DESIGN OF MARINE
STRUCTURES
Volume 2
Conceptual Design
Torgeir Moan
NTNU, 2003VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
3 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PROCEDURE
3.1. General
Different types of structures may be relevant for a given purpose, e.g, as an exploratory
drilling platform. The actual design used commonly is the result of an evaluation procedure,
starting with a wide variety of different designs and then natrowing it down to one which is
designed in detail.
‘The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the features assessed in the conceptual design,
‘when many altematives is still considered.
This is done by using a mobile (floating) exploratory drilling platform as an example,
In the following chapters, various concepts with different functions will be discussed.
There are various ways to classify such structures. Two alternatives are observed here.
1. Classification according to mobility, ie.,
‘© mobile units
— ships used for transport
~ platforms used for exploratory drilling, pipelaying,
© permanent units
— platforms used for long-term oil/gas production
— floating or submerged, buoyant bridges
— floating airports
Il. Classification according to “rigid body” motion properties (see Table 3.1)
Table 3.1 Classification of structures according to “rigid body” motion, properties
Rigid degrees of freedom”
Type Example Surgelsway _Heave _Pitch/oll__Remarks_
Floating (buoyant) Freely floating ship, platform — 7 7
Floating bridge 2
Compliant 1 - © ©
(partially buoyanv’ ALP © x -
partially botom = GT ©) x -
supported)
Bottomsupported Jacket
Jack-up (op. mode) x
1)(8) denoted “rigid”, and (~) denotes “free”
2)Surge is prevented
© Design of Offshore Structuces, Vol. 2 mVOLUME 2 Concepwal Design
3.2 Case Study: Mobile Drilling Platform
3.2.1 Basic asstimptions
A floating platform for exploratory drilling is to be designed.
The drilling operation is described in Chapter 1.3.2, The following functional requirements
can then be deduced:
* adcok area and load carrying capacity to accommodate a derrick, storage of casing, drill
string, mud
* a deck area to have access for the riser to the sea, without interfering with the structure
during vertical and norizontal motions of the platform
* limited (heave) motion (cfr. Table 1.3 in Volume 2) to avoid excessive forces on the
risers
* mobility, i.c., easy/fast, to “decommission” at one drilling site and move to the next site,
and start operation
The platform should fulfill safety requirements regarding:
adequate buoyancy/stability (particular code requirements for Mobile Drilling Units)
© adequate structural strength requirements (particular code requirements for Mobile
Drilling Units)
* access for inspection and repair, and design for monitoring by leak-before-break
ciple
* fire and explosion safety (area classification)
* escape and evacuation system
While buoyancy, stability and motion requirements have implications on the buoyant part of
the structure, requirements to deck area and arrangement of drilling equipment, pipes and
mug, fire and explosion safety as well as escape and evacuation system determine the design
of the deck.
In the final detailed design methods described in Volume 1 will be applied.
In addition, the design should aim at a structure which can effectively be fabricated, possibly
in modules which are built in parallel, and then assembled to save fabrication time. At least
rapid fabrication is important if the platform is contracted for work.
‘The aim of the design process is to arrive at a structure (platform), ie.,
* overall scantlings of buoyant body and the deck structure and the possible connection
between these parts, as well as interior structure
which fulfill the functional and safety criteria in an “optimal” way. Traditionally, optimal has
been synonymous with minimum fabrication costs, while now fabrication and operational
costs are considered together.
The design process is an iterative process. This can be illustrated by the design spiral as
shown in Fig. 3.1. Conceptual design refers to the first cycle. The design is more and more
detailed as the center is approached
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2 iaVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Srorontions
a SBaprcrwa
Me,
Hvonevnaics ‘srnucrunaL
(metoDeL Tests) SESW a NiaLysis
wooans &
bese
Fig. 3.1 Design spiral for (floating) platform design. After APIRP 2T (i
Ships by Evans [3.1])
The results of the design process are:
* drawings of the structure (basis for fabrication)
© specification of fabrication procedures
* specification of operations procedures (operations manual)
It is important to reflect the operational assumptions made as operational restrictions in an
‘operations manual.
Besides the hull with drilling equipment and articles of consumption, a drilling platform
consists of:
* ballast system to change the draft (see Section 3.2.2). A ballast system consists of
piping, pumps and power supply and vents, to change the ballast in different
compartments in which pontoons and columns are subdivided. These operations are
performed and controlled in the marine control room.
‘* mooring system to prevent the platform ftom drifting off location due to steady wind,
current and wave forces. The mooring system consists of wire/chain anchorlines,
anchors and winches
‘* possible machinery system to provide propulsion for moving the platform
3.2.2 Layout
In general, it is possible to achieve good designs with very different platforms. Fig, 3.2
shows three layouts based on a deck and a certain buoyancy volume to support the deck.
In principle, all these concepts could be applied as drilling unit. However, here only the type
shown in Fig, 3.2c is pursued. The deck is supported by the buoyancy of a number of
columns and pontoons. The columns provide overall stability (Fig. 3.3), Semi-submersible
platform.
‘The implications of functional (serviceability) and safety requirements are discussed in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vel. 2
f 50VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
stabilized unit
2) Ship type b) Buoy-type ©) Colum;
Fig. 3.2 Alternative layouts of floating drilling platforms
Primary functions
deck with equipment Draught
l= operational draft
<2
INCLINATION ANGLE
‘Measure for Compl
Crean ‘Messe for Compliance ‘Acca Ratio, Dag 1.0 Ineresse GM,
(13 Ares Ratio) (68) Increase weathentighiness
Reduce Tank Size
Init OM L.0m Increase GM Increase UDB
oz. POSGMsing Increase GM First tntercept, 8 17° Inerense GM
Mincercept 235" Increase GM Redes Tank Size
2Imereept Ean" Increase GM Residual GZ, G2q 2{WA) Increase OM
Increase UDB, Inerease UDB,
Range Stability 7° neeate GM
Trorense UDB
Incas weathentghess
a) Intact stability b) Damage stability
Fig. 3.6 Measure to comply with stability criteria
Fulfillment of floating ability of the deck structure in case of large scale damage, according to
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, has particular effect on the deck structure
It may be of interest to examine the effect of size on stability and payload. In the following,
this is done by considering the wind heeling moment, GM, static angle heel. Reference is
made to the relevant expressions in Chapter 2.3. A linear increase in dimensions by a factor
S is assumed.
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2
ig a 7VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
As the size of vessel increases, there need be very little increase in the underdeck clearance;
deck heights do not change; and since the deck area will increase in proportion to the square
of the sides, there will be no need for additional decks. Furthermore, on this basis, it should
be possible to reduce the deck-house or superstructure. Thus the wind area will increase at a
rate no greater than the linear increase in dimensions and will increase at a rate less than the
linear increase.
Feebards oping
ee
Fig. 3.7 Floating position of damaged semi-submersible
According to the assumptions made above, the exposed wind area increases at most by $ and
the moment arm increases (due to increase in the submerged part) at most by S. Hence, the
wind moment increases by at most S*. The volume of displacement will vary as S°. GMb is
given by BMp + KBo - KG, where BMp is defined by the second moment of the water plane
area divided by the displacement, and increases by a factor S. Since the underwater structure
is gcomettically similar, KBy is increased by S. However, since clearance above the sea has
not changed significantly, KG will change less than $. GMb, therefore, increases more than
by. Hence, the angle of heel will decrease by a factor, which is larger than $’, showing that
the heel angle of large semi-submersibles is very much less than that of the “prototype”.
Assuming that the same wind heeling angle can be allowed in each design, this indicates that
the value of GMb in the scaled design can be reduced or alternatively the same deck load can
be carried at a lower displacement. In practice, all of these possibilities may be used, e.g.,
— reducing the diameter of the columns and perhaps inserting further columns to reduce the
deck spans
— reducing the overall dimensions and thus displacement
= allow some increase in KG
Therefore, increasing size makes it easier to carry high deck loads while maintaining the
same level of stability and without increasing the anchoring loads by the same amount, This
aspect is further discussed in [3.2], Chapter 2.
Itis often found that damage stability is governing for semi-submersibles.
Fig. 3.9 shows the location of water levels on column B (which is the most submerged part
for a given wind direction) in intact and damaged condition,
Fig. 3.10 shows the location of water level on the Alexander L. Kielland platform after the
Joss of column D which was not a damage condition considered in design at the time of this
accident,
The result of the stability calculations are partly expressed in the design of the structure and
partly included in the operations manual, in terms of:
‘© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol
58VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Fig. 3.8 Allowable KG for the “Alexander L. Kielland” platform according to the operations
manual. This diagram does not include large damage criterion,
Fig. 3.9 Calculated waterline level on column B of the Alexander L. Kielland platform for
intact and damaged platform, The damage is flooding of tanks 9 and 10 in column B
Bl
© Design of Offshore Strutues, Vo. 2
“ 59VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
oe)
Das ne
ZB sinner we
Fig, 3.10 Calculated floating position of Alexander L. Kielland in still water after the actual
Joss of column D (large-scale damage) Draft: 30.3 m and heel angle of 32° [3.4].
Fig.3.10 shows the location of water level on the Alexander L, Kielland platform after the
oss of column D.
‘* requirement to the location of the center of gravity (KG) as a function of the draft. See
Fig. 3.8.
* In operation, this is complied with by proper distribution deck loads, ballast, etc., which
are logged daily
* Control system for pumps, valves, water tight doors, ...
* Control panels are located in the marine control room,
34.3 Structural integrity
‘The choice of pontoons, columns and overall deck size is primarily governed by requirements
to motion performance, and stability. See Fig. 3.11
fea My
Fig, 3.11 Overall layout of semi-submersibles as determined by considering motion
performance and stability.
Requirements of structural integrity suggest the use of braces between the major buoyancy
members and the deck to reduce the forces, as discussed in Chapter 4, Vol. 1. Such braces
are relevant for a structure which is to operate in extended periods as a stationary unit. (Due
to the influence on the hydrodynamic resistance, such an arrangement cannot be introduced in
SWATHs, catamarans, ete.)
© Design of Offehore Structures, Vol. 2 anVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Fig, 3.12a shows a structure without braces. If braces are introduced, especially as shown in
Fig. 3.12c, the forces in the deck structure are reduced. This implies less steel (weight) and
hence improved stability or increased payload. However, there are also some disadvantages
with the braces. For example, care must be exercised to avoid increased hydrodynamic
resistance during transit. Also, braces should not come in conflict with the requirement of
having an open space in the riser/moon-pool area
Fig. 3.12 Brace arrangement (in a transverse section) of a semi-submersible
In addition, strength requirements determine the scantlings (plate thicknesses, stiffener sizes,
etc.) of the structural components.
Mobile drilling units are designed to fulfill SLS, ULS, FLS and PLS criteria. While, in
principle, all codes refer to the first three types of criteria, only some, notably in the North
Sea region, specify PLS criteria.
‘The main structural design check to determine scantlings is ULS checks. In areas with much
dynamic loading, fatigue may be important to welded joints with stress concentration for
semi-submersibles. In the North Sea, fatigue is orucial for the slender braces. Progressive
limit state criteria can also have influence on brace arrangement and deck girders.
Table 3.4. Design criteria for semi-submersible
—
re eae ere atta
The major loads are:
— functional loads (payload, ballast, and, not least, hydrostatic pressure)
= wave, current and wind loads. Current and wind loads are not important for the design
of the hull
Wave loads are commonly determined by the design wave approach, For semi-submersibles,
typical load conditions are given in Table 3.5.
Structural response is calculated by using a frame model as exemplified in Fig, 3.13. This
model yields member forces. More detailed stress levels, especially in brace-column,
pontoon-column joints need to be calculated by using finite element methods based on
membrane or sheil elements,
© Design of Offhore Sirutues, Va. 2
: 61VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Table 3.5 Selected design wave conditions for Akers H3
Tee ‘Bap Tipo a oe
parang =
Sul water
Veroal wecktatin 22 an teas, vente bases
Sane we bat lt need To
Pierack to ding tower, | eck, yeni bree
Opsraing da Te WS wes Pa
sce inthe shrug = 2B, = 16.191 | transverse horzomal
braces
‘Dperaing dal, TSR
Paton pod the cres H1= 16.19 m | transvene boron
hares
‘perang dak =a wy P= Vise
We 30 Wand ICO kot vransvene vertical
bees
‘Operaing dal head m | Fo Spee]
He 30, Win 100 bots, ooo, cons
hosnclciagons
Wave approaching dagonaiy._ [aces
In(pencd)= A(T) Ware height =H
The purpose of the PLS check (Chapter 12, Vol. 1) is to ensure that the platform survives
under credible damage conditions, determined by risk analysis. Typically, the damage
conditions given in Table 3.6 are considered for semi-submersible platforms.
In particular, strength checks should be carried out for conditions involving flooding and void
spaces, also considering the heel after the corresponding buoyancy loss.
Fig. 3.13 Frame model of semi-submersible
‘The hydrostatic pressure in flooded spaces is assumed as the vertical distance between a load
point and damaged waterline in heeled condition (15°). Any additional effect of waves is
assumed implicitly accounted for by the strength criteria, i.c., by neglecting reserve strength
after elastic behavior of the elements.
In the damaged stability requirement, the heel angle is not to exceed 15° in any direction. At
this angle, the gravity component parallel to the deck is 0.26 g,
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2
62VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
A simplified check will be to superimpose on the intact static local cases 0.26 times the
weight of deck + 1/2 columns as a horizontal force countercted by horizontal forces at the
pontoons and vertical forces at the columns, See Fig. 3.14,
Table 3.6 Damage conditions of semi-submersibles for PLS design check
Platform Component Accident load/damage condition
Pontoon Dropped objects, and for the columns, in addition: ship impacts and fire on the sea
Column surface, but the local damage made will in general not be critical for the overall
strength.1) In addition, heel forces should be considered. See Fig. 3.14a.
Deck girders Fire or explosion damage
Braces Ship impact, abnormal fatigue damage corresponding to failure of one brace at a
‘ime, In addition, heel forces should be considered. See. Fig, 3.14b.
1) Damage to pontoons and columns is more relevant for damage stability checks than PLS check of the
structural integrity,
sinag-M +0 260M
2 HL pes wrt
x Passi espana entfr
cntim Up deck iy oy
pontoon. et ' = i
a) Longitudinal heel b) Transversal heel
Fig. 3.14 Heel forces of semi-submersible platform
‘The survival of the platform is then checked by considering functional and environmental
loads. In the analysis of this residual strength, it is acceptable that individual members suffer
failure, ie., by buckling or yielding, provided it can be demonstrated that excessive forces
can be redistributed to other members. Such redistribution may be demonstrated by different
methods:
a. Recalculation with reduced stiffness of elements with plastic behavior. See Chapter 12,
Vol. 1.
b. Redistribution by hand calculation of the excessive forces obtained as the difference
between the analyzed forces in the elastic analysis and the plastic capacity.
An example of the latter method is shown in Fig. 3.15. When a vertical diagonal bracing
supporting the deck fails, large shear forces must be distributed in the transverse deck girder.
The excessive force beyond the plastic capacity of the girder, may conservatively be assumed
distributed along the pontoon to the next vertical/diagonal bracing. ‘Thereby the effect of
longitudinal girders are neglected,
Another critical case is failure of a vertical diagonal bracing supporting the derrick, ‘The
transverse gitder supported by that bracing will often be loaded beyond its capacity and the
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2 6VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
excessive loads must be redistributed to the other derrick supports via the derrick and drill
floor.
In practice, large deflections are not assumed to occur for the deck girders loaded beyond
their capacity as discussed above, as long as the surrounding structures are not overloaded
and thus remain elastic,
fate rH
a i
Fig. 3.15 Redistribution of forces in a critical diagonal sea
Design is concerned with:
determination of scantlings
— choice of material quality
— specification of fabrication and operational procedures
Determination of scantlings is accomplished by complying with all design criteria. Implicit
in this procedure is the choice of material quality (weldability ete.) and also strength class
(yield strength). Fig, 3.16 illustrates a typical choice of materials.
AD
a) Quality b) Yield streneth
Fig. 3.16 Example of materials selection in semi-submersible platform
In particular, high strength steel (HTS) is preferred in the deck structure because HTS steel
implies a potential weight saving. This is important for the deck, where saved weight means
a corresponding increase in payload. The potential reduced weight stresses from the higher
yield strength of HTS compared to mild steel (MS). However, the elasticity modulus is the
same. Hence, for components under tension, the scantlings (weight) is inversely proportional
to the yield strength. For a component in compression, the strength depends on the
slendemess. For stocky components the effect of yield strength is as for tension components,
while for (very) slender components it is independent of yield stress, but proportional to the
elasticity modulus. In bending, the effect is somewhere between that of tension and
(© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2 aVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
compression members. Assuming the components in the deck to be predominantly subjec to
bending, the weight.saving may be of the order 0.5 to 0.8 of (1 - cys/ous).
On the other hand, there is no benefit of using HTS where fatigue is the governing design
criterion, because the fatigue endurance (SN curves) for welded joints is the same for HTS
and MS. For braces in North-Sea platforms, fatigue is a governing criterion, not only to the
brace/column joints, but because of many fillet weld attachments to such bracings, fatigue
usually would imply increased plate thicknesses over all the brace (compared to ULS
criteria). In this case, mild steel will be preferable.
During operation of the platform, structural integrity is followed up by:
— control of variable functional loads, such as payload on deck and ballast. These loads
have an important influence on stability, but on certain platforms, also on the strength.
— inspection and monitoring of the structure — to detect cracks, dents, etc. and initiate
repair, when necessary.
Inspection focuses especially on braces and their joints with columns and deck because these
components are most prone to fatigue cracks, and because the overall strength is most
sensitive to damages in these components. Besides visual and NDT inspection, use of the
leak-before-break principle is often applied to detect cracks in submerged braces, It is
demonstrated in [3.5] that there is a significant residual fatigue life after through-thickness
cracks in (some) brace joints.
Circular cross-section is in general preferred for the (submerged) platform components due to
hydrodynamics considerations. However, pontoons are often designed with a square cross-
section - with rounded comers. By using this cross-section for the pontoons, the joint
between pontoons and circular columns become easier to make than when both members
have circular cross-section; see Fig. 3.17. In one case (Fig. 3.17a), a transition from circular
to square cross-section of the column is made to even further facilitate the fabrication.
Fig. 3.17 Pontoon-column joints
© Design of Oftshore Structures, Vol, 2VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Since the diameter of these members is of the order 8 to 15 m, significant stiffening is
necessary in the joint, and great care in having a smooth local geometry to avoid stress
concentration, is necessary.
3.44 Escape and evacuation
To be completed,
3.5 Selection of Overall Layout
Based on functional and safety criteria, various system layouts are possible. Fig. 3.18 shows
sketches of some alternatives.
dervick
saline Le
= payload
= fire explosion
strength
Fig. 3.18 Alternative semi-submersible layouts
scape & evacuation
= Buoyaney/stability
= Motion properties
= Girength)
Fig. 3.19 Overall variables for semi-submersible
The global design parameters are:
overall height, width and length
volume of submerged structure (buoyancy)
ratio of volume between pontoons and columns
shape and size of pontoons and columns
bracing arrangement
internal subdivision
scantlings of structural components
© Design of Offhore Sirutures, Va. 2
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Different designers have arrived at different choices of “best” system. Fig. 3.20 and Table
3.7 show some designs that have been employed. Not all have been successful; and some
represent early concepts in a trend towards concepts of the twin pontoon type, as, ¢.g., shown
in more detail in Fig. 3.21.
ate @ ge he
Zapata deco
7583000" Waage Drill 1” “Transocen HII" ecco
in 4
Sedeo 135 : cy ‘The Offshore Co.
Penrod 70" SCP III-MarkiI"
‘Odeco ‘Odeco
"Odin" "Ocean Voyager" "Ocean Scout"
Fig. 3.20 A selection of semi-submersible drilling platforms
working space —
of deck
SE
buoyancy ateiy
Fig. 3.21 Aker H.3 type Halvt-nedsenkbar mobile bore platform.
© Design of Offhore Structures, Vol.2
ss 67VOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
Table 3.7 Semi-submersible drill rigs [3.6]
Zapats 7
Lover Has Pacer Seton 709 (AE AkerH3 —— Sedeo 135
engi 0.8. (8) 2060) 1095) Leon 1082055) 303 (00)
Bear, mi) 152.60) 2630) 240) 11.065) 133 6)
Desh, mq) 61 G0) 64( 2 3.08) 67 Gay 18 05)
Wash OA. m0) 6i0@o) 1248) 4010) 674. @21) L036 340)
Section Shape Rectangular w! Oblong Rectangular w/ —Resiangularw 3 individual
Radius corners Shape comers Shapecorners Tetings
Stability columns
Number 6 5 6 8 3
Diameter, 98 (32) 4@91(30) 9.10) 4@7906 10.7035)
4@95(18) 4@53119)
Weather Deck
Elevation Above Keel BEC) 396.342.7040) 396 (130) 506 (865)
Length.8.1n (0) 620) «A 1AM) — 2AM) —- 736 QD)
Width OA (2) 485159) 60.0 (197) 567.186) 61.0 0) 65.3 80)
Operation Conditions
‘Transit Deal, an) 5909) 58 I) 64 61 a0) 61
‘Operating Dram) 183 0) 244 (BO) 244 GO) 13M)
Digpzcemen ons wis 24980 2678 19000 15000
Survival Dra, mf) 3.7(85) 1836) 198 5) 183 (60) 244 (80)
Maximum Wave
Dating, mt 152(50) Bz 4) 229(79 152(50) =
Surv n) 305(100) 305 (100) 305(100 305 (100) 30.8 (100)
AirGap-Dailing,r(f) 132.3) NA 13.745) 18260) 229 05)
Working Depths
Water Depth 366 437 50s ss 3
Water Depth, (8) 1200) (1500) (1900) (600) (9)
Dring Depth, > 7625 7520 160 7520 1600
Dring Depts (2) (3000) (25000) (25000) (2500) (25000)
Capacities
Personnel st 90 0 38 a
Bulk MudCement, m? Bulk 258 m 565 sto 230
ModiCement (0) (9480) (6625) 20000) (18000) (105)
Sack Ma, Seeks 000 NA 4500 6000 3250
Liquid Mud? (O) 273.1710) 318.2000) 270.(1900) 231 (1450) 2621650)
Diesel Oi, (Bb) 057 (6680) 1065 (6730) 1s90 10000) 2687 (16900) 808 S080)
Dri Water, (2b) 490g (!2000) 1882(11909) 1s90(10000) 2290(14400) L615 (10160)
Pomble Waier,m? (BI) 207(1300) 191 (1200) 110) NA. 460)
Number of Seows - a 2
Naber of Thsters - 4 - - 7
HP. (Tata) 000 6400 6000 5000 -
Mooring
‘Type ain hain Crain Wire Rope
Number of ees 5 © § 8
Sia, me in) 750) 20% 766) 6Q)
Length of lines, (8) 4067 (3800) 1219 (40001219 aco) 914 (000) 1463 (4800)
‘Anchor Weigh ke 13600 13600 1sh40 3600 13600
hs) ce60) 30000) on00) Gon) «so000)
© Design of Offehore Structures, Vol. 2 aVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
3.6 Station-Keeping System
3.61 General
Semi-submersibles may be kept on the offshore location by:
= acatenary mooring (CM) system with relatively small pretension (500-1000 KN)
= dynamic positioning (DP) system, based on thrusters and an automatic control system of
the thrusters
= combination of CM and DP system
The installation and dismantling time and effort associated with high tension mooring system
(tension-leg systems) do not make them relevant for exploratory drilling rigs.
CM and DP systems may be combined in different ways. A CM system may primarily be
used and peak loads taken by thrusters. For ships with turrent mooring (a vertical oylinder
about which the ship can rotate), CM can be used to moor the cylinder, and thrusters can be
applied to ensure that the ship is directed head-on weather (waves, wind),
‘The conventional catenary mooring system is most frequently applied for drilling units and is
discussed in the subsequent sections.
3.6.2 Catenary mooring system
A catenary mooring line consists of chain and/or mooring line, typically with a fluke anchor.
Different combinations of wire and chain may be used, as shown in Fig. 3.22. Each platform
is moored with a number of lines in a spread mooring pattem. If the direction of wave,
current and wind forces is uniformly distributed, a mooring system with uniform
stiffhess/strength is aimed at; see Fig. 3.23.
When the weather condition has a prevailing direction, this is accounted for in the design.
Moreover, if the rig is anchored adjacent to other platforms or pipelines, this must be
accounted for to ensure that in the the semi-submersible drags its anchors, it will not hit the
other plantform(s) and that the anchors will not connect to pipelines.
a EMR EE, 8
a
es
Fig, 3.22 Three types of deep Fig. 3.23 Spread mooring pattems.
water mooring line
systems
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2 ipVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
3.6.3 Analysis and design
It is important to nete that the pretension and stiffiness is low for catenary mooring systems.
Pretension is chosen so that “slackening” and, on the other hand, lifting of anchors are
avoided.
Fig, 3.24 shows an cxample system, where typically an increase in the total horizontal force
of about 200 tons, increase the excursion from 20 m to 40 m,
assez enuen
sane ton ste pen)
overall displacernent
Fig. 3.24 Mooring diagram for semi-submersibles [3.2]
‘The mooring system, therefore, has no effect on the first order motions which involve
horizontal forces of at least an order of magnitude larger.
‘The main purpose of the mooring system is to prevent drift-off, ic. resist steady-state forces
due to wind, current and second order wave forces.
On the other hand, when calculating the tension in the individual mooring lines, the effect of
the excursion due to steady-state forces as well as motions due to first and second order
forces should be taken into account.
‘Typical “steady” force level on North Sea platforms that will yield mooring line tension:
- wind: 1500-2500 kN
current’ 600-1500 kN
= wave slow drift: 200-300 kN
In addition comes the forced displacement due to first order wave forces. ‘The surge/sway
amplitude is determined.
The line tension is assumed to be determined by the quasi-static approach, based on the static
equilibrium due to a constant wind and current force, and the maximum offset due to wave
motions of the rig. The line tension after a breakage may be determined by a quasi-static or a
dynamic method of analysis. The dynamic transient analysis is accomplished by combining
line breakage with the significant value of the wave-induced motions.
© Design of Offshore Stuetures, Vol. 2
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Serviceability requirements refer to the platform motions, ie., maximum offset, For some of
the activities in exploratory drilling, an operational limit for the maximum offset is decided
uring planning based on the design conditions assumed, e.g., for the drilling riser. For
drilling, the allowable offset is typically 3-6% of the waterdepth. If the riser is connected, but
no work takes place, the offset limit may be 10%. ‘The operational limit may more indirectly
be specified in terms of sea-state and given in the operation manual, which is to be complied
with during operation. Serviceability criteria thus imply requirements to the restoring
properties of the system.
Serviceability requirements to the station-keeping system are decided and complied with by
the operator because these criteria mainly affect the economy of the operation. However, if
the operations do not meet the criteria, the consequence may be failure of equipment
designed on the basis that they were met. This aspect should be accounted for as accidental
conditions in the design of the aciual equipment.
Conceming safety criteria, codes for drilling platforms require an explicit check of ultimate
and progressive failure, and do not refer to fatigue, wear and other deterioration phenomena,
even if such phenomena are extremely important. Such effects are supposed to be covered by
inspection and repair/replacement during operation.
ULS and PLS requirements related to ultimate consequences such as loss of lives, pollution
and material losses. Such consequences may be induced by the following more or less
interrelated events
— failure of one or more components of the station-keeping system
— excessive motions
— driftoft
~ mooring-induced capsizing (tripping)
which are listed in increasing order of importance.
Failure of individual station-keeping elements rarely would represent serious consequences.
For instance, the failure of the mooring lines would only affect personnel in the immediate
vicinity by a possible whipping flap.
It is the excessive motions or drift-off that represent the largest risk, as they, for instance,
may lead to:
= collision between the actual rig and other installations
= impacts or wear on pipelines or other subsea equipment from dragging anchors
— blowout, fire or explosion or oil spill
= possible grounding
— failure of risers or bridges, depending upon the activity taking place
Obviously, such consequences would depend on the operation, the prevailing weather at the
time, the number and location of other installations, whether the installations are manned or
not, the availability/reliability of possible active actions to control the motions or drift-off etc.
Even collision events involving a drifting platform do not necessarily imply large
consequences.
The safety requirements (such as safety factors etc.) to the station-keeping system could
differ depending on the consequences of the failure. The actual consequences can be fully
© Design of Offshore Structures, Vol. 2
aVOLUME 2 Conceptual Design
reflected in safety requirements. However, if simple criteria for station-keeping systems are
desired, the worst credible consequence must be the basis for them.
For drilling vessels/platforms, it may be convenient to distinguish between two de
conditions ~ (maximum) operation and extreme (survival) — because the consequences of line
failure may differ significantly for these conditions. While the riser and drill string are
connected during operation, they are disconnected during extreme sea states (survival
condition).
Analogously, one may expect that the safety factor for PLS check would be larger than that
of ULS check, since the PLS check is concerned with avoiding failure of the system while
ULS refers to a single line failure. The reason for the present relative magnitude of the safety
factors is that the PLS check is made on the condition that a line has failed, and there is a
certain “small” probability that this will occur.
The design criterion is
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