Republic of the Philippines particular. You can come to my house at any
) LUIS TAGORDA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal
Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising
attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general
elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute
for you a deed of sale for the purchase of
land as required by the cadastral office; can
renew lost documents of your animals; can
make your application and final requisites
for your homestead; and can execute any
kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help
you collect your loans although long
overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his
town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve
the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of
a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to
inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I
should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in
time here in Echague, to submit to me any
kind of suggestion or recommendation as
you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my
membership in the Board I will have my
residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come
back home on the following day here in
Echague to live and serve with you as a
lawyer and notary public. Despite my
election as member of the Provincial Board,
I will exercise my legal profession as a
lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot
see me at home on any week day, I assure
you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will
receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits
to be sworn to before me as notary public
even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this
matter for the reason that some people are in
the belief that my residence as member of
the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would
then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it
clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit
this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that
they may be informed of my desire to live
and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the
services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would
be willing to handle the work in court and
would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write
down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived
related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919
at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association,
said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by
adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the
Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the
Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR
INDIRECT. — The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced, but must be the outcome of character
and conduct. The publication or circulation
of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted
by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing
of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships
to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
 laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION,
DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. —
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at
common law. It is disreputable to hunt up
defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to
bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking
out those with claims for personal injuries or
those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ
agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay
or reward directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital
attaches or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly
advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to
seek his professional services. A duty to the
public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the bar having knowledge
of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof to
the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up
suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at
the common law, and one of the penalties for this
offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil
have been provided in a number of jurisdictions
usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been
upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes
of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann.
Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A.,
231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain
terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great
profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in
needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be
distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of
Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the
law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action
which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the
Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded.
We think that our action should go further than this if
only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is
only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation
that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in
the future. A modest period of suspension would
seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it
should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have
influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this
particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken
as indicating that future convictions of practice of
this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the
judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the
practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a
lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or
suspension or any other disciplinary action against
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P.
Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14,
1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:
"x x x xxx xxx
"That in connection with my business, I was
introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,
sometime in September, 1998, in his office
at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la
Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally
represent me in a money claim and possible
civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers,
for which services I have accordingly paid;
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint,
which he subsequently drafted, copy of
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover
from the parties to be sued I, on January 4,
1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the
instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should
receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited
for such notice from the court or from Atty.
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress
in my case, such that I frequented his office
to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me
just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case,
considering that I am told to wait [every
time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty.
Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the
court personnel had not yet acted on my case
and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me
to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland,
Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he
left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor
at the ground floor of the building and told
to wait while he personally follows up the
processes with the Clerk of Court;
whereupon, within the hour, he came back
and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-
around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to
the Office of the Clerk of Court with my
draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to
personally verify the progress of my case,
and there told that there was no record at all
of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated
May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was
lied to and treated, I confronted Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta at his office the
following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at
all filed the complaint because he had spent
the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease my feelings, he
offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999,
in the amounts of P12,000.00
and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which
are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and
deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct;"
xxx xxx x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999
Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently
denying the allegations of complainant "for being
totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had
allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of
the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter
against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which
the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of
the business partners of complainant, replied to this
letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -
- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process
server of the former's law office to deliver the letter
to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had
required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared
a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr.
Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC
Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC
Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property
claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for
his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him
why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no
settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to
draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent,
whose services had never been paid by complainant
until this time, told the latter about his acceptance
and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted
to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost
P4 million, complainant promised to pay on
installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount
of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that
it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When
informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately
called the attention of complainant, informing the
latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees
before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was
told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told
respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of
the complaint because the former might be paid by
another company, the First Oriental Property
Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of
land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations
went on for two months, but the parties never arrived
at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to
respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the
acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed
that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When
respondent refused, complainant demanded the return
of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount
using his own personal checks because their law
office was undergoing extensive renovation at the
time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and
encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced,
mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone
had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it
was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8,
2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as
follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000
deposited by complainant with the Respicio
Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainant's
deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the
part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client, the
complainant. The failure of respondent to
fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of
the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes
highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees,
does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to
impress upon the respondent the gravity of
his offense, it is recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of
respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him
the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the
former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also,
respondent alleges that the amount delivered by
complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best
efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of
the client's cause. They who perform that duty with
diligence and candor not only protect the interests of
the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession.5 Members of the
bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the
honesty, and integrity of the profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no
lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was
established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case
for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles
of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is
established.7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the
fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner
of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal
advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had
actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once
lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense
of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost
learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of
respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The
IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be
prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have
immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant's
attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the
payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget
that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining
of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence
may be attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given
by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued
by the law office of respondent -- the latter also
violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall
hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties
that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are
in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon
the client's funds, documents and other papers that
have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may
apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not
relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.17 In any event,
they must still exert all effort to protect their client's
interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public.18 Respondent fell
short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client
and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The
fact that the former returned the amount does not
exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with
complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found
guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-
counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as
a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is
held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration
engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under
the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in
matters connected with the
law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship character, and acting at all times do during our
have been held to constitute law under the heavy trust obligations to review of the
practice, as do the preparation and clients which rests upon all provisions on the
drafting of legal instruments, where attorneys. (Moran, Comments on Commission on
the work done involves the the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 Audit. May I be
determination by the trained legal ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re allowed to make
mind of the legal effect of facts and Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], a very brief
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. statement?
(Emphasis supplied) Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service THE
Practice of law under modem Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). PRESIDING
conditions consists in no small part (Emphasis ours) OFFICER (Mr.
of work performed outside of any The University of the Philippines Law Center in Jamir).
court and having no immediate conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers The
relation to proceedings in court. It (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of Commissioner
embraces conveyancing, the giving law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling will please
of legal advice on a large variety of and public service. proceed.
subjects, and the preparation and One may be a practicing attorney in MR. FOZ. This
execution of legal instruments following any line of employment has to do with the
covering an extensive field of in the profession. If what he does qualifications of
business and trust relations and exacts knowledge of the law and is the members of
other affairs. Although these of a kind usual for attorneys the Commission
transactions may have no direct engaging in the active practice of on Audit. Among
connection with court proceedings, their profession, and he follows others, the
they are always subject to become some one or more lines of qualifications
involved in litigation. They require employment such as this he is a provided for by
in many aspects a high degree of practicing attorney at law within Section I is that
legal skill, a wide experience with the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. "They must be
men and affairs, and great capacity Cardell, 155 NW 312) Members of the
for adaptation to difficult and Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, Philippine Bar"
complex situations. These which requires the application of law, legal — I am quoting
customary functions of an attorney procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To from the
or counselor at law bear an intimate engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts provision —
relation to the administration of which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, "who have been
justice by the courts. No valid to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of engaged in the
distinction, so far as concerns the service, which device or service requires the use in practice of law
question set forth in the order, can any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR for at least ten
be drawn between that part of the 23) years".
work of the lawyer which involves The following records of the 1986 Constitutional To avoid any misunderstanding
appearance in court and that part Commission show that it has adopted a liberal which would result in excluding
which involves advice and drafting interpretation of the term "practice of law." members of the Bar who are now
of instruments in his office. It is of MR. FOZ. Before employed in the COA or
importance to the welfare of the we suspend the Commission on Audit, we would
public that these manifold session, may I like to make the clarification that
customary functions be performed make a this provision on qualifications
by persons possessed of adequate manifestation regarding members of the Bar does
learning and skill, of sound moral which I forgot to not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the necessarily engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
COA We have to interpret this to involve legal majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
mean that as long as the lawyers work; it will Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
who are employed in the COA are involve legal Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
using their legal knowledge or work. And, At this point, it might be helpful to define private
legal talent in their respective work therefore, practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
within COA, then they are qualified lawyers who are "an individual or organization engaged in the
to be considered for appointment employed in COA business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
as members or commissioners, now would have Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
even chairman, of the Commission the necessary practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
on Audit. qualifications in The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
This has been discussed by the accordance with firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
Committee on Constitutional the Provision on as professional corporations and the members called
Commissions and Agencies and we qualifications shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
deem it important to take it up on under our are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
the floor so that this interpretation provisions on the younger or more inexperienced salaried
may be made available whenever Commission on attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
this provision on the qualifications Audit. And, The test that defines law practice by looking to
as regards members of the therefore, the traditional areas of law practice is essentially
Philippine Bar engaging in the answer is yes. tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
practice of law for at least ten years MR. OPLE. Yes. that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
is taken up. So that the Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
MR. OPLE. Will construction Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
Commissioner given to this is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out
Foz yield to just that this is of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
one question. equivalent to the law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust
MR. FOZ. Yes, practice of law. Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
Mr. Presiding MR. FOZ. Yes, [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325,
Officer. Mr. Presiding 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
MR. OPLE. Is Officer. almost every function known in the commercial and
he, in effect, MR. governmental realm, such a definition would
saying that OPLE. Thank obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op.
service in the you. cit.).
COA by a lawyer ... ( Emphasis The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
is equivalent to supplied) client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
the requirement Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
of a law practice provides, among others, that the Chairman and two lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
that is set forth in Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) and a large percentage spend their entire practice
the Article on the should either be certified public accountants with not without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
Commission on less than ten years of auditing practice, or members many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
Audit? of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public
MR. FOZ. We the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis image and the self perception of the legal profession.
must consider the supplied) (Ibid.).
fact that the work Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
of COA, although which is in many ways synonymous with the word public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why
it is auditing, will "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described
as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law,
as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work
or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent
is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business
daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what
truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular
those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major
corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding
of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation.
The recognition of the need for
such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the
mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing
of significant conditional factors,
the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the
use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic
computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-
making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context
or a segment thereof is developed
to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal
profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends
of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively
little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation
for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration
or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-
making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations
involving corporate finance
problems would require the
services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a
corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and
with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.
Despite the growing number of
corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation.
Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents
and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in
other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may
assume responsibilities other than
the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is
representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management.
( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one
may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to
be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's
services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate
lawyers to enter the international
law field. After all, international
law is practiced in a relatively
small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by
many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas
jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e.,
the role of the lawyer in the realm
of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives
the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law
practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the
subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management
issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances
which are of particular significance
to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and
management of the legal function
itself.
These three subject areas may be
thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms
a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior
and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel
for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's
participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization
and operations of governance
through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is
familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies.
And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race ar
e examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary
spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge
of the environment coordinating
work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the
organization. In general, such
external activities are better
predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal
managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate
effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the
corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field
of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more
accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This
enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation
Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of
such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction
in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate
the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization
and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by
lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities.
They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the
risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is
the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of
the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global
operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability
exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home
the thesis that knowing corporate
law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor
to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand
all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of
the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of
the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect
of their work. Yet, many would
admit to ignorance of vast tracts of
the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance
law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as
a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's
work involved being knowledgeable in election law.
He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments
to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129
Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a
negotiating panel acts as a team,
and which is adequately constituted
to meet the various contingencies
that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the
legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement
is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the
meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an
important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national
development policies as key factors
in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the
work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States
Agency for International
Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-
31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and
compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of
a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements
contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction
is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must
not only define the responsibilities
of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion
to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua
non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush
are not the equal of quiet genius
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo
J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers
in Foreign Investments," Integrated
Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it
is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
(Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the
appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but
to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular
 position. It also has no authority to
direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within
the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the
appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in
the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX
of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the
Commisioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years,
without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's
separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped
notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice "
. . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on
Appointments rejects a nominee by
the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is
in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the
Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate
(which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter
that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson.
Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the
petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by
Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing
that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be
confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the
Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on
the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose
in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned
were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's
comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at
least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents
deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the
core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions
involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the
solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific
standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met
and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly
understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that
matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and
is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs.
Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ...
(emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent
Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of
law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice
of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for
the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law
implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his
professional services are available
to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the
term "practice of law" (Ernani
Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p.
806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S.
462) If compensation is expected,
all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected
with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur
C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal
principle practice or
procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship.
Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge
of law but involves no attorney-
client relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be
useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time
of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks
which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or
habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks
habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice
of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People
vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private
practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as
a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition
and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified
for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my
brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with
him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from
examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is
not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's
credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were,
the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to
our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was
involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the
same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we
said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign
people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we
cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be
declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry.
The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was
qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private
respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice
of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as
embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under
the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in
litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of
law even if his main occupation is another business
and he interprets and applies some law only as an
incident of such business. That covers every
company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering
the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He
can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts
involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public
utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he
would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the
rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory
Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining
the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ...
in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing.
The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is
to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living,
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation.
The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be
sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he
has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as
an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is
focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was
acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL
and the Constitutional Commission (together with
non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended
over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice
of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for
many other positions worthy of his abundant talents
but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no
less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully
vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that
engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in
fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the
result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view
that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind
while on official leave but not expressing his clear
stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he
did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
there was no error so gross as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult.
First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is
precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission
errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot
shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in
the practice of law for even one year. He is a member
of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is
stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But
if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has
not engaged in an activity where membership in the
bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not
only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have
if there main occupation is selling real estate,
managing a business corporation, serving in fact-
finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether
in Government or private practice, except that in one
joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to
pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one's decisive
choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it
out with intent and attention during the ten-year
period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data
submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission
on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law
except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for
M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's
activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics
(Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group
— Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin
American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group —
Executive of various companies,
i.e., Meralco Securities
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group —
President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila —
Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of
Companies — Chief Executive
Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine
Constitutional Commission —
Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding
Commission on the December 1989
Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer
of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems
Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the
Following:
a. Engineering Construction
Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy
Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings
Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial
Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital,
Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and
Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture
Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture
Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even
remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all
sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead
of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services,
he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on
Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in
the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge
in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations,
agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose
with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow,
or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market
vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of
law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not
only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and
it includes the giving of advice or
the rendering of any services
requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a
will, contract or other instrument,
 the legal effect of which, under the
facts and conditions involved, must
be carefully determined. People ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not
impossible to lay down a formula
or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as
an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs
of our courts, is the giving of
advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of
such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition,
we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People
v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview
of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions
propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or
not he ever prepared contracts for
the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the
question as to how many times he
had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years
of his business, he said: "I have no
Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his
answer was I suppose. Asked if he
did not recall making the statement
to several parties that he had
prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered:
"I don't recall exactly what was
said." When asked if he did not
remember saying that he had made
a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was
not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so,
that is not a practice." Pressed
further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not
the broker, he finally answered: "I
have done about everything that is
on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that
because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing
of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ...
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general
sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his
stead; an agent; more especially,
one of a class of persons authorized
to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons
are attorneys at law, and non-
professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as
meaning an attorney at law. A
person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally
qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on
the retainerof clients. "The
principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his
client; (2) to manage the business
of his client with care, skill, and
integrity; (3) to keep his client
informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets
confided to him as such. ... His
rights are to be justly compensated
for his services." Bouv. Law Dict.
tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb
"practice," as defined by Webster,
means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on
in practice, or repeated action; to
apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art.
etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan,
S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of
law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus,
we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14
SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment
itself recognizes habituality as a required component
of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum
prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of
law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for
the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p.
115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent
Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge,
the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under
the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in
the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific
legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines
which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not
within the context of doing business. This was our
ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v.
Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic
leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC
Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed
for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on
Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar
to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and
"B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL
5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.
8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving
FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of
Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN
Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr.
US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended
their valuable services and cooperation of which this
Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court
are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the
merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner
by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e.,
"legal support services" vis-a-
vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same
are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny
that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services
from government or non-
government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice
of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today
it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke services. In addition, the thereafter validly
the administrative supervision of advertisements in question appear obtained abroad
this Honorable Court to perpetually with a picture and name of a person by the alien
restrain respondent from being represented as a lawyer from spouse
undertaking highly unethical Guam, and this practically removes capacitating him
activities in the field of law practice whatever doubt may still remain as or her to
as aforedescribed. 4 to the nature of the service or remarry, the
xxx xxx xxx services being offered. Filipino spouse
A. The use of the name "The Legal It thus becomes irrelevant whether shall have
Clinic, Inc." gives the impression respondent is merely offering capacity to
that respondent corporation is being "legal support services" as claimed remarry under
operated by lawyers and that it by it, or whether it offers legal Philippine Law.
renders legal services. services as any lawyer actively It must not be forgotten, too, that
While the respondent repeatedly engaged in law practice does. And the Family Code (defines) a
denies that it offers legal services to it becomes unnecessary to make a marriage as follows:
the public, the advertisements in distinction between "legal services" Article 1.
question give the impression that and "legal support services," as the Marriage
respondent is offering legal respondent would have it. The is special
services. The Petition in fact simply advertisements in question leave no contract of
assumes this to be so, as earlier room for doubt in the minds of the permanent
mentioned, apparently because this reading public that legal services union between a
(is) the effect that the are being offered by lawyers, man and woman
advertisements have on the reading whether true or not. entered into
public. B. The advertisements in question accordance with
The impression created by the are meant to induce the law for the
advertisements in question can be performance of acts contrary to establishment of
traced, first of all, to the very name law, morals, public order and conjugal and
being used by respondent — "The public policy. family life. It is
Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it It may be conceded that, as the the foundation of
is respectfully submitted connotes respondent claims, the the family and an
the rendering of legal services for advertisements in question are only inviolable social
legal problems, just like a medical meant to inform the general public institution whose
clinic connotes medical services for of the services being offered by it. nature,
medical problems. More Said advertisements, however, consequences,
importantly, the term "Legal emphasize to Guam divorce, and and incidents are
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the any law student ought to know that governed by law
term medical clinic connotes under the Family Code, there is and not subject to
doctors. only one instance when a foreign stipulation,
Furthermore, the respondent's divorce is recognized, and that is: except that
name, as published in the Article 26. . . . marriage
advertisements subject of the Where a marriage settlements may
present case, appears with (the) between a fix the property
scale(s) of justice, which all the Filipino citizen relation during
more reinforces the impression that and a foreigner is the marriage
it is being operated by members of validly celebrated within the limits
the bar and that it offers legal and a divorce is
 provided by this
Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that
the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws
are exploited for the sake of profit.
At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A
lawyer shall not
counsel or abet
activities aimed
at defiance of the
law or at
lessening
confidence in the
legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant
to point out that advertisements
such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a
cartoon of a motor vehicle with the
words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract
of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications
for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal
Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from
the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to
the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo,
(that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that
respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any
other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or offering
some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from
offering such services to the public
in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that
providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized
legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the
Bar encroaches upon the practice of
law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services
involved in the case at bar can be
better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar,
however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the
protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public.
Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing
objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more
difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be
made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because
of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however,
that some of respondent's services
ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest
or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent
may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the
information given, a disclaimer that
it is not authorized to practice law,
that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it
is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to
advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of
the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by
paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not
engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held
that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them
to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural
persons can engage in the practice
of law, and such limitation cannot
be evaded by
a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself
to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It
is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who
act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is
not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur.
270). It is a personal right limited
to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It
follows that not only respondent
but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers'
Association's position, in answer to
the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in
the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained
of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court
has the power to supress and punish
the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized
practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not
engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly
show that it is indeed engaged in
law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general
public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services
unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge
and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the
Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public
from the danger of being exploited
by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer
requires one to take a rigorous four-
year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to
practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is
sanctioned in many jurisdiction as
an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of
study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general
public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures
should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned
advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the
impression that information
regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption
and foreign investment, which are
in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name
— The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does
not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives
the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when
only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further
belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
on the structure and main purpose
of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of
the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the
petition are clearly advertisements
to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not
only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it
is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the
public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the
USA, Canada and other countries
the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special
skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs
can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to
be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these
advertisements that seem to project
that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are
highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to
consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek
advice on divorce, where in this
country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
in the Philippines. It is also against
good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which
by our laws cannot be done (and)
by our Code of Morals should not
be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53
Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional,
and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de
Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not
engaged in the practice of law, such
as management consultancy firms
or travel agencies, whether run by
lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business
of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty
of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one .
. . . acting as a consultant
can render effective
service unless he is
familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems .
. . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of
the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in
determining what
measures he shall
recommend, do not
constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a
fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the
law . . . . Our knowledge
of the law — accurate or
inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we
are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen
generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the
laws touching their
particular business or
profession. A good
example is the architect,
who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory
and tenement house
statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in
harmony with the law.
This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect,
asked by his client to omit
a fire tower, replies that it
is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of
some measure that he
recommends, a decision of
the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal
advice or information, and
the legal question is
subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of
degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one
intending to erect a
building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in
respect to the building
code and the like, then an
architect who performed
this function would
probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the
case. The most important
body of the industrial
relations experts are the
officers and business
agents of the labor unions
and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it
has been the practice for
some years to delegate
special responsibility in
employee matters to a
management group chosen
for their practical
knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or
lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the
defendants have the same
service that the larger
employers get from their
own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for
which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading
universities. The court
should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-
established method of
conducting business is
unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men
who customarily perform
a certain function have no
right to do so, or that the
technical education given
by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a
man is practicing law, we
should consider his work
for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law
defining his client's
obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client along the path
charted by law. This, of
course, would be the
practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the
case before me.
Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic
and psychological lines.
The law only provides the
frame within which he
must work, just as the
zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits
the kind of building the
architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or
information defendant
may give, does not
transform his activities
into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his
work, he performed
services which are
customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he
would be practicing
law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of
defendant's work is the
representations of the
employer in the
adjustment of grievances
and in collective
bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and
may select an agent
particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion,
and the person appointed
is free to accept the
employment whether or
not he is a member of the
bar. Here, however, there
may be an exception
where the business turns
on a question of law. Most
real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade
the opposite party to the
same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between
an employer and his men
grows from differing
interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it
is quite likely that
defendant should not
handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is
not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer
before administrative
agencies of the federal
government, especially
before trial examiners of
the National Labor
Relations Board. An
agency of the federal
government, acting by
virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress,
may regulate the
representation of parties
before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere
with such determination or
to forbid representation
before the agency by one
whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and
Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited
in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be
said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not
customarily reserved to members of
the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for
the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in
relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both
lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is
engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal
Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage
license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in
"Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what
may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer,
such as the Legal Clinic, renders
such services then it is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears
to give information on divorce,
absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and
"B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable,
however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the
law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that
the publication of a legal
text which publication of a
legal text which purports
to say what the law is
amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated
in the text may be
accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining
of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms
should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is
the situation with many
approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold
to the public at
large. There is no personal
contact or relationship
with a particular
individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of
confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS
IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE —
THE REPRESENTATION
AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON
IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer
general advice on
common problems, and
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily
identified person.
Similarly the defendant's
publication does not
purport to give personal
advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a
designated or readily
identified person in a
particular situation — in
their publication and sale
of the kits, such
publication and sale did
not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . .
. . There being no legal
impediment under the
statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction
against defendant
maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or
separation agreement any
printed material or
writings relating to
matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the
memorandum of
modification of the
judgment against
defendant having an
interest in any publishing
house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and
against his having any
personal contact with any
prospective purchaser.
The record does fully
support, however, the
finding that for the change
of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of
personal contacts
concerning particular
problems which might
arise in the preparation
and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and
assistance in the
preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the
practice of law,
particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and
counsel by the defendant
relating to specific
problems of particular
individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation
agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State
 v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D
270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states
that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine
marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be
ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services,
are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we
now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract
by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney
at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of
another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected
with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration
engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under
the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending
or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern
conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold
customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194
N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it has
been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically
consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern
information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of
information and communication,
such as computerized legal
research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties
or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic
institutional services from
government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient
management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish
a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by
an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is
transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along
U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even
if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his
staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-
legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal
Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and
walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the problem.
That's what doctors do also. They
ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's
how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then
it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in
medical terms, require surgery or
follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter
of minutes. "Things like preparing
a simple deed of sale or an affidavit
of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can
take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung
baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like
a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more
extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you
her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives
will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by
the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american
jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them
to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to
the construction, interpretation, operation and effect
of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department
can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none
in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards
or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes
in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to
a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that
the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to
those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the
advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section
25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law
is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of
 character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation
are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising
or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of
a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can
be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect
to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from
71% to 14%
Professional from
71% to 14%
Honest from 65%
to 14%
Dignified from
45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of
the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise
his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales,
who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of
the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to
the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the
Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon
and determined, we are constrained to refrain from
lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly
not within the adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in nature.
It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law
and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized
for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of
the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in
any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
 SECOND DIVISION Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v. Gaspar Mayo, et
al.) for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc.,
an appealed case from the Municipal Trial Court of
JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09- General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged
3210-RTJ that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an
ANGELINA P. CIOCON, Order directing the parties to submit their respective
MARIVIT P. CIOCON- Present: memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the order.
HERNANDEZ, and Complainants further alleged that on 30 September
REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., CARPIO, J., 2008, a copy of the order was sent by registered mail
Chairperson, to the defendants, which they should have received
Complainants, BRION, within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants
PERALTA,* alleged that the 30-day period within which to submit
SERENO, and memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the
- versus - REYES, JJ. defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6
JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO, November 2008, complainants alleged that they
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, should be deemed to have waived their right to
General Santos City, Promulgated: adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have
Respondent. June 20, 2012 decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make
---------------x his decision.
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the
RESOLUTION parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda on 12 September 2008. The Order was
CARPIO, J.: sent to the parties through registered mail on 30
September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the
The Case plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on 10
November 2008 but the court did not receive the
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. registry return card on the notice to the defendants.
Ciocon-Hernandez, and Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent
(complainants) filed an administrative complaint a letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos
against Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the City asking for certification as to when the Order of
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No.
22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or 690, was received by the defendants. However, the
procedures; gross incompetence and inefficiency; court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019;
violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009,
Penal Code; violations of pertinent provisions of the for the greater interest of substantial justice, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial defendants were given their last chance to submit
Conduct per A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of their memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the
Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and grave order. In the same order, he directed the plaintiffs to
misconduct. coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal
delivery of the order to the defendants. However, the
The Antecedent Facts plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the branch sheriff
and the order was sent to the defendants, again by
registered mail, only on 17 June 2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant
Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is engaging in the
practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge
Lubao asked this Court to require Karaan to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt for
unauthorized practice of law.
Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that
Judge Lubaos failure to submit his comment on time
to complainants administrative complaint is a
violation of the existing rules and procedure and
amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards his
alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged
that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the
issues at hand.
The Findings of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported that a
verification from the Docket and Clearance Division
of its Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous
administrative complaints[1] against judges from
different courts, all of which were dismissed by this
Court.
In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that
there was no evidence to show that the orders issued
by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty
or bad faith. The OCA stated that the matters raised
by complainants could only be questioned through
judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by
way of an administrative complaint. The OCA stated
that Karaan could not simply assume that the order of
12 September 2008 had been received by the
defendants without the registry return card which was
not returned to the trial court.
The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached
to the records, it would appear that Karaan was
engaged in the practice of law. The OCA also noted
the numerous frivolous and administrative complaints
filed by Karaan against several judges which tend to
mock the judicial system.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of merit. The
OCA further recommended that Karaan be required
to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule
71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court
dismissed the complaint against Judge Lubao for
being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This
Court likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for violating Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao.
Karaan denied that he had been assuming to be an
attorney or an officer of the court and acting as such
without authority. He alleged that he did not indicate
any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance
Number in his documents. He further stated that
A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against Judge Lindo was not
actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to
the motion for reconsideration and compliance to the
show cause order. Karaan reiterated that he never
represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer
of the court and that his paralegal services, rendered
free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated
that he assists organizations which represent the
interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and
members of the community with limited means.
In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA
found no merit in the motion for reconsideration. The
OCA noted Judge Lubaos explanation that the case
was summarily dismissed by the municipal trial court
without service of summons on the defendants. Thus,
Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order
requiring all parties to submit their memorandum to
give all concerned the opportunity to be heard. The
OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubaos
action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the
claim of Karaan that he could prove the receipt of the
order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was
not in the records of the case where Judge Karaan
based his order.
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of
intemperate and slanderous language, continually
attributed all sorts of malicious motives and nefarious
schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his
official function but failed to substantiate his
allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is
just one of the many cases Karaan filed against
various judges in other courts where the same pattern
of accusations could be observed.
The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show
cause order unsatisfactory. The OCA noted
Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal
advice and then making the parties execute a special
power of attorney that would make him an agent of
the litigants and would allow him to file suits,
pleadings and motions with himself as one of the
plaintiffs acting on behalf of his clients. The OCA
noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the
underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall within
the practice of law. The OCA recommended that
Karaan be declared liable for indirect contempt and
be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for 10
days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine
of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of
the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against
the courts, judges or court employees will merit more
serious sanctions.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the
motion for reconsideration of the Courts 24
November 2010 Resolution dismissing the complaint
against Judge Lubao has no merit.
Not all administrative complaints against judges
merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action.[2] We agree with the OCA that the remedy of
the complainants in this case is judicial in nature.
Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration
of this Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution
dismissing the administrative case against Judge
Lubao is in order. As the OCA stated, Karaan could
not make assumptions as to when the defendants
received the copy of Judge Lubaos order without the
registry return receipt. While Karaan claimed that he
knew when one of the parties received a copy of the
order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and
was not in the records of the case when Judge Lubao
issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants
their last chance to submit their memorandum. The
records would also show that Judge Lubao had been
very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch
clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General
Santos City asking for certification as to when the
Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry
Receipt No. 690, was received by the
defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao
acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao
could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties
an opportunity to be heard considering that the
records of the case would show that the court a
quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants.
We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was
engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[3] the Court ruled that
practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal
profession.[4] Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.[5] Here, the OCA was able to
establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice
of law. He would require the parties to execute a
special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to
join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-
fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and
other pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being judicial in nature.
as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of the We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN,
parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the SR. GUILTY of indirect contempt under Section
pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he (P10,000).
was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of of the land for their guidance and information. The
Civil Procedure, a person [a]ssuming to be an courts and court employees are further directed to
attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such report to the Office of the Court Administrator any
without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan, Sr.
court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a before their sala.
respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court SO ORDERED.
of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.

Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin

T. Borromeo,[6] the OCA recommended that Karaan
be cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to
serve an imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City
Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a
repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or
other offense against the courts, judges or court
employees will merit further and more serious
sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a
memorandum be issued to all courts of the land to
notify the judges and court employees of Karaans
unauthorized practice of law and to report to the
OCA any further appearance to be made by Karaan.
However, the records would show that Karaan is
already 71 years old. In consideration of his old age
and his state of health, we deem it proper to remove
the penalty of imprisonment as recommended by the
OCA and instead increase the recommended fine
to P10,000.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for

reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated 24
November 2010 dismissing the complaint against
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF
THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November
30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on
the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had
in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of
the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays
the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962,
arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that
there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No.
3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration
of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This
law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years
from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order
to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the
administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred
thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in
the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for
the same purpose shall be included
in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with
argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the
advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission
and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power
to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the
Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given
by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to
5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This
requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine
qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the
collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include
all lawyers.
Complete unification is not
possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by
Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession
based on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position
of the Bar as an instrumentality of
justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession,
pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar,
in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of
justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part
of its members high ideals of
integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional
interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a
spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the
discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the
Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating
thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal
education;
(7) Promote a continuing program
of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among
other things, make it possible for
the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective
assistance in maintaining the Rule
of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants
against the abuse of tyrannical
judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly,
its responsibility in the disciplining
and/or removal of incompetent and
unworthy judges and prosecuting
officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which
traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self-
interest may level at it, and assist it
to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized
practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for
families of disabled and deceased
lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set
up lawyer reference services
throughout the country so that the
poor may not lack competent legal
service;
(9) Distribute educational and
informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a
program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys
in order to elevate the standards of
the profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical
standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and
establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate
the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain
pervasive and meaningful country-
wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict
the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it
may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the
power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing
that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic
Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts
the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the
unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature
of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent
discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of
Bar integration measures has been
put in issue, the Courts have upheld
their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements
support this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to
supervise and regulate the practice
of law.
— The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer
owes duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the
nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice,
as an officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is
privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can
best be discharged through
collective action; but there can be
no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body
can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is
fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the
support of such organized body;
and, given existing Bar conditions,
the most efficient means of doing
so is by integrating the Bar through
a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer
a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when
he passed the Bar examinations. All
that integration actually does is to
provide an official national
organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is
already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in
its elections as he chooses. The
body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual
dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in
the Unified Bar imposes only the
duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a
question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any
other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar
activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the
end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the
people. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services,
may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does
compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject
of legislative regulation and
control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to
be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated
Bar is an exaction for regulation,
while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such
an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's
power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration
of the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always
been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed
to positions taken by the Unified
Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a
member's due to promote measures
to which said member is opposed,
would not nullify or adversely
affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally
condition the right to practice law
upon membership in the Integrated
Bar, it is difficult to understand
why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the
 very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material
of a "free speech" issue. Even the
income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of.
The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended,
might refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of war or of any other
end condemned by his conscience
as irreligious or immoral. The right
of private judgment has never yet
been exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to
lawyers already practising because
although the requirement to pay
annual dues is a new regulation, it
will give the members of the Bar a
new system which they hitherto
have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive
benefits they have not heretofore
enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective
manner than they have been able to
do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally
to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect,
and because it is a new regulation
in exchange for new benefits, it is
not retroactive, it is not unequal, it
is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the
Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time — requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England,
Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved
discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4)
greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive
profession; and (9) better and more effective
discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to
the public. No less than these salutary consequences
are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued
that in the event of integration, Government authority
will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all
over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent)
voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per
cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty
(80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all
over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and
other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it,
and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide
demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power
vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the
Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo,
and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as Republic Act
No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act
of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying
degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average
of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to
1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the
court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President
allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally
was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of seventy per
cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one
bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining
a grade below fifty per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of
the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the
Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions
for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners,
the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they
had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant
to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid,
should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the
petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the
history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more
readily the effects of the law, the following statistical
data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them.
Consolidating, however, their highest grades in
different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No.
972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by
this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which
are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has
been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its
validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-
mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this
question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing,
on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire
Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of
the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle,
the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos
A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it,
aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners,
Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners
Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of
the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per
cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal
preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly
and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and
civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that
there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials
is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had
also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines
published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally
during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports
began to be published since 1946, which continued to
be supplemented by the addition of new volumes.
Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier
had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is
there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal
history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals
by the Congress of the United States, and which we
have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against
its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon,
240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña
(24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President
which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent
to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper
(22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of
that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be
admitted to the practice of law under the provisions
of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia
College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent
with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any
other office of public trust. All votes for
either of them for any elective office except
that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male
citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of
good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p.
93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public
officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this
was the principal appointing power which
they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in
which this power had been exercised, and
with the restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section
quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
the insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular
section of the Constitution, evidently arose
from its connection with the object of this
prohibitory clause. There is nothing
indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their
power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission
spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of
granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses
the requisite qualifications to entitle him to
admission.
These positions may all be conceded,
without affecting the validity of the act. (p.
93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that
the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the
text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and
having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of
the institution, but to a certain definite
period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered
this examination, together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as
fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary examination
by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference
to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have
had no other object, and hence no greater
scope should be given to its provisions. We
cannot suppose that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain and
explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to
indicate an intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that
it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it
is to be read in connection with these
statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of
the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what
shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of
the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of
attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and
that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been disputably
a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and
exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition
that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to
be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of
this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts
was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of
legislative power without parallel in the
history of the English speaking people so far
as we have been able to ascertain. There has
been much uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and
the act of admission has always been
regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an
attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power
is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section
1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority
when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed
those qualifications which in its judgment
will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the
court to impose other and further exactions
and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted?
(p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and
legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought
of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex
rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which
it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which
the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p.
445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a
peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is
an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no
small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and
bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their bars,
at least in the English speaking countries. (p.
445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court
ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as
follows: For more than six centuries prior to
the adoption of our Constitution, the courts
of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law,
which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles."
If the courts and judicial power be regarded
as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be
difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an essential
element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to
the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a
separate independent, and coordinate branch
of the government. They took this institution
along with the power traditionally exercise
to determine who should constitute its
attorney at law. There is no express
provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that
the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
merely to its general and unquestioned
power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in
order that public interests may be protected,
such qualifications do not constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its selection.
Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary
by the course of the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars
persons deemed by them unfit to exercise
the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p.
450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to
exercise the power of appointment. It is
quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is
in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys
to the practice of law is a judicial function.
In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far
as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of
the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53,
19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas.
413.
The power of admitting an attorney to
practice having been perpetually exercised
by the courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of
the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney
is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of
justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient
ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by
Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in
the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He
becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the end of justice. His cooperation
with the court is due "whenever justice
would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties.
That has been the history of attorneys under
the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition
to that end is filed in courts, as are other
proceedings invoking judicial action.
Admission to the bar is accomplish and
made open and notorious by a decision of
the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is
an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its
work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated
succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its
officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54
NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333,
18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test
oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office
as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence
of their possessing sufficient legal learning
and fair private character. It has always been
the general practice in this country to obtain
this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years
preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein.
From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They hold their
office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or
their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of
judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court
of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence
their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of
their appropriate judicial functions." (pp.
650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost
without exception conceded everywhere to
be the exercise of a judicial function, and
this opinion need not be burdened with
citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one
of the inherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the
exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281
Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65,
A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to
establish rules that shall regulate and govern
in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and
obligations with reference to transactions
that are past or conditions that exist at the
time of the exercise of judicial power, and
the distinction is a vital one and not subject
to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its
province shall be invaded by either of the
other departments of the government. — 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly
control the action of the courts by requiring
of them construction of the law according to
its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken
in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the
bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of
law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated
by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part
of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law
in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have
the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines. —
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII,
sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside
in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has
not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to
it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules does not signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress
may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly
attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But
this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates
our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by
a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to
the practice of law without a previous examination.
The Government appointed Guariña and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of
Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the bar, without taking
the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February
28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of
Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under
the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior
to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position
of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the
Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of
the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant
city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant
attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without an examination,
upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of
said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a
former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination.
The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various
branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short
of the required percentage of 75. We would
be delinquent in the performance of our duty
to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency
of the applicant in the required qualifications
of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him
license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves
that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions
of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination
"upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he
has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes.
It is urged that having in mind the object
 which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view
of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act
which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of
the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190,
the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred
upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a
case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as
used in the above citation from Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting
the power conferred upon the commission is
to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who
were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court
held:
In the various cases wherein applications for
the admission to the bar under the provisions
of this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that
such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we
had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of
their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney
in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal,
and it further affirmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his
defieciency on that occasion, we do not
think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof
if his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he
took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to
a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that
the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of
provincial fiscal, we think we would be
justified under the above-cited provisions of
Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general
rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a
committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law
to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to
those who had studied in a law office and would pass
an examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for
admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application
is made, is entitled "An act to amend section
1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law
in relation to attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears
in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following:
"And every application for a license who
shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in
force at the time such applicant commend
the study of law, either in a law or office or
a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double
proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any
law school regularly organized under the
laws of this state, whose regular course of
law studies is two years, and requiring an
attendance by the student of at least 36
weeks in each of such years, and showing
that the student began the study of law prior
to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with
the usual proofs of good moral character.
The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in
a law office, or part of such time in a law
office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began
prior to November 4, 1897, shall be
admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now
required by the rules of this court. If the
right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue
of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers
substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules
of legislative creation for their admission to
the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an
enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of justice, and
could prescribe the character of evidence
which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and
ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2.
The right to practice law is a privilege, and a
license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him
the right to appear for litigants, to argue
causes, and to collect fees therefor, and
creates certain exemptions, such as from
jury services and arrest on civil process
while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may
classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end sought. There
must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no
just relation to the subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66,
35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98,
40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced,
and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E.
881); but the place where such physician has
resided and practiced his profession cannot
furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based
upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E.
113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test
of fitness for the profession of the law, and
plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to
engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to November 4,
1897. This class is subdivided into two
classes — First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who
studied law for the period of two years in a
law office, or part of the time in a law
school and part in a law office, who are to
be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this
court, and as to this latter subdivision there
seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both
classes, the conditions of the rules are
dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for
the law school, but a diploma granted upon
the completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study,
while those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit.
The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31,
1899, and without any prescribed course of
study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification cannot
rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole
purpose of bestowing privileges upon
certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the
court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason.
If it be granted that the legislature has power
to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit
and license those applying as attorneys at
law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of
the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232,
233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly
the right of every citizen of the United States
to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to
such restrictions as are imposed upon all
persons of like age, sex, and condition."
This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations
are all open to every one on like conditions.
All may be pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and great
learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the
right to continue their prosecution — is
often of great value to the possessors and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any
more than their real or personal property can
be thus taken. It is fundamental under our
system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications
shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged,
and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state
at the time of the enactment of the law
rendered such law unconstitutional because
of infringement upon this general principle.
State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28
S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76
N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110,
99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and
assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an officer
of this Court as a mere matter of legislative
grace or favor. It is not material that he had
once established his right to practice law and
that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to entitle
him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select
from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws
1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme
Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the
military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a
honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the
purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as "World War
Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is
rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act
was held |unconstitutional on the ground that
it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application
of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331,
227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity
of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences
between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent
and real differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any
law that is made applicable to one class of
citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason
on which it can be defended. In other words,
there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just
and natural cause for the difference made in
their liabilities and burdens and in their
rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause
unless there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained
a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of
75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
the abovementioned authorities, for this classification
? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941
or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has
no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years,
from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is
the exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by
some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure
? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which
the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of
75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent;
and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did
not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not.
The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
the general average by one per cent, with the order
that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of
the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This
is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what
the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial
passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take into
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system
that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect
for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees
the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal
to perform something contrary to reason and in an
arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on
the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no
other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced
in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice
at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who
since the beginning have announced their decision
not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act
No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices,
that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII
of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions
of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained
a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief
Justice may set. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7944 June 03, 2013
REX POLINAR DAGOHOY, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN
JUAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For consideration are: (1) the letter1 dated August 28,
2012 of respondent Atty. Artemio V. San Juan
informing the Court of his compliance with the
Court’s Resolution2 dated April 16, 2012; and (2) the
Report and Recommendation3 dated January 14, 2013
of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
The Facts
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for
gross negligence, in connection with the dismissal of
his client’s appeal filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the
father of complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was
charged with and convicted of theft by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del
Norte.4 According to the complainant, the CA
dismissed the appeal for Atty. San Juan’s failure to
file the appellant’s brief.5 He further alleged that
Atty. San Juan did not file a motion for
reconsideration against the CA’s order of dismissal.6
The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of
being untruthful in dealing with him and Tomas. The
complainant, in this regard, alleged that Atty. San
Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real
status of Tomas’ appeal and did not disclose to them
the real reason for its dismissal.7
In his comment,8 Atty. San Juan denied the charge.
He imputed fault on Tomas for failing to furnish him
a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare
and file the appellant’s brief. He claimed that he tried
to save the situation but a rich niece of Tomas
dismissed him and prevented him from further acting
on the case.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
After receipt of Atty. San Juan’s comment, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.9
On September 15, 2009, Investigating Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag found Atty. San Juan negligent
and recommended the penalty of three (3) months
suspension from the practice of law.10 The
Investigating Commissioner opined:
Under Section 7, Rule 44 of the same Rules, the
period within which Appellant should file his Brief is
limited only to forty five (45) days, unless an
extension of time to file briefs has been granted by
the Court upon good and sufficient cause, and only if
the motion for extension is filed before the expiration
of the time sought to be extended. However, up to the
present or for a period of almost one (1) year,
Accused Appellant neither moved for extension of
time to file nor filed his brief.11
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-305 dated May 15,
2011, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
approved the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.12
The IBP refers its findings to the Court
The complainant and Atty. San Juan did not file a
motion for reconsideration against Resolution No.
XIX-2011-305 dated May 15, 2011. The IBP
thereafter submitted its findings to the Court.
In our Resolution dated April 16, 2012, we resolved:
A.C. No. 7944 (Rex Polinar Dagohoy vs. Artemio V.
San Juan). – The Court NOTES the Notice of
Resolution No. XIX-2011-305 dated 15 May 2011 of
the IBP Board of Governors which adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner finding the same to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and finding respondent
guilty of gross negligence, ordered the suspension of
Atty. Artemio V. San Juan from the practice of law
for three (3) months; transmitted by letter dated 16
January 2012 of Acting Director Dennis A.B. Funa,
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, together with the
records of the case and the notation that no motion
for reconsideration was filed by either
party.13 (emphases and italics supplied)
Atty. San Juan’s letter dated August 28, 2012
and motion to lift suspension from the practice of law
In a letter dated August 28, 2012, Atty. San Juan
manifested his compliance with the April 16, 2002
Resolution and prayed for the lifting of his
suspension. He stated that:
This will please confirm receipt on May 31, 2012 of a
Resolution dated 16 April 2012, by the Hon.
Supreme Court, Second Division, Baguio City,
ordering my suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months. Upon receipt of the notice on May
31, 2012, I personally informed the Presiding Judge
of the [c]ourts where I have been handling cases by
showing to them the above-mentioned notice from
the High Court.14
In its Report and Recommendation dated January 14,
2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended:
A resolution, whether to adopt or modify the penalty
imposed on the respondent as recommended by the
IBP, be now issued;
For purposes of determining the effectivity of the
order of suspension, respondent be REQUIRED to
notify the Court of the date of x x x the said
resolution;
After the lapse of the entire duration of the order of
suspension, the respondent be REQUIRED to file a
sworn manifestation, with attachment of
certifications from the IBP Local Chapter where he
belongs and the Office of the Executive Judge of the
court where he practices his profession, all stating
that he has ceased and desisted from the practice of
law (stating the date of the start of suspension up to
the end of the period of suspension).15
The Court’s Ruling
Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the
findings of the IBP.
In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan,16 we
held that the failure to file a brief resulting in the
dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In this case, Atty. San Juan’s negligence
in handling his client’s appeal was duly established
by the records and by his own admission. We cannot
accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by
his client in failing to provide him a copy of the case
records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records
was within Atty. San Juan’s control and is a task that
the lawyer undertakes. We note that Atty. San Juan
received a notice dated April 19, 200517 from CA
Clerk of Court Beverly S. Beja informing him that
the case records were already complete and at his
disposal for the preparation of the brief.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or
should have known, that filing an appellant’s brief
within the reglementary period is critical in the
perfection of an appeal. In this case, Atty. San Juan
was directed to file an appellant’s brief within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the notice dated April 19,
2005 sent by CA Clerk of Court Beja.
The preparation and the filing of the appellant’s brief
are matters of procedure that fully fell within the
exclusive control and responsibility of Atty. San
Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts
and procedures necessary and incidental to the
perfection of his client’s appeal.
Third, the records also disclose Atty. San Juan’s lack
of candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to
inform Tomas of the progress of his appeal with the
CA.18 Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real
reason for the CA’s dismissal of the appeal.19 Neither
did Atty. San Juan file a motion for reconsideration
to address the CA’s order of dismissal, or otherwise
resort to available legal remedies that might have
protected his client’s interest.
Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the
Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to "conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his)
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to (his) clients[.]" He also
violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
"It is a fundamental rule of ethics that ‘an attorney
who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.’" 20 It was Atty.
San Juan’s bounden duty to see his cases through WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
until proper completion; he could not abandon or resolves to:
neglect them in midstream,21 in the way he did with NOTE the Report and Recommendation dated
the complainant’s case. January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar Confidant;
In light of these considerations, we find the IBP’s SUSPEND from the practice of law for a period of
recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension one (1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for violating
from the practice of law not commensurate to the his Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04,
gravity of the infractions committed; as described Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
above, these infractions warrant the imposition of a with a WARNING that the commission of the same
stiffer sanction. We take into account the following or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more
acts, omissions, and consequence attendant to Atty. severely; and
San Juan’s inadequacies: first, the negligence in DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan
handling his client’s appeal; second, his failure to act in the letter dated August 28, 2012 that he be allowed
candidly and effectively in communicating to return to the practice of law.
information to his client; and more importantly, third, Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts.
the serious and irreparable consequence of his The Office of the Bar Confidant is instructed to
admitted negligence which deprived his client of include a copy of this Decision in Atty. San Juan’s
legal remedies in addressing his conviction. file.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal,22 we imposed a one (1) SO ORDERED.
year suspension from the practice of law on a lawyer
who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of
gross negligence in handling his client’s case. With
this case as the norm, we hold that Atty. San Juan
should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from
the practice of law for his negligence and
inadequacies in handling his client’s case.
Finally, we deny Atty. San Juan’s motion to lift the
order of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. San Juan’s self-
imposed compliance with the IBP’s recommended
penalty of three (3) months suspension was
premature. The wordings of the Resolution dated
April 16, 2012 show that the Court merely noted: (1)
the IBP’s findings and the recommended penalty
against Atty. San Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the
case back to the Court for its proper disposition. The
IBP findings and the stated penalty thereon are
merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has
the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose
against them penalties for unethical conduct.23 Until
finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP
findings and the recommended penalty imposed
cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its
own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot
be a proper subject of implementation or
compliance.24
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority? This is
the question sought to be resolved in the present case
involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses
Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union
on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided
in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he
must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching
submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986,
issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14
June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered
voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October
1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was
elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar
Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated
20 April 1999, he was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to
file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to
the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating
that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which
the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at
best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship
which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies
that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the
election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of
the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age
of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which
had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years (VELAYO, supra at p.
51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No.
70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said
period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when a
(sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422,
s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s.
1953). But in Cuenco, it was held
that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable
time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However,
due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A.
No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation,
attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
states:
1. I have always considered myself
as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and
consistently declared myself as one
in my school records and other
official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession
(Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
 4. I participated in electoral
process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of
Tubao, La Union as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship
on July 15, 1999 in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a
statement signed and sworn to by
me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of
Philippine citizenship with the oath
of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine
citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN
PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine
citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took
the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five"
are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over
to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose
born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be
noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section
1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to
make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625
did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the
United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco
vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been
construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years
is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be
extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension
of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing,
petitioner was born on February 16,
1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-
eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached
the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of
majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11
April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by
any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot
constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in
the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that
Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925
(when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating
in the elections and campaigning
for certain candidate[s]. These acts
are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts
and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the
1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of
Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act
would be necessary to confer on
him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship
(U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543,
Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May
12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111,
June 28, 1954). Neither could any
act be taken on the erroneous belief
that he is a non-filipino divest him
of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further
elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines
"election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship. In the
exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held:
Esteban's
exercise of the
right of suffrage
when he came of
age constitutes a
positive act of
Philippine
citizenship. (p.
52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise
his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation
of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or
formal declaration is a requirement
for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine
citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of
Philippine citizenship on the part of
the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it
would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the
plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently,
we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority
until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result. this golden privilege slipped away from his
grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application
for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO
THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation
rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a
result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.
This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was
granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted
from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr.
Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993
Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with
this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not
last for more than ten (10) months from the time of
the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has
filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed
in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed
by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in
North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives
nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this
requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He
is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with
is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose
chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of
Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that
there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that
arise in the practice of profession.
For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a
high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the
board of bar examiners as an arm
of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of
the moral standard of each
candidate for admission to practice.
. . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree
of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission and interests of their clients, but be acquired in after
to the bar. The evil must, if able to assist court in the trial of the years, but if the
possible, be successfully met at its cause. Yet what protection to applicant passes
very source, and prevented, for, clients or assistance to courts could the threshold of
after a lawyer has once been such agents give? They the bar with a
admitted, and has pursued his are required to be of good moral bad moral
profession, and has established character, so that the agents and character the
himself therein, a far more difficult officers of the court, which they chances are that
situation is presented to the court are, may not bring discredit upon his character will
when proceedings are instituted for the due administration of the law, remain bad, and
disbarment and for the recalling and it is of the highest possible that he will
and annulment of his license. consequence that both those who become a
In Re Keenan: 6 have not such qualifications in the disgrace instead
The right to practice law is not one first instance, or who, having had of an ornament to
of the inherent rights of every them, have fallen therefrom, shall his great
citizen, as in the right to carry on an not be permitted to appear in calling — a curse
ordinary trade or business. It is courts to aid in the administration instead of a
a peculiar privilege granted and of justice. benefit to his
continued only to those who It has also been stressed that the requirement of good community — a
demonstrate special fitness in moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so Quirk, a
intellectual attainment and in far as the general public and the proper Gammon or a
moral character. All may aspire to administration of justice are concerned, than the Snap, instead of a
it on an absolutely equal basis, but possession of legal learning: Davis, a Smith or
not all will attain it. Elaborate . . . (In re Applicants for License, a Ruffin. 9
machinery has been set up to test 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
applicants by standards fair to all [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187): inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
and to separate the fit from the The public policy the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to
unfit. Only those who pass the test of our state has be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
are allowed to enter the profession, always been to proceedings for disbarment:
and only those who maintain the admit no person Re Stepsay: 10
standards are allowed to remain in to the practice of The inquiry as to the moral
it. the law unless he character of an attorney in a
Re Rouss: 7 covered an proceeding for his admission to
Membership in the bar is a upright moral practice is broader in scope than in
privilege burdened with conditions, character. The a disbarment proceeding.
and a fair private and professional possession of this Re Wells: 11
character is one of them; to refuse by the attorney is . . . that an applicant's contention
admission to an unworthy applicant more that upon application for admission
is not to punish him for past important, if to the California Bar the court
offense: an examination into anything, to the cannot reject him for want of good
character, like the examination into public and to the moral character unless it appears
learning, is merely a test of fitness. proper that he has been guilty of acts
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8 administration of which would be cause for his
Attorney's are licensed because of justice than legal disbarment or suspension, could
their learning and ability, so that learning. Legal not be sustained; that the inquiry is
they may not only protect the rights learning may be broader in its scope than that in a
 disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might
not establish his guilt of any of the
acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications.
The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in
their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable
"hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries
which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate
Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust
and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by
the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant
A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We
stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only
at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at
the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court,
for its examination and consideration, evidence that
he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to
inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the
father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10)
day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution
be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.
 SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
13-4129-RTJ], July 20, 2015
FLOR GILBUENA
RIVERA, Complainant, v. HON. LEANDRO C.
CATALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 256, MUNTINLUPA
CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
"A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head."1
A judge who adheres to this principle cannot be
administratively held liable and be sanctioned.
Subject of this disposition is the petition2 filed on
September 10, 2013, by complainant Flor Gilbuena
Rivera (complainant), charging respondent Judge
Leandro C. Catalo (Judge Catalo), Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa
City (RTC), with a violation of Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct3 when he flip-flopped by first
setting aside and then recalling a final and executory
judgment.
The Facts:
On February 1, 2012, complainant filed her Amended
Petition4 before the RTC, praying for the issuance of
new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 3460, docketed as LRC Case No. 12-
005. The case was raffled to the branch presided by
Judge Catalo.
The amended petition alleged that complainant was
one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena (Gilbuena); that
TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name of
Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of the
said title had remained missing despite their diligent
efforts to locate the same. When the case was called
for hearing, no oppositor appeared before the RTC.
Upon motion, complainant was allowed to present
evidence exparte on March 18, 2012.
On May 18, 2012, Judge Catalo rendered his
decision5 granting the petition for issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence
presented by complainant, particularly the affidavit of
loss and the certification issued by the Register of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City (RD). The decretal portion
thereof reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be
meritorious, the same is hereby granted. Accordingly,
the Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3460 that was lost is hereby declared null
and void. The Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa
City is hereby ordered to issue a new Owners
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3460, which said title shall be entitled to full
faith and credit as the lost one.
6
SO ORDERED. redarclaw
[Emphasis Supplied]
The RTC decision became final and executory on
July 3, 2012 and the Certificate of Finality7 was
issued on July 6, 2012.
In a Letter,8 dated August 16, 2012, the RD informed
complainant that the Affidavit of Loss, annotated on
TCT No. 3460, was being recalled considering that
the said title was already cancelled and being a
cancelled title, it could no longer be a subject of any
transaction.
On October 15, 2012, RD Acting Records Officer
Vivian V. Dacanay (Dacanay), formally filed her
Manifestation9 before the RTC stating, among others,
that upon examination of the documents submitted to
their office, it appeared that TCT No. 3460 had long
been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924; that on
August 16, 2012, the RD issued a letter recalling the
approval of the annotation of the Affidavit of Loss on
TCT No. 3460 after it was discovered that the said
title was already cancelled and, therefore, could no
longer be the subject of any transaction; that the
discovery of the cancellation of the title was
sometime in August 2012, when their office found
out that several titles had already originated from
said title; that the truth was that the title was not lost,
rather, it was cancelled by virtue of valid transactions
and conveyance as early as April 2, 1924; and that
the basis of the petition for issuance of new owner's
duplicate, which was an affidavit of loss, was totally
false, untrue and fabricated.
Dacanay added that "[t]o allow, otherwise, would
result to reviving a dead title and double titling and
later on, spread spurious titles."10redarclaw
Acting thereon, Respondent Judge issued an order
requiring the complainant and all the parties
concerned to attend a hearing on November 7, 2012
on the Manifestation filed by Dacanay. Despite being
given 15 days to give his side, the complainant did
not appear in court.11redarclaw
In the Order,12 dated June 21, 2013, Judge Catalo
recalled and set aside the May 18, 2012 decision of
the RTC.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject
administrative complaint before the Court alleging
that Judge Catalo committed gross misconduct for
recalling a final and executory judgment.
Position of Complainant
Complainant avers that the act of Judge Catalo in
recalling and setting aside the final and executory
decision was of doubtful legal and moral basis.
Complainant adds that his act of flip-flopping was
considered a violation of the Canon on Judicial
Conduct as it flagrantly disregarded well-known legal
rules and constituted grave misconduct punishable by
dismissal from the service.
Accordingly, complainant prays that Judge Catalo be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits.
Position of Respondent Judge
In his Comment,13 Judge Catalo averred that on
October 15, 2012, after the RTC decision became
final and executory, Dacanay filed her
Manifestation,14 informing the trial court that TCT
No. 3460 was already cancelled; that he then set it for
hearing on November 7, 2012 and required
complainant to present his stand; that during the
scheduled hearing, Dacanay testified that the subject
title was already cancelled and that the previous
records officer, who misinformed the RD on the
status of the title, had been sacked; that he even
required the RD to submit the English translation of
the Spanish entries just to confirm that the subject
title was previously cancelled; that complainant
failed to present his stand despite being given 15 days
to do it; that because complainant fraudulently filed
the petition for issuance of new owner's duplicate
with the use of spurious documents, the RTC
decision was void and could be recalled; and that, for
said reason, he recalled the said decision in his June
21, 2013 order.
Judge Catalo invokes the inherent power of the court
to amend and control its processes and orders to
make them conformable with the law and justice. The
respondent explained that although a final judgment
is immutable and unalterable, such rule is not
absolute as it admits exceptions such as those
concerning void judgments.
Report and Recommendation
In its Report,15 dated April 20, 2015, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo
was administratively liable, not for gross misconduct,
but for gross ignorance of the law.
When the May 18, 2012 decision became final and
executory on July 3, 2012, it became immutable and
unalterable. Thus, Judge Catalo inexcusably and
wrongfully ignored such basic principle when he
decided to motu proprio recall his own final decision.
The OCA also found that he overlooked the basic
principle that a final judgment, order or resolution
could only be annulled under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.
The OCA, thus, concluded that for exhibiting gross
ignorance of the law, Judge Catalo violated Rule 1.01
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as he
failed to conform to the high standards of
competence required of judges. It was the
recommendation of the OCA that Judge Catalo be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
fined in the amount of P21,000.00.
The Court's Ruling
The Court declines the recommendation of the OCA.
Gross ignorance of the law by a judge presupposes an
appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law
or procedures and well-established jurisprudence that
tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
fairness of the court which he personifies.16 In this
case, the Court is not at all convinced that Judge
Catalo committed gross ignorance of the law.
Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or
immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect.17 Like
any other rule, however, there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.18redarclaw
Under the second exception, a void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is
a source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head.19redarclaw
In the case of Abalos v. Philex Mining
Corporation,20 the Court reiterated the third
exception, concerning unjust and inequitable
judgments.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the law, the court may modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain
facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory.21
In other words, if there are facts and circumstances
that would render a judgment void or unjust after its
finality, and render its execution a complete nullity,
such judgment cannot exude immutability.
In this case, the Court is of the considered view that
Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because
the second and third exceptions on the doctrine of
finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After
the finality of the RTC decision on July 3, 2012, it
was discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been
cancelled as early as April 2, 1924. Complainant,
when later asked to present his stand, failed to
contradict the allegation that he falsified his affidavit
of loss. Clearly, these subsequent events raised a red
flag and placed the Respondent Judge on his toes.
Judge Catalo realized an execution of such judgment
would definitely be unjust and inequitable as it would
be sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would
judicially permit the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in
existence.
Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate.
Judge Catalo was correct in stating that the judgment
was void and could not have attained finality. Citing
the case of New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA,22 he
stressed that a court had no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a
certificate of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here,
the original title was not lost but officially cancelled.
Hence, Judge Catalo correctly exercised his judicial
prerogative to amend and control his factually and In the LRC case, Dacanay filed a manifestation
legally infirm decision. moving for the recall of the final judgment. This
manifestation should have been considered as an
The Court cannot agree with the OCA in ruling that opposition to the execution of judgment as she
the respondent motu proprio recalled his own final declined to implement the flawed court order.
decision. It is not disputed that he required both
complainant and the RD to attend the November 7, Judge Catalo correctly rectified his questionable
2012 hearing to shed light on the matter raised in the decision. Had he not acted responsibly, the void
manifestation filed by Dacanay. Yet, despite proper judgment would have spawned double and
notice giving him an opportunity to explain his side, conflicting titles and would have wreaked havoc on
complainant failed to do so. It was only after due the revered Torrens System of land registration.
process and hearing that Judge Catalo issued his June
21, 2013 order recalling the May 18, 2012 decision of Based on the foregoing, as the respondent complied
the RTC. with the established procedural and substantial rules
to nullify a final judgment, no fault can be ascribed to
Also, the Court does not share the view of the OCA his actions.
that the respondent should have waited for an action
under Rule 47 to assail the final judgment. First, it Hence, Judge Catalo committed no gross ignorance
can hardly be expected that the RD would itself file of the law.
an independent action to annul the final judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Second, an action under WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent
Rule 47 is not the only remedy to assail a final Judge Leandro C. Catalo, Presiding Judge, Regional
judgment. In Arcelona v. CA,23 the Court cited the Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City,
explanation of Senator Vicente J. Francisco in his is DISMISSED.
treatise regarding the remedies against a void
judgment in this manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on
the ground that the judgment or order is null and
void, because the court had no power or authority to
grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties or both. The aggrieved
party may attack the validity of the final
judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order
to annul the same, as certiorari, which is not
incidental to, but is the main object of the
proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may
also be attacked collaterally as when a party files a
motion for the execution of the judgment and the
adverse party resists the motion by claiming that
the court has no authority to pronounce the
judgment and that the same is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over
the parties.24redarclaw
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
 Republic of the Philippines the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City,
Branch 72.
Supreme Court
Manila In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,[1] the
spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elaydas handling
of their case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his
FIRST DIVISION failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure
and evidence,[2] to wit:
SPOUSES A.C. No. 7907
VIRGILIO and 4. That on February 14,
ANGELINA 2006 hearing of the said case, the
ARANDA, Present: case was ordered submitted for
Petitioners, decision [the spouses Aranda] and
CORONA, C.J., [Atty. Elayda] did not appear;
Chairperson, certified copy of the order is
VELASCO, JR., attached as Annex C;
LEONARDO-DE
- versus - CASTRO, 5. That the order setting
DEL CASTILLO, and this case for hearing on February
PEREZ, JJ. 14, 2006 was sent only to [Atty.
Elayda] and no notice was sent to
Promulgated: [the spouses Aranda] that is they
ATTY. EMMANUEL were unaware of said hearing and
F. ELAYDA, December 15, 2010 [Atty. Elayda] never informed them
Respondent. of the setting;
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 6. That despite receipt of
the order dated February 14, 2006,
[Atty. Elayda] never informed them
DECISION of such order notwithstanding the
follow-up they made of their case
to him;
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
7. That [Atty. Elayda] did
not lift any single finger to have the
The instant case stemmed from an order dated February 14, 2006
administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio reconsidered and/or set aside as is
and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the normally expected of a counsel
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission devoted to the cause of his client;
on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel,
Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross 8. That in view of the
negligence or gross misconduct in handling their inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court
case. The spouses Aranda were the defendants in naturally rendered a judgment
Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa dated March 17, 2006 adverse to
v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed before [the spouses Aranda] which copy
thereof was sent only to [Atty.
Elayda] and [the spouses Aranda]
did not receive any copy thereof,
certified xerox copy of the decision
is attached as Annex D;
9. That they were totally
unaware of said judgment as [Atty.
Elayda] had not again lifted any
single finger to inform them of
such adverse judgment and that
there is a need to take a remedial
recourse thereto;
10. That [Atty. Elayda]
did not even bother to file a notice
of appeal hence the judgment
became final and executory hence a
writ of execution was issued upon
motion of the plaintiff [Martin
Guballa] in the said case;
11. That on July 18, 2006
Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag
implemented the writ of execution
and it was only at this time that [the
spouses Aranda] became aware of
the judgment of the Court, certified
xerox copy of the writ of execution
is attached as Annex E;
12. That on July 19, 2006,
they wasted no time in verifying
the status of their case before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Olongapo City and to their utter
shock, dismay and disbelief, they
found out that they have already
lost their case and worst the
decision had already become final
and executory;
13. That despite their plea
for a reasonable period to take a
remedial recourse of the situation
(the Sheriff initially gave them
fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag
 forcibly took possession and
custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero
with Plate No. 529;
14. That they were
deprived of their right to present
their evidence in the said case and
of their right to appeal because of
the gross negligence of
respondent.[3]
In its Order[4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty. Elayda
to submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning
that failure to do so will result in his default and the
case shall be heard ex parte.
Atty. Elayda filed his Answer[5] dated September 1,
2006, in which he narrated:
7. That this case also referred to
[Atty. Elayda] sometime December
2004 after the [spouses Aranda]
and its former counsel failed to
appear in court on February 7,
2005;
8. That from December 2004, the
[spouses Aranda] did not bother to
contact [Atty. Elayda] to prepare
for the case and in fact on May 30,
2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for
postponement of the case for
reason that he still have to confer
with the [spouses Aranda] who
were not around;
9. That contrary to the allegations
of the [spouses Aranda], there was
not a single instance from
December 2004 that the [spouses
Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to
talk to him regarding their case;
this reason that they alone should
10. That the [spouses Aranda] from be blamed for what happened to
December 2004 did not even bother their case x x x.
to follow up their case in court just
if to verify the status of their case
and that it was only on July 19,
2006 that they verified the same At the mandatory conference hearing held on March
and also the only time they tried to 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with their
contact [Atty. Elayda];
respective counsels. The parties were then given a
11. That the [spouses Aranda] period of 10 days from receipt of the order within
admitted in their Complaint that
they only tried to contact [Atty. which to submit their position papers attaching
Elayda] when the writ of execution therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits of
was being implemented on them;
witnesses, if any.
12. That during the scheduled
hearing of the case on February 14,
2006, [Atty. Elayda] was in fact After the submission of the parties position papers,
went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo
City and asked Mrs. Edith Miano to Investigating Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras came
call him in Branch 73 where he had out with his Decision[6] finding Atty. Elayda guilty of
another case if the [spouses
Aranda] show up in court so that gross negligence, and recommending his suspension
[Atty. Elayda] can talk to them but from the practice of law for a period of six months,
obviously the [spouses Aranda] did
thus:
not appear and Mrs. Miano did not
bother to call [Atty. Elayda];
WHEREFORE, premises
13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at
considered, respondent Atty.
fault that he was not able to file the
Emmanuel F. Elayda is suspended
necessary pleadings in court
from the practice of law for a
because the [spouses Aranda] did
period of six months, which shall
not get in touch with him;
take effect from the date of notice
of receipt of the finality of this
14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot
DECISION. He is sternly
contact the [spouses Aranda] for
WARNED that a repetition of the
the latter failed to give their contact
same or similar acts will merit a
number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did
more severe penalty.[7]
the [spouses Aranda] go to his
office to leave their contact
number;
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed
14. That the [spouses Aranda]
were negligent in their I dont care Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128[8] dated March 6,
attitude towards their case and for
 considered a privilege, not a right, xxxx
2008, adopting and approving Investigating bestowed by the State on those who
Commissioner Pizarras report, to wit: show that they possess and Rule 18.02 A
continue to possess the legal lawyer shall not
qualifications required for the handle any legal
RESOLVED to ADOPT and conferment of such privilege. matter without
APPROVE, as it is hereby adequate
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Verily, lawyers are preparation.
Report and Recommendation of the expected to maintain at all times a
Investigating Commissioner of the high standard of legal proficiency Rule 18.03 A
above-entitled case, herein made and of morality which includes lawyer shall not
part of this Resolution as Annex A; honesty, integrity and fair neglect a legal
and, finding the recommendation dealing. They must perform their matter entrusted
fully supported by the evidence on four-fold duty to society, the legal to him, and his
record and the applicable laws and profession, the courts and their negligence in
rules, and in view of respondents clients in accordance with the connection
negligence and unmindful of his values and norms of the legal therewith shall
sworn duties to his clients, Atty. profession, as embodied in the render him liable.
Emmanuel F. Elayda is Code of Professional
hereby SUSPENDED from the Responsibility.Any conduct found Rule 18.04 A
practice of law for six (6) months wanting in these considerations, lawyer shall keep
with Warning that a repetition of whether in their professional or the client
the same or similar acts will merit a private capacity, shall subject them informed of the
more severe penalty.[9] to disciplinary action. In the present status of his case
case, the failure of respondent to and shall respond
file the appellants brief was a clear within a
Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a violation of his professional duty to reasonable time
Petition for Review maintaining that he was not his client.[11] to the clients
negligent in handling the spouses Arandas case as to request for
warrant suspension, which was too harsh a penalty information.
under the circumstances. The Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide: CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL
After a careful review of the records of the instant REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES OF THE LAW.
Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients. HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of
In Abay v. Montesino,[10] this Court held: IN HIM. his clients. He should be conscientious, competent
and diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty.
The legal profession is CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time
invested with public trust. Its goal SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH to all the cases he is handling. As the spouses
is to render public service and COMPETENCE AND Arandas counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor
secure justice for those who seek its DILIGENCE. the progress of said spouses case and is obligated to
aid. Thus, the practice of law is exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense
authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by
the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty.
Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never
knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses
never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that
communication is a shared responsibility between a
counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary
duty to inform his clients of the status of their case
and the orders which have been issued by the
court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make
an inquiry about the developments in their
case. Close coordination between counsel and client
is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the
case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of
the case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a
lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at
the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. Again, Atty. Elaydas
excuse that he did not have the spouses Arandas
contact number and that he did not know their
address is simply unacceptable.
Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty.
Elaydas explanation that he cannot be faulted for
missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the spouses
Arandas case. The Court quotes with approval the
disquisition of Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:
Moreover, his defense that
he cannot be faulted for what had
happened during the hearing on
February 14, 2006 because he was
just at the other branch of the RTC
for another case and left a message
with the court stenographer to just
call him when [the spouses Aranda]
come, is lame, to say the least. In
the first place, the counsel should
not be at another hearing when he
knew very well that he has a
scheduled hearing for the [spouses
Arandas] case at the same time. His
attendance at the hearing should
not be made to depend on the
whether [the spouses Aranda] will
come or not. The Order submitting
the decision was given at the
instance of the other partys counsel
mainly because of his absence
there. Again, as alleged by the [the
spouses Aranda] and as admitted
by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did
not take the necessary remedial
measure in order to ask that said
Order be set aside.[12]
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the
RTC order submitting the spouses Arandas case for
decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the
spouses Aranda for a sum of money. Notice of said
judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again
did not file any notice of appeal or motion for
reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final
and executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the
spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The
spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC
judgment, which by then had already become final
and executory, only when a writ of execution was
issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed
to exercise due diligence in handling his clients case
but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved
himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty,
not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which
he is an officer.[13]
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a
lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether or not it is for a fee or
free.[14] Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,[15] the Court
held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause
of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters
cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by
the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from
an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties
not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal
profession.[16]
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting the Decision of
the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Elaydas personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.