is not worked out in
KPM but reserved for the Logic lectures. He also goes into why KPM is dedicated to
Scheler (p. 182).
33. In Heidegger’s Letter to Richardson, which serves as the preface to Richardson’s Heideg-
ger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. xiv–xv. My italics.
34. See Martin Heidegger, “Über das Prinzip ’Zu den Sachen selbst’, “a recently published
fragment dating from the 1950’s, in Heidegger Studies, vol. 11 (1995): 5–7. Here he asserts
that this principle in Husserl “leaves nothing undetermined, for ‘die Sache selbst’ is what
consciousness holds; it is a consciously having in consciousness, and this consciousness
is that of a knowing ‘ego. ’´’ Heidegger then turns to the Greeks for his answer to what
is really “die Sache selbst.” At the end of this remarkable fragment, Heidegger lists 5
factors that for him made a break with Husserl’s form of philosophizing “unavoidable”
[unumgänglich]:
a) because in (“Kantian”?) transcendental philosophy “what is at stake” [die Sache] –
“consciousness” – is less and less permitted to be worthy of questioning [frag-würdig];
b) because in this way the principle [“to the things themselves”] is as such made rigid
[erstarrt, made stiff, ossified] and its possibilities silenced;
c) above all, precisely because with the stimulus of this principle the claim of Seyn itself
in the forgottenness of its difference was lighted up;
d) because Seyn itself goes through and beyond all basic positions [Grundstellungen];
e) on both sides – however different – [there is] a personal denial [Versagen] of the
existence of this break, which is something other than a mere break.
35. He indirectly acknowledged this protest in defending himself against it in the preface to
the third edition (1949).
36. For a lengthy and detailed assessment see Walter Biemel, “Heideggers Stellung zur
Phänomenologie in der Marburger Zeit,” in Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger in der Sicht
neuer Quellen, ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth, contributions by Gerd Brand, Manfred S. Frings,
and W. Biemel. Phänomenologische Forschungen Series, nos. 6–7 (Freiburg/Munich: Karl
Alber, 1978), pp. 141–223.
37. “Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl,” Philosophischer Literatu-
ranzeiger 37 (1984), pp. 48–69. This is the first of a series of three essays on “Heidegger
in Marburg” in the same journal. The other two are dedicated to “Die Auseinandersetzung
mit Aristoteles” and “Die Auseinandersetzung mit Kant.” See also the substantial books
on the early Heidegger by Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993) and John van Buren’s The Young Heidegger: Rumor
of a Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), as well as the collection
edited by Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Chicago: Precedent
Publishing, 1981), especially Sheehan’s biographical sketch of the early Heidegger which
introduces the volume.
38. Volpi, p. 55.
39. But the term “phenomenology” was dropped when the lectures appeared in GA 20 titled
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979). Translated
by Theodore Kisiel as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1986). My italics.
40. See Heidegger’s extensive review of Husserlian phenomenology in GA 20. Also see Volpi,
op. cit., for extensive discussion of this and other aspects in Heidegger’s relation to Husserl
during this period.
41. GA 20, p. 62. Cited in Volpi, p. 57.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 58.
44. Ibid. “ . . . das Sehenlassen des Seienden in seiner Gegeständlichkeit,” – “the letting be
seen of the entity in its objectivity.” My italics.
HUSSERL’S DEBATE WITH HEIDEGGER 33
45. See in his GW 10, Hermeneutik in Rückblick (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995): “Subjektivität und
Intersubjektivität, Subjekt und Person” (1975), pp. 87–99, “Phänomenologie, Hermeneu-
tik, Metaphysik” (1983), pp. 100–109, “Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge" (1986), pp.
3–13, “Heidegger und die Griechen” (1990), pp. 31–45, “Die Kehre des Weges” (1985),
pp. 71–75. See also “Der Weg in die Kehre” (1979), in GW 3 (1987): 271–284.
46. “Subjektivität und Intersubjektivität, Subjekt und Person,” ibid., GW 10: pp. 87–99.
47. Gadamer, “Heidegger und die Sprache,” GW 10: p. 25.
48. Otto Pöggeler in Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, makes this point in his valuable
discussion of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, pp. 80–87.
49. The page references to KPM in the following discussion are to the first edition, since those
are the pages on which they appear in Husserl’s copy of KPM, but in my translation of
the complete marginal remarks, the corresponding pages of the Heidegger text in the fifth
edition and GA 3 are also given. For reasons of space they are omitted here.
50. The chapter occupies pp. 106–160 in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought
x
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). The citation is from p. 106.
51. Also, on the “violence” of phenomenological encounter, see also SZ 7c.
52. Note on Heidegger and Scheler:
Heidegger’s dedication of KPM to the late Max Scheler also represents a significant
move in relation to Husserl, since Husserl viewed Scheler as a dangerous influence in
phenomenology. In a letter to Georg Misch of August 3, 1929 (Rriefwechsel 6), for
instance, Husserl begs Misch “not to understand phenomenology in this letter according to
Scheler but as in my Ideas.” Gadamer has noted that Husserl regarded both Heidegger and
Scheler as two uncontrollable geniuses and dangerous corruptors of phenomenology. (See
Gadamer’s commemorative article, “Max Scheler – der Verschwender,” in Max Scheler
im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie, ed. Paul Good [Bern/Munich: Franke, 1975],
pp. 12–13.)
On the other hand, Heidegger found in the effusive Scheler a true dialogical partner,
with whom in December 1927 he had “day-long, night-long Auseinandersetzungen and
struggles.” (Cf. “In memoriam Max Scheler,” in Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Logik
im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26 [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978], p. 63.) In a recent article
on the Heidegger-Scheler relationship, Otto Pöggeler goes so far as to assert that the
dialogue between Heidegger and Scheler entailed “a turn in phenomenological philosophy
that went decisively beyond its form in Husserl.” (Cf. Otto Pöggeler, “Ausgleich und
anderer Anfang: Scheler und Heidegger,” in Studien zur Philosophie von Max Scheler, ed.
Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Gerhard Pfafferott. Phänomenologische Forschungen series, no.
28/29. Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1994, pp. 169.) Indeed, according to Pöggeler, “the new
encounter with Scheler transformed Heidegger’s thinking and pushed it off the old tracks”
(ibid., p. 181). It was Scheler, one may recall, who caused Heidegger to offer a seminar on
Schelling’s concept of freedom in 1928. Certainly Scheler sharply criticized Heidegger for
his “solipsism” in Being and Time, saying the first absolute astonishment of philosophy is
“not [astonishment] at the Dasein of solus ipse” but at the fact “that there is something at
all and not nothing.” (Max Scheler, Späte Schriften, ed. Manfred S. Frings. Bern/Munich:
Franke, 1976, p. 261.) Scheler also criticized the dominance of Angst in Dasein: its lack
of relationship to nature or other persons, and its lack of eros.
Heidegger criticized Scheler and Husserl for reducing the problem of time to Sinnlichkeit
[sensory experience], but he and Scheler had the highest respect for each other. Indeed, at
Scheler’s death in May, 1928, Heidegger placed Scheler at the pinnacle of contemporary
philosophy, characterizing him – not Husserl – as “the strongest philosophical power in
today’s Germany, no, in today’s Europe – even in today’s philosophy as such.” (Cf. “In
memoriam Max Scheler,” GA 26: pp. 62–64, citation 63.) After Scheler’s death, Heidegger
began editing Scheler’s Nachlass [unpublished writings]. So Scheler would appear to be
an important factor in Heidegger’s desertion of Husserl’s phenomenology and in his “new
beginning” in the early 1930s. On this, see especially Pöggeler, “Ausgleich und anderer
Anfang: Scheler und Heidegger,” cited above.