Design meth

smoke and h
ventilation

H P Morgan
B K Ghosh
G Garrad
R Pamlitschka
J-C De Smedt ST. J8
L R Schoonbaert

OF
Photo acknowledgomsnts
Wontcoe — conq it
Brussels International Airport
Company (MAC)

Rae con.' at
Colt Plates 1, 35
and 6
Cooper Qoip: Plate 4
F$ET: Plates2, Ji, .12, .13 and .14
 BRE
Garston.Watford
WD2 7JR

Design methodologies
for smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation

H P Morgan BSc, PhD, C Phys, M InstP, F I FireE

B K Ghosh MSc, BA, C Phys, M InstP, Dip Math

G Garrad BSc, MSc

Dipi Ing R Pamlitschka(Colonel)

J-CDeSmedt AlFireE

Ing L R Schoonbaert DipI CFPA, Al FireE

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Firstpublished1999

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Front coverphoto:

Hot-smoketest atBrussels
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1
 ______________

Foreword

Useby fire engineers ofsmoke and heat exhaust ventilationsystems (SHEVSasthey havebecome
known) has grown in recentyears.It istherefore welcomethatthis guide has beenproduced
whichprovidesthe fireengineer with assessmentdesignmethodologiesfor theuse ofthese
systems. SHEVSrequire the most carefuldesign prior to introduction. It is importanthowever to
ensure, aswith all fire-engineeringdesigns,that due regard is taken overissuessuchasescape time
andfire growth since thesefeatures provide thebase uponwhich the designparameters canbe
made.
It is also important that dueregard be ultimatelymade regardingthe maintenance ofany
systemsinstalledand current guidance,primarilywithin the BritishStandardsInstitution's DI)240
Firesafetyengineeringzi buildings.DD240 hasintroduced the overalldesign processwhichthefire
engineer should consider.DD240 also makes it clear that caution is necessaryandthatall options
haveto be consideredbefore entering intoa particulardesign process.SHEVSis oneofthose
options and thisbooktherefore provides comprehensiveidentificationofthe issueswhichneed
consideration.Itis particularlyimportant to payattention,as the document outlines,to the
restrictionsofcomputer softwaremodelling programs, as it is alsofor the fire engineer to
recognizethereare limitationsastowhat any systems (and that includes SHEYS) can achieve.
Withthesethoughts in mind, thisbookprovides amost usefuland comprehensivereview of
current thinkingregarding SHEVSdesignmethodologiesforutilization bythe fire engineer.

D T DavisOBEQFSM CEug FiFireECIMgt

HM ChiefInspector ofFire Servicesfor Scotland
iJune 1999
iv

Preface

Thisguidesummarizes the adviceavailablefrom theFireResearch Station,to designers ofSmoke

and HeatExhaust VentilationSystems (SHEVS)for atria andotherbuildings.Itbuilds upon
currently availablepublishedadvice (especiallyBRE Report Design approachesforsmokecontrolin
atriumbuildings[13],butalsoBRE Report Desinprinciblesforsmokeventilation thenclosedshopping
cenfres24l), byincluding moreguidance ontheuseofthe methods given, and by includingthe
results ofresearch carried out since the publicationofref. [13] in 1994. Inparticular,the use ofa
design firesizeis considered inmore detail, including:
•• adiscussionofgrowingfires,
formulaeand calculation methods todetermine the deflection ofsmoke curtainsinfire
situationsso thatthespecificationofsmoke curtainscan become part ofthe SHEVS design,
• the effectsdue to airflowon theefficiencyofnatural smoke exhaust ventilators and on the
stabilityofsmokelayers.

This guide does not consider the scenario whereafire in a room connecting to an atriumcausesa
flame plume to rise intotheatrium. Inthis context, anylarge space adjoiningthe fireroommay be
considered to be an atrium, egmalls in shopping complexes.
A discussionis included ofthe factorswhichneedto beconsidered whenspecifyingthe
hardware (ventilators,smoke curtains,etc.)required to implementthe design in abuilding.
Some adviceis alsoincluded on:
•• factorstobeconsidered ininstallingthe system inbuildings,
howtotest thefinctioning ofthe equipment separately and as a complete system onceit has
beeninstalled, and
• 'goodpractice' measuresinvolvingthemanagement andmaintenance ofthe system whenthe
buildingis in everyday use.

Thepurpose ofthisbooktherefore isto provide practical guidanceon the design ofsmoke-control

systems.It reflectscurrentknowledge andis basedonthe resultsofresearchwhereavailable,
including asyet unpublished resultsofexperiments. In addition,itdraws on the authors'
cumulativeexperience ofdesignfeaturesrequired forregulatory purposes inmanyindividual
smoke-control applications.Manyofthese designfeatures have evolvedover several years by
consensusbetweenregulatory authorities,developers andfire scientists,ratherthan byspecific
research.
Themethodology underpinning the bookis explicitlyempirical in approachand caneasilybe
extended to most buildings.Whereguidanceis necessaryto address practicaldesign issuesbut
there aregaps inthe establishedknowledge-base,theauthors haveexercised theirprofessional
judgement in offeringconservative,pragmaticadvice.When guidanceis offeredinthese
circumstancesanypotential weaknessesare madeexplicit.Related to this is the continuance ofthe
philosophy usedin the book's predecessor BRE Reports'3'241that evenwherea document is
difficult to obtain, or even verbal private communicationis the source ofadvice,it is listed as a
reference.

HPM, BKG,GG, RP,J-CDe S, LRS

June 1999
 V

About the authors

Howard P Morgan
Principal Consultant, Fire ProtectionSystemsCentre,
Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE
Head, FRS(Asia)Centre
Technical Director, FRSAFSET(Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong

Fire Research Station, BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford, WD27JR, UK

Email: morganh@bre.co.uk

BijoyGhosh
Senior Fire Consultant, Fire Research Station (FRS),
BRE

Fire Research Station, BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford, WD27JR, UK

Email: ghoshb@bre.co.uk

Gordon Garrad
FireScientist,Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE

Fire Research Station,BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford, WD27JR, UK

Email: garradg@bre.co.uk
vi Aboutthe authors

ColonelR Pamlitschka
Head ofFirePrevention Department, Professional Fire
Service, Vienna, Austria
Head of Smoke-Control Department, Prüfstelle für
Brandschutztechnik des Osterreichischen
Bundesfeuerwehrverbandes, Austria

CO Ma. 68, Hauptfeuerwache Mariahilf,

Gumpendorfer Gurtel 2, A-1060Wien, Austria

Jean-Claude De Smedt
Managing Director/PrincipalConsultant,International
Fire Safety Engineering Technology (IFSET),Belgium
Managing Director, FRS/IFSET(Asia) Ltd, HongKong

NVIFSET SA, Stationsstraat35, B-i730ASSE,

Belgium

Email: jcds@ifsetcom

Lieven R Schoonbaert
SeniorConsultant, International Fire SafetyEngineering
Technology OFSET), Belgium
Director, FRSAFSET(Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong

NV IFSET SA, Stationsstraat35, B-1730ASSE,

Belgium

Email: ls@ifset.com
 VII

Contents

Foreword iii
Preface iv
Abouttheauthors v
Contents vii
Abbreviations xii
Nomenclature Xiii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Thehazardsofsmoke 1

1.2 The regulatorybackground 1

1.3 The role of smoke and heat exhaustventilation 2

1.4 Smoke and heat exhaustventilation as a part offire safety engineering 2
1.5 A brief history of smoke ventilation 4
1.6 The atrium:descriptionand behaviour in fire 5
1.7 Active control of the fire 6
1.8 Implementation of a smoke and heat exhaustsystem in a building 7
1 .9 The purposeof this book and its relationship to earlierguidance 8
Chapter 2 General principles of smoke production, 10
movementand control
2.1 Fire growth and smokeproduction 10
2.2 Pressurization and depressurization 12
2.3 Throughtiow ventilation (or smoke exhaustventilation) 12
2.4 Smoke and heat exhaustdesign philosophies 13
Chapter 3 Design-firesize 14
3.1 General 14
3.2 Growingdesignfires 15
3.3 Steady-state designfires 16
3.4 Acceptablefailure rates 19
Chapter 4 Escape times 20
Chapter 5 Smoke control on the storey of fire origin 22
5.1 Within the fire room 22
5.1.1 Plumes above large fires 22
5.1.2 Plume above smallfires 24
viii Contents

5.1.3 Effects of adjacent walls on entrainment into the plume 25

5.1.4 Effects of sprinkler 25
5.2 The flow of hot gases out ofthe room of origin into 25
a taller adjacent space(eg an atrium or mall)
5.3 Ventilation of single-storey smoke reservoirs 27
(including the balconyspacewheresmoke is contained
and exhausted from beneath a balcony)
5.4 Smoke layertemperature 28
5.5 Effects of sprinkler systems in smoke reservoirs 30
5.6 Flowing layerdepth 30
5.7 Localdeepening 31
5.8 Automatic smoke curtains 31
5.9 Inletair 32
5.10 Minimum numberof exhaustpoints 34
5.11 Throughflowventilation:area of naturalventilation required 35
5.12 Naturalventilatorsand wind effects 35
5.13 Required ventilationrate (powered exhaust) 37
5.14 Slit extract 37
5.15 False ceilings 37
5.16 The use ofa plenum chamberabove a false ceiling 38
5.17 Maximum dimensionsfor smoke reservoirs 38
Chapter 6 Smokeventilation within multistorey spaces (egthe atrium) 39
6.1 Smokemovementintheatrium 39
6.2 Channelling screens 40
6.3 Entrainment into 'spill plumes'risingthroughthe atrium 42
6.3.1 The effective height of rise fromthe spill edge 42
to the smoke layer base
6.3.2 Entrainment calculationmethods 44
6.3.3 Recommendations for selecting a spill plume formula 49
6.4 High temperatureplume 49
6.5 Firesontheatriumfloor 50
6.6 Throughflowventilation: remaining design procedures 50
6.7 Limitationsto the use of throughflowventilation 50
Chapter 7 Alternative forms of smoke control for atria 53
(including multistorey malls but excluding throughflow ventilation)
7.1 Voidfihling 53
7.2 Compartmentseparation 53
7.3 Depressurization ventilation 53
7.3.1 Principles 53
7.3.2 Naturaldepressurization 54
7.3.3 Naturaldepressurizationand wind effects 57
7.3.4 Powereddepressurization 58
Chapter 8 Depressurization/smoke ventilation hybrid designs 59
Chapter 9 Atrium smoke layer temperature 61
Chapter 10 Additional design factors 64
10.1 Atrium roof-mounted sprinklersystems 64
10.2 Controlled fire load on the atrium base 64
 Contents ix
________

10.3 Air-conditioned atria 64

10.4 Channelling screensand hybrid systems 65
10.5 Wind-sensing devices 65
10.6 Crossdraughtwithin the atrium 65
10.7 Crossflowwithinthe gas layer 65
10.8 Wind effects on horizontalventilators 66
Chapter 11 Interactions with othersystemsin the building 67
11.1 Sprinklers 67
11.1.1 Automaticsprinklers 67
11.1.2 Automaticsmoke exhaustventilation 67
11.1.3 Sprinklerscombinedwith smokeventilation 67
11.2 Fire-detection systems 69
11.3 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)/ 69
Air Conditioning and Mechanical Ventilation (ACMV)
11 .4 Pressurization of stairwellsand lobbies 70
11.5 Lightingand signage 70
11.6 Public addressand voice alarm systems 70
11.7 Security 70
11.8 Computerizedbuilding control systems 71

Chapter 12 SHEVS andthe fire services 72

12.1 General 72
12.2 Design objectivesfor SHEVS and implications for the design-fire 72
as a basisfor design
12.2.1 Fundamental fire-fighting objectives 72
12.2.2 Design objectivesfor SHEVS in connection 73
with fire-fighting objectives
12.3 Circumstances which reduceor impede the ability of a SHEVS 76
to assist fire-fighting operations
12.3.1 Factors adverselyaffecting successfulintervention 77
by the fire services
12.3.2 Additional provisions for optimizingthe effectiveuse 77
of a smoke-free layer created by a SHEVS
for fire-fighting operations
12.4 Circumstanceswhere a SHEVS is of minor benefit 77
for fire-fightingoperations
12.5 Circumstanceswhere SHEVS are not applicable 78
12.5.1 Premises with risk of fast-growing fires 78
12.5.2 Premiseswhich must not be enteredin case of fire 78
because of other prevailing hazards
13 Selection of equipment 79
13.1 General 79
13.2 Natural smoke and heat exhaustventilators 80
13.2.1 Time taken to come into full operation 80
13.2.2 Coefficientof performance 80
13.2.3 Resistancetoheat 81
13.2.4 Opening under load: snow 81
13.2.5 Opening under load: side-wind 81
x__________ Contents _________________________ ______________________________

13.2.6 Lowambienttemperature 82
13.2.7 Reliability 82
13.2.8 Abilityto resist windsuction 82
13.2.9 Abilityto resist rain penetration 82
13.3 Powered smoke and heat exhaustventilators 82
13.3.1 Timeto come into full operation 82
13.3.2 Resistancetoheat 83
13.3.3 Opening under load: snow 83
13.3.4 Opening under load: wind 83
13.3.5 Lowambienttemperature 83
13.3.6 Reliability 83
13.4 Automatic smoke curtains 83
13.4.1 Timeto deployto the fire-operational position 83
13.4.2 Speedoffallofbottombar 83
13.4.3 Resistance to hightemperature 83
13.4.4 Reliability 84
13.4.5 Fail-safe 84
13.5 Air inletsand doors 84
13.6 Smoke dampers 84
13.7 Smoke ducts 84
—
Chapter 14 Installation 86
Chapter 15 Acceptance testing (commissioning) 89
15.1 General 89
15.2 Testing and commissioning 89
15.3 Hot-smoketests 91
Chapter 16 Maintenance,management and re-testing 92
Chapter 17 Some common mistakes in the design of smoke ventilation systems 94
17.1 Mis-location ofthe point source of a 'point-source' smoke plume 94
17.2 Inadequate specificationof smoke curtains 94
17.3 Installation does not follow design 94
17.4 Mis-use of computer models 94
1 7.5 Mistaken perceptionsof conflict between 95
active and passive fire precautions
Chapter 18 Smoke ventilation design and enforcement of regulations 96
Chapter 19 Acknowledgements 97
Chapter 20 References 98
Annex A: Design procedure with a growing design fire 101
Annex B: Design procedure with a steady-state design fire 103
Annex C: Deflection of smoke curtains 106
Annex D: A comparison of differentspill-plume calculation methods 109
Annex E: User's guide to BREspill-plume calculations 112
AnnexF: 1977fire at IMF building, WashingtonDC (basedon reference [18]) 117
AnnexG: Design procedure for hybrid systems 119
________________ Contents ______________________________ ________ xi

Annex H: Effect of a buoyant layer on the minimum pressure 120

recommendedfor a pressure differentialsystem
Annex I: Aspects of hot-smoketests to confirmthe performance of SHEVS 121
Annex J: Casehistory — smoke-control design in 'D3 Espace Leopold 123
Bui!ding', European Parliament, Brussels
XII

Abbreviations

ACMV Airconditioning and mechanicalventilation

BRE Building ResearchEstablishmentLimited
BS British Standard
BSI British Standards Institution
CEA Comité Européen des Assurances
CEN Comité Européende Normalisation
CFD Computational fluid dynamics
Eqn Equation
FRG Fire-resistingglazing
FRS FireResearchStation
HST Hot-smoketest
HVAC Heating,ventilationand airconditioning
IFSET InternationalFire Safety EngineeringTechnology
NIST National Institutefor Standardsand Technology(USA)
NPP Neutralpressure plane
RTI Responsetimeindex
SHEVS Smokeand heat exhaust ventilationsystem
 XIII

Nomenclature

Note: An additionalNomenclaturelistcan befound in Annex E

A Functiondefined by Eqn(7.3)
Af Area ofthe fire(m2)
Ag Area ofthe gaps between smoke curtains, orbetween curtain and structure (m2)
A Area of inlet (measured)(m2)
Ares Plan areaofsmoke reservoir (m2)

A5 Area of exhaustventilator (measured)(m2)

A Areaof opening (window),eg betweenaside-room and an atrium (m2)
c Specific heat ofair(kJkg1K1)
C Aconstant (kgms1kW')
Cd Coefficientof discharge foravertical opening
Cdfor flows out of anopening where abalcony or canopyprojects beyond
CdO
the opening
CdS Cd forflows ata spill edge.
Ce Entrainmentcoefficient in Large-fireplume model'
C Coefficientofdischarge lie theperformance coefficient) foran inlet
C Dimensionlessentrainment coefficient, found experimentallytobe0.44 for a free plume,
and 021 for an adhered plume
C5 Aconstant inZukoski's small-fireplume modef43
C5 Wind pressurecoefficient
Wind pressurecoefficient acting on aninlet
Wind pressurecoefficient acting onthe leewardsideof building
CPL
Wind pressurecoefficient acting on anexhaustventilator
C5 Coefficient ofdischarge (ietheperformance coefficient) for anexhaustventilator
d Horizontaldeflection ofasmoke curtain, measured atits bottom bar(m)
d1 Visible depth of smoke layer inthe smoke reservoir (m)
d0 Depthofan opening between anatrium and a side-room,
measuredfromtop to bottom ofthatopening (m)
d2 Effective depth ofsmoke layer — only used as part ofspillplume entrainmentcalculation(m)
D Depth ofsmoke beneathan exhaustpoint(m)
DB Depth ofa smoke layer under a balcony (m)
Dd Depth ofa downstandfascia (m)
Df Diameter offire (m)
D1 Designdepth ofa smoke layer in a reservoir (m)
D Depth ofaflowing smoke layer ina vertical opening (m)
Dmax Maximumdepth ofsmoke inan atrium (m)
(Note:Thiscan either be tothefloor,orthe maximumallowable in a
hybrid SHEVS/depressurizationdesign)
Dmn Minimumallowable smoke layer depth in a hybrid SHEVS/depressurizationdesign (m)
g Accelerationdue togravity (ms2)
h Height ofthetop ofa vertical opening/window abovethe base ofthefire insidethe room (m)
hb Height ofrise ofa thermal line plumefroman opening or balcony edgetothe smoke layer (m)
h5 Height ofrise ofleakage gases fromthe base ofthehot gaslayer in the smoke reservoir to theceiling
inthe adjacent protected area (m)
H Height ofavertical opening (m)
H5 Height ofthe atrium (m)
H Height tothe ceiling (m)
L Channellingscreen separation; also length ofaspilledge(m)
(Note: L = W foraspill plume rising directly abovean opening)
xiv Nomenclature
L Length of the smoke curtainfromtop to bottom bar, measured along the fabric (ml
M Massflow rate (kgs')
M1)
Massper metre length ofthe curtain's bottombar (kgm1)
Mr Massperm2 ofthe curtainfabric(kgm2)
M0RIL Critical exhaustrate atan exhaustpoint priorto the onset of plugholing )kgs
M Massflow rate of smoky gases exhaustedfromthesmoke reservoir (kg 1)
(Note: UsuallyMe = M)
M1 Massflow rate rithe plumeabovethe fire (kgs 1
M1,
Massof gas flowingthrough the gap between smoke curtains, or betweencurtain and structure Ikgs)
MB Massflow rate under a balcony (kgs I)
M1
Mass flow rate entering a smoke layer in a reservoir (kgs1)
M Mass ofgasflowing into gaslayer in protected area, having leaked through gaps in smoke curtains (kgs 1)
M Mass flow rate flowing through averticalopening (kgs1)
n An integer used to identify one stage in an iterative process
N Number of exhaustpoints
P Perimeter offire(m)
q Heat release rate 1kW)
q Heat release rate per unit fire area (kWm2)
Q Heat flux 1kW)
Q, Convective heat flux in the gases after the initial flame plume )kW)
Q Convectiveheatflux passing through avertical opening (or under a balcony)(kW)
Afunction defined by Eqn(H.11
I time after ignition Is)
T Absolutetemperature of gases (K)
T3 Massweighted average absolutetemperature ofgaslayer under a balcony (K)
T Maximumvalue ofabsolutetemperature in a layer beneatha ceiling or soffit(K)
T Mass-weightedaverage absolutetemperature of gas layer in areservoir (K)
T0 Absoluteambient temperature (K)
v, Wind velocity at the same heightas thetop ofthe building (m s1)
V Volumetricflow rateof gases (m )s
V1 Volumetricflow rateof gases exhaustedfroma reservoir (m3si)
W Width ofverticalopening (ml
W Width of balcony(distance fromvertical openingto front edge ofbalcony)(ml
W Characteristicwidth oftheventilator/exhaust point (m)
X Heightfromthe base ofthe smoke layer to the NPP(m)
Effective heightof rise ofaspill plume (m)
y Height abovethe top ofthefuelto thesmoke layer immediately above (ml
Y1 Height ofthevirtual origin ofthe plumemeasured abovethetop ofthe burning fuel Im)
(Note Thisusuallytakes a negativevalue)
Ypi Height abovethe NPP in a smoke layer (m)
Y Height fromthe base ofthe fireto the smoke layer immediately above (m)
Y Height abovethe base ofthefire tothe virtual originofthe smoke plume(ml
(Note:This usuallytakes a negative value)
i Coefficientin critica exhaustrate eqn (kgm3)
y A constant definingthe steepness of atime-squaredfire growth curve (kWs21
fiM Entrainmentrate into both free ends of a spill plume(kgs')
Empiricalheight ofvirtual source below a spill edge (m(
ADB Additional smoke depth due tolocal deepening(m)
Ap Buoyantpressure rise aboveambient at a heightYNpP abovethe NPPlPa)
o Temperaturerise aboveambient of smoky gases (°C(
°3 Thmperaturerise aboveambient of smoky gases under a balcony(DC)
0 Temperaturerise aboveambient of smoky gases in areservoir 1°C)
o Temperaturerise aboveambient of smoky gases in a vertical opening (°C)
p Densityof gases lkgmi)
p0 Densityi:f ambient air (kgm1l

1 Introduction
1.1 The hazards of smoke
Inthe context offire theterm smokeisusedto describe
liquidand/or solid particulatesproduced by combustion
offuel materials,suspended in a mixtureofair and
gaseousproducts ofcombustion, including steam. It is
thus convenientto use the word smoke' to includeboth
theparticulate and thegaseousproducts, including any
air which is entrained intothe fireplume and into
subsequent smokeflows,
Thegaseouscombustion Products usually include
toxic gases, the most common in buildingfires being
carbon monoxide,although hydrogen cyanide and other
toxic gasesmight he presentto some extent; irritants such
as Acrolein;and relatively harmlessproducts such as
water and carbon dioxide,Smoke pai-ticles themselves
can.be irritants,and can be particularlydangerous to
people Who are subjectto asthma or other respiratory
problems.'['he reduction in oxygendue to combustion
can itselfbe dangerous in sonic situations,and can result
inthe suffocationofvictmstrapped in smoke. Theheat
inthe gasesdue to combustionis alsopotentially
hazardous, eitherto people who might be immersed in
the hot gases orby heatradiation from the hot smoky
gasesifthegas temperature ishigh enough.
The reduction invisibilityin smoke alsorepresents a
severe hazard, It hampers evacuation andthe rescuing of
disabled orinjured occupants ofbuildingsaswell as
affectingfire4Ightingoperations which can result in large
fires involvingseriousthreat to livesand the
environment.
In general,ifthe visibility through thesmoke is
sufficient or the emergency exits are visibleto the
escapees,the toxic products will not stoj:) those people
from escapingto safety. In practice this means that either
the smoky gasmust be diluted with sufficient clean airto
achieve a safevisibility(typicallyof10 iii which has come
into)widespread use internationally,although it has avery
weak scientificbasis, and should only be regarded as
approximate),orthereshould he aphysical separation
between the smokygases and the people at risk. Note
that thedirectproducts of combustion may needto be
diluted by more than one thousand times byvolume to
achieve a safevisibility.
1
Smoke ispotentially lethal, Itis a wellestablishedfact
that in the UK most deaths from tires aredue to smoke
inhalation ratherthan tothe victimhaving been burned.
However, the majorityofthese deaths occur in dwellings.
Deaths from fires in other premises are relatively
infrequent.This impliesthat the Iifesafety measures
required by legislationformost public and commercial
buildingshavebeen effectiveon the whole,
1.2 The regulatory background
Eachcountry in the world has its OWfl approach to the
creation and enforcement of regulationscovering the
topicofsafety in fire. Eachhas its own history bywhich it
developed thatapproach. In this section we focuson the
UK, inview of'its earlyand continuing development of
fire regulations.
FiresaiCty in buildingsmust, inthe UK, conform to the
relevant regulations (eg guidancefor England and Wales
is given in Approved 1)ocument B1l). The principal
objectiveofthese regulationsis to safeguardlife l:y:
•• reducing the potential for fire initiation,
controlling firepropagation and spread,
• the provisionof adequate means ofescape :ibr the
building'soccupants.
Means ofescape in case offire was first introduced to the
BuildingRegulationsfor England and Walesin 1973. Prior
to that datethepowersofcontrol in Englandand Wales
over means ofescape had been contained in other
legislation•2•-4•,
Historically, the prevention of fire growth within (or
between) buildingshasbeen achieved by the
containment ofthe fireand its products, by means of
coinpartmentation and/or separation. The designof
structural compartmentation and separation has been
largelyempirical and the concepts gradually refinedand
enhanced in such a waythat the BuildingRegulations
i
now cC)ver primarilylifesafetyandthe protectio of
means of escape. It is necessarytoconsider four major
aspects ofbuildings'— purpose,size,separation and
resistance tofire to promote safedesign.
Smoke and beat exhaust ventilation doesnot appear
directly in the UK's regulations,except in some Local
2 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Acts.It has formed part oftherecognized package of
measuresneededto merit aRelaxation from the Building
Regulationsforshopping mallssince 1972; and atthe
time ofwriting has become an indirect requirement of
Approved Document whichrequires that newmalls
inEngland andWales comply with BritishStandard
BS 5588:Part io61 whichin turnrequires thatmalls
should have smokeventilation as anessentialpart oftheir
safety provisions.Itis expected that a similarlinkwillbe
establishedbetweenfuture editions ofApproved
Document B and BritishStandard BS 5588:Part7for
atria7.
Severalother countries havelegislationconcerningthe
protection ofpropertyin case offire —especiallythat
propertyneighbouringan object on fire—and the
protection oftheenvironment (egair pollutionand/or
contamination ofwaterand soil) whichwill be
endangered ifafire islikelytoreachan unmanageably
large size.
1.3 The role of smoke and heat exhaust
ventilation
Thisbookfocuses on the use ofsmokeand heat exhaust
ventilation,ratherthan other forms ofsmoke control
suchas smoke control usingpressuredifferentials
(although it does also discussthe need to allow for the
interactions betweensuchsystemswhendesigning).
As mentioned insection 1.1, thecombustion products
from buildingcontentfiresmay require averylarge
dilution to achieve a safevisibility. Withtypically smoky
fuelssuchasmanypolymers thisdilution can reachone
thousand timesthe initialvolume ofcombustion gases.
This isdifficultto achieve forthesizeoffire wetypically
have to consider in designingfire safetymeasures,and is
rarely afeasibleoption —butitmaybepossiblewherethe
designfireis small, and the buildingvolume is large.
Physical separation ofsmoke and people is
conventionallyachieved usingwalls anddoors, andis
specifiedintheregulationsofmost countries,differing
only in details.This approach cannot, by definition,be
usedwherethe people (orproperty, or escape routes)
being protected from smoke are in the same undivided
space as the fire; and in many modernbuildings,large
undividedspaces are usedto improve the appearance and
environmental ventilation.Itis this scenario where
smoke andheat exhaust ventilation is ofvalue. The
principles areverysimple.Hot,buoyantgases from afire
riseto form a stable layer in areservoirbelowthe ceiling
suchthatacoolerclear layerofsufficientheightmay be
presentforlong enough toachieve safeevacuationof
occupants. Often it isnecessary tovent the smokefrom
the reservoirusinga natural or mechanicalexhaust. In
thisbooksuchaSmoke andHeatExhaust Ventilation
System willbe referred tousingthe acronym SHEVS.
It is raretofind circumstanceswherea SHEVSis
requiredwithin a smallroom. It isusuallysufficient in
such circumstancesto ensuresafety byacombination of
fire-resistingcompartmentation, sufficiently shorttravel
distances for escape,and measures for detecting the fire
in an early stage andalertingthe occupants ofthe
building. Itshould be noted, however, that
compartmentation maynotbe sufficientby itselfto assist
firefighting. Facilities toremove smokeand heatmay be
ofbenefit forfirefightingoperations, and in some cases a
reduction ofcompartmentation may be inevitableas a
result offirefightingpractice (eg smokemayspreadout
ofa smallroomintoa number ofotherrooms through
dooropeningsheldopen byfire hoses). Theassessment
ofsuitablefacilitiesto remove smoke andheat from such
smallrooms and theirneighbouring spaces duringand
after extinguishingprocedures will be a case-by-case
decision in accordance with the experience andtraining
offire fighters,and not as a result ofcalculation.These
precautionsforremoving smoke andheatare notwithin
the scope ofthis book.
A SHEVSis more likelyto be advantageousin a larger
room, suchas an exhibitionhall, shopping mall, or a
factory,wherethereis no internal compartmentation and
wherethetravel distances areappreciable.
A SHEVSis no differentin principlewhetherdesigned
for alargesingle-storeyspace whichis essentially alarge
box (egmanyfactories, or exhibition halls),orfor a
complicated (but undivided) space containing many
storeys ofbalconies ormezzanine levels with potential
firelocations in rooms to the sideofbut open to the main
space.As can be seen below, theformer can beregarded.
as aspecial case ofthe latter.
1.4 Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation as
a part offire safety engineering
Every fireis a chemicaland physicalprocess producing
energy (mainly heat) and smoky gasesas well as other
less hazardous products. Therefore, every fire prevention
concept must have the same mainobjectives:
••to avoid ignition and thusthe outbreak ofa fire at all,
to protecthuman beings,goods, the buildingandthe
environment from the hazardous effectsofthe
products ofthe fire (egheat and smoke) aslongas they
arestill beingproduced bythe fire,
• to hamperand finally stop the production ofheat and
smoke (ie to extinguishthe fire).
Anyfire prevention concepttherefore should be a
composite ofwell-selected measures beingin tunewith
eachother, and which hamperorstopthe production of
heatand smoke, and/orwhichprotectthe objectswhicl
areintended tobeprotected(people,property, etc.) by
separatingthem from smoke andheat.Wherethis last
cannotbefully uchieved, the purpose must be todiminish
the effectsontheprotected people and/or objects.
Theserelationships areillustrated inFigure 1.The
thickarrows represent those influenceswhichdiminish
the production ofsmoke andheat; orwhich reduce then
effects;orwhichkeep the hazardous products of
combustion awayfrom the endangered people orobjects
to be protected. The thinarrows show the interactions
 1 Introduction 3

INFLUENCES
STRUCTURAL(PASSIVE)
FIRE PRECAUTIONS TECHNICALFIRE
Fftresistant stmcturea for PRECAUTIONS
compartments. means ofescape, tiredeteciton systems,
accessrotitas, cc bustbiIityofstructure extinguishing and firesuppression
systems,
fixinstalledfirefighting equipment
Irisers,
Limitation of fuel,
preventing thespread
ofproducts of
combustion

C/,
LU
C)
z
LU
D
-J
PRODUCTS OF
COMBUSTION
7
7
HEAT
fru
l
spa
ther res
struGturc
t
SMOE
ha .raslr
('OrOSOfl

Reductionoffire duration Reduction of effect of

smoke andheatby
removing them

ORGANISA1IONALRRE
SMOKE ANDHEAT EXHAUST
noperatiorts
PRECAUTIONS
andto eaceaflon teterveningplans,
VENTILATK)NSYSTEM
(SHEYS)
pnwisfonofeidingulsh1ngaents _________________________

INFLUENCES
Figure1 The roleofSHEVSin Fire Safety Engineering

betweenthe differentactivitieswhichproduce those combustion,smokeand heat, from the compartment and

influences.
Figure 1 demonstrates thatany SHEVSexistswithin a
much more comprehensivefireprevention concept.
Structural(passive)fireprecautionsseparate whatis
protected (egpeople, goods) from the products of
combustion (egsmoke and heat) bystructural means, In
most cases this means thatthe relevant structure will be
fire resisting.This form ofprotection impliesthat
everythinginside a fire compartment maybelostifno
further active measuresto extinguishthefire takeplace or
cannot beperformed;these activemeasures can include
anattack by thefireservices. Peoplehaveto be ableto
leave the compartment which isonfire and reacheithera
structurallyprotected safeplace, orthe exterior ofthe
building,in asufficientlyshorttime ifthey are to be safe.
A SHEVScanremove thehazardous products of
canseparatetheobjects and/orpeople tobe protected
from smoke and heat already insidethecompartment, at
leastuntilthe firehas reached acertain size (design-fire
size) wherever the SHEVShas been designed tocreate a
smoke-freelayer beneathabuoyant smokylayer.
Because ofthis smoke-free layer,firefightthgoperations
canbeperformed moreeasilybythe fire services, which
will control and stop production ofsmokeand heatmore
quicklyand lessentheireffect on any people and goods
remaining inthebuilding.Itfollowsfrom this, thatthere
is a close correlation betweentheeffect ofa SHEVSand
possiblefire-fightingmeasures,including the effectofthe
latteron thelikelydesign-firesize (see Note 1,nextpage),
whichin turn influencesthe designofaSHEVS.
Technicalfireprecautionsmainly affectthe reduction of
thetime betweenignitionand thefire being attacked
4 Design methodologies forSHEVS

successfully,thus preventing further growth. • the

organizationalprecautions for assistingevacuation of
• Automatic fireattack
suppressionor extinguishing
the fire
systems, which
building
— acoustic
include:
may
guidancesystemsor
•eg sprinklers, directly.
Automatic fire detectionsystems (especiallysmoke
detection systems) shortenthe time untilsuccessful
— trainedevacuation staff.

fire fightingoperations canbe performed. This is Allthese organizationalfireprecautions willassistfire-

especiallytruewherethe fire servicesare called fightingoperationsbecause they allow more ofthe fire
automaticallyon the operation ofthedetection brigaderesources toconcentrate on extinguishing
system. Notethat wherethe automatic smoke operations with fewer ornocrews having to be employed
detectionsystem triggers theSHEVS, the fire-fighting insearching orrescuing people.
approach and attack are supportedby the smoke-free All the precautionslisted above,technical and
layer createdbythe SHEVSby callingthe fire services organizational,enhance an early successfulattack on the
at a very earlystage offire development. Such fire. Thus, the hazard caused by the products of
detection systems alsoalertoccupants ofabuilding combustion (smokeand heat)to people, the buildingand
whoin turn maybeable(supported by asmoke-free its environment is diminished.
layer due to an effectiveSHEVS) to attack an Ithas to bebornin mind, however,thatthe
automaticallydetected, and usuallytherefore still effectivenessofall the precautionslisted above benefit
small, firethemselveswith technicalfire precautions considerablyfrom the creation ofa smoke-free layer
suchas the portable extinguishersorhosereels produced by a well-designedSHEVS. In other words, a
provided in the building,even before the firebrigade is SHEVSshould he an integral componentofan overall
on site. fire prevention conceptand ofthe fire-fightingstrategy,
whichbecomes considerablyless effectivein the absence
In thisway, SHEVSinteract with technical fire ofa SHEVSto create a smoke-freelayerat an earlystage
precautions and fire-fightingoperations, whichtogether in the fire.
havethe potential to influencethedesign-firesize. It has
to be admitted, however,that the effectivenessoffirst-aid 1.5 A brief history of smoke ventilation
fire fightingbythe occupants ofa buildingis questionable
in many cases,and should notbeconsidered when Smokeventilation is notnew. Our distant ancestors knew
assessingthe design fire. Nevertheless,the effectiveness that iftheywantedto lightafire inside a hut theyneeded
ofafire-fightingapproach canbe improved iftrained staff to make aholein the roof,otherwise the occupants ofthe
familiarwithfire-fightingtechniques and the technical hutwould be choked by smoke. Modern smoke
fire precautionsare presentand are supported by an ventilationmerely appliesthe same principleto large fires
effectiveSHEVS. in modernbuildings.
This leads to organizationalfireprecautions, whichare a Smokeventilation as adedicated fire precaution
partofthe Fire SafetyManagement arrangements for a became popular for industrialbuildingsfollowingsome
building.These include: large fires (egGeneral MotorsplantinMichigan,USA,in
• trained staffto:
— start fire
1953, see Plate 1; theJaguarplantin Coventry, UK, in
and Vauxhall Motors at Luton, UK, in 1963). Only
fighting(eg 'WorksFire Brigades'),and/or 1957,
—
manageevacuation,and/or the last ofthesethreeplants hadautomatic ventilators81.
— assist
fire-fightingactivitiesperformed by the fire During the 1960sthe Fire Research Station (FRS)inthe
brigade (egby deliveringall informationneeded UK developed design algorithmssuitable for
about usage andpopulation ofthe building,critical circumstanceswherethefire would be directly belowthe
items insidethebuilding,technicalbuilding thermally buoyant smokelayerformed beneaththe
equipment includingtechnicalfireprecautions and ceiling9'10. The technique wasmostly usedas awayof
theirintended function); reducing propertydamageby allowingfire fightingto
• intervention plans, includingsuchprovisionsfor become much more effective.
Afire in the linked Wulfrunand Mander Shopping
emergency management as:
— fire
preventionplansofthe building,or Centres inWolverhampton,UKin 1968[11], alerted people
— fixedinstalledcommunication devices,or to thetremendous potential forthe spread ofsmoky
—
extinguishing agents in store readyfor use bythe fire gases in covered malls. Itwas realizedthatsucha fire
services (especiallyifdistinctiveagents are to be could cause a largeloss oflife ifit occurred whenthemall
usedfor certain fuelspresent, whichmustnotbe was beingusedby the public.
attacked byplain water); Researchersrealizedthatthe smoke ventilation
approach already developed forlarge spaces could be
Note:
adaptedto keep smokeentering amall safelyabove
peoples' heads; thus protecting the means ofescapein
The concept ofthe design fire isdiscussed in more detail rnChapter 3,Forthe present purpose,
whereaSHEVSisdesignedtoassrstoperationalfire-fighting,the design-firesize isthe most the mall. Research intothe wayin which smoke moves
pessimisticbut still realistic assumptionofan area, ormorepreciselyofavolume, involvedin the within mallscontinued throughthe 1970s, leading to the
fire andproducing acertainamountofheat, whenthe estinguishingmeasuresthe attack on the
fire bythe fire services)become successfulsothatthefire doesnot5mwany larger. development ofdesignformulaefor calculatingthe

;
Plate1 Fire at General Motorsplant,Livonia, Michigan, USA, 1953
movement ofthe smoke, the mixing ofair into the smoke,
and hence the sizes ofthevents orfans needed to exhaust
the smoky gasesin orderto maintain the smokelayerin
the mallsat asafeheight. Asummary ofthe designadvice
availablefrom FRS was publishedin 1979u•This advice
has been expanded and updated in the lightoffurther
research and experience,and has been incorporated in
the most recentdesignguidanceavailablefrom FRS'3.
Inthe late 1970s, researchbegan on the related
problems ofatrium buildings.The mainfeature ofan
atrium buildingis that a centralvoid rises throughtwo or
morestoreys, allowinganysmoke entering the void to
affectmorestoreys than the originalfirestorey. Unless,of
course, these floors are separated from the atriumby fire-
resistingconstruction, in whichcase the atrium is merely
aroom withanunusuallyhigh ceiling! It follows that
design calculationmethods whichapply toatriain
general, includingthe case wherethe fire is on the baseof
the atrium directly beneaththeceiling,also cover
virtuallyallother buildinggeometries ofinterest. Note
however thatthe design-firesizes dependvery strongly
onthe use and contents ofthe building.
It should bereadily obviousthat a shopping mall of
two or morestoreys represents a special case ofan
atrium. Itis an atrium with a singleclass ofoccupancy.
The smokemovement willbesimilar,the smokehazards
will besimilar,andthe smoke control solutionscan be
expected to be similar. The pivotal problem forboth
mallsand atria is that smokeentering thevoid must not
beallowedto endanger thesafeescape forpeopleinthe
mall ortheatrium itself; or for people inany adjacent
space open tothe mall oratriumonanystorey.
In atria ormultistoreymalls, every storeyopento the
void is potentiallyrapidly affectedby smokefrom afire
on anyotherstorey. Twofires that illustratethiswerethe
fire in the RegencyHyatt hotelat O'Hare in Chicago in
1972[14] and the firein the StJohn's Centre in Liverpool in
1977[15]. It follows that to protectthe safe escape ofthe
building'soccupants,specialmeasures are needed for
atriaasfor malls.
Anymeasuresto protectegressfrom abuildingwill
alsoassisteasier entry for fire fighters.Hence, the same
1 Introduction 5
measureswillserve to improve the property-protection
aspectsofthefire-protection package,although where
thesmokeventilation system is solelyintended to ssist
in fire-fightingoperations (ie to assistthe fire servicein
protecting the propertyand/or contents) the design
criteria required for safety canbe differentfrom these
required to protectthe general public inview ofthe
specialequipment and clothingusedbyfire-fighters.
1.6 The atrium:description and behaviour
in fire
Socialandtechnical changes haveled to changes in
buildingenvironmentswhich incorporate new(or
revived) buildingforms andthe useofinnovative
construction techniques and newsynthetic materials.
Thebuildingsadoptingthese changes oftenhave
includedwithin theirdesignlarge spacesorvoids, often
integrated with many ofthe storeys.These largespaces
have been describedas malls, atria, arcades and light
wells.The generic termfor the buildingtype tends lobe
'atrium' andby theirvery nature, they can often run
contrary to the traditional BuildingRegulations'
approach in terms ofhorizontal compartmentation and
verticalseparation.
The originalatriumwasanentrance hall in aRoman
houseand was one ofthe most important rooms ini:he
building.The conceptofthis space hasevolved
architecturallyover the past few hundred years and now
applies to structuresmuch larger than the typicalRoman
house. Modern atriaare designed such that the visualand
spacial 'outdoor' environmentsare createdindoors6.
In Romantimesthe control ofany smoke andhot:
gases thatmayhave issuedfrom afire in a room adjacent
to the atriumwaslikelyto have beenasimple matter,
provided therewereno adverse windconditions (due to
local topography ofadjacent structures) then the smoke
and heatwould undoubtedlyvent itselfviathe open
portionofthe atrium roofknown as the'compluviurn'
(generallyusedforlighting purposes).
Modern atriumbuildingstend to contain large
quantitiesofcombustiblematerialand often have open-
planlayoutsincreasingthe risk ofthe spread offire. The
populationswithin such buildingshavealso increased,
hencetherehasbeena substantialincreasein thenumber
ofpeople tobeprotectedand evacuated in an emergency.
Modern atriumbuildingsare usuallydesigned withthe
atrium as a feature which canbe appreciated from within
theadjacent rooms. Theroom/atriumboundary is
usuallyeitherglazedor completelyopen. Thuswhen
compared with 'conventional'buildings,this
architectural/aesthetic requirement imposes additional
problems oflife safetyduringafire, as smoke, hot gases
and evenflames may travel from one (or more) rooms
intotheatrium andthenceaffect areas which, but for the
presence ofthe atrium, would not be affected.
In conventionalmultistoreystructures thereis always
thepossibilityoffire spread up theoutside ofthe building
withflames issuingfrom one room and affectingthe
6 Design methodologies for SHEVS
floors above. Examplesofthis modeoffirespreadare an
office block in Sao Paulo'71 andthe Villiers Buildingfire in
Londonon l9January, 1979. Ifthe escape facilitiesfrom
the variousroomsare ofa suitablestandard and are
segregated from other compartments (as required inthe
UK), thereshould not (in theory) be anyserious hazard
to lifesafetyinthis fire condition. Itis only whenthe
means ofescape are inadequate or the parameters
dictating their designare violated,that the loss oflife may
occur.
Ifabuildinghas an atrium thenthis fireand smoke
spreadcanalso occur internallysince thereisgenerally a
maximizationofthe window areaand/or openboundary
betweentheroomsandthe atrium. Hence,thereisan
increased risk toother levels oftheentry ofsmoke and
toxicgases andevenflamesfrom afire.
Anumberofmethods canbe usedto ensure safetyin
7
an atriumbuilding. BS 5588:Part givesthe relevant
Code ofPractice describingwhichcombinationsof
measures are currently recommended and in which
circumstances.Oneofthosemethodsis smoke andheat
exhaust ventilation.
Experience offires inatriumbuildingsin the USA'4'181
has shownthe problemofflametravel internally through
the atrium tobe minor in comparison with the problem
ofhotand toxic gasesaccumulatingand fillingthe atrium;
spreading throughout the building;and affectingescape
routes. Thus, thereappears to be a needfor aproperly
designed smoke and heatexhaust ventilationsystem in
atrium buildings.
The ideal optionwould be to prevent any smokefrom
a room fire entering the atrium at all. Aneasily
understood wayofachievingthis is to ensure that the
boundary betweenthe roomand the atrium is both
imperforate and fire resisting,and that the atriumbase
hasonlya very restricted use. This option hasfrequently
beenused,but is architecturallyrestrictive.Consequently
it is not favouredby designers.Theconcepthas been
labelledthe 'steriletube'E'S].
Wherethe boundary betweenthe roomand the atrium
is open, itis sometimes feasibleto provide a smoke
ventilation system within the room, to maintain smoky
fire gasesabove the openingto the atrium. Unfortunately,
itis often verydifficult, impractical,orextremely
expensiveto fit aseparate smokeexhaust system to each
and every room, however small. Occasionally,
circumstances dictate thatsmoke control dedicated to
eachroomin this wayis themostviableoptionfor
protecting the atrium (this can occur, for example,when
the roomlayout isofalarge area, ispredominantly open-
planand open-fronted). Therehavebeen several
examples ofthis.Nevertheless, it remainsgenerallytrue
that this option is rarely foundto be appropriate for most
atriumbuildings.
Another possibilityisthatthe atrium should be
pressurizedto prevent smokemoving from a room into
theatrium. This is notusuallyaviableoptionwherethe
opening betweenthe room andtheatriumis large (egan
open-fronted room or room whose glazing has fallen
away in wholeorin largepart). Thisis becausethe
airspeed neededfrom the atrium intothe roomin order
to prevent the movement ofsmoky gases theotherway
through the same opening, can vary betweenabout
0.5 ms1 and approximately4 ms1 depending on gas
temperature, etc. All ofthis air must be continuously
removed from within the fire room in orderto maintain
theflow.Thequantitiesofair-handlingplantrequired
will often exceed the size ofsmokeventilation systemsfor
many typical atrium room openings. Note, however, that
pressurizingthe atrium may be a viableoption wherethe
atrium facadehas only relatively smallleakage paths.
Wheresmoke from a firein aroom canspreadintothe
atrium, withthe possibilityofrapid further spread
affectingother partsofthebuilding,therewill be an
extreme threat to safeevacuation ofoccupants from the
affected parts ofthe building.Similarthreatswill occur if
thereis a serious fire in the atrium space itself. In either
case,the threat to means ofescape whichare either
within the atrium, or are in spacesopento the atrium, can
develop rapidlyunless some form ofsmoke control is
usedintheatrium, in order to protectthose means of
escape. In otherwords, a smokecontrol system inthe
atrium is essential to ensurethat escape is unhindered, b
ensuringthatanylargequantities ofthermally buoyant
smoky gasescan be keptseparate from people who may
still be usingescape routes, or awaitingtheirturnfor
evacuation.Therefore, the role ofa smokecontrol systersi
isprincipallyoneoflifesafety.
In orderfor a design tobe achieved,itis necessaryto
identifythe various 'types' ofatrium thatare built. These
canbe simplydefined asfollows.
• The'steriletube'atrium: the atriumis separated from
theremainder ofthe buildingby fire-resistingglazing
(FRG). The atriumspace generallyhas no functional
use other than as a circulationarea(Figure2).
• The closed atrium:the atrium isseparated from the
remainder ofthe buildingby ordinary (nonfire-
resisting)glass.The atrium space may well be
functional (cafeterias,restaurants, recreation,etc)
• (Figure3).
Thepartiallyopen atrium:here some lowerlevelsare
open to the atriumand the remaining levels closed off
byglazing (Figure4).
• Thefrillyopen atrium:some ofthe upperlevelsor all of
thebuildinglevelsareopen to the atrium (Figure 5).
1.7 Active control of the fire
A more detailed discussionofactivefire fightingis
presented in Chapter12.
Itshould be remembered thatfire fightingbecomes
both difficultand dangerous in a smoke-loggedbuilding.
Itfollowsthat to assistthefireservices,the smokecontrol
system should becapable ofperformingits design
function for aperiod oftimelonger than that required fir
the public to escape (seealso 12.2.2.1),thus allowinga
speedierattack on thefiretobe made afterthe arrivalof
the fire service. Anymeasuresto protectegress from a

Figure2 Sterile tube: fire-resisting glazingbetween atriumand
compartments
Figure4 Partially openatrium
buildingwill also assisteasier entryforfire fighters.
Hence, the same measureswill servetoimprove the
propertyprotection aspects ofthe fire-protection
package (seealso 12.2.2.2).Wherethe smoke ventilation
system is solelyintended to assistin fire-fighting
operations,the design criteriarequired for safety might
be differentfrom thoserequiredto protectthegeneral
public inview ofthe special equipment andclothing used
by firefighters (seealso 12.2.2.4).
Anysmoke control measures needto specifya
maximumfire size for its designandsprinklers are often
needed tolimit the sizeto thismaximum.It is also likely
that some kind ofsmokeventilationwill be required to
maintain a clear escape route. Thus both sprinklersand
smokeventilators are needed to achieve aproperlife
safety design. Atpresentthereis considerabledebate
overthe effectsofinteraction betweenthetwo.One
1 ntroductkn 7
Figure3 Closed atrium:standard (non fire-resisting) glazing
between atriumand compartments
Figure5 Fully openatrium
argument is that opening the smokeventilators on smoke
detection, iebefore sprinkler operation, may delay the
activation ofsprinklersand thus have detrimental effect
on sprinklerperformance. Onthe otherhand, ifthe
opening ofsmokeventilators is delayeduntilsprinkler
operation, theremaybe considerablesmoke loggingand
the effectivenessoftheSHEVS may be seriously
compromised. This debateis discussedin more detail
elsewhere in thisbook.
1.8 Implementationof a smoke and heat
exhaust system in a building
Whenthe 'concept design' ofthe SHEVShas been
completed satisfactorily(egby followingthemethods
describedinthisbook), therestill remains a great dealto
bedonebefore thesystem is successfullyinstalledin a
8 Design methodologies for SHEVS
fullyfunctioningstatein the finishedbuilding.The ideas
mustbeturnedintophysicalreality,inawaythatensures
thatthe resulting arrangement will functionas desired
whenthefireactually occurs:regardless ofthe conditions
applying at the time.
Itfollowsthat therearemany necessaryconsiderations
whenselectingthe equipment neededto make the design
areality.Theequipment (hardware) must be ableto
function inthefire condition expected underthe design
conditions,and oughtto havebeen testedbythe
manufacturers and/or thesuppliersto confirmthis. The
equipment should alsobe appropriate to the
circumstancesofthe buildinginwhichit is to be fitted.
Thesecircumstances includethe geographicaland
meteorologicalconditions expected,both atthetime of
the fire andin normal use. It isnotthepurpose ofthe
presentdocumentto try toprovide detailed guidanceon
the selection ofsystemsin all circumstances.
Nevertheless,some pointers towards the parameters
which should be considered are described in Chapter 13.
Even the best equipment can beinstalled wrongly.
There havebeenmanyinstances wherewhatwas
installed did not exactlycorrespond to whatwas
intended, or wheretheinstallationprocedures have not
beenworked out in sufficientdetail. It isnot the purpose
ofthis bookto provide detailedguidance similarto the
equipment specification.Nevertheless, some guidance
concerning procedures is included in Chapter 14.
Humannature being as fallible asit is, it is desirable
thatwhen asystem is fullyinstalled,it should be tested
forftinctionality.This caneitherinvolvetests to confirm
thatthe equipment still performsto specification
(perhaps most important whereducts are usedto move
the gases) withoutactuallysimulating thebuoyancy of
fire gases, orit can involvespecial tests (hot smoketests)
to confirmthat both theequipment and the design
conceptitselfareperformingto expectation. Once again,
the discussionandadvicein this bookis limited to outline
guidance, and can be found in Chapter 15.
Asthe fire may notoccuruntilmany years after the
system isinstalled,it is alsonecessaryto ensurethatthe
hardware is capable ofsurvivingmanyyears of
installationand is still ready to serve its purpose ifa fire
occurs. This impliesthat thereoughtto be regular
maintenance and re-testing procedures as part ofa larger
fire safety management strategyforthe buildingin
question. Somediscussioncanbefoundin Chapter 16.
1.9 The purpose of this book and its
relationship to earlierguidance
Previousguidanceto designers ofatrium smoke control
systems within the UK has been provided bythe British
Standard BS 5588:Part 7 Codeofpracticeforthe
incorporationofatriain bui/dings, andthe BRE Report
Design approachesfor smokecontrol inatriumbuildings['31.
Therehave beena number ofqualitativepapers, and
otherpapersusingrelativelysimple models ofsmoke
movement within atria'921. The National Fire
Protection Associationofthe USAhasdeveloped a
Code22 whichsets out afire engineering approach to the
design ofsmoke control foratria (termed 'Smoke
Management' in the USA). While this code is inmany
ways very comprehensive andbroaderin purpose than
thisbook, some ofthe approaches useddifferfrom
alternativeswith which UKdesigners are more familiar,
and canbe more approximate thanmethods currently
recommended byFRS. This particularlyapplies tosmoke
entering the atrium from adjacent rooms.
Some other countries have recognized existing
publicationswithin theirownguidelines.Forexample,
Singapore has referred in its 1997 Codeofpracticeforfire
precautionsii'z bui7dings231to BRE guidanceonthedesign
ofSHEVS24'131.
It canbe notedthatthere is amajor differencebetween
any application ofthis booktosmoke and heat exhaust
ventilationofshopping mallsofmore than one storey,
andtheearlier guidanceforsuchmallspublishedby
BRE241.The diflèrenceis not so muchinthe formulae
andtheresulting design solutions,as inthe underlying
philosophyofdesign.The earlier guidanceadopted the
view that itwas possibleto specify agenericallytypical
smokeflow rateleavingfrom the front openingofa retail
unit,whenspecifyingthe flowparameters in the smoky
gasesapproaching the spilledge. Itfurther assumedthat
thesetypicalflowratescould be takento bethose
measured experimentallyin ascale model ofa shop
unit51.The result wastogive a relativelysimple
calculation,whichallowed for differentwidths ofthe
unit's front opening, without the designer or the regulator
having to worry about changes ofcontentsin the units, or
ofdetail differencesbetweenneighbouringunits. The
disadvantageofthis earlier approach isthatitbecomes
unreliableforreal mallswhichdeparttoo far from the
dimensionsmodelled in the experiment251. Inpractice,
this means that the earlier guidancestrictly only applies
forstoreyheights close to 5 m, andfora 5 MW, 3 mx 3 m
design fire.
Theadvantage ofthis current bookis that it allowsthe
circumstancesofthefire in the unittobe included
explicitlyin calculation,includingthe actual dimensions
ofthebuilding.This impliesthat separate calculations
must be doneforfires located ineachand every unit
suspected ofbeingapotentially 'worst case' forthe mall
inquestion. In practice, the current bookis themore
powerfultechnique for design,butthis advantage is
gained atthe expense ofsome loss ofrelative simplicity
compared with earlier guidance. Note, however, that
wherethereal mall's shape and dimensionsareclose to
those on whichthe earlier guidancewasbased, that
earlier guidancecan still be usedwith confidence.
It is hopedthat the current bookwill support the
Regulatoryand Standard Codes being developed byBSI
and CEN.This bookcannotcover all the infinite
variations ofatrium design. Instead, it givesgeneral
principles forthedesign ofefficientsystems,with
simplifieddesignprocedures for an ideal model ofan
atrium and then further guidanceonfrequently

encountered practicalproblems.Asthedesign
procedures are ofnecessity simplified, the bookalso gives
their limitationsso that,whennecessary,amoredetailed
designby specialistscanbe carried out.
The above-mentioned designprocedures and
guidance documents arebasedon the useofzone models:
in which the problem is divided into separate zones
(which may or may notinteract); andrelatively simple
formulae (often empiricalin origin)are usedtodescribe
the smokeand heatmovement in eachone. While thisis
avery powerfultechnique which canbe applied with
confidenceto amajority ofsmokeventilationdesign
circumstances,it must be recognized that abuilding
geometry whichdeviatestoo far from the idealized
geometry usedin deriving the designformulaecannot be
designed usingthoseformulae.
Sincethe mid-1970s, field modelling has been
developed whichexploitsthenewtechniques of
computational fluiddynamics (CFD) todeduce how, and
atwhatrate,smokewould fill an enclosure.Itdoesthis by
avoiding resortto experimental correlation,as faras is
currently possible,and byreturning tofirstprinciples to
solve the basic lawsoffluidflowand thermodynamics.As
a consequence,withadequate validation,this typeof
modelling should have wide application. Theuse ofa
1 Introduction 9
computer is necessarysince the techniqueinvolvesthe
solution oftensofthousands ofmathematical equations
forevery step forwardthe simulationmakes,and
consequentlyinvolvesrelativelylongcomputational
timescompared withthe use ofzonemodels. This makes
CFD simulationsrelativelyexpensive,particularlywhen
usedfor buildingswith complicatedgeometry.Asthe
computersbecome faster and more powerfial andthe
algorithmsevolveand improve, CFD islikelyto become
cheaper andto gain more widespread use in Fire Safety
Engineeringincludingthe smokecontrol designprocess.
Users ofCFD models should be aware ofthe
importance of:
• correctlyidentifyingthe boundary conditions
appropriate tothe precise circumstancesofthe design,
• correctly identifyingthe appropriatenessofthe sub-
modelsused, forexample the heat transfer and
radiation model, turbulence model, etc.
• usinga smallenough grid size so that the converged
solution isindependent ofthe grid size.
TheCFD methodology isbeyond the scope ofthisbook,
but a full descriptiontogetherwith adiscussionofcurrent
limitationsis given,for exampleinreference [26J.
10
2 General principles of smoke
production, movement and control
2.1 Fire growth and smoke production
In most instances,a room (compartment) fire maybe
assumed toburn in eitheroftwoways.
• Fue/BedContra/is whenthe rate ofcombustion,heat
output and fire growth depends onthe fuel being
burned and thereis more than sufficientoxygen
presentto support the combustion.This isthe 'normal'
fire condition found in mostsingle-storeybuildings
whilstthe fire is still small enough for successfulsmoke
control.
• T/entz/atthn Controliswherethe rate ofcombustion etc.
is dependentuponthe quantity ofair availableto the
firecompartment, assuming that anymechanical
ventilation systemshavebeen madeinactive.
The quantity ofsmoky gases produced, ie the massflow
rate offire gasesin andfrom the compartment, andthe
energy (heatflux) contained therein, may be very
differentforboth regimes.It istherefore important to
identifythe regime whichappliesand to determine the
mass flow and the heat fluxwithin the smoky gases.
It is important to understand the basic mechanisms
whichcontrol thefire condition. A step-by-step history
ofa growingfire may be as follows.
1 The fire starts for whatever reason, itsrate ofgrowth
depending uponthe materialsinvolved,their
orientation and positionsrelativeto eachother. In
most practical compartments there is sufficient oxygen
to support combustion in thefirstfew minutes, andthe
firegrowth and smoke production are controlled by
thefuel,ie fuel bed control.
2 Smoke from the fire rises in a plume to the ceiling.As
theplumerises,airis entrained intoit, increasingthe
volumeofsmoke and reducing its temperature. The
entrainment increases with increasingheightofrise of
theplume. The smokespreads outradially underneath
theceilingand forms a layerwhichdeepens as the
compartment begins to fill. Ifthe compartment is open
totheatrium (or a mall),thenthe gasesflow out
immediatelythey reachthe opening.
Ifthe compartment isglazed or the opening is
below a deepdownstand then the smokesteadily
deepens. As the layergets deeper thereis less height
________________
for the plume ofsmoke to risebefore it reachesthe
smokelayer,henceless air is being entrained, with the
result that the temperature ofthe smoke layer
increaseswith layerdepth, even for a steady fire. Most
fireswill continue to grow larger as the layerdeepens,
reinforcingthis effect.
3 6 mmplateglassmayshatter whenexposed to gasesas
littleas 100 K warmer thanambient. Oneofthemain
reasons forglassbreakage is the differentthermal
expansion values ofthe glassand itsmountings;
breakage at relativelylow temperature may result
whenthereis noprovision for differentialexpansion.
Thus, oncethis temperature is passed,thereis an
increasinglikelihood that the glasswill fracture.Ifthe
compartment is sprinklered and the water spray hits
the glass, the localizedheating oftheglassby radiation
from the fire andbythe gas layer, combined with
sudden coolingdue to the water spraymayincrease
the likelihoodoftheglassbreaking (note:there are
'deluge' sprinklersystemsdesigned to keep the glass
cooland prevent it from breaking).Plate or 'float' glass
breaksin an unpredictableway.A crackmay not result
in glassfallingout;but theassumption that glasswill
fall away once broken is asafeassumption for design in
the circumstancescovered in this book. Thesmoke
and hot gases will thenflow externallyto the
atmosphere, orentertheatrium (where one is
present), or both, depending uponthe natureofthe
compartment and its relativeposition in the building,
thesize and position ofthefire inthe compartment,
andthe strength ofdifferingglazing systems.
In atriumbuildings,ifthefire canbe accidentallyor
deliberatelyventedto the atmosphere then the threat
to otherlevelsviathe atrium is greatly reduced. There
will,however, be instanceswhen afire willvent all its
effluent gas into the atrium, and thisis generallythe
worstdesign scenario (Figure6).
Thereis so muchmixing ofambient air intothe
plume that,exceptclose to the fire itself, the hotsmoky
gasescan be regarded asconsisting ofwarmed air,
whencalculatingthe quantity (massflow rate)being
produced in the compartment.
4 Initially,this mass flow rate ofsmokewillbe controlled
by the fuel bed, as mentioned above. However,the
 2 Smoke production, movement and control 11

Air Inflow

Figure6 Smoke enteringan atriumfromafuel bed controlledfire Figure7The onsetofflashover

in an adjacentroom

geometry ofthe openingontotheatrium has a crucial

effect. Asthe fire grows largein comparisonto the area
ofthe opening,the air supply to thefire is'throttled',
causingthe fire toburninefficiently.
5 This leads to thesituation wherethe inabilityofthe
compartment tovent the gases effectively duetothe
restricted areaavailablecausesthe layerto deepen
further,whichcombined withthe increasingfirearea,
causesthe layertemperature to rise. Once thelayer
temperature reaches approximately 600 °C, then in
mostcompartments thedownward radiation from the
gas layer is sufficientto cause ignition ofthe remaining
combustiblematerialsinthe compartment (Figure 7).
Wherethere is sufficientfuel within the compartment
forthe entirecompartment to become involved,the
layertemperature will rapidlyriseto flame Figure8 Afully involved ventilation-controlled fire
temperature, very approximately 1200 K (930 °C). The
rate ofburning,heat output and massflow leavingthe
compartment are now strongly dependent uponthe reducedto two principalparameters for most
geometry oftheopening, ieventilation control compartments:
(Figure 8).
6 The transition from thefuel bed controlled fire with a AH°5, (where A is the areaofthe opening intothe
layerat 600 °C totheventilation-controlledcondition atrium andHis the heightofthe opening); and
is very rapid, and may takeonly seconds. This Af (theareaofthe fire).
condition is often known as 'flash-over'.
7 Theremaybe an intermediate situationwherethe Fora further discussion,see eg references [27—29].
compartment has flashedover or the firehas simply
grown to encompass the entire widthofthe Note: Both the fully-involvedlarge-openingfire and
compartment, butwherethe quantity ofair now ventilation-controlledfireconditionswillalmost
required to maintain combustion is adequate, even certainly produce flamesfrom the opening intothe
thoughtheonly surfaceavailable forairentrainment is atrium.
the widthofthe opening (as opposed to the fire 9 Thepresence ofsprinklerswill usuallyserve to prevent
perimeter for afuel-bed controlled fire).This fire growth proceeding to fullinvolvement;ifthe
condition isknown as the 'fully-involved,large- burning material isnotshielded from the water spray
opening fire' (Morgan& Hansel![271). thenthe fire is likelytobe extinguished (or almost
8 Thereare many factorswhichdeterminetheprevailing extinguished);with shielding,the firewill continueto
condition includingthe type and disposition ofthe fuel, burn, although it islikelytobe maintainedin afuel-
the dimensionsoftheenclosure andthe dimensionsof bed-controlled stateand the fire size willbelimited.
the ventilationopening. Theycan, however, be
12 ________________ Design methodologies for SHEVS

2.2 Pressurization and depressurization generalapproach needed forsuccessfuldesign.

Inpressurization, air is introduced intoan escape route
(usuallya stairway)at arate sufficient to hold back any
smoketrying to pass onto that route. The pressure
differenceacross any smallopening ontothe routemust
be large enough to offsetadverse pressurescaused by
wind,buildingstack effect and firebuoyancy.It must also
be low enough to allow the escape doors tobe opened
with relativeease.The air supply must alsobelarge
enough to produce avelocity sufficientto holdback
smoke at any large opening onto the pressurizedspace.
Therequirements aresomewhat contradictory.
Pressurizationsystemsare designed to have adequate air
flow across anylarge openings (egdoors). Excessive
pressure differenceacross asmall opening (when the
doors are closed) canbe prevented by the use ofdampers
(egbarometric dampers).Experience ofpressurization
Air mixes intothe fire plume as it rises givingalarger
volume ofsmoky gases. Thesegasesflowoutwards below
the ceilinguntil theyreachabarrier (eg thewalls,or a
downstand, see Plates 2 and 3). The gasesthen form a
deepening layer,whose buoyancy can drive smoky gases
throughnatural ventilators (or alternativelysmoky gases
can be removed using fans). For anygiven size offire, an
equilibriumcan be reached wherethe quantity ofgases
beingremoved equalsthe quantity entering thelayerin
the fire plume —no significantmixingofair occurs
upwards intothe base ofthe buoyant smokelayer.Itis
essentialthatsufficientair enters the space below the
layerto replace thegases being removed from thelayer,
otherwisethe smokeventilation system will not work.
Thedesignprocedures aredescribed indetail in the
remainder ofthis book, andthe calculationprocedures
aresummarized inAnnex A (for time-based calculations

I
designssuggestthatitis well-suitedtothe protection of involvingagrowing design fire)and in Annex B (for
stairwaysused as escape routesin tall buildings,although steady-state calculations).
the technique canbe usefulin othercircumstances.
Codesforpressurizationcanbe found in BS 5588:
Part4[301•
Depressurizationis a specialcaseofpressurization,
wheregasesare removed from the smoke-affectedspace
ina waythatmaintains thedesired pressure differences
and/orair speeds across leakage openings betweenthat
space and adjacent spaces30. Note that depressurization
doesnot protectthe smoke-affectedspace in any way.
Instead it protects theadjacent spaces. In the
circumstances ofan atrium, itis sometimespossibleto use
the buoyancyofthesmoky gases themselvesto create the
desired depressurizationeffects.This is explainedin
moredetail in section 6.3.

2.3 Throughflowventilation (or smoke

exhaust ventilation)
Smokeexhaust ventilation (throughflowventilation)is
usedwhenthe fire is inthe same space as the people,
contents, or escape routes being protected, withoutit Plate2 Example of a fixedglazed smoke curtainin a shopping mal
filling that space.The intention is to keep the smoke in
the upperregions ofthe buildingleaving clean airnear
the floor to allow people tomove freely.This
stratificationorlayeringofthe smoke is made possibleby
the buoyancyofthe hotsmoky gases produced bythe
fire, and it follows thatto be mostsuccessfulthe high-
level smoke layer must remain warm. Smoke ventilation
is therefore onlysuitable for atria wherefires can cause
smoke to enterthe atrium space and forlargesingle-
storeyspaces which arehigh enoughfor an appropriate
layering.Suchfires can eitherbefuel-bed-controlledfires
at thebase ofthe atrium, orfires in adjacentspaces
(rooms)whichallow smoky gasesto enterthe atrium.
Much ofthe current bookis concerned withthe
calculationofdesignparameters for smokeventilation
systemstailored to the circumstancesfound in various
types ofatria. First, though, it is worthreviewingthe Plate3 Example of afixed smoke curtainbeingused as a reservoir
underlying principles ofsmokeventilation and the boundary

2.4 Smoke and heat exhaust design
philosophies
Thesmokeventilationsystemcan bedesigned tofulfil
one or more separate requirements within a building.
Protection of means of escape
The objectiveisto achieve a desiredsmoke-free clear
layerbeneatha smokelayer.This is a commonlyused
approach wherethepurpose ofthe smoke exhaust
ventilation system isto allow the continued useofescape
routeswhich arein the same space as the fire (examples
include enclosed shopping mallsand many atriaorlarge
single-storeyspaces,egforpublic assembly).The
thermally buoyant smokeforms alayerbeneaththe
ceiling.The smokeexhaust (using eithernatural smoke
exhaust ventilatorsorpowered smoke exhaust
ventilators)is calculatedto belarge enoughto keep the
smoke at asafeheightabove the headsofpeople using
the escape routes for a given designfire size,evenwhile
thefire is stillburning. Itis essentialthat thesystem
comes intooperation as early as possibleduringthe fire,
and itis usualtoinitiate the operation automaticallyon
receipt ofa signalfrom asmoke detection system.
Temperature control
Wherethe heightofclear air beneaththe thermally
buoyant smoke layer is nota critical designparameter, it
is possibleto use thesame calculationprocedures as for
protection ofmeans ofescape,but in a differentway.The
smokeexhaust canbe designedto achieve a particular
temperature ofthe gasesinthebuoyant layer.This allows
theuse ofmaterialswhichwouldotherwisebedamaged
by hottergases. A typical exampleiswherean atrium
facadehasglazingwhichisnotfireresisting,butwhichis
known to beableto survivegas temperatures uptosome
specifiedvalue. The use ofa'temperature control' smoke
exhaust ventilation system insucha casecould, for
example,allow the adoption ofa phased evacuation
strategy from higher storeys separated from the atrium
only by suchglazing.
Assistingfire-fightingoperations
In order for firefighters to dealsuccessfullywitha fire in a
building, itis firstnecessaryfor themto drive theirfire
appliancesto entrances givingthemaccessto the interior
ofthe building. Theythenneedto transport themselves
andtheir equipment from this pointto the scene ofthe
fire.
2 Smoke production, movement and control 13
In extensive and multi-storeycomplexbuildingsthis
may involvetravelto upperandlowerlevels, and may
takesome time. This travel,as well asthe fire-fighters'
effortsto effectrescues and to carry outfire-fighting
operations, may be seriouslyhampered ifthe buildingis
full ofhot smoky gases. The provision ofheat andsmoke
ventilation systemsrequired to assistmeans ofescape or
fortheprotection ofproperty, may alsoaidfire fighting.
Thereis often the desire to designa smokeexhaust
ventilationsystem specifically for fire-fightingoperations,
wherethedesign philosophies aresimilartothatusedfor
a SHEVSdesignforlifesafetybutthe functional
requirements maybeless stringent (ie moresevere
conditionsmay be acceptable)because ofthe specialist
equipment and clothing available. IftheSHEVSis
designed solelyto assistfire fightingand has no other life
safety implications,and certain other appropriate
circumstancesapply (egwhenthe primary design
objectiveispropertyprotection and automatic
extinguishingsystemsare present), it canbe appropriate
toleave the ventilatorsclosed (this mayreduce fire
growth) untilthe firebrigade arrivesand then to open
themmanually.Functionalrequirements should be
agreed bythefire serviceresponsiblefor the buildingin
question.
The applicabilityofSHEVS to operational fire fighting,
andthe close relationshipbetweenthetwo,isdiscussed
in much greater detail in Chapter 12.
Property protection
Smokeexhaust ventilationby itselfcannot prevent a fire
from growinglarge. It will guaranteethat afire inthe
ventilated space has a continuingsupply ofoxygen to
keepgrowing.
Itfollowsthat smokeexhaust ventilation canonly
protectproperty byallowingactive intervention ofthe
fire servicesto be quickerand moreeffective.Depending
onthe materialspresent, apropertyprotection
philosophy may be basedonthe needto maintain the hot
buoyant smokelayerabove sensitivematerials,or maybe
basedonthe needtomaintain the smoke layerbelowa
criticaltemperature. In eithercase,the functional
requirement for keyparameters onwhichthedesign
must be based,need notbethe same as wherethe
primarypurpose is life safety. Theywill dependonthe
circumstancesapplyingineachcase.These key
functional requirements must be agreed with allrelevant
interested parties.
14 ____ _____ ____ _____ _____
3 Design-fire size
3.1 General
Manyareasoffire safety engineeringrequire the
identificationofan appropriate fire size uponwhichthe
design canbe based. Designfires can takemany forms,
forexample,when consideringfire resistanceofdoors
and wallsa fullydeveloped post-flashoverfire on oneside
ofthedoor or wall is assumed:the designfire in this case
will be a frilly-involved fire compartment.
Smoke exhaust ventilation is only ofvalue whenthe
people, contents orstructure being protectedare in the
same space as the fire, and it is therefore conventionalto
consider only pre-flashover fires. Thatscenario is also
commonly found wherethe 'timeto danger' for the
building'soccupants isbeingcalculated, eitheras part ofa
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system design or asa
separate calculation.The calculationofthe quantity of
smoke and heatproduced byafire requires a knowledge
ofthe sizeofthefire,in terms ofarea, perimeterand heat
fluxdeveloped perunitareaorfrom the fireas awhole.
Whendesigningsmokeventilation ordepressurization
systems,the massflowrate and heat fluxdeveloped in the
room aremajorparameters in the calculationofthe
system requirements, changes in whichcan substantially
affectall ofthe subsequentsmoke flow conditions.
Ideally,the designfire would be based on the materials
within an occupancy,suggestingthat the choiceofa
design fire should be straightforward.Unfortunately,this
is notthe case.Whilethe heat release rates formany
materialsare known, it is rarely possibleto say thata fire
will consist ofaknown quantity ofmaterial.Within an
occupancya fire will involvea combination ofdifferent
materials,so that the heat release rateforthat occupancy
will be a function ofallthe materials present. Hence the
development ofa fire is dependenton a number of
factors,including:
• theprecise location ofthe ignitionwithrespect to the
fuel,
•• the typeofmaterials present,
the quantity ofmaterialspresent,
•• theposition ofthe materialsrelative to eachother,
possible chemical reactionsbetweenmaterials present
iftheir containment is
•the destroyed by fire,
position ofmaterialsrelativeto walls,ceilingsand
similar,
• the availabilityofoxygen (in sealed rooms afire can
become oxygen-starved),
• thepresence andeffectivenessoffiresuppression
devices,
• changing ofburningbehaviour dueto ageing of
materials.
Consequently,there is no methodavailable to calculate
the development ofa fire in any but thesimplest fuel
arrays. The likelysize ofafire can only be deduced from
the analysisofthe statisticsoffires in thetypeof
occupancy ofinterest, orfrom experiments on
appropriately similar fuelarrays. The values for fire
growth and fire sizecontained in this bookare based on
both statistical analysesand experimentalwork. Itis
worthnoting herethatdesign firesbasedon statistical
analysisare always based on animplied acceptable risk
whichcandiffer forvarious applications,andwhichis
always ultimatelyrelated to public opinion.
Adesign fire caneitherbe asteady-state fire with
constantheatoutputor atime-dependent growingfire to
whichthe means ofescape and evacuationtime for the
particular buildingoccupancy could be related (see also
section 12.2.2.1).Steady-statefires for designcalculation
invarious occupanciesaregiven in the relevant standards
and thesehaveusuallybeenused historically.Although it
is acknowledgedthata real fireis notusually'steady
state', itis relativelysimple to assessthemaximum size a
fire can reasonably be expected to reachduring the
escape period in aparticular scenario, and to design a
smokecontrol system ableto copewith that.
Theassumption ofa steady-statefireallows the smoke
control system to cater for allfires up to designfiresize,
andby not consideringthegrowth phaseofthe fire, often
introduces asignificantmargin ofsafetyto the system
design.A firewill produce smaller quantitiesofcooler
smokein its early 'small'stage, depending on the nature
andarrangement offuels.The reduction ineffectiveness
ofa natural SHEVS dueto the lower temperature will be
compensated by the reduction in the quantity ofsmoky
gas needing to be exhausted.
Onthe otherhand, useofagrowingfire could result in
a less onerous design criterion which mayresult in

considerablesavingsin the implementationofa SHEVS
design in alarge orcomplexbuilding.Historically,one
reason for not usinggrowing firesfor designhasbeen the
lackofavailabledataaboutfire growth rate invarious
occupanciesand scenarios.Research has been carried out
in thelastfew years, atFRS and elsewhere,to determine
thelikelyfire growth rate insome occupancies.Dataare
still not availablefor many scenarios.Itis hopedthat a
database offire growths willbebuiltupwhichwill enable
widespreaduse ofgrowing fires for SHEVSdesigns.Any
fire safety strategymust inevitablycomparethe timeto
the onset ofdangerous conditions, which in turn depends
strongly on the assumed fire growth rate,totheestimated
evacuation timefor occupants aswell as tothe
attendance time offire-fightingservices. Such strategies
arevery sensitiveto influencesontheseparameters,
whichcaninclude the inappropriatebehaviour of
escapingpeople, minorchanges inthe building's
geometry, trafficjams orroadworks onthe accessroutes
ofthefire-fightingservices, temporary absenceoffire
crews at the nearest fire stations forwhatever reasons,
etc.
Eithermethod ofassessmentofthe designfire sizecan
sometimesbe baseduponavailablestatisticson fire-
damaged areas butmayhaveto dependupon
experiencedjudgement, basedon the anticipated fire
loadwhere amorerigorous approach is notfeasible.
It followsfrom theforegoingthat thereis astrongly
subjectiveelement in assessingwhatfire size is
acceptablyinfrequent for safedesignpurposes. Clearly,
an 'average'fireforsafety design is unacceptable,since by
definition,nearly halfofallfires would grow larger.Also,
it is unreasonableto expecta SHEVSto be designed for
the largestpossiblefire.
3.2 Growing design fires
Thetime-dependentgrowingdesignfire hasthe
attraction oftrying to model thereality ofgrowing time-
varying fires. For horizontal fire spread atime squared (or
't2') curve maybeconsidered:
q=yt2 (3.1)
where:
q= heat release rate (kW),
y= aconstantdefiningthe steepness ofthe curve (kWs2),
t=timeafterignition (s).
This approach isfollowedin severaldesign guidance
documents for smokecontroI22'28'29includingNF'PA
92B221, whichclassifies thefires asslow, medium,fast and
ultra-fast.Values foryforthose fire growth rates are given
in Table3.1. Wherethis approach is useditis desirableto
carry out other calculations(egthe firesizeat the onset of
flashover)to setan upperlimitto whatwould otherwise
beaninfinitefire growth.
Inreality,ofcourse, any actual sample offires
occurring in the same nominal occupancywill never be
describableby asingle growth curve.Therewill bea
3 Design-fire size 15
Table 31 Various t2fire growth rates
Timeto reach
Fire 1000kW
growth (s) (kWs2)
73 0.18760
Ultra-fast
Fast 146 0.04689
292 0.01172
Medium
Slow 584 0.00293
distributionofgrowth curvesdepending on suchfactors
as variationsin fuellayout andvariations inthelocation
ofthe initialignition.This distributionmeans in principle
thatthe designer should choose an appropriately
pessimisticcurve: putperhaps too simply,any design
basedon an averagecurve impliesafailurerate ofone in
two.This is usuallyunacceptablewherelifesafety is
involved.Itis nevertheless unreasonablefor the designer
to base thedesign on theworstcurve possible— this
would be anexplosion.The designer (ormoreusuallyin
practicethe enforcer ofregulations)must decidewhere
the limitsofreasonableness lie. Ideallythiscould be
specifiable in terms ofthe constant yinEqn3.1 beinga
specifiednumberofstandard deviationsaway from the
meanvalueappropriate to the classofoccupancy.Also,
for some scenarios,the growth rate mayvary with time,
eg afire maygrowat a 'medium' rate for thefirst five
minutes andthen change intoa 'fast'fire.
Ramachandran31 has pioneered the analysis ofthe
UKFire Statisticsdatabaseto deduce not only fire growth
curves (expressedin exponentialform) butalso toderive
the probabilitydistributionsforthosecurves.
Unfortunatelytheavailabledatado not cover many
occupancytypes ofmajor interest tothe smoke control
designer.
Exponentiallygrowing fires have alsobeenusedin
some other documents[22] Thefire growthis given as:
q=c(exp(f3t)—l) (3.2)
whereuand 3 areconstants (note:theseconstantsarenot
thesame parameters represented by uand 1 elsewherein
the presentwork). Exponential growth can bevery rapid
andprincipallyapplies to fire spreadinvertical surfaces.
Theyarenotnormallyusedfor SHEVSdesigns.
Thereisaremaining sub-group ofgrowingfires for
designuse. These are wherethefuel loadcorresponding
toaspecificoccupancyhasbeenrecreatedundera
calorimeter (egthe 'sprinkleredcalorimeter' at FRS[3233])
and hasbeen burnedso thatthe heatrelease rate and
otherimportant parameters areknown as afunction of
time. These datacanthen be usedby designersto predict
the consequencesofwhatwould have happened ifthat
same fire had been burned in the buildinggeometry of
interest tothe design.Thistechnique isusefulinthatit
canallow aconfident departure from themoreusual
designfires for aspecificapplicationwherethe fuelload
16
is not likelyto vary much from the arrangement studied
in the experiment.
Some designers offire safety systemsassumethat a
growing design fire in the presence ofsprinklerswill grow
until ithasbecomelarge enough to trigger the first
sprinklerhead,afterwhich it willprobably decline or be
extinguished.It is often cited as a pessimisticassumption
that it issufficientfor designerstotakeasthelargest size
fire that which triggers the firstsprinkler and thereafter
remains constant22'28291 —butnotethatBS DD 240 (the
lastofthe threereferences)also allowsthe designer to
selectotheroptions includingthat thefire should
continue to grow.
Thereis a considerablebodyofknowledge concerning
the effectofsprinklerson specificfuelarrays usedin
experiments.It is clear from these experimentsthat the
effectivenessofsprinklersdepends stronglyonthe degree
to whichthe fuel is shielded from the water spray
(egreference [32]). It is also clear from theseand many
other experimentsthat thereis a wide range ofpossible
fire growth behaviour,and thatwhile sprinklerswill
usuallycontrol afire and will often extinguishit, therecan
becircumstanceswherethe fire canindeed grow after the
first sprinkleroperates. Unfortunatelythere appear tobe
no experimentallyderived statisticsavailableto quanti
the probabilitiesofthese possibilities.
Thus, the commonly held assumption that the upper
limit to agrowing designfire can be takento be the size at
whichthe firstsprinkler operates, remains unconfirmed.
As mentioned earlier, resultsfrom experimentalwork
inwhichfireswith thefuel loadtypical ofa specific
scenario have beenstudiedunderacalorimeter can
provide informationfor use in SHEVSdesign. The
experiments provide heat release rates and other relevant
parameters in the rigas afunction oftime. The resultscan
thenbe extrapolated to build up a realisticfire growth
scenario for the buildingofinterest. Resultsfrom some
recentexperimental workaregiven inTable3.2.
Table 3.2 Results ofexperiments simulating differenttypesofoccupancy
Fire Heat release HRR at operation of
Type of growth rate (HRR) 1st quick-response
occupancy rate per m2 fuel sprinkler
Retailpremises Fast to ultra-fast 280—650 kWm2
Cellularoffices Medium 270 kWm2
Libraries Slowtomedium 150—650kWrn2
Note: Heat release rate valuesare priortosprinkler operation.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
A designprocedure with a growingdesignfireis
summarizedin Annex A.
3.3 Steady-statedesign fires
Thereis acommonmisconceptionthat a steady-statefire
is meanttobe onewhichgrowstoaparticular size,and
thencontinues at a constant burning rate limitedby some
factor suchas limited availabilityoffuel or limited
ventilation.In practice, this definitionhas not featured in
the 'steady-state'approachto specif,ring designfires.
The actual approach followedin the UK andmany
othercountries over the past 30 to 35 years has beento
assessthe largest sizethe fire is likelyto reachduringits
development (includingthe effectofthe fire servicesin
controllingthe size offire aswellas the effectiveness of
sprinklersorother extinguishingmedia), and to design
the system as ifthefire wasalways ofthis size.This
approach requires the assumptionthat anysystem able to
achieve safedesign conditionsforthis largefirewill also
achieve safetyfor all smallerstages ofthe same fire (see
section 3.1 above).It alsofollowsfrom this concept that
the steady-statedesign fireis inherently astatistical
concept.
As for thegrowingfiredescribed above, assumingan
'average' maximumfire size will implyan unacceptable
failurerate of50%, whereas the largest possiblefire is
alwaysunreasonable.The designer and regulator has to
adopt the concept ofasubjectivelyacceptable largest
designsize (seealso section 3.1). Unfortunately,steady-
statedesignfires contain no informationabout the actual
times involved inthefire.
TheUK FireStatisticsaremuch easierto analysein
terms ofthe largest fire-damaged arearecorded afteran
incident than in terms ofthe actual growth rate
(egMorgan &HanseIl34 and Ghosh351).Another
approach to the maximumareahas been discussedby
Ramachandran61 usingmainly informationfor fires in
HRR at operation of
1st normal-response
sprinkler Notes
Between 100 kW Between 500 kW This occupancy type can contain
(videos) and 700 kW and 1000kW a wide range of fire hazards,
(packets of crisps) leading to a wide rangeof
growth ratesand heat release
rates. The arrangement of
materials can alsohave a
significant effectonfire growth,
eg fire growth may bemore
rapidingoods displayed on
shelving. __________
The fireload mainlycomprised
furniture, papers and computers.
Thefuel comprised hardback and
paperback books.

(a)
200
100
50
40
30
20
E
10
5
4
3
0 5 10152025 50
% ofsamp'e >
Figure9Percentage offires exceeding a specifiedfire-damaged area: (a)offices, (b)retail areas
the textile industry.References[34,35] followedthe
earlierMorgan & Chandler°1 paper defininga 'relative
frequency',such thatit represents the percentage offire
incidentsoutofadefined population ofincidentswhich
exceed aspecifiedfire-damaged area. For example,in
Figure9a (fromreference [34]), 10% ofincidentsfrom a
population definedas fires startinginofficeswhere
sprinklersare present, exceed a fire-damagedareaof
16m2. In thiscase,whichhas become thecommonly
adopted designfire for sprinkler-equippedoffices,we can
say thatthe designfirehas arelativefrequencyof10%.
Another exampleis the more recentstudyby Ghosh3 of
fires startingin retail areas ofretail premises (Figure9b),
although the decision as tothe designfiresizefor
sprinkler-equippedpublic areas ofretail premises was
taken on the basisofmuch weakerevidence5'24.
Figures 9a and 9bshow that sprinklershavethe effect
ofreducing the frequencywithwhichfires exceed any
given area, for all except the smaller fires. It is alsowell
establishedthat sprinklers,whenin operation, makeit
muchless likelythat a fireinaroom will achieve
flashover.It is common inthe UK to speciIr that
sprinklersbefitted,as part ofthesmokeventilation
concept, in order tokeepthefire within limitswhich
allow morepractical smokeventilation.Indeed, inthe
UKthe fittingofsprinklersin shops opento enclosed
shopping malls, combined withsmoke exhaust
ventilation in those malls, is mandatory.
It canalso be seen from Figures9aand 9b that different
occupancies (in this case offices and retail areas) donot
followthe same curve. Itimmediatelyfollowsthatthereis
no suchthingas a universaldesignfire. Eachdifferent
3 Design-fire size ____ ______ 17
(b) 100
50
20
10
5
I
0 20 40 60 80
% offires>A1
class ofoccupancy must be expected to have itsown
characteristicdesignfire.
It is also impossiblein most casesto arriveat a heat
release rate from the UK FireStatisticsdatabase, and so it
has alwaysbeen necessaryto assumeor derivefrom some
othersourcea valueofheat release rate per squaremetre
appropriatetothe occupancyin question.Ithasbeen
usual to assume apessimisticvaluefrom afrequency
distributionofheatrelease ratesper squaremetre, where
this can be deduced27. This approach necessarilymeans
that apessimisticview hasbeenintroduced in two
separate stagesoftheargument in arrivingatadesig:nfire.
It canalsobenotedthat wherethereis alackofreliable
evidenceto support the choice ofeithera growing cr a
steady-statefire, itis usuallymorepracticabletoassess
thelargest sizethat a fire might reasonablyachieve rather
thanthetime itmighttaketo reach suchasize.This
means,forexample,thatwhenthereisnoclear evidence
availableto support a choice ofeitheraparticular
constantinthe 't2' growth formula, or astatistically
reliablesteady-statemaximum fire, it isusuallysafer to
ask an experiencedfireofficerto assessthesize offire his
first-attendingcrew would begin to extinguishthan to ask
himto assesshowlong the fire would taketo grow to that
size.
Workondesign guidancefor smokeventilation
systemsinshopping centres5'24usedthe principleof
selectinga fixed sizeoffirethatwould cater for almost all
ofthe fire sizeslikelyto befound in that class of
occupancy and then deducing apessimisticheat output
from thatfire37'241. This procedure hasbeen adopted for
occupanciesother than retail, which are alsocommonly
18 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Table 3.3 Steady-state design-fire sizes

Fire Fire Heatrelease Totalconvective
Occupancy area, A perimeter, P rate density,q heat flux
type (m2) (m) (kWm2) (kW)

Retail areas
Standard response sprinklers 10 12 625 5000
Quick response sprinklers 5 9 625 2500
No sprinklers Entire room Width ofopening 1200 ?
.-
Open-planoffices
Standard response sprinklers 16 14 255 2700 (closetothe fireflume)
1000 (atthewindow)
Nosprinklers:fuel-bed 47 24 255 8000(closetothefireplume)
controlled 6000(atthe window)
No sprinklers: full involvement Entire room Width of opening 255 ?

ofcompartment .. -
Hotelbedroom
Standard responsesprinklers 2 6 250 400 (close tothe plume)
300 (at thewindow)
No sprinklers Entire room Width of opening 100 1000(atthe window)
(typically c. 20m2) .-
Carpark
(a burning car) 10 12 400 3000(closetothe plume) -
Notes:

Experimentsin a opriakieredcaisrimeter indicate thatthe fire sizes issomeoccepancies msybe smallerthee gineeisthe table, batasyetthere is not enoaghintormatisn togixe reliableasIans.

Desige fire sizes for offices asd hotelrooms are sotofficially 'epproxed'choices,althoeghtheyore widely soed.
Recentintormation osbaraisg cars ooggestothatmodern cars ese materialswhich may sometimesgixehigher borniegrates than isthe Table.The positionis not yetcleartorcarsoshre incar parks, arid
thisrecommesdotionmay changemhenbetter data become available.

associated with atrium buildings,ie officesand hotel above. The mass flowrate ofgasesentering the final
bedrooms34'351. reservoir will be less than would becalculated usingthe
Table3.3 summarizesseveral ofthe more commonly valuegiven above. Even forthis scenario, therefore, the
adoptedsteady-state design fire sizes incurrentuse. The above value should erronthe side ofsafety.Designers
heat release rate (qfAf) isthetotal heatgenerated by wishingto takesprinklercooling in the firecompartment
combustion per second, and is the parameter measured in morerigorously'intoaccount should adopt a fullyfire-
most calorimetryexperiments. Some ofthisheat is engineered approach appropriate to theirspecific
radiatedfrom the flames, and warms the surrounding circumstances,forexample byusingthe methods
walls,floor, etc. The heat remaining in the gases is the described insection 5.5 to assessthe effectofsprinkler
convectiveheat flux, and is the heatflow parameter cooling on the outfiowinggases.
required for calculationsofsubsequent smoke Theuse ofthe bedroom floor areafor the hotel
movement. bedroomdesign firereflects the situationwheretherearc
Whenconsidering an unsprinldered office occupancy nosprinklers present. Unpublished research on
thereexiststhepotential for flashoverto occur, and for sprinklered bed fires1391, wherethe lowheat output per
theentirefloor becoming involvedin fire. Even ifthe unitareawas comparable tovalues for hotelbedrooms,
buildinggeometry can accommodate this fire condition, suggest that the much lowerfuel load (compared withan
thedestructive powerofafullyinvolvedofficeroom fire office) expected in ahotelbedroomutilizing
is suchthat smokecontrol systemscannotusuallybe conventionalsprinklersshould makeitpossibleforthe
designed to protectsatisfactorilymeans ofeseapein this smokygases to be cooled sufficiently tobe retained
situation, except for fires in smallrooms. An assessment within the room oforigin (assumingthe windowis not
ofthe mass flowrate andheat fluxfrom aroom fire will open). The operation ofsprinklers islikelyto coolany
allow the potentialforflashoverto be estimated,and smokefrom afire and suppressthatfire to suchan extent
thencewhetheradditionalprecautionary measures are thatthe glazingto the bedroom willprobably remain
required, egsprinklers.This bookwill only provide intact. This is particularlytruefor double-glazed
gnidaneeforthe designofsmoke control systemsfor a windows.
fuel-bed-controlledfire in anoffice,and afullyinvolved The same research391 indicatesthatthe use of
fire in a hotelbedroom. conventionalsprinklersin a residentialenvironment may
Gases flowingintothe atrium from a fire deep within a not, however, allow conditionswithin the roomto
large-area officewith operating sprinklersmaybe cooler remain tenable, and it may be inferredthatthe presence
than is assumed in the 'sprinkleredoffice' designfire ofan open window to the room could produce hazardous

conditionsinthe atrium, at least above the floor offire
origin.Thereare no statisticaldataavailableonfires in
sprinkleredhotelbedrooms in the UK; consequently,any
choice ofdesignfire size willbesubjective.Should a
designer wishto examinethe effectofa plume emanating
from an open window in a sprinkleredhotelbedroom, it
would not seem unreasonabletouse a valueof6 m
perimeter(equivalentto asinglebed) with a convective
heatoutputofaround 500 kW asthe designfire.
Research intothe use offast-responsesprinklersin a
residentialenvironment°'41 has clearlyshown that at the
time ofoperation ofthesesprinklersthe conditionsinside
theroomswerestill tenable, ie therewas no life-safety
risk from thesmoke, evenwith excessiveceilinglevel
temperatures. This clearlyindicatesthat for anygases
flowingintotheatrium (egthroughan openwindow) the
further entrainment induced by the risingsmokeplume
willensurethatconditionswithin the atriummust be
tenable, regardless ofthe smoketemperature or smoke
production rateinthe room. Whileitis possiblethatthis
may also be true for cellularoffices employingfast-
response sprinklers,thereis no evidence (experimentalor
empirical)to validatethis, andso toerr ontheside of
safety,thisbookwillregard sprinklered offices employing
fast-responsesprinklersinthe same wayas offices using
conventionalsprinklers.Further research andstatistical
dataaredesirablein thisarea.
Thedesignprocedure for a steady-statedesignfireis
summarizedin Annex B.
3.4 Acceptablefailure rates
It has already beennotedthatit is never feasibleto design
afire safetyengineered systemto copewiththe largest
3 Design-fire size 19
possiblefire, orthefastest possiblefiregrowth rate, In
practice, itis alwaysnecessaryto designfor the largest
reasonablesize offire; orin otherwordsfor afire which
will be exceeded in anacceptablysmallproportion offire
incidentslikelytooccurinthe occupancytype ofinterest
tothe designer.Wherethe dataexistsin thecorrectform,
this essentiallymeans choosingan appropriatevalue of
relativefrequency andfindingthe correspondingareafor
thedesign fire. Similarlyforgrowingfires, it is always
necessaryto choose a designfire whose growthratewill
be exceeded inanacceptably smallproportion of
incidentsin the typeofoccupancyofinterest.As has
already been notedabove, the paucity ofavailable
probabilitydistributionsofgrowth curvesmakesthe
choice ofdesignfire difficult. For both steady-stateand
growing designfires, these decisionsare necessarily
subjective(more so wheredecisionshaveto be basedon
an experiencedjudgement inthe absenceofaknown
probabilitydistribution).
Oneexpects differencesofperception. It is common to
findthatindividualsresponsiblefor a singlebuildingwill
seeas low those values ofprobabilitywhichthe regulator
will see asunacceptablylargewhenapplied to alarge
numberofsimilarbuildingsforwhichhe has
responsibility.
Whatconstitutes an acceptable point in a probability
distributionalso depends onthe likelypublicreactionin
potentially multi-fatalityfires.Anecdotal evidence,egthe
strengthofthepublic reaction followingamajor
multiple-death fire suchas the Kings CrossUnderground
Station fire in Londonin 1987 after many decades
withoutany firedeathsin similarcircumstances,suggests
that forsome types ofpublic buildingtheacceptable
failurerate can be very low indeed.
20 ____ ____ _________
4 Escape times
SHEVS are often designed such that a clear layerwill
remain for an indefiniteperiod, provided thedesignfire
size is not exceeded.Ifthe purpose ofthe smoke control
system is purely forlife safety then a clear layeroniyneed
be maintainedforsuchaperiodthat safeevacuationofall
the occupants cantakeplace. In thesecases, itis
important todetermine both the availableescape time
and the required escape time to ensurethatthe available
escape timeis at leastas long as the required escape time.
Availableescape time is defined as the timefrom the
detectionofafireto the 'time to danger' whereescape
becomes impossibleorvery difficult. The time to danger
isthe timeuntil:
• the clear layerheightis less than3 m (may be lowerin
some cases), or
• thehot gas layertemperature is 200 °C or more.
Ifthe clear layer (ievisibilityofatleast10 m) wastoo
shallow then escape would bethroughsmokeand will be
difficult. Radiationfrom alayerwhose temperature is
morethan200 °C maycause severe painand discomfort.
It is relativelystraightforwardto calculatethe available
escape timefrom procedures given in this book.
Itis much moredifficult to assesswhat therequired
escape timeswill be. In general,they will havetwo
components:
• alerting time and
• evacuation time.
Alerting time
Alerting time is the time needed for the people to realize
that thereis a lifethreatand to startto move. Evacuation
time is the time needed to reacha place ofsafety. Alerting
time will dependon many factors,some ofthe most
important being the type ofalarmgiven and the
availabilityoftrainedstaff. Proulx & Sime421 have shown
thatwhenusing only afire bell, as an alarmthealerting
time canbe nearly 10 minutes, whereas withvoice-alarm
and staffintervention thiscan be reduced to 60—90s.
Note that alerting times canchange due to too many false
alarms or to failureofthe alarmsystem. Experience has
shown thatpeopletend to ignore alerts ifthey occur
frequently.
Evacuation time
Evacuationtimewill dependon the traveldistance,the
numberandwidth ofexits,and the population.It also
depends on the presence ofstragglers, disabled or injured
people andthe unpredictablebehaviour ofhuman beings
in an emergency: people whohavealready reached a safe
environment will often gobackintoan endangered zone
for subjectivereasons (ega motherlooking for her child
from whomshe became separated during evacuation).
Also,the population ofabuildingcannot be estimated
accuratelyfor allcircumstances,eg in the timebefore
Christmas there canbe far more people than normal
inside ashopping mall. In this case,the required escape
time can be longer than assumed in the design.This could
leadto deaths ifthe safetymargin included in the design
is insufficient.
It isbeyondthescopeofthisbookto discuss escape
times in detail. In general, specialisthelp should be
sought for egress calculations.In some scenarios,itis not
possibleto consider smoke control withoutan estimate of
escape times.
Thesensitivityofthe 'time to danger' totheassumed
fire growth rate has been discussedin Chapter 3. This
introduces a probabilisticaspect tothe conceptofthe
availableescape time. Similarly, the timeneededfor safe
evacuation ofoccupants should ideallybe described in
terms ofprobabilities,although the dependence on
human behaviour makesthis difficult. Ideally,it should be
possibleto calculatethe combined probability ofa design
being successfhl taking intoaccount allthe separate
probabilitiesofthe differentassumptions,both inthe
availabletime for escape and in the time required for
escape. Unfortunatelythis willbeimpossibleto do with
accuracy in most cases because ofthe inadequacyof
availablesupporting data, and it willbe necessaryto
approximate to a greaterorlesserextent. This inturn
suggeststhe need for adequate safety margins to be
applied to the results and conclusionsofsuch
calculations.
It should notbeforgotten that the time required for
safeescape ofthe occupants from abuildingmay notbe
the only timelimit which has to be consideredwhen
carrying out atime-based SHEVSdesign. It isusefulto
regard fire-fightersasbuildingoccupants while they are
________________________________ ____ 4 Escapetimes ____ 21
inside fightinga fire; the design ofthe SHEVSshould not parameters whichleads, for example,tothe prediction
allow themto be putat risk simplybecausetheoriginal thatfirecrewsmay be caught in aflashovercannotbe
occupants have escaped. Anychoice ofdesign regarded as goodpracticeinSHEVS design (seealso
section 12.2.2.1).
22 _________________________________ ______________
5 Smoke control on the storey
of fire origin
5.1 Within the fire room
In anysituation involvingthe potential movement of
smoke intoescape routesitis alwayspreferable, although
notalways practicable (as in most shopping malls),to
control the smokein the fire room and henceprevent its
passageto otherwiseunaffected areas. Ventilationofthe
fire roommaybe achieved eitherby a dedicated SHEVS
orby adapting and boostingan air-conditioningor
ventilatingsystem. The latter systemsare usually
designed to distribute air uniformlythrougha space and
notto establishthermalstratificationas in a SHEVS.It
followsthat control dampers will usuallybeneededbe
neededto modifythe mode ofoperation, egto keep
exhaust points nearthe ceilingopen and to shut down air
supply from the ceilingdownwards, as well as other
related changes in operation. Ifthe compartment isopen
to anadjacent atrium, then thecompartment musthave
eithera downstand barrier tocreateareservoir within the
compartment, or a high-powered exhaust slotat the
boundary edgeto achieve asimilar effect (Figures lOa
and lob).
Theminimum height ofthesmoke layer base in the
room must be compatiblewiththe openings ontothe
atrium, with the layer depthbeingno lowerthan the soffit
(a)
Exhaust from
compartment
Downstand
Figure10 Smoke ventilation withina compartment:(a) use of a downstand to createa smoke reservoir, (b) use of a 'slot exhaust' to
preventsmokefrom enteringthe reservoir
ofthe opening (Figure 11).Whereno downstand exists,
and an exhaust slot is usedinstead,the exhaust capacity
provided willneed to be compatiblewiththe layerdepth
(Figure 12). See section 5.12 on exhaust slots(slitextract).
More generally,the minimumheightto the base ofthe
smoke layer formedin the smoke reservoirshould be
chosen on the grounds ofsafety. Some minimumvalues
arelisted in Annex Bfordifferenttypes ofoccupancy of
thebuilding.
This typeofplumeis definedas an axi-symmetric
plume as the smokeflow should be approximately
symmetricalabout an axis; intheabsence ofwindtheaxis
willbe vertical.Having establishedthe clear layer height
inthe room, the mass flowrate ofsmoke canthen be
calculated.
5.1.1 Plumes above large fires
Plumesabove large fires can be considered tobe those
where:
Y 1O(Af)°5 (m) (5.1)
whereY istheheightofrise oftheplumeand A(m2) is
the areaofthe fire.
WorkbyHansell43 drawing onworkby Zukoskiet
(b)
Exhaust from Boundary edge
compartment exhaust slot
downstand

Exhaust from
*
compartment
/ predominantlyto one side ofthe fire (eg from an
iJDownstand
* Volumetric flowrate sufficiently great
to prevent smoke spillage beneath
downstand for height of rise V.
Figure11 Plume height and layerdepthwith a downstand
Exhaust from Boundary edge
compartment
* exhaust slot *
* Volumetric flow rate sufficiently great
to prevent smoke spillage beyond the
exhaust slot for height of rise Y.
Figure12 Plume height and layerdepthwith a slotexhaust
al441 andQuintiere et al45 to modifyearlier studies by
Thomas etal9 and Hinkley4 has shown that the rate of
air entrainment intoa plume ofsmokerisingabove afire,
Mf, maybe obtainedusingthe equation:
Mf= Ce Py3"2 (kgs1) (5.2)
where:
Ce = 0.19 (kgs'm52) forlarge-area rooms suchas
auditoria,stadia,largeopen-plan offices, atrium
floors,etc. wherethe ceilingis wellabove the fire.
=
Ce 0.21 (kgs1m5"2) forlarge-area rooms, suchas open-
plan offices,wherethe ceilingis close to the fire.
(Note:it isnot known how andunderwhat
conditionsoneshould regard a ceilingas being
close to the fire. Until betterevidence appears, it is
hereby suggestedthat Ceshould takethe value 0.21
whenever Y is<threetimes JAf. Itishoped that
researchwill allow a betterbasis for choice).
5 Smoke control on storey offire origin 23
Ce = 0.34 (kgs'm512)for smallrooms suchas unitshops,
cellularoffices, hotelbedrooms (prior to flashover
or fullinvolvement),etc. with ventilationopenings
office window in one wall only).Thusmost small
rooms will takethis value.
P = perimeter ofthe fire (m).
The earliestform ofEqn (5.2) wasby Thomas et a1191,and
was developed from theoretical considerations forthe
flameregion above extensive areas offire: wherethe fire
isnot close to any wall,the ceilingismuchhigherthan
theflame region ofthe plume, and air is free to app:roach
the firefrom all sides.
The basic equation was simplifiedby merging
constants,and bygivingcertain parameters values
appropriate to flameconditions, reducing to Eqn (5.2)
withCe=0.188. Itfollowsthatthejustificationfor using
Eqn (5.2) for thethermalplume region above theflames
is essentiallyempirical,and has beensummarizedby
Hinkley4, showing thattheequation has beenvalidated
experimentallyforvalues ofYupto 10 times (Af)0'5 (from
0.1 mto20m)[46] for firesinlargespaces,usingsquare
fires ofsidelengths between 0.2 m and 4.5 m.The
equationhasbeen validated for firesizes between8 kW
and 30 MW,withvalues ofthe heat-release ratedensity
between200 kWm2 and 1800 kWm2. Its extension
beyond those rangesisuntested, but it is likelythat any
fireextending above thatrange will rapidly leadto
flashover,andthe full involvementofany room, andthat
anyfire smallerthanthatrange would besubject to the
thermal plume breaking up intoalarger number of
smallerplumes.
Poreh& Morgan481haveshownthat Eqn (5.2) is
equivalenttothe equation derived byZukoskietal44
(see section 5.1.2 below) for entrainment intoabuoyant
plume, within the limits ofthe availableexperimental
uncertainties.
Note herethatEqn (5.2)(andall other axi-symmetric
plumes) will be fhrther modifiedifthe fireis very close to
one or more walls.This effectisdiscussedinsection 5.1.3
below.
Thequantity ofsmoke entering a ceilingreservoir or
flowinglayer given byEqn (5.2)is showngraphicallyin
Figures 13a and 13bforboth (small) cellularand open-
planrooms (Ce =0.34 andCe=0.19) and for sprinklered
and unsprinklered offices (P = 14m andP= 24 m).
Similarcurvesare showngraphicallyin Figure 14 for
sprinklered large retail areas ofshops.
Thedemarcation betweena cellularroomand an
open-plan layout is determined bythe abilityofthe
incoming airflowtoflow intothe risingplume from all
sides.The narrower theroombecomes, the less easilythe
air can flow behind theplume. Inthis regard, cellular
rooms areconsidered herein tobe those in which the
maximum roomdimension is less than orequalto 5 times
the effectivewidthofthe designfire size (egits diameter
ifcircular),and the incomingair canonly enterfrom one
direction (Figure 15).This demarcation dimensionwas
24 Design methodologies for SHEVS
C0Ol8U =
C0 O331
(a) (b)
5

a
U) 3
U)
0
Cs
E
U)
0
E
U)
0
•I
.0
U)
2

:2

0 0
20 30 40 50 60 0 :10 40 60 80 100

Massflow (kgs) Massflow (kgs)

Figure13 Rateof production ofhot gasesfor (a)sprinklered,(b) unsprinklered offices

5
chosenarbitrarilywhenfirstproposed forinclusionin
reference [13], basedonthe experiencedjudgement of
the authors, and still has no theoretical derivation.
Research inthis areais highly desirable.
4 Whilst Figures 13a and 13b show the mass flow
production curvesfor cellularoffices, many such
configurationswillnot in practice have afixed wall
construction with agoodenough fire resistance,orhave i
large enough opening to sustain the replacement air
E
U) 3
U)
Cs
-D supply (seesection 5.8) needed for such large fires.
U)
0 Figure 13b also has a 'cut-off' belowwhichthe -

E
U) temperatureofthe gas layerwill exceed 600 °C and
0 flashoverofthe room will almost certainly have occurred.
Themechanism offlashovermaywellstartto occur prior
to this criticalpoint, and gastemperatures in excessof
500 °Cmay be considered aconservative lowerlimit for
flashoverpotentia147.The 'danger-zone' is shown as a
shadedareaon Figure13b.
Mass flowrates should be above this shaded zone for
the smoke control systems to operatesafely.

5.1.2 Plumes above smallfires

Plumesabove small fires arethosewherethe
10 15 20 25 30 characteristicdimension ofthe fire (egthe diameter ofa
Massflow (kgs-) roundfire) is sufficiently smallerthan the plume height
above the firethatthe plume can be regarded as being
Figure14 Rate of production ofhotgasesfor large essentiallycircular inhorizontal cross-section and at
sprinklered shops theseplume heights appears to behave as ifit were

conicalinshaperisingfrom a pointsource. Because of
thisbehaviour mathematical modelsbasedonthis
approximationare often known as 'point-source' models.
Note that in thesemodels the actual fireis taken to
correspond to ahorizontal plane in the conicalplume,
some distance above the pointofthe inverted cone. It
followsthat the location ofthe point isvirtual (ie
imaginary,havingnoreal existence),and this location
canoften belowerthanthefloor beneaththeactual fire.
The distancefrom theactual fire to thevirtualpoint
source can be defined from differentheights in the fuel
array, and cantakedifferentvaluesin differentmodels.
In view ofthe greaterconvenience ofEqn (5.2), this
current bookwill only considerthese 'small-fire'models
asbeingappropriate for:
Y> 10(Af)05 (5.3)
Poreh& Morgan48 haveshownthat Eqn (5.2) is
equivalentto the equation derived byZukoskiet al441for
entrainment intoabuoyant plume, within the limitsof
theavailableexperimental uncertainties.Following
Zukoski et al, we canwrite:
Mf= CQ[3(Y-Y0)5'3 (kgs1) (5.4)
where:
C == 0.071 (kgs' kW-1'3m5'3),
convectiveheatflux
= heightabovethebase(kW),
ofthe fireto the virtualorigin
ofthsmoke plume (m).
Theuse ofEqn (5.4) requires that the valueofY0must be
determined foreachfire size.
canbe calculated from reference [44]:
=
'V0 -l.O2Df+ 0.083Q5 (m) (5.5)
Eqn (5.5) has only been validated for pool-type fires, and
itis assumed thatformostsolid fuels found inbuildings
thevalueofY0 islikelyto be similar. Thevalue ofthe
convectiveheatflux (Q) can beassumed as —70% ofthe
total heatreleased persecond bythe fire for most
practicalflielmaterials.
Ifthe height ofthe ftielis known then amoreaccurate
calculationofentrainment may bedoneby usingthe
formula derivedby Heskestad49:
M= 0.071Q33(y_y0)LO7[1+0.026Q19O7(y_y0)tO7](kg s') (5.6a)
wherey0 istheheightofthevirtualorigin ofthe plume
measured abovethetop ofthe burning thel, and:
=
y0 -1.02D1+0.083QX5 (5.6b)
5.1.3Effects of adjacent walls on entrainment
intotheplume
Wherea fireis expected to be directly bounded bywalls,
it iscommonly assumed thatthewalls act to reduce the
5 Smoke control on storey offireorigin 25
entrainment intothe buoyant plume.
Whenusingthe LargeFire Eqn (5.2), it is sometimes
assumedthatthereduction in mass flow is the same as
thereduction in the effective fire perimeter.Thus, aliquid
poolfirein a 1 x 1 m traywill have a perimeter of4 m
whenthe trayis away from anywall;3 m whenoneside
ofthetrayisclose to a wall;and 2 m whenthetrayis
locatedin acorner, ietwo ofthesides arelocated close to
walls.For the same heightofrise ofa plume,the
corresponding massfluxshould then be Mf, 0.7SMfand
O.SMfwhenthe fire is inthe middle ofthe room, near one
wall,andin acorner respectively.
WhenusingEqn (5.4) it is often assumed, from
theoretical analysis, thatthe wallswillreducethe mass
flow from the firesuchthattheentrainment willbe
0.63 times that ofthe same fire inthemiddle ofthe room
whenthefire is close to one wall,and is 0.4 times that of
thesame fire in the middle ofthe room whenthe fire is in
acorner.
Recent unpublishedexperimental evidence obtained
atthe Fire Research Station suggeststhatwhenthe fire is
nearone ormorewalls thetruemass flowmaybe greater
than those values.Forafire close to onewall themass
flow was —0.7 times that ofthe same fire in the middle of
the room, and for afire inacorner themass flowwas
—0.65times thatofthe same fireinthemiddle ofthe
room.Dataareonly availablefrom averylimited number
ofexperiments.
Therefore, designassumptionswill err on the side of
safety ifthe smallervalues ofM arc usedtopredict
flashoverconditionsand the larger valuesofM (typically
for fires not close to wallsin most cases)usedfor
calculatingthe capacityoftheSHEVS.
5.1.4 Effects of sprinkler
Thereisno informationavailableto show howthe
equationsfor entrainment into a plume should be
modifiedto allowforthe effectsofsprinkler spray
interactions.Consequently,they are usedhere
unmodified.
5.2 The flowof hot gasesout of the room of
origininto a taller adjacent space (eg an
atrium or mall)
Manybuildingshaveroomsopening intoa common
space with amuchhigherceiling.Examples include
multistorey shopping malls, single-storeyshopping malls
wherethemall has a much higherceilingthanthe shop's
openingheight,atria andbuildingswith mezzanine
floors. In suchbuildingsanyfire on the floor ofthe larger
space can bedescribed as ifit were asimple single-storey
space with ahigh ceiling.
Additionalprocesses must be considered whenthe fire
occursin one ofthe rooms adjacent to the tall space. In
such a room the selection process for the designfire
remainsunchanged. The plume immediatelyabovethe
fire is as described in Eqn (5.2), butthesmoke layer
formed underthe ceilingoftheroomwill flow
26
horizontally through the opening(s) tothelarger space
unless special measures are takento prevent it.
ASHEVS designrequires calculationofthe massflow
rate ofsmoke at eachstage en route. Thisrequires a
calculation ofthe massflowrateattheroom's opening. It
is also necessaryto identifiwhethertheselected design
fireis realisticforthecircumstances.This canbe checked
by calculatingthetemperature ofthe gasesbeneaththe
ceilingofthe fireroom— or at itsopening. Ifthe
temperature istoo high heatradiation in the roomwill
rapidly cause full involvementofallavailableftielin the
room (ie flashover).In suchacase,theonly reasonable
designfire isa fullyinvolved room, requiring a
reassessmentoftheheat release rate,and alsorequiring a
change in the calculationprocedures. Itcan beassumed
thatsprinklers inthefireroomwill prevent flashover.
Themass flow rate ofsmoky gasespassingthrougha
vertical opening (Mw)maybefound from references
[43,13]:
Ce PW/-Z312
Mw— (kgs') (5.7)
[W2/3+I(Y1312
L C2)]
where:
W =widthofopening (m),
h = height ofthe top ofopening above thefloor (m),
Cd = effectivecoefficientofdischargefortheopening.
Note: The number'2' inEqn (5.7)istheresult of
combiningvarious parameters, and has dimension.
It is worthrepeating at thispointthe earlier comment
that the demarcation betweena cellularroom and an
open-plan layout, ie the basis for choosing C, is
determined by the abilityofthe incoming airflowto flow
intothe risingplume from allsides.The narrower the
roombecomes, the less easilythe air canflowbehind the
plume. In this regard,as stated in section 5.1.1, cellular
rooms are considered hereinto bethosein which the
maximum room dimensionisless than or equal to 5 times
thediameterofthe design fire size,andthe incoming air
canonly enterfrom one direction (Figure 15).
Wherethesmoke flow directly approaches a'spill
edge' withnodownstand (egwherethe ceilingis flush
withthe topoftheopening),Cd = CdS = 1.0. Where
smoke spillspast adeep downstand at the spilledge, the
discharge coefficientfor smoke flows directly beneaththe
downstand can betakentobe 0.65.
Wherethesmoke flowsbeyondadownstand or lower
ceilinglevel at anopeningsetbackfrom the actual spill
edge, risinginthe form ofa plume ofheightDd (Figures
16a andb) ithasbeen shown that the heightofrise ofthe
plume has an effecton the rate offlow ofsmoke leaving
the opening43. This effectcanbe expressed asa
modificationto the coefficientofdischargeatthe
opening (which wecan write as CdO inordertomaintain a
distinctionbetweenthe twoscenarios).Note: This should
not be confusedwiththe coefficientofdischargeatthe
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Cellular room
P1
Restricted air flowto
fire and plume
opening
Cellular room
1H •L
iLJH
Figure 15 Limiting size ofcellularroom
spilledge itself(discussedin the previous paragraph).
Anempiricalcorrelation involvinganiterative methoc
ofcalculatingC10wasdeveloped byHansell431 and was
included in earlier guidancefrom BRE13. Unfortunately,
it had notbeenpossiblefor his work to study awide
variety ofopening widths, opening heights, ormass flow
rates ofhotgases. Ithas beenfound in practice that
although the correlation gave agoodresult over the
experimental range, the predicted valueofCd0can
become unbelievablylargewhenit isusedfor
circumstancestoo differentfrom the original
experimental geometries whichgaverise to Hansell's
correlation. It is noteworthy that wherethe design
condition is close tothe experimental geometry, most of
the calculatedvalues ofCdOfor 'intermediate-depth
downstand' using Hansell'sifull method are reasonably
close to 0.8.
As a result ofthe above, a simpleralternative is here
recommended forcalculatingthe appropriate valueof
• Make5.7anand
Cd0:
initialassessmentofthe mass flow rate using
a trial valueof andthus an
Eqn CdO (CdO 0.65)
initialassessmentofthe flowinglayer depth D canbe
madefrom:
D (m) (5.8)
CdOL2WJ
usingthe same initialtrialvalue ofCdO. (Notethat
Eqn 5.8 is asimplifiedand approximated version ofthe
moredetailed equation discussedin section 5.6.While
it is sufficientlyaccuratefor the purposes ofthe
iterative procedure described herein, itis betterto
followsection 5.6wherethe actual layer depth has to

(a)
Figure16 Flow out ofanopening with(a) downstand and projectingbalcony, (b)a high balcony
• beWhere
calculated.)
Dd=0 (ieno downstand), do notseparately
calculateforthewindow ifitis not alsothe
opening
spilledge. In practice, it should bepossibleto ignore
very smalldownstands.It is here suggestedwithout
evidence thatwe can treat allvalues ofDd less than
• D 0.25 asbeingableto be ignored.
WhereDd >> (it is here suggestedwithout
evidence that one can assume Dd>2D),we can
assume that Cd0 = 0.65.
• Forall intermediate cases,assume that Cd0 = 0.8.
Note: the number'2'in Eqn (5.8) istheresult of
combiningvarious parameters, andhas dimension.
It is clear thatthis represents an unsatisfactoryposition,
and this approachcanbe expected tobesuperseded as
soonas a more comprehensive experimental study can
leadtoabetter,morewidelyvalidated,correlation.
Earlyexperiments in smokeflow in shopping malls50
and unpublishedfurther analysisofthe dataatFRS have
shown that the smokeflowingfrom aroomwith adeep
downstand andthen underabalcony beyond the
opening becomes moreturbulent with increasingmixing
ofair. This analysiswasbasedon the differencesin
temperature measured beneaththe downstand at the
opening, andbeneaththe balcony.In the continuing
absence ofbetterevidence,we suggestthatforthe
purpose ofengineeringdesignthemass flow rate of
smoke entering the balcony reservoirMB canbetakento
be approximatelydouble theamountgiven byEqn (5.7)
ie:
MB =2M (kgs1) (5.9)
This assumptionistakeninthespirit ofthephilosophy of
this bookdeclared in thePreface,andis known tobe
crude. Furtherresearch is highly desirable.
5 Smoke control on storey of fireorigin 27
(b)
Notethatfor the specificcaseofsingle-storey
shopping mallswhose ceilingsare nottoo much taller
thanthe shop units opening intothose malls, therehas
beenan alternativeempirical correlation2451. In this
approach, allthe calculationsofolltflow from the fire-
compartment detailed insection 5.2, aswell asEqn (5.9),
aresimplyreplaced byEqn (5.1) withY being the hLeight
measured from the base ofthe fire tothebase ofthe
buoyantsmoke layer in the mall andwith Cetakingthe
value 0.38. It is believedthatthis correlation willbreak
down for mallswherethe smokereservoirlayer's base is
toohigh above thetopofthe fire-compartment'sopening
(ie the window betweenshop unitand mall),and it is
suggested that this simple correlation should notbeused
wherethe layerbase is morethan2 m above thetop of
the opening241.Instead, the designer should employ the
calculationmethodsdetailed inChapter 6.
5.3 Ventilationof single-storeysmoke
reservoirs (including the balcony space
where smoke is contained and exhausted
from beneath a balcony)
Thissectionappliesboth whereanaxisymmetricplume
rises directly intoa smokereservoir,andwherea smoke
reservoiris formed onthe same storey asthefirebut
outside the roomoffireorigin. This latter case occurs
whenthesmoke cannot be contained within the room of
origin becausethe rooms have demountablepartitions;
and/or insufficient replacement air canbe provided;
and/or theengineeringimplicationsaretoocostly or
difficult to apply, then the smokeand hotgaseswill be
able totravelfrom the room oforigin intothespace
beyond. This space can be a single-storeymall, or part of
the same storey asthe fire-room.Thissection therefore
applies to anysmokereservoir formed on the samestorey
asthefire-room,butadjacentto thatfire-room.
Some atria aredesigned with balconies around the
28
Atrium
Figure17 Schematicsectionof anatriumwith balconies
4 ofthe reservoir to ensurethatthe smoke retains its
(Exhaust from
balcony reservoir
Atrium
Balcony edge
screen
Figure 18 An underbalconysmoke reservoir
perimeterofthevoid, serving all the rooms at that level.
Figure 17 illustratesinschematic form an atrium with
floors (two levels only are shown inthe Figures) which
have balconies which leave a considerableareafor
pedestrians. On eachlevel thereis a large areasituated
beloweachbalcony.Ifscreens (activated by smoke
detectors or as permanent features) are hungdown from
thebalcony edges, theregion below eachbalconycanbe
turned intoa ceilingreservoir (Figure 18). In this case,the
clear air height beneaththe smoke reservoirmustalso be
selected on the grounds ofsafety;seeAnnex B for a
listing oftypical minimumvalues.This is similartothe
procedure usedin multistoreyshopping complexes241.
This reservoir,however it has been formed, can then
beprovided with its ownexhaust system. Smoke curtains
canbe positioned (egacross thebalcony) to limitthesize
Design methodologies forSHEVS
Figure 19 Under-balcony smoke reservoirventing into an atrium
smoke reservoir
buoyancy.Eachreservoir should be limited to an areanot
exceeding 1300 m2 in area, with anupperlimit to the area
ofthe fire—room of1300 m2 wherepowered smoke
exhaust is used; or 1000 m2for eachparameter where
natural smokeventilation is used (by analogywith
shopping malls241).Note that it is logicallyequivalentto
specifythatthe total areaoffire-room plus adjacent
smoke reservoir should not exceed 2000 m2 fornatural
smokeventilation,or2600 m2 ifpowered smoke
ventilationis used. Alsoby analogywith shopping
malls1241, the smoke reservoir should havea maximum
length of6O m. See section 5.17 belowfora fuller
discussionofthe limits tosmokereservoir size.
Wherethe smoke reservoiris formedbeneatha
balconyin amultistorey space (egan atrium ormall),the
screens around thebalconies will,in general,befairly
close to potential fire compartments (egoffices). Being
close, smokeissuingfrom such a compartment will
deepen locallyon meeting atransverse barrier. The depth
ofthesescreens should takeintoaccount local deepening
(seesection 5.7). Smoke removedfrom theselower-level
reservoirsshould usuallybe ducted to outside the
buildingbutcan be ducted intothe ceiling reservoirofthe
atrium (Figure19). The mass flow rate ofsmoketo be
exhausted from the atrium roofwill then be that
calculated for the under-balcony condition[50]
5.4 Smoke layertemperature
Themeantemperature rise ofthe smoke layer above
ambient, 0, canbe calculatedfrom:
Mc (K) (5.1(a)

where:
Q=
=
convective heatfluxin the gases (kW),
M mass flowofsmoke (eg orMB) (kgs'),
M a major escape route. The maximumsmoke layer
c = specificheat capacity ofthe gases (kJ (kg)1K1).
Tables 5.la to 5.ld givethe temperature rise 0 for
1 MW,2.5 MW, 5 MWand 6 MWconvectiveheat fluxes
respectively.Note that an ambient temperature of
15 °Celsiushas been assumedwhenpreparing these
Tables.
Inunsprinklered fire situationsa high smokelayer
temperature will result in intense heat radiationwhich
5 Smoke control on storey offireorigin 29
maycause difficulties for people escapingalong abalcony
beneaththesmoke layer,especiallyifthe balconiesform
temperature whichwill allow safeevacuationwithout
unduestress is oftheorderof200 °C. Ifthis gas
temperature (or lower) cannot be achieved underthe
balconythen consideration should be given to:
•• alternative routes,
escape
shorter escape paths along the balcony,
• the installationofsprinklers,abovethebalconyto cool
thegases further.

Table 5.la Volume flowrateand temperature ofgases fora Table 5.lb Volumeflowrateand temperature ofgase fora
1 MWconvective heatflux 2.5MWconvective heat flux
Mass Temperature Volumerate Mass Temperature Volumerate
flowrate of gases of exhaust flowrate ofgases ofexhausi
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
ofexhaust) ambient temperature) ofexhaust) ambient temperature)
(kgs') (°C) (m3s') (kgs') (°C) (m3s')

4 258 6.2 10 248 15.2

6 165 7.7 12 206 16.8
8 124 9.4 15 165 19.3
10 99 11.0 20 124 23.4
12 83 12.6 25 99 27.5
15 66 15.1 30 83 31.6
20 50 19.2 35 71 35.7
25 40 23.3 ______ 40 62 40.0
30 33 27.4 50 50 48.0
35 28 31.4 60 41 56.1
40 25 35.6 75 33 68.4
50 20 43.8 90 28 80.8
110 23 97,2

Table 5.lc Volume flowrateandtemperatureofgases fora Table 5.ld Volume flowrateandtemperatureofgase fora
5MWconvective heatflux 6 MW convective heatflux
Mass Temperature Volumerate Mass Temperature Volumerale
flowrate of gases of exhaust flowrate of gases ofexhaust
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
ofexhaust) ambient temperature) of exhaust) ambient temperature)
(kgs') (°C) (m3s') (kgs1) (°C) (m3s')

10 495 22.2 12 495 26.7

12 413 23.9 15 396 29.1
15 330 26.3 20 297 33.2
20 248 30.5 25 238 37.4
25 198 34.5 30 198 41.1
30 165 38.6 35 170 45.5
35 141 42.7 40 149 50
40 124 46.8 50 119 58
50 99 55.0 60 99 66
60 83 63.2 75 79 78
75 66 75.4 90 66 91
90 55 87.7 110 54 107
110 45 104 130 46 123
130 38 120 150 40 140
150 33 137 200 30 181
200 25 178
30
5.5 Effects of sprinklersystemsin smoke
reservoirs
Offices,shops, assembly,industrialand storage or other
non-residential purpose groups in England and Wales are
nowexpected to havesprinklers iftheyhave a floor more
than30 m above ground level.Multistoreybuildingsin
the assembly,shop, industrialorstorage purpose groups
will alsobefitted with sprinklersifindividual
uncompartmented floors exceed a given size.Sprinklers
mayalsobe requiredinothercircumstancesfor insurance
purposes.
The actionofasprinkler system inan office on the
cooling ofgasesflowingfrom the office totheatrium is
accounted forinthe derivation ofthe 1 MWheat fluxat
the window271.It is,however, theusual practice in the
UK to assume that the heat fluxleavinga shop unit
throughits window has the same value as forthe initial
convective heatfluxclose to the fire plume.This
differencein approach can only be explainedhistorically,
and rationalizationofthedifferentapproaches awaits
further research.
Wherethe smoke layer is contained wholly within the
room oforigin by a smokecontrol system and has alarge
area, the sprinklerswill cool the smokelayer further.
Similarly, wheresmoke is collectedwithin abalcony
reservoir adjacent to sprinklered rooms, operation of
sprinklersunderbalconies will leadto increased heat loss
reducing the buoyancyofsmoke,whichin turn can
contribute to aprogressiveloss ofvisibilityunderthe
smoky layer.
Whenthe fire occursin an adjacent room, the
operation ofsprinklers in an adjacent smokereservoir
outside that room will not assistin controllingthe fire. If
too many sprinklersoperateoutsidethefire room,
sprinklersin the room could becomeless effectiveas the
availablewater supply approaches its limits.
It followstherefore that sprinklersneedonly be
installedinasmoke reservoir:
• ifthe smokelayertemperature is likelyto exceed
200 °C, and thus produce sufficientradiationto bea
danger tolightly cladpeople belowthe smoke, and
thustoimpedeescape, or
• ifthereis thelikelihoodofsufficient combustibles
beingpresentto pose a significantthreatofexcessive
firespread.
Apowered exhaustsystem, to a reasonable
approximation,removes afixed volume ofsmoke
irrespective oftemperature. Therefore, iftheextentof
sprinklercooling is overestimatedthe system could be
under-designed.
A system usingnatural ventilators depends onthe
buoyancy ofthehot gasesto expel smokethroughthe
ventilators. In thiscase, the system would beunder-
designed ifthesprinkler coolingwereunderestimated.
The heatlossfrom fire gasesdueto the water spray
from sprinklersis currentlythe subject ofresearch and
datasuitablefor designapplication arenot yetavailable.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Nevertheless,an approximateestimate canbe obtained
as follows.
Ifthe smoke passinga sprinklerishotter thanthe
sprinkleroperating temperature that sprinklerwill
eventuallybe set off. The sprinklerspraywill then cool
the smoke. Ifthesmoke isstill hot enough, the next
sprinklerwill operate coolingthe smoke further.Astage
will bereached whenthe smoketemperature is
insufficientto set offfurther sprinklers.The smokelayer
temperature can thereafter be assumedto be
approximatelyequal to the sprinkleroperating
temperature beyond the radius ofoperation ofthe
sprinklers.Thisradius isgenerally not known.
In the absence ofbetterinformation,itmaybe
acceptable to assumethatnomore sprinklerswill operate
thanareassumed when calculatingthe designofsprinkler
systemsand theirwater supply (eg 18 headsfor Ordinary
Hazard Group 3).
Forpowered exhaust systemsthe cooling effectof
sprinklerscan be ignored in determining the volume
exhaust rate required. This will errontheside ofsafety.
Alternatively,this further cooling and the consequent
contraction ofsmoky gases canbeapproximately
estimated on the basisofan averagevaluebetweenthe
sprinkleroperating temperature and the calculatedinitial
smoketemperature. Wherethefan exhaust openings are
sufficiently wellseparated it can be assumed that one
opening maybe close to the fire, and will extract gases at
thefull initialtemperature given byEqn (5.10).The other
openingsinthese circumstancescan be assumedto be
outsidethe zone ofoperating sprinklers,andwill extract
gasesat the sprinklers'effectiveoperating temperature.
Thenumberofpotential 'hot' and 'cool' intakes must
be assessedwhencalculatingtheaverage temperature of
extracted gases.
Ifthe sprinkleroperating temperature is above about
140 °C, or ifit isabove the calculatedsmoke layer
temperature, then sprinklercooling canbe ignored for
natural ventilators.
Notethat the effectofsprinklercooling is to reduce the
Q
heatflux withoutsignificantlychangingthe mass flux.
It followsthat once a newvalue of0has beenestimated,
thenewheat fluxcanbefound using Eqn (5.10).
5.6 Flowinglayer depth
Smokeentering a ceilingreservoirwill flow from the
point ofentry towards the exhaust points. This flow is
driven bythe buoyancyofthesmoke. Even ifthere is a
very large ventilationareadownstream (egiftheceiling
downstreamwereto be removed) thisflowinglayer
would still haveadepth related to the widthavailable
undertheremaining ceiling(which cannowbe
considered aba]cony),the temperature ofthe smokeand
themassflow rateofsmoke.Workby Morgan[52] has
shown thatthis depth canbe calculatedforunidirectional
flow as follows:

r The extentoflocal deepening canbefoundfrom
DB 0.361 M87 (5.11)
Cd [o 05 W T°5
where:
DB
= flowingsmokelayerdepthunderthe ceilingor
balcony (m),
MB = mass flow rate underthe ceilingorbalcony (kgs1),
=
WB ceiling or balconychannel width (m),
Cd = 1 ifno downstand ispresentat right angles to the
flow; 0.6 ifa deep dOwnstandis presentatright
angles totheflow.
Note: the subscript'B' can simplybereplaced with '1' in
Eqn (5.11) foritto apply to the minimumdepthofflow in
anysmokereservoir or flowingbuoyant smoke layer,.
instead ofsimplyto an under-balconyflow.
Values ofCd foran intermediatedepth downstand cannot
be statedwith confidencefor the wide range ofgeometry
tobe foundinpractice. Itis suggestedthat eitherofthe
extreme values should beadopted inseeking a
conservativedesignapproach.
The resultingvalues oflayer depthfor different
balcony reservoir widths and mass flowrates ofsmoke
aretheminimum possibleassumingan excessofsmoke
exhaust employed downstream:consequentlyit
represents the minimumdepth forthatreservoir.The
depthmust bemeasured below thelowest transverse
downstand obstacleto the flow (eg structuralbeams or
ductwork) ratherthan the true ceiling.Representative
valuesare shown in Tables5.2a—d for 1 MW, 2.5 MW,
5 MWand6MWconvective heatfluxesrespectively,
and for flowsbeneatha smooth ceiling.
In order to useTables 5.2 to findthe minimumdepthof
flow beneath a deep downstand (ega structural beam)
across the direction offlow, find the value inTables 5.2
corresponding tothesame massflowrate and channel
width, andthen multiplythatvalueby 1.67.
5.7 Local deepening
Wherea buoyant layer ofhotsmoke flowsalongbeneath
a ceilingand meetsatransversebarrier, itdeepenslocally
againstthatbarrier because the energy ofthe
approaching layeris converted tobuoyantpotential
energy againstthe barrier asthe gases'downward
velocityis brought to a ha1t531.
Whendesigningasmoke ventilationsystem foratriaor
for shopping malls, in whichthe balconies are acting as
reservoirs,it is often necessaryto control the path of
smokeflowusingdownstand smoke curtains.These are
typically installedaround the edge ofthe voids to prevent
smoke flowingupthroughthe voids. Ifthe void edgeis
close to the fire room this local deepening could cause
smoke to spillbeneaththe smokecurtain and flow up
throughthe void, possiblyaffectingescape from other
storeys. Clearly,thevoid edge screens must be deep
enough to contain not only theestablishedlayer,but also
theadditionallocal deepening outside theroom onfire.
5 Smoke control on storey offire origin 31
Figure20. The depth ofthe establishedlayer (DB in
Figure20) underthe balcony immediatelydownstream of
thelocal deepeningmust firstbe foundusingthe design
procedure given in the preceding sections.Usuallythis
means in the channel formed between the void edge
screen andthe room facade.The additionaldepth DB can
thenbe foundby inspection ofFigure20, allowingthe
necessary minimumoverall depth (DB +LDB) ofthevoid
edgescreen tobe found53.
Thefollowingscale-independent formulacanbe used
to approximateto Figure2O{54u]:
(5.12)
where:
ADB = the additionaldeepening
at the transverse
barrier
(m),
H == the floor to ceilingheight(m),
DB the established flowinglayerdepth (m),
WB = thedistancebetweenthe opening and the
transversebarrier (ie balcony breadth) (m).
5.8 Automatic smoke curtains
Itis commonplaceto use automatic smokecurtainsto
form part ofthe reservoirboundary.Smoke curtains can
also be usedtoachieve separation betweenthe main
smokereservoir andadjacent spaceshigher than the
designsmokelayer base in the smoke reservoir,by
deployingfrom ceilingtofloor intheopeningbetween
suchadjacentspaces and the smokereservoir.These
devices areusuallymade ofanappropriate fabric,ableto
withstand the temperature predicted for the smokygases
theyarein contactwith. Thecurtains areusually
contained ina box fastened to the ceiling,and deploy to
the designposition on receivinga signalfrom the SHEVS
control system. When deployed the fabricis keptunder
tension by aweighted bottombar, which also servesto
keep the curtain straight.
Automatic smoke curtains areusuallydesignedsuch
thatwhentheyarein theirdeployed position theyhang
freely,beingfastened to the buildingstructure only at
theirtop edge, and depending on theweight ofthe
integral bottom barto holdthem vertical.The buoyancy
ofthehot smokelayer exerts apressureon the surfaces
containing the layer. The pressure ofthe smokelayer acts
onthe curtain as ifitwere a sail, pushingit sideways.If
the pressureis too greatthenthe sidewaysdeflection
becomes significant, the bottomedge ofthe curtain lifts,
and thecurtain might not contain thesmoke layer,thus
causingtheSHEVSto fail to achieveits designpurpose.
See Plate 4 for an example ofalightweight curtain being
deflected byan airstreamfrom afan intended to simulate
smokebuoyancy.
It is cruciallyimportant that all smoke curtainsforming
32 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Table 5.2a Minimum reservoir depths or minimum Table 5.2b Minimum reservoirdepths or minimum
channelling screen depths for 1 MW convective heatflux. channelling screen depths for 2.5 MWconvective heatflux.
Unimpeded flow: smoothsoffit Unimpededflow: smooth soffit
Massflowrate Mass flowrate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channelwidths (m) smoke layer Channelwidths (m)
(kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15

4 0.57
______0.51
______ 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 10 1.058 0.81 0.67 0.57 0.51 0.44
6 0.77 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.37 0.32 12 1.204 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.48 0.50
8 0.96 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.46 0.40 15 1.420 1.08 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.59
10 1.157 0.88 0.73 0.63 0.56 0.48 20 1.776 1.36 1.12 0.96 0.85 0.74
12 1.347 1.03 0.85
____________________ 0.73 0.65 0.56 25 2.13 1.63 1.90 1.16 1.02 0.88
15 1.635 1.25 1.03 0.89 0.79 0.68 30 2.481 1.89 1.56 1.35 1.19 1.03
20 2.107 1.61 1.33 1.14 1.01 0.87 35 2.833 2.16 1.78 1.54 1.36 1.17
25 2.581 1.97 1.63 1.40 1.24 1.07 40 3.186 2.43 2.0 1.73 1.53 1.32
30 3.044 2.32 1.92 1.65 1.46 1.26 50 3.88 2.96 2.44 2.11 1.87 1.61
35 3.549 3.55
_______________ 2.24 1.93 1.71 1.47 60 4.60 3.51 2.90 2.50 2.21 1.91
40 4.00 3.05 2.52 2.17 1.92 1.66 75 5.64 4.31 3.55 3.06 2.71 2.34
50 4.95 3.78 3.12 2.69 2.38 2.05 90 6.66 5.08 4.20 3.62 3.20 2.76
Note 1:The minimamdepthsforbi-directionalsmoke flowcanbe foundbylookingatthe column 110 8.04 6.14 5.1 4.37 3.87 3.33
correspondingtotwicethe actualwidthofthe channelorreservoir.
See NotestoTable5,2a.
Note 2:Tofindthe minimumdepth offlowbeneathadeep dswristandlega structural beam)
across the direction offlow, find the value in Tables5.2 correspondingtothe same massflowrate
andchannelwidth, andthen multiplythatvalue by1.67.

Table 5.2c Minimum reservoirdepths or minimum Table 5.2d Minimum reservoirdepths orminimum
channelling screen depths for5MW convective heatflux. channelling screen depths for 6 MWconvective heatflux.
Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit _______ Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit
Mass flowrate Mass flowrate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channelwidths (m) smoke layer Channelwidths (m)
(kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15

10 1.082 0.83 0.68 0.59 0.52 0.45 12 1.22 0.93 0.77 0.66 0.59 0.51
12 1.206 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.58 0.50 15 1.40 1.07 0.88 0.76 0.67 0.58
15 1.386 1.06 0.87 0.75 0.67 0.57 20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.69
20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.70 25 1.95 1.49 1.23 1.06 0.94 0.81
25 1.97 1.50 1.24 1.07 0.95 0.82 30 2.22 1.69 1.40 1.21 1.07 0.92
30 2.25 1.72 1.42 1.22 1.08 0.93 35 2.49 1.90 1.57 1.35 1.20 1.03
35 2.54 1.94 1.60 1.38 1.22 . 1.05 40 2.76 2.10 1.74 1.50 1.33 1.14
40 2.82 2.15 1.78 1.53 1.36 1.17 50 3.29 2.51 2.07 1.79 1.58 1.36
50 3.38 2.58 2.13 1.84 1.63 1.40 60 3.82 2.92 2.41 2.07 1.84 1.58
60 3.94 3.01 2.48 2.14 1.89 1.63 75 4.61 3.52 2.90 2.50 2.22 1.91
75 4.78 3.65 3.01 2.59 2.30 1.98 90 5.40 4.12 3.4 2.93 2.60 2.24
90 5.62 4.29 3.54 3.05 2.70 2.33 110 4.92 4.06 3.50 3.10 2.67
110 5.14 4.243.653.24 2.79 130 5.71 4.71 4.06 3.60 3.1
130 4.94 4.26 3.77 3.25 150 5.37 4.63 4.10 3.53
150 5.64 4.86 4.31 3.71 200 7.0 6.04 5.35 4.61
200 6.35 5.62 4.85 SeeNotesto Table52a.
See Natesto Table5.2a.

partofaSHEVS are'fitforpurpose'. This means that 5.9 Inlet air

whatever the intended purpose ofeachcurtain in the
SHEVSdesign, it must be ableto fulfilthat purpose in its
dejlectedposition.Itis therefore necessaryto calculatethe
expected deflectionofeachcurtain inthe design, andto
usethesecalculationsto speciflythe properties required
ofthecurtains. Somecalculationprocedures areset out in
Annex C.
Theremustbeadequate replacement air for the efficient
operation ofa smokeventilation system. When
ventilatingcompartments directly,ifthe facadeis
normallysealed then facilities should be provided for the
necessaryquantity ofreplacementair to be supplied to
the fire room automatically.This requirement often
 5 Smoke control on storey offire origin 33
0.65 WB=6m WB4m
WB=8m
0.6
—— 8m widechannel
— 6 rnwide channel
0.5 — .— 4 mwide channel

NB: Flowawayfrom barrier is

bi-directional ri all cases
0.4
E NB: Errorbars are one
0 standard deviation

0,3

0.2

0.1

0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

D8(m)

Figure20 Local deepening at a transverse barrier

Naturallyventilated systemshaving more than one

Plate4 Experimental smoke curtaindeflectingundertest
makesthe provisionofsmokeventilationto the room of
origin prohibitiveorundesirable.The provision of
replacement air to asystem employingbalcony reservoirs
is far easier,provided the balconies are opento the
atrium, as is also the provision ofreplacement air to
systemsemployinga smokereservoir in an atrium or
mall.
In naturallyventilated SHEVSdesignshaving natural
inlets, the effectofthe flowresistance ofthe inlet
openings is explicitlyincludedinthe designequations
usedto calculatetheventareaneeded. See for example
Eqns (5.15a andb).
smokereservoir,andwheretheremaynotbe sufficient
inlet areaavailable at low level, maybe able touse open
ventilators in reservoirswhich are notaffectedby smoke
as inlets for replacement air. This is becausethe ambient
temperature air entering the buildinghas no intrinsic
buoyancy, and so can move up ordown as easilyas
moving sideways.Itis important that whatever the height
oftheinletopenings, thereplacement air must bebelow
the smokelayerinthe affectedreservoir whenitfirst
comes intocontact with that smokelayer.Itis also
important thatventilators functioningasinlets should not
betoo close toventilators emittingsmoke, orthereis a
danger thatsome smokewillbe drawn back intothe
building.Therehas been no research intothe minimum
separation betweenventilators actingas inlets andthose
emittingsmoke, butit is suggestedhere thatthis
minimumseparation should be 6 m.
Areplacement airflow beneath a buoyant smoke layer
can disturb the interface and cause the smoke to mix
downwardsifthe relativevelocityis too large.Itis good
practice to ensurethatthe airspeed ofthe replacement
air,whereit firstcomes intocontactwitha buoyant
smoke layer,is less than 1 ms'.
Iftheareaavailablefor inlet becomes too restricted,
incoming airflowthroughescape doors may be attolD
highavelocity foreasy escape.Such air inflows through
doors in public buildingscould hinder escapees.
34 _______________ _______________
Research551 on the abilityofpeople to move throughan
exitagainst an opposing airflowhas shownthat
movement is not impeded forairspeeds below 5 ms,
although people actingas test subjectsreportedthatthey
believedthatthey were being slowed by the air moving
againstthem atthis airspeed. Measurements ofthe
subjects' actual walkingspeeds showed that itwas not
seriouslyimpeded below10 ms1 (although some
discomfortwas reportedatthese higher airspeeds).This
suggeststhat inflowairspeedsshould not usuallyexceed
5 ms for psychologicalreasons.Consequently a5 ms1
maximum limitis currentlyadoptedintheUKand is
recommended in thiscurrentbook.
Othervaluesmaybe appropriate for other
circumstances.For example,inbuildingswherethe
population is largely familiarwiththe escape routes;
wheretheincoming airis entering the fire room directly,
or wherein the instanceoftheinletairbeing supplied via
the atrium and the major escape routesareaway from the
atrium, then aless onerous parameter canbe applied,
A fan-driveninlet air supply may beused, but cangive
problems whenmechanicalexhaust is used (the building
willusuallybefairlywell sealed in such circumstances).
This isbecause the air warmedby the firebefore being
takenoutwill have a greater volumethan the cooler inlet
air. As the firegrows and declines,themismatch in
volumebetweenthe inlet air andthe exhausted fire-
warmed air willalso change. This can result in significant
pressure differencesappearing across any doors on the
escape routes, making themdifficultto open and
potentially impeding the easy use ofescape routes. For
this reason simple 'push—pull'systems, ie powered inlet
and powered exhaust systems,should be avoided,
5.10Minimum number of exhaustpoints
Thenumberofexhaust points within the reservoir is
important since, for any specifiedlayerdepth,there is a
maximum rate (MCRJT) atwhichsmoky gasescan enter
anyindividualexhaustpoint.Anyfurther attempt to
increase the rate ofexhaust throughthatexhaust point
merely serves to drawair into the orificefrom below the
smokelayer.This is sometimes known as 'plug-holing'.
Where'plug-holing' is presentpartofthe installed
exhaust capacity is being 'wasted' by drawing clean air
intotheorificesofthe ventilators instead ofsmokygases.
This is notnecessarilyaproblemifthefireis smallerthan
themaximum assumed for design;but represents awaste
ofcapacityforthe designfiresize itself.Iftheeffect has
beenignored whencalculatingthe necessaryfan capacity
(orthenecessarytotal areaofnatural ventilators),then it
followsthat 'plug-holing' at the designfire condition will
represent a failure ofthe system as the ventilators will not
be exhaustingthe full amount ofsmoky gases required.
It followsthat, for efficientexhaust, thenumberof
exhaust points must be chosen to ensure that no air is
drawnupinthis way.
Thecritical exhaust rate MCRITfora ventilator away
from awall is givenby561:
Design methodologies for SHEVS
GlUT
_2.05 p0 (g 1 0)°' D2w°'5 (5.13)
T
1
where:
MCRIT
= criticalexhaustrate at an exhaustpointprior to
the onset
= density ofof'plugholing' (kgs1),
p0 air at ambient temperature (kgm3),
g acceleration dueto
= depth ofsmoke layergravity (ms2),
D below the exhaust point
(m),
T0 = absoluteambient temperature (K),
01
= excess temperature ofsmoke layer (°C),
T1
= T0 + O (K)
W\T
= characteristicwidthofthe ventilator (m) (egthe
diameter, orthediameter ofthe circle ofthe
same area).
The equationimplies that the availableexhaust rate
increasesrapidly with increasinglayerdepth. It also
impliesthat a number ofsmallventilators maybeused
instead ofa sing]elarge ventilator to optimize the exhaust
efficiency.
Proximityto awall will reduce the availablesmoke
dischargecapacity, although only limited dataare
availableforthis particular scenario.Ifthe ventilators are
smallcompared with the layer depth then the critical
exhaust ratecan befound from reference [57],with the
constant subsequentlyre-analysedby Heselden58.
Heselden's methodofanalysisis strictly onlyapplicable
where the characteristic widthoftheventilator orificeis
much smaller thanthe depthofsmokelayerbeneaththe
ventilator.It is muchmore common for the characteristic
widthofthe orifice tobe comparable to thedepth
beneathatthe onset of'plug-holing'.Nevertheless,
Heselden's analysisgivesmore pessimisticresults (ie a
larger minimum numberofexhaust points required) than
the alternativesforventilators notclose to side-walls,and
consequently canberegardedas aworst-case methodfor
ventilatorswhichare close to walls.
/ 1/2
MGRIT = 13 1 gD 7 1
(kgs1) (514)
2 )
Therequired number ofextract vents (N) is thengiven
by:
M
N
MCRJT
whereMe= mass flowrateenteringthe layer
(ie MforMB) (kgs).
Wheresprinklersareinstalledand additional cooling
ofthesmoke layer needstobe accounted for, the number
ofexhaust pointsrequiredcanbe determined by
calculatingthe critical exhaust rate for an opening using
Eqns (5.13)or (5.14), whichever is appropriate, taking into
considerationthe lowergas temperature due to sprinkler
cooling.
Wherevery largeorphysicallyextensiveventilators
areused(ega long intakegrille in theside ofahorizontal
duct) an alternativemethodis possible.For this case,

Eqn 5.11 canbe usedwith WBre-defined to be the total
horizontal accessibleperimeter ofalltheventilators
within thereservoir (egthe total length ofintakegrilles in
the example above) and the 'minimumreservoirdepth'
corresponds to the depthofthesmoke layerbeneaththe
topedgeoftheintake orifice.
Intermediate size intakes (ie wherethe ventilator
width is comparable to the layer depth) cannotbetreated
so simplyand it is recommended that Eqn (5.13)beused.
5.11 Throughflowventilation: area of
natural ventilation required
A natural ventilationsystem uses thebuoyancy ofthe
smoke toprovide the drivingforce for exhaust.The rate
ofexhaustislargely dependentuponthe depthand
temperature ofthe smoke. The advantage ofa natural
ventilationsystem is that it is very simpleand reliable,
and cancope with a wide range offire conditions. Should
the fire growlarger thanthedesign fire sizefor any
reason, a greater depthand temperature ofsmokeleads
toanincreased exhaust rate, soto anextenta natural
ventilation system hasaself-compensatingmechanism.
Theprecise relationshipbetweenthe massflow rate
extracted, the ventilator area, the inlet areaandthe
smoke layer is given byThomaset aJJ9]:
poA,Cj2gDOiTJ2
M —
(5 15a)
2 3/2
T+IkT1
(AC)
and canbe re-arranged algebraicallyintothemore
convenient form:
M1T
kC= (5.15b)
[2PD OT[Mi]J
ACJ2
where:
= measuredthroat areaofventilators (m2),
= total areaofall inlets (m2),
= coefficient ofdischarge (usuallybetween0.5
and 0.7),
= entry coefficientfor inlets (typicallyabout0.6),
= pressure
M1 mass flow rate ofsmoke tobe extracted (kgs'),
p0 = ambient air density (kgm3),
g = accelerationdueto gravity (ms2),
D = depth ofsmoke beneath ventilator (m),
= temperaturerise ofsmoke layer above ambient (°C),
=
T1 absolutetemperature ofsmoke layer (K),
=
T0 absolutetemperature ofambient air (K).
Tables5.3 a—dgivethe minimumfreeareaofventilation
required basedonEqns(5.15), ignoringthe effectofany
inlet restriction (ie assuming an infiniteareaofinlet
ventilation),and for a convectiveheatfluxthroughthe
ventilators (note that this heatfluxis the same as Qf ifone
5 Smoke control on storey of fireorigin 35
ignorescoolingofthe smoky gases after they leavethe
fire plume).
5.12 Natural ventilators and wind effects
Whennaturalventilatorsareusedfor smokeexhaust, it is
important that they are positionedwheretheywill not be
adverselyaffectedby external wind conditions. A positive
windpressurecanbe much greater thanthepressure
head developed by a smokelayer. Shouldthis occur the
ventilator mayact as an inlet ratherthan as an exhaust.
However,ifsitedin an areaofnegativewindpressure,the
resultant suction force on a natural ventilatorwouLd assist
smoke exhaust (Figure21).
Tallbuildingsor taller areas ofthesame building(such
as rooftop plantrooms, etc.) can create a positivewind
pressure onlowernearby roofs.Steeply pitched roofs ie,
roofs over300 pitch,mayalsohaveapositivewind
pressure onthe windwardslope.
A suggestionsometimes advanced foroffsettingwind
over-pressure,is to increasethe total areaofnatural
ventilation per reservoir.Since the over-pressureis, by
definition,force per unitarea,this will usuallynot'work
andindeed could exacerbatethe problemby allowing
evengreaterquantitiesofair tobe driventhroughthe
ventilator to mix intothesmoke.
In some cases it may be possibletoretainnatural
ventilation openingsin avertical plane byarrangingthem
to face inwardsto eitheraregion shelteredfrom wind
action, orwherethe wind will always produce asuction.
In othercases theerection ofsuitablydesigned screens or
wind baffles (outsidethe verticalwall or window holding
theventilators) canovercome wind interference andmay
even be able to convert anover-pressureintoasuction.
Thereis alsothe possibilityofselectivelyopening
ventilatorsinresponse tosignalsfrom awinddirection
sensor. Expertadviceshould be sought forsuchdesigns.
Duetothecomplexity ofwind-induced air flow over
some atriumbuildingsand the surroundingbuildings,it
Winddirection
Figure21 Positioning naturalventilatorsto be shelteredfrom
wind action
36 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Table 5.3a Minimum total ventilation area (m2) needed for A A (m2) needed for
Table 5.3b Minimum total ventilation area
asmokereservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC = 0.6); Q = 1 MW a smokereservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC 0.6); Q =2.5 MW
=
Mass Mass
flowrate flow rate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smokedepth beneath ventilators (m) rate) Smokedepth beneathventilators (m)
(kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10

4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 10 5.13 4.4 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.C
6 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 12 6.23 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4
8 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7 15 8.0 6.9 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.7 3.1
10 5.9 5.1 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.3 20 11.2 9.7 7.9 6.8 6.1 5.2 4.3
12 7.4 6.4 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.9 25 13.5 11.7 9.6 8.3 7.4 6.3 5.2
15 9.9 8.5 7.0 6.0 5.4 4.6 3.8 30 18.4 16.0 13.0 11.3 10.1 8.5 7.1
20 14.5 12.5 10.2 8.9 7.9 6.7 5.6 35 22.5 19.5 15.9 13.8 12.3 10.4 8.7
25 19.6 17.0 13.9 12.0 10.8 9.1 7.6 40 26.8 23.2 19.0 16.4 14.7 12.4 10.4
30 25.3 21.9 17.9 15.5 13.9 11.7 9.8 50 36.0 31.2 25.5 22.1 19.7 16.7 14.C
35 31.4 27.2 22.2 19.2 17.2 14.5 12.2 60 46.5 40.3 32.9 28.5 25.5 21.5 18.C
40 37.9 32.9 26.8 23.2 20.8 17.6 14.7 75 63.2 54.7 44.7 38.7 34.6 29.3 24.
50 52.2 45.2 36.9 32.0 28.6 24.2 20.2 90 81 70 57.3 50.0 44.4 37.5 31.4
60 67.9 58.8 48.0 41.5 37.2 31.4 26.3 110 108 93 76 66 59 50.0 41.7
Notesto Table5.3:Toallow forthe effectof limitedfresh air inletsthe fo]lowingguide canbe used Note: See Notes toTable5.3a.
asan alternativetsEqs 5.1 5):
Ifthe inletareatotheatrium istwice the exhaustventilationarea givesbyTable5.3the indicated
ventilationareaandthe inletareashould both be increasedbyapproximately10%.

Ifthe inletareaisequal tothe exhaastventilationarea,the indicatedventilationareaandtheinlet

area shouldboth be increasedbyapproximately35%.

Ifthe inletareaixhalfthe exhauxtventilationarea, the indicatedvestilatios areaandtheinletarea

should both be increasedbyapproximately125%.

Table 5.3c Minimum totalventilation area (m2) neededfor A Table 5.3d Minimum totalventilation area (m2)needed forA
a smoke reservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC= 0.6);Q= 5MW a smoke reservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC =0.6); Q = 6MW
Mass Mass
flowrate flowrate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smoke depth beneathventilators (m) rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m)
(kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10

10 5.3 4.6 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.1 10 5.5 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.1
12 6.24 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4 12 6.4 5.5 4.5 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.5
15 7.7 6.7 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.6 3.0 15 7.8 6.7 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.0
20 10.3 8.9 7.3 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.0 20 10.2 8.9 7.2 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.0
25 13.0 11.3 9.2 8.0 7.1 6.0 5.0 25 12.9 11.1 9.2 7.9 7.0 6.0 5.0
30 16.0 13.8 11.3 9.8 8.7 7.4 6.2 30 15.6 13.5 11.1 9.6 8.6 7.2 6.1
35 19.1 16.5 13.5 11.7 10.4 8.8 7.4 35 18.6 16.1 13.1 11.4 10.2 8.6 7.2
40 22.3 19.3 15.8 13.7 12.2 10.3 8.6 40 21.6 18.7 15.3 13.2 11.8 10.0 8.4
50 29.3 25.4 20.7 18.0 16.1 13.6 11.4 50 28.2 24.4 19.9 17.2 15.4 13.0 10.9
60 36.9 31.9 26.1 22.6 20.2 17.1 14.3 60 35.2 30.5 24.9 21.6 19.3 16.3 13.6
75 49.3 42.7 34.9 30.2 27.0 22.8 19.1 75 46.7 40.4 33.0 28.6 25.6 21.6 18.1
90 63 54 44.4 38.4 34.4 29.1 24.3 90 59.2 51.2 41.8 36.2 32.4 27.4 22.9
110 82 71 58 50 45.1 38.1 31.9 110 77.2 66.9 54.6 47.3 42.3 35.8 29.9
130 104 90 73 63 57 48.0 40.2 130 96.8 83.8 68.5 59.3 53.0 44.8 37.5
150 126 109 89 77 69 59 49.0 150 117.8 102.0 83.3 72.1 64.5 54.5 45.6
200 189 164 134 116 103 87 73 200 175.9 152.3 124.4 107.7 96.3 81.4 68.1

Note: See Notesto Table5.3a. Note: See Notes toTable5.3a.


maysometimes be desirableto carry out boundary layer
wind tunnel studies to establish the windpressure over
thebuilding'senvelope. Once areas ofover-pressureand
suctionhavebeen identifiedforall possiblewind
directions,designofventilators orfans can proceed as
before.
Theinteraction betweenthe windand horizontal
natural ventilators is discussedfurther in section 10.8.
Apowered exhaust system should beusedwhere
positivewindpressures are likelytobeaproblem, or
whereit is necessaryto extract smokeviaan extensive
ductwork system.
5.13 Requiredventilation rate (powered
exhaust)
Apowered smoke exhaustsystem consists offans and
associated ductwork designed to remove the mass flow
rate ofsmokeentering the smoke reservoir,and tobe
capable ofwithstandingthe anticipated smoke
temperatures.
The controls andwiring should ofcoursebe protected,
to maintain the electricalsupply tothefans during afire.
The massflow rate ofsmokedetermined from the
previoussections can be converted tothe corresponding
volumetric flow rateand temperature, usingTables5.1a
to 5.ldor thefollowingequation forselection ofthe
appropriatefans:
M1T1
po7J
(5.16)
where:
V1
= volumetricexhaustraterequiredin the reservoir
(m3s1),
M1
= Mfor MB determined from theprevious section
(kgs 1),
= ambient air temperature (K),
T1 =T0+01(K),
p0 = densityofambient air (kgm3).
5.14 Slit extract
Whenremovingthe smokefrom acommonbalcony
reservoirand thereis no possibilityofusingdownstand
screens to prevent the passage ofsmoke orwherever a
physicalbarrier maynotbeused, a slitextract system
maybeemployed over the length ofthe flowpath to
supplementthemainreservoir exhaust system and
replacethe screens (Figure22). Aslitextract system can
be usedacross aroom'sopeningstoprevent any outflow
ofsmoke, or atabalcony edgeto protectan atrium.
Such a system islikelyto work bestwith further
exhaust distributed within the fireroom,whichfor a
sprinkleredroommaypossiblybe provided bythe
normal ventilationexhaust system,the normal ventilation
input and recirculation ofair being stopped, orfor an
unsprinklered room, beprovided by apartial smoke
exhaust system.Whilst this system is designedto prevent
5 Smoke control on storey offireorigin 37
DroD screen
Balcony
Reservoir
screen
Figure 22 Slit exhaust
smokepassingthe slit(egentering the atriumvoid), itwill
not necessarilymaintain aclear layerwithin the room
itself, andthe space belowthe smokelayermaybecome
'fogged'.The exhaust should beprovided very closa to
the opening from acontinuous slitwhichmaybe situated
in theplaneofthefalseceiling.
Wraight59 showed thatpowered exhaust from a slitat
right anglesto a layer flowcould completelyprevent
smokepassingthat slit, provided thatthe exhaust rate at
theslitwasatleast5/3times theflow inthe horizotital
layerflowingtowards the slit. This allowsausefulgeneral
methodfor sizingsuch an extract:
• firstcalculatethe flow rate ofgasesapproaching the
opening(orgap in thebalcony edge screens)using
sections 5.2—5.4 above as appropriate,
•• multiplythis massflow rate by 5/3.
usingthe known layer convectiveheatflux (and
allowingfor sprinklercooling usingsection 5.5 above if
appropriate) calculatethe volumetric exhaust rate
required from the slit, usingEqn (5.10) to calculatethe
meangas temperature drawn through thefan, and
Eqn (5.16)to calculatethe requiredfancapacity.
5.15 False ceilings
Where thereis an unbroken falseceilinginthe fire room
or balcony,itmust be treated as thetop ofthesmoke
layer.Ifthefalseceilingis porous to smoke, ieifithas an
appreciablefree area, any smokecurtainsforming the
smokereservoir must be continued above the ceiling.If
theproportion offree areais large enough, thereservoir
andits screens mayevenbetotally abovethe falseceiling.
The permeableceilingoughtnotto interfere appreciably
withtheflow ofsmokefrom thefireto the smoke
ventilationopenings above the falseceiling.
Ithasbeenshownexperimentally601 that a minimum
freeareaof25% canbeusedas a 'rule ofthumb'valu.e
whichwill allow smoketo flowthroughalmost
unhindered. For single-storeyand balconyreservoirs
cool smoke canbe expected to affectsome nearby rooms
undersome circumstances,but would not significantly
38
hindersafe escape.Free areas ofless than25% are
possibleinsomecircumstanceswhile still allowing safe
conditions; it is possibleto calculateapproximately
smoke flow through the ceilingfrom firstprinciples—
expert adviceshould besoughtwherethis possibilityis
thoughtto be desirable.
516The use of a plenumchamber above a
false ceiling
Somedesignshave been seen in which the space above
the mainly solid falseceilingin arooforabove abalcony
isusedforthe exhaust ofair for normal ventilation
purposes. Afan extracting air from this space (effectively
aplenum chamber) reduces its pressureand sodraws air
from the space belowthrough a number ofopeningsin
the falseceiling.In theeventofa fire afan ofsuitably
larger capacity starts up and draws smoky gasesintothe
chamber in a similarway.
Apotentially valuablebonus ofsuch a system in a
sprinklered buildingis that the sprinklerswhich are
normallyrequired inthe space abovethefalseceilingwill
coolthesmoky gasesbefore theyreach the fan.
Furthermore, it canbe desirableto leave the false ceiling
belowthe exhaust points'solid' (ie notableto pass
smoke) to prevent air beingdrawnup throughthe smoke
layer.A sufficiently extensive areaof'solid' falseceiling
willensure thatthe smokepasses throughatleastone
sprinklersprayen route to the extract.
Theplenum chamber should notbelargerin areathan
itsassociated smoke reservoir.Larger chambers should
be subdividedby smokescreens extending thefull height
ofthe chamber, and belowthe falseceilingtoform a
complete smoke reservoir below.The minimumnumber
ofopenings through the falseceilingrequiredwithin a
singlesubdivisioncan be found from section 5,10.The
total areaofsuch openingsper reservoirshould be
decided byconsideration ofthe designpressure
differencesbetweenchamber and smokelayer, andofthe
flowimpedance ofthe openings concerned. A system of
reasonablywide (perhaps 1 m or2 m) slots surroundinga
region offalseceilingcould perhaps be usedinstead of
screens belowthe falseceiling.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
5.17 Maximum dimensionsfor smoke
reservoirs
Mostthroughflowsmokecontrolsystemsare designed
with an arbitrary limitationto the ceilingreservoir of
between 1000—3000 m224'9'25, one reason being to
prevent excessiveenergy loss from the buoyantsmoke
layer.Manyatriacannotphysicallyor architecturally
adoptsuchreservoirformations,and iflarger thanthe
areas mentioned above willcause additionalenergy to be
lost from the layer.Ithasbecomethe common practice to
specifythat the maximum areaacceptable for asmoke
reservoirshould be 2000m2 wherethereare natural
ventilators and the objectiveis toprotectescape routes;
risingto 2600m2 for powered ventilatorsand the same
objective;risingto 3000m2 wherethe objective is to
protectproperty with no significantlife-safetyobjective.
Note, however, that in the UK, these same principles
areexpressed differentlywhenthebuildingis a shopping
mall:with natural ventilators, smokefrom shop units of
upto 1000 m2 plan areacanentera mall smoke reservoir
which can itselfbe up to 1000 m2 inplan area; with
powered ventilators eachvalueincreases to 1300 m2.
There is no scientificreasonforthis differentwayof
expressingthe principles.Instead, the differenceis based
on decisionsmade byUKRegulatoryAuthorities as to
theeaseofenforcement in thecircumstances applyingto
shopping malls.
It is likelythat this maximumareawillbe revisedwhen
mathematical modellingofheat transfer processes from
smokelayers becomes sufficiently reliablefor confidence
in theresults. Currently,however, thebest available
argument forthe presentlimitis that thereis no clear
evidencethat it has proved excessivelylarge anareain
real fires.
Another commonly adopted limit, applied
simultaneouslywith the arealimit, is to apply a maximum
lengthto eachsmoke reservoir of60 m, measured along
the mid-line ofthe reservoir.The origin ofthislimit has
never been formallypublished, but anecdotallyfirst
appeared in 1972[5] basedon aUK committee beliefthat
peopleescaping belowabuoyant smokelayershould be
ableto move out from belowthatlayerin less than 30 m
from anypoint. This was expressed as a maximumlength
ofreservoirinthe interests ofsimplicityofenforcement.
The committee's opinion wasbasedon an assessment of
the probable psychologicalreactions ofmembers ofthe
general public in suchcircumstances.

6 Smoke ventilation within
multistorey spaces
(eg an atrium)
6.1 Smoke movement in the atrium
Whenthe smokeand heat cannot, for variousreasons,be
confined andremoved from theroomoforigin or
associatedbalconyspace, the use of'throughflow' or
steady-stateventilationfrom the atrium itselfis usually
considered.
Thisform ofsmoke control is commonly called 'smoke
ventilation'or SHEVSandis based upona defined
buoyant smoke layer being establishedat some point
within the structure,with a 'clean' layer ofair beneath.
Themass flowofgasesentering this layer being
equivalenttothatflowingoutthroughthe exhaust
system (Figure23).
Thebase ofsuch a layer is usuallyata height chosen
for safetyreasons (See Annex B,whereit is noted that the
clear heightabove the highestexposed escape route
should be 0.5 mmorethan for the single-storeycase
described in Chapter 5), orto avoid breaching the
practical'cutoff' limitsoutlined in section 6.7 below.
Once the heightofthislayerbase is chosenfora lowest-
Inlet
Figure23 Throughfiow ventilation ofan atrium
39
level fire, the heightabove the topofthe opening (or
above the edge ofthe projecting canopyorbalcony above
theopening where relevant) must be establishedwhere
thefire is in an adjacentroom.
Notethatwhenthefire is onthe floor ofthe atriu.m and
is directly belowthe smokelayerthat forms underthe
atrium ceiling,entrainment intotherisingaxi-symmetric
plume is similarto thatgiven in section 5.2 above. This
special case is discussedin section 6.4below.
In general, however, theworstcondition tobe catered
for is a fire in an adjacentroomonthe lowestlevel,as
resultsinthe most entrainment in the rising smokeplume
andhencethelargest quantity ofsmokygas entering the
buoyant layer.
Thefirecondition in the compartment (thedesign fire)
should bespecified,andthe mass fluxleavingthroughthe
compartment opening and anyentrainment under1:he
projecting balconyorcanopycan be calculated as
described in sections 5.1—5.3.
Asthesmoke flows throughthe room opening intothe
atrium space it will either:
- /1 1L1
E
40 _____ ____ ______
• rotateupwardintoaround thetop edge oftheopeningand
theatrium space as aplume, or
• passdirectly
flowundera horizontal projection suchas abalcony
ofthe
beyond theopening, pass to the
edge projection
and riseupwards intothe atrium space as a plume.
Suchplumes areoften referred to as 'spill' plumes, or as
'thermal'line plumes. Theterm 'line' denotesthat the
base ofthe plume immediatelyfollowingrotation is long
and relativelynarrow.
Lineplumes maytakeone oftwo forms:adhered
plumes or free plumes.
Adheredplumes arewherethe smoky gasesproject
directly from acompartment opening, and the plume
attachesto the verticalsurfaceabove the opening whilst
rising upwards.Thiswill also occur whenthereis a
vertical surfaceimmediatelyabove anyrotation point
intothevoid. Thesurfaceoftheplume in contactwith
the ambient atmosphere inthe atrium will cause
additionalair to be entrained intoit (Figure24a). This
typeofplume is alsoknown variouslyas asingle-sided,
attached orwall plume.
Freeplumesarewherethe smoky gasesprojectintoa
space beyond ahorizontal projection (ega balcony),thus
allowingthe formingplume to rise upwards unhindered.
This creates alarge surfaceareafor entrainment on both
sidesofthe plume along itsspillwidth (Figure24b),for
whichreasontheyarealso known as double-sided
plumes.
The degree ofentrainment intothe risingplume, and
hencethe totalquantity ofgasesenteringthe smokelayer
forming underthe ceiling ofthe atrium space,is governed
basicallyby four initialparameters251:
1 the mass flow rate ortemperature ofthe gasesat the
edge ofthe rotation pointintothe atrium,
2 theheat fluxofthe gases,
3 thelengthofthe line plume entering the atrium,
measured along theedge past which the smoke spills,
4 the height through whichthe plume must rise.
(a)
Figure 24(a) adhered plume, (b)free plume
Design_methodologies for SHEVS ______
Reductionsin the mass flow rate ofsmoke entering the
smokelayercan usuallybe effectedby changes to
parameters 3 and 4. In practice, the heightofrise ofthe
plume is usuallychosento permitsafeevacuation,leaving
only adependency on the length oftheline plume.
6.2 Channellingscreens
Whentheatriumhas aplanefacadewith no horizontal
projections, the lengthofthe plume is determined bythe
widthofthe opening throughwhich the smokeis passing.
When, however, smoke is abletoflow unrestricted under
a horizontal projection,eg a balcony, itwill flow forwards
towards the balconyedge, and laterallysideways.It will
continue to flow sidewaysuntil it meetsan obstruction or
loses sufficientenergy to become stagnant and will then
rise intothe atrium space as avery long line plume
(Figure25a and Plate 5).This resultsin large quantitiesof
airbeing entrained and henceavery large massflow rate
ofsmokeentering thelayerin theatrium roof.
This excessiveentrainment canbe reduced by
restrictingthesidewaystravelofthe smoke underthe
balcony and hencereducing the lengthofthe line plume.
The devicesusedtoachieve this arecommonly known as
channellingscreens, andliterally'channel' the smoke
from the exit from the room to the balconyedge
(Figure25b and Plate 6). This conceptis used in smoke
control systems in multistoreyshopping centres24.
The minimumdepthrequired for apairofthese
screens to channel all the smoke is dependentontheir
separation at the void edge (L).Somevaluesfor 1MW,
2.5 MW, 5 MW, and 6MW convectiveheat fluxesare
given in Tables 5.2.
Alternatively,the minimumchannellingscreen depth
maybecalculated using Eqn (5.11), modifiedto:
DB=---- MBT
05 (m)
Cd L05]
(b)
-Ji
H
 6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 41
(a) (b)
r

TT :*

Figure25(a)Smoke spreading sidewaysbeneath a projectingcanopyor balcony; (b)smokeconfined to a compactspill'plume by

channeling screens

Plate 5 Smoke spreading beneath a balcony Plate6Use of channeling screens

42
where:
0—
B
M8c'
Cd = the dischargecoefficientappropriateto the
horizontal flow approaching the spilledge, andis
therefore the same as Cd8 introduced in section 5.2,
L = the channellingscreenseparationwidth.
The resultingdepthis themaximum flowingsmoke layer
depthand henceminimumscreen depth. Goodpractice
suggests that asafety margin should be considered. An
additional depth ofatleast0.1 mwouldbe reasonable.
Screens maybefixed ormay descend uponsmoke
detection. As described above,the final mass flow
entering the layer is afunction offourinitialparameters,
one ofwhichis the plume lengthat thebalcony edge. The
narrower the plume is atits base, the less the massflow
enteringthelayer.
Thus, the closer the screens maybeinstalled to each
other,themorethe smokebase may be allowedto risefor
the same mass flow entering the smokelayer.
These screens must, ofcourse, meetthe wall ofa
compartment whereit meets the balcony.Anyscreen
fixed midway across a compartment opening will serve
nopurpose since smokewill flow on both sides
simultaneously.
Ifchannelling screens arecreatedusingfreehanging
smoke curtains then their deflectionsand consequent rise
oftheirbottombarsmust be takenintoconsideration.
Deflection ofsmokecurtains is giveninAnnex C.
Research suggeststhat channellingscreens are
unnecessaryifthe balconyprojects no morethan 1.5m
beyondthefire room61. Thisresearchhas alsoshown
thatbalconies whichareshallow (<2m)willcause the
risingplume to curl inwardstowards the structure
(Figures26aand 26b).Ifthere are higher balconies a
vortex willbecreatedbetweenthe balconies,smoke
logging the balcony levels abovethefire floor.
(a)
Figure26 Effect ofbalconydepth on plume trajectory: (a) deepbalcony projection,
Design methodologies forSHEVS
6.3 Entrainment into spill plumes rising
through the atrium
6.3.1 Theeffectiveheightof risefrom the spill edge to
the smoke layerbase
All existingtheories ofline plumes apply to plumes rising
through free space, wherethe air outside the plume is
uniformlyat ambient temperature, although some
theories can bemodifiedto approximatetoplumes
adhered to averticalsurfaceas they rise.
Wherethewidth (which canbe defined asthe square
root ofthe plan area) ofthe smoke reservoiris small
compared with the layer depth, the air beneaththe layer
usuallyappears to have a uniformtemperature. Where
the converse is true, the air beneath the visiblebase ofthe
buoyant layer has a temperature excessrelativeto the
trueambient temperature (Figure27). Experiments have
shownthat there is a differencein theentrainment into
the spillplume in these twocases. Foragiven heightof
rise, the entrainment intothe plumewherethe smoke
reservoir areais large compared tothe plume dimensions
is smallerthanwhenthe smoke reservoiris comparable
insizeto the smokeplumes horizontal dimensionsat the
heightofthe smokelayer's base. See for example Morgan
&MarshallL621 fora large areareservoir,and Hansel! et
al611for asmallareareservoir.
This differencewas discussedinPorchet al631, who
notedthat the existingdatasupported two alternative
ways ofexpressingthis differencein entrainment
(without being able to differentiatesignificantly between
them). Onemethod isto assign differentvalues to the
plume entrainment coefficientforthe two cases,while
taking theheightofrise ofthe plume to beto the visible
base ofthe smokelayer.The alternative methodis to
adjust the heightofriseofthe plume for the large-area
reservoircase to alowervalue, withoutaltering the
plume entrainment constant. The authors suspect,
thoughwithouttangible proof, that the truephysical
processis neitherofthe above, but is an interface
phenomenon wherethe plume enters the smoke layer.A
(b)
(b) shalow balcony projection
 Ceiling
11 ____________

10

Height above split 7

edge (m) H
6

5 H H

visible layer base

4

3
effective layer base
(I)
2 3
0
CD

CD
=
r-1-
0 0=
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

=
Temperature above ambient(°C) 3
(I)
Figure 27 A typical temperature profile for a broad reservoir layer 0
-
CD

(I,

C-)
CD
U)

.
(A)
44 _____Design methodologies for SHEVS
CFD study byMiles et al641 came tobroadlysimilar
conclusions.It is sufficient for design,however, to note
that the phenomenon is experimentallyobservable,and
thateitherofthe two methods ofincluding this
phenomenonin designcalculationsshould be empirically
acceptable.
Thecurrentbookwill only presentthemethodfor
adjustingtheheightofrise ofthe plume in order to
achieve greatersimplicityofcalculation.This method is
as follows.
6.3.1.1 Smoke reservoirswhere visible depth <0.67
Forreservoirswherethevisibledepthisless than
A Followthe procedures ofMorgan & Marshall[2562] for free
0.67 A, (and noting thatthis is basedon an analysisof
empirical data61 with no underpinning theory)proceed
as follows.
To calculatethe mass flow rates ofsmoke entering the
reservoir,introduce acorrection factor for the smoke
layer depth in the reservoir.Experiments withflat-roofed
models62 have shownthatforcalculatingplume
entrainment, the effectivelayerdepth (d2) is 1.26 times
thevisiblelayer depthd1 (seeFigure27).
The effective heightofrise ofthe spillplume above the
spilledge isthen given by:
X= H-1.26d1 (m) (6.1)
A negative orverysmallvalue ofX resultingfrom this
procedure means thatonehasgonebeyond the limits of
validationofEqn (6.1). Itfollowsthat if afterapplying
Eqn (6.1),X< 0.75 misobtained thenX should instead
be definedas:
X= H-d (m) (6.2)
Note that these procedures only apply whencalculating
entrainment into the spillplume. d2 hasnovalidity for
any otherapplication.
6.3.1.2 Smokereservoirs where visible depth>0.67
Forsmoke reservoirs wherethe visibledepthis greater
than0.67 A, no correction applies,and
X= H-d1 (m)
6.3.1.3 Matching X to the spill-plume model
Use the value ofX resultingfrom eithersection 6.3.1.1 or
section 6.3.1.2 as the heightofrise ofthe spillplume
above the spilledgewhencalculatingentrainment forthe
BRE methodoutlined in section 6.3.2(a), butonly use
Eqn (6.2) for determiningX,for sections 6.3.2(b), (c) or
(d) and then only in the contextoflarge areareservoirs.
This seemingcontradiction is a consequence ofthe
methods usedto derive the entrainment in the source
papers.
6.3.2Entrainment calculation methods
Calculations ofentrainment into the smokeflows rotating
around the opening/balcony edge and into the
subsequent risingplume may be carried out usinga
numberofalternativeprocedures. Some ofthemare
given below. Ithas been shown'65 that all fourmethods
givereasonably close agreement whencompared with
the availableexperimentaldata.This is not surprisingin
view ofthe fact that all derive their empiricalterms from
the same experimental sources ofdata.
(a) The'BRE method'
This isthe procedure whichwas given in BRE Report
Deszrn approacheforsmokecom'rolinatthim buildthgsLul.
plumes,usingthe modificationsintroduced byMorgan &
Hansell71.Entrainment intosmoke flows rotating intoa
risingadhered plume canbe calculated usinga similar
method given by Morgan & Hansell271,although it
should be noted that the entrainment constant
appropriate to an adhered line plume isabout halfthat for
afreeplume66'611L Avalue of0.077 may be usedfor the
calculation61.
This calculation method is outlined in detail in
Annex E. The algorithm described canbe used either
directly,orasthebasis for a computer program.
Oncethe desired height ofthe layer base (hb) has been
chosen, theopeningwidthhas been established,orthe
channelling screens separation L [and hencealso
channelling screen depthusingTables 5.2 a or5.2 b, or
Eqn (5.11)] hasbeenchosenonthe basisofpracticality
(egsuch thatthe screens contactthewalls separating the
rooms) then the mass flowrate ofsmoke entering the
layerforming the ceilingspace ofthe atrium canbe
calculated.
Resultsofexainpie calculationsofsmokeproduction
dueto entrainment intothe risingplume areshown
graphicallyin Figures28—39. TheseFiguresmaybe used
for designpurposes but itis preferableto do amore
precise calculation,using the procedures ofAnnex E.
(b) Methodusingequations derivedby Porehetal631
Recent work byPorehet al631, based on datareportedby
Marshalland Harrison67, hasshownthat the
complicatedcalculation methods given in the BRE
methodabove to determine theentrainment intospill
plumes can be simplifiedas follows:
M1 (6.3)
M1=Q3C[h6+D6÷ CQ3]
where:
M1
= mass flow ofsmoky gasesentering thesmoke layer
at height12b(kgs'),
= convective heat fluxin gases (kW),
C = aconstant(kgms1kW"3),
hb
= height ofrise ofthermalplume from balcony tothe
atrium smokelayer,
DB = depth ofsmokelayerbeneathabalcony (m),
M= mass flowofgasesbeneathabalcony (kgs1).
C is aconstantfiragiven atrium and agiven ambient

temperature andis defined as:
C = 0.3Cp0L2'3
where:
Cm
= dimensionlessentrainment coefficient, found
experimentallyto be 0.44 for afreeplume, and 0.21
for an adhered plume,
p0
= density ofambient air (kgm3),
L = length ofspilledge (m).
This calculationprocedure givesthe entrainment along
the length ofthe plume,but does not allow for
entrainment intothe endsofaplume wheretheplume is
notbounded bywalls.It is possibleto combinethis
calculationprocedure with that ofThomas (1987)[68] to
giveasingleprocedure which issimple and which
includes entrainment intothe free ends. This is discussed
inMethod(c) below.
Note 1:This combined methodonly appliesto free
plumes, and cannot be usedforadhered plumes.
Note 2:The empirical constants in thismethodwere
essentiallyderived forlarge-area reservoirs,and so the
method should not be usedfor small-areareservoirs.It is
suggested thatforthe presentwork thecriterion for
differentiatingbetweenlarge andsmall areareservoirs
canbe thesameas in section 6.3.1 above.
(c) Methodto calculate the entrainmentintothe line
plumederived by Thomas(1987)[68]
Thistreatsthe plume ina 'farplume'approximation
apparently risingfrom aline source ofzero thickness
some distance below the void edge. The relevant formula
is:
L2 O.22(hb +2A)
M1 =058p [g 11/3 (h
LPCT0] +A)[1+ L ]2/3
where:
=
M1 mass flowofsmokygases entering the smokelayer
atheighthb (kgs1),
p =
density ofwarmgases atheighthb (kgm3),
=
convectiveheat fluxin gases (kW),
L =
length ofvoidedge past which gases spill(m),
o = specificheat ofair (kJkg1K'),
=
T0 absoluteambient temperature (K),
A =
empirical heightofvirtualsourcebelowvoid edge
(m),
hb = height ofrise ofthermal plume above voidedge
(= X from section 6.3.1) (m).
Itshould be realizedthat the derivation ofEqn (6.5) limits
its applicationto scenarioswheresmoky gasesissue
directlyfrom the compartment onfire, with abalcony
projecting beyond. Withappropriate changes tothe
value ofA to cater for changes in room/opening
geometry, and hence the massflowunderthe balcony
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 45
(see sections 5.3 and 5.4 for amore detaileddiscussionof
the dependence ofthis flow on conditionsin the source
(6.4) compartment), the Eqn (6.5)and calculationmethod
given inAnnex E should givebroadly similarresuks since
although both methods use differentempirical
approaches, theseconstants were obtained byfittingto
the same data. It should alsoberealized that Eqn (6.5)
only describesa free or double-sidedplume andcannot
be adopted for an adhered or single-sidedplume.
This formulahas the advantage ofexplicitlyincluding
entrainment intothe exposed endsofthespillplume,
unlike the formula ofPoreh etal inmethod(b) above.
Unfortunatelythe value ofAis not aconstant, butvaries
withsuchparameters as perimeter ofthe source fire, heat
outputperunitareaofthe sourcefire, opening geometry
betweenthe fire-room and atrium, presence ofa
downstand at that opening, etc.
Inview ofthe essentialsimilaritybetween Eqns(6.3)
and (6.5),however, andbecause we do notexpect
proportionately much entrainment intothe idealized
'wedge-shaped' plume at andbelowthe spilledge, we can
use Porehetal'smethodtoidentifly amethodof
calculatingA for use in Thomas' formula(Eqn (6.5))
appropriate to the designscenariosofinterest. First
calculateA:
- Mfi
(m) (6.6)
CQ13
Thenuse theresult in Eqn (6.5) as ifit was a constant
(which itwill be for agiven smokeflow out ofthe
specifiedsource compartment).
Eqn 6.5 has aminor practicaldifficultyin that it
contains a gas densityterm (p) whichcan only be£Dund
accuratelyiftheresult ofthe calculationis known before
the start. In practice, it isusuallysufficient to assumea
valuea little smallerthan ambient air density [eg usinga
valueof1.1 kg/m3 instead ofthe more usual 1.2 kg /m3
(6.5)
(for temperateclimatesatsea-level)]and treat it as ifit
were constant. Forgreaterprecision it is possibleto use
repeated iteration, with eachcalculationleadingto a
revisedgas densityfor use in the next iteration.
Thesource dataavailableatthetime ofthe derivation
ofthismethodonly covered large smokereservoirs.It is
not clear howitwillapply to smallsmokereservoirs,and
it should be usedwith great caution in such
circumstances.
(d) Methodto calculate the entrainmentintothe line
plumederivedbyThomasetal (1998)[65]
Thistreatsthe spillplume in a rigorous dimensional
analysis,leading to expressionsalittlemore complicated
than Poreh et al'smethoddescribedin (b) above.It
requires the prior calculationofM\and
but does not
Q
calculation
at the spill
ofthe depthof
edge require prior
the approaching smokeflowat the spilledge. In principle
it should alsogivemorereliableresultsclose to the
turningregion at the spilledge thanany oftheother
methods. It does, however, only apply to free plumesand
46 Design methodologies forSHEVS
28 20

/
I
/
// /
29 23

1/,
// /
/,/
/ I/
/ /
// / /// /
II/
/1/1/
/ ,/
/
I
/ •1
/

//
I'

I / / // / / I
/
// /
// / /

I//I / 7
I//I
15 15

/ / /
I/I',
// / // II
I//I
//
//

/
I / / I'
/
E
0
0 III"
I /

,/ / / /
,' E
0
0
/

'li-
/ /
/ / / 1/
/
15 IS
II ///
/I // I,'/
0 0
-o
Cs

C
I 0)
5,
C
I
5)
I/i'
Ij,/
,'
—Wl0rn
I—j— W15rr

b20m L
5

Topof opening Top of opening

0 50 150 150 200 250 300 350 0 50 150 150 200 250 300 350
Mass flow(kgs) Mass flow(kgs)

Figures 28, 29 Free plume from open-plan sprinkleredoffice: 28 no downstand, 29 1.0 mdownstand

30 25 31 20

Is 15

E E
0
0 0

10 10
0 0
-n
(0 (0

=S
0(
I 0)

20 40 60 00 100 120 140 20 40 60 50 100 120 140

Mass flow(kgs) Mass flow(kgs)

Figures 30, 31 Adhered plumefrom open-plan sprinklered office: 30 no downstand, 311.0 m downstand
 6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 47
32 33 30

24 24

18 18
E E
0
0
a

I I
80

12 12

O 6

0 0
0 500 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 0 100 200 300 400 500 000 700 000
Massflaw (kgs-') Mass flaw (kgs)

Figures 32, 33 Free plume fromlargeshop fitted with quick-response sprinklers:32 nodownstand, 33 1.0 m downstand

30
34 35

24

18

12

5 52 100 550 200 250 050 350 400 0 50 500 150 200 252 300 350 400
Massflow (kgs) Massflow (kgsj

Figures34, 35Adhered plume fromlargeshopfittedwith quick-response sprinklers:34no downstand, 35 1.0 mdownstand

48 Design methodologies for SHEVS
-- 7
362)1 / /
7 37 .11)

/
/
//

// /
/ 21

/
/
0

,1
/ // /
//
/ if
14

—. VI

VI.111,1
44: 151W - W.
—: W..

4I.0l1I VI :Ill0
22—101.: VI::)
...—.. II 41)1 —-—WIll
11)0 W 14)))

H 11)1)11 Of))? lop UI OPOQIO9

11 20 3 Cl 40) 5.) II 70 1) 10 2)) II 43 51111 4110 7 IH)

Moo.flow if. Moo), flOw(kq'

Figures 36, 37 Free plume from largeshopfitted with standard-response sprinklers,36 no downstand, 37 1.0 rn downstand

38 39 (0

Ill
if
S

I VI IS I —--4)50
7) 3 VI))
VII:: — .__ 14 .l)
3. 21Cr.
1:4 75 3)1.

7) 40. V. 4(ls
W VII — ---- VI..'1lo

1.11111 OfillI 1 lOP / OflOllIflif

II II I) 53 I II) ISO .0(1 2l .101 150 4011

M'o.flow (kfl. Mow flow (kll

Figures 38, 39Adhered plume from largeshop fitted with standardresponse sprinklers: 38 no downstand, 39 1.0 m downstand

notto adhered plumes
Thomas et al expressed some uncertainty about the
effects oflargeand smallreservoirson the entrainment
predicted by theirmethod, and identifiedthe need for
further research intothis aspect. They developed the
entrainment equations primarilyin terms ofdatalbr large
areareservoirsso consequentlytheir method should not
be applied to smallareasmoke reservoirs.In the absence
ofbetterdata,we canassume that the same criterion as in
section 6.3.1 can be used to differentiatebetween large
and small area smoke reservoirs.
The entrainment into the spillplume (ignoring
entrainment intothe free ends) is then:
/
= l.2M, (6 7)
+0.l6X1,L1 +0.0O27Q (kgs1)
while the entrainment intoboth the freeends (SM) is (for
unknown) :
X/L 'not too large', and wherethis limitingcriterion is
SM = 0.09X "
L (kgs') (6 8)
6.3.3 Recommendationsfor selecting a spillplume
formula
Thedifferentmethodsoutlinedin section 6 2 above do
not all cover thesame circumstancesand scenarios.Some
oftheselimitationsderive from theways in which the
methods were derived.Itis not the purpose ofthe current
bookto reviewthe detailsoftheresearch papers
concerned (which are anyway cited as reiCrencesabove).
It is useful to summarizewhereeach canin principlehe
expected to be applicable,based on the assumptionsand
selected dataemployed inthose sourcepapers.
TheBRE method (see 6.3.2 (a) above),while being
complicatedto use, coversfree and adhered plumes. It
can be usedbr largeorsmall areasmoke reservoirs,It
('an he usedeitherwith or without mixingof'air into the
free ends ofthe spillplume. This makes it the most
versatile of the ftur methods,
The Porehet al method (see 6.3.2 (h) above) is much
simpler. It can be expected to apply to free and adhered
plumes, but only to those risingbetweenside wallswhich
prevent any entrainment intothe endsofthe spillplume.
This greatly limitsthe range of scenarioslikelyto he
fbund in prac'tice. It applies to large smoke reservoirsand
notto smallones.
TheThomas (1987)method(see 6.3.2 (c) above) only
applies to free plumes, and cannot be used for adhered
plumes. Entrainment into the endsof'thespilll)ll.lmeis
explicitly calculated.The method can only he used with
confidencewith large smokereservoirs,and notwith
smallreservoirs.The difficulty ofknowing the
appropriatevalue, ofA,the height from the virtualline
sourceto the spill edge, without calculatingit each time
for the circumstancesofthe specihc' design scenario,
impliesthat this method should only be used whenA can
he calculated.
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 49
TheThomasetal (1998) methodcan be expected to
apply to free plumesonly, and to largesmoke reservoirs
only. While it includes terms for entrainment into the
ends ofthespillplume, thesewere stated with a
cai.itionary note in the source paper.6'L
We should notethat any and all empiricallybased
modelscan be expected to have some dependence on the
sourceexperimentsusedin deriving the empirical aspects
ofthose models. It is noteworthy that all the models cited
in section 6.3.2 drawon thesame experimental sources,
although not all use all ofthe availabledata,
Themethods have beencompared in Annex I) for a
design scenario which applies to all four, but extending
into a range ofparameter valuesdifflring from the
originalexperimental source data. It can l:e seen from
Annex1) that,fbr the examplechosen therein, there is a
reasonableifnot close agreement forup to 5 mn abovethe
spilledge for all methods . This iswithin the most
common range of designheights of riseforspill plumes.
Note here that only the Thomas et al (1998) method is
expected to giveaccurate resultsat heights ofrise less
than about 3 m above the spilledge. The methods diverge
for greater heights, although it is noteworthy that thereis
amuch closer agreementbetweenthe BRE method and
the Thomas (1987) method using Eqn (6.6) to calculateA
for all relevant heights.
Thelarger valuesofmass flow represent themore
conservativedesign option in terms ofsafety,particularly
in view of the fact that at these greater heights ofrise, and
hence at the correspondinglyvery large mass flow rates,
the smoky g'astemperatures tendtohe low, It should also
henotedthat therewas a good matchbetween the BRE
method and experimental observation in a ftillseale hot
smoketest9'with the very differentcircumstancesof an
adhered plume with entrainment into the free ends, again
with a largeareasmoke reservoir.This tends to give
greater confidencein the range of validationof the BRE
method, and byimplicationof'theThomas (1987)/Poreh
method far free plumes.
Consequently,the authors of'thisbookrecommend
thefollowing.
• Forfreeintoplumes risingless than in above the
3 spill
edge, a large smoke reservoir,use the Thomaset al
• Forfreeusemethod
(1998) of6.3.2
(d).
plumes risingmorethan m above the
3 spill
edge eitherthe BRE method of6.3.2 (a) forlarge Or
smallreservoirs,orthe Thomas (1987) method of
6.3.2 (c) usingEqn (6.6), for largesmoke reservoirs
• For
only.
all other spillplume scenarios,use the BRE
method,
6.4 High temperature plume
Hansel! et al1 has suggested that the entrainment into a
high-temperature spillplume might be lower than intoa
thermal plume. The effectis not sufficiently well studied
to allow quantitativeadviceto begiven,beyond the
statement thatthe effectbecomes apparent for valuesof
50 Design methodologies for SHEVS

0B (or of O wherethe compartment opening hasno

projectingcanopy) greater than approximately300 °C. / ,I
Wherethe entrained mass is the criticaldesign parameter , /,
/
(egfor estimatingthe capacityofpoweredsmokeexhaust
ventilators) it is recommended that the same calculation
//
procedures be followedasfarlowertemperature thermal 20

plumes,since this will result in an overestimateofthe

exhaust capacity and an underestimate of the smoke- //
reservoir'slayer temperature; givingan extra margin of
safety. It is expected that all the calculationprocedures // —

for spill plumesdescribed inthe current book will give

sufficiently erroneous results forflameplumes
IT
/ //_ —
—
—

[egtypicallyforO (or 0) greater than about 550 °C]

that theyshould not be employed. It is not clear what
calculationprocedures can be adopted forflame spill
plumes.

6.5 Fires on the atrium floor

Thisrelativelysimplecasecan be treated in the same way
asa lire in a single-storeyspace,wheretheplume canrise
unhindered from the fire directly into the base ofthe
layer. The designfirecan bespecifiedin terms ofareaA1
andperimeter P, based on expert assessmentofthe fire
load at the atriumfloor (which can vary from trees to
cars, from furniture toexhibitionsl.Ifknown,the calorific
valueofthe likelyfuel can be usedto estimate the heat
Q
fluxin the risinggases Examples ofknown heat fluxes a 100

Mass ifow 010 the layer (ks

01 /10

may be:
• a group offoureasy chairs,clusteredtogether, forming
a perimeter ofaround 6 rn, with a convective heatflux
Figure 40 Rate of productionofhot gasesfrom afire on an
atriumfloor
of2 MW,
• a sprinklered office environment,provic:lingthe
sprinklerscan operate over the fire area,with atotal calculationsare essentiallythe samefor all subsequent
(q
convective heatflux ofabout 115kWm2 offire*, stages ofsmokemovement in the smoke reservoirasfor
• anunsprinklered office environment with a total
convective heatfluxQ1ofabout 250 kWm2 oflire,
an axi-symmetricplume. Thedesigner cansimply
employ the methods described in section 5.4 and
• a vehicle (car)with a fire perimeter of12 111 and a total
convective heatfluxof3,0 MW.
onwards to complete the basic design of the SF1EVS.
Notehowever that the designerwill still have many other
factorsto takeintoaccount,as discussed elsewhere in the
*Notc,.ifthe atrium ceilingis high, specialprovisionsmay current book.
haveto bemadeto ensure effectivesprinkler operation.

Ifthe heatfluxis not known forthe predicted fuel load,
a convective heatfluxQ1of0.5 MWm2 offireareaisa
usefully pessimistic ruleofthumb' coveringmany cases.
Themass flow rate in theplume as it enters the smoke
layer maybe establishedfrom Figure40 orEqn (5.2). This
procedure can be used for Y 10.0 (Af)Oh. Forlarger
valuesofY, it would bebetterto use the 'smallfire' plume
theories (seesection 5.1.2 above).
6.6 Throughflowventilation: remaining
design procedures
Oncethe smoky gaseshave reached the base ofthe
smokelayer in the final smokereservoir,therewill be no
significantfurther entrainment. Once the massflow rate
ofsmoky gasesentering this layeris known,the design
6.7 Limitationsto the useofthroughflow
ventilation
Themassflow rategenerated bythe entrainment intothe
risingplume increasesrapidly with increasingheightof
rise ofa l)lume,and hencethe plume cools quicklywith
height. This largeincrease in mass flow withincreases in
height tends to suggestthat theremay be some cut-off
pointin the rise ofthe plume above whichit might
become economicallyimpractical interms of a smoke
control system.Experience suggeststhat this is often true
for flows larger than 150—200kgs'.
Anothereffectivelimitmayoccur ifthetemperature of
the smokygas layer forming in theroofvoid is too low.If
internal day-to-day heat gains (solar,plant,etc. are
allowedto accumulatewithin the atrium roofspace
(eg passivesolar atria) then high-level air temperatures

Figure 41 Early (or premature) stratffication
within the atrium may be very high. Roofspace
temperatures have been recorded at or above 50 °C.
Smoke spreadingintoan atrium duringthe incipient
stagesofafire will naturallybevery cool, and the
entrainment processeswill draw in the surrounding
ambient air as the plume rises.In most instancesthis
ambient air willbe at or near 20 °C (either due to
ventilationor airconditioning) producing a plume
temperature which may be considerablylowerthan the
air within the roofspace,
Unlessthis hot air canbe removed sufficiently quickly,
this will result in the initialsmokelayer ft)rmingat a point
lowerdown in the buildingthanmay he desirable.This
process is known as early (or premature) stratification
(Figure41). Asthe fire is probably growing,the plume
temperature will rise progressivelywith time. This may
result in hotter smoke'punching' itswaythrough the
cooler smokelayer and fbrminganother warmer layer
above.This process may continue until th&' smoke 'strata'
have become suflicientlymixed to rise up as a singlehulk
ofsmoke. This problem ofearly stratificationcanto some
extent he overcome by providingsmokedetectors at
many heights within the atrium or located to ensure
detection of smokeclose to the fire. Once a ftrming
smokestratum is detected and the smokeventilation
system set off, the hottest (and therefore highest) gases
will be removed first, allowingany cooler strata to riseto
taketheirplace. Hence smoky gaseswill reach the
ventilators and the smoke ventilationsystem should
settle into its 'design'state. The timescale fir this process
is uncertain and hence'early'detection ol smokein these
circumstancesis essential.
A further problem which may be encountered maybe
more problematicalduring cooler weather, Atria with
large areas ofexternal glazingwill presentalarge surface
areato the smokelayer,whichcan lead to largeheat
lossesfrom the layer.
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 51
This energy loss will increase with the distancethe
smokehas to travel from the fire source, and will manifest
itselfas aloss ofbuoyancy within theflowing layer. This
in turn cancause the layer todeepenbeyond the desired
design depth, perhaps considerablyso.
Cool smokewill alsobe sensitiveto airflow
movements, such as air currents (draughts) due to
ventilation,air conditioning orweather conditions.
Excessiveair movement in contact with a cool but
otherwise stable smokelayer can cause it to become
unstable,spreading further throughout the building.The
formation of asmoke layer depends uponbuoyancy for
the maintenance of stability. Smoke layerswhichhave
temperatures (and hencedensities)approaching that of
theincoming replacement air supply will have a tendency
to 'mix' with this air, ratherthan 'float' above it. This
process is known as dilution ventilationand is frequently
usedin industry to reduce contamination levelsin
buildings(egwelding shops). The mechanismsinvolved
in dilution ventilationcan easily induce downward
mixingofa smoke layerto the extentthat,with sufficient
air movement, complete smoke logging of an atrium can
occur. It followstherefore that the atrium snmkelayer
should beata temperature compatiblewith stable
stratification.
Thereis littleinlbrination available on the
destabilizationofcool buoyant layers,so a precise
limitingtemperature beyondwhich the above effectswill
lessencannot be given. Further research is desirablein
this area. Experienceand experimentalobservation
however indicatethat these cfièctsmayhe severe in
terms ofsrnoke control, perhaps leading to smoke
spreadingto otherwiseunaffected escape roules.
Inthe absence of the necessaryexperimental data, and
as aresult ofpracticalexperiencethis bookwill adopta
lowerlimit to thelayer under'design'conditions of2()°C
above ambient asthe critical layer temperature below
52
whichundesirable effectsmayoccur. This temperature
rise should beregardedas that which the layer will have
aftersufferingheatlosses to the structure inwhichitis
contained.
Thus, the practical limitationstotheuse of
throughflow ventilation are a maximummass flow rate of
150—200kgs1 and/oraminimumsmoke layer
temperature of2O °C above ambient.
Which limitis reached firstwill dependuponthe
situation being considered,ie on the type offire
Design methodologies for SHEVS ______
considered,the construction ofthe compartment, the
geometry ofthe atrium, etc.
Experience (and Figures28—39) suggeststhatone or
otherlimitis usuallyreachedwhenthe heightofrise
above the fire room opening exceeds 8—12 m. It follows
that it doesnot usuallyappearto bepracticable to design
athroughflow ventilation system requiringmore than
threeto sixstoreys (sometimesless) to bekeptfreeof
smoke, regardless ofwhetherit is powered or natural
smoke ventilation.

7 Alternative forms of
smoke control for atria
(including multistorey malls
but excluding throughflow ventilation)
7.1 Void filling
Someatria provide largeavailable volumesinwhichany
smoke from afire could becontained, such that smoke
ventilation may be unnecessary.
This approach is usuallybaseduponthe assumption
that a firewill grow at apredictablerate,and that the
quantity ofsmoke generated can be contained safelyin
the roofvoid duringtheevacuationperiod, without
prejudicingthe evacuation ofoccupants ofthe space.
This relies uponquantitativepredictions ofboth fire
growth and personnel escape times. Fire growth is
difficult to predict duringthe very earlystages offire
developmentand can therefore, atbest, be only arough
estimate. Similarly, actual timesneededfor evacuation
arealso extremely difficult to determine.PaulsL°1 has
shownthat escape periods inmultistoreybuildingscan
vary from 10 minutesfor a l5-storey building,where
escapees were 'caught' on the 13th floor for5 minutes
before being able to descend, to31 minutes for a21-
storeystructure whereescapees were 'caught' on the 12th
floor for20minutes. Anecdotal reports ofsimilar exercise
in a shopping mall inthe UKhave shownatotal
evacuationtime in excessof3O minutes, Similarly, we
must also remember thatit is customaryfor the fire
serviceto search buildingsfortrappedorlost escapees.
Therewill be some designswheretheevacuationtimes
willbe shorterthan the timeforsmoke toendangerthe
escape routes. It followsthatthe smoke control option of
'doing nothing'should notbe ruled out completely,but
should only be accepted when supported by 'Fire
Engineering'calculationsembodying appropriate safety
margins.
7.2 Compartment separation
Oneapproachthat maybeconsidered for the protection
ofthe atrium from fires in adjacentrooms(or vice-versa)
is the concept ofthe 'steriletube' (discussedin Chapter 1
in outline).
In this instance,the atrium isglazed throughout with
fire-resistingglass, or itsengineered equivalent.Thus,
there is no opportunity for hot smoky gasesto enter
rooms adjacent to the atrium, and the buildingfiresafety
53
precautions revert to those foundinthe absence ofan
atrium.
Theobviousadvantage ofthis techniqueis simplicity.
However, it has several disadvantages.Itis rather
restrictivefor buildingdesigners,as the atriumcannotbe
utilized asa flrnctionalspace, andgenerallythere must
only be limited quantitiesofcombustiblematerial
contained on the atriumfloor.Therecan be no areas of
public movement within the atriumspace otherthan at
ground floor level.
Since thereisthepotential for the atriumto be wholly
full ofsmoke, the facade should bewell sealed. Ifthe
gasesin the atriumbecome hot, as they often may local to
thefire, the facadematerials and construction (and.the
sealingtechniques used) mustbe abletowithstand these
highertemperatures.
Such atria may be fitted with means ofremoving
smokefor FireServiceuse. These systemsare often
provided on an arbitrarydesignbasis,usuallycomprising
anair-change ratecriterion ifpowered ventilation is used,
ora percentage ofthe atriumfloor areaifnatural
ventilationisused.Thesesystems areforFire Serviceuse
only, for clearing ofresidualsmoke (usuallypost-
extinction) and must notbe regarded as life-safety
systems.Air-change rates ofbetween6 and 12 per hour
areoften employed.
7.3 Depressurizationventilation
7.3.1 Principles
Greaterarchitectural freedom becomes possibleifthe
atrium facadeneed notbesealed,but canbe allowedto
beleaky, even ifthe upperatriumis filledwithsmoke.
Examples ofsuch'leaky facade'designsmightinclude:
• hotelbedroomshaving doors onto 'decorative'
balconies overlookingthe atrium (ie not accessor
escape routes), smallenough to be evacuatedthrough
the doors in afew seconds,
• facadeswhereunsealed windowsare usedfor
simplicityand cheapness, or
• facadeswheresmallventilationopeningsallow air to
circulatebetweenthe accommodation spaces andthe
atrium.
54
Clearly,theremust be no escape routes opento the upper
atrium.
Ifsuch doorsand othersuchleakagepaths do not have
tightseals,smoke from the atrium mayentermany
adjacent rooms on many levels,causing aloss ofvisibility
in thoseroomsand possiblyaffectingescape routesaway
from theatrium(Figure42).
This might happensimultaneouslyon many floors,
requiring the simultaneousevacuation ofall affected
floors,thus adding to the pressure ofuse on escape routes
elsewhereinthe building.This is likelytobeaparticular
problem wherethereis a'sleeping risk', egatrium hotels.
It willalso be a problem for fire fighters,since theymay
feel the need to search all accommodation on allaffected
floors to ensurethatno-oneremains atrisk. Such a search
would be muchquicker ifall accommodation were kept
clear ofsmoke.
Hence smoke must be prevented from passingin
appreciablequantities through thesesmall leakage
openings. Onewayofachievingthis may be by
depressurizingthe atrium71'72t
7.3.2 Naturaldepressurization
In anystructure with natural ventilation openingsat high
and low level,and with a quantity ofheat trapped inside,
a ventilation rate will becreateddueto the 'stackeffect'.
In order forairto move out through the high-level
opening, the pressure athighlevel inside mustbegreater
thanthe external pressure otherwise therewould be no
air movement. Similarly, for air to flow inwardsatlow
level the pressure atlow level inside must be less than
thatoutside. Thusthere must bea position within the
structure wherethepressure inside is equal to that
outside. This is known as the 'neutral pressure plane'. Any
openings situated atthe neutral pressure planewill have
no airflowthroughthem,as therewill be no pressure
differentialat that height.
In buildingswhereathroughflow ventilation system is
Figure42 Smoke loggingin a 'leaky' closedatrium
Design methodologies forSHEVS
installed,wherethe inlet areais equal to the exhaust vent
area, then the neutral pressure planewill exist
approximatelymidway within the smoke layer
(Figure43). Ifthe inlet vent areais smaller than the
exhaust vent area, then the neutral pressure planewill
move upwards (Figure44).
Anyopeningsabove the neutral pressureplanewillbe
underapositivepressure (definedpositiveoutwards from
the atrium).Thus, therewillbe a flowofsmokefrom the
atrium intorooms above the neutral pressure plane
throughany leakagepathwhichmight exist.
However, carefulmanipulationoftheneutralpressure
plane can raiseitto a 'safe'heightabove sensitivelevels,
wherethere is littleornothreat from the positive
pressure above (Figure45). The pressure in the atrium
belowthe neutral pressureplane willbe at apressure
lowerthanambient, thus anyairflowwill be from the
room intothe atrium. Hence the levelsbelowthe neutral
pressure planeareprotectedfrom heat and smoke
contamination.
Annex F givesa description ofa firethat occurredin
the IMFbuildinginWashington15.Thefire occurred on
the 10th floor ofa 13-storeyatrium, and bythe time the
fire servicearrived (16 minuteslater) the smokelevel had
descended belowthe 10th floor.
An interesting aspect ofthisfire was that despite the
presence ofa natural ventilation system inthe roof, the
atrium became completelysmoke-logged at onepoint.
This apparent failure ofthe venting system was attributed
to theuse ofnatural ventilation in a'tall'building,where
the smokehadinsufficientbuoyancyto reachthe vents.
However, the fire occurred on the 10thfloor, and for all
practical purposes,whenthe fire brokeout itwas
effectivelyin athree-storey buildingwith adeep
basement. Natural ventilationworksextremely well in
'shallow' buildings,andtherefore there must havebeen
some other mechanism in action, affectingthe operation
ofthe ventilation system.
 7 Alternativeformsofsmoke control for atria 55

inlet: equals
vent area

Figure43 Neutral pressure plane (NPP):throughfiowventilation

Inlet:smaller
vent area

Figure 44 NPP: exhaust islargerthan inlet

Theatrium had no apparent inlet facilityand
accordinglyinstead oftheventilators providinga
throughflow ventilationeffect,theatrium became
depressurizedin the manner describedabove. This, in
turn, prevented smoke from spreadingbeyondthe
atrium, despitebeingsmoke-loggedto ground-floor level
atone stage.
Theneutral pressureplane(NPP) will lie somewhere
depending uponfactors such as: inlet/ventarearatio, gas
temperatures, windpressures,etc. It isnot, andshould
notbe conflisedwith, the actualbase ofthe smoke layer.
Theequation describingthe above relationship,in the
absence ofwindeffects is71'72:
4ç) T0I—1
(7.1)

within the depth ofthe smokelayerinthe atrium [X

56 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Neutralpressureplane

IT'

Figure45 NPP is above highestleakystorey

r 11

where:
X = the heightfrom the base ofthe smoke layerto the
desired position ofthe NPP (m),
=
Dm maximum depthofsmokelayer from the
20

centreline ofthe exhaust ventilator (m).

This equation is represented graphicallyin Figure46.

Eqn (7.1) represents thecondition wheretheatrium
has a single,dominant inlet leakage path from the 15
exterior (egaccess doors) but smallerleakage paths
betweenthe atriumand accommodation and the exterior
(Figure47). rAc312
Withthetechnique as described above it isquite LA C11
possibleforthe atrium tobe entirely filledwith smoke
(seeAnnex F: IMFbuilding),inwhichcase Dm< will 10

approach the height ofthe atrium (H3), eg Dm—* H3.

Itis a straightforwardtaskto calculatethe ventilation
requirements for a'pure' depressurizationsystem using
Eqn (7.1) or Figure46,andChapter 8 to determine the
smoke layer temperature from the appropriate heat
outputforthe occupancy concerned (seesection 5.4 for 5

the heat output).

IftheNPPwasto descend belowthedesireddesign
depththen some ofthe higher storeys maybecome
endangered. This can arisefrom an increase in the actual
inlet leakage areaavailable, egwherethe firebrigade has 0
openedaccess doors to theatriumto investigatethe 1.0 1.5 2.0
severityofthe fire.A successfttl depressurizationdesign °max
should be ableto prevent smoke infiltrationintoadjacent x
spaceson the higher floors even in thiscondition.
Additionally,it is possiblethatthe fire may cause Figure46 Solution to NPP Eqn (7.1)
windowstobreakon both the external facadeand the
atriumfacade ofthe fire room. In this case,thebroken
areas can act as a'dominant' leakage path from the
exterior.

Figure47 NPP: dominantinlet
Thus, allpotentialinletleakage paths must be assessed
whenusingEqn (7.1) or Figure46.
Itshould be notedthatthe simple approach set out
herewillbe invalidwherethe leakage paths across the
atrium boundary have appreciableareas onseveral
storeys [although allleakage areas below the smoke
layer's base can beaggregated and regarded as being at
thelayer's base for calculationpurposes whenusing
Eqn (7.1) orFigure 46].Wherethereareappreciable
significantleakagepaths on severalstoreys above the
layersbase, thesame depressurizationprinciplecanbe
employed but a more complicated'flownetwork'
calculationmust be used.This is bestleft to specialistsin
the field.
Itis difficultto givea simplegeneral rule to identif'
whenabuilding canberegardedas havinga single
dominant inlet. Nevertheless,it may be sufficientto adopt
a guidelinefrom the related field of'air infiltration',so
that one canassume a'dominant inlet' ifthetotalareaof
all openings belowthelayer base is morethan twicethe
total areaofall openingsabove the layerbase (excluding
the areaoftheventilators themselves)[73J
7.3.3 Naturaldepressurization and wind effects
TheNPPis sensitivetothe effects ofwind, and 'adverse'
windpressures might cause the NPPtofallto alower
position onthe leeward side ofthe building,possibly
contaminatingthe topmostleeward storeys ofthe
building.It followsthatthe depressurizationdesign
procedure must takewind-force intoaccount.
To assessthe efficiency ofoperation ofa
depressurizationsystem aknowledge ofthe wind
pressure coefficientsactinguponabuildingwill be
necessary.These area well-establishedwayofrelating
thewindpressure anywhere on abuildingtothe wind
velocity at rooflevel.
7 Alternativeformsof smoke control for atria 57
Wind pressure coefficients(Cr's) have often been
measured so that structural wind loadingcan be
calculated.Thereis aconsiderablebodyofdatain
existence.
Wherecomplete certainty isrequired for a novel or
complicatedbuilding,wind-tunnel observationsusing
scale modelswillyieldusable results.In general,
however, it should often bepossibleto obtain reasonable
valuesfor the Ce'sneededforsmoke control calculations
from availableliterature (seeegreference [73]).
Figure48(a) shows the typical3-dimensional
complicatedpatternofwind pressure coefficientsover a
tall towerblock741.In practice, itwould be necessaryto
identifythe most pessimisticvaluesfor eachstorey, in
whichcase theproblemcanbe simplifiedto
2-dimensionalasshownin Figure48(b).
Withthesedataestablishedfor any specific building
the design procedure for checkingon theperformance of
anatural depressurizationsystem is fairlysimplewhere
thereis a singledominant opening.
Toprevent smokeleakage intothetop leewardstorey
forall wind speeds71:
[(A—1)c —ACPL +Cpj} 0 (7.2)
where:
= windpressurecoefficientatthe vent,
= windpressurecoefficientatthe topmostleeward
ofthe building,
= storey
wind pressure coefficientatthe inlet, and
A=21QHYfL1+l (7.3)
u;L4cj
Provided the requirements ofEqn (7.2) are satisfied, then
natural ventilationwillworkat all wind speeds. This
58 Design methodologies for SHEVS

(a) (b)

-0.8
Wndward Leeward
-0.60
0.75 -0.55
0.95 -045
0.95 -0.45
0.90 -0.45
0.80 — -0.45
0.70 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.60 -0.45
0.55 -0.45
0.50 -0.45
0.45 -0.45
0.35
0.30
0.25 - . . -0.45
-0.45
-0.45

0.2
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9 Figure48 Wind pressure coefficients(Cr's) around atypicaltower
0.95 block: (a) 3-dimensional, (b) 2-dimensional distribution

implies that the roofventilation system should be A natural smoke control system willbe affectedby the
subjected to suctionwindpressuresatall times. windpressuresoperating against allthe openings in the
However, ifit is impossibleto use a natural ventilator on a structure, thus pressure differentialsvary withwind
particular building,fans can beusedinstead. direction and openingposition and the throughflow ofair
willvary with windvelocity.
7.3.4 Powered depressurization However,whenthehole in the roofis replaced bya
The necessary capacityis a littleharderto calculate,and fan,the pressure differentials within the buildingnow
thebestfan is one whichis not affectedbywindpressures haveto bechangedby mechanicallyaltering the
on its exhaust. Witha fan,however, one must always throughflow ofair. Therefore, the system must be
assumeamaximum wind speed fordesignpurposes. The designed witha maximum designwindvelocityto cater
required volumetric flowratemaybe calculated from711: for all conditions.
Further sophisticationmaybe achievedby the use of
____ 174
an anemometer and having 'groups' offans, eachgroup
— — 2
+ 2gO1X1112
operating at a differentwindvelocity. So ifthe windwas
wind
[ T0 ][(C T1 ]
light, one group could operate, and ifthe wind speed
where: increased, ftirther groups might be activatedasnecessary.
V1
= fan capacityrequired (m3s 1),
vWlfld
= designwindvelocity (msj.

8 Depressurization/smoke ventilation
hybrid designs
Chapters 3 to 6 have indicated how smokeventilation
canonly keepa limitednumberoflowerstoreys clear of
smokebelowthebuoyant smokelayerformed inthe
atrium. The technique does in principle,however, allow
those lower storeys to have adjacent spaces,and their
escape routes, open to the atrium. Sections7.3 and 7.4
above show thatitis often possibleto design a
depressurizationsystem whereclean air is drawn through
all significantleakageopenings on the atriumfacade
immersed in the smokelayer.Depressurizationdoesnot,
however, protectany large leakageopenings on any
storey above the layerbase in the atrium. Nor will it
protectany escape routes onthatstoreyopen to the
atrium. Inthis context alarge openingisone wherethe
opening in the atrium facadeis larger than the sumof
openingsfurther along the same leakagepath away from
the atrium (eg ifthe atriumfacade opening islargerthan
openings in the external wall).
Itwill often be thecasehowever,that architectswill
want to maximizeuse ofthe atrium space,and anobvious
wayis to combinethe smokeventilation approach of
Chapters 3 to 6, allowinggreaterfreedom ofdesign on
theloweststoreys,with thelesser freedom of'leaky
facades'allowed bythe depressurizationtechnique set
out in sections 7.3 and 7.4 above.In this'hybrid'design
theratioofventareato fresh-airinletareawillbe
determined byEqn (7.2) orFignre46,whereas the actual
valuesofthese areas must be consistentwiththe
necessarysmoke exhaust requirement as defined in
sections 5.12 and 5.13.Itshould be appreciatedthatin
59
suchahybrid designthe smoke layertemperature inthe
atrium required forthe depressurizationcalculationsis a
natural outcome ofthe plume entrainment calculations
needed forthe smoke exhaust calculation.Notethat
hybrid designsare similarlypossiblewherepowered
ventilators are usedfor atrium smokeexhaust.
Hybrid designsusuallyfollowone oftwo approaches:
mass-flow-basedapproach and temperature-based
approach.
Mass-flow-basedapproach
This approachis wherethe atrium is designed with a
number ofopen levels above the atriumfloor and
requires aplume ofa specificheight. The maximum
number oflevelswillbedetermined by eitherthe
magnitude ofthe massflow rate entering the layer,or the
smokelayer temperature falling belowtheminimum
value of2O °C. The principles ofa mass-flow-based
hybrid smokeventilation system are shown in Figure49
(seenext page).
Temperature-based approach
Thisapproachisto coola potentiallyhot smokelayer by
the deliberate entrainment ofambient air into the rising
plume. This mayenable the use offacadematerials which
cannotwithstand hightemperatures (eg floatglass).The
principlesofatemperature-based hybridsmoke
ventilationsystem are shown in Figure50 (seenextpage).
A designprocedure for hybridsystems is given in
AnnexG.
60 Design_methodologiesfor SHEVS

Centre line ofventilators AvCv

Neutral pressure plane

Inlet AjC1

Figure49 Principles of hybrid'smoke ventilation system: mass-flow-based approach

Centre line ofventilators

Inlet AC

Situation A Situation B

Figure50 Principles of hybrid'smoke ventilation system: temperature-based approach


9 Atrium smoke layer
temperature
In mostsmoke control system designsno account is
takenofthe heat lossesto the structure.It is nssumedthat
there is conservation ofheat andthat all ofthe heatflux
entering asmokereservoir is contained in, and remains
in, thesmoke. Experimental work in thepasthas shown
that this assumptionholds goodfor relativelysmall
smoke reservoirs,with medium to high thermal
resistance in the containingstructure, orforhigh mass
flow rates ofsmoke.
Whenconsidering atria, however, this assumptioncan
no longer be consideredentirely valid.Anatrium smoke
reservoirgenerallyhas alarge surfacearea, which is
openvenfilafors or
powered exhaust units
Figure51 Heatbalancein an atrium
61
predominantlyglazed in most cases,thus providir.ga
goodheat sink.Therewill be apassage ofheatenergy
from the smokelayer intothe structure, and accordingly
the smoke layerwill suffera reduction in temperature.
Figure51 shows the heatbalance in an atrium, A
simple computer model based on these principleswas
usedto determine theloss ofenergy from the smoke
layer,basedupon'worst case'assumptions forthe
facade721.The facade fabric is assumedtobethin glazing
withno apparent delay in thetransfer ofthe energyfrom
the layer. Theresults ofusingthis model areshown
graphicallyin Figures52, 53 and 54for 1 MW, 5 1M[W and
Heatcarriedby
exhaust gases
Heat oss through roof.
' Radiation downwards.
62
6 MWfires, respectively.The model showed, despite the
fact thatmany differingatrium geometries were
considered with differentvaluesofexterrial exposure,the
resultant calculationpointscould beplottedcomfortably
as singlecurvesforeachvalueofmass flowrate.
Design methodologies forSHEVS
At high values ofmass flow ratethere is little change in
theatriumsmoke layertemperature for wide variations in
smokelayer surfacearea. This isdue tothegas flow being
theprimemover ofenergy,and tends tojustify the
assumptionthat loss ofheattothe structure ofabuilding
maybeignoredforrelatively smallcontactareas.

150

140

130

120

0 M1Okgs-
90
H—— M10kgs
'VP M125kgs
—
M15Okgs
M1100k9s

60

----
E
Go
50

40
\ -S..

30

20

IC

Tota' surfacearea (cicludinO base)

rn a 1000)

Figure52Atriumlayertemperaturefor fire of 1 MW
 9Atrium smoke layertemperature 63
320

300

280 t\
26O

240
\ \
220 \

\\
200
\\ '\
\\
0=1MW
\ M=Ukga
Me10kgs
—
\ \ N M,25kgs
160
——M50kgs
aE 140 \ \\.
'
—— Mr100kgs

p
H
--- ___
20

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tota'surfacearea (hicludOig base)
(mx 1000)
Figure 53 Atrium layertemperaturefor fire of 5 MW

020 _________

300 t

280

260\ \
240 \
220 \ '
\ \ 0=1MW
200

180
\ \\\ \ M,0kgs

S\
160
's M,=5Okgs1
— —
M=100kga
fi 140

120

100

2 4

Total surfacearea (includingbase)

(mx 1000)
Figure54Atriumlayertemperaturefor fire of 6 MW
64
10 Additional design factors
10.1 Atriumroof-mounted sprinkler
systems
Conventional sprinklers mounted in the roofofan atrium
will only be ofpotential benefit ifthereis afire on the
atrium floor itself. However, due to the heightthatthese
sprinklerswill generallybe mounted above the floor,the
firewillbe ofconsiderable proportions before the
sprinklers activate and they will therefore be oflimited
benefit. Moreimportantly perhaps, ifasmoke layer isjust
abovethe operating temperature ofthe sprinklers,it will
be reasonablystable (8 50°C). Theactionofall the roof
sprinklersoperating almost simultaneously(as canbe
inferredfrom workby Hinkley751) mayrapidly cool the
layerandcause itto become unstable.This can occur ifa
fireis above the atrium floor,and ishighly undesirable.
One method ofovercoming thisproblemis to usewall-
mounted, long-throw sprinklers around the sides ofthe
tallspace. It is unlikelyinsuchcircumstancesthat the hot
gases from a firewhichis not actuallyagainst oneofthe
walls willcontactthe sprinklerheads, and so
conventional sprinklertriggering devicescannotbeused.
Instead, ifthe sprinklersare ableto operatein
predetermined zones onreceipt ofanelectrical signal;
and ifthere isafire-detection system able to identif,r the
position ofthe fire sufficiently closely,then a signalcanbe
sentautomaticallyto operate the appropriate sprinkler
zone. This approach has been pioneered byOveAmp
Limited.
10.2 Controlledfire load on the atrium base
Ifthereis alikelihoodthat afire loadwill bepresenton
theatriumfloor, the smokecontrol system designedfora
firein an adjacent room willgenerallybe able to cope
with theproducts ofamuch larger fire directly beneath
theroof. Thus, withpropermanagement to restrict the
use offliel assembliesand good housekeeping, such a fire
could feasiblyexistandburn itselfoutbefore becoming a
problem to other areas outsidethe atrium. This does, of
course,assume that the methods detailed elsewhere in
this bookwillhavebeenusedto demonstrate that sucha
fire doesnot represent a threat.
BS 5588:Part7[7] includes adefinitionofthe upper
limit criteriafor a controlled fire load for an atrium base as
follows.
• Ifthe total weight ofcombustibleson the atrium base
exceeds 160 kg, the materialsshould be confined to
isolated islands.
• Eachislandashould:
— contain maximum of ofcombustible
160 kg
material,
— cover amaximum floor areaof10 m2,
— be
separated from other areas ofcombustiblesby at
least4 m (except wherethose areas areprotected
bya sprinklersystem).
• Allwall and ceilinglinings should have at leasta
Class 1 surfacespread offlamewhentestedin
accordance withBS476: Part 7.
• Whentestedinaccordance with BS 5852,all
upholstered frirnitureshould resist ignition bythe
smoulderingsource (ignitionsource 0) and the flaming
source (ignitionsource 5)*.
• Alltextiles (drapes and curtains) should meetthe
requirements ofBS5867: Part2.
*Note:Attention is drawn to the provisionsofthe
Upholstered Furniture (Fire Safety) Regulationsin
respect offillingmaterials,in the UK.
10.3 Air-conditionedatria
In some hot countries itis common practicefor an atrium
to be ftilly air-conditioned,making the internal ambient
temperature in the atrium lowerthan the external
ambienttemperature. In suchcases,especiallyforthe
relatively smallheatoutputs inthe earlystages ofa fire,
thetemperature ofthesmoke layer whichinitiallyforms
in theatrium canbecoolerthanthe external ambient
temperature, while still beingwarmer than the initial
internal atrium air temperature. Inwhichcase,use ofa
natural ventilation system would cause a reversestack
effect, iewiththe roofvents actingas inletsand the inlets
(includingany doors beingused as escape routesfrom the
atrium tothe exterior) acting as vents. This could cause
problemsofcool smoke spreadingdownwards towards
(and through) the escape doors. Once the coolatriumair
has been flushed out bythe warmerambient air entering

through the vents, the system will reverseits direction of
flow,with the further potential fordrawing backintothe
buildingthecool smokewhich has just beenventedto
the streetoutside.
Thisproblemofan initialdownward movement of
smokemaybe alleviatedbythe use ofsmoke detectors in
therooms, ratherthaninthe atrium, causing the
ventilation system to operate and creating abalance
betweentheinternal and external temperatures priorto
the smoke entering the atrium in quantity;orby using
powered ventilators.
10.4 Channellingscreens and hybrid
systems
It has beenshown insection 6.2 that whensmoke passes
under abalconyto rise intotheroofvoid above,the
quantity ofsmokeentering the smoke layer in the rising
smoke plume can bereduced byrestricting the widthof
the plume as it passesthe balconyedge, bythe use of
channelling screens.
Theneedfor plume widthrestriction is necessaryfor
anysmoke control designwherea clear layer ofair is
required above a balconyprojection beyond thefire room
(eg for escape purposes), and so will apply to ahybrid
smoke control system whenthe heightofriseofthe
smoke plume is fixedby escape requirements (mass-flow-
basedsystems).
As described in Chapter 8, analternative use ofa
hybrid system is to coolthesmoke layer for some
purpose (eg to prevent glazingfrom cracking)by
deliberate entrainment ofair into the smokeplume
(temperature-basedsystems).When designinga natural
ventilationsystem forthis purpose a knowledgeofthe
depthofthe smokelayerin the atrium is necessaryto
calculatethe vent arearequired. Thisinturn implies a
knowledge ofthe heightofrise ofthe smokeplume.
Therefore, an estimate ofthe plume widthleavingthe
room is desirableto determine the height ofrise required
for coolingpurposes,and the plume widthshould be
reasonably narrow (usuallynotmore than 10—20 m).
However, variations between the mass flowentering, and
thatbeingvented from, theatrium smoke layerwith this
typeofhybridsystem will beimmediatelycompensated
forby a change in the depthofthe smokelayer.Thus,the
actual widthofplume achieved is irrelevantto the
satisfactoryoperation ofthe system.Hencethere is no
practicaladvantage in physicallyreducing thewidthof
the risingplume for thisform ofhybrid system.Therefore
in the designoftemperature-based hybridsystems,
channellingscreens are unnecessary.
10.5 Wind-sensing devices
Sections 5.12 and 7.3.3 concluded that roofvents should
operate in areas ofhigh suctionpressure for allwind
directions.In certain instancesitmaybelikelythat
natural vents mayexperience an adverse pressure effect
(egverticallymountedvents). Inwhichinstancethe
10 Additional design factors 65
ventilationsystem should be controlled by awind
direction indicator,andtherequired amount of
ventilationshould operate in aleeward zone only.
It is possibletouse awinddirection sensorto open
natural ventilators in zones ofwind-induced suctionfor
more conventional'throughflow' systemsaswellas for
depressurizationsystems,while leavingclosed any
ventilators whichmightexperience awindoverpressure.
In eithercase,it is necessaryto mapout thezonesof
suctionand overpressurefor all possiblewind directions.
This canmosteasilybe done using amodel ofthe
buildingand itssurroundings in aboundary-layerwind
tunnel. Itis alsoimplied thatthe ventilatorsmustbe
controlled by an automatic,probably computer-based,
control system.
Itshould benotedthat,although systemsbasedon
wind-direction sensors have been installed in buildings,
the technique is relativelyuncommon.
10.6 Crossdraughtwithin the atrium
Thisdescribes the action ofahorizontal air flowbeneath
ahotgaslayer,suchas through the entrance ofabuilding
intoanatriumormall. Therecanbeahigh relative
velocity between the smokelayer and incoming air when
air is drawn inthroughan inlet oflimited areaand passes
directlybelowthe smoke layer. Smoke willbe drawn
down intothe air stream bytheVenturieffect,and also by
turbulent entrainment ofsmoke from the gas layerinto
theflow.Thatwill leadto loss ofvisibilityinthe clear
layer761.
The effectofthe flow depends on thewidthofthe
entrance throughwhich air enters the building,and on
the relativeposition ofthe base ofthegas layer and[the
top oftheairinlet. Forflow through narrow inlets, such as
singleor doubledoors, there canbeserious loss of
visibilityintheclear layerwhenthe flowhas a velocity of
0.3 ms orgreater, and the layeris less than 2 mabove the
top ofthe inlet.
Whereflowis across awideropening, such asacross
thewidthofamall,flows ofgreater than 1.0 ms can
cause seriouslossofvisibilityin the clear layer whenthe
base ofthe hot gas layer isclose tothe top oftheinlet.
Whenthe base ofthehot gaslayeris more than1 m
above the top ofthe inlet butless than 2 m above it, then
flows ofgreater than 1.9 ms can cause serious loss of.
visibilityin the clear layer.
It is very difficult toprotectagainstthe mixingcaused
by theflowofair undera hotgas layer,but ensuringthat a
screen definingthe end ofthe reservoiris placed at:least
3 m backfrom the air inlet willminimize the effect,
10.7 Crossflowwithin the gas layer
Experiments have shownthat wherethere is horizontal
flow within the hotgas layer across the openingintoa
centrally mountednatural smokeexhaust ventilator,
therewill be no significantreduction inthe efficiencyfor
velocitiesofup to4 It is reasonabletoassume that
66
theresults will besimilar wheremechanical smoke
exhaust is used. Hence suchcrossflowscanbe ignored
whendesigningventilation systems.
10.8 Wind effects on horizontal ventilators
Wind flowingoverhorizontalventilatorscan influence
the exhaust rate through theventilator, especiallyfor
natural ventilators.The windcan increase the massflow
throughthe ventilator dueto the Venturieffect, orreduce
the effectiveventareabyreducing theeffectivedischarge
coefficient.This latter phenomenon appears to be dueto
the creation ofawind-induced vortex inside and closely
belowthe leeward edge ofthe ventilator's opening.
Experiments have shown that natural ventilators
mountedon aflat roof, and having a kerb (to form a
Design methodologies for SHLVS
chimney around or beneaththe ventilator) at least 0.2 m
high, are notadverselyaffected byexternal winds.This
appears to be due tothe kerb deflectingthe air flow
upwards far enough for the flowto re-attachtothe roof
downwind ofthe ventilator itselfVentilatorswhich are
flush withthe roofcan beadverselyaffected forwind
speeds as low as 4.5 ms'78. However, even with a kerb,
gas layers shallowerthan 2 m, and at atemperature ofless
than 25 °C above the ambient canbe adverselyaffected
bywinds flowingtangentiallyacross them.Thereis also
some anecdotal evidencethat the aspect ratioofnatural
ventilators, even for those fitted withkerbs, should not
exceed 5:1 in order to avoid these problems whenthe
windblows in a direction close to the long axisofthe
ventilator.

11 Interactions with other systems
in the building
11.1 Sprinklers
11.1.1Automatic sprinklers
Automatic sprinklershave a major impact onthe
protection ofpropertyagainstfire. The statistical effectof
sprinklersisto reduce the frequencyoflarge fires.
Sprinklerscancontrol fire growth, provided the sprinkler
installationis chosen to matchthe nature and
arrangement ofthe fuelsexpected tobepresent. Even so,
there will always be a smallproportion offires which will
become large.Nevertheless,all studies show that
sprinklers have agoodeffectivenessin controllingfires.
Sprinklerdesign rules tend to be very prescriptive,and
havebeendescribed in many documents over theyears,
egby theCEA1791, orby many national standards
(egBS 5306:Part 2[801).
Overthe past 10—15 years in particular,ithas been
recognized increasinglywidelythat sprinklerswhichcan
operateearlyin a fire canhave alife-safetyrole aswell as
protecting property; although itis still generallytrue that
sprinklersare notuniversallyacceptedforthis role.
Wherelife-safety is seen as important, many modern
Standards specifyadditionalfeaturesforthe sprinkler
installationcompared with installationssolely intended
for property protection.
Wheresprinklersoperate inabuildingandwherethe
fireservice alsointervenes, itcan be very difficult to say
whichhad the greater effect.In practice sprinklersand
fireservices,actingtogether, usuallyachieve better
resultsthan eitheractingseparately.
11.1.2Automatic smoke exhaust ventilation
Smokeexhaust ventilationsystemswerefirstproposedto
achieve the benefits ofventing throughthe roof,while
thefire was still small.
From1972, in the UK and many othercountries,it has
become commonplaceto require smokeventilation
systemsfor certain types ofbuildingin orderto protect
theescape routesduringthe early stages ofafire.
Examples include enclosed shopping mallsand many
atriumbuildings.This places averyclear life-safetyrole
on smoke ventilation,and demands operation ofthe
smokeventilation system earlier than the arrivalofthe
fire services—usually on the first detection ofsmoke.
67
It is alsotruethat directfire-fightingintervention is
faster and more effectiveifthefire-fighterscan see what
theyaredoing.Partofthetraining offire services
everywhere isconcerned withthe use ofventilationto try
to control the movement ofsmokein order toimprove
visibility. Hence SHEVScan also assistinfire-fighting
operations.
Ever since the 1960s, ithas beenrecognized thata
smokeventilationsystem cannot, on its own,control the
sizeofafire. Eitherit allowsthe fire servicetocontrol the
fire moreeasily,oritrequires additionalmeasures to
control fire growth. IntheUK, forexample,it has been
routine since 1972forsprinklers to berequired in
enclosed shopping complexesto limitthe firesizeto a
magnitude whichthe smokeventilation system can cope
with[5]Thatis, by makingthe smokeventilationpossible,
the sprinklershave beenseen as sharing in the same life-
safety role.
11.1.3 Sprinklers combined with smoke ventilation
It follows that sprinklersand smokeventilators are both
important forlife safety and fQrproperty protection,
although smokeventilation should only be seen as being
usefulfor property protection bymakingfirefighting
easier and faster.Itis therefore reasonabletoexpectboth
sprinklersand smokeventilators to beusedtogether,
both forlifesafety andforpropertyprotection.
Itwouldbeideal ifthe operationsofonesystem
(sprinklersor smokeventilators)had no adverse effecton
the operation oftheother. Unfortunatelythat isnotthe
case.
Factory Mutual Research Corporation carried out
some excellentexperiments inthe early 1970s'. Their
mainconclusionswere that vents allowedmorefire
damage (ie morefuel was consumed) andcaused delays
intheoperation ofsprinklers.Thus, sprinklerswould
perform more effectivelywithoutvents, especiallyifthe
buildingwas allowedto fill with smoketo create low-
oxygen conditionswhichwould fUrtherlimit
combustion.This led to theiradvice,publicizedmost
clearlyafter1980, to 'button-up' the buildingandto allow
sprinklersto achieve extinctionofthe fire.
No account wastakenofthepotential for active fire
serviceintervention in theiranalysis, and indeed their
68
'button-up' approach effectivelyrecommended thatthe
fireservices should waitoutsidethe buildinguntilthe fire
hadbeen extinguishedby the sprinklers.This approach
was contrary to the operational doctrine ofthe Fire
Brigadesin the UK andelsewhere.They wantedsmoke
ventilationto make theirjob easier,and to reduce the risk
ofa backdraft threatening theirfirefighters whenthey
enterwhat could otherwise be a smoke-filledbuilding.
Theresult has beenapolarization ofviews. Oneside
supports the 'button-up' idea, and thinksthatsmoke
ventilation reduces the effectivenessofsprinklers.The
othersidefavoursusingsmoke ventilationsimultaneously
withsprinklers in orderto increasethe effectivenessof
fire fighting.Therewere many paperspublishedduring
the 1980s discussingandreinforcingtheseviewpoints.
Since then, much research has been carried out on
interactions betweensprinklers,ventilators and the
thermally buoyant layers.A numberofcomputer models
havebeendeveloped, some ofwhicharelisted inTable
11.1. Typical results from some ofthe models predict a
small increasein the time to operation ofsprinklers
coupled with a considerableextension ofthe time to
develop smoke-loggingin the compartment.
Therehave alsobeen some experiments, most notably
the large experimentsin Ghentin Belgium88,and at
SP Bors89.Figure55 is atypical example ofthe results
from the Ghentexperiments, showing a smallincreasein
thetime to operatethe firstsprinklers,and anunexpected
reduction in the total numbers ofsprinklers operating
during the fire.Notethatthe fire growth andcontrol was
arbitrarilyselected for the purposes oftheexperiment.
Resultsfrom the Ghentexperimentshavebeen usedto
testthepredictions ofRADISM and resultsfrom the
SPBorásexperiment have beenusedto testthe
predictionsofSPLASH andJASMINE.
Unfortunatelythe same evidencehas been interpreted
differentlyby the two sides and progress since 1980 has
not removed the controversy,although it has clearedup
many details.It has tendedto confirmthe two opposite
poles ofthe argument intheir respectiveviews.
A compromise wassuggested byMorgan901 asfollows.
• Wherethe primary purpose ofthe smokeventilation
system is the protection oflife, eg by protecting the
Table 11.1 Computer models developed to determine
interactions between sprinklers, ventilatorsand thermally
buoyant layers
Computer Developer
model
RADISM DevelopedbyHinkleyfroma jointFRS—Colt
Internationalproject, UK82
LAVENTS DevelopedbyCooper atNIST, USAt8384
SPLASH DevelopedbyGardiner(1988)and Jackman (1992)
fromajoint collaboration between Brandforsk,
Sweden,FRSand SouthBank University,UK8586
JASMINE A two-phaseversion developedbyKumar et al at
FRS, UK'8
Design methodologies for SHEVS
55
50
45
40 — ——
— ExperIment 26
Experiment 31 1
NO xenix
35
30
25
CO
22
12
10
I 23vents
-
6 120 160 240 300 300 420
Time(secs)
Figure55The effect ofsmokeventilatorson sprinkler operation
escape routesusedby occupants ofthe compartment,
this must takepriority.Sprinklerswill usually be
needed to control the fire to a sizewithwhichthe
smokeventilation system can cope. The smoke
ventilationsystem andallits associated features
(except the sprinklers)must beactivated on first
detection ofsnsoke,whichalmost always means earlier
thanany sprinklerswill operate.
• Wherethe propertyis likelyto experienceahigh-
challengefire, thereshould be adifferentapproach.
Pending research intothis aspect, wecan assume that
'extra-high-hazard' occupanciesidentifiedfor
sprinkler installationpurposes correspond to this
category. Means ofescape should not dependon
smoke exhaust ventilation,but should instead depend
oncompartmentation and adequatelyshorttravel
distances forescape ofthe occupants.Ifa smoke
ventilation system is needed to assistfirefighting, it
should be operated byaswitch easily accessibleforfire
fighters withoutthem havingto enterthe fire
compartment. This will allow the risk ofa backdraftto
dissipatebefore any ofthe fire-fightershave to be put
• atFor risk.
properties belowthe extra-high-hazard category,
andwherethe ofthe smoke
primarypurpose
ventilation system is to protectpropertyby assisting
fire-fightingintervention,we can identifytwo
alternativestrategies:
— where the attendance time ofthe fireservices is
likelyto belong, adopt the same strategy as for
extra-high-hazard occupanciesasabove.
— where the attendance time ofthe fire servicesis
likelyto be short, operate the smokeventilation
system on firstdetection ofsmokein order to obtain
themaximumadvantage ofasmoke-free region for
fire-fightersto workin. Sprinklerscan be allowedto
operate with theirusual triggering devices.
It has sincebeen suggestedthat in thelastpointabove,a

smokeventilation system maybeinitiated bya flow
switchinthe sprinkJersupply,but only ifquick response
sprinklersare used. Thereis alsoa strong and clear
recommendationthatthe issueofwhetherthe
attendance time willbelongorshortshould be decided
by discussionwith Fire Officers whoknow thelocal
circumstancesaffectinganyindividualbuildingdesign
(for a more detailed discussionsee Chapter 12).
The compromise proposals outlined above must be
regarded asan interim solutiontothe problem, allowing
standards-writersandregulators to cope with real
buildingdesigns,and allowingFire Servicesto develop
theiroperational and training procedures accordingly.
However, whereaSHEVS designis primarilyforlife
safety,itmustbe operatedatthe earliestpossible
opportunity,whichin practicewill usuallymean
triggeringon smoke detection.
11.2 Fire-detection systems
The operationofanysmoke control system is generally
dependent upona smokedetectoroperating and there
arescenarioswhereparticular detection strategies may
needto be considered. Itis essentialthat whereoperation
oftheSHEVS is dependentonthe prior operation of
smoke or other fire detection, the detection system must
link intothe SHEVS control system in awaywhich
allowsthe latter to operate the appropriate zones,and to
initiate other appropriate actions (egto start alerting
occupants,to call the fire service, etc.).
Ina particularlytallatrium, stratificationofthesmoke
layer before reachingtheceilingisprobable, especiallyin
atria which are air-conditioned inthelowerportiononly,
orhave a high proportion ofroofglazing.Thus, ifthe
only detection system presentis roof-mounted it may not
operate, or atleastbe considerablydelayed in operation.
This problem may be overcome bytheinstallationof
smokedetectionto the various rooms wherefiremight
startand/orby intermediate detection zones at different
heightsin theatrium, possiblyusingbeamdetectors.
Ifthe environment is particularly'dirty' then point
smokedetectors will be proneto falsealarms, and it may
benecessary toreduce the operating sensitivity. With
intelligent analogueaddressable detectors itwill alsobe
possibleto use a 'progressive'system wheredifferent
actions maybe takendepending onthe signalsgiven bya
numberofdetectors. In some environmentsthe use ofa
samplingsystem willbe ofgreaterbenefit.
Although smokedetectors will be used inthe majority
ofapplications,otherformsofdetection maybe
considered. For example,there may be scenarioswhere
an infra-red flamedetectormayhave superior
performance characteristics.Sensitiveinfra-red heat
detectors may perform adequately insome situations,
and canbe essentialtoidentifythe location ofthefire and
to trigger wall-mounted,long-throw sprinklerswhere
theyareusedbecause theceilingis too high for
conventionalsprinklersto be ceiling-mounted.
11 Interactionswith other buildingsystems 69
11.3 Heating, Ventilationand Air
Conditioning (HVAC)/AirConditioningand
MechanicalVentilation(ACMV)
HVAC andACMVsystemsare intended to do essentially
the same task: theyprovide a comfortableenvironment
within the building.The termHVACis usedmainly in
cooler climates,andACMVinwarmerclimates whereit
is rarelynecessaryto heatthe building.These ventilation
systemsserve an essentiallydifferentpurpose to a
SHEVS.They are typicallydesigned to minimizeenergy
lossesfrom (or into) the building— unlike aSHEVS
whichis designed to let energy (heatfrom the fire) outof
thebuilding.Other important differencesinclude thefact
that HVAC is usuallydesignedtobring warmair which
has risen to the ceilingback down to lowerheights where
the occupantsareto be found. This isthe exact opposite
ofwhata SHEVSistrying to achieve.Whenthese
systemsare in 'air-conditioning'mode, it is common to
introduce air intothe spacesat high level,nearthe
ceiling,andto remove 'used' air from low level— once
again,the opposite ofwhat aSHEVSis trying to achieve.
Itfollowsthat it is rarethat aHVACorACMVcan
simplyflilfil a double role as aSHEVS, although ths can
bepossiblewith asufficiently 'intelligent' control system.
It is the most common practiceforthe HVAC/ACMV
system to shutdown onreceipt ofa signalfrom the same
detectionsystem thatstarts theSHEVS operating.The
result ofthis is that any ducts with openingsexposed to
the smokelayers associatedwiththe SHEVS, regardless
ofwhethertheyfunctionas supply or exhaust in non-fire
conditions, are able to actas pathways forthat smoke—
often in undesiredways andto undesired parts ofthe
building.This process is often referred to as 'siphoning'.
Thedesigner ofthe SHEVSshould tryto foreseeall of
thesepotential unwanted smoke paths, andshould
specifythatsmokedampers be installedinthoseducts in
positionswhich willprevent any smoke spreading
beyond theboundaries ofthe smokezone.
Thesedampers must be motorized, and should be
triggeredintooperation byreceipt ofa signalfrom the
SHEVScontrol system — subjectofcourseto any delays
required bythe control system in orderto ensurethe
correct sequencingofoperation ofdifferentcomponents
and thus to prevent any damage.In general,all SHEVS
should be testedregularlyfor operation asa part of
management responsibilities.This will require that the
smokedampers mustbecapable ofbeing motorized back
open after thetest.This is because, ifre-setting the
equipment aftersuchatest istoo demandingofstafftime,
the testwillonly everbedone once!
Theauthors havefound, while checkingother
designers' work, that it is regrettably true that the need
for smoke dampers to prevent siphoning is often
overlooked in many designs.In practice, the absenceof
suchdampers will usuallyonlybe noticed byanin-situ
'hot smoke test', whensmoke starts to appear inpartsof
thebuildingwhereit should notbe. As suchtests arestill
very infrequent,it seemslikelythata significantbui:
70
unknown proportion ofSHEVS installationswillhave
this failing.
Therecanoften be advantagesifthe HVAC/ACMV
system is designed in a coordinated waywiththe
SHEVS.This can allow,as far as is possible,the
HVAC/ACMVtobe zoned with the same boundaries as
theSHEVS, andso reduce theneedfor (andthecostof)
smokedampers.
11.4 Pressurizationof stairwells and
lobbies
Insome atrium buildingsthere may be a requirement or
desire to pressurizethe escape stairs and associated
lobbies. Ifthe atrium employs a depressurizationor
hybrid smoke control system and the glazingbetween
the fire room and the atrium has cracked orshattered, the
pressure within the fire room will,ofnecessity,be lower
thantheoutside ambient pressure. This reduction in
pressure will actas thoughan extract fan was fitted to the
fireroom,increingthe pressure differentialdeveloped
across the escape lobby doors. This increased pressure
differentialwill increase the air flow through the leakage
paths ofthe lobby,thus enhancing the efficiencyofthe
pressurizationsystem in preventing the passage ofsmoke
into the escape route.
Thesituation willbe differentwherethe pressurized
stairwellor lobbyconnectsthroughto the atriumspace
itself, especiallywherethe atriumhas a 'throughflow'
SHEVS without anyspecial 'atrium depressurization'
features. In this case all parts ofthe atriumabove theNPP
will be at a higher pressure than ambient, requiring a
higher value ofthe minimumdesign pressure difference
for thepressurized shaft and/orlobby.A procedure for
thecalculation ofthis changedvalue is outlined in
Annex H.
11.5 Lighting and signage
Ingeneral, the presence ofa SHEVSwillmakelittle
differenceto the usual requirements forthe provision of
emergency lighting and ofemergency exit/wayfinding
signs.Itis possible,however, to make some observations
ofgoodpracticebasedon commonsense.
It isexpected that a SHEVSwillresult in a buoyant
layer ofsmoky gasesbeneaththe ceiling,eitherin a
smoke reservoirorin channelled flows en routeto the
smoke reservoir.This smoke is likelyto be optically dense
andblack inanyreal, severefire. It followsthat any lights
and any signs positioned higher than thedesign smoke
layer base in these circumstancesare unlikelyto be ofany
actual valueto people trying to escape. Ifthe designofthe
SHEVSis taken intoaccount whendecisionsare made
aboutthe locationsofthe lights and ofthe signs,then
thesecanbelocatedbelowthedesign layer base, and
theycanserve theirintended function. Insome cases,it
maybe easierto designthe SHEVS so that the smoke
layerbase ishigherthanthe emergency lights and signs,
although the costs incurred by the extra entrainment and
Design methodologies for SHEVS
hencethelarger smoke exhaust capacitywill usually
outweigh anysavingson the lightingand signage.
11.6 Public address and voice alarm
systems
Itis the purpose ofanalarm(iean alerting)system to
persuade the occupants ofa buildingto start to evacuate
the building.Thereis considerable experience[42]
(including many Fire Serviceanecdotes) that a simple
bell or sounder is essentiallyineffectiveinpersuading
untrained occupants to startto escape.Thereis a
developingconsensus thata voicealarm will be far better
at persuading people to start421.That is,thatasimple,
clear, andinformativemessage in plain langnageis much
better atmotivatingpeople to stop theirotheractivities
and starttoescape. Apublic address system canvery
easily be adapted to meetthis function.
Itis an unfortunateconsequence ofhuman nature that
suchvoicemessages should not be delivered 'live'.The
designated person may notbe presentat the critical
moment, or may notrealize the importance ofgivingthe
warning ratherthan carrying outother emergency
actions. Itfollow s that itis betterto use a pre-recorded
message, automaticallytriggeredby the same controls
thatstartthe SHEVS.In alargeand complicated
building,it mayeven bereasonable to use different
automaticallygenerated messages in differentareas
depending onthe detectedlocation ofthefire. This
would, for example,allow people tobe automatically
directedon the safest route away from the fire, orto take
part in aphasedevacuationwherethose closest to thefire
are evacuatedfirst.
It should be notedthat powered ventilators (fans) can
bevery noisy in operation, and candrown out thevoice
message unless thishas been allowedfor in design. It
followsthat any voicealarm system must be loud enough
to beheardclearlyand audiblyabove the noise ofthe
fans.
11.7 Security
Mostbuildingslarge enough and complexenough to
warrantaSHE'VSwill also needsecurityarrangements to
protectagainsttheft, vandalism,etc. At its simplestthis
canmean that all doors intothebuilding,and all other
largeopenings, willbe locked (eg at night, or outside
normal working hours). This can conflict with the
requirements that all designated air inletsforthe SHEVS,
whichcanoften include doors, must be ableto open
automaticallywhenthe SHEVS comes intooperation.
Note thatthere will usuallyalsobe aregnlatory
requirement that securitymeasures must never block
escape routesforpeople inside the building. It is also
undesirablein most casesforthe securitymeasures to
hinder fire fighters' accessintothe buildingintheeventof
fire.
Possiblecompromises to resolvethe conflict might
include,for example,the use ofautomaticallyunlocking

andopening doors on receipt ofasignalfrom the SHEVS
control panelwherethose doors are intended to serve as
air inletsforthe SHEVS.Another possibilitymightbe to
useopen-mesh securityshutters,with keysbeingin the
possessionofthe fire service.
11.8 Computerizedbuilding control
systems
A constantly increasingnumberofbuildings have their
internal services controlled by a central computer. It is
particularlytempting to linkthe SHEVSand otherfire-
protection measuresintothe same computer system,
both forconvenience andbecause ofthe largenumberof
required automatic actions affectingthe normal building
services in the event offire.
Unfortunately,itis the common experience thatthe
'environmental' controlling softwareoften requires
amendment, andthat the computer itselfwill be
upgraded.Wheneverthese occur, thereis adanger that
thefire-protection system softwarewill be inadvertently
affected,orthat it maybe less compatiblewiththe latest
upgrade to the operating system, or anyone ofseveral
otherproblems.
11 Interactionswith otherbuilding systems 71
Thedesigner ofthe SHEYS'control softwareshould
ensurethat thereisa fulldescription in the system
documentation,includinga fullydetailed and annotated
listing ofthe program code. This should also be the case
for other fire-protection measurescontrolled bythe same
computer. Unfortunatelythis will notprevent problems
ofthe sort envisagedin the previousparagraph,although
it should makeproblem-solvingeasieroncethey occur.
A smallmeasureofextra protection mightbegained
by using aseparate dedicated computer for the fire
software,but this still faces the difficultythat many ofthe
necessaryactionswill require the buildingcontrol
softwareto respond intheappropriate manner.
Theonly wayto be surethatchanges do not degrade
performance is to ensurethatwhenever anychanges are
madeto the buildingcontrol hardware or software,or to
the fire protection hardware or software,it would be
goodpracticeto testthe fire-protection measures,
includingtheSHEVS,by triggeringthe fire-detection
system (egbyblowing asmall amount ofsmoke intoa
smoke detector) andconfirmingthatall the actions
whichoughttotakeplace doinfact still takeplace,
according tothe design specifications.
72
12 SHEVS and the fire services
12.1 General
As discussedin section 1.4 both SHEVSand operational
fire-fightinghave theirplace within an integrated
approach to fire-safetyengineering.Chapter2
mentioned that the assistanceofoperational fire-fighting
canbe one ofthe design objectivesfor a SHEVS,and that
perhaps the most important wayin which a SHEVScan
serve to protectproperty is by makingfire-fighting
intervention easier and quicker.
The purpose ofthis chapteris to examinemoreclosely
the factorswhichinfluencetheeffectivenessofa SHEVS
inassistingfire-serviceoperations. It is notthepurpose of
the current bookto provide complete operational
guidancefor the fire services.While muchofwhat
followstakes the form ofactions to betakenbythe fire
services,the authors' intention is to alert readers to the
problems and needsofthe fire-fighter.
12.2 Design objectives for SHEVS and
implications forthe design-fire as a basis
fordesign
12.2.1 Fundamental fire-fightingobjectives
Fire-fightingby human beings has been a self-evident
necessitythroughthe ages, although notalways fully
successfulin all cases.Even nowadays,thoughmany
approved and reliableextinguishingor suppression
systemsare available, fire-fightingbyhuman beingsis still
inevitableand therefore establishedin the legislationof
many countries as aduty. Thatis partly becauseno
technicaldevice can achieve 100%reliability. Apartfrom
firesuppression systemswhich prevent the ignition ofa
fireinveryspecificand confined spaces (eginside
machinery for processes havingexplosionrisks) and gas
extinguishingsystemsfor singleapparatus orsmallrooms
or spaces (egunderneathfalsefloorsusedfor electric
installations),extinguishingsystemscannotavoid every
adverse effect ofthe products ofcombustion (especially
smoke) before the fire is extinguishedin all cases.
Fromexperience itis known that extinguishing
systemsapplyingwater sprayscannotextinguishall fires
in every case.Theywillusuallyachieve control,
depending on the natureanddistribution ofthe fuel to be
protected. It should also never be forgotten thatwater
sprays cannot extinguishfuel whichis shielded from that
water. Therefore, accompanyingandfollow-up
extinguishingoperations byfire serviceswill be
inevitable.
Thisimplies the necessityoffire-fightingoperations
(includingrescuing people) and suggeststhe benefit or
even necessity ofSHEVS supporting fire services even
thoughextinguishingsystemsarepresent. To understand
thevarious design objectivesfor a SHEVSand the
resulting requirements,it isusefulfirstto consider what i
meantby a 'successful'fire-fightingoperation.
A common doctrine definingwhatfire-fighting
operations oughtto achieve sets out the fundamentalfire
fightingobjectives (seeBox,below).
IRescuinglives
This objective comprises all activitiestohelp occupants
trapped in an endangered zoneto escape from it, if
necessaryby means ofladders and/or bysupporting
themwith breathing apparatus and guiding them out to
places ofsafety. [t also includesthe search for missingor
trappedpeople, and the transport ofdisabledor injured
people out ofspacesthreatened by fire and smoke.
II Extinguishing fires
This objective includes all activitieswhichhamper and
interrupt the chemicalprocess 'burning' and therefore is
dedicated to controllingthe fire growth andachieving
extinction ofthe fire. In thisway, goods and contents not
set onfirecanbe protectedfrom ignition,but without
beingprotected from theadverse effectsofsmoke ifthey
arenot separated from it. Actions intended to extinguish
the fire willalso reduce theheat outputand therefore
diminishthe thermal stress on the building'sstructure.
Fundamentalfire-fighting objectives
I Rescuinglives
II Extinguishingfires
Ill Savingthe structure, valuablegoods, contents and equipment in
premises
IV Savingthe surroundingsand the environment

III Saving thestructure,valuable goods, contentsand
equipmentinpremises
This objectivecomprises all activitiesbesides
'extinguishing'to separate valuableitems and/or
equipment from the adverseeffects offire (smoke and
heat)before theybecome damaged or destroyed. This
willbe particularlyofimportance ifitcan be foreseen that
the fire cannot be stopped in time (eg dueto lack of
extinguishingagents, ofenough fire-fightingequipment,
and/orofenough personnel) but thereis stillthe
possibilityto carry thosevaluablethings out ofthe
endangered zonebefore they are affectedbyfire or
smoke.
IV Saving thesurroundingsandenvironment
This objectiveincludes all activitiesto protectthe
surroundingsofa compartment or buildingfrom being
ignited, and to prevent excessiveharm to the
environment, egby air pollution orby contaminationof
soil orgroundwater.This objectiveis usuallyachievedby
extinguishingafire at an early stage ofburning.
Followingthe priority and urgency ofthe fire-fighting
objectiveslisted above, adequate operations have to be
carried out in this sequence (or all togetherifit is possible
with the manpowerandequipment available).
Naturally,afire-fightingoperation is totally successful
ifallfourfire-fightingobjectivescanbe achieved.If,for
whatever reasons (regulatoryor bythechoice ofthe
occupant ofapremises — ifheis free to do so) the fire
services areonlysupposed to achieve one or achoiceof
thefire-fightingobjectivesoutlined above (egjust
objectivesI and IV), then a fire-fightingoperation which
achievestheseobjectiveshas to be considered to be
'successful'(even if followingthe examplegiven in
brackets above,the wholeoccupancy affectedby fire is
lost but thereare no casualtiesordamage to the
environment).Notethatthe concept ofthe 'throw-away
building' is not new!
From the foregoingit followsimmediatelythatthe
design objectivesfor a SHEVSandtheresulting
requirements foritshould be closelycorrelated withthe
fire-fightingobjectivesI-IV above.
122.2 Design objectives for SHEVS in connection with
fire-fightingobjectives I—IV
12.2.2.1SHEVSdesignobjective life safety only'
supportingfire-fightingobjective I
Thedesign objectivefor such a SHEVSmust be to
remove smoke andheat from the accommodation on fire
and toprotectany means ofescape within thatspace by
creating asmoke-free layerfrom the beginning ofsmoke
production until the lastoccupantofthe buildinghas
escapedfrom itorhas reached asafeplace (ie protectedby
afire-resistingstructure which is wellvented).
Ifthe firecan developwithoutbeingcontrolledthe
SHEVSwill become unable to cope with the larger
quantities ofsmoke and heat.This willresult in:
• smokelogging ofthe wholefire compartment,
12 SHEVS and thefireservices 73
• temperature rise ofgasesnear the floor to harm uiil
levels,and
• flashoverofthe compartment
finally
intofullinvolvement.
Whenthishas happened theSHEVS is notofany value
forfire-fighting(orfor escape or rescue as anyone left in
thecompartment will bedeador dying).
Therefore, designapproaches which only equate the
presumed escape timetothe 'time to danger' basedon a
growing fire, and takethe fire size andheat output at this
time as the basis ofdesignfora SHEVS,can only support
all fourfire-fightingobjectives(ie I—IV above) ifthere is a
considerable degree ofconfidencein the calculated basic
parameter 'escape time', and also ifthis period islonger
thanthe time whichhas passed to the point whenfire-
extinguishingoperations become successfulin
preventingfurther firegrowth.
Note: The timebetweenfirealertand extinguishing
operationsbecoming successfulis often described as 'fire-
fighters' intervention time' and consistsofthe attendance
time offire servicesplus the time needed to developa
successfulattack on the fire, ie toput enoughwater onthe
fireto prevent itfrom growing further.It should alsonot
be forgotten that some timewillhaveelapsedbetween
ignition and detection ofthe fire, and sometimeseven
moretimebetweendetection andthe alert being givento
the fire service. All these periods oftime should be
considered in SHEVSdesigncalculationsofthetype
being discussed.
Ifthefire-fighters'intervention time isless thanthe
'timeto danger',fire-fightingoperations will startwhile
evacuation is stillinprogress.Thiswill allow the fire-
fighterstobegin to control the fire growth and thus delay
the onset ofdanger to people escaping. In addition,
people will behave in a more disciplinedwayand are
more likelyto followevacuation instructionsinthe
presence offire-fightingpersonnel.
Otherwise, ifthe fire-fighters'intervention timeis
greater than the presumed 'time to danger' andto
evacuation time (however well assessed!) the
effectiveness ofthe SHEVScan break down before
successfulfire-fightingoperationscan start. Thus, in
thesecircumstancesa SHEVScannot contribute to
achievingfire-fightingobjectivesI—IV above. In a very
largeand complexbuildingthis willresult in greater
propertylosses,withthesebeingmainly restrictedjustby
compartmentation. Intheabsence offixed extinguishing
systems (which can be expected to prevent unconrolled
fire growth evenifthey do notextinguishthefire)total
losses ofwhole fire compartments can be expected.
Total losses oflarge fire compartments usuallyalso
threatentheenvironment byheatradiation, flyingsparks
and often bytoxic smoke. Larger fires canalsopresenta
threatto the environment in the form ofthe run-offof
contaminated fire-fightingwater.
In this respect, a designconcept for lifesafetywhich
uses the assumed or calculated evacuationtimeto define
the upperlimit ofthegrowingdesignfireis potentally
very dangerous andvulnerableto abuse.
Even wherelegislationonly concerns the safetyofthe
74
building'soccupants and savingthe environment around
thebuildingfrom the fire threat,it is notclear thatthere is
public acceptance forfire 'prevention' concepts which
allow forthe total loss ofa buildingas long asoccupants'
safety andprotection ofthe environment are achieved.
Theissue ofthe consequentialcoststo society in terms of
job losses,rebuildingcosts, etc. is a frequent subjectfor
debate.
An even more threatening aspect ofusing the
evacuation time asthe determining design parameter for
thefiresizeofagrowingfire,whichin turn is a key
parameter for designinga SHEVS,is the possibilityof
underestimatingthe evacuation time.
Computer models simulatingevacuation, or
evacuation exercisesperformed by test persons, willbe
very helpful in assessingescape times. Butit hasto be
bornein mind that thesesimulationsshould allow forthe
possibleexistenceofstragglers, disabled and/or injured
people. In addition,the fact thatfiremen often haveto
search for missingpeople after acompleted 'evacuation'
should not be forgotten. It is well known that people
often entera burning buildingagainforsubjective
reasons. The existenceofthese problems impliesthe
needfor safety margins in the estimated evacuationtime.
Themain uncertainty in assessinganevacuationtime
is the unpredictableperiod betweenalerting the
occupants and theirsubjectivedecision to start escaping.
After 24 years' experience as an officerofa professional
firebrigade the author ofthis chapterhas found that
people usuallydo not startto try to escape untilthey
perceive themselvesto be endangered whichis often too
late forsafelyescaping withoutsupport from the fire
services.
Adefinitestartofevacuation can therefore onlybe
assumed ifthe occupants are subject to some form of
directed organization.This can be eitherinside an
existinghierarchy amongst themselves, as willbe the case
for employees ofacompany or civil servants in large
office accommodation,or wheretheoccupants are
controlled by an organizationestablishedforthe purpose
ofevacuationsuchas trained staffinhotels or premises
forpublic assemblies.
12.2.2.2 SHEVS design objective 'life safety and
propertyprotection'supportingfire-fighting
objectives I—IV
Itfollowsfrom the discussionin section 12.2.2.1 above
that the designofaSHEVS merely forlifesafety based on
a designfiresize dependenton theevacuationtime is
dangerous and inappropriate from fire-fightingaspects.
Eachassessmentfora suitabledesign fire sizeshould rely
onthe effectivenessofextinguishingsystems or on the
most likely assumptionthat the fireis controlled byfire-
fightingoperations and cannotgrowfurther.
Forsteady-statefires, whicharederived from statistics
(eg>90% offires have notbeenlarger thana specified
areawhenthe fire brigade started asuccessfulattack on
them) orfrom experiments whichprovide evidencefor
the effectiveness ofextinguishingsystems,the
Design methodologies for SHEVS
assumption ofthe design firebeingthe most 'plausibly
pessimistic'fire sizewill dependon the limits ofthe
relevant statistics.
Forgrowingfireswhereeitherthereis no fixed fire-
extinguishingmedium,or whereits effecton the growing
firecannot be reliablyidentified,the intervening time for
thefire services (ie attendance time plus timefor
developingasuccessfulattack on the fireas defined in
section 12.2.2.1 above) has to be the suitableparameter
forassessingthefire size, although there mightbe some
severeuncertainties in these assumptions.These
uncertainties include difficulties in assessingthe
attendance time ofthe fire services due to traffic jams or
casual deviationsdueto roadworksonthe access route,
or simplythe possibilitythatthe fire-fightingforces
closestto the buildingconcerned and dedicated to
intervenethere firstare already employed elsewhereon
another emergency.
Whatever method wasused, oncehaving assessed a
suitabledesign-firesize on the pessimisticassumption
that it is the 'most likelylargest fire size'when
extinguishingoperations (performed manuallyand/or
automatically)become successful, aSHEVS designedon
thisbasic parameter will servefor lifesafety andproperty
protection because all four fire-fightingobjectives
(SHEVS designobjectives'life safety and property
protection' supporting the fire-fightingobjectives I—TV)
canbe achieved.
12.2.2.3 SHEVS designobjective 'propertyprotection
only'supportingfire-fighting objectives II and IV, and,
ifalso designedtodo so,III
Forsome occupancies,thereis no, orjustavery low, risk
tolives due to threatfrom smoke.Thiswill be truefor all
circumstanceswherethere are very few or usuallyno
persons inside alire-affectedcompartment (egas in most
warehouses,especiallyifthey are automaticallyloaded
andunloadedby robots (seealso section 12.3 below).
Another example concerns premises wherethe means of
escape are provided by compartmentation: iewhere
corridors andstaircasesare enclosed byafire-resistant
structure and protectedfrom ingressofsmoke (egby
vented lobbieswith fire doors orby pressurization
systems).Under these circumstances,SHEVSneed not
provide asmoke-free layer from the very beginning ofthe
outbreak ofa fireto ensurethat people are ableto escape.
Wherethe concern is limited to property protection
therearetwo main approaches possible,although the
distinction between them can be blurred:
• property protection mainly relying on fire-fighting
• operations,
property protection mainly relying on effectivenessof
extinguishingsystems.
12.2.2.3aPropertj'protectürnrelyingonfire-JIghtingoperations
In this case a SHEVSis supposed to support fire-fighting
operationsby removing smokeand heat in sufficient
amounts for fire-fighterstobe able to:
• enterthe compartment on fire,

•• theitlocation ofsothe
identifl,i stillrelatively small fire, and
extinguish quickly that therest ofthe
compartmentremains undamaged.
This means that a SHEVShas tobe designedtocreate a
smoke-freelayerin the fire compartment.This smoke-
freelayer neednotbeprovided from thevery beginning
ofsmokeproduction (as mentioned above)butmust be
availableforfire-fightingoperations. This consideration
onlyhasan influenceon the time for actuating the
SHEVS, but not on the designfire size and the resultsof
consequent calculationsfor designingthe SHEVS (see
also section 11.1.3).
Therefore, aSHEVS intended to protectpropertyonly
by supportingfire-fightingoperationsbycreating a
smoke-free layer,willnot needless technical effort put
intothe designthanwill systemsfor lifesafety plus
propertyprotection.
A delay in actuating the SHEVSis only tolerable ifthe
temperature rise dueto smokelogging ofthe
compartment is notso severethatitmayignite other
goods away from the fire's origin,or mayseriously
endanger the building'sstructure. This is unlikelyto
happenifthe SHEVSisactuatedby a flowswitch in the
sprinklersupply,particularlywherequick-response
sprinklersare usedto ensure that the sprinklersystem
starts operating as earlyas possible,and wherethat
operation has the minimum delay dueto heat extraction
by theSHEVS. Despite this temperature criterion,
caution has to be applied whenconsideringthe adverse
effectswheresmoke is notremovedfrom thevery early
stagesofthe fire.
Ifgoods, contents, liningsorstructure maybe
destroyed orbecomeunusablebecause ofthe corrosive
and contaminating effectsofsmoke, any designconcept
involvingdelayed response ofaSHEVSis ofminor
benefit to protectsuchgoods orproperty. Wherethis isa
significantconsideration,actuating the SHEVSon a
signal from smoke detection canbe recommended. Itis
also awell-experiencedfact thatit takes a significanttime
to create asmoke-free layer in an already smoke-logged
space, especiallyifnatural throughflow ventilation is
used. Forthis reason, the actuation ofa SHEVS on
detection ofsmoke is also preferable for assistingfire-
fightingoperations in these circumstances.SHEVS
designedto open on a signalfrom smoke detection
support fire-fightingobjectiveIII,which isto separate
valuableitems (egworks ofart, documents, data, etc.)
before being affectedbythe fire and/or itsproducts
(smokeand heat).
The reasonswhythe actuation ofa SHEVSshould be
delayed until the actuation ofsprinklers,or should be
deferred until the arrival offire-fightersoften can be
considered to be asfollows.
A SHEVSencourages thedevelopment ofafire by
ensuringthat the firehas asupply ofair. Therefore, it
should only be actuated ifextinguishingorcontrolling
operations eitherby fire-fightersorby extinguishing
systemsare already inprogress. This is true in principle.
12 SHEVS and thefire services 75
But the temperature rise duetothe fact that heatis not
exhausted from a closed space also enhances fire spread
and, intheabsence ofsprinklers,can leadto early
flashover.
Therefore, ifthe interveningtime ofwell-equipped fire
servicescan be expected to be reasonably short(eg 10
minutes afterbeingalerted by asmoke-detection
system),the maximum benefit ofaSHEVS creating a
smoke-free layercan be obtained ifitis actuated on
smoke detection before the fire-fightersarrive (aslongas
the design firesize remains manageableforthe fire-
fighters).
This is likelyto apply forproperties below'High
Hazard'risks ('Extra-HighHazard'in older terminology)
whichareprotectedby sprinklersorfor very low risks
(due to the nature ofthe contents) even ifnot protected
bysprinklers.
Nevertheless,it has tobebornein mind that inthe
absence ofsprinklerprotection thedesign firesizes can
be larger, often getting beyondmanageable sizesforthe
fire brigade.Wherethis happens,a SHEVSis not auseftil
component ofthe fire-preventionconcept and limitation
ofpropertylosses canonly beachieved by
compartmentation.
Ifthe interveningtimeforfire servicesis assessedto be
longer than 10 minutes (for risksbelow HighHazard, for
which 10 minutes maybe toolong), firesizes will bemore
likelyto growbeyond manageable sizesifno
extinguishingsystem is used. In thiscase installationofan
extinguishingsystem to control the fireuntilfire-fighting
operationsbecome successful, has to be ensured.
Thereis awidespreadbeliefamongst people in the
sprinkler world, that this can only be achievedby
activatingaSHEVS after sprinklershave come into
operation. Ithas tobekept in mind, however, that
contentssusceptibleto smoke might notbe protected by
this approach as the compartment could be totally smoke
logged bythe time fire-fightersarrive.Acompronhise
solution (as explainedin section 11.1) could beto activate
the SHEVSon a flow-switchinthesprinkler supply
provided that quick-responsesprinklersare usedas
mentioned above. This makes itmuch more likely that
sprinklerswill be ableto control thefire until
extinguishingiscompleted by fire-fighters.Thiswill only
apply for risksbelowthe (Extra-)HighHazardcategory.
Another frequently heard argument for actuating a
SHEVSmanuallyisthe beliefthatfalseactuatingby the
smoke-detection system causesopening ofnatural vents
and leads to property damage dueto rain, snow or
freezing.This problemmust not be solvedby rely[ngon
manual actuation ofthe SHEVS,butinstead by making
thedetectionsystem more sophisticated andreliable.
12.2.2.3bPropertyprotectionrelyingon effectivenessof
extinguiththgsystems
Wherethereareadverse effectsfor fire-fightingas
outlinedin sections 12.3 and 12.4 below, orlong
interventiontimesforfire servicesso thatsuccessfulfire-
fightingis onlypossiblewith the support ofextinguishing
76
systems, theremust besufficientconfidencethatthese
systems will achieve their designed purpose and will not
be influencedadverselyby othersystemsincluding
SHEVS. This istrue for storagerisksbelongingtothe
HighHazardcategory andfor otherstoragerisksifthe
intervention time ofthe fire servicescan become
considerablylong (egmorethan 15 minutes, or even less
for fast orultra-fastfire-growth rates).
In thesecircumstances,andtogivethebest chance for
complete extinguishingby the extinguishingsystem,it
would be wiseto activate a SHEVSonly manuallyfrom a
safeplace outside a fire compartment atthe discretion of
thefireservices.This is discussedfurther in sections 12.3
and 12.4.
Thiskind ofSHEVS cannot provide asmoke-free layer
whenfire-fightingservices arriveattheplace ofthefire
because itis activatedonly whenthe fire-fightersoperate
it. Such a SHEVScan only clear a compartment from
smokeand heat after arrivaloffire-fighters.Nevertheless,
it canstillprovide access for themto extinguishany
remaining burning fuelwhichhad not been extinguished
bythe extinguishingsystem. Prior to activationin these
circumstances,it is quitelikelythatthe compartment will
havebecomefilledwith smoke, even down to the floor.
This allowsthesmoke to become hotter,faster,thanwith
theSHEVS in operation, and givesthe sprinklers (or
otherextinguishingmedium) thebest conditionsfor
earlyoperation andtherefore thebest chance of
successfulsuppression ofthe fire. WhentheSHEVS is
activated, the buoyant smoky layer should lift, allowing
fire-fightersto see andmove around beneaththe hot
smoky gases.
The designofsucha system requires that a designfire
sizeshould beassessed,and thatthe system should be
calculated as it is desired to beafterithas been activated.
Additional informationis given in section 12.2.2.4.
12.2.2.4 SHEVS designobjective 'assisting fire-fighting
operationsonly', mainly supportingfire-fighting
objectiveII
Thereis no special design dedicated only to assistingfire-
fighting operations. Eachfire-fightingoperation pursues
atleastone ofthe four fire-fightingprinciplesdiscussed
above.Using extinguishingmeasureswithout
simultaneouslyaiming at protection oflife or property, or
ofprotecting the environmentis asenseless exercise.
Therefore, eachSHEVSdesigned for one ofthe design
objectives 'life safety' and/or 'propertyprotection'
automaticallyassistsfire-fightingbycreating asmoke-
freelayer(except underadverse designassumptions for
design objective 'life safety only' as outlined in section
12.2.2.1.
No smoke-freelayeris initiallyprovided for fire-
fighters at theirarrivalbySHEVSfollowingthe design
objective'propertyprotection' relying on effectiveness of
extinguishingsystems as discussedin section 12.2.2.3b)
above, although a reasonably clear layer willbecome
established quicklyoncetheSHEVShas been manually
initiated whichwill enable the fire-fightingservicesto
Design methodologies for SHEVS
complete the task ofextinguishingthe fire.
Although any devices (egwindows, simplelight
domes, etc.) allowing smokeand heat release out ofa
compartment on fire can in principle assistfire-fighting
operations, these cannotberegarded as a SHEVS,which
has tobe designed and calculated followingthe
methodologies outlined in this book.
12.2.2.5 SHEVS designobjective supportingfire-
fightingobjective IV
The fire-fightingobjectiveIV canusually be achieved
withoutsupport ofaSHEVS especiallyiffire-resistant
structuresand compartmentation are applied toprevent
spreading offire and smoke. Inthis case,any opening in
thestructure will havean adverse effecton preventing
smokefrom affectingthe surroundiflgsofthe building.It
is usuallysufficientto have alarge enough water supply
and extinguishingcapacity forthe fire serviceson site to
prevent fire spread. It is worthmentioning,however, that
large amounts ofsmoke and toxicgaseous or dusty
materialsspreading from theircontainers whichhave
beendestroyed by thefirewill endanger the environmeni
evenwherefire spread isprevented.
Therefore, SHEVScan contribute to achieve fire-
fightingobjectiveIV by creating asmoke-free layer and
thus supportingthe fire-fightingobjectivesII andIII so
thatthe fire is less likelyto become largeenoughto
threatenthe environment byits consequences.Itfollows
thatany SHEVSservingpropertyprotection will also
contribute to protection ofenvironment.
12.3 Circumstanceswhich reduce or
impedethe abilityof a SHEVS to assistfire-
fightingoperations
A SHEVSonits owncannot prevent or slowfire growth.
Even whereit serves toprotectthe means ofescape there
is often a needforthe fire serviceto search the buildingto
confirmthat no-one remains, orto rescue people who
havefailedto evacuate the building.Itfollowsthat even
with aSHEVS, thereisoftenstill aroleforthe
intervention offire servicesto save lives. It is also the case
thatthe fire serviceswill have amajorrolein
extinguishingthe fire and thus protecting property.
ASHEVS, ifwell designed,cancreate a smoke-free
layerwhichassistsfire-fighting.Forcertain risks and/or
underadverse circumstancesa successfulintervention of
thefire servicescanbecome impossiblewithoutthe
presence oftechnical precautions suchas fire detection or
automatic fire-extinguishingsystemsin spite ofthe
presence ofasmoke-free layer whenthe fire is first
attacked.
It is fundamentalthat successfulfire-fightingactivities
canonly beperformed ifthefirebrigade is called and can
arrive on site before the fire compartment is fullyinvolved
in fire, andwhen thefire isstill smallenoughto be
controlled andfinallyextinguishedby the available
means forfire-fighting.The latter requires that thereis a
large enough water supply (or supplyofother

extinguishingagents ifneeded) and sufficient fire-fighting
equipment on site. Notethatthe referencehere to afire
compartment appliesprimarilywherethefire
compartment is large (which will almost alwaysbethe
casewherea SHEVSis employed).
12.3.1 Factorsadversely affecting successful
intervention by thefire services
• Noautomatic fire-detection system to alertthe fire
servicesautomatically
• Inadequate water supply (or supply ofother
extinguishingagents ifneeded) on site for asuccessful
suppressionofthe firebyfire-fightingactivities
• Inadequate fire-fightingequipment on siteavailablein
time: this can be dueto the location ofthe building
relativeto the numberandlocationsofthefire stations,
andto the number and typeofapplianceswhichare
allocatedto intervene in a buildingin case offire.The
presenceofobstaclesaffectingthe access for fire-
fighters andtheir applianceshave tobetakeninto
account aswell.
12.3.2Additionalprovisions for optimizingthe effective
use ofa smoke-free layercreatedby a SHEVS for fire-
fightingoperations
In order to gainfullbenefitfor fire-fightingoperations
from the smoke-free layer created by aSHEVS, andto
avoid adverse effects outlined in section 12.3.1above,the
followingprecautionshave to be observed.
1 Thebuildingdesigner should provide automatic fire
detection and automatic alarmtransmission tothefire
services.
2 Thereshould be an adequate watersupply,or a
sufficientreserveofextinguishingwaterifthe normally
availablewater supply from afixed pipe network is
insufficient.Whereappropriate, ensure that sufficient
stocks ofspecialextinguishingagents (ifneeded for
certain fuels,egfoaming agents) are present.
3 Thereshould be direct unhindered access to the
buildingfor the numberofappliancecrews dedicated
to intervene in case offire in thebuildingconcerned.
Thefire serviceshould ensure that after receipt ofthe
alarm,they can deliver within 10 minutes the
extinguishingcapacity needed(manpower and
equipment) to extinguishthe design fire. Inview ofthe
many practicaluncertainties (eghaving to drive
throughheavy traffic, orthepossibilityofappliances
from thenearest fire stations being ata differentfire
whenthe call arrives) it is wise to allow asafety margin
of100%.Ifthis is not possible,oris difficult to achieve,
fire-fightingprecautions have tobe made inside the
buildingcomprising trained fire-fightingstaffwith
correspondingfire-fightingequipment to deliver the
extinguishingcapacity.
4 Alternatively,a fixedautomatic extinguishingsystem
(egsprinklers)can be provided in the building.Whileit
cannot be guaranteed thatsprinklerswill extinguisha
fire, they are known tobe very goodat controllingfire
growth and thus reducing the size offire which the fire
12 SHEVS and thefireservices 77
servicefinds on arrivalatthe scene, andwhichhas to
beconsidered in 2 and3 above.Thepresence ofa
properly designed automatic extinguishingsystem will
usuallyremovethe need for an on-site,specially
trained group ofemployeesacting as a 'worksfire
brigade'.Note, however, that theremay still be a need
for suchgroups wherethereare special circumstances.
Having takenthese precautions,the fire servicescan take
full advantage ofa smoke-freelayercreatedearlyby an
automaticallyactivatedSHEVS (preferablyon smoke
detection),with agoodchance ofbeing ableto extinguish
astill relativelysmallfire immediatelyafter arrivalon site.
Thus, the objectivesfor life safety, propertyprotection
and also environment protection canbeachieved..
12.4Circumstanceswhere a SHEVSis of
minorbenefit forfire-fightingoperations
Forsomebuildingsand fuelsit isnot possibleforthe fire
brigadeto apply water byusinghoses directly and.
immediatelyon all the burning fuel,because ofthe
arrangement ofthatfuel.In suchcircumstances,the fire
willstill become larger eventhoughit is being attacked.
This ismainly true for high riskssuchas high-rack-
storage with narrow aisles between the racks,or storage
inracks withoutclear aisles allowingfree movement (eg
whereracksareloaded and unloaded automaticallyby
robots). In caseoffireinside suchracks,thereis no safe
accessleading near enough totheburning fuel to apply
thewaterproperly, whetherthere is a smoke-freelayeror
not. Ontheirwaythroughsuch burning racks fire-
fighters would be endangeredby burning goods falling
down on themorby collapseofthe racks.A SHEVSwill
be ofvery limitedvalue in such cases,since it is incapable
ofaffectingthe primary problemofrapid fire growth and
spread. In thesecircumstances,only fixed automatic
extinguishingsystemscanbe applied successfullyto
control the fire.
Thebenefit ofa smoke-freelayer in this caseis not
important in the firststage offire-fighting,because
firemenwill not enterthe fire compartment immediately
for safetyreasons,as outlined above,butwillinstead rely
on theautomatic extinguishingsystemsto contro [the
fire.These extinguishingsystemswillbe more effictive in
relativelysmallandsealed spacesifthe fire is not
ventilated.
In very large poorly sealed spacestherewill be enough
oxygenforcombustion.A SHEVScan beusedto remove
heat from the fire-affectedspace, andto reduce the
temperature ofthe smoke layerunderthe ceiling
compared withanunventilated space, and thus reduce
the number ofsprinklers opening faraway from thefire.
Thus, unnecessarywater and pressure losses on the
extinguishingsystem are reduced and the effectiveness of
the extinguishingsystem is enhanced. Itshould be noted,
however, thatthisbenefit only occursifthe SHEVS
comes intooperation eitherbefore the sprinklersoperate
orimmediatelyafter thefirst sprinkleroperates.
78
WheretheSHEVS has not operated very early,and
thebuildingispossiblyfullofsmokewhenthe fire service
arrives,fire-fightersshould release the SHEVSmanually
from outsidethe fire compartment andthusavoid
backdraftwhenthe access doors are opened. When the
fire is controlled oralmost extinguished by the sprinklers
the SHEVSwill gradually establisha smoke-free zone.
Thenfire-fighterscanevenclimbinside the racks or
remove goods to get accessto still glowingfuel and fire
pockets for final extinguishing.
The removal ofheatwill also havereduced the thermal
stress onthe buildingstructure and racks,whichmakes
these follow-up extinguishingactivitiessafer for the fire-
fighters.
12.5 Circumstanceswhere SHEVS are not
applicable
12.5.1 Premiseswith riskof fast-growing fires
Wherethereis ahigh probabilityoffast development ofa
firewhichmakes firesuppression or extinguishing
systems necessary,installationofaSHEVSwould serve
nousefulpurpose. Examplesforsuchfire risksarewhere
flammableliquidscan cause large liquidpool orjet fires,
orwherethe spread ofcombustiblegases or dusts can
cause explosions.
These riskscan only be overcome by installedfoam or
gas-extinguishingsystems, or suppressionsystemswhich
prevent the outbreak ofafire.Inmost casesthese systems
will only be effectivein a relativelysealed space.
Therefore, SHEVS designed to create a smoke-free layer
basedonbalancingairinflowagainst smoke exhaust are
notapplicable.Theextinguishingorsuppression systems
inthesecases have to be designed to extinguisha possible
Design methodologies for SHEVS
fire completely and notjustto control it. This is different
to the usual designbasisforsprinklers,which aims at
control although inmost cases sprinklersalsoextinguish
afire.
Therefore, forsuchrisksitwill be sufficientto take
precautions to remove the smokefrom the affected space
afterthefire has beenextinguished.In most cases the
existingopenings for natural lightand accessto the space
will be sufficient,especiallyifportable fans are applied by
the fire brigade.Sometimesit will be necessaryto provide
additional openings ofa few squaremetresforthis
purpose whichare normallyclosed and can be opened
manually.
12.5.2 Premises which mustnot be entered in caseof
firebecause ofother prevailing hazards
Examplesfor suchrisks arepremises inuniversities,
hospitals,research orindustrial plants wherehazardous
infectious,viral orbacterial, substancesorradioactive
liquidsordusts are handled whichmust not be released
intothe open atmosphere, egwith the smokeofa fire.
Therefore, suchpremiseshave to betotally separated
from other spacesby completelyleaktight and fire-
resisting construction.Smoke spreadin this case is not a
matterfordiscussion.Theenclosing structure must be
fire resistant and all openings forventilation must be shut
by fire-resistantand gastightdampers.
Theproblem willbeto remove the cold, contaminated
smoke from the compartment after the firehas been
extinguishedby automatic extinguishingsystems. For
thispurpose, special equipment with appropriate
cleaning deviceshas to be provided —this isbeyondthe
scopeofthis book.

13 Selection of equipment
13.1 General
No designisofany valueunless it resultsinthe
installationofa system whichis fitfor its intended
purpose.
This concept of'fitnessfor purpose' is ofcritical
importance for allfireprotection measures,and notjust
for a SHEVS.All fire protection measuresshare the
common feature thatthey mustworkas intended when a
fireoccursevenifthat fireis a rareeventin thelifetimeof
thebuilding.This carriesimplicationsforhowthe
equipment to implement adesign must bespecified,as
wellas for howthatequipment must be installed,
serviced,and maintainedduringitstimein the building.
This carriesthefurther implicationthatthe equipment
oughtto becapable ofbeingservicedand maintainedin
as easy amanner as possible.
Aknown bad example concerns smokeventilators
whichhavetobemanuallyclosed by someone climbing
onto the building'sroof, especiallywhena testofthe
fhnctioningofthe system resultsinmanyventilators
beingopened. It is unlikelythatmany managers will carry
out suchatestmorethanonce, in view ofthetime,
trouble, and possiblewindand rain damage which might
occur while the ventilators arebeingreset. And yet
without regular functionalteststhere canbe no
confidencethatthe system will operate whena fire does
occur.The answerto this paradox is, ofcourse, to specifv
equipment whichcanbe closed easilyby operation ofa
simple switchin the central control panel, but to make
thatswitch inaccessibleto everyone except an authorized
person so that arealoperation ofthesystem is not
terminated prematurely.Regularandfrequent fbnetional
testing is especiallyimportant wherethe SHEVSis
designedto reduce the threat tolife.
These simple principlesapply to all the specialist
equipment neededfora SHEVS.'Fitness forpurpose' can
be met in many cases byensuringthatthe equipment has
beentestedin an appropriate way.
Note the word 'appropriate'.Thishides aconsiderable
degree ofnecessarycomplexity.In general,anitem of
equipment will have to function whenexposedto a
variety ofdifferentenvironmental conditions. These will
themselvesvary from place to place: egequipment in
79
Scandinaviaorthe Alpswillhaveto operate even when
thebuilding'sroofis coveredwith deepsnow; whereas in
tropical countries thereis no such need. The test
methodswill have to reflectthesedifferingrequirements,
and will often pass an item ofequipment as being in a
particular 'Class',ie performingbetterthan one valueof
the testedparameter, but notachievingthe valuedefining
the next Class.
Similarly, the designmethodology described
elsewherein this reportwill describe the conditionsto
which the item ofequipment will be exposed.For
example,the designcalculationswill predict the highest
smokelayertemperature towhichsmoke curtains,fans,
or natural ventilators willbe exposed;another example is
that thedeflection calculationsfora hanging smoke
curtain will leadto the specificationofthe minimum
weight ofbottombar and fabricfora particular
application. The test methods carried out on the product
(theitem ofequipment) by its manufactureror supplier
should allow the specifierto selecttheappropriate Class
or Classes forthe conditionspredicted by thedesign.
It is regrettablytruethat atthe time ofwriting, many of
thesetestseitherdo notexist asStandards,orare still in
Draft. The developingEuropean Standards in the
PrEN12101 seriesoncepublished should fill theneed
within Europe, but ithasto berecognized that the
specifierofequipment fora SHEVSin many parts ofthe
worldwill continue tohaveto relyonthe resultsofad-
hoctests carried out bythe manufacturer(orby the
supplier).
It must alsobe recognized that theenforcer offire
regulationsfaces the same difficulties. This reinforcesthe
desirabilityofearlyand continuing consultationbetween
the regulator andthe equipment specifier (who maynot
alwaysbe the same as the system designer)inorderto
ensurethat theequipment being installed intothe
buildingis appropriate to the needs both ofthe building
and ofthe environment to which the system willbe
exposed.The authors suggest,for example,thatwherean
item ofequipment can be obtained satisingany one ofa
range ofclasses, then itshould be the ultimate
responsibilityofthe regulatorto specifr which Classis
appropriate to the circumstancesofthe building.
Economies can sometimesbe obtained ifan item of
80
equipment serves adualrole. That is, whereit fulfils a
non-fire role in everydayuse, and changes to afire-role as
an integral part ofthe SHEVSfollowingdetection ofthe
fire. Examples would include doorswhichalsoserve as
inlets for replacement air; and ducts which serve the
HVAC/ACMVrole untilthey are needed as part ofthe
SHEVS. These dual-role itemsfacethe challenge of
having to meet all the requirements ofnormal use, as well
asallthe appropriate requirements for thefire protection
application.In otherwords,the specifier(and the
regulator) must be satisfiedthat those items are 'fit for
purpose' in both roles.
It is notthe purpose ofthis chapterto be a
comprehensivelydetailed guide to allofthe requirements
ofevery last nut, bolt, and wire usedin a SHEVS.Neither
is it an attemptto describe eachtest method. What
followsis instead intended tobe an indication,for some
ofthemajorcomponents ofa SHEVS, ofsome ofthe
factors whichneed to be considered ifthe installed
system isto be 'fitforpurpose'.
13.2 Natural smoke and heat exhaust
ventilators
13.2.1 Time takento comeintofull operation
WhenaSHEVSisrequiredto come intooperation, itwill
usuallybeanurgentneed.Part ofthe designand
specificationprocess should be to decidewhichsequence
ofoperation ofthe differentitems ofequipment will be
needed so as to avoid one interferingwith another. At the
same time, wecan recognizethatveryfew real fires are
likelyto grow explosively, and iftheydo then a SHEVSis
not appropriate to cope with anexplosion!It seems a
reasonable compromiseto suggest that the entireSHEVS
should come intoitsfullyoperating statein atime ofnot
more than one minute from the initiatingsignalbeing
generated (whether byhuman orautomatic means).
Natural smokeand heat ventilators only operate to
pass smoky gaseswhenthose gasesbuild up beneath
them.Therewill be no clear adverse effectson the rest of
the system iftheytakeas long to open fullyas the restof
the system takes to deploy intoits fire-operationalstate.
It follows thatit is reasonableto allow a maximumtime of
one minute for the ventilator to open fullyto itsfire-open
position.
This maximum time should apply,however, regardless
oftheforces or temperatures towhichtheventilator
mightbe exposed,and so this maximum time must be
satisfiedas a 'pass' criterion in allthosetest methods for
otherparameters wheretheventilator is required to open
as part ofthe test. Most ventilators availableon the
market open in much shorter times than oneminute, so
this isnot an onerous criterion.
It is notadirectlife-safetyissue ifthe ventilator cannot
close as quickly.One should,however, consider whether
the ventilator will befaced with a requirement for
repeatedfunctionaltesting duringits installedlifetime.It
is theopinion oftheauthors that suchregular and
frequent testing is highly desirablewherever the purpose
Design methodologies for SHEVS
ofthe SHEVSisto protectlifesafety (egby protecting
escape routes), and that it should be the responsibilityof
an enlightened buildingmanagement to carry outsuch
tests. It has already been noted in section 13.1 that such
tests are unlikelyto bedone ifeachtime thereis a
significantcost (intime, effort,or inconvenience).
Consequently it is felt thatall ventilators specifiedfor
use in a SHEVShaving alife-safetyrole should be
capable ofbeingclosed automatically,on receipt ofa
signalfrom the control panel. Thetimetakento close is
less critical,and could wellbelonger than one minute.
An additionalfeature essentialto allventilators except
those intended for use in manuallyinitiated systems,is
that theventilator should open (ie should 'fail-safe')
whenever there is a loss ofpowerto the usual opening
mechanisms.
13.2.2 Coefficient of performance
Thepurposeofa natural ventilator istoallow smoky
gases toflowthroughitfrom insidethe buildingto the
outside.Its abilityto do this obviouslydepends on the
sizeofthe opening(known asthe geometric free area)
and on the resistanceto flow ofthat opening including
any turbulence-generatingfeatures within it (egsprings,
rods,louver blades,etc.). The geometric free areais easily
determined by simple measurement ofthe sizeofthe
opening inthe plane wherethe ventilator is fastened onto
thebuilding.Anolderbut less usefuldefinitiontookthe
narrowest part ofthe flow-path through the ventilator.
This canbe difficult tomeasure, and whencombined
with the measured coefficientofperformance (see
below) leads to the same practicalresult. The only
significance ofthe olderdefinitionshould be that
everyone concerned should be aware ofthe possibilityof
confusion!The resistancetoflow isless easy, and requires
atest ofthe entireventilator (except wherethere is a
sufficientcollection ofexistingmeasurement dataon
similarventilators for an assessmentto be made—
possibleon only afew ventilator shapes).
Suchtests canbe done bydrivingair at ambient
temperature through the ventilator bya measured
pressure difference,orbyusinga thermally buoyant hot
gas layer to simulatethe firecondition. Current tests use
the former method, while the latterhasbeen
demonstrated experimentallyas being feasible.We then
havethe followingrelationship:
Ap=
''V2
2
2(CA) (13.1)
where:
= pressuredifferencebetweenthefront ofthe
ventilator (ie insidethe building) and the back
(ie outsidethe building) (Pa),
=
p density ofthe gasespassing through theventilator
(kg m3),
V = volume flow ratethroughthe ventilator (m3 sd),
= geometric free areaofthe ventilator (m2),
C = coefficient ofperformance.

Note: The product is know as theAerodynamicFree
Area.
Thecoefficientofperformance is also known asthe
dischargecoefficient. It isa measure ofthe efficiencyof
the ventilator's design,highervaluesindicatinga higher
efficiency. Ausefulbenchmark is the well-known value
for a simplehole in an infiniteplanebaffle, for which
C,=0.6.Carefulshaping oftheflowpath throughthe
ventilatorwill leadtohighervalues,while turbulence-
generating devicesinthe gas-stream will reduce the
value.
It is known (see egsection 10.8) that a side-wind
blowing across the outletfrom the ventilator can increase
C
the flow resistanceand leadto a reduction in the value.
Thebetter testmethods include a wayofmeasuringthis
effectbyrotating theventilator in a selectableairstream
(simulatingthe side-wind) while the aerodynamicfree
areais being measured. Such tests usuallyrequire that the
worst (ie the lowest) valueof correspondingto the
worst combination ofside-wind speedand direction must
be cited bythe manufacturerand/orsupplier as beingthe
appropriate valueforuse indesign calculationssuch asin
section 5.11.
It is commonly foundthatventilators having kerbs (see
section 10.8)and no parts projecting above the plane of
the outletopening (ie above thetop ofthe kerb) do not
suffer adverse problems from side-winds.Ventilators
having a singleflap which rises above the opening in the
fire-operational position can cause catastrophic problems
to the coefficientofperformance,with or withouta kerb
present.
13.2.3 Resistance to heat
Anatural smoke andheat exhaustventilator canbe
expected to experience exposuretothehotgases passing
through it. In general,however, one doesnot expect the
operating mechanismsto be ableto surviveexposureto
heat— theventilatorwill be expected to openwhile the
firehas onlyjustbeen detectedand is still small. The
exceptionto this concerns ventilatorsdesigned to beused
in applicationswherethe SHEVSwillbetriggered
manuallyrelativelylate in the fire. These latter ventilators
must beableto withstand considerable exposureto heat
while remaining closed,andyet stillbe able to open
satisfactorilywhencalled uponto do so. Relativelyfew
existingdesignsare suited tothis combinationof
circumstances.
Withthis exception noted, we canstatethat the
important heat-resistingproperties ofaventilator should
all apply whenthe ventilator is already open.
Theventilator must not reduce its aerodynamicfree
areawhensubjectedto a throughflow ofhotgases. This
must be demonstrated by the test method.
The ventilator must not allowhot or burning parts or
flamingdroplets to fall ontopeople orobjects belowthe
smokelayer since this could result in injury or in
secondary fires. This requirement also concerns the
safety offire-fighters,who should notbe endangered by,
forexample,hotplasticpartsfallingon them.
13 Selection ofequipment 81
Theventilatormustnot cause the hot gasesemitted
from it toplayonthe roofsurfaceoutsidethe building
since this could cause secondary fires. Similarly, the
outsideofthe ventilatorbodyshould notbecome
sufficiently hotto threatenthe rooftowhichitis fixed.
13.2.4 Openingunderload:snow
Snow comes inmany differentforms,depending on the
proportions ofice, air, andliquidwaterinthe mixture.In
general,older, more compacted snow willbe denser,
although partiallythawedsnow can alsobeverydenseas
waterdisplacestheoriginallytrapped air.
Withthepossibleexception ofventilators designed for
manual triggering,weexpectthata SHEVS will come
into operation very early in the fire. It followsthatit isnot
reasonableto dependonthe heatofthe fire gasesinside
the buildingmelting enough snow above the ventilator
forittoopen despite a relativelyweak opening
mechanism.
Therequirement fora natural ventilator is thatit
should be able to open successfully, evenwhenit is
covered on the outsideby alayer ofsnow.The depth and
density ofthat snow will vary with the location andthe
season,as wellas being subject to the usual random
chance ofweather. in practice this is not such a problem
as it might seem becausethose countries andlocalities
wheresnow loads might be aproblemwill already have
theirown Codes forstructural loading with designlimits
for theexpected snow loads.Theselimits cansimplybe
adopted forspecifyingthe appropriate load Classfor
ventilator operation, as proved byan appropriate test.
Note that ifa ventilator is designed tobe mounted on
sloping surfacessteep enough that snow cannot build up,
thereis no needto testforthis parameter.Aminimum
slope of45° should ensure thatnosnow will build up on
the slope.
Onthe otherhand, theremaybeobstacles on a roof
(egstructures for lift machinery,chimneys)whichcan
cause considerablyhigh and dense packagesofsnow due
tosnowtransport bywind.In theselocations ventflators
must not be installed.
13.2.5 Opening underload: side-wind
It has beenstated in section 13.2.2thatparts ofa
ventilator whichproject intoa side-windblowingacross
the ventilator canaffectthe measured coefficientof
performance.Ifsuch apart (eg aflap,or the dome ofa
domelight) hasto open againstthe wind direction,it may
bepossiblefor the force ofthat wind to prevent it from
opening fully (even ifthereis alockingmechanism to
holdthe partin place onceithasbeenfullyopened). It
follows that the ventilatorshould have been testedwith a
real or simulatedside-windto ensure thatits opening
mechanismis strong enough to function properly.One
canexpectthatthis is nota problem for any ventilator
withoutany moving parts projecting intothe external
wind.
82
13.2.6 Low ambienttemperature
Whenanypieceofmachinery is cooled,parts made of
differentmaterials contract at differentrates, and
lubricating oils and greases tend tobecomemoreviscous.
This is obviouslyalsotrue for natural ventilators.Thereis
a chance that abadly designedventilator, ifcooled
sufficiently, may require a much larger force than usual to
open to the fullyfire-operationalposition. Thereis evena
chance thatmoving parts ofthe openingmechanism
mightfail to clear other parts ofthe ventilator,which
mightthen jam.Ofmore specificconcern to those
ventilators powered byhigh-pressuregas cartridges is the
fact that the pressure in the cartridgewill fall at lower
temperatures.
Itwill usuallyneedaconsiderable dropin temperature
before these factorsbecomeimportant. Lowvaluesof
ambient temperature occur in many northerncountries,
and evenin northern Scandinaviathere are some
unheated buildingsusedfor storage.
Consequently,depending on the climaticconditions
expected forthe localityofthe building,the specifierand
regulator should satisfythemselves that the selected
ventilators are capable ofopening satisfactorilyat the
lowest temperature likelyto be experienced.
13.2.7 Reliability
Anyventilator must be made ofmaterials expected to
keep theirproperties for the expected lifetimeofthe
SHEVS.This is primarilya matter for designby the
manufacturer.
Perhaps more important istheneed to be surethatthe
SHEVSwillworkwhenneeded, however many years
might have passed since installation.This implies aneed
for regular maintenance by appropriately skilled
personnel, perhaps most often satisfiedby some form of
regular servicecontract. Wherethere is a high
dependence on successfuloperation, suchas wherethe
purpose ofthe SHEVSis to protectlife safety,it will
usuallybedesirableto havea regular programme of
functionaltestingaspart ofthe responsibilityofthe
building'smanagement,in order to identifyfailures as
theyoccur and to replace faultycomponents.
Whereversuchaprogramme isenvisaged,itwill be
necessaryto specifyventilators (and other equipment)
whicharedesignedto survivethe number ofopen/close
cycles expected over the lifetimeofthe installation.This
reliabilityshould have been confirmedby arepeated-
operation test, wherethe ventilator's own opening and
closingdevices havebeen used(perhaps with aseparate
external sourceofpower) for that number ofcycles.For
example,ifthe expected programme isforweekly
operation over a20-year lifespan,the minimumnumber
ofcyclesbecomesmorethan 1000. Ifthe ventilator is
intended to be usedfor day-to-day comfort ventilation,
closingwhenever itrains (as is one applicationin
practice) the minimum number ofcycles can be much
greater still.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
13.2.8Abilityto resistwind suction
Natural ventilators should neverbeexpected to operate
in positionswheretheymay be exposed to wind-induced
overpressures.It followsthat theywill only normally
experience wind-induced suctions.Ifa ventilator can be
forced openby thesewindforces whenit is supposed to
remain closed (ie whenthere is no fire),itwill become an
embarrassment to the building'smanagement and there
is astronglikelihood that it will be fastened shut
permanently.
Natural ventilators should be ableto withstand the
largest suction force expected for the location on the
building,and forthatbuilding'sown location. Wind
forceshavebeen well researched over the years in view
oftheir importance forstructural windloadinginthe
designofbuildings91'921, and appropriate values ofwind
force canbe adopted from these sourcesto identifythe
appropriate Classofventilator.Itis important that any
ventilator specifiedhas been tested for its abilityto
remain closed underthe applicationofthe appropriate
simulatedwindibrce.
13.2.9 Abilityto resistrain penetration
ManyapplicationsofSHEVSwill be in circumstances
wherethe ventilatorsmust not allow any rainpenetration
in normal everydayuse. This doesnot matterduringthe
emergency circumstancesofa real fire, but one does not
want theventilators to be covered over bysome sortof
fabricto stop rain penetration (as has happened). It
follows that the abilityofaventilator toresist rain
penetration can have safetyimplications,as well asbeing
practicaland cost-related.
Anadditional feature whichcanbeconsidered for
ventilators intended to be usedfor day-to-day comfort
ventilation is arain sensor,whichautomaticallyclosesth
ventilatorswhena sensitivesurfacedetects water. It is, of
course, necessaryfor the rain sensor to beexcluded from
thecontrol algorithm whenafire isdetected.
13.3 Poweredsmoke and heat exhaust
ventilators
13.3.1Time takento comeintofull operation
As fornatural ventilators,powered smokeand heat
exhaust ventilators (almostalways this means fans,
although other devicesare possible)must fit intoa
SHEVSdesignwhichallowsthe entiresystem to come
intofulloperation quicklyoncethesystem has been
initiated.
The only complicatingfeature withfans is that they
usuallyhave amuchlarger starting current than when
running atfull speed, and this often requires that the fans
bestartedin sequence,ratherthanall at the same time. In
orderforthe entiresystem to be operating within one
minute,this means thatindividualfans haveto bequicker
in running upto Eill speed. Amaximum timeof3O
secondshasbeen suggested as being appropriate,and
should represent the 'pass' criterion in all testsof
individualfanswhichinvolvesfurtingthe fan.

13.3.2 Resistance to heat
Inthesame wayasthe natural ventilator,the fan must be
able to continueworking for long enough forthe SHEVS
to achieve its designpurposes,whenexposed to the
expected gas temperatures passingthroughit. The design
conditionsforthe exhausted gasescan vary from below
100 °C toflame temperatures, depending on the purpose
ofthe design. Consequentlymosttest methods will
identifyclasses,eachofwhich isacombination ofgas
temperature and exposuretime. Examples include
'200 °C for 2 hours', '300 °C for 1 hour','600 °C for
1 hour', and many more. In practice, different
combinations have beenrequiredby differentregulatory
authorities in differentcountries.Thereis noapriori
universally correctcombination,but the choice should be
dictated by the designcalculationswith ofcourse a good
safety margin for the time inview ofthe usual
uncertainties in time-dependent aspects ofthe design
calculations.
Othersecondary aspectscanbeimportant, eg the
external casing ofthe fan should notbecome hot enough
to igniteanythingin contact, andwherea separate
coolingair supply isusedfor the motor it should notbe
hotenoughto ignite (or dischargedin aplace where
ignitionofany)nearby materialsmightbepossible.
13.3.3 Opening underload: snow
Manysmokeexhaustfansare mountedwith their
exhaustspointingupwards. Sometimestherecan be
otherdevicesto close theexit from the fan.Someofthese
maysimplybe flaps whichareheldopenbythe force of
the exhausted gases. Others maybe similar to the
automaticallyopening natural ventilator mechanisms.
Forallofthese thereis thepossibilitythat snow may
accumulateonthe exhaust ofthe fan, or even fillthe
throatofanunprotectedfan. As stated in section 13.2.4,
one cannot dependonthe heat ofthefiregasesto melt
thesnow —theSHEVSmust operate earlyinthe fire
whenthe gasesbeingexhausted willbebarely above
ambient temperature.
Thesnow load whichthe fan must overcome canbe
selected in the same wayas fornatural ventilators (see
13.2.4 above), andmustbeappropriate forthe location of
the building.Theselected fanfor any applicationshould
havebeentestedandpassed in aClasssuitable forthat
location.
13.3.4 Opening under load:wind
Fansarecommonly specifiedwherewind overpressures
areexpected onthe roofofbuildings.Sometimesthese
pressures canbelarge.Fans fitted withdevicesto close
the exhaust opening whenthe fan is not in usewill need
to be able to overcome thedynamic pressuresofthe
wind.Wherethis isrelevant to aSHEVS design,the fans
must be specifiedasbeing able to open to the filly
operating position inless than 30 seconds againsta load
simulatingthe wind pressure.
13 Selection ofequipment 83
13.3.5 Low ambienttemperature
Theproblemfacing afan in low ambient temperatures is
essentiallythe same as for natural ventilators.The
solution is alsosimilar,in thatthe ventilator should be
shownby asuitabletestto beableto operate fullyin less
than30 seconds in ambient temperature conditions
appropriate to the location ofthe building.
13.3.6 Reliability
Thesame argumentsinfavourofregular functional
testingapply to fans asto natural ventilators when usedin
aSHEVS.Itfollowsthatthe fan should havebeentested
for an equivalentnumberofstart/stopcycles compared
withthenatural ventilator,for asimilaruse.
13.4Automatic smoke curtains
13.4.1 Time to deployto the fire-operational position
Automaticsmokecurtainsservetwo mainroles.They
canprovide partofthesmoke reservoir's containing
boundary, or they can channel the smokeflow while the
smoke is en route tothe reservoir.Ifthe SHEVSis to
reachits full operating condition in one minute, thenthe
curtainscan takeupto that one minute to deploy.
13.4.2 Speed offall of bottombar
Ifa curtaindeploys too quickly,itsbottombarcanreacha
relatively high velocity and represent adanger eitherto
someone whose head is inthe way, or to the fixings
holding the curtain tothebuilding'sstructure ifthe
curtain reaches its full extension and stops withajerk.
Thecurtain needstobedesigned in sucha waythatitwill
notdamageitself even ifthe designcalculationsof
section 5.8 leadto the specificationofaveryheavy
bottom bar. Inmany designsthis is achievedwith a
frictionbrake, and with the curtain fallingunderitsown
weight.It is important that the test on the curtain allowed
for the heaviest weights which might occur in the design
ofthebuilding'sSHEVS. Onecannot simplyexpect a
curtain mechanism that worked with alightbottom bar
to be equallysuccessfulwith aheavy bar.
Themaximum allowablespeedto avoid injury to
people is more difficult to assess. Many curtainswill beso
designedthat they never reach head height, and so this
criterion is notrelevant to them.Othercurtains, suchas
thoseintended to close offa higher storeyfrom an
atrium, carry agreaterrisk. Thereis no clear guidanceon
howtotackle this problem. Beingstruckbyaheavy bar
travellingateven 1 m could be dangerous.Perhaps the
bestcompromise isto allow the curtain to fallatupto
1 m s1, but to designthe positions ofthesecurtains in
order to minimizethe exposureofpeopleto this risk.
13.4.3 Resistance to high temperature
It is generallytruethat smoke curtainsshould be ableto
survivethe temperatures towhichtheywill be exposed,
as predicted bythedesign oftheSHEVS. Thatis, the
curtain should beabletocontinue to fulfil itsfijnci:ion as a
barrier to the movement ofsmoke.It doesnot matter
84
from asafety pointofview ifthe mechanisms which
deploy the curtain are destroyed, as long asthe curtain
remains functional andinplace.
Typical temperatures ofgases in contactwith the
curtainswill rarely exceed 200 °C in most reservoir
applications.Typical temperatures experienced by
channellingscreens could be higher, perhaps
approaching flametemperatures, whichcanbe
pessimisticallytaken(ie ahigh value) tobe about 600 °C
and above.
A differentargument canbe put forward,thatifthe
gasesin a smoke layer in areservoir reachtemperatures
whichwill cause radiativeignition ofmaterialsaway from
the originalseatofthe fire, the entire compartment is
about to flash over. Once this has happened the firewill
be much larger thancanbe controlled bythe SHEVS,
andso the subsequentfailureofthe SHEVSiseffectively
irrelevant:it will already have failedto meet its design
purpose. This pessimisticargument suggests thatthe
highest temperature gases that asmoke curtain can
usefullybe expected to contain in most cases willbe
about 600 °C. Consequently thisis a common upper
temperature limit in tests on smoke curtains.
Therewill alwaysbe some applicationswherecurtains
may be exposed to higher temperatures (egifacurtain is
usedto close offan otherwise open shop front) andthe
fire could belocatedvery close tothat curtain.
Fortunatelysome newcurtain materials appearing on the
market are ableto withstand the full fire-resistance
heating curve usedin furnacetests (although notmeeting
the insulationrequirement for fire resistance),and canbe
regarded asblurring the distinction betweensmoke
curtains andlightweight fire shutters.
13.4.4 Reliability
Thesameargumentsapplyto the advantagesofa
programme ofregular functional testing, as applied to the
natural ventilators.Forthesame reasons,wherever such a
programme is envisaged,the curtainsmustbetestedfor
their abilityto remain functional after the appropriate
numberofdeploy/closure cycles,which should in
principle be the same number asforthe ventilators,
althoughthe additional number oftest cyclesfor
ventilators intended to provide everyday ventilationneed
notbe taken intoaccount for the numbers oftestcycles
for smokecurtains.
As withtheventilators,it is ofgreatimportance that
curtains intended to meet the needsofsuchaprogramme
canbemotoredbackintotheir'concealed' positions
easilyon receipt ofa'reset'signalfrom the control panel.
Hencethecurtains usedin the reliabilitytest should use
their ownon-boardmechanisms,to close as well as to
open.
It isalso important fortheheavier curtainsthatthe
reliabilitytest should have been done on equivalently
heavy curtains.
Designmethodologies for SHEVS
13.4.5 Fail-safe
It is important thatall smoke curtains specifiedfor the
SHEVSshould be designed to deploy intotheirfire-
operational position whenthesource ofpoweris cut off
forany reason. This isperhapsthe main reasonwhy
manydesignsusegravityto deploy, slowed and
controlled by afriction device.
13.5 Air inlets and doors
Inlets for replacement air havetheadvantage that they
oughtnever to be exposed to high-temperature gases.
Thereis alsothe disadvantagethatat thetime ofwriting
there is no specifictestforairinlets required for SHEVS.
Thefunctional requirements fordoors and inlets can
be identifiedas being thefollowing.
• Thereisa needto open fullywithin thesame1 minute
as the entire SHEVS.
• WheretheSHEVSusesapowered exhaust, the
doors/inlets need to be ableto openbefore any ofthe
fans havedeveloped an appreciableexhaust flow,
otherwise the fans could developa significantdrop in
pressure insidethe buildingwhich might prevent the
inlets from opening. In practice, this maymeanthat
the doors and/orinletdevices must be able to open
within 2 or 3 seconds ofreceipt ofthe signalto open.
13.6 Smoke dampers
Asmoke damper is a deviceusuallyfitted intoaduct, but
possiblymountedontothe duct opening intoaroom,or
servingto redirect air flows from one duct path (egfor
HVAC/ACMVpurposes) intoanother(egfor smoke
exhaust).
At thetime ofwriting,there areno clearlydeveloped
publishedStandards forsmoke dampers, although there
isanUnderwriters' Laboratory Standard931. Some
performance requirements can, however, be identified.
Thedamper must be able to move intoits fire-
operational position fastenoughto allowthe SHEVSto
meet its 1-minutetarget. Note that some dampers will
have to move from opento closed positions, whereas
otherswillhaveto move from closed to open.
Thedamper must be able to withstand theanticipated
gas temperature towhichit is exposed, and
simultaneouslythe pressure differencesto whichitwillbe
exposed,without moving from thefire-operational
position. When openinthe fire-operationalposition, the
damper must not fail byincreasingthe flow resistance.
Whenclosed,itmust not allow increased leakage;the
leakagepast aclosed smoke damper must be minimal.
In many designs,the fire-operationalposition ofan
individual damper will depend on the detectedlocation
ofthefire.Insuchdesignsthere canbe nofail-safe
position forthe damper.Consequently,thedampers for
such designswill need an unusuallyhighlevel of
reliability. This places even greater stress on the
importance oftestingthe damper throughalarge number
ofoperating cycles.

13.7 Smoke ducts
A smokeductis a ductintended to carry smokeaspart of
a SHEVS.Thereareno specifictestStandardsforsuch
ducts atthe time ofwriting, although aduct which meets
therequirements offire resistance canbeexpected to be
satisfactoryforsmoke ventilation.Thislevel of
specificationis necessaryforthose ducts which pass
throughfire-compartmentboundaries since the duct
mustnowserve effectivelyas an extension ofthat
13 Selection of equipment 85
boundary andshould bebuilttothe same requirements as
thatboundary. Notethat theductmust be able to survive
hottemperatures inside the ductand cold outside, and
alsocold inside and hotoutside (where the duct is
exposedto afire in the next compartment).
AlesserStandard isreasonable for ducts whichare
designedto be wholly immersed in a smokereservoir
since theirfailureifthe gas temperature passes600 °Cwill
be nomoresignificantthanfor thecaseofthesmoke
curtain mentioned above.
86 _____
14 Installation
Whenthe SHEVShas beendesigned,the equipment
needed to implement that design has beenspecified,and
that designhasbeendeemedacceptable in principleby
the RegulatoryAuthorities, thereremains thetaskof
installingthe equipment intothe buildingfor which it is
intended. This stephas provided many examples oferror
in practice. It is notthe roleofthe current bookto provide
a detailed descriptionofallthe procedures necessaryfor
successfulinstallation.Nevertheless,a discussionis
presented in outline form to alert the readerto some of
the more important aspects.
Whilea system may be installed bya singlecontractor,
it is morecommonlythe casethatmany ofthe individual
pieces ofequipment will be fitted byspecialist
contractors. For example,the smoke curtainsmaybe
installedby a differentcontractor to the ventilators;or
whereuse is madeoftheHVAC/ACMVsystem as partof
the SHEVStherewill alsobe adivision ofresponsibility
for differentequipment. The possibilitiesfor confusion
aremany. Itis important that there should be a single
contractor responsible for co-ordinating the activitiesof
every participant in the installationofthe SHEVS. Itis
important that this co-ordinating contractor should be
experienced inthe fieldofSHEVS design and
installation,and that its personnel involvedshould fully
understand the concept design in all its aspects.This can
be expected to be the case where the co-ordinating
contractor is also the designer ofthe system; but where
this is not thecaseit is important that the co-ordinating
contractor should liaisecloselyand frequentlywiththe
designers ofthe SHEVSconcepts. Therehave been
many exampleswherelatearchitectural changes have
adverselyaffectedtheeffectivenessofthe SHEVS
without the installershaving realizedthatthiswas the
case.
It is, as has beennoted, often the case that thepeople
who developed the 'concept design' donot continue with
theresponsibilityto turntheirconceptintophysical
reality. It istheresponsibilityoftheco-ordinator ofthe
installationprocess to ensurethat:
•• all the separate components are compatible,
all the connections are correctly specified,and
• the specificationsofthe equipment areappropriate to
the designconceptand to the circumstancesboth of
the buildingand ofthe location ofthebuilding.
Theparameters identifiedin Chapter 13, and the results
oftesting onthe differentproducts, areespecially
important. It is particularlyimportant here that the
proposedmaintenance and re-testing regime should be
establishedprior to specificationofthe equipment. This
will allow the correct specificationofequipment interms
ofthe 'reliability'test (seeChapter 13) and in terms ofthe
abilityto deploy/returnequipment easily usinga remote
manual signal in order to ensurethat routine functional
testing is easy, and willnot cause excessivewearinthe
system. Easeofreplacement and/or maintenance of
faulty components mustalso be bornein mind; eg it
would beunwise to locate a smoke detector inthe middle
ofa large areaoffragile glazed ceilingat thetopofa
multistoreyatrium.
It is the co-ordinating contractor's responsibilityto
ensure that the control sequence allowsthe different
parts ofthe system to comeintooperation without
impeding or overloadingother parts. It is his/her
responsibilityto ensurethat allinterconnections with the
non-fire buildingsystems (eg with the HVAC/ACMV
system),and with the other essentialfire safety systems
(eg the smoke detectionsystem) have been considered
and properly specified.In short, it ishis/her
responsibilityto ensure that the design concept is
implemented correctly.
Ifthe installersofthe SHEVS areto be sure ofsuccess,
theyneedftll and sufficientinformationon all the
equipment usedin the system.Therefore, all suppliers
mustgivethe necessary informationon recommended
methodsfor fixingcomponents, forelectrical wiring,for
operating instructions,andfor recommended
commissioningprocedures fortheir particularproduct.
The suppliersshould also givefull informationon the
important parameters forlinkingtheir productto others,
egby givingrecommended maximum and minimum
pressuresin pneumatic lines needed to provide operating
energy for aventilator.Not only the technical detailsof
theproductand therecommended methods of
installation,but alsothe limitsthereofneed to be defined.
Itcanbeseen from the above that thereneeds to be a
continuing liaisonbetweenthe installer and the creatorol

the concept. It is usuallyamistaketo assume that a design
canbe boughtfrom one consultantand installedby
another withoutany continuinginvolvementofthe first.
Itis even worse to assume thathaving bought the
concept, the developer only needs to employ specialist
contractors with no co-ordination atall for installation.
Many examples existofallthese faults, whichusually
derive from abeliefon the part ofthedeveloper or
his/her agents thatfire is a simplethingwhichdoesnot
require the continued applicationofspecialist
engineeringexpertise.
Someaspects ofinstallationhave a directbearing on
safety,as well asonthe successfuloperation ofthe
complete system. The positioning ofventilators and
ducts presentspecialproblems, and special attention
needstobe given to thefollowingdetails.
• Ventilatorexhausts (natural or powered) needtobe
positioned so that the hot gasesemitted from them will
notbedeflected onto the rooforwall surfacesclose to
theventilator.Allgases emitted should bedirected
away from the building'sstructure.
• Combustibleparts ofthe roofstructure adjacent to
smoke ventilators needto beprotectedas flamescan
ignitethe vulnerablezonearoundtheventilator.Itis
suggested that protection should extend atleast0.5 m
aroundtheventilator.
• Combustiblematerials,whetherstructure, linings, or
surfacefinishes,should similarlybe protected where
theyareadjacent to ducts which areintended to carry
hotsmoky gasesthrough a compartment or outside
wall.
• The free areaofa natural ventilator needsto be free of
obstruction above and below the ventilatorfor atleast
2 m in orderto avoid increasingthe flow resistanceof
thatventilator, exceptwheresuchan obstruction has
beenexplicitlyincluded inthedesign calculations.
Thiscanrepresentasignificantconstraint on structural
features nearventilators.
• Theoutletofapowered ventilatorand/oritsductwork
must be free ofany obstructionsover a distanceof1.5
times the diameter ofthat exhaust outlet.Thisis also
intended toavoid thecreation offlowresistances
which mightincrease the back-pressureonthe fan and
hencereduce thevolume flow rate ofthe exhaust.
• Wherewinddeflectorsarefitted to avoid wind
overpressureproblems on natural smokeexhaust
ventilators,butthosedeflectors do notform part ofthe
ventilator itself,careshould be taken to ensure that
snow (where climaticallyrelevant) cannot collect and
create a greater snow load for the ventilator to
overcomewhenopening. Care should alsobe taken to
ensure that anysuchdeflectorswill not experience
wind-drivenresonantvibrationwhich can accelerate
fatigue and early failureofthe deflectors.
Whereemergency power suppliesmust be installedto
back-up the powersupply for the SHEVSin case of
failureofthe Mains powersupply,specialattentionmust
begiven to correctlabelling ofequipment and switches,
14 Installation 87
andto the provisionofprotection from damage
(mechanicalor byfire)both forthe power supply andfor
all ofits connections totheSHEVS.The objectivemust
beto ensurethat theback-up supply cannot be prevented
from operating whenneeded. Switchingbetween main
powersupply and emergency powermust beautorriatic,
and sufficiently fastto ensure that theSHEVS continues
to fulfil itsfunctionwith no risk tothebuilding's
occupants orto the SHEVSdesignobjectives.
The worst caseforback-up power supply is whenthe
Mains supply failsatthe start ofthe fire. Consequently,
the emergency supplypowermust be designedto fulfil its
duty duringtherequired operation time ofthe SHEVS.
The same level ofprotection andlabellingmust be
giventothe electrical cablingaswell as to the control
panels.The manual controls must be located outsidethe
smokereservoir andmustbereached easily,in sight ofa
safe accessdoororroute. Wherethe SHEVS is designed
to be triggeredby a manual fireman's switchratherthan
by an automatic method, themanual controls must be
locatedoutside thefirecompartment servedby the
SHEVS,and must be on the primaryaccess route
planned foruse byfire-fightersentering the building.This
istoallow the SHEVSto remove any threatofbackdraft
before any fire-fightershaveto enterthe affectedfire-
compartment.
Ductwork forming part ofthe SHEVS must belabelled
clearlyas suchandthe hangers mustbeconstructed in
such a waythat the duct system will stay in place forthe
required operation time. It should notbe forgotten thatin
some circumstancesthe hangers aswell asthe duct may
be exposedto hotgases, and so theyshould becapable of
surviving the expected smoketemperatures. Another
occasionalmistake involvingducts is tofail to make
allowanceforthe thermalexpansionofthe ductwhenit is
exposed to hotgases. The expansion ofa duct
constrained atboth endswillusuallyleadto a splitinthe
duct.
Whensmokedampers areinstalled,aremovablepanel
or grid should provide easy accesstothe activator and
damper blade. No element attached to the smokedamper
should obstruct the properfunctioningofthe damper
blade. It isgoodpracticeto selectdampers which make it
easy to see the position ofthe damper, directly,byan
electrical indication,orby amechanical pointer external
to the casing. It has beenacommonmistake to fit
dampers in inaccessiblelocations, often obscuredby
otherequipment or structure, in such a waythat it is
impossibleto assesswhetherthe damper has operated
satisfactorilyor not. This canmakeboth testing and
maintenance checks extremelydifficultto do, and
therefore less likelyto bedone.
Air inlets areneededforagoodsmokecontrol
installation.These are normallylocated at low levelin
ordernottodisturb the smokelayer in the reservoir.
Thereis a realisticchance thatblockingthe airinlet will
occur ifpositioning (eg inthe sidewall) isnot designed
carefully. Controllableinlets, includingautomatically
opening doors wherethese form part ofthe air inlet
88
provision,mustbe connected to the emergency back-up
power supply.
Wheninstallingsmokecurtains and particularly
automatic retractable curtains, special attention needsto
be givento the maximumgap betweenfabricand
structure, and betweenadjacent curtains whereseparate
curtains are combined to form alongrun ofcurtain, when
inthe deployed position. Ideally thereshould be no gaps
at all.This is notpracticable,although whereadjacent
curtainsform a straight run it is possibleto overlapthe
curtains,and to clip togetherthe bottombars, in a way
whichminimizesthe leakage gap betweenthesheetsof
fabric. It is more difficult to reduce the size ofthe gaps
betweenthe edge ofa curtain and the adjacent structure.
It is moredifficult still toreducethe gap size wherethere
is ajunctionbetweentwocurtains whicharenot aligned,
although inthis case the effectsofbuoyant deflectionof
the curtains in opening upthe gap can be reduced by
using aheavier bottombar.
Thelarger the gap the more smoke willleakthrough,
and the worse the effectwill be on the nominallysmoke—
freeside. It is possible,thoughdifficult and beyond the
scope ofthe current book,toestimate the movement and
rate ofbuild-up ofsmoke onthe side supposedly clear of
smoke.The problem iscomplex, and depends on the air
movements and on the volume ofthe space the leakage of
smokeis entering, as both factorsinfluencethe dilution of
thesmoke. What is safein onecircumstancecanbe
dangerous in another. Atthetime ofwritingthereis no
consensus on the safe limitsto suchgaps, although it
Design methodologies for SHEVS
is suggested hereinthat the pragmatic approach canbe
adopted ofassumingthatthe total areaofall suchgaps
may not exceed 1% ofthe total curtain surface.
These gap sizesare sufficiently smallthatthey arevery
sensitiveto the detail and quality ofthe work ofthe
installers,indicatingthe essentialtaskofthe co-ordinator
in checkingthat installationhas beendone satisfactorily.
Other important decisionsrequiredoftheinstaller
concerns the specification,design, location, and
ergonomic layout ofcontrol panels, bearingin mind the
requirements ofthe Fire Serviceas well as ofthe
building'smanagement.Somefurther detailsare included
in Chapter15.
Lastly,and very importantly,theremust be a set of
detailed engineeringdrawings (the Detailed Engineering
Plan) showing the complete SHEVSinstallationas well
as ofthe related systems. These latter canbe.expected to
include the sprinklerand smoke-detection systemsin
mostcases, and should also indicateall the control
dampers in the HVAC/ACMVsystem whichhave arole
to play during afire. ThisPlan should be prepared in
advance ofany actual installationofequipment, and
should be revisedduringinstallationso that it is at the
end an accuraterepresentation ofwhathas beenfitted
intothe building.These drawingsoughtto be made
availableto the FireServiceaswell as tothebuilding's
management, togetherwiththe SHEVSDesign
documentation. It is cruciallyimportant that these
drawingsshould be updated whenever any changes are
made to the system duringthe building'slifetime.
 89

15 Acceptance testing
(commissioning)

15.1 General Testingand commissioningchecks

• Designcheck
Before handing overthe installationto the final user, afile • Mechanicalcheck
should be preparedby the installercontaining all relevant • Control and actuation check
technicaldocuments, test reportsofthe individual • Electrical check
components,as-built plans,set pointsand anacceptance • Runningcheck
— Initial start
report. The system cannot be commissionedwithout — Functionaltest incontrol
thesedocuments. — Balancingand regulatingofairflow
Theas-builtplanshould represent thewholesystem,
indicatingquantity, size and location ofthe ventilators,air
inlets and other SHEVSelements,fixingofthe main Thefollowinginstrumentsand tools will very ofrcn be
elements (egductwork), location ofthe control panels, required:
smoke dampers and theiraccess,labellingofthe whole
and eventuallyindicatingtheprotective measures to
••clamp-on ammeter,
voltmeter,
mechanical damage.An electricalwire plan should be ••anemometer,
provided ifan emergency powersupply unitis installed. smoketracer.
Thewholeconstitutesthe Detailed EngineeringPlan
referred to in Chapter 14. Except for simple devicessuchas pitot-static tubes,
It is an everydayexperiencethatwhat is builtis not inclined manometers, U-gauges and similar, all
always exactlywhatwas intended, anditwillbe instruments,meters, etc. usedfor testing purposes
necessaryto carry out commissioningtests on the system should:
once it has been installed.These tests should include the ••be provided in duplicate,
haveamanufacturer-claimedaccuracyofnot more
followingitems (not an exhaustivelist).
••Reaction time ofthe SHEVSto open thanplus or minus2%ofrange,

•Airflowmeasurementsforpowered ventilators
Simultaneousopening ofventilators and air inlet
devices
•Eventualpneumatic leakageswheresuch power
suppliesare used
••
Reaction ofautomatic andmanual controls
Start-up time ofthe emergency power supply
•
Behaviourofthe automatic smoke curtains
•be manufacturedto an appropriate standard or
recognized equal international or national standards
whereappropriate and available.
•havebeencalibrated by a recognizedtestingor
calibrationlaboratory not more than threemonths
priorto the dateoftest. The calibrationcertificate
provided bythelaboratory should beavailableduring
the test.

15.2 Testingand commissioning Design check

It isrecognized that requirements mayvary from country
to country, and that occasionallycircumstancesmight
require ad-hocdepartures from the procedures. Hence
the procedures inthis section areintended to bea guide
ratherthana set ofrigidrequirements. Ingeneral, the
checks and tests given inthe box opposite are
recommended.
The as-builtlayoutshouldbe checked againstthe system
designer's approved plans.
Mechanical check
•Check the resultsofthe pressure test on the smoke-
exhaust-systemductwork whichshould havebeen
carried out duringconstruction.
•Perform the mechanical check as per test procedure for
fans and motorized dampers.
•Check smokezoneboundary and automatic smoke
90
curtain location accordingto approved smokecontrol
• designlayout.
Check motorized fire smoke dampers are correctly
connected, and that the smokeand fire damper blade
• andbearing rotate smoothly.
Check that smoke curtainsdropdown smoothly and
thebottombars stopatthe correctposition.
•
Control and actuation check
Check thatall systems automaticallyactuate and
remain in operation until reset bythe testers, either
manuallyorby activation ofacentral resetcontrol.
• Check thatwhenin 'fire' mode, all other building
systemsconnected with the SHEVS are put intothe
appropriate fire-operational state.
• Check thatmultiplexerorsimilar devicesdo not affect
transmissionofactuating signalsfrom the automatic
fire-alarmpanel forthe operation ofthe smoke exhaust
systemsunless suchdeviceshave the approval or
certificationofone ofthe testing authorities.
• Check that eachsystem is provided with amanual
on/offcontrolswitch and indicator light at the master
fire control panel.
— Check thatswitches for all smoke exhaust/removal
systemsare grouped in one areaofthe panel
togetherwiththose for staircasepressurization
systemsor similar.
— Check that all switcheshave the same
method/directionofoperation.
— Check that adevice that senses effective operation
oftherelevant smoke/airhandling system (ega
centrifugalswitch oran air pressure switch) actuates
the indicator lights.
— Check that all switchesand indicators are clearly
labelledto show operating positionsand systems
served and stating thatthe controls shallbe operated
only by authorized personnel.
Electrical check
Prior to the initialrunning ofanyelectricallydriven fan,
the followingprocedures willbe adopted.
• Ina normal situation,all smoke and firedampers must
be installedas per the designlayout.
• Foreachsimulatedposition ofthe firerecognized in
the design scenario, thesmoke andfiredampers in the
extract and supply systemsmust eithermove into, or
remainin (as appropriate), theirdesignfire-
• operational positions.
Should therebe a failure ofthe supply make-up fans
(where includedinthe design) then only the supply
system must shutdownandallsmoke andfire dampers
on the supplyductmust returnto the design position.
Theexhaust system shall continue to operate.
• Should therebea failureofthe powersupplyto the
smoke andfire dampers, thesemust move intotheir
fire-operationalpositions wherethese have been
identified in the design scenario.Note that in some
designstherecan be nofail-safe position.
• Both audio and visualwarnings must be provided to
Design methodologies for SHEVS
indicate afault detectedon:
— the
signallingwire connectingthe control panel
to the smoke extraction system control panel, or
— the
wiringothedetectors.
• All equipment servingthe smokeexhaust and
complementary replacementair systemsshallbe
provided with an appropriate emergency power
• Perform
supply.
the electricalcheckasper testprocedures for
fan and motorized damper.
Runningcheck
All systemsmust be completed and tested to ensure that
theyarefunctioningcorrectly before the final full testand
demonstration takes place.A full setoftest andfunctional
operation checkrecords should be prepared, and may be
required tobe submitted to the authorities.It is also
recommended hereinthat the system designer should
observethefull test and attach to the Report a signed
comment confirmingor otherwisethat he is satisfiedthat
the installation(s)areoperating in accordance with his
design.
Fulland complete records must be kept ofall tests and
the resultsthereof typicallyincluding the items listedin
the Boxbelow).
Initial start
• Performthe test run as pertest procedure for fan and
motorized damper.
Functional test incontrolcheck
• Check thatinterlock offans and dampers function
• properly.
Check the properfunction ofremoteON/OFF
operation.
Balancing andregulatingofairflowshouldbe checked.
Anyadjustments needed to achievethedesign airfiows
should be made, andtheir effectivenessconfirmedby
appropriate re-testing.
This, however, doesnot guarantee that the control
mechanisms,or the computer software,will correctly
operate everythingin the correctsequences,orfollowing
theappropriate logicwheredevicesmayhavemore than
onefire-operational statedepending, eg on thelocation
ofthe fire. It is desirableas partoftheacceptance test
Itemstoinclude in a running checkrecord
•
Recordsofpressure testing during construction
• Make,serial no.typeand owner ofall instruments used, together
with acopyofthe calibration certificates
•• Actual measurementstaken
• Resultingairfiows, current, belt tensions, shaft speeds, etc.
Make,serial no. type and useofevery device checked, including
rotational speeds, pressure drops/generation, etc.
•• Date andtime oftests
Signatureof operator/tester orsupervisor and anywitness for
each test
• Signatureofdesigner confirming his/her acceptance

procedure totrigger operation ofthe SHEVSbyinitiating
a realisticsignal (for examplebyblowing asmallquantity
ofsmoke intoa smokedetector) and thenconfirmingthat
all ofthe desired actions have in fact occurred. Where
differentpatterns ofactions are required forfires in
differentlocations,all ofthese oughtto be checkedby
simulatingdetection ofa fire in differentlocations or in
differentways (the lattermightinclude break-glassfire
alarm points, or simulatedoperation ofsprinklers,instead
ofa smokedetector).
15.3Hot-smoketests
There is amore complicatedoption: the Hot-Smoke
Test.Thisuses real fires in controlled conditions, inthe
buildingasclose to completion aspossible,in order to
provide aflow ofbuoyant smoky gaseswhichcantest not
only the operation ofseparate components, but alsoto
testin aquantitativemanner theproperftinctioningof
the designconceptitself.In otherwords, to testthatthe
properfunctioningofthetotalsystem hasbeenachieved.
Variations on this techniquehavebeen developed in
Australia94'951 and in the UK and BelgiumLS9961. Both
15 Acceptance testing (commissioning) 91
methods use alcohol fires in view oftheirclean and
predictableburning.The Australianmethod is restricted
to firesdirectly beneaththefinal smokereservoir,
whereas the BRE technique has alsobeen usedfor fires in
sideroomswheresmokecan spillintoa larger mal].or
atrium. Both use artificial smokesto markthe firegases
andto make themvisible:the Australianmethoduses
pyrotechnic smokegenerators;the BRE method uses oil-
mist generators ofthe type widelyusedin theatres and
forfire-servicetraining.
Hot-smoke tests arenot needed wherethereis
confidencein the designscenario, and inthe design
calculations.Theyare desirablewherever it is not
possibleto feel suchlevelsofconfidence.A summaryof
pointstobeconsidered by anyonecontemplating theuse
ofhot-smoke testsis presented in Annex I.
Wherethe commissioningoftheinstallationis
checkedbyan independent body, detailsofthe testing
body, the names ofits representatives,the test methods
employed andthe results ofthose tests, as well asthe
engineeringplan availableto thatbody, should all be
mentioned inthe acceptance report.
92 ______________
16 Maintenance, management
and re-testing
Whatever the basic objectiveofthe SHEYS, itwillbe
intended to thnction properly whenthe fire happens.
Fires are essentiallyinfrequent events,whichcan occur in
a randomway. It isvery unlikelythat thefirewill happen
immediatelyafterthe system has been installedand
successfullydemonstrated towork. Years might pass
before the system is called upontowork, andthen it is
criticallyimportant that the system doesindeed work as
designed.
Buildings will not remain static inthe intervening
years, andthe usual forcesofcorrosion and decay can be
expected to operate. Itfollowsthen, that aswith any
otheractive system involvingmachinery,thereis a need
forthe system to be maintained and servicedduringthese
years.This places a major responsibilityonthe building's
management.
A regular checkon the system is essentialto ensure
that itwill operateas designed,ifneeded. Also,
intervention oftrained staffis sometimesbeneficialor
even necessaryto achieve satisfactoryevacuation ofthe
occupants inthe eventofafire. For example,calculations
done at FRS L1001 haveindicated thatthe presence of
trained staffto help withevacuation is ofgreatbenefit in
large single-storeybuildings.It is difficult to ensurethat
thereis acontinual training programme, particularly
whenthe 'ownership' ofabuildingchanges.
The bestwayto confirmthatthe SHEVS is workingas
intended is to generate afire-detection signal (egby
blowinga smallamount ofsmoke intoa smokedetector)
and confirmingthat all the devicessupposed to operate
actuallyhave operated satisfactorily. Ifthis is done
regularlyitis more likelythat anymechanical or
electricalfailureswillbeidentified in time for the fault to
be corrected. It is also more likelythat anypoor
maintenance will be identifiedintimeto becorrected.
The optimum extentand frequency ofregular re-
testing ofthesystem will inevitablydependon
circumstances.Systemshaving a crucialroleinprotecting
life safetyoughtto be testedmuch morefrequentlythan
those whichhave no suchrole. Even wherelife safetyis
concerned, the frequencyoffunctional re-testing may
vary. For example,itwould bedesirableto check the
operation ofaSHEVS in a largeshopping complexat
least once aweek, whereas in an office buildingit may be
____ ______
moreappropriate totest it once a month. It maybemore
appropriate for systemsintended forpropertyprotection
to be testedonceayearin some cases.It can be expected
that the RegulatoryAuthorities havingresponsibilityfor
a buildingwill have a strong interest inthefrequency of
functionalre-testing, especiallyifthe SHEVSis intended
to protectthelivesofthe public.
The building'smanagement will find theirtask much
easier ifthey have been provided with fulldocumentatioi'
summarizingthe designconcepts, in all the different
scenariosconsidered, aswell as the 'Detailed engineering
plans' and documentation recommended tobe provided
bythe installer in Chapter 15. It isalso important that the
key individualin the building'smanagement should be
familiarwith this documentation,and should understand
theideas involved.These documents, takentogether,
form the basis ofa'log book' forthe SHEVS, and could
usefhllybewidened to include all other aspects offire
safety,although that goes beyond the scope ofthe
current report.
The manager's taskwill alsobe eased ifthe installerha
provided a 'maintenance file' as part ofthe logbookin
which the management can record all maintenance,
modifications,tests andtheir results,etc.,duringthe
building'slifetime.
The maintenance programme canbe subdividedin
differentsections,in directrelation to the frequencyof
checking.Notethatthe frequenciessuggestedhere are
intended to beillustrative, and are certainlynot intended
to beuniversalfor all applications!
Basic functional check (once a month)
• The component parts oftheSHEVS areoperated and
people can see,hear or smellmalfunctioningparts:
pressured air leakagesare quitecommon, a rusty spring
canprevent natural ventilators from closingagain.
• All defectiveparts must be repaired or replaced
immediately.
Maintenance programme (oneper 6 months)
•On thebasis ofa maintenance checklist,all moving
partsoftheinstallationwillbelooked at andreplaced
• where necessary.
Special attention is givento corrosion,mechanical

damage,penetrations, blocked activators,overheated
electricalparts.
• All parts are cleaned andrelabelled wherenecessary.
Full functionaltest(once per year)
After the maintenance tour, afunctional check must be
worked out, possiblyattendedby a representativeofthe
RegulatoryAuthorities,to seewhetherthe installation
still complieswiththe acceptance report.
• This test starts with the triggering ofone or more
detectors inthe testedzone and all subsequent
automatisms (ie the actions whichfollow
automaticallywithouthuman intervention) are
checked out (reactiontime, emergency powersupply
unit comingup, openingorclosingofdampers,
lowering ofsmokecurtains, ...).
This test shall be activatedand the equipment resetfor
every smoke control zone. Results should berecordedin
the logbook.
Apartfrom themaintenance programme, a SHEVS
management program needsto beset up. This means
16 Maintenance,management, re-testing 93
thatthe usermust verifythroughthe years whetherthe
installedsystem is stillcapable ofdealingwith areal-fire
situation.
It is usuallyeasy to recognizewhenamajor structural
modificationto abuildingwill influencethe functioning
ofa SHEVS.Forexample,changing a workshop intoa
high-rack warehouse willhavebig implicationsforthe
design parameters ofthe SHEVS. It isless often realized
thata successionofsmallmodifications,eachone
seeminglytootrivial to matter, can cumulativelyaffect
the functioningofaSHEVS. Itshould alsoberecognized
that many buildingsspecialistswith noknowledge offire
caneasilyfailto distinguishbetweenwhat is major and
whatis minor.Whereas-builtplans,test reports and
maintenance programs have beenkept fullyup-to--date,it
is more likelythat changeswillbecorrectly identified,
and that mistakeswill be more readily noticed and
corrected. Notein this context thatthe building's
managers share withthe RegulatoryAuthorities (inmost
countries) the responsibilityforcommissioninga new
SHEVSanalysisand re-designifthe building's
modificationschange the assumptions and conditions
whichwere appropriate to the originaldesign.
94 ___
17 Some common mistakes
in the design of smoke ventilation
systems
17.1 Mis-location of the point source of a
point-source smoke plume
Someofthe formulaeavailablefor the calculation ofthe
mass ofair entrained intoa smokeplume risingdirectly
above a fire are derived for smallfires. When applied to
fires which are not small(such asthose in real fire
scenarios),they require a correction whichtreats the
smoke as thoughit was risingfrom apoint (zero width)
source at a distancebelowthe real fire which depends on
the actual physicalsize ofthe fire. Severalguidance
documents statethat it is acceptable to ignore this
correction and to takethe plume height asbeingthe
heightofthelayerabove thefloor (orthe base ofthe real
fireifdifferent).However, suchan assumptioncan leadto
an underestimate ofthe mass ofsmoky gases entering the
smokelayer.For example,whenthe fire diameter
approaches theheightofrise ofthe smokeplumethe
mass ofair entrained into the smoke can be
underestimated by more than a factor oftwo.
17.2 Inadequatespecification of smoke
curtains
Research by FRS has shownthat the existingdeflection
tests for smoke curtainsare virtuallymeaninglessin terms
ofactual behaviour,and that it is necessary to bring
smoke curtainsintothe designprocess97,usingthe
procedures given inAnnex C. It is necessary tospecify
thecorrectcombination ofcurtain materialweight and
bottom bar weight to ensure that the curtain deflection
remainswithin acceptable designlimits for the particular
application.In general, the hotter and deeper the smoke
layerbecomes, then the heavier the curtain and/or
bottombar must be. This inturn canrequire major
differencesin the components, egthecurtainmightneed
stronger motors, stronger brakes and stronger
attachments tothebuilding.
Specificationofa smokecurtain which istoo lightfor
theapplication canresult inexcessivedeflection,with
accompanyingrise ofthe bottombar and leakage of
smoke past the curtain.
Another common mistake is to position smoke
curtains which are lightenoughto deflect appreciably,on
________
the line betweencolumns.This position hasthe apparent
advantage ofeconomizing on the necessarylengthof
curtain, and hence on cost. Unfortunately,wherethe
columns are rounded orotherwise lackingin parallel
surfaces,any smalldeflection leads to a rapidly increasing
gap betweenthe curtain's edgeand the column's surface,
with consequent smokeleakage pastthe curtain.
17.3 Installation does not follow design
Itis common for detail designchanges to occur during
the construction ofbuildings.Apossible consequenceis
that an initiallycorrectdesignbecomes unsuitable.An
exampleknown to the authors is ofsmoke curtainsbeing
1.5 m too shortwhenfitted. Itis desirablethatthe fire
safety system designers be retained bythe buildingdesign
team to comment onall designchanges and to confirm
that thefinal installedsystem fulfils the designconcept.
17.4 Mis-use of computer models
Every computer model ofany aspect ofsmoke
movement is based on mathematical representations of
theunderlyingphysics.In zonemodels theseareoften
empiricallyderived formulae.In CFD models these are
more fundamentallybased,solving conservation
equationstypically for mass,momentum, enthalpy, etc. It
is often forgotten thatthe equations expressing
turbulence in current commercialCFD models are also
partlyempirical.
Empirical relationshipsofwhatever sortall share the
common feature that they have been developed to fit a
specificrange ofexperimental circumstances.They may
not be as accuratefor othercircumstances outsidethat
range. This affectsthe reliabilityofvalidation ofthe
model: within the appropriate rangesa model can be
correctly shown to match reality — but outsidethe
appropriate ranges ofparameter values the same model
cangive grosslyincorrect answers. It is never simply
enough to note thata model 'hasbeen validated'.
One exampleofthis typeofproblem concerns the
expressionfor the fire size at the onset offlashover ina
compartment. Oneofthemostcommoncorrelationsfor
this relationship is based onworkby McCaffreyet al981,

and variationson this areusedin designguidance, eg
refs28'291.McCaffreyet al's correlation was derived for a
testroom ofless than 30 m3 in volume,withwindow
openingswhichwere predominantly tall compared with
theirwidth. Itcanbeshownthatvery different
relationshipscanbe expected for the firesize at the onset
offlashoverinverylarge rooms havinglarge openingsrc9i.
Anothercommon exampleconcerns the common
practice in ZoneModels basedon small-fireplume
formulaeto defaultthe location ofthe virtualpointsource
to thebase ofthe fire regardless ofthesize ofthe fire (see
section 17.1for amore detaileddiscussionofthis error).
CFD models dependfor accurate modelling ofreality
on the correctness ofthe initialand oftheboundary
conditionsusedto definetheproblem mathematically.
These 'input conditions' are essentialto statecorrectly
thephysicaland chemicalnature ofthe problem being
studied, andifthey are inappropriate,theCFDmodel
will givean inappropriate result.Anotheressentially
mathematical constraint isthatthe computationalmesh
size (ie the selected dimensionsofeachelementary
'calculationvolume') mustbeappropriate tothe problem
being studied. In practice, this means thatthe'solution' to
the calculationmust be independent ofthemesh size,
whichcannotbe automaticallyassumedfor all
circumstances.
Thevalidityofa CFD model for a given application
would depend onthe fact thatit incorporates proper
descriptions,throughsubmodels,ofthedominant
physical andchemicalprocesses (suchas combustion,
radiation,turbulence, etc.) forthat application.Because
ofthe often partially empiricalnature ofthe built-in
submodels,validationofthe CFD model is crucialto
ensurethe validityofits submodelsfor aparticular
application.It follows that a successfulvalidationforone
applicationwill apply to other scenariosinthe same
category ofapplication,but not necessarilyto other
categories. Forexample,caremust be takenwhena CFD
modelvalidated for smokemovement is applied to
problems involvingflame spread. In general,one can say
that in view ofthe complex nature ofCFD models,
knowledge offire science and ofCFD isessentialfor
'correct' use fora practicalfire application.
The foregoingparagraphs should notbeseen as an
argument againstusing computer models. Many designs
would be impossiblewithouttheiruse. Theyshould
instead be read as a warning that computer models
should notbe used by inexperiencedpeople as 'black
boxes' alwaysassumedby themto givethe correct
answer.Itis alwaysnecessaryforthe designerofa
SHEVSto ensurethathe/shehas identifiedwhichmodel
(or models— a designmayrequire the use ofmore than
one) isappropriate to the circumstancesbeing
considered. It isalways necessaryfor the designer ofa
SHEVSto satisfy him/her selfthat the model isbeing
usedwithin its prudentlimits.Andofcourseit is
necessaryforthe Regulator assessingadesignproposal to
become satisfiedthatthe designer ofthe system has
considered thesefactors.
17 Common design mistakes 95
17.5 Mistaken perceptionsof conflict
betweenactive and passivefire precautions
There often appears tobe awidespread misconception
thatin some wayactive fireprecautions suchas aSHEVS
and passivefire precautionssuchas fire-resisting
partitions are competing one againsttheother. Such
views can be seen to be the result oftoo narrow a focuson
one partofthe wide range ofmeasures available. Similar
problems exist inmisconceptions ofthe perceived
conflict between differentactive measures (seesection
11.1,for example,concerningthe interactionsbetween
smokeventilation and sprinklers).
It canbe misleadingto contrast one form offire
protection with anotheras iftheywere completely
independent ofeachother. In practice, eachsystem
influencesthe others. It is betterto regard the building
itselfasthe system,withdifferentforms offireprot:ection
sharing contributionstowards overall safety. The
importance ofthis cannot be overstated.
In fact virtuallyall formsofsmoke control depend on
aspectsof'passive'fireprotection. Pressuredifferential
systems aredesigned to protectagainst smokeleakage
throughsmallgapsin whatis otherwisepassive
protection enclosingthe escape route. The marketfor
fire-resistingmaterials is essentiallyunaffected bythe
presence ofsuchmethods ofsmoke control. Smoke and
heat exhaust ventilationallowstheuse ofspacesmuch
larger than a conventionalfire compartment. Usuallythis
isthe result ofusing sprinklersas well.But even forthis
casethere are still many requirements for 'passive'fire
protection, eg all shop unitwalls exceptthe front, ofshop
units opening onto amall wherea SHEVSis fitted into
themall, or where smoke exhaust ducts passthrough
neighbouringfirecompartments. Other examples
include:
•• partitionmembranes,
walls,
• ceiling
downstandsfor smokereservoirsor smoke barriers.
Related 'passive'fire-protection measuresimportant for
smoke control can also include intumescentseals forfire
doors and fire-resistingglazing.
As for all applications,there arethesame requirements
for fire-resistingmaterialsto be ableto withstand thermal
shocks,to be impermeableto smoke, andto bestable
underdifferentenvironmental conditions includingthe
abilityto resist humidity, fringal attack,thefreeze—thaw
cycle,and ageingofthematerials.Ifthe material cracks,it
could renderthe smokecontrol system unable to prevent
thepassage ofsmoke. Alllarger openings,suchas holes
madeforpipes, cables,ducting,etc., must beproperly
sealed. This has to be aproperfire and smokeseal,riota
patchwork usingwhatever materialis left on site
(examplesexist ofthe failure offire-resistingwalls
because ofsuch inadequate materials ascardboard and
polystyrenehaving been used to seal holes madefor
cables,pipes, etc. —thiskind offault is seen alltoo often
duringpost-fire investigations).
96 __________ _______________
18 Smoke ventilation and
enforcementof regulations
Thefinal decision as to whatis acceptable rests with
those who are responsiblefor enforcingthe relevant fire
safetyregulations. In large or complexbuildingsit is
usuallyimpracticaltofollowthe prescriptiveguidelines
given in the relevant standards and a fire safety
engineeringapproach isneededto achieve a successful
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system so that the
same level ofsafety is accomplished asfor amore
conventionalbuildingwithoutthe same amountof
compartmentation.
The successor failureofthedesign will often depend
on the details.The assumptionsand calculation
procedures whichare correct forone scenario may not be
correctfor another. It should also beclearlyunderstood
thatthevarious publishedformulaewere derived from
experimentsand maynotbe appropriate whenthe design
scenario is very different. For example,aformula
experimentallyderivedfrom a tall and narrow atrium
maynotbe suitablefor SHEVSdesign ofa wide atrium
with a relativelylow ceiling.Unfortunatelythereis often
confusionaboutthevalidity ofvarious assumptionsand
calculationformulaeusedin the designprocess
It should be emphasized further that anySHEVS
designprocedure has 'assumptions' built intoit. It is
impossibleto do a smoke-control design from first
principleswithoutanyassumptions.Thus, it follows that
the enforcer ofregulations,and thebuilding'sowneror
developer, should insistthat the designer ofa system
should make all the assumptions explicit,and should state
the sourcesfor methodology and/or data.It is often the
case that the most worrying problemswith adesign arise
from unreasonable assumptions.Although itmay
sometimes be difficult to followthecalculation
methodology itis usuallypossibleto make a
commonsensejudgement about the validity ofthe
assumptions.
As the buildingsbecome more complicated,both in
size and geometry and alsowiththe introduction ofnew
innovativematerials andconstruction techniques,
formulaenormallyusedfor design ofsmoke control
systemsbecome less reliableandparticular careis needed
in the designprocess.In those scenariositmaybe
desirableforthe enforcer ofregulationsto seek asecond
opinion from an independent source ofexpertise.Ifthe
buildingis so complex that confidencein the design
process is low then it maybe desirableto do an 'in-situ'
commissioningfiretest to check the SHEVS designand
tofinetunethe system.A further advantage ofsuchatest
is that it may clearlyshow some implementation faults,eg
whetheradamper in a ducthas beeninstalledsuchthat i
opens in the 'wrong' direction in the eventofafire.The
testinvolvestheuse ofoneor more alcohol fires to
produce sufficient heat such that the hot buoyant gas
layerflows can bemonitored and the effectivenessofthe
SHEVScanbe assessed.Obviouslythe temperature must
alsobekept low enough so as notto cause any damage to
thebuilding.Non-toxic and non-corrosiveoil-mist
theatrical smokemay be injected into the fire plume if
visualizationofthe hot gas layer is desired. Such methods
have beendeveloped andusedsuccessfullyin the last few
years.
One otherproblemwith a smoke-control system is
maintenance and training ofstaffwhere needed. A
regular check on the system is essentialto ensure that it
will operate as designed,ifneeded. Also, intervention by
trained staffis sometimesbeneficial or even necessaryto
achieve satisfactoryevacuation oftheoccupants inthe
eventofafire. For example,calculationsdone atFRS'°°
indicated that the presenceoftrained stafftohelp with
evacuation isofgreatbenefit in large single-storey
buildings.Itis difficult to ensure that thereis a continual
training programme, particularlywhenthe 'ownership' of
a buildingchanges.

19 Acknowledgements
Theauthors ofthis bookwould like to record their
indebtednesstoDr G 0 Hansell, co-author ofDesin
approachesforsmokecontrolinatriumbuildizgsL'31, an earlier
BRE publication,some ofwhose texthasbeen carried
forwardintothispresentbook; and toMrJoris Verbeek of
IFSET for his work on the Figuresand Plates.
97
Theywould alsolike to statetheirappreciation cfthe
work ofCEN/TC191/SC1andoftherelated 'Mirror
Groups' in the national Standards Institutesinprep:aring
thedraftParts ofPrEN12101. Manyideas havedeveloped
andhavebeenclarifiedasaresult oftheirdiscussions.
98 ______ _____
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Annex A: Design procedure
with a growing design fire
Note: The principles described inAnnexBare applicable
hereaswell.
A.1 Choosea design fire curve
Thishasbeen discussedin moredetail in section 3.1.It
will also be necessaryto identifythe averageheat release
rate persquare metrefor the selected scenario.
A.2 Establish the required escapetime
Thismustbe done usingmethodsfrom sources outside
thefield ofsmoke ventilation.
A.3 Calculatetimes to danger, ie available
escape time
Useaniterative procedure basedontheprinciple ofa
'quasi-steady-state'calculation,wherethe growing fireis
treated as ifitis asuccessionofsteady fires, eachinits
owndefinedtimeinterval,with thewholeapproximating
tothe actual curve.This lends itselfwell to converting
intoa computer program, and can be muchmoregeneral
in applicationthan afullyanalyticalsolution,since the
latterwill yieldvery complicatedformulaefor all butthe
simplestofbuilding geometries.
(a) Selecta time incrementfor calculation
Toolargean increment will givepooraccuracy andcould
result in the calculationbeingmathematicallyunstable, ie
inherently unable to givethe correct answers.The
smaller the increment the more accurate the resultsof
this method ofcalculation,buttoo smallan increment
canleadtoarithmetical errorsarisingin computerswhich
specifynumbers byusing toofew digits.A one-second
increment seemsto work well with computer programs
inthe presentauthors' experience.
(b) Iterativeprocedure
• Identify mass ofsmoky gasesresident inthe smoke
reservoir atthe end ofthe previousiteration.
=0 forthe firstiteration.
• Set
Identifytotal heatresident inthesmoky gasesinthe
smokereservoir at the end ofthe
previous iteration.
101
=
0 forthefirstiteration.
• Set
Identifythe location ofthe buoyant smokelayers base
in thesmoke reservoiratthe end ofthe previous
iteration. Set= ceiling height for the first iteration.
Hence, identifythe height ofrise to the layer base at
thestartofthe current iteration.
• Using the appropriate growth curve identifiedearlier,
andthe heat-release rate identifiedearlier,calculate
theaveragefireperimeter during thetime interval for
thecurrentiteration.
• Calculatethe averageconvective heatfluxin the
smoky gasesduringthe time interval for the current
iteration.
• Usingthe heightofrise, the heat flux, and the fire
perimeter calculatetheaverage massflow rate of
smoky gasesentering the layer duringthe current
iteration, usingthe samemethods as for asteady-.state
designfire. Notethat thiswill cover both single-storey
geometries andthe more complicated atrium-like
• geometries.
Usingresults calculatedforthe layerfrom all previous
iterationsand steady-stateformulaefortheventilators,
calculatethe exhaust mass flow duringthe currenttime
interval.
• Fromand
the differencebetweenthemass entering the
layerthe mass calculatethe net
being exhausted,
mass ofsmokygases adding tothe layer duringthe
current increment. Ifthe exhaust is greater than the
flowrate entering the layer, defaultthe layer depthto
the depth ofaceiling-jet.
• From the differencebetweentheheat carried intothe
gasesand the heat being exhausted from the layer,
calculatethe net heat addingto the layerduringthe
current increment.
• Byadding the net addition ofmassto the massresident
atthestartofthe increment,calculatethe mass of
smoky gasesresident in the layer attheend ofthe
current increment.
• By adding the net addition ofheat to the heat resident
atthestartofthe increment,calculatethe heatresident
in thelayerat the end ofthe current increment. Note
that itis conventionalto ignoreheat lossesfrom the
layer otherthan by the exhaust gases,but one could
include the effectofsprinklercoolingifnecessary.
102 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Inclusionofheatlosses to the buildingstructure is A.4 Acceptability criteria for calculated
difficult.
• Calculate the excesstemperature ofthe gasesresiding times
in the layer at the end ofthecurrentincrement. Apply • Wherethe layercriteria
temperature ishigherthan the
before the 'timerequiredfor
the same 'maximumlayertemperature above ambient' 'steady-state'
criteria as for the steady-state design:ifthe layeristoo safety',the designis not acceptable.
end theiterationand branch out to section • Where the layer depthexceedsour 'steady-state'
•hot,
Using the mass of smoky gases
resident in the
and the
at the
layer
end
A.4.

ofthe
criteria earlier than the 'time required for safety',the
design not accpable.
is
temperature,

the smoke reservoir,calculatethe

layer
currentincrement, and theknown horizontal areaof
atthe
• Whenneither criterion is exceeded earlier thanthe
'time
layerdepth
end ofthe current increment. Notethat one can
introduce non-rectangular-section smoke reservoirsby
making the areaa function ofheight.
• Using minimumclear heightsspecifiedas forthe
steady-state designmethod, checkwhetherthe
calculated layerdepth has reachedthe deepest
acceptable limit. Ifit has, stop the iterativecalculation
and branch outto section A.4.
• Check whetherthe total time tothe end ofthe current
iteration has reached the 'time required forsafety'.Ifit
has, stop the iterativecalculation and branch out to
section A.4.
• Loop backtothe startofthe iterativeprocess and start
the calculationsforthe nexttimeinterval.
for the is
required safety', design acceptable in
principle,but stillhas tobe subjected to other criteria
specifiedinthe 'steady-state'design methodology.
A.5 Further acceptability criteria
The designershouldusethe layer depth and
temperature, and the exhaust mass flow rate, calculated
forthe final timeincrement to carry outthe same 'steady-
state'calculations such as minimumpossiblelayer depth
forflowto the exhaust ventilators,wind effects on
ventilators,air speedat escape doorsbeingusedas inlets,
etc.

Annex B: Design procedure
with a steady-state design fire
B.1 General introduction
Theflowofthermally buoyant gasesaway from afire,
through a building,intoasmoke reservoir,andtheir
exhaust from the buildingintothe surrounding
atmosphere, is influencedby many factors.Theseinclude
the shape ofthebuildingat eachpart oftheflow,and
external factors suchas wind pressures,snow loads, etc.
To be successfulasmoke exhaust ventilation system must
be designed in a waywhichincludesconsideration ofall
suchinfluences.
B.2 Identification of 'design regions' needed
in calculation
The designproceduremustconsider a successionof
zones(also called herein'design regions'),which
correspond to successivestagesin the path followedby
the smoky gases.
B.3 Zone-by-zonedeterministic calculation
procedure: single-storeyspaces
Forlargesingle-volumespaces (ie wheresmokerises
directly from the burning fuel to the thermally buoyant
layerin the smoke reservoir)thefollowingdesign regions
arenecessary.
(a) The fire
The designshouldbe based on a steady-statefire ofa size
appropriate to the buildingconcerned, as discussedin
Chapter 3.
(b)The plume above thefire, risingintothe smoke
reservoir
The heighttothe smoke base mustbespecifiedforlife-
safetyapplications.Somepossiblerequirements are listed
in TableBi. Themass flow rate ofsmoky gases entering
thereservoir is then calculated.
Fortemperature control designsthe temperature ofthe
buoyantsmoke layer must be specified; and the massflow
rate entering the layerand the height ofrise ofthe plume
arethen calculated.
103
Table Bi Minimum clear heightabove escape routes
Typeofbuilding Minimum height
Public buildings(eg single-storeymalls, 3.Om
exhibitionhalls) _______ _________ ____________
2.5 m
Non-publicbuilding (eg othces,
apartments, prisons) _____________ ____________ ________
Carparks Smaller of2.5 m or
0.8 times ceiling height
Note: These heightsapplyto single-storeysituations.Wheresmoke must rise throughanother
it
storeybeforereachingthe fisalsmoke reservoir, isusualtoaddanother0.5 mtoeachvalve.
(c) The smoke reservoirand ventilators
The smokereservoirmustbe ofsufficient depth; this
requires calculation ofthe minimum depthoflayer
necessaryfor gasestoflowfrom the plume's point of
entrytothe layer towards theventilators.
Thegases in thelayershallbe between acceptable high
and low temperature limits:thehigh limitbeing200 °C to
avoid painfulheatradiation on lightlyclad people
beneaththe smoke layer,thelow limitbeingmore
arbitrary buttypicallybeinga minimumdesignlayer
temperature of2O °C to avoid loss ofbuoyant stabilicy of
the layer.
Theareaofnatural ventilators (ie wherethegases are
propelled through the ventilatorsby the buoyant
pressure ofthe layerbeneaththe ventilator), or the
capacity ofpoweredventilators (usuallyfans),must be
calculatedto exhaust the same massflowrate as enters
the layer in the plume risingfrom thefire.
Note: Natural and powered smoke exhaust ventilators
should never be usedsimultaneouslyin the same smoke
reservoir.
(d) Effectof externalinfluences(eg wind and snow
The effectofexternal influencesmust be allowedforin
the design. This is particularlyimportant in decidingthe
location ofnatural ventilators and in choosingbetween
natural and powered smoke ventilators.In essence,n.o
natural ventilator should be located whereitmight
experience an overpressurefrom a wind.Wind-induced
overpressuresoccuronthe upwind sidesofbuildings, and
104
fora considerable distance on any lowersurfacesupwind
ofahigherstructure. Thepossibilityofsnow orice
affectingthe operation ofthe ventilators must also be
takenintoaccount whenspecifyingequipment.
(e)Airinlets(including anydoors servingas air inlets)
Thesemust allow sufficient replacement air to enterthe
buildingtoreplace the gasesbeing exhausted as smoke.If
they areusuallyclosed,theymust open on receipt ofthe
same signalthatoperatesthe rest ofthe smoke
ventilation system.The airspeed throughany inlets also
serving as escape doors (acommondesign feature) must
beless than 5 rn/sto avoid adverse effectson people
escaping throughthose doors. All inlet air must bebelow
the smoke layer and preferably moving at less than 1 rn/s
whenit enters the affectedzone. Powered inlet fans
should never beusedwith powered smokeexhaust fans,
in orderto avoid changing pressureforces on escape
doors asthe fire size changes.
Note: Ifthe provision ofinlet air is inadequate,the entire
smokeventilation system will be ineffective.
(f) Free-hanging smokecurtains
Wherepresent,these shallallow forthe effectsof
buoyancy-induceddeflection away from the vertical,and
must meetthe criteria forminimum leakagewheninthe
deflected position. Notethatthis aspect ofdesign and
specificationofsmokecurtains hasbeen largely
overlooked untilrecently, and doesnot feature in any
earlier design guides.Nevertheless, it is clear from
experiments at FRS971that deflectioncan be a serious
problemcapable ofjeopardizing the successofthe entire
smokeventilation design, especiallyfor lighter and
deeper curtains, unless the problemis properly addressed
by calculation duringthe designofthesystem andby
specifyingthe equipment to compensate andthus reduce
theproblemto harmless proportions.
(g) Suspended ceilings
Wherepresent,these can complicatetheflow ofsmoky
gases, and must be allowedfor in the design.
BA Zone-by-zonedeterministic calculation
procedure: complex flow path involving spill
plumes
Buildings wherethe initialplume above the fire is
intercepted by aceiling andthe smoketravels laterally
before spillingintoa higher adjacent space (egsee
Figure 5), require additionalstepsin the calculationof
smoke movement and ofthe entrainment ofair into
smoky gases. Examplesinclude multistorey shopping
malls, atriaand buildingswith mezzanine floors.
(a) The fire
The selectionofa designfire isas for the single-volume
space above.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
(b) Entrainment in, and flow outof, a side room
Theplumeabovethe fire is as above,butcan be
combined with the flowofsmoky gasesleavingthe
fireroom intoa single calculation.
(c) Smoke flowsbeneath a canopyor balcony,
approaching a spilledge
Wherea canopy (or the underside ofa balcony) projects
beyondthe fireroom's opening,the effectonthe smoke
flowatthe spilledge canbecalculated to find the mass
flowrateflowingtowards that edge. Ifthe smokeexhaust
ventilationdesign requires that smokebe contained
beneaththe canopy or balcony, andbe prevented from
spillingintothe adjacent space, the remainder ofthe
design calculationis essentiallyas for section B.3.
(d) Thespillplume
The mixingofair intothe spillplume as it risesto meet
the buoyant smokelayerunderthe ceilingmust be
calculated,to give the total massflow rateofgas entering
the smoke layer. Forlife-safetyapplicationsthe heightof
thebase ofthebuoyantlayerofsmoky gasesabove the
highest escape route open to the same space as the fire,
must be specified. It is usual to add 0.5 mto the minimum
valueslisted inTable B1.
For temperature control systemsthe temperature of
thegases in the smokereservoir (ie in the layer)shall be
specifiedand the mass flowentering the layercalculated.
Thecalculationprocedures for the spillplume canbe
usedtofind theheightto thesmoke layer base.
Where thereare higher balconies above the spilledge
the designmust takeintoaccount thebreadthofthe
balconies,iethe distance betweenthe edgeofthe balcony
and thewall (or glazedfacade).This affectsthe abilityof
airto move betweenthe plume and the facade,and
determines whetherthe plume willthrowitselfclear of
the wall or be pulled backagainst it to smokelog the
higherbalconies.
(e)Thesmoke reservoir
All calculationsand requirements from sections
B.3 (c)—(f) shallalso apply to the presentcase.
(f) Atriumdepressurization
Wherethe pressures in the smokelayerin an atrium are
to be reduced belowambient to prevent smokemoving
intorooms adjacent tothat atrium, theeffects ofwind
pressures on the outsideofthebuildingmust be included
in thedesign calculations.
B.5 Integrating the SHEVSinto the building
Compatibilitywith other safety and buildingsystems in
the same buildingis essential.Itis also acommon
experience that any safetymeasures which interfere with
the building'severyday use willbe 'deactivated' for the
sake ofconvenience.This practicaland psychological
problem can be greatly reduced ifthefire-safety
measures are properly integrated intothe buildingdesign

atanearlystage. It is still common practice in all
countries,unfortunately,to designthefire-safety
measures intothe buildingalmost as an afterthought.
This reduces the chances ofthose measuresremaining
effective over the building'slife, and is also likelyto
increase the initialcostofthefire-safetymeasures.
B.6Computer-based design calculations
Wherecomputer-based zonemodels areusedto carry
outcalculationsaspart ofthe designprocess,all
AnnexB: Design procedure — steady-stateftre 105
mathematical formulaeusedin those models,
assumptions made, and valuesofinputparameters should
be explicitlyincludedinthe documentation made
availabletotheownerofthebuilding,andto the enforcer
ofregulationsiftheyrequire it.
In addition,informationconcerningvalidationofthe
computer-basedzone modelsusedin design should be
included in the documentation.Wheresuch validation
informationexistsinthepubliclyavailableliterature it
oughtto be sufficient to cite appropriate references.
106 ________ ____

Annex C: Deflection of
smoke curtains

C.1 Principle
In SHEVSsmoke curtains areusedto create reservoirs
whichwill contain smoke andhot gases.To fulfil that role
theymustresist the sidewaysdeflection causedby the
buoyancy-drivenforces due tohot gases, orthefan-
induced forcesin mechanical exhaust systems.
Iftheydo notresist those forces, gapsmight occur
beneaththe curtain orbetweenthe curtain andthe
building structure,leading to the flowofhot gases from d1
thereservoir intoadjacent areas.
Theoretical andexperimental workhas shown that the
deflectionofasmoke curtain andthe flow ofhot gases C
N
through gapsin itcan berelated to the hot gas layer
contained bythe curtain.
ThisAnnex considers the deflectionoffree-hanging A
curtains only, as those whichare fixed atboth ceilingand
floor and/orsidesare effectivelylocked inplace and will
not be subjectto deflection.The methodofcalculationof
the leakagethroughgaps inthe curtains is validfor all
types ofcurtains. FigureCl Defleclionofa smoke curtainwhichdoes not reach
Free-hanging smoke curtainscan bedivided intotwo the floor
categories:
• those whichact to contain agas layer whichdoesnot
extend below the bottom ofthe curtain (FigureCl) (eg C.2Curtains not reaching the floor
reservoir screens and channelling screens),
• thosewhichfallto floor level and act completelyto Thedeflectionofthe curtain is calculated following
seal areas from asmoke compartment in whichthe gas reference [97] (FigureCl):
layer extends belowthe bottomofthe curtain (Figure
C2) (such as mightbeinstalled along balconies to form d =1.2 p061D
(Ct)
a closed atrium). 3T/(2Mb+MCLC)
Thetypes will bereferred to as those which do notreach
the floor andthosewhichclose an opening, respectively. where:
d = deflection ofthe curtain (m),
Thepressure ofgases acting onthesmoke curtain will p0 = density ofambient air (kgm3),
cause it to deflect from the normal verticallyhanging 01
= temperaturerise above ambient ofthegases in the
position. Thathorizontal deflectionofthe curtain causes smokelayer (°C),
the bottomofthe curtain to rise, whichcould leadto D1
= depthofthegas layer (m),
leakage ofgasunderneath the curtain ifthe rise takes the T = absolutetemperature ofthegas (K),
bottomofthe curtain above thebase ofthegas layer. Mb = mass per metrelengthofthe curtain'sbottombar
Because the curtainsare not rigid, they are alsolikelyto (kgnf'),
bowinuse, like a sail inthe wind. Such bowing will lead M == mass per m2ofthecurtainfabric (kgm2),
to afurther riseofthebottomofthe curtain. L to bottom
length ofthe smoke curtain from top
bar, measured along thefabric (m).
 AnnexC: Deflection of smoke curtains 107

o L=zd0+d (C.5)

Theprocedure is:
d0 \Lc 1 assumea valuefor L d0,
2 calculatedusingEqn (C.4),
3 calculateLusing Eqn (C.5).
d1
Repeat steps 1—3withthenewvalueofL, until
C successivevaluesof differby 1% or less.
L
The calculatedvaluefor L must thenbe modifiedby
floor
includinga termto allow forbowing ofthecurtain as for
curtainsnot reachingthe floor,so that:
window
L(fiflal)
= L+ 1.7 (L
—
d0) (C.6)

C.4 Smoke leakage through gaps in

FigureC2 Deflection ofa smoke curtainclosingan opening
The lengthofthe curtain to contain a gas layerofdepth
D1 is calculated using an iterativeprocedure:
curtains
The leakageofsmokeand hot gas throughverticalgaps
at theedges ofsmokecurtains canbe related to thehot
gas layer that they contain bythe followingequaticn101:
1/2

M =A 352.172gDiO1 (C.7)
l\ T )l T0 )
g

L=D1+d (C.2)
where:
=
Mg mass ofgas flowingthrough the gap (kgs),
Ag areaofthe gap (m2),
==

Theprocedure is: T1 = absolutetemperature ofthe gasesinthe layer (K),

1 assume astarting valuefor L
D1, T0 = absoluteambient temperature (K),
d
2 calculate usingEqn (Cl), = depth ofgas in reservoir (m),
3 calculatenextvalue ofL usingEqn (C.2). g = accelerationdue to gravity(ms),
= temperaturerise above ambient ofthegas (°C).
Repeatsteps1—3with the newvalue ofL, until
successivevalues ofL differ by 1% orless. The gasesflowingthroughcurtain gaps will entrain air as
The calculated valuefor L must then be modifiedby theyrise totheceiling,and maycause the formation ofa
includinga termto allow for bowing ofthe curtain9,so smoky gas layerwithin the areawhichthe curtains are
that: intended to protect. Suchagas layerwill be considerably
cooler than that within the main reservoir.Wherea
L(fil)= L + 1.7 (L—D1) (C.3) smoke layerforms within the areaintended tobe
protectedbythesmoke curtains,then it maybe necessary
to consider further measures toprotectoccupants.Such
C.3Curtains closing an opening entrainment has notbeen closely studied,butpreliminary
research'°'1 suggeststhatthe mass entrained can be
The deflectionofthe curtain is calculatedfrom (see related tothe mass flowingthroughthe gapsto give a
FigureC2): conservativeestimate ofthe smokerisingto the ceiling.

M = 6Mh (C.8)
d C
12p0O(3D1—2d0)d (C.4)
g

3T1(2Mb+MCLC) where:
whered0 istheheightofthe opening (m) andother
variablesare as definedabove.
M = mass ofgas flowingintogas layer in protected area
(kgsj,
The required curtain length to contain agas layer of =
Mg mass ofgas flowingthroughagap in asmoke
depthD1 is calculatedusing an iterativeprocedure: curtain
(kgs'),
h = height ofrise from the base ofthe hot gas layerin
108 __________ Design methodologies for SHEVS _____
the reservoirto the ceilingin the protectedarea.
NIg o
Note:This equation is derived from a smallnumber of = (K) (C.9)
experiments'°1. It is desirableto extend thestudy further
to confirmthe derived correlation.
where =temperature above ambient ofthe smoke
Acalculationprocedure for thetemperature ofthe gas layerinitiallyforming (ignoringanysubsequent cooling)
layerwithin the protected areais: inthe protected reservoir adjacent to the leakage (°C).
 109

Annex D: A comparison of different

spill-plume calculation methods

D.1 The example scenario reservoir,it is necessaryto specifythe heightofthe

Thespill-plumemethodsdescribedin section 6.3.2apply
to differingscenarios.The limited shared features of
these methods dictate that a comparisonmustbebased
on a scenarioinvolvinga large-area smokereservoir,with
afreeplume risingfrom thespill edge. Oneofthemost
common ofsuchscenariosisamultistorey shopping mall,
wherethe fire islocatedin ashopandthe smoke travels
out ofthe shop and is channelledto alengthofspilledge.
Thefollowingtypical example ofashopunitscenario
is usedas the basisforcomparison.
Shop width= 10m, having no downstand facia (chosen to
remove amajor areaofuncertainty inthe calculation).
Storeyheight=5 m, simplifiedforpurposes ofthis
exampleso thatthe shop opening is takenas 5 mhigh.
Assuming asteady-state designfire:
Convectiveheatfiuxleaving the shop = 5000kW, coming
from a 3 m x 3 mfire having aperimeter of12 m.
Becausethe shop widthisless than 5 times the side ofthe
fire (seesection 5.1) Ce inEqns (5.2) and (5.7) = 0.34.
The smokeis channelleddirectly to the spilledge overa
lengthofedge of10 m.
Thereis no downstand atthe void edge.
ceilingin the mall in orderto be ableto use the 'effective
layer depth correction' in assessingthe effective heightof
rise ofthe spillplume foruse inthe BRE method. ftdoes
notaffectthe othermethods. Weconsider heretwo
••
ceilingheights:
15 m above the floor, and
11 m above the floor.
See FigureDl which illustratesthe dimensionsofthis
example.
Itis nownecessaryto calculatethe mass flowentering a
visiblesmoke layer base atdifferentheights above the
spilledge, within a smokereservoirformed beneaththe
ceiling.Results are listedbelowand are shown
graphicallyin FigureD2. The Thomas (1987) method has
not beenincludedinits unmodifiedform in view ofthe
uncertainties surroundingthe choiceofanappropriate
value ofAforthe circumstancesofthisexample.The
method has been usedinits modifiedform wherethe
valueofAis calculatedusing Poreh's method.

UsingEqn (5.7):
Massflowrateofgases approaching spilledge=
29.2 kg/s.

Using Eqn (5.11):

Depth ofsmokelayerapproaching spilledge = 1.19 m.

A more precise calculationispossibleusingEqn (E.3),

wherethetemperature dependence ofthe parameter KM
can beincluded for still greater accuracy521,givinga
depthof1.14 m.This lastvaluehasbeen used inthe
present calculation,although Eqn (5.11) alone is
sufficiently accurate for normal designpurposes. FigureDl Idealized shopping mall:example for comparingspill
Hence atthe spilledge we have for the approach flow: plume calculation methods
Q= 5000kW
M7= 29.2 kg/s
D= 1.14m
Becausethe example stipulatesa large-areasmoke
110 Design methodologies for SHEVS

D.2 BRE method D.3 Thomaset al (1998) method

(a) 15 m ceiling Calculationswere done using Eqns 6.7and 6.8. Results
Theresultsofapplying section 6.3.2 (a) andAnnex Eare arelisted inTable D.3 and areshown in FigureD2.
shown in TableD.1.

Table D.1 Entrainment intothe example spill plume: Table D.3 Entrainment into theexample spill plume:
BRE_method,_15_m_ceiling ________ Thomas etal (1998) method
Heightofvisible Mass flow rateof Height ofvisible Massflowrateof
smoke base smoky gasesentering smoke base smoky gasesentering
above spill edge smoke layer above spill edge smoke layer
(m) (kg/s) (m) (kg/s)

3.6 105 2 ___________ 75 ________

5.24 146 4 102 __________
6.83 189 6 __________ 129 __________
8.41 239 8 156
10 285 10 _____ 183

(b) 11 m ceiling
The resultsofapplying section 6.3.2 (a) and Annex E are
showninTable D.2. D.4 Poreh et al method
Calculationsweredone usingEqns 6.3 and 6.4. Results
Table D.2 Entrainment into theexample spill plume: arelisted in TableD.4, and areplottedgraphicallyin
BRE method, 11 m ceiling FigureD2.
HeightofvisibJe Massflowrate of
smoke base smoky gasesentering Table D.4 Entrainment intothe example spill plume:
above spilledge smoke layer Poreh method
(m) (kg/s) Height ofvisible Mass flowrate of
smoke base smoky gasesentering
2.04 84.3 above spilledge smoke layer
2.83 105
(m) (kg/s)
3.62 124
4.41 146 2 69
5.21 167 4 94
6 189 6 119
8 144
10 170

E
0
0
IL 15
>
0
.0
a)
Co

10
a)
0
E
Cl)
- x BRE-method-iSm ceiling
It) o gRE-method - lim ceiling
.0
(It 5 + Thomas Ctal(1998) method
>
0 0 Poreh etal method

.0
[odiiedThomas)l987)method
It)
0
50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290
Mass FlowRate in Spill Plume (kg/s)

FigureD2 Spill plume entrainment: comparisonofcalculation methods

 AnnexD: Spill-plume calculation methods 111

D.5 Thomas(1987) using Poreh method to theThomas (1987) method. It does, however,suggest
thatthis method isnotready yetfor general
calculate A.
Calculationswere done usingEqns 6.5 and 6.6.Results • application.
TheThomas methodwith calculatedusing
(1987) zX
arelisted in TableD.5 and areshown graphicallyin Poreh's method (Eqn isinclose agreement with
6.6)
FigureD2. theBRE methodsthroughout theheightrange.
• The Thomas method
(1998) isin reasonable
Table D.5Entrainment into theexample spill plume: agreement (althoughthe end-entrainment
Modified Thomas (1987)using Porehmethodto calculate A contributionissurprisinglysmall) forlesserheights of
Height ofvisible Massflowrate of rise (perhaps acceptablyso for heightsup to around 4
smoke base smokygases entering m for designpurposes). Thereis a large andgrowing
above spill edge smoke layer discrepancycompared with the BREand the modified
(m) (kg/s) Thomas (1987) methods above this height.

2 97.5 Itis generallytruethat designsbased on thelarger mass-

4 136
6 177
8 219
10 263
D.6 Discussionand conclusions
It canbe seenfrom FigureD2that:
I The Porehmethod, while applicableto situations
whereend effectsare to
unimportant, appears predict
consistently the lowest entrainment. This is not
surprisingin view ofthe absence ofanyend-
entrainment terms. This is unlikelyto matter where
the plume is very narrow, suchas inthe 'virtual'partof
flowvalues are conservativein terms ofsafety. We can
alsonote thatforthe verydifferentcircumstanceo:Fthe
European Parliament hot smoketest (adhered plume
with end entrainment, 1 MWfire, twofiretrays, large
smokereservoir)[69J (summarizedinAnnexJ), the BRE
method predicted asmoke layerbase within measuring
error ofthe observedvisualsmoke layerbase. Whilethis
is not complete validationofthe BREmethod, this good
agreement represents a major extension ofthe 'envelope'
ofvalidationand as suchtendsto lend added confidence
in that method. By extension,we caninferthat it also
lends greaterconfidenceinthe modifiedThomas(1987)
method for the freeplume example cited inthisAnnex.
Noneofthe othermethods described in this bookcanbe
applied to this hot-smoke test scenario.
112 ______ ______ _____________ ____

Annex E: User's guide to•

BRE spill-plume calculations

Note: This Annex usesa differentnomenclature to the
rest ofthisbook:seethe nomenclature listatthe end of
theAnnex.
E 1 Introduction
FRS has carried out anumberofstudies intothe
movement ofsmokeinbuildings.Part ofthis bookhas
resulted inthe development ofatheoryby Morgan &
Marshall251 to estimate the amount ofair entrained into
free(ordouble-sided) thermalspillplumes (Figure24b).
Thiscalculation method is important forsmoke-control
design in that it enables the designer to calculatethe
required fan capacity or vent areafor asmoke ventilation
system forlarge undividedvolume buildings(egmulti-
level shoppingmallsand atria). Anumberofstudies have
since been carried outwhichhave resulted in the
modificationofthe originaltheoryto include morerecen:
workon thermally buoyant horizontal flows271and
adhered (or attached, or wall, or single-sided)
plumes2761 (Figure24a).
The calculationscanbe done using an electronic
calculator havingfrill scientificfunctions.This, however,
maybetime-consuming,particularlywherethe designer
wishes tolookata numberofgeometries or conditions.
Thecalculationscaneasilybeincorporated in a computer
program wherefrequent calculationsare required. An
alternative method to FigureEl isgiven laterin this
Annex in order to facilitatesuch programming.
Many ofthe variablesusedin equations in this Annex
do not appear in the main bodyofthebook. To avoid
unnecessary complicationsfor the reader who doesnot
wish to use this calculationprocedure, thisAnnex is
providedwith a separate listofnomenclature.

———b
a
>,
0
C—.
a.
0—
— .i.
o
a
CCC
000
CCC
EEE
000

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Modifieddistanceabovevirtual
soinrceI (v)

FigureEl Graphical representation ofthe theoreticalsolution for a plume issuing from a restrainedsource F < 1

E.2 Scenariosand assumptions
The calculationmethodstrictlyonly appliesto fire
scenarioswherea horizontallyflowing,thermally
buoyant layer ofsmoky gases approaches avoid, through
which those gases then rise. Morespecifically, the
followingassumptions aremade.
•Thisapproachflow is assumedto be beneath aflat
ceiling(ora downstand) atthe edge ofthe void.
•It is channelled bydownstands (which may be either
walls or channellingscreens).
•Theflowhas flow-lineswhichareeverywhere parallel
and which approach the edge ofthe void at a right-
• Theapproach flowis also assumedto be
angle.
fully
•• There
developed.
is no immersed ceilingjet.
It is alsoassumed that thevelocity ofthe clear air
belowthe smoke has avalue smaller
layer thanthat of
the layer itself
Fortunately,these assumptions correspond tomany
practical scenariosofinterest to designers.
Further, it should be notedthatexperimental
evidence611 suggeststhat the calculationprocedure
whichis the subjectofthis guide should not be usedfor
approach flow layertemperatures higher than about
350 °C. Accuratemethodsforhigher temperatures do not
yetexist. Thepresentmethod significantly overpredicts
the mixingofair intothe risinghotgases forhigher
temperatures.
In practice, the designer willhave arrived at thekey
parameters oftheapproach flow by some calculation
procedure independent ofthe presentguide. For
example,byusingEqns(5.7) and (5.8)to calculatethe
flowofsmoky gases passingfrom aroom intoan atrium
void. Another example is whereasingle-storeymall
allowssmoke to risethroughthevoid ofa two-storey
mall: here,the flow in the single-storeymall canbe
calculated in the usual wayusing, forexample, sections
5.2 and 5.3 ofthis book.
E.3 Outline of procedure
The calculationproceedsin discrete stages:
1 Thedesigner mustknow:
(a) the internalgeometry ofhis building,including
relevant channel widths,
(b) at least two ofthe keyparameters ofthe approach
flow;usefulpairs are:
massflow/heatflux,
massflow/meanlayertemperature,
mass flow/ceiling temperature,
heat flux/mean layertemperature,
heat flux/ceilingtemperature,
heatflux/layer depth,
layer depth/meanlayertemperature,
layer depth/ceiling temperature.
2 Usingtheknown parameters for the approach flow,
AnnexE: BRE spilplume calculations 113
calculatethe remaining parameters ofthe flow.
3 Using theresultsfrom theprecedingstage, calcuLlate
the entrainment into the flow as it rotates around the
void edge, ieas the smoky gases change from a
horizontallymoving flowto a verticallymovingflow.
Bythe end ofthis stage thekeyparameters requiredfor
thenextstage ofcalculationofthevertically moving
gases willbeknown at the horizontal plane passing
throughtheceiling/void edge. Theseparameters are
the heatflux, the verticallymoving massflux, and the
kinetic energy ofthe gases (this last is based only on
the verticalcomponent ofvelocity).
4 Theplume at greater heightsbehaves asifit risesfrom
an infinitelywide source located in thehorizontal
plane passingthrough the ceiling/void edge, where
that sourcehashorizontal profiles ofbothbuoyancy
and (theverticalcomponent of) velocitywhichcanbe
describedbyGaussianfunctions.This sourceis, of
course,virtual. We have followedLee &Emmons102
in usingthis source, and indeed in the method of
calculatingthe plume above this source.The BRE
method follows Lee& Emmons in callingthis source
an 'EquivalentGaussian Source'.
Calculate the keyparameters ofthe Equivalent
Gaussian Sourceby ensuringthat the three key
parameters from stage 3 abovekeep the same values.
5 Knowingtheheightabove theceiling/void edge (eg
this islikelyto bechosento be equal tothe smokelayer
base inthe reservoirabove the void),calculatethe
entrainment intothe spillplume. This calculation
treats the plume as aperfect 2-D plume havinga Jength
equalto the widthofthe channel ofthe approach flow.
It is important thatthe designer firstidentifieswhether
the'effective heightofrise' discussedin section 6.1 of
the main textofthepresentworkapplies tohis/her
circumstances.
6 Calculatetheadditional entrainment intothefree ends
ofthe plume.This assumesthat the bulk ofthe plume is
relativelyunaffectedbythese end effects; this is
reasonablefor plume heightstypicallysmaller than or
comparableto the plume length[62.
E.4 Detailed calculation procedure
E.4.1Deriving key approach-flow parameters
Complete allnecessarypre-calculationsto derive the key
parameters ofthe approach flow described in stage 1(b)
above.
E.4.2 Determingremaining approach-flow parameters
Select from the followingEqns(from27)to determine the
remaining parameters forthe approach flow from the
initialknown parameters. —
Calculatethe meanlayertemperature (0w):
(K) (E.1)
Calculatethe mass flowrate (Mw)at the opening52]:
114 _____ __________ Design methodologies for SHEVS
anomalous entrainment above the spilledge as ifit
M= C312 (2gO7)"2 dW3/2cM (kg s) (E.2) occurred in the rotation region.
Ifthe line plume issingle-sidedgo to E.4.7after
where: completion ofthis step.
p0 = 1.22 kgm3for an ambient temperature T0of288K,
Cd = 0.6 for opening with a deep downstand or 1.0 for E.4.4 Calculate the Equivalent GaussianSource:
no dowristand, First convert Qand M into the corresponding
g 9.81 ms2, parameters perunitlengthofplume (ie divide bythe
= 1.3 for most typicalflowinglayers. O
channel width (W) to give and A). Then solve the
followingEqns:
The depthofthelayer(d)at the opening is thengiven
1
by521: (E.1C
[Notethe importance ofknowing whetherthereisa [ T0cjp0J
downstand running along the edgeofthe void (and thus
at right angles to thedirection oftheflow), becausethis
changes the valueofCd.] [9J — Il+A2
________ (E.1J)
r ,2/3 LT]G F Q0
3M7 Tctl A+—
d =[2C2Kwp(2gOT)1/2] I
(m) (E.3) 0[ T0c

wherethe empiricalthermalconstant'°21 2= 0.9:

The mass-weightedaveragetemperature O ofthe gas

]
2B
layer ist52: c= (E.12)
— Fe ____
O —0
K
(K) (E.4) PoL[]i32
wherelcQ =0.95 for most typicalflowinglayers.
Greater accuracycan be achievedby calculatingthe
values ofthe profilecorrection factor 1M and KQusingthe
temperature-dependent formulaein52, although this is
usuallyunnecessary for mostpractical designs.
UG

and
- (E.1)

Thelayer's characteristicvelocity (v) is given by271: bG

= (E.14)
1/3

v = 0.96 CdKM [ gQT (m s') (E.5)

IC0 LCP0IW'o]
1
where []
G U(; and bG are parameters ofthe Equivalent
GaussianSource.
Fora deep downstand, whereCd = 0.6,this becomes:
1/3 E.4.5 Calculate theentrainmentintotherising plume:
= 0.761 gQT 1 (m s') (E.6)
The SourceFroudenumber(F) forthe line plume is251:
[cp0WT2o]
Withno downstand at the opening,Cd= 1.0, and F= UG
1/2 (E.15)
1/3
[2 (gb)
V = 1.271 gQT 1 (ms) (E.7)
LcP0WT2o] wherea = 0.16 for double-sided'°2 and 0.077 for single-
Calculatethehorizontal flux(B) ofvertical buoyant sided61 line plumes. Calculatethe transformed
potential energy27'251 (relativeto the voidedge): parameter (DG) forthe Equivalent GaussianSource:
1
Vg (E.16)
B=1Q.gvd2 (Wm1) (E.8) (1— F2)'3

I
Determine the valueof (1g) by usingthe following
E.4.3 Calculate themass flux (Mr) rising pastthevoid procedure (or the alternative procedure ofE.6below):
edge271:
represents a valueon the vertical axisofFigure El.
M3, poWa'(2g )2d 3/2
+M (kgs1) (E.9)
Lookacross to the middle solid curve and findthe
correspondingvalueofIi(uc;) on the other axis.
wheretheentrainment constant a = 1.1.
Note: cC takes sucha large valueas aresult oftreatingall Calculate the transformed heightparameter ofx'
 AnnexE: BRE spill-plumecalculations 115

correspondingto the desired plume height (x), noting SMr=4biia XPo (kgs1) (E.26)
thatxmust be setequal totheappropriate effective
heightofrise identifiedin section 6.1 ofChapter 6 ofthis
book. where:
2 x
x/ =—a— (E.17) E= (ba +b) (E.27)
(m)
2
Next calculateA11(u):
(;±u) (m) (E.28)
Al1(v) = (E.18)
[F2(1— F2)]113
Notethatwhile the originalderivation was semi-
and empirical,thistreatmentis equivalentto regarding the
freeends ofthe line plume as iftheywere themselvesline
11(v)= 11(v0)+M1(v) (E.19) plumesoflength2b at eachend, although the
parameter btakes its valuesfrom the properties ofthe
Determine valuesofb, p andu' correspondingto the main line plume itself
calculated valueofT1(n) usingthe followingmethodor an Addthis to theplume entrainment result from E4.5 to
alternativeprocedure which is setoutin E.7below. obtain the total mass flowMrofsmokygases risingpast
11(u) represents a valueonthe horizontal axis ofFigure thespecifiedheight(x), ie:
El. Usingthis valuefindthecorrespondingvalues (from
allthree curves) foru, p and b. Then use the following Mr=mrW + öMr (kg s') (E.29)
equations todetermine u', p and b':
It should benotedthat where both endsofa plume are
u'= u"F'1'3 (E.20) bounded by sidewalls (egas in a shaft)then öMr=0.
1
(E.21) E.4.7 Modifications to the above procedure for single-
(1—F2)1°p' sided27'611(or adhered) line plumes
Convert both the Equivalent GaussianSource and the
b'= b"[F2 (1— F2)]113 (E.22) plume intoacomposite ofa real andanimaginary balf
suchthatthe centreline ofthe composite lies along the
Nextdetermine thecharacteristichalf-width (b) ofthe verticalwallto whichthe plume is adhering. This is done
line plume251atheightx: bydoubling valuesfor B, M (and henceA), and Qfrom
b= b'bg E23" E.4.3)before returning to E.4.4—E.4.6 above. Note that
experiments [61] show thatthe valueofa needed in
Then calculatethe axial vertical velocity component E.4.4—E.4.6 should change valuefrom 0.16 (valid for a
(u) ofthe gases at height x: free- or double-sidedplume) to 0.077 forthe adhered
plume.
usc-
F (E.24) Oncompleting E.4.6, halvethe final valueofmass flow
Mrrisingpast thedesired plume height(x).
Calculate the massflow per unitplume length (mr)
passingthe chosen height25x: E.5 Limits to spill-plume entrainment
calculations
=
Poub[1 '[] (1 +A 2)112]
(kg s1 It isknown from experimental studies with free plumes
thatfor heights ofrisefrom the spilledgeto thevisible
Convert tothetotalmassflow in the line plume smoke layer base ofless than 3 m, no current theory
(ignoringend-effects)bymultiplyingEqn (E.25) by the adequately describes the entrainment. The mass flow
channel width(ie mrW). ratespredicted bytheoryaregreaterthan observed in
practice. Whereheights ofrise less than 3 m occur,this
E.4.6 Calculate the entrainmentöMr125'62 intothe free over-prediction ofentrainment will usuallyprovide an
ends ofthe line plume additionalsafetymargin inthe provision ofsmoke
The widthoftheline plume (and alsoits axial velocity) exhaust ventilation.
canbe taken asbeingapproximatelyconstantfor most of
itsheightas a first-order approximation,and equal tothe E.6 Alternative method for determination
meanofthevalues atthe EquivalentGaussian Source and
atthechosen heightx. Of l(Ug)
The entrainment öMrintoboth endsofthe line plume IfDg 1.549 then Ti(Ug) = (ug_ 0.75)/O.9607
is then623: IfDg 1.549 and 1.242
116 Design methodologies for SHEVS

then Ii(Dg) = (lJg— 0.843)/0.8594 Nomenclature used in Annex E

If 1.242 andhg> 1.059
then11(Ug) = (hg— 0.9429)/0.6243 Parameters
= — A Upward mass flowrate per metreacross the
IfDg<1.059 then hi(hg) (hg 1.0)/0.3714
horizontal planethroughthe balcony (kgs1m')
b Characteristichalf-width ofline plume at height x
E.7 Alternative method for calculating value b' Dimensionlesshalf-width oflineplume
of b', p' and u' B Potential energy fluxpermetre ofhorizontal gas
E7.1 Determination of u stream approaching spilledge (Wm1)
1f11(l))> 1.896then u' = 1.0 Cd Coefficientofdischarge
>0.786 and I1(D) 1.896 c Specific heatatconstantpressure ofgas (kJ kg'°C-1)
thenu' = 0.090811(u) + 0.821 d Depthofgas stream beneathceiling (m)
IfI(u) 0.786then u' =11(u)°35 F Source Froude number(for line plume)
g Accelerationdue togravity (ms2)
E.7.2Determination of p"
= + 0.75
Im Transformedheight(dimensionless)
Mass flow rate per unitwidthofgas stream
1f11(u) >0.832 then p' 0.960711(D)
1f11(i) >0.464 and I() 0.832 (kg m's')
thenp' = 0.859411(D)+ 0.8429 6m Mass per second per metreofair entrained intohot
If11(u) >0.186 and 11(D) 0.464 gas stream at corridor ceilingedge (kg ms1)
then p' =0.624311(o) + 0.9429 M Mass flow rate ofgases (kgs1)
=
1f11(o) 0.186 then p' O.371411(u) + 1.0 M Mass persecond ofair entrained intofree endsof
plume (kgs 1)
E.7.3Determination of b p Dimensionlessbuoyancy on plume axis
=
1f11(u) >2.161 then b' 0.93811(u) + 0.82 Q Heat fluxin the gas (kW)
1f11(i) 2.161 andI(ii) > 1.296 Q0 Heatflux per second per unitwidthofgasflow
then b' =0.8911(u) + 0.95 (kWm1)
1f11(D) 1.296 and I(u) >0.896 T Absolute gas temperature (K)
then b'=0.8111(v)+ 1.071 u Verticalgas velocity at height x (ms')
1f11(o) 0.896and 11(u) >0.65 u' Dimensionlessvertical gas velocity
then b" =0.619I(o)+ 1.214 v Horizontal velocitycomponentofgas (ms')
IfI(h) 0.65 and 11(u) >0.543 W Widthofgas flow (m)
thenb"=0.33111(h)+ 1.414 x Heightofclear layerabovefire
1f11(i) 0.543 and11(u) > 0.421 compartment/balcony (ie spill) edge (m)
thenb' = 0.062711(D) + 1.55 x' Dimensionlessvariable
=
1f11(u) 0.421 and 11(D) >0.348then b" 1821 0.6I(o)
— cx Entrainment constant for plume (0.077 and 0.16 for
1f11('u) 0.348then b'
= single-sidedand double-sided plumes)
cx' Entrainment constant for air mixingintogases
Now calculateu', p andb' from Eqns(E.20)—(E.22)in rotating aroundahorizontal edge
E.4.5 KM Profile correction factor for mass flow (approx. 1.3)
Profilecorrection factorfor heat flux(approx.0.95)
? Anempiricalthermalplume constant(?= 0.9)
p Gasdensity (kgm3)
0 Excess temperature ofgases above ambient
temperature (°C)
v Transformedreciprocal ofbuoyancy
(dimensionless)
Function definedin Eqn (ElO)
Function defined in Eqn (E12)

List of subscripts
o Anambient property
c Variableevaluated athighestpointin a flow
(but outside anyboundary layer)
g A propertyofthe equivalentGaussian source
r Base ofceilingsmokereservoir
w Variableevaluatedinthe horizontal flow at opening
y Variable evaluated invertical flowpast top of
opening

Annex F: 1977 fire at IMF building,
Washington DC
(based on reference [181)
Casehistory: Fire atIMF Building, WashingtonDC, in 1977
Building 13-storey.square-shapedreinforced concrete
office buildingwith penthouse, basementand
4-storeyundergroundgarage
Atrium Acentrally situated enclosed courtyard created the
atrium. Thewindows otthe offices facingthe
atrium were of6.35mm plate glass
Dateoffire 13May1977
Locationoffire 10th-floor office
Fire protection
Two ventilationsystemsrecirculated air atthetop ofthe
atrium, andatthe base oftheatrium therewas an air-
handling unit. Smoke detectors wereprovided at the fans
ofthe air-handlingunitand were arranged to shut down
thefans whenthe detectors activated. Theunits could be
manuallyrestarted and put on exhaust. The general office
areawasfedbypenthouse air-handlingunits that could
go intoa 'smoke-purge mode' iftheywererunning when
afire occurred. Noneofthe above systemswas in
operation at the time ofthe fire.
Theroofofthe atrium was madeofclear plasticpanels.
Sixcustom-made smokeventilators were provided in the
atrium's roofcomprising clear plasticpanels onhinges
FigureFl Plan ofthe 10th floor ofthe IMF building showing
locationofthe office where the fire started
117
equipped with springsand release mechanisms.The
release devicewas operated by one smokedetector
locatedin theatrium roofFusiblelinks onindividual
ventilators were alsofitted. Sprinklerswereprovided at
rooflevel in the atrium andthe buildingwasequipped
with manual fire-alarmpoints and hydrant valveson each
floor.
The fire
At 6.45 pma worker discovereda fire in asmalloffice
(3 mx 4.6 m) onthe 10th floor (seeFigureFl for aplanof
this floor).The Fire Brigadereceived the alarm at
7.01 pm. On arrival,firemen found fireventing from the
office window into the atrium. The firefloor was hoi: and
smoky andthis, coupled with the fact thatthe fire
involvedaninner office, made locating the fire difficult.
Thick black smokeissuingfrom the office hadbuiltclown
from the roofofthe atrium tobelowthe 10thfloor.
Although the smoke detectorhad operated, only two
ofthe sixsmokeventilators had opened. TheotherIbur
had released butthespringshad lostsufficientstrengthto
open themfully. These units had to bemanuallyopened
from outside. Smoke however did not vent effectively
and atonestage completelysmoke-loggedthe atrium.
Smoke extractors could notbeconnected to the smoke
ventilators and so firemen usedlargeextractors pointed
upward from the atrium ground floor to pull fresh air
from the frontdoorsand pushsmoke upwards andout
throughthe ventilators.Nobuildingengineeringstaff
were availableto advisefiremen on the HVACsmoke-
purgecapabilityuntilmuchlater. It took2—3 hoursto
finally removethesmoke from the atrium.
Conclusions
• The firewasconfined to the room oforigin bythe
closed officedoorandwall construction.
• Windows facingtheatrium above the firefloor were
crackedby heatbut fire andsmoke had not penetrated
otherfloors.
• The temperature ofthe gas layer in the atrium was
insufficienttoactivate the sprinklersin the atrium roof
• Dueto ah insufficiency ofreplacement air the existing
118
ventilation system designwas inappropriate for
clearance ofsmokefrom the atrium, andthe 'dilution'
ventilation approach usedby the Fire Brigadetook
many hours to clear thesmoke.
• Ifthis had beenan atrium with balconies providing
accessto escape ways, the smokemaywell have
causedserious escape problemsfrom upperfloors.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
• Despite thefact that therewere unprotected openings
onto the atrium, and thatatone theatrium was
point
totally smokeAogged,smokedid notmigrate from the
atrium to other parts ofthe building.This indicates
that the existingventilation arrangements apparently
'depressurized' the atrium.

Annex G: Design procedure
for hybrid systems
G.1 Mass-flow-basedsystems(Figure49)
• Determinetothe heightofrise ofthe smokeplume
requiredclear the openlevels,hb, with thedesign
fire (seeChapter 3) chosenonthe lowest open level.
This will alsoyield the smokelayer depth D, measured
from thecentreline ofthe ventilator.
• From Figures28—3 9 or bydetailed calculationand with
thedesiredchannellingscreen separation L, or
opening widthW, determine the mass flowrateM1
entering the base ofthe layer.Ifthe fireis on the atrium
floor, determine M1 usingsection 6.5.
• Calculatethe total surfaceareaofthe smokelayer (the
atrium surface areain contactwith the smokelayer
plus theareaofthe layer base),and determine the
likelysmoke layertemperature usingChapter 9. Ifthe
smoke layer temperature is below20 °C above
ambient, then the numberofopen levels may needto
be reconsidered, or some (or all) ofthelowerlevels
vented independently from the atrium, usingthe
• procedures setout in Chapter 5.
Setthe neutral pressure plane heightX, to that
required abovethebase ofthe smokelayer, and
determine the value of(AVCV/AC) from Eqn (7.1) or
• Figure46.
Withthesevalues of(AC/A1C), D, M1 and 9 calculate
the ventilationarearequired from Eqn (5.15), (or from
Eqn 93 in reference [9]), and alsothe inlet area
• required.
Followprocedure given in section G.3 below
G.2Temperature-based systems
(Figure 50)
• Decide on awith
smokelayertemperature rise
compatible the facadematerial
0,
employed.For
float glassatemperature rise of70 °C above ambient
will givea reasonablesafety margintothe system
design.Toughened glassmaybe capable of
withstanding higher temperature rises
• Calculate
(eg200—300°C).
the totalsurfaceareaofthe smokelayer(the
atrium surface areain contactwiththe smokelayer
plus the area ofthe layerbase), and determine themass
119
flowrate requiredto givethe desiredtemperature rise,
usingChapter 9. Asa simplificationincorporating a
margin ofsafety,this stepcan beomittedand the mass
flow ratecalculated usingEqn (5.10),
• By detailed calculationandwiththe channelling
screen separation LoropeningwidthW, determine
the height ofrise hb to thebase ofthe layer,necessary
to givethe requiredmass flowrate (see sections 6.2 and
6.3).
• Withthe designfireatthe lowestlevel (seeFigure 50)
and intoaccount the
taking necessaryheight ofr[se hb
for coolingpurposes,determine the maximum smoke
layer depthDm Setthe neutral pressure plane height
X,to that required above the base ofthis smokelayer
depth,and determine the valueof(AC/A1C) from
• Eqn (7.2).
Withthe same value ofhb,determine the shallowest
smoke layer depthD1, compatiblewiththe
depressurizationconcept (this is often the second level
beneaththe NPP).
• Withthesevaluesof(AVCV/AC),D1, M1 and 0
calculatethe ventilation areaandthe inlet area
required using Eqn (5.15), (orfrom Eqn 93 of
reference [9]).
• Followprocedure given in G.3 below.
G.3 Commonprocedure
• In the eventthat the actual inlet areaavailable is
thanthat
greater required bycalculation,then the
ventilation areashould be increased to maintain the
ratioof(AVCV/AiCI).
• Using Eqns (7.2) and (7.3) and the appropriate wind
pressure coefficients(Cr's),checkthe system
operation with regard to windeffects.
• Intheeventthatthe wind effectsmayadverselyaffect
the operation ofanatural ventilationsystem, calculate
the fan capacityrequired usingEqn (7.4),with the
appropriatevalue ofdesignwindvelocity.
• Check that the anticipated suctionpressure and/orair
inflowvelocitiesdo not in themselvesendanger the
safeuse ofany escape routes away from the atrium(see
section 5.9).
120 _____ ________ ____________

Annex H: Effect of a buoyant layer

on the minimum pressure
recommended for a pressure
differential system

t
Smoke exhaust
H.1 Assessmentof height ofthe neutral Me (A2Cvi) anatural ventilator)

pressure plane (NPP)

Thedesignerofthe SHEVS willhavecalculated the
Uc
depthD and temperature 01 ofthebuoyant smoke layer.
He/she will alsoknowthe ventilator andinlet Heightof
highest
parameters, including the mass exhaust rateofsmoky leakage
path to
gases (Me)• pressurized
space

H.1.iWitha'dominant'air inlet
A 'dominant' air inlet occurswhenthe total areaofinlets Pressurized
belowthe smoke layer's base is morethantwicethe total Height
ofNPP
area ofall openings,other thantheventilators
themselves, above the smoke layer'sbase.
Theheightofthe NPPabove the base ofthesmoke
layeris for natural smokeand heat exhaust ventilators
neglecting wind effects (seeFigure Hi):
Air
inlet
d1Tambr2
x
Tambr + T1 () (Hi)
AiC1

Figure Hi The NPF'and smokelayer buoyant pressure

where:

= CA0 using aflow network analysisconsideringall significant

CA leakage paths.
andC1A=total aerodynamicfreeareaofthe dominant This is beyondthe technical scope ofthe presentbook,
Inlet (ie ofall inletsbelowthe smokelayer's base). and is not considered further herein.
Forpowered smokeand heatexhaust ventilators
neglectingwind effects(see FigureHi): H.2 The pressure rise at a specified height
TM2
1
above the NPP
2gO1 p (CA.)2
(m) (H.2) The buoyantpressureat a height YNPPabove the NPP is:

H.i.2Withno dominant air inlet Lp =--pOgyNPP (Pa) (H.3)

Wherethere is no dominant air inlet thereis no means of
simple calculation,and the height must be calculated

Annex I: Aspects of hot-smoke tests
to confirm the performance
of SHEVS
1.1 Whydo hot-smoketests (HST5)?
Hot-smoke tests (HSTs) are a form ofon-site acceptance
testofthe entireSHEVS,in as close a form aspossibleto
thefinal installedsystem. Itis not always necessaryto do
them.HSTs are desirablein the followingcircumstances.
• Wherethe designcalculationsfor the SHEVSare
believed tobe inadequate bytheRegulatoryAuthority,
whois neverthelesswillingto grant conditional
approval subject to proofofperformance.Notethat
this should not occur very often, as inadequate designs
should be identifiedat an early stage inApprovals
Procedures and the design corrected before
installationofthe SHEVS equipment. Itmaybe
considered wherea designisdefended bythe specialist
designer,but is still not trusted bythe Regulatory
• Authority.
Wherethe system,buildingshape,orequipment as
installed doesnot matchthe
on which
proposal
approvalwas granted,butthe SHEVSdesigner
nevertheless arguesthatthe system will work
satisfactorily. This scenario oughtneverto happen, but
occurs all too often.
• Wherethe circumstancesofthebuildingaresuch that
the fundamentalassumptionsunderlyingthetheories
uponwhich designsarebasedarenot valid, and
approximationshad to be madeinthe design. Atypical
casemightbe wherea spillplume rises past a strongly
curved (inthe horizontal plane) spilledgewhereas the
design methods are all basedonthe spilledge being
straight. This canperhapsbe regarded as a special case
ofthefirstcircumstance above,withno-onein a
position ofblame in any way.In an ideal world, this
oughtto be the only reasonforwanting HSTs.
1.2 Choosing the test location
It is possibleinmostbuildingsfitted with a SHEVSto
imaginea real fire occurring in anyone ofmany locations.
Someofthese locationswill represent amore severe
threatthan in otherplaces. For example,afireon the
floor ofan atrium, notnear tothe walls,will entrain less
air than the same firelocatedin aside-room whereby the
smokeenters the atrium as a spillplume. The fan capacity
121
neededto maintain a smokelayerat a given height might
for the latter casebetwicewhat is needed forthe former.
Similardifferencescan occur betweenan adhered spill
plume and a free spillplume. Another exampleis where
smoky gasesfrom a side-room (eg from a shop) can
spread sidewaysunderneath aprojecting balcony before
spillingintothe atrium, compared with another location
wheresuchsidewaysspread cannot occur.
It is generallytruethat a SHEVSshould be designed to
cope with the worst-case location within any smokezone
(ie within any areafeedingsmokeintoa singlesmoke
reservoir). It istherefore necessaryto locate the test fire
inthatsame location.
Thefire should never be located in the easiestlocations
simplybecause they aremore convenient.
1.3 Choosingthe test fire
Thebasicrequirements for the HST are that:
••itmust notdamage the building,and
itmust be as similaraspossibleto the designfire, in
order tominimize the extent ofextrapolationrequired
afterwards.
Reconcilingtheseconflictingrequirements inevitably
means thattheHST must be specificallydesignedto
matchthe chosen location in thebuilding.Thefollowing
listgivesafew considerations.
1 The fuelmustburncleanly.Ethanol (either pure
anhydrous, or as the almost-pure industrial methylated
spirits)is excellentasitburns with no visiblesmoke,
andleaves no deposits.
2 Theperimeter ofthe fire should beas closeaspossible
to the designvalueinorderto obtain asimilar rate of
entrainment. This may mean using more than one fire
trayto simultaneouslysatisfy3,nextpoint below.
3 Theheat output ofthe HSTshould beas closeas
possibleto the designvalue, subjecttothe gas
temperatures being lowenough to avoid doingany
damage.This must be calculated.
4 Heatinsulatingmaterialsmust be usedwherever the
gaseswillbehot enough to causelocal damage.
Typicallythis willinclude liningor simulatingaside-
roomand anybalcony projectingbeyondthe opening,
122
and/orany glazingabove the opening to aheightpre-
calculated asbeingnecessary.
5 Atypical maximumlayer temperature inthe HST
mustbebasedon themostvulnerable material (often
PVC incable insulation,or otherwise, forwhichthe
temperature must never exceed 70 °C). Good practice
requires that asafety margin ofatleast20 °C beleft
belowthatvalue. Themaximum heat output for
point3 above is usuallyderivedby reverse-calculation
from this layer temperature.
14 During the test
1 Thermocouples should be usedto measure the layer
temperature in the smoke reservoir,preferably as a
vertical profile.
2 Height markers should be positionedto makeit easy
and accurateto estimate theheightofthe smoke
layer's base.
3 Thesmoke generators should be ofatypewhichleaves
no deposits.
4 Thesmoke generators should be positioned so that the
smoke is notdestroyed by the gas temperature (ie the
smoke should not be introduced too close to the fire).
5 Enough smoke should beusedfor the layertobe
visible—and forany smokeleakage elsewhere tobe
visible. Notethatit is effectively impossiblefor the
HSTsmoke tobe as optically denseas from areal fire.
Itis betterto say that ifit ispossibleto see thetest
smoke at all, the real firesmoke would be
unacceptable!Calculationsofsmoke densities in real
fires are possible,although difficult.
6 Observers should look for smoke leakagewhereit
should notoccur. (Thisis cruciallyimportant.)
7 Thereshould be sufficient safety procedures for people
presentduring theHST. Theseshould include having:
— a fire-crew
readywithhoselaid (or other
extinguishingapparatus) in case oftrouble,
— 'minders' for the inevitable crowds ofonlookers and
VIPswithinstructions on how to guide themto
safety,
— a safetyofficerin charge ofthe test with sole
authority to demand evacuation ifconditions
become unsafe,etc.
8 Thebuildingmust havebeen effectively cleared of
peoplebeforetheHST (apart from thosetaking partin
it, or being controlled spectators),especiallyat higher
levels wheresmoke is expected to accumulate.Note
that therewillbe enough CO2from the testfire in the
smokelayerto be harmfulto anyonebreathing it. (Also
notethat for one HSToneofBRE'sobservershad to
Designmethodologies for SHEVS
orderone ofthe building'ssecuritystafftoleave the
top floor against his will becausehe had beentoldby
thebuildingownerto stand thereand keep people
from entering that floor!).
9 Thereshould bea preliminaryHSTwith a smaller size
offireto confirmthat the actual smokebehaviour
safelymeetsthecalculated HST parameters. (Forone
HSTthe testers had to abandon the originalfull fire
size because in the preliminary test smokewas seen to
beunexpectedly intercepted by aceilinghaving
sprinklers.The fulloriginal size ofHST fire would have
triggered several dozen ofthe sprinklerheads.)
1.5 The subsequentanalysis
1 Conclusionsshould not be based solely onvisible
smokedensityThis is a major mistake,see section 1.4,
point S above.
2 Did theobserved resultsmatchthe predictionsforthe
HST?
(a)Ifyes, has the same methodusedto calculatethe
HSTbeenusedto extrapolate tothe full design
condition?In this casethis can be donewith
confidence.
(b)Ifno, has a location-specificcorrection been
derived and applied to the designscenario forthat
same location?This is the bestthatcan bedone in
the circumstances.
3 Were thereany otherproblems revealed bythe test
whichrequire separate modificationsto the SHEVSor
to otheraspects ofthebuilding?Examplesinthe past
have included:
— deflection of
hanging smokecurtains,
— of
siphoning smokethroughHVAC/ACMVducts
whichlackedsmoke dampers,
—
build-upofsmoke in 'stagnant corners' beneaththe
smokelayer,
build-upofsmokein supposedlyprotectedspaces
—
dueto unexpected leakage paths,
— smokeatrooflevel which has
already leftthe
buildingthrough the smoke ventilators,re-entering
plant-room intakes whichserve other parts ofthe
building,etc.
4 Doesthe extrapolated designscenario, calculated as ir
point 2(a) or 2(b)above, andconsidering any
additionalproblems asin point3 above, represent a
worsening ofsafety compared with the originaldesign
criteriabeingtested?
5 Ifno, the SHEVShaspassed theHST.
6 Ifyes, the SHEVShasfailedtheHST.
 123

AnnexJ: Case history

smoke-control design in
'D3 Espace Leopold Building',
European Parliament, Brussels

Note: This design studywas carried outusing the

predecessor documents to the presentbook (ie two
BRE Reports[24"3]), but usingmethods whichwere
essentiallysimilarto the presentbook.

The 'D3Espace LeopoldBuilding'ofthe European

Parliament in Brussels ishighly innovative and for
architecturalreasons required a performance-based
approach to fire-safetydesign.The buildingincludes a
300 m longcovered 'lightstreet' or atrium, open to three
tall storeys offoyers on one side, leadingto mostofthe
meetingrooms, and to sixstoreys ofofficesontheother.
Thefire-safetyengineered designdescribed in this
Annex includes aSHEVSincorporating automatic smoke
curtains to isolatethefoyer storeyopeningsaspart ofthe
provision toprotectthe means ofescape,and to separate PlateJi External appearance of European Parliament buildings,
adjacent smokereservoirs.An extensiveanalysisof Brussels
possiblefire scenariosled to specificationsfor
programmingthe FireSafetyManagement system,and to
writingevacuation procedures andfire intervention plans Belgiumalso has veryprescriptivecodes andwithouta
forthebuilding. Fire SafetyEngineeringapproach the designofthe new
At therequestoftheBrusselsFireService,ahot smoke headquarters ofthe European Parliament would not have
testwas conducted in the 'light street', using a 1 MWfire beenpossible.
in aspeciallyconstructed simulatedshopcompartment, TheEuropean Parliamentbuildings(Plateji)in the
to confirmtheproperfunctioningofthesmoke-control heartofBrusselsaretoday'sand tomorrow's centres of
design.This test confirmedthe appropriatenessofthe important decisions.Onemajor decision,made4years
basic smokeventilation design,but yielded important ago, isalready in execution:theofficesand meeting-
recommendations,especiallyfor finalizingthe room complexfor Members ofthe European Parliament
installationofthe smokecurtains. as well as for the administration (ie the D3 building)will
This case studywill cover the followingtopics: be extensivelyequipped withactive fire protection,
•• Architect's design
Code requirements for fire safetyin Belgium
including aflexibleapproach to compartmentation,
• Achievement offire safetylevel inaccordance with the
smoke detection, sprinklerswhereappropriate,and
smoke-control installations.The authors wish to make it
architect'sview clear thatthe fire safetyengineeringdesign described
• FireBrigaderequest:hot-smoke test to verifythe herein wasdoneby IFSET, withFRS onlybecoming
function ofthe smoke-control system and to check involvedwhenahot-smoke test was proposed.
whethersecondary problems could occur.
J.2 A plan ofthe D3 complex
J.1 Introduction
The D3 complexis abuildingwith differentareas
Inmostofthecountries around theworld fire regulations interconnected with eachothertocreate amaximum
arestill very prescriptiveandvery little freedomfor spatial effect. The buildingcomprisesthefollowingareas.
designisgiven to architects to designspecial buildings'as
the codes do not allowit'.
124
Qr, 1Q 2Or 3O 4O §O
FigureJi The light street'coveredwith a glass roof
J.2.1 Underground levels
The buildinghasfive underground levelsofwhichLevels
—5, —4 and —3 are usedforcar parking only. On average,
thelevelshave the followingdimensions : length 273 m,
width 77 m andheight2.4 m.
Eachlevel has a parking capacityofabout 660 cars.
Therearetwoentrances (North and South) open
betweenthe differentlevels,connecting eachlevel to
form a singleopenvolume.
ParkingLevel—2 has the same overall dimensions
althoughthatpart ofthe buildingbetweenaxes A andD
(width=25 m) isusedfor other purposes. The north side
is usedfor leisure activities, the southside for deliveries,
both incoming and outgoing,and includesspace for
storage.The numberofparking spacesis thus reduced to
360 cars.
Level—1 is notusedas aparking areabuthas 20
deliveryquays forunloading andloading goods
into/fromlarge and smalltransport vehicles.Thereis a
largestorage hail aswell as aself-servicerestaurant.
J.2.2 Theinner street(covered with a glass roof)
As canbe seen in FiguresJlandJ2, andinPlateJ2, thereis
avoid betweenthe 7-storey-highconstruction atthe
frontofthebuildingand the 16-storey-highconstruction
at therear. This void is covered with aglazed roof
forming a'lightstreet' so that the entire length(240 m)
canbe considered as anatrium6storeys high, interrupted
bya central forum betweenaxes N04 and S04.
Atevery second level,3 walkways(bridges)cross the
light streetfrom axis G to axisH.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
At ground-le'el00 (FigureJ2),thecovered streetis a
meeting place and circulationzone. The adjacent offices
havesocialfunctions,andthere arealso a few shops
located atthis level aswell asthe printing officeand the
restaurant.
TheFire SafetyPlan hadto consider thefollowing
officesand meetingrooms whichare eitheradjacent to or
haveescape routesopen tothe lightstreet.
J.2.2.1. Conferenceblock 'Rue Wiertz'
Between axes A andG, a totalof39 conference rooms art
locatedonthree levels: Level 01, Level 03 and Level 05.
Each conference roomextends over two levels in height.
At the entrance to each large conference room (140 seats
there is alobbywhichis completely open to the covered
lightstreet. Between Sli and S14 thereare some smaller
offices whichhave glasstowards the inner street
(FigureJ3).
J.2.2.2Office block 'RueMail'
Between grid linesH and L smaller offices are situated on
eachlevel (from 01 to 06). Some 40 offices on eachlevel
areadjacentto thecovered lightstreetand separated
from it byplain glasswindows (grid line I) (FigureJ3).
J.2.3 Thecentralregion
The centralregionis mainly a circulationzone on
Levels 01—04. The library is situated onLevels 05 and 06
and was includedin the study foractive fire-protection
systems.
 AnnexJ: Case history 125

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126 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Exhaustvolumejiow
MrT/(1.22 T0) = 11.9 m3/s (J.3)

where:
T0z=15+273 =288K,
T1 = 440 +288= 728 K,
01 440°, and
ambient temperature = 15 °C.
This exhaust rateis the same forall fourunderground
levels (Levels—5 to —2). Thereare no sprinkler
installationsplanned for the car parkareas.
The entrances on thenorth orsouthsidewill provide
replacement air.
At Level —1 thereis also astorage room for incoming
goods. As thispart ofthe buildingcan contain flammable
goods, thereis anappropriate quick-responsesprinkler
installation.Itwas agreed that it would be appropriate to
PlateJ2 D3 Espace Leopold Building: the light street' use the same fire size as before, andhenceEqns
(J.1)—(J.3) also apply here, withthe same numerical
valuesas above.
J.3 Fire risks and smoke control scenarios As thesmoke temperature willbe affectedby cooling
bythe sprinklers,the volumerate is reduced to 6.8 m3/s.
J.3.1 The underground levels (Plate J3} At Level —1, however, the exhaust rate willbe
Thedesignfireforacovered car parkwas taken to be determined bythepossibilityofa fire in a truck ata
12 m perimeter firewith a convectiveheat-release rateof loadingquay or ofa fire in the stockroom orrestaurant.
2500kW (2.5 MW). As thereis ahigh potential for risk to life in the restaurant,
Theceilingareaneedsto be dividedintosmoke and toreduce the chance ofa severe lorry fire, the
reservoirsby means ofautomatic curtains toprevent decision has been takento installquick-response
excessivecooling ofsmoke leading to smoke-loggingof sprinklersin both the restaurant and the deliveryquay.
the entirefloor area. The followingfireparameters have beenadopted:
Thevolume ofsmoky gases needingto be exhausted
from the underground zonewas calculated as follows. Restaurant
Intheabsence ofany specificdatafor restaurant fires, it
Massflow was decided that adopting the BRE Reportt241 designfire
Mf= 0.188 x P x (y)3/2 = 5.68 kg/s (J.1) for retail areas would be appropriately pessimistic,
modifiedbythe more recentadvicefrom FRS thatthe
where: size canbe halved whenquick-responsesprinklers are
P = 12 m perimeter, usedinstead ofstandard-response sprinklers.
Y = 1.85 m heightofrise.
Area = 5 m2,
Smoke layertemperature Q =2.5MW.
= Q/(cM-)=440° (J.2)
Stock-holding areas
where: In theabsence ofspecific dataforfires in the stock-
= 2500 kWconvectiveheatflux. holding areas, it was decided to adopt the BRE Reportt241

PlateJ3 D3 Espace Leopold Building: carpark


designfireforstandard-response-sprinkleredretail areas.
Area = 9 m2 (Note:thisshould notbeusedas a
universalprecedent.),
Q- = 5MW.
Deliveryquay
In the absenceofspecificdataforsprinklered fires at
deliveryquays, itwas decided to adopt adesignfiretwice
as largeas the correspondingretail fireadvised by FRS
forretail areas equipped with quick-responsesprinklers.
Area = 9 m
Q- =5MW
According to Eqns(J.1)— (J.3) andapplying aheightrise
of2 mintherestaurant and3.2 minthe deliveryquay, the
followingsmokeexhaust rates are predicted:
stock 6.8 m3/s,
restaurant 4.8 m3/s,
deliveryquay 13.2 m3/s.
J.3.2 Covered street
Itwasconsideredthat the covered light streetconstituted
a largeatrium. Consequentlythe smoke control design
drewonthe guidelinesand calculationprocedures in a
BRE Report1,which are similarto thoseinthis book.
On the ground-floor (Level00),thefire risk in the
streetitselfis negligible. However, the restaurant,
adjacent shopsandprinting room havea fire risk. Asthe
smokewill be exhaustedfrom the atrium(the covered
lightstreet), the mass flowand the air-flowrates must be
calculatedforthe worst case scenario on the ground floor.
This isthecase for a fire in ashop with a shopfront of7m
wide facingthe street.
Quick-responsesprinklerswillbeinstalled toreduce
the designfire size and the amount ofsmoke produced.
Thedesign fireparameters arethus:
P = 9 m perimeter offire,
Q= 2500kW.
O =67C
Of = 37 kg/s
V = 38 rnYh
= 36.800 m3/h
Figure.14 SHEVSdesign: smoke in light street from a shop fire
AnnexJ: Case history 127
Withafurther heightrise of2.5 m afierthesmokehas left
thecompartment (ie afurther height rise of2.5 mabove
thetop oftheshop's opening intothe atrium), amass
flowof37kg/swill enterthe smokelayerwith an average
temperature riseof67°C. (Thiswas calculated following
the method in reference [131. Thatis, usingtheBREspill
plume entrainment procedure but wihoutusingthe layer
depthcorrection for alarge-area smokereservoir which
hassubsequentlybeenshown to apply to atria such as
this, and whichis recommended forthis and similar
scenariosinsection 6.3. The effectofthis for thiscase
study is thatthe smokeexhaust volumecould have been a
little smallerthan was calculated,iethe designerred on
theside ofsafety.)
Thetotal smokeextract volume is 38 m3/s (FigureJ4).
J.3.2.1 Conferenceblock'Rue Wiertz'
As this side isfullyopen to thelightstreet, thepotential
danger existsthat all smokeentering the atrium will
entrainlarge quantitiesofair so that alarge amount of
coldsmokewillfill theatrium. Therefore, thesmoke
should notenterthe atriumand must be exhausted
directly from thefoyer withoutsignificantspillageinto
the atrium.
As thefire risk is low,itwasdecided that an
unsprinkleredfire of9 m2 and 1 MWcould betakenas
designfire parameters foruse with Eqns (J.1)—(J.3.This
predicted a massflow of11.8 kg/s (equivalentto 13 m3/s)
tobe exhaustedseparatelyfrom thefoyers'
compartments on each appropriate level (FigureJ5).
J.3.2.2Offices 'Rue Mail'
Attheotherside ofthe atrium (covered Street)the
situation is different.Here, thereare unsprinklered[, small
officesonsix levels,whichare notopen totheatrium but
areonly separated with awindow.Thesmoke is allowed
to flowfrom thefire-levelintothe atrium (afterthefire
has broken the window). The designusedthe principleof
temperature-control,whereenough entrainment is
H8
4
5
I
H SMOKE CURTAINS1
I POSITIONED
AT
THE BRIDGES
2
MAIL
128 Design methodologies for SHEVS

FigureJ5 SHEVSdesign: smoke in conference blockfoyer

allowedto reduce the average layer temperature in the
atrium to a valuethat will notbreakany glazingexposed
to the layer. This corresponded to a height ofrise of1.9 m
above the fire-room's window to cool the smoketo 80 °C.
Thecalculationprocedures were essentiallysimilarto
thoseforashopfireinthe'covered street', but with a
design firemore appropriate to the office scenario.The
design solutionswere similarbut less onerous, andare
notdetailedfurther herein.
J.3.3 Centralregion
In thisarea,thefire risk is very lowbecause thereareno
shopsor offices.Therefore, this location is not
sprinklered. Oneshould notehowever that,similarlyto
the forums nearthe conference rooms, aspillageof
smoke intothe atriumfrom lowerstoreys could cause
highrisks forthepeople at higher levels.Theworst-case
fire scenario is whenafirestarts beside one ofthe voids
because smokewill rise throughthe voidsto a higher
levelwhile coolinglargeamounts ofsurrounding air by
entrainment.
It was decided that an appropriate design fireforthis
region would be:
Area = 1 m2,
= 500kW, with smoke allowedto spillintothe
voidpast alengthofspill edge of5 m.
Inthis case, once againfollowingthe calculation
procedures inreference [13], the smokevolume entering
thevoid willbe 4.6 kg/s.
After entering the void, a further heightofrise of2.5 m
is calculated to allow people on the higherlevels to
evacuate.The resultingmass flow ofsmoke entering the
smoke reservoiris 24 kg/s while the temperature riseis
50 °C atthispoint. Hencethe volume rate = 22 m3/s
according to Eqn (J.3).
.1.3.4Summary of smoke-control scenarios
See Tableji.
J.4 Practical solutionsand installation
Thefollowingaspectshad tobe taken intoconsideration
whendesigninginteractivefire-protection systems.
••Smoke compartments (automatic smoke curtains)
Automatic smoke detection systems
••
Sprinklers(normal or quick-response)whereneeded
Reliablesmoke exhaust fans.

Table ii Summary ofsmoke-control scenarios

Smoke Temperature
Zone Level Sprinklers? exhaust Volume rise
{m/s) (°C)

Carpark —2to—5 No Compartment 11.9 450

Storage —2 Yes Compartment 6.8 70
Restaurant —1 Yes(FRS)* Compartment 4.8 70
Deliveryquay —1 Yes(FRS)* Compartment 13.2 70
Ground-level 00 Yes(FRS)* Coveredstreet 38 67
RueWiertz 01—06 No Compartment 13 92
Centralpart No Void 22 50
Offices 07—16 No No — —

Quick-responsesprinklers
 AnnexJ: Case history 129
J.4.1 Smoke and fire compartments • Curtainshave beeninstalledwhich close offthe
will
J.4.11 Fixedfire compartment betweenthe
openings andthe
bridges corresponding
According to BelgianStandards,the buildingis divided levelsto prevent the smoke movingfrom one sideof
into separate firecompartments. Afire-resistancerating the coveredstreetto theother.
(RI)is definedintermsofexposureto thetestfurnace
heatingcurve. Atotal length ofabout 1.5 kmofmovablesmokecurtains
This means: hasbeeninstalledintheD3building.
• thecomplex is compartmented horizontally,at every
level (Rf=4h), J4.1.2.2 Centralregion
• rooms or places havingvoids over 1 or morelevelsInthecentral areathere aretwo types ofmovablesmoke
needto becompartmented from the otherplaces on curtains:

• technical rooms (eg plantrooms) arecompartmented • lobbies

thatlevel, curtainsthat lowerfor m andwhichform the1 smoke
compartment,not allowingthe smoke to enterthe
adjacent to the conferencerooms,
•• (Rf=2 h),
staircasesandelevators are compartmented (Rf= • curtainsat Level 03 aroundthe voidto prevent
1 h), smoke
sprinklered andnon-sprinklered rooms are from Levels 02 or passingthrough the void
01 arid
compartmented one from the other (Rf= 1 h). Level entering 03.

J.4.1.2Flexible smokecompartmentation J.4.1.2.3 Cert/ledquality

Toprevent the smokedilutingtoo much andbecoming
too cool(with the effectoflosingthe desired layering),
automatic smoke curtainsare specifiedin the
underground levels,the covered streetand aroundthe
voids inthecentral region.
The smokecurtains in theunderground carparkswill
lower1 m to contain the smoketo a limited area.
The smoke curtainsatthe entrances have two
•
positions:
ifthe fireoccurs at the same level (this willbe indicated
by theaddressable smoke-detectioninstallation) the
screen willlowerfor 1 m to allow replacement air to
enter,
• ifthesmoke tends to risethroughtheentrances to a
higher level,the screens can belowered further in
order to prevent the smokefrom leaving the
compartment.
J.4.1.2.1 Coveredstreet
In theatriumthreetypes ofmovablesmoke curtainsare
installed.
• Screenshavebeen installed along the balconies
betweenthe covered streetand theforums infront of
the threelarge conference rooms. These curtains can
be lowered to two positions.
— Ifthere isa fire on the samelevel the curtainswill
lowerto halfposition. The smokewillbe keptinthe
compartment andreplacement air can enterthe
compartment (seeFigureJ5)
— Ifthereis afire in the offices or
shops atthe
opposite sideofthe streetthe curtainswill lowerto
the base oftheopeningsto the forumsto close
those openingsand prevent smokepropagation
towards the forums (seeFigureJ4).
• Curtains havebeen hungunderthe bridges across the
coveredstreet. Thesescreens will alwayslower
through the total height between the underside ofthe
higher bridge tothe walkwayofthe lowerbridge
directly beneath, to provide aboundary to the smoke
compartment (smoke reservoir)inthe street.
Themovablesmoke curtainsaretestedto British
Standard BS 7346: Part3 whichindicatesa heat-proof
fabric that cansurvivea smoky gas temperature of600 °C
for halfan hour.
J.4.2Automaticsmokedetection
Thewholecomplex is equipped with an appropriate
smoke-detection system.Thesesmoke detectors are
addressableso that the firelocation can be identifiedas
quicklyas possible.The control panelmust perform the
followingautomatic actions:
•• close fire doors,
open escape doors,
•lowersmokecurtainsto theirappropriate design
••height,
activatethe emergencypowersupply,
startthe smokeexhaust fans,
••
open the air inletsfor replacement air,
bring thelifts to evacuation level,
••
stop the normal ventilation installations,
activate the alarm signals.
J.4.3 Sprinklers
As alreadymentionedin the descriptionofthe firerisks,
sprinklersare only installedinplaces wherethereis a risk
offast-growingfires.
Quick-responsesprinklersare a'newgeneration'-type
ofsprinklerwith alow response timeindex (RTI)value.
Theyareusedin restaurantsand on deliveryquaysfor the
trucks atLevel—1.
J.4.4 Smoke exhaust fans
As indicatedinthe firescenarios allsmoke exhaust
installationsare powered. Natural exhaust withsmoke
vents was notapplicablebecause ofthe strongprobability
ofadverse wind effectsaround such atall and complex
building.
Thefans,as well as the ductwork,mustwithstand the
anticipated designtemperatures (seeTableji).
130 Design methodologies for SHEVS
The fans aretestedfollowingBritish Standard BS 7643:
Part 2.
It is obviousthat fans must operate without
interruption in an emergency situation. Therefore, fire-
resisting cablingis usedat all times.

J.5 Hot-smoketest
J.5.1 Introduction
Inview ofthenovel features, and the limited full-scale
validation ofcalculationprocedures foradheredspill
plumes in atria, the BrusselsFireServicerequired a full
scalehot-smoke test inthebuildingin orderto confirm
both the designandtheoperation ofthe smoke-control
system.This requirement was part ofthe conditions to
obtain thebuildingpermit. The test wasscheduled fora
dateas nearto completion ofthebuildingas was
compatiblewiththe construction schedule. Temporary
sheetingwas usedextensivelyto close offopenings,
whichwere due to be closed more permanently before
completion.
InMarch1996 IFSET and FRS collaborated for the
second time to carry out ahot-smoke test in abuilding
(thefirsttestbeingBrusselsAirport Terminal).Thetest
scenario agreed withthe Fire Servicewas afireina
typicalshop opening out intothe atrium. Twotest fires FigureJ6 Schematicarrangement ofhot-smoke test
were carried out, apreliminary onewith a 0.5 MWfire
and themaintestwitha 1 MWfire in conjunctionwith
theoretical calculationsto extrapolatethe experimental
resultsto the fill design scenario.
Afullreportwas presented to the client and to theFire
Servicedescribingthe test givingtheresultsand
conclusions.

J.5.2 Description of the test

Thetest followed the procedure developed byFRS.
Industrialmethylated spiritswereburnedintrays, which
inturn were floated onwater. A lightweightfire-resisting
fire compartment was built to simulatethe shop
geometry andtoprotectthe actual structure ofthe
building.This protection was carried upthefacadeofthe
atrium highenoughto ensureprotection ofthe structure
and glazing directly above the opening to the fire
compartment (FigureJ6and PlateJ4).
Thetestfirewaschosentobelargeenoughto allow
confident scalingofthe resultsto the full design scenario,
butnotso large asto cause any damage to thebuilding.A
preliminary test fire ofhalfthe calculated sizewasused
first in order to confirmthe validityofthe design ofthe
main test, and to confirmthat therewereno unexpected
departures from the design assumptions.
Temperature measurements were made inthe smoke
layerformed in theatrium, as well as inthefire
compartment. In addition,observations were made ofthe
layer depth in the atriumas well as ofthebuild-up of
smoke intheforums dueto leakage pastthesmoke
curtains. The hot gaseswere madevisibleusing a PlateJ4 Hot-smoke test: lIre insimulated shop
synthetic oil-mist smokefrom commercialtheatrical-
typesmokegenerators. Additionally,observationswere

madeby'rovingobservers' looking for any unexpected
phenomena, suchas the appearance ofsmokein other
parts ofthebuildingdueto leakage or siphoningthrough
ventilation ducts.
Safetyprotocols were agreed withthe Fire Service,and
were applied very strictly.
Calculationsofthe entrainment in the atriumwere
made followingthe procedures set out inthisbook,
includingthe 'effective layer depth'procedure.
Calculationprocedures for extrapolatingthe observed
build-up ofsmoke in the forums,and for deducing
implicationsfor modificationsto ensurethedesired
performance in the completed building,werededuced
from firstprinciples.Reductions in smoke curtain gap
widths were proposed.
J.5.3 Summary of conclusions from the test
• The testwassuccessfullycarried out without damage
to thebuilding.Fires of4pproximatcly and MW
0.5 1.0
were burnt in a simulatedshopunit.
• The • Consideration should begiven to providingearly
powered SHEVSmaintained a smokelayerbase
in the atrium reservoirwith abase at ±
15.5 0.5 m
above ground-floor level.The predicted result agreed •
within observational
experimental uncertainty.By
extrapolationfrom the test results,the SHEVSis
expected to maintain the layer base unitat 10.4 m
above ground-floor level,from a 2.5 MW,
2.2 mx 2.2 m quick-response-sprinkleredfire in a
• shop.
There should be a seriesoffunctionaltestscarried out
on thesmoke curtain system whenthebuildingis in its
final stateandwhenthe permanent smoke curtain
system is in place.These functionaltests should
confirmthat all gaps are assmall as possibleand not
larger(preferablysmaller)thanthoseproposed inthe
calculations(notincluded inthe presentsummary). If
largergapsremain whenthebuildingis completed it
would benecessaryto recalculate the smokefilling
timesforthefoyers and bridges.These functionaltests
should alsotest the operation ofthe automatic
detectionsystem and should confirmthatall the
smoke curtains operate automaticallyon detection.
• Forthemaintest the curtain onBridge2, Level05
deflected 0.10 m.
Forthedesign condition thecurtain on Bridge2,
Level 05 was calculatedto deflectapproximately
0.38 m.The length ofthe fabric in the curtain should be
enoughforthe bottombar to reston the walkwayeven
whendeflected. (Notethatthe installershad needed to
modif5rthese curtainspriorto the test toallow forthe
relativelylarge buoyant pressuresexpected in this
• design).
In thetest smoketravelled throughunforeseen leakage
paths. All openings thatare likelyto be inthe smoke
layer should be identifiedandremedied. For example,
builders' work ducts to beclosed, doorgapsto be
sealed, gaps around windowsto be sealed.
• In thetest smokeenteredotherreservoirsthrough
edge gaps around the under-bridgesmoke curtains,but
AnnexJ: Case history 131
was welllayered. It is desirablethatfans should be
operated in adjacent reservoirs simultaneouslytothe
one containingthe fire to remove this smoke, ifthe
provisionforinlet air andfor electricalpower allows.
• Smoke entered the foyer on Level 05 mainlythrough
gaps between the smokecurtains andreached
dangerous conditionsafter approximately 6 minutes
from ignition inthe maintest. This would havebeen
perhaps 3 minutes from ignitionfor the design
conditionswith real smokeand an ultra-fastgrowing
fire. Reducingthe smoke curtain gaps could increase
the time availablefor escape.Also, itwas
recommended that early automatic detection and a
voice alarm system be provided in these areas and a
similarsystem in adjacent areas to warnpeoplenotto
escapethroughthe foyer.
Considerationcould be given to studyingthe
possibilityofusing apowered dilution system in the
foyers to extend the time availablefor evacuation.
automatic detection in the shop and office units to
trigger both the smokeexhaust and alerting systems.
Thewindows intheoffices opening ontothe atrium
should be keptclosed atall times.
J.6 Fire safety management
Asthebuildingis anopen construction relyingvery much
onthe use ofactive fireprotection installations,fire
scenarios havebeen written for the approximatetota][ of
400 compartments inthe building.
These fire scenariosidentifr alltheautomatisms (ie the
automaticallyinitiatedelectronic, electricaland/or
mechanical operations) ofeach technical installation
whichwill play arolein case offire. Allthe possible
interactions have been definedsuchthat everything
could be programmed onto the central management
system forthe building.Itis intended that this will greatly
simpliljithe degree ofcontrol ofthe building'ssystems
required ofthe FireService.
In additionto definingthefire scenariosand the
consequent automatisms,itis intended to define and
prepare evacuationprocedures and plans,andFire
Serviceintervention plans in similardetail so that allthe
actions,both automatic and byhuman agencies,required
during afire emergency willbetakenin afullyintegrated
manner.
It is notenough to design systemsintoabuildingto
ensure firesafety.It isimportant that those systemsmust
stillbeworking, perhaps years later, whenafire actually
occurs. For this reason, itis important that the building's
management should be able to maintain the systemsand
to trainkeystaffintheir operation. Itis alsoof
considerablepracticalimportance thatthese fire safety
management activitiesshould not involvetoo much
inconveniencetothe normal use ofthe building.
In this building,thefiresafety management procedures
must beableto monitor andmaintain fourtypes ofactive
fire-protectivesystems.As the control panels ofthe
132
smokecurtains, fire detection, sprinkler installationand
smoke-control installationare centralized in one control
room, theirstatusand interactions can bechecked easily.
Itis also easy to generate firesimulationsor scenarios,
whichfacilitateseasy andfrequentfire training for the
security staffwho usuallyman the Control Room.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
J.7 Conclusions
• Aswiththethearchitecture ofthe buildingincouldnotcomply
aFire
prescriptiveregulations Belgium,
SafetyEngineered approach has been applied leadin
to anintegrated approach to the applicationoffire
safetymeasures.
• The Fire Service Department have approved the active
fire protection and fire safety management procedures,
whichhave beendeveloped for this complex.
CI/SfB (68.5) Aboutthis book
1999 This book summarizesthe adviceavailablefromthe
Fire ResearchStation, todesigners of Smoke and
HeatExhaustVentilationSystems (SHEVS) for atria
and other buildings. Itspurpose isto provide
practical guidance onthe design ofsmoke-control
systems. Itreflects current knowledgeand is based
onthe results ofresearchwhere available,including
as yetunpublishedresults ofexperiments.In
addition, itdraws on theauthors' cumulative
experience ofdesign features requiredfor regulatory
purposes in many individualsmoke-control
applications. Manyofthese design features have
evolved overseveralyearsbyconsensus between
regulatory authorities, developers and firescientists.

CRC Ltd
151 Rosebery Avenue
LondonEC1R 4GB,UK

BR368
ISBN 1 86081 289 9
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