SECOND DIVISION

JUAN DELA RAMA and G.R. No. 142309

EUGENIA DELA RAMA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CORONA,*
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BRION, JJ.
OSCAR PAPA and AMEUERFINA Promulgated:
PAPA,
Respondents. January 30, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition allows us to reiterate some of the basic rules concerning the notarization of deeds of conveyance
involving real property. Such rules are important because an improperly notarized document cannot be
considered a public document and will not enjoy the presumption of its due execution and authenticity.

I.

Petitioner spouses Juan and Eugenia dela Rama were the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in
Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 91166 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna. The property was acquired for P96,000.00 by way of sale from Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE), as
evidenced by a notarized Absolute Deed of Sale dated 10 July 1980 executed by Juan dela Rama and CSE, as
represented by Jesus de Veyra. Eugenia dela Rama also affixed her signature as proof of her marital consent.[1]

According to Juan dela Rama, he became a resident of the United States by 1984 and would acquire American
citizenship by 1989.[2] In 1992, petitioners through their representative, were reminded to pay the realty tax on
the property, only to be informed by the assessors office that their title to the property had in fact been
cancelled, and a new title, TCT No. 102128, issued in favor of respondents Oscar and Ameorfina Papa.[3]
Until 31 July 1985, Oscar Papa had been the Assistant Vice- President and Head of Marketing of the Laguna
Estate Development Corporation (LEDC), a marketing arm of CSE and the entity through which the property
had earlier been marketed and sold to petitioners. The property was transferred to and retitled in the name of the
spouses Papa pursuant to a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 March 1985, covering the subject
property, and identifying petitioners as the vendors and respondents as the vendees. The 1985 deed of sale bears
the signatures of petitioners and respondents, at least two witnesses (whose identities are not spelled out or
otherwise ascertainable on the face of the document), and the notarial signature and seal of Atty. William
Gumtang. The new title in the name of respondents was issued on 21 June 1985.

Articulating the primary claim that their signatures on the 1985 deed of sale were forged, petitioners filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Branch 92, for Cancellation of Title Obtained Under
Forged Deed of Sale.[4] They prayed for the declaration of nullity of the 1985 deed of sale, the corresponding
cancellation of TCT No. 102128 in the name of respondents and the issuance of a new one in their names.
Respondents counterposed in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim:[5] (1) that the 1985 deed of sale had
been duly executed; (2) that laches had barred the complaint since they had obtained title and physical
possession as far back as 1985; (3) that they had every reason to believe that the person from whom they
purchased the property was duly authorized to sell the same given that such person was in possession of the
owners duplicate TCT; and (4) that their purchase of the property was in good faith and for value, thus even
assuming that the forgery occurred, the action should be directed against those who perpetrated the fraud.

During pre-trial, the following factual matters were stipulated upon: (1) that Juan dela Rama was the registered
owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-91166, which was subsequently cancelled; (2) that TCT No.
102128 was issued in the name of respondents after they acquired the same for P96,000.00; (3) that from 1974
to 1985 or thereabouts Oscar Papa was employed or connected with LEDC, holding the position of Head of
Marketing; (4) that LEDC was a developer and marketing arm of CSE; and (5) that LEDC had developed the
residential subdivision where the subject property is located.

Petitioner Juan dela Rama and respondent Oscar Papa both testified in court. Dela Rama claimed having
religiously paid the property taxes since 1980. He denied that he or his wife executed the 1985 deed of sale or
any other document that conveyed their interests or rights over the property. He even denied having met Papa
before he testified in court in 1995. Dela Rama also explained that he had purchased the property in 1980 while
a student at New York University, and that he had been a permanent resident of California since 1984, and
a United States citizen since 1989.

Oscar Papa testified that he was connected with LEDC from 1974 to 1985, where he marketed residential,
industrial and agricultural lots which belonged to the Canlubang Sugar Estates. He claimed not to recall who
had offered to him to buy the subject property, and that he had never met Juan Dela Rama. He also admitted
signing the deed of sale, such document being witnessed by two staff members of LEDC, but he did not see dela
Rama sign the same document. Neither could he remember signing the deed of sale in front of the notary public
who notarized the document.

Papa claimed that in real estate transactions, it was standard practice that the buyer first sign the
document before the seller did so. He also claimed that it was likewise standard practice in the real estate
industry that the buyer and seller did not necessarily have to meet face to face. Respondent further alleged that
at the time of the transaction, sales of real property was (sic) very bad with several owners trying to sell back
their property even at a price less than the purchase price, as this came shortly after the assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr.

On 26 June 1986, the RTC promulgated a Decision[6] annulling the deed of sale, cancelling respondents
title and reinstating petitioners title to the subject property. The RTC said that the facts and evidence presented
indicated preponderating evidence that the plaintiffs signatures in the deed of sale x x x are not their
signatures,[7] such conclusion being corroborated by the admission of Papa that he did not see petitioners sign
the deed of sale. The RTC also disbelieved respondents contention that it was standard practice in real estate
transactions for the buyer to first affix his signature before the seller; noting that [i]t must be that before a buyer
would part with his money, he will first see to it that the sellers [sic] signatures were already affixed and if
possible, affixed in his presence.[8]

The RTC did not consider respondents as buyers in good faith, given their dubious assertion that it was
typical that the buyer signs the deed of sale before the seller, as well as such circumstances like the failure of
respondents to ever pay real estate taxes on the property and to assert possession or occupancy over the
property. Accordingly, it held that the cancellation of respondents title was proper. In addition, the RTC
discounted the claim of defendants that laches and estoppel had set in to bar the action, pointing out that under
Section 47 of Pres. Decree No. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, and that under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, [t]he
action of defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.[9]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 7 September 1999, the appellate court rendered a
Decision reversing the RTC and upholding the validity of the deed of sale.[10]

The Court of Appeals considered the pivotal issue as whether the signatures of the petitioners on the
deed of sale were indeed forged, and ultimately concluded that there was no such evidence to support the
finding of forgery. It was observed that the burden of proving the forgery fell upon the petitioners, yet they
failed to present convincing evidence to establish the forgery. The only evidence presented to establish the
forgery was the oral testimony of Juan dela Rama himself, which according to the Court of Appeals, was self-
serving. The RTC was chided for not applying Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence, which provided
in clear terms how handwriting must be proved. It was pointed out that the Rule required that the handwriting of
a person be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has
thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.[11]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals cited that neither one of the dela Ramas was confronted with their
signatures in the challenged deed of sale. Nor did they positively and unequivocally declare that the signatures
were not theirs or that these were forged.

II.

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners devote considerable effort in highlighting facts and
admissions elicited from Oscar Papa himself to cast doubt on the validity of the deed of sale. Yet it would be
impertinent on our part to immediately dwell on such evidentiary matters without first contending with the legal
arguments cited by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint. While this Court is generally not a trier of
fact, there are recognized exceptions to that rule, such as when the findings of fact are conflicting, or when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[12]
 The petition hinges on a factual question whether the signatures of the petitioners as appearing on the
deed of sale were forged. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that petitioners had the onus probandi to
establish such forgery. In concluding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden, the appellate court cited
the rule upholding the presumption of regularity of a notarized document. Applying that rule, it is necessary that
the forgery must be established not merely by preponderance of evidence, but by clear, positive and convincing
evidence, and the Court of Appeals appears to have applied that more exacting standard.

However, petitioners point out that respondent Papa had admitted before the Court that he did not sign
the deed of sale in front of the Notary Public. Based on the transcript of Papas testimony before the RTC,[13] it is
clear at least that the witness could not attest to the fact that he had signed the document in front of the Notary
Public.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you recall Mr. Witness if you sign[ed] this document in front of a Notary Public?

[Papa]:

No[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you know this Mr. William Gumtang?

Witness:

Yes
Atty. Lizares:

How do you know him Mr. Witness?

Witness:

Atty. Gumtang is one of the Notary Public of CSE.

Atty. Lizares:

He is one of the Notary Public of CSE?

 Witness:

Yes[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not recall if you signed this in front of Atty. Gumt[a]ng?

Witness:

I do not recall.

The deed was purportedly notarized by Atty. William Gumtang, who was personally known to Papa as
he was one of the notaries public of CSE.[14] Had Atty. Gumtang testified that Papa had signed the deed of sale
in his presence, Papas memory lapse would have had less relevance. Yet Atty. Gumtang was never called on as
a witness for the defense, nor was any other step taken by the respondents to otherwise establish that Papa had
signed the deed of sale in front of the notary public.

A.

Papas admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, bear legal significance. With respect to
deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference between a public document and a private document is
the acknowledgment in the former that the parties acknowledging the document appear before the notary public
and specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who executed it, and acknowledge that the same
are their free act and deed. The Court, through Chief Justice Davide, had previously explained:

A jurat which is normally in this form:

Subscribed and sworn to before me in ____________, this ____ day of

__________, affiant having exhibited to me his Community (before, Residence) Tax
Certificate No. __________ issued at __________ on ___________.

"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to before him.
It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was properly made
(Young vs. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." The jurat in the petition in the case also begins
with the words "subscribed and sworn to me."

To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a
document. To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc.
 Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath
before a notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.

As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer

duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.

It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents.(Emphasis supplied)[15]

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of sale.
Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary public, a bare
minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of sale.
However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and subject the deed of
sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the Court of Appeals. This consequence is with
precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino,[16]where the public document in question had been notarized by a judge who
had no authority to do so, the Court dispensed with the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally
attached to duly notarized documents, and instead applied preponderance of evidence as the measure to test the
validity of that document.

It appears that respondents had previously laid stress on the claim that it is a common practice in real
estate transactions that deeds of conveyance are signed on separate occasions by the vendor and the vendee, and
not necessarily in the presence of the notary public who notarizes the document but they adduced nothing to
support their claim but their mere say-so. Assuming arguendo that is indeed the common practice in the
business, we quite frankly do not care. The clear requirements of law for a proper acknowledgment may not be
dispensed with simply because generations of transactions have blithely ignored such requirements. If it is
physically impossible for the vendor and the vendee to meet and sign the deed in the presence of one notary
public, there is no impediment to having two or more different notaries ratifying the document for each party
that respectively appears before them. This is the prudent practice adopted by professional law enterprises, and
it is a correct measure in consonance with the law.

B.

There is another implication under our rules of evidence. Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, documents acknowledged before a notary public except for last wills and testaments are deemed as
public documents, and as such, under Section 23 of the same Rule, they are evidence of the fact which gave rise
to its execution and as to its date.[17] Excepting the other public documents enumerated in Section 19, all other
writings are private, and before such private document is offered as authentic, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.[18] Accordingly, in order that the challenged deed of
sale may be accepted by the Court as genuine, we must be satisfied by the evidence on record establishing that
its genuineness was proved by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the
genuineness or handwriting of the maker.

This shift in perspectives relieves petitioners of an extraordinary burden to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the deed of sale was forged, as well as any presumption that the said document is
genuine as to its due execution. The question now is thus whether they were able to establish the fact of forgery
through a preponderance of evidence.

III.

It is now upon this Court to ascertain whether the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale
have been duly proven, there being no presumption that it was. In doing so, we continue to recognize that it
remains incumbent on the petitioners to prove their allegation that the deed of sale was forged even though that
document no longer enjoys any significantly weighted presumption as to its validity since it cannot be
considered as a public document. The properly applicable standard of preponderance of evidence necessitates
that the court counterweigh the respective evidence submitted by the litigants to test whether the plaintiffs
claims are actionable. Accordingly, in this case if the evidence presented by the petitioners that the deed of sale
is a forgery is greater or more convincing than that presented by the respondents, then favorable relief may be
granted to petitioners.
 The evidence-in-chief presented by petitioners to prove that the deed of sale was fraudulent consists of
the testimony of two witnesses for the plaintiff petitioner Juan dela Rama, and respondent Oscar Papa, who
called as a hostile witness for the plaintiff.

A.

We begin with Juan dela Ramas testimony. Petitioners assert that Juan dela Rama expressly denied in
open court his signature on the deed of sale, and such denial is made plain in the transcript of his testimony
of 25 July 1995.

Atty. Lizares:

Mr. Witness I am showing to you the document mark[ed] as plaintiff[s] exhibit which is the
Deed of [A]bsolute Sale
which is also the Annex C of complaint purportedly executed on March 29, 1985 by Juan
Eugenio dela Rama and Eugenia dela Rama in favor of Mr. Oscar Papa, did you
execut[e] the document?

[dela Rama]:

I did not.

Court:

What exhibit is that.

Atty. Lizares:

Exhibit 1 your Honor is defendant marking the same document that is mark as exhibit M and M-
1 for the plaintiff this a common exhibit. This is a 2 pag[e] document. Did you execute the
document?

Witness:

No [I] did not.

Atty. Fortun:

May I know the date?

Atty. Lizares:
 March 29, 1985. Did you execute any document whatsoever M[r]. Witness disposing or
transferring any interest or right over the property which was earlier evidence[d] by your
TCT No. T-91166?

Witness:

No such document was ever executed by me or my wife.

xxx

[On cross examination]

Atty. Fortun:

You declare that when you [were] shown that contract, it Appears that between you and
Mr. Papa you stated that was not your signature?

Witness:

Yes Maam.[19]

[On redirect]

Atty. Lizares: So you never executed any Deed of Absolute Sale on any document
transferring your right or interest of the propertycovered by TCT No. T-91166.

Witness:

No sir.[20]

The Court of Appeals noted that his testimony was not corroborated, thus, self-serving, and further
castigated the trial court for failing to apply Section 22 of Rule 132, which establishes how the genuineness of
handwriting must be proved. The provision reads:

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.The handwriting of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
 Petitioners argue that our ruling in Emas v. De Zuzuarregui and Aguilar[21] is in point. Emas involved a
plaintiff who sought annulment of title on the ground that his signature on the contract of mortgage on which
the conveyance of the property was based had been forged. In explaining that the plaintiffs testimony on the
forgery of his signature sufficed to debunk the genuineness of the contract, we held:

The proof adduced before the trial court shows, we think, beyond any doubt, that the
deed, original of Exhibit A, which purports to show a conveyance of the property in which
purports to show a conveyance of the property in question from the plaintiff, Lucio Emas, to the
defendant De Zuzuarregui, is a forgery, and that the fraud was consummated substantially in the
manner above described. The plaintiff in this action (the real Lucio Emas) testified
unequivocally that he had never taken any part in the creation of the deed in question, and his
testimony, in our opinion, leaves no room to doubt that he was speaking the truth. As evidence of
the crime of forgery, the plaintiff's attorney submitted in the trial court certified copies of the
judgments entered in the Court of First Instance of Manila and afterwards in the Supreme Court
in the criminal case convicting Ortega of the crime of estafa by falsification of a public
document. These certified copies were admitted by the trial court as competent proof and the
attorney for the defendants objected on the ground that said judgments are inadmissible in this
civil action, being res inter alios acta. As an abstract point of law the assignment of error based
on this exception is perhaps well taken; but we are of the opinion that, apart from said certified
judgments, the record contains ample evidence to support the finding of the trial court that the
original of the Exhibit A is a forged document, and that the present plaintiff, Lucio Emas, was
not a party thereto.[22]

Does Section 22 of Rule 132 accommodate the testimony of the very person whose signature is disputed
as a means to establish the genuineness of handwriting? We believe that it does, and Emas remains a good law
notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of the Rules of Court. After all, the owner of such disputed signature
may fall within the category of any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. In Alo v.
Rocamora,[23] plaintiff Alo presented in evidence a deed of sale establishing that he, and not the defendant, was
the prior purchaser of the land in question. Alo himself testified as to the authenticity of the deed of sale. In
discussing whether the genuineness of such document was proved, we cited the then Section 324 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which provides any writing may be proved, either by anyone who saw the writing executed; or
by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or by a subscribing witness. The Court then
pronounced:
As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may be said that it was
fully established by the testimony of the plaintiff himself and by that of the witness, Vicente
 Alquizola, who signed the same together with the gobernadorcillo and who testified under oath
that he was present when the document was executed and signed by those whose names are
subscribed thereto. x x x
Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the said instrument, the
latter having been one of the accompanying witnesses of the local authority before whom it was
executed. Consequently there is no doubt as to the authenticity of the said document, nor as to
the truth of the contents thereof, nor is there anything in the record, or any legal reason, that
would justify this court in holding that the said document was false.[24]

Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Section 22 of Rule 132, so our
application of the former rule in Alo remains appropriate today. At the very least, Section 22 of Rule 132 does
not exclude such testimony from consideration. It is in fact well-established in the law of evidence that the
testimony of the very person whose signature is disputed is more than competent proof on the genuineness of
such signature. According to Wigmore on Evidence, there even was once thought that for proving the
genuineness of a document the alleged writer was a preferred witness, though it is now believed that no such
rule of preference exists.[25] At the same time, there really is no rule that automatically discounts the testimony
of the alleged writer as to the genuineness or spuriousness of his own signature. In enumerating the methods of
authentication of a handwriting, Professor Herrera actually designates as the first method, the testimony of the
purported writer:

I. Proof of the Genuineness of a handwriting

A. Methods of Authentication

1. The Testimony of the purported writer

Except to the extent that certain formalities of proof are required by the rules relating to attesting
witnesses or rules requiring formal certification, and the like, various means are available
for proving the authenticity of a document as a prerequisite to its admission in evidence.
Under ordinary circumstances, it would seem that the testimony of the purported writer
would be the most satisfactory authentication, where it is available.

While this is generally true, it is not necessarily so in all cases. There is no preferential rule
requiring the testimony of the writer on the ground that it is the best evidence; the fact
that the best available evidence is not used being significant only in so far as it affects the
weight. Thus evidence of handwriting may be admissible even though the person whose
writing it is claimed to be in available as a witness.

xxx
 When the testimony of the writer is not available it may be said that the next best
evidence in quality would be in the testimony of a witness who had seen the writer sign
his name or actually make the writing x x x (Citations omitted)[26]

We acknowledge the general premise that the testimony of the very person whose signature is put in question
has probative value, whether such testimony is offered to affirm or dispute the genuineness of his signature.
That testimony satisfies the requirements under Section 22 of Rule 132 on how handwriting must be proved. At
the same time, the evidentiary weight of such testimony wholly depends on the strength of the particular
witnesss testimony viewed in conjunction with the totality of the evidence at hand.

It may be possible, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, to discount the testimony of a plaintiff disavowing
the authenticity of his purported signature as self-serving, but such posture can only be warranted if the self-
serving assertion is negated by other evidence or legal presumptions. If the challenged deed of sale were
considered by us as a public document, then dela Ramas mere testimonial disavowal of his signature would be
insufficient to rebut the presumptive due execution of that writing. However, since we cannot consider the deed
of sale as a public document owing to its improper acknowledgment, Dela Ramas denial that the signature was
his gains greater weight for evidentiary purposes.

B.

Counter-intuitively perhaps, the petitioners as plaintiffs called on Oscar Papa to testify in their behalf as a
hostile witness. This he did on 25 July 1995. It was an impressive gambit on the part of counsel for the
petitioners that produced spectacular results.

Papa testified for the petitioners that he did not sign the document in the presence of the dela Ramas.

Atty. Lizares:

But you do not (sic) meet the person. Who signed as Juan
Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No I did not see him sign.

Atty. Lizares:
 So you did not see him signing?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

But you said you sign[ed] this document?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

When you sign[ed] this document did Mr. dela Rama were [sic] the person who purportedly
signed in his behalf?

Atty. Fortun:

Your Honor he had repeatedly answered that he signed it without seeing him.[27]

A contrary admission on Oscar Papas part would have allowed the Court cause to believe that the petitioners
had consented to the sale.

As a witness for the petitioners, Oscar Papa admitted that he had not never met Juan dela Rama before
and during the sale, and until 1995 or ten years after the sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Have you ever met Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No sir.

Atty. Lizares:

He is not the one Juan Eugenio dela Rama who testified a while ago?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor witness cannot recall.

Court:
 Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

At the time you acquire[d] the property supposedly from Mr. dela Rama you were the
Head [of the] Marketing Department?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Who introduce[d] you to Mr. Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

Atty. Fortun:

Misleading your Honor.

Court:

Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

So you mean you never met the person who execute[d] this document?

Witness:

Yes sir.[28]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa could not recall who exactly had offered the subject property to
him.

Atty. Lizares:

Who offer[ed] you this property which is the subject matter of this case?

[Papa]:

I could not specifically recall who in particular offer[ed] the property, it could have been
one of my staff, or brokers at the time because aside from my job I am handling several
 construction not only this subdivision, not only Ceres I, there is Ceres II and Ceres III and
all the industrial lots.[29]

xxx

Atty. Lizares:

You dont recall who offer[ed] this property?

Witness:

At this moment specifically I cannot recall.[30]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not recall whether or not any of the dela Ramas
had already signed the deed of sale when he signed the same:

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed the document was it already signed by the suppose[d] vendor?

[Papa]:

I could not really recall right now but the fact is at the time
for the buyer to sign it first and then give it [to] the seller
seller and then the seller signed it afterwards.[31]

xxx

Atty. Lizares:

And you also dont recall whether the signature Juan Eugenio dela Rama was already in
this document when you
sign this document?

Witness:

I do not specifically recall now as I have said earlier the practice was for the buyer to sign
first and then the seller signed afterwards.[32]
 As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not remember where and how he signed the deed
of sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Now so who presented this document to you for your signature?

[Papa]:

My either (sic) my staff or agent who told me that such property is for sale.

Atty. Lizares:

When the staff or agent told you that the property is for sale what document did you ask
from agent or staff?

Witness:

Deed of Absolute sale and I presume at the time whoever was selling it inform me that the
title is available.

Atty. Lizares:

Now when you sign[ed] this document where did you [sign] it?

Witness:

I could have signed it in the office or in our house.

Atty. Lizares:

You dont recall where?

Witness:

Yes I cannot recall.

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed it were you alone?

 Witness:

I could not even recall where I signed it.

Atty. Lizares:

Or perhaps with your wife?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor he does not know.[33]

Had counsel for petitioners been content with relying singly on dela Ramas testimony, there would have
been a good chance that the complaint would not have survived. His move to call in Papa as a hostile witness
allowed the above-cited testimony to form part of the evidence for the plaintiffs. The trial court correctly
appreciated Papas testimony on 25 July 1995 (as distinguished from his subsequent testimony as a witness for
the defense) as part of the evidence for the petitioners.[34]

In addition, another corroborative piece of evidence of the petitioners, as found by the trial court, lay in
the fact that the dela Ramas had paid real estate taxes on the property until about 1993, [35] or eight (8) years
after the purported sale. Any reasonable person who had sold his property would not undertake the unnecessary
burden of continuing to pay real property taxes on the same.

That piece in evidence should be taken into account together with petitioners presentation of Papas
clear-cut and unrebutted testimony of as well as the evasive and ambivalent testimony of Papa. The totality of
the evidence for the petitioners established a prima facie case that the deed of sale was not genuine. Even as the
burden of proof may have initially lain with petitioners in establishing the forgery of what is a private
document, their evidence was sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to respondents to establish the
authenticity and due execution of said private document, especially as it is they who rely on the same in their
defense.
 III.

There are a myriad of ways respondents could have swayed the case then in their behalf after the
burden of evidence had shifted to them. Most pertinently, they could have presented the two persons whom
Oscar Papa had identified as witnesses to the deed of sale, Mrs. Galeos and Mrs. Reyes, as well as Atty.
Gumtang, to whom the deed was referred to for notarization. All three persons were personally known to Papa.
Galeos and Reyes were, according to Papa, staff of LEDCwho finalize[d] the document,[36] while Atty.
Gumtang was one of the notaries public of CSE.[37] Yet none of them testified in respondents behalf.

Respondents had initially manifested to the trial court that they were to present Gales and Reyes as
witnesses in their behalf,[38]yet only Papa ultimately testified for the defense. Assuming that the deed of sale
was prepared, signed and notarized according to Papas version of events, any of these three witnesses could
have easily bolstered the evidence in favor of the genuineness of the deed since Papa himself attested to their
personal knowledge of these events. That they were not presented by Papa in his behalf speaks poorly of the
veracity of his tale.

When Papa did testify in behalf of the defense on 26 March 1996, his counsel adopted in full his
earlier 25 July 1995 testimony as a hostile witness.[39] That earlier testimony unfortunately was quite
incriminatory. To make matters worse, his own testimony in his defense poked even more holes to his version
of events. On cross-examination, he made it clear that he had no particular interest in meeting the petitioners for
the purposes of negotiating or consummating the sale.

Atty. Lizares:

In your previous testimony Mr. Witness you testified that you never met Mr. Dela Rama
do you confirm that?

[Papa]:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And you never had a chance to speak with him?

Witness:
 Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And neither his wife?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever ha[ve] a chance to ask the broker or the person facilitating this whoever he
was that you want to meet Mr. dela Rama?

Atty. Fortun:

Objection your Honor. Misleading.

Atty. Lizares:

No Im just asking whether he had a chance to ask.

Court:

Reform your question.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever make a request in connection with this Transaction to meet with Mr. dela
Rama?

Witness:

I cannot answer because I cannot recall.[40]

Most incredibly, Papa revealed he could not even remember to whom he tendered the purchase price
of P96,000.00.

Atty. Lizares:
 Mr. Witness, you or do you recall to whom did you made paid (sic) of the P96,000.00 that
you said you paid to whoever who effected or facilitate[d] the sale?

[Papa]:

Unfortunately I cannot recall at this time because it was on 1985 and this is not the only
transaction I am handling at that time being in sales I am also handling the same of
companys commercial lots, also handling the industrial lots the golf shares, Ive been
meeting a lot of people, I could not really recall how this particular transaction happen.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not remember to whom you pay the money?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you remember if there is only one or two or three person[s] who arrange[d] with you
for the sale of the property?

Witness:

I cannot recall but as I am trying to recall the numerous transaction handled at that time,
normally with this kind of transaction it will involv[e] some person, or some broker or
even some agent.

Atty. Lizares:

But for this particular transaction you can tell exactly how many?

Witness:

No sir.[41]

In the context of trying to establish the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale, Papas
testimony proves woefully insufficient. It must be remembered that the transaction was personal to Papa, and he
was not conducting in behalf of his employers. It was his own money, and not the companys, that he was
tendering. Thus, it is highly incredulous that Papa could not recall even the most basic details over his own
personal transaction, in fact the only one he had during his stint at the LEDC, that involved a then princely sum
of P96,000.00 of his own money.
 Papa did testify in court that he had signed the deed of sale,[42] and that assertion by itself has about as
much weight as dela Ramas claim that he did not. At the same time, that statement even if true does not
conclusively prove the validity of the sale as it does not establish mutual consent as to the putative vendors and
vendees to the sale. That point is especially salient since Papa admitted that he did not sign the document in the
presence of the petitioners.

IV.

We are cognizant that the Court of Appeals approached its analysis of the case from a wholly different,
and ultimately erroneous perspective. We are unable to utilize its appreciation of the facts. The Court of
Appeals was unable to advert to anything on record as to how the deed of sale was substantiated during trial by
Papa. Respondents, before this Court, are likewise unable to offer any convincing argument tending to verify
the deed of sale that is independent of the now-debunked legal presumption that the document was duly
executed.

The reversal of the Court of Appeals decision is clearly warranted. We do not discount the fact that the
petitioners could have further bolstered their case either by presenting a handwriting expert, or Amuerfina dela
Rama as a witness. Still, their failure to do so is not fatal as the document in question is a private document, one
which carries no presumption as to its authenticity and due execution. All told, the findings and conclusions of
the trial court are correct and credible, compared to those of the Court of Appeals hence, reinstatement of the
lower courts decision is in order.

At the same time, we wish to impart a few more observations.

Given that the deed of sale has been proven as false, is there still any basis for which the respondents
can retain title to their property? We observe that at the respective levels of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, respondents had argued that they should be considered as purchasers in good faith, especially since the
complaint had adverted to certain unscrupulous persons illegally representing themselves to be the plaintiffs
and illicitly forging plaintiffs signatures sold to herein defendants.[43] We are unable to agree. By the very
version of facts submitted by the respondents, there are enough circumstances to discount good faith on their
part. Papa never bothered to communicate directly with the petitioners to ascertain whether the persons
claiming to be their representatives persons Papa could not even identify were indeed authorized by the
petitioners. Papas inability to remember to whom he tendered payment for the property likewise reveals utter
apathy on his part as to the circumstances of the sale.

In Abad v. Guimba,[44] we ruled that a party was not an innocent mortgagee in good faith because he
neglected to check if the person he was dealing with had any authority to mortgage the property. The rules on
ascertaining mortgagee in good faith are the same as those for purchasers in good faith. Without directly
communicating with the petitioners, how could have Papa been certain that the persons apparently unknown to
him were indeed duly authorized by the petitioners to sell the property.

The following observation of the trial court is also pertinent in this regard:

The defendants said that it is the practice in real estate transaction for the buyer to first
affixed his signature and then the seller. This asseverations cannot be accepted as ordinary. It
must be that before a buyer would part with his money, he will first see to it that the sellers
signatures were already affixed and if possible, affixed in his presence. Intriguing also is the
failure of the defendants to assert their right of ownership over the land by actually entering and
occupying the premises and their failure at any moment the real estate taxes since 1985 when
they allegedly purchased the property. xxx[45]

Finally, the Court of Appeals had observed that upon close comparison of the signatures on the
questioned deed of sale and that earlier executed between the petitioners and CSE and in petitioners passport,
the challenged signatures appeared very similar with each other. We have examined the signatures in the two
deeds of sale, and in fact noticed distinct differences, and varying writing styles. The signatures of the
petitioners on the 1980 deed of sale are smooth and smaller than their purported signatures on the 1985 deed of
sale. Moreover, the signature of Juan dela Rama in the deed of sale appears hesitant and non-fluid. The
signature Eugenia dela Rama on the two deeds betray their very distinctive angles or slants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
September 1999 and the Resolution dated 1 March 2000 in CA G.R. CV No. 53914 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Branch 92 dated 26 June
1996 is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129416. November 25, 2004]

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO
AQUINO andFLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale
involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the
Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the
presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude
instead that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint
for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).[1] The complaint sought to enforce an
alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond
located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under
the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.[2] The conveyance was covered by a Deed
of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to
recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the
same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the
compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.[3] On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in
substitution of her deceased father Isidro Bustria,[4] attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial
court, now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the
Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had
failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for
Consignation.[5]
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed by the Aquinos,
and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment,[6] seeking
the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.[7] The Aquinos
filed an answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed
of sale dated 17 October 1985.[8]
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the
instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the
same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by
Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their
Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale (Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of
Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which had not been
acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been
previously unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tignos previous Motion for
Consignation.[10]
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.[11] A Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.[12]
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and
Cario as conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any
statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria;[14] that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or
represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale [15] or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for
Consignation.[16] The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be
denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had
become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by action such as the instant complaint.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-
1257.[17]
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.[18] In the meantime, the RTC allowed the
execution pending appeal of its Decision.[19] On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division
promulgated a Decision[20] reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that
there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that
would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution
instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria
by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.[21] It was noted that a notarized document carried
in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the
right of Bustrias heirs to repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for Reconsideration,[22] the present petition was filed
before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals
when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of
Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally lead
to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,[23] factual
review may be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court
are contrary to each other.[24] Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the
notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that
matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

 PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both
parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of
a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same
was sworn before him.[25] Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,[26] which has been replicated in
Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[27] the Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a
notary public.[28]
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition.
This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.[29] Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,[30] that municipal
judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts
of conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. [31] In response,
respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing documents took
effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.[32]
Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the
Revised Administrative Code.[33] However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,[34] the Court explicitly
declared that municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of
their official duties.[35] The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cario, and there
was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case,
considering that Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of Sale as Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions
and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16,
Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a
notary ex officio.[36]

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90
permits notaries public ex officioto perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided
that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception
applies.[37] The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios improper notarial
activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to
accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,[38] was even then not an
isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his
improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge
Carios advanced age, assuming he is still alive.[39] However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation
of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their
official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The
validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be
treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in
good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to
admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a
lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly
appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in
pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.[41]
On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a
civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits
or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted
rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been
uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the
transaction, but required merely for convenience.[42] We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though
not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for
the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the
parties.[43]
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from
the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since
the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 states:

Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public
or private.

Public documents are:

 (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents;
hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed
by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even
assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it
was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20,
Rule 132, which states:

Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its
enforceability militates against Tignos claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its
authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a
private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents,
as distinguished from private documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132
provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in evidence.
The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its
veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound
discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged
the existence of the Deed of Salewhen they filed their answer to petitioners current action to revive
judgment.[44] Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the
Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos
duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then
the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to
exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents
themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they
opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale,
if in existence and valid, would have already precluded Tignos causes of action for either consignation or
execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet
to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgmentan existential anomaly
if we were to agree with the respondents that such document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also
pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented
by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.[45] The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the
receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for
significant amounts given and to keep the same.[46] In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of
consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of
the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of the
Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to
seek his lawyers assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property
had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document
would not be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the
scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of
Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly
signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled
unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute
the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it
should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustrias age are typically sedentary
and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed
of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustrias signature in the 1981 Compromise
Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was
eighty-nine (89) years old. However, Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when
he was already ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident
differences between Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These
have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of
Sale was established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own
appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final
measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the
conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario himself prepared and
typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed,[47] while Judge Cario testified that he did
not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the
signing.[48] On this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record
revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who
prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the
Court of Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no
contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria signed
the Deed of Sale.
 However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of
the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of
Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia now become material not only to establish due
execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the
RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this all-
important document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the
respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and
sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document,
notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to
establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that
is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions
about the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence
and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed
of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of
imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and
with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario,
would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would
indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall
notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the
reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author of
the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the
Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of
Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies of
de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of
Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to
admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to
the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical
presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated
earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient
basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tignos right to repurchase was not
extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996
and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and
the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil
Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7184 September 17, 2014

FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe (respondent) for malpractice as
a notary public, among others.

The Facts

In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged respondent,
previously of the Public Attorney's Office,2 for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty
as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public
for the City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra judicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva"3 dated "25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that
he is a "notary public for and in the City of Marikina."4 Said document was one of the attachments to the
Amended Complaint5dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled "Esperanza Nieva Dela
Cruz[(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada[(as represented by complainant)]." To prove his
claim, complainant attached a Certification6 dated May 26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a
commissioned notary public for the Cityof Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. In a
Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his Comment8 which he eventually
submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed
notarized the acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary
public at that time.9 To prove his defense, he attached a Certification10dated August 23, 2006 issued by the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of his appointment as notary public for
the City of Pasigand in the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-
1999 under Appointment No. 98.11 Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative
complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the
instant administrative case against him.12

In response, complainant filed a Reply13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the legitimate rightto file the
administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful act of notarization, which is not an act of
harassment as respondent claims. He alsodraws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely
dated and yet notarized by respondent.14 In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court,inter alia, referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually,
both parties appeared during the mandatory conference held on April 30, 2008.16

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
foundrespondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s oath, reasoning that he could not
notarize the acknowledgment of the subject document inMarikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of
his jurisdiction. To this end, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the
subject document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public for and in the City of Marikina,
Province ofRizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the Notarial Law. Moreover,respondent likewise
violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood.18

In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years
from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public,
the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such.19

In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to
one (1) year, with immediate revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.

On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution22 dated March 8, 2014, modifiedthe penalty
stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty ofreprimand with warning, and disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was
commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan,
and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the
City ofMarikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the RTC of
Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:23 Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term– A person commissioned as notary public
may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning courtfor a period
of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made,
unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,24 of which Section 240, Article II states:

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with
the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No
notary shall possess authority to doany notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina,
when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of
falsehood which is undoubtedly anathemato the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court instructively
expounded on infractions similar to that of respondent:

While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place
outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification. While perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity inthe violation involved, what the
Court said in Nunga v. Virayis very much apropos: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission todo so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of
the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate false hood,
which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization isnot an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from
it.1âwphi1 Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case,
take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings,28 the
Court finds that suspension for a period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty.
In addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his
notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked.30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary

public,and violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his
receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same orsimilar acts will be dealt
with more severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period
of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015

JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON, Complainants, v. ATTY. ARTURO B.

CEFRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their
participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence
of the parties is a breach of duty.

Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and sister-in-law.1
Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of land located in Sison,
Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69244.2cralawred

Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. He was admitted to
the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as notary public in the Municipality of Sison,
Pangasinan.3cralawred

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale4 over a land covered by TCT No. 69244.
The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and
complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as
the vendee.5cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged that they did not sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra.6 The National Bureau of
Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged.7
This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the document, which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Munici[pa]lity of Sison, personally appeared JOHNNY
ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, who
exhibited to me their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-indicated, known to me and known to be
the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is
their free act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists of two pages and have
[sic] been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on each and every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
 PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN8cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically impossible for their
brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in
the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.9cralawred

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as
witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and Paran.10cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint11 with this court on August 6, 2001
questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public.

In the Resolution12 dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to comment on the administrative
complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension of Time,13 which this court granted.14 Despite the
allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this court’s order to file a Comment. This
court fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12, 200315 and November 17, 2003.16 In both
Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his Comment.17cralawred

Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest and commitment.18
Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his residence on January 14,
2007.19cralawred

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment20 on January 15, 2008.

In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property covered by TCT
No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen Anudon went to his residence to
consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to Paran.21 Atty. Cefra claimed that he
assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale, which included the deed of sale and the
acknowledgment receipts for payment.22cralawred

On August 13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed of Absolute Sale to the
residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon (Loejan) to have the document signed.23 Viola
Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the
document.24 Loejan affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and
Benita.25cralawred

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita “with the full
knowledge and permission of the three[.]”26 He allowed this on the basis of his belief that this was justified
since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his mother’s leg.27 It clearly appeared that
Loejan forged the three (3) signatures. Loejan did not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his father,
uncle, and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he “notarized the questioned document in good faith, trusting in [complainants’]
words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping them out legally and financially[.]”28cralawred

After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.29cralawred

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared without any counsel and
manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public Attorney’s Office.30 She also informed the
Investigating Commissioner that her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already passed away.31 The mandatory
conference was held on February 20, 2009.32 On the same day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an
Order33 terminating the mandatory conference and requiring the parties to submit their respective Position
Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale
violated the Notarial Law.34 In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,35 which requires that “[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.”

Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s notarial commission and
the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. The Investigating
Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.36cralawred

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-24937 dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.38 However,
they recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be modifed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual Disqualification from re-appointment as
Notary Public.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 asking the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to temper the
recommended penalty against him.41 In Resolution No. XXI-2014-9342 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its original penalty against Atty.
Cefra:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial practice, if
presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice SUSPENDED for two (2) years.43
(Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no longer filed a Petition for
Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.44cralawred

We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra
violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without
requiring the presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization
is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of
that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.46 This law refers specifically to the acknowledgment and
authentication of instruments and documents. Section 1(a) of this law states that an acknowledgment “shall be
made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.”

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person
before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or
document;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative
capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.— . . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document—

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.cralawlawlibrary

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his
or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her
duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that “[i]t is obvious that the party
acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]”48 Furthermore, this court pronounced
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are
personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the
contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public
are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the
document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to
guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement
between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents.
It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed
it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the
document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as
vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought
to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the
document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by
the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real.

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty.
Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties.
In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those
documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also
allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court
imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent-lawyer notarized 22 public documents
even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer
from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57cralawred

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires “[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” He contumaciously delayed compliance
with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty.
Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was
arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008,
more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]”

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, “wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court” constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s
disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment
in 2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this
infraction.

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to
submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to
file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise,
she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining
her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s “conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her]
obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’”64cralawred

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his
acts of misconduct.

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this
court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his
incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned
as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for
any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cr