Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dr Frank H. Gregory
Dept. of Information Systems
City University of Hong Kong
Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon, Hong Kong
incorrigible within the system. They have the same status as necessary, or logical,
truths. There is a problem here that dates back to the beginning of British
words the rules that govern the behaviour of the physical world are not necessary
but contingent truths. We are, therefore, faced with the problem of explaining how a
systems of necessary truths can tell us anything about, or be useful in dealing with, a
contingent world.
The problem is not unique to computer systems. Prima facie it seems that
mathematical formulae are logically true. The question of how, given this, they can
apply to reality has been the subject of lengthy debate in the philosophy of
mathematics. The present paper recounts how the problem has been structured and
Whatever, principles underlie the application of arithmetic to reality will also need to
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underlie the design of any information system intended to be informative about the
real world.
2 INTRODUCTION
There are two basic questions that can be asked in respect of mathematical
propositions. One is "what are they about?" the other is "how are they justified?".
Korner [1968] makes a distinction between, what he calls, pure and applied
proposition of the form "one apple and one apple makes two apples" is a proposition
of applied mathematics. This distinction opens the door to the possibility that there
are two different types of mathematical proposition and that these are about different
objects and events in the real world while those of pure mathematics do not.
If it were true that propositions of applied mathematics are about real world
objects then this would suggest that they are justified empirically. Here we can
identify two broad schools of thought. Following Tymczko , accounts of the nature of
mathematicians who discover truths about this reality. Constructivism insists that any
homogenous. The idea that parts of mathematics are invented and parts discovered
should not discounted out of hand. However, if the inquiry is limited to basic
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propositions of arithmetic i.e. the addition or subtraction of finite numbers, as will be
the case in this paper, then the realist and constructivist accounts have the
combined with the pure/applied distinction then there are four permutations and in
two of these realism and constructivism are not even contraries let alone
All four permutations are open to immediate difficulties. The first needs to
The second needs to explain why a mental construct, such as arithmetic, can be
informative about reality while other analogous mental constructs, such as chess,
are not. The third has similar difficulties, it needs to explain how a mental construct
relates to a real world discovery. The fourth appears to combine the worst aspects of
the other three permutations, it needs to explain why pure arithmetical propositions
are falsifiable while the apparently contingent applied arithmetical propositions are
not.
Popper put forward a version of the third permutation. However, he did not
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arithmetic and statements of applied arithmetic. Rather his idea was that a number
statement such as "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" can be taken in two senses. In
one sense it is irrefutable and logically true in the second sense it is factually true
and falsifiable. Another way of putting this is to say that a single number statement
can express two proposition one of which can be explained on constructivist lines the
psychological level rather than at a logical level. However, a similar but tenable,
paper. Here it will be argued that there cannot be a meaningful system that consists
only of logically true universals and factual particulars. Factual universals must be
introduced into the system to make it workable. Part I argues the case for a realist
Part II makes the much stronger claim that there cannot be a meaningful
system that consists only of factually universals and factual particulars. Here logical
universals must be introduced into the system to make it workable. Part II argues for
The main thrust of the paper is to develop a tenable version of the third
show that the fourth permutation, while not necessarily a practical perspective, is
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3 PART I: Popper's account
The question "Why are the calculi of logic and arithmetic applicable to reality?" was
the subject of a symposium at which Gilbert Ryle, Karl Popper, and C. Lewy
presented papers. Both Ryle [1946] and Lewy [1946] limited their papers to a
discussion of logic, but Popper directly addressed the issue of how arithmetic applies
to reality.
Ryle contended that the rules of logic are rules of procedure and therefore do
not apply to reality at all. In the earlier sections of his paper Popper [1946] agreed
with Ryle that the rules of logic (or of inference) are rules of procedure and as such
they are not meant to fit the facts of the world. Thus the problem disappears. But
Popper felt that there was an underlying problem that had not been solved. This was
the question of how the rules of logic can be useful in dealing with the world: "Why
Popper thought that this could be answered rather easily. A man will find "the
procedure useful because he finds that, whenever he observes the rules of logic,
whether consciously or intuitively, the conclusion will be true, provided the premises
were true". Here we would expect the argument to move into a discussion of theories
of truth, but Popper does not do this. Instead he says "... a "good" or "valid" rule of
making the point that a rule of inference will only be valid if its use in an axiomatic
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system will not lead that system into inconsistency. That is, the use of a rule of
inference will not lead to the production of any theorem and its contradictory. On this
interpretation the theorem and its contradictory would be the counter example. But it
seems unlikely that this is what Popper had in mind as this would not go far towards
solving the usefulness problem. There are many consistent systems that have no
A more likely candidate is that he was saying that rules of inference are open
to falsification by facts. I.e that if "All men are mortal" is a description that fits the
world and "Socrates is a man" is a description that fits world, but "Socrates is mortal"
is a description that does not fit the world, then it would be shown that modus
ponens is not valid. In this case it must be at least logically possible for modus
inductive account of deduction. However, this was not Popper's position either. This
descriptive theory and therefore falsifiable. Two questions now need to be answered:
firstly, how does a calculus become a descriptive theory, and, secondly, which
calculi can become descriptive theories? (it is not clear that all calculi can become
descriptive theories, some calculi have been developed merely to explore the
properties of formal systems, for example the MIU-system Post Production System
in Hofstadter [1980].
6
Popper attempts to answer the second question as follows:
giving a psychological account here. He could be saying that people do, as a matter
of fact, interpret "2 + 2 = 4" in two ways. That, as a matter of fact, there is an
oscillation of "2 + 2 = 4" between being a logical truth and a physical truth in every
person's thinking. As a psychological account it has a lot to commend it. It can help
to explain why the problem is such an intractable problem and why it has a now you
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see it, now you don't quality. "2 + 2 = 4" taken as purely logical throughout a system
physical throughout a system or narrative. The errors that undoubtedly occur in this
area are when a given instance of "2 + 2 = 4" is taken to be logical and physical in
the same system or narrative. We then have the situation were people claim that
there must, as a matter of logic, be four rabbits in a basket; and the opposite error
where people claim that arithmetic is a branch of physics. The problem is how to
deal with "2 + 2 = 4" in such a way that it has logical and physical implications in the
logical account of when, where and how logical systems apply reality. If Popper's
account is taken as purely psychological then he will not have explained how and
why "2 + 2 = 4" taken as logical and a calculus can determine, or help to determine,
what the physical state of affairs is with regard to apples. The psychological account
says only that arithmetic is logical and it can work in the real world and people have
learned to use it. It does not explained which calculi can become descriptive
theories. It does not say why arithmetic can work in the real world; therefore it cannot
explain how people have learned that it can work in the real world. Briefly, arithmetic
can work in the real world but we don't know how, and people have learned that it
can work in the real world but we don't know how they have done that either;
however, we do that they have learned to use it. But this says no more than that
people have learned to use arithmetic and this, I think, we knew already.
8
3.1 A Logical Reformulation
contains a pair of apples and nothing else. Take a bucket that contains a pair of
apples and nothing else. Empty the entire contents of the basket into the bucket
taking care to make sure that everything that is in the basket goes into the bucket.
Now how can we determine how many apples are in the bucket?
One way is to use the calculus of arithmetic. We can take the contents of the
basket as an instantiation of the arithmetical notion "2". We can take the contents of
the bucket as another instantiation of the arithmetical notion "2". We can take the act
of emptying the entire contents of the basket into the bucket as an instantiation of the
arithmetical notion of "+". Given this we can describe our experiment arithmetically
as "2 + 2". We can use to the calculus of arithmetic to show "2 + 2 = 4" and from this
we can conclude that there are four apples in the bucket. Let us call this the
"calculation method". There is another way to determine the number of apples in the
bucket and this is by counting them. We can take an apple out of the bucket and say
"one", then we can then take another apple out and say "two" and so forth. When
there are no more apples left in the bucket we know we have counted them all. Let
us call this the "counting method". The contention that arithmetic, understood in the
constructivist sense, applies to reality is the contention that the calculation and
Popper's mistake was to take "2 + 2 = 4" as being at one time (the time
therefore contingently, true. A better account is that "2 + 2 = 4" is always logically
true. What is only contingently true is that objects and events in the world are
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If two apples are taken as being a contingent instantiation of the arithmetic "2", four
apples as being a contingent instantiation of the arithmetic "4" and emptying the
then the problem is on the way to being solved. We can say that it is true as a matter
of logic that any instantiation of "2" combined with an instantiation of plus and
Apple System 1
(1) Apples when counted as two are an instantiation of "2 apples". (factual
hypothesis).
(2) The apples in the basket have been counted as "2 apples" (factual particular)
(3) The apples in the bucket have been counted as "2 apples" (factual particular)
(4) Emptying a basket into a bucket is an instantiation of "+" for the things in the
(5) Any instantiation of "2x" combined with an instantiation of "+" and another
(6) An instantiation of "4 apples" when counted will be counted as four apples.
(factual hypothesis)
Suppose we count the apples in the basket as two, count the apples in the
bucket as two, empty the basket into the bucket and then count the apples in the
bucket. Further suppose that the count results in three apples. Then we could
assume that the count has gone wrong somewhere. But we could repeat the count
using other methods of counting. If we are satisfied that our counting is correct then
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we might think that (4) is false or we might think that (1) or (6) is false. Whatever the
This gives us necessity and falsifiability in all the places where we want it. In fact (4)
is false as it stands, as Popper points out two rabbits plus two more rabbits may
produce seven or eight rabbits. In order to avoid completely abandoning (4) the
inanimate objects. But this limitation placed on the universe of discourse only effects
(4), (1) and (2), it has no effect what so ever on (5) we do not need to posit a limited
Apple System 1 shows how non-falsifiable statements such as (5) can play a role in
our calculation of quantities in the real world. Unfortunately it does not show that
such statements are necessary for our calculation of real world quantities. This is
because all six statements in Apple System 1 could be replaced by a single factual
hypothesis: When the apples in a basket are counted as "2" and the apples in a
bucket are counted as "2" and the contents of the basket are emptied into the bucket
then the contents of the bucket will be counted as "4". At first glance it might be
extrapolate. Inductively one would not be able to say that 67 apples in the basket
and 95 apples in the bucket would result in 162 unless one had observed these
quantities being put together before. To make the extrapolation requires the abstract,
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But this argument does not stand up to a more subtle version of the realism.
We could adopt a similar strategy to that adopted by Field [p 274, 1989] in his
version of logicism "What ... is the value of the search for modal translations (or any
not instead adopt the easier course of simply trying to translate each of the
not say that every statement of arithmetic is induced from observations of real world
quantities. Nor need we say that the system of arithmetic is open to falsification, but
is not in fact never falsified by the observation of real world quantities. All we need to
say is that in any system for the calculation of real world quantities that employs
arithmetic.
This opens the door for the contention that non-falsifiable arithmetic is just a
useful but non-essential tool, rather like a typist's shorthand, or that it is a useful
fiction. This is a position that is counter to our intuition and today few would advocate
it. Ayer, in what Lakatos [p 30, 1985] described as logical empiricist orthodoxy, came
close to it when he claimed that truths of mathematics are analytic and a priori, that
there can be no a priori knowledge of reality, and that if a proposition is true a priori it
though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in
themselves contain any information about any matter of fact." [1946, p 87].
Gaskin produced an argument that counts against this sort of realist account.
Gaskin argues that an arithmetic formula such as "7 + 5 = 12" cannot mean the
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objects. He argues that in order to explain mistakes in counting we need to invoke
the notion of counting correctly. But Gaskin argues the meaning of correct counting
propositions based on counting do not have equivalent meaning, nor can they be
close because it would show the necessity of logically true statements, such as (5) in
Apple System 1, in every system of applied arithmetic. It would show that the
beginning of this section, was inadequate. It would, along with earlier arguments,
establish the main point of the present essay which is that every system, that is
informative about reality, must contain factual particulars, factual universals and
Gaskin's idea that there must some form of logical truth underlying our notion of
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counting cannot be identified without an arithmetic calculus and this is plainly not
Case C1. A child counting apples in a bucket says "one apple, two apples,
four apples, five apples" and concludes that there are five apples in the bucket when
there are in fact only four. In this case it is clear that the child has not learned how to
Case C2. A person who has learned to count correctly makes a mistake
counts by the same person or by other people. If a second, third and fourth count all
agree then we will conclude that the first count was incorrect.
soliloquy "one, two, three" etc. will make mistakes when counting large numbers.
These mistakes can be identified and corrected by other methods of counting. There
are many other ways of counting apples: i) writing the count down by taking an apple
out and writing down "1" taking out another and writing down "2" etc. ii) using a tally
board and crossing off "1" then "2" then "3" as the apples are removed, iii) using a
machine, banks have bank note counting machines and, no doubt, somewhere in
In none of these three different ways of identifying mistakes is there any need
Gaskin's contention that the notion of correct counting is, on the basis of the
arguments so far considered, rather implausible. The situation is made worse when
arithmetic can be identified and corrected by counting. A person might use addition
to determine the sum of a bucket containing seven apples and a basket containing
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five. He might come up with the answer "eleven". This mistake could be identified
That some form of logical truth underlining our notion of "correctness" in the
assignment of number requires a more powerful and more general argument than
A comprehensive account of the distinction between logical and factual truth would
necessary and contingent. Such a massive digression into philosophical logic can,
for present purposes, be circumvented if the distinction between logical and factual
truth is based on the key terms used to describe the difference between realism and
constructivism. That is, logically true statements are those that are invented and
what follows from them, factually true statements are those that are discovered to be
Following Popper we can say that all factually true universals are open to
falsification. Therefore they are contingent. Logically true statements by contrast are
not open to falsification, they are necessarily true. The relations between the two
types of statement can be seen in axiomatic systems. The axioms, definitions and
rules of production are inventions of the person or persons developing the system
and are, therefore, logically true. Any theorems that follow from the axioms and
definitions by means of the rules of production will also be logically true. Factually
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true premises can be introduced into an axiomatic system and theorems that follow
from axioms and factual premises by means of the rules of production will inherit the
contingency of the premises and be factually true. The problem is to determine why
we need the logical truths. Axioms and definitions could be replaced by factual
premises and factual theorems generated by the rules of production, and, as was
that is a system that is not underpinned by any logical statement, is not possible. The
later Wittgenstein argued that all languages are rule based. Rules may change but
they not falsifiable. As they are not falsifiable they have a very similar status to
case that two statements contradicted each other we would not know which had
been falsified. Suppose we take "all swans are white" to be a factual statement. Then
this can be falsified by "Donald is a swan and Donald is white". However, in order to
know that Donald is a swan we must have a criterion for including Donald in the
class of swans that is independent of Donald's colour. This criterion might be "being
a water-fowl with a long neck". However, if we are going to say that, on the basis of
Donald being a black water-fowl with a long neck, that "all swans are white" is false
then we have taken "being a water-fowl with a long neck" as being a defining
criterion for swans. That is we will have taken it to be logically true. A fixed pivotal
With Donald, the newly discovered black water-fowl with a long neck. The
crucial point is that before you can say "Donald is a swan" or "Donald is not a swan"
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you must have decided if white is a logical or a contingent identifying criterion for
swans. The need for both factually true and logically true statements in any
informative system can be seen clearly when we consider how the two forms of
of more than one term, will be characterized by the disjunction of the terms.
to specify all the members of the class i.e. all the extensions. Where a class F has
three members, G, H, I, we can express its extension as (∀x) (Fx ⊃ (Gx v Hx v Ix)). If
this class has, as a matter of logic, only these three members we can formulate an
class we can generate factual hypotheses about them. Suppose we define "cat" in
terms of its member species. E.g. every cat is a lion or a tiger or a leopard or a puma
etc. On the basis of this we might formulate various factual hypotheses, i.e. that only
cats have claws and that all cats have sharp teeth. These could lead to other factual
universals e.g. that anything that has claws also has sharp teeth. Thus, extensive
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Intensive definitions give the sense (connotation) of the definiendum. An intention
will give a criterion for class inclusion, in the case of intensive definition we need to
specify all the criteria. Where a member of a class J must meet three criteria, K, L,
M, we can express these as (∀x) ((Kx & Lx & Mx) ⊃ Jx)). If as a matter of logic there
only three criteria, we can formulate an intensive definition: L (Ax) ((Kx & Lx & Mx) ≡
Jx).
Intensive definitions can be useful. A fixed criteria for class membership will
enable us to identify members of the class. If we define a tiger as a cat with stripes
then we can say that if X is a cat and X has stripes then X is a Tiger. It might also be
true as a matter of fact that all wild Tigers live in Bengal or Assam. In this case if we
find an animal that is a cat and has strips and lives in Africa we will know that it is not
wild. Thus, intensive definitions can be useful in the formulation of particular factual
conclusions.
In these examples there has been a logical extension with a factual intention
or a logical intension with a factual extension. Now let us consider the case where a
term has a logical extension and a logical intension. Surely such a formulation is
useless. If the extension is fixed then intension can play no part in helping us identify
members of the class, nor is it factual. In this case, therefore, the intension is
useless.
The situation is hardly better where a term has a factual intension and a
factual extension. As neither are fixed both are open to revision. But if one is to be
revised it must surely be revised in the light of the other. We can discover that the a
putative intension is false based upon the extension. Or we can discover that a
putative extension is false based upon the intension. But we cannot make any
discoveries about one without taking the other as fixed. If we are to determine that
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something is a member of a class there must be some criterion for class inclusion
for class inclusion then that criterion must be true of all members of the class,
therefore, in order to make the determination we must have identified the members
of the class. It can be concluded that any useful term or class that has a logical
extension must have a factual and contingent intension; and any term or class that
has a logical intension must have a factual and contingent extension. An example
The intention of "a snake" could be "any reptile that does not have legs and
does not have eyelids", an extension could be "any member of the viper family or
adopt this extension as a definition of "snake", and suppose we give "viper" the
intensive definition of "any reptile with retractable fangs" Then, if we find a reptile that
has retractable fangs and eyelids, then we will have discovered that some snakes
have eyelids. We will have discovered that the putative intension of "snake" as "any
reptile that does not have legs and does not have eyelids" is false.
our discovery of the reptile with retractable fangs and eyelids would be the discovery
discovery that not all vipers are snakes. The putative extension of "snake" that
included all members of the viper family would have been discovered to be false.
An important point here is that as things currently stand in the world both the
intension and the extension given above are sufficient for the identification of snakes.
This means that for the practical purpose of identifying a snake we do not have to
know, or do not have to decide, whether it is the intension or the extension that is
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definitional. It is only when something like the reptile with retractable fangs and
eyelids is discovered that we have to make a decision. These are situations which
offer no precedence. A situation where the existing rules of language will not provide
a decision procedure. They require that a new rule be made but this will not
factors that go into the decision but logically it will be arbitrary. In these situation a
having decided which is a definition. Both are sufficient identification criteria. They
therefore inhabit a logical limbo which will not be resolved until a particular fact
forces the issue. Lets imagine a animal called "Olga" and the following:
i) is factual or not.
fangs.
This forces a decision about whether i) or ii) is false. And this decision is not
factual, it is solely about whether the language game player choose to take one or
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other as a definition. If i) is taken to be definitional then ii) will be false - it will not be
true that all vipers are reptiles. However, if ii) is taken as definitional then i) will be
false and we will have insufficient grounds for asserting that Karl is a snake. The
may not have been accepted as definitions as yet. One might say that the truth value
A case can now be constructed to show the relation between the calculus of
arithmetic and systems of counting are of the same order as that between intensions
and extensions. However, the word "counting" will be dropped because this is
sometimes and sometimes not, used, like "knowledge" as a success word. It could
be argued, one way or the other, that a correspondence with the arithmetic calculus
is built into the concept of counting. The word "tally" will be used in its place. The
word "tally" will imply nothing more that a system or ritual for producing totals.
Tally System 1
There is a tribe of goat-herds who live in an enclosed valley from which no goat can
escape. Each member of the tribe has a tally stick onto which beads are threaded.
When a tribe member is given a goat, or when one of his goats gives birth, a new
bead is threaded on to the owners tally stick. When one of his goats dies a bead is
taken off the owner's tally stick. We can imagine that in the tribe social prestige and
privilege is the determined by the number of goats that a person owns. Given this the
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tally system will be useful. It can be determined who has the most goats by placing
Tally System 2
first goat 0
second goat 00
third goat 0000
fourth goat 00000000
This form of tally system differentiates the social ranking more clearly that in
Tally System 1, therefore one might argue, it is more useful. However, in this system
when a goat dies only one bead is removed from the tally stick. Therefore, we can
assume that the number of beads on the tally stick will not normally correspond to
the number of goats that a goat herd owns. The number of beads on the tally stick
will not normally even correspond to the number of goats that a goat herd has
owned. A goat herd who has had four goats and four have died and a goat herd who
has had three goats and none have died will both have 0000 on their tally sticks. But
we need not assume that this system is any less useful that system 1. Perhaps goats
require skill to breed but die largely by accident. It is, we might imagine, quite right
that a man who has had four goats, but been unlucky and lost them all, should be
given the same respect as a man who has only ever had three.
We need not assume that the goat-herds using either Tally System 1 or Tally
System 2 have any knowledge of arithmetic. Nor need we assume that they can
count in any way independently of their tally sticks. Beads are threaded and taken off
as part of a public semi-religious ritual. Everybody in the tribe can agree when this
22
ritual is properly performed. Children are taught the ritual along with various occult
rituals.
The way in which number is defined can now be considered. One possibility is to
"three" can be as follows: "(1 + 1 + 1) & (1 + 2) & (2 + 1)". Given this logical intension
the contingent extension would be the total returned by a system or ritual that
System 1 or a total from System 2 or a total from System 3 etc.". Any system that
produced a total would be a candidate for inclusion. Tally System 1 and Tally System
2 would both be candidates and, as a matter of fact, totals from Tally System 1
would be part of the extension but those from Tally System 2 would not.
It is fortuitous that the bead threading ritual of the tribe using Tally System 1
we are entitled to call it a system of counting. It is not that a logically true arithmetic
is required in order to determine what correct counting is, as Gaskin suggested, but
that a logically true arithmetic will enable us to determine what systems are to count
will be a matter of empirical inquiry and discovery which systems and rituals can be
part of the extension i.e. which systems and rituals are counting systems where
problem in explaining how it applies to reality (our problem was explaining how
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logically true number systems could apply to reality). It can now be explained, which
Popper failed to do, why a logically true system of arithmetic can be useful.
Given that tally systems are contingent with regard to number, the logically
true system of arithmetic is not only useful but essential. This might not be
immediately apparent because it might seem that tally systems can be identified as
systems of counting by the fact that the totals they produce stand in a one-to-one
relation with objects in the real world. But it is difficult to see how "one" can be given
because arithmetic provides such a definition, i.e. "(3 - 2) & (4 - 3) & (5 - 4)" that one
have to say that a counting system must produce one-to-one totals unless we have
the present account is not a system of counting, is just as dependent on real world
objects as Tally System 1, which is. Tally system 2 is also in some mathematical
relation to real world objects. If number were defined in some other way it would
open up the possibility of a system of "counting" in which the total were not in a one-
adequate answer to this question. However, the arguments used above can also be
used to challenge the contention that the formulae of arithmetic are logically true.
that given in the previous section. Number and counting could be defined in terms of
Tally System 1. Numbers could be determined by placing tally sticks upright next to
24
each other. A "one" tally stick is higher than an empty tally stick but shorter than a
"two" tally stick. A "two" tally stick is higher than a "one" tally stick but shorter than a
"three" tally stick. Counting is the act of assigning the number to a tally stick. Given
that numbers are defined in this way it will be contingent and a matter of empirical
that tally systems existed before arithmetic. In this case originally it must have been
5 CONCLUSION
There are two tenable accounts of number. One is to regard numbers as defined by
the propositions of arithmetic in which case these propositions are, incorrigible and
logically true, while the propositions based on tally systems are falsifiable and
factually true. The other is to regard number as defined by a tally system in which
case propositions based on the system will be incorrigible and logically true while the
knowledge spread and the notation for expressing it because increasingly uniform
more people began to regard it as logically true. This trend continued to the present
day when most people would take any tally system and possibly every tally system
tenable account of formulas such as "2 + 2 = 4", they have assumed that they are
25
either logically true or contingent in an absolute sense. They have assumed that
some arguments would be produced that would show conclusively that they are one
or the other. Popper is, I think, the only one to have come up with the idea that "2 + 2
= 4" can at one time be logically true and at another be factually true, that the
Popper's mistake was to think that it was the formula "2 + 2 = 4" rather than
the number "4" that could be taken in two sense. As we have seen "4" is in one
sense the product of an arithmetic formula in another sense it is the product of a tally
system. Popper also regarded arithmetic as being logically true. This might be true,
as far as most people, as a matter of fact but it is not true as a matter of logic. As has
been shown, there need not be any self contradiction involved in taking arithmetic as
factually true provided the products of a given tally system are taken as logically true.
question to ask which is more practical. There could be logical problems in defining
numbers in terms of more than one tally system. As things currently stand it would
This was possible for Napoleon but would be difficult to arrange today.
6 REFERENCES
Ayer, A.J. (1946) Language, Truth and Logic, Second Edition. London: Gollancz.
Gaskin, D.A.T. (1940): Mathematics and the World, The Australian Journal of
Philosophy, 18, 2, 97-116.
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Hofstadter, D.R. (1980): Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. London:
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