How Afghanistan is challenging India’s ‘Good terrorist bad

terrorist’ stand
KABIR TANEJA

PM with Afghan President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Narendra Modi

AFGHANISTAN INDIA-AFGHANISTAN

In June 2015, the rich Northern European country of Norway served as the unlikely host
to a delegation of Afghan Taliban representatives and officials from the Afghanistan
government. Norway has never shied away from attempting to mediate global conflicts.
This land of just over 5 million people has done more than most in the name of peace,
from mediating between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government to playing a successful
role in ending the 50-year war between the Colombian state and the leftist FARC rebels
in 2016.

The fact that the Taliban set up an office in Doha in 2013 for talks with not just the
Afghan government but international actors as well could be seen as the initial sign that
the American-led military campaign to dismantle the Taliban, launched as a reaction to
9/11 in 2003, was coming to an inconclusive conclusion. However, the Taliban’s Oslo
sojourn and the Norway’s enthusiasm for ending global conflicts produced a convergence
of a sort.

The Taliban had developed some confidence in the Norwegians, specifically their
diplomat, Alfe Arne Ramslien, whose work to gain the terror group’s trust had proven
astonishingly successful in 2007. According to a report by The New York Times, the
Norwegians even managed a coup, orchestrating a late-night meeting with the then
elusive and now deceased Taliban chief, Mullah Mohammed Omar, himself.
Since then we have seen not just the mainstreaming of the Taliban and dialogue processes
around the terror group, but the international community and actors also opening dialogue
processes with the organization. While the Norwegians have met Taliban representatives
in cities such as Oslo, Karachi and Bangkok, the Chinese have hosted an Afghan Taliban
delegation led by Qatar office chief Sher Abbas Stanikazi. This visit to Beijing came only
days after Chinese, Pakistani and Russian diplomats met in Moscow and called for
Taliban leaders be removed from the United Nations sanctions list, and Moscow, perhaps
savoring the irony, offered to host peace talks between the Afghanistan government and
the Taliban. The U.S., China, Russia and other Western nations are now in the mood to
bring the Taliban into Afghan politics. But these maneuvers, initiated after nearly 15
years of Western military efforts, are stepping on the toes of some other vital and
influential partners in the Afghan story, most notably, India.

New Delhi has maintained a highly visible marketed stance on terrorism, namely that the
concept of “good” terrorists and “bad” terrorists is invalid. India’s stakes in Afghanistan
are great, as it fears any mainstreaming of the Taliban into the fabric of Afghan politics
would give unbridled access to archrival Pakistan, as its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
provides, protects and manages the Taliban from its fortresses in Rawalpindi. However,
India’s argument against political acceptance or normalization of the Taliban is in danger
of leaving New Delhi isolated.

Last month, the Afghan government made a valuable breakthrough by bringing to a close
its long-standing battle with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb-i-Islami (HIG).
Hekmatyar, warlord to some, terrorist to others (as designated by the U.S.-led Coalition)
dropped his most prevalent precondition for any peace process with the state, that of a
complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil. A disciple of Egyptian Islamic
scholar Sayyid Qutb’s vision of political Islam via the Muslim Brotherhood, Hekmatyar
has been dubbed “Butcher of Kabul” for single-handedly being responsible for most of
the civilian deaths that city saw in the 1990s. His return is no sudden epiphany, but is
rather the outcome of political negotiations and deal-making between him and the Afghan
government over the past six years.

On his return to Kabul, Hekmatyar called for peace with the Afghan Taliban while
speaking at the presidential palace, an area that in years past his forces bombarded
mercilessly. He addressed the Taliban as “brothers,” as he positions himself as a
politician, mediator and statesman. Upon his arrival, his engagements also included a
host of meetings with foreign diplomats, including a dialogue with India’s Ambassador to
Afghanistan, Manpreet Vohra.
The optics of India’s acceptance of Hekmatyar, perhaps at the behest of the Ghani
government, are confusing. As Vohra and Hekmatyar sat down for the meet, India’s flag
shared the stage with the flag of Hizb-i-Islami and not that of Afghanistan, highlighting
the intricacies and grey areas between HIG and the Afghan government that still prevail.
More than this, however, the meeting threw the spotlight on India’s hard line on the
“good terrorist-bad terrorist” hypothesis. In preparation for the success of Afghan
government’s talks with HIG, the UNSC removed Hekmatyar from its sanctions list
(although other HIG commanders remain on it) and the U.S. praised this reconciliation.

The security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating over the past few months,
with more frequent attacks on the Afghan armed forces and the Taliban making territorial
gains. It is perhaps the geographical advances and re-establishment of supremacy by the
Taliban in parts of the country that has most worried Washington and others, including
New Delhi. According to the latest report by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Afghanistan directly controls only 24 percent of
the country and influences 36 percent of it. Meanwhile, the Taliban and other insurgents
contest, influence or control 40 percent of Afghan territory. Despite the U.S. committing
further troops to a war they thought had ended, Kabul does not see military operations as
an effective way of diminishing the Taliban, and perhaps no one but the Afghan
government now has the experience to make that call.

This leaves India in a bind. As a major influence in Afghanistan with billions of dollars
invested in developmental projects, New Delhi has sternly maintained that there is no
differentiating between “good” and “bad” terrorists. On this basis, India has not –
officially at least – engaged in negotiations with the Taliban or approached the group’s
Doha office. However, not viewing Hekmatyar as a terrorist on the basis of the Kabul-led
reconciliation begs the question: Should India now also look at participating in
multilateral (or even bilateral) dialogues with the Taliban? This would mean softening its
line on the “good” and “bad” terrorist view and being open to such groups’ political
validity. True, a change now on this front could also have domestic political implications
for India. Nonetheless, if New Delhi continues its policy of refusing to see any political
validity in the Afghan Taliban, it could also be sidelined from the political jigsaw puzzle
and lose the position it has spent years building via goodwill and development. Even
Hekmatyar during his meeting with Vohra highlighted India’s developmental work,
thanking India for the Salma Dam in Herat province.

India’s approach in Afghanistan has been centered on developmental projects and aid;
however, its understanding of the political landscape may be in need of drastic shift.
While Rawalpindi’s influence on the Taliban and the Quetta shura is undeniable, New
Delhi needs to revisit its Afghanistan policy and position it in a long-term frame, one
attuned to the changing dynamics. If that means opening official channels with the
Taliban, then such an idea should be given space for deliberations.

This commentary originally appeared in Diplomat