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7 Philamgen v. Sweet Lines PDF
7 Philamgen v. Sweet Lines PDF
*
G.R. No. 87434. August 5, 1992.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to begin
with or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.
198
REGALADO, J.:
1
A maritime suit was commenced on May 12, 1978 by
herein petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI)
against private respondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and
Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI),
along with S.C.I. Line (The Shipping Corporation of India
Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the
court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged
shipment plus exemplary damages, attorneyÊs fees and
costs allegedly due to defendantsÊ negligence, with the
following factual backdrop yielded by the findings of the
court below and adopted by respondent court:
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1 Civil Case No. 115376, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch II.
199
„Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey
conducted on the same day shows an actual delivery to the
consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise noted
were the following losses, damages and shortages, to wit:
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6
motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari, faulting respondent
appellate court with the following errors: (1) in upholding,
without proof, the existence of the so-called prescriptive
period; (2) granting arguendo that the said prescriptive
period does exist, in not finding the same to be null and
void; and (3) assuming arguendo that the said prescriptive
period is valid and legal, in failing to 7conclude that
petitioners substantially complied therewith.
Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are
jointly pursuing this case, considering their common
interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy,
to obviate any question as to who the real party in interest
is and to protect their respective rights as insurer and
insured. In any case, there is no impediment to the legal
standing of petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to
sue herein private respondents in its own capacity as
insurer, it having been subrogated to all rights of recovery
for loss of or damage to the shipment insured under8 its
Marine Risk Note No. 438734 dated March 31, 1977 in
view of the full settlement of the 9 claim thereunder as
evidenced by the subrogation receipt issued in its favor by
Far East Bank and Trust Co., Davao Branch, for the
account of petitioner TPI.
Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the
insurerÊs entitlement to subrogation pro tanto, being of the
highest equity, equips it with a cause of action
10
against a
third party in case of contractual breach. Further, the
insurerÊs subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the
bill of lading in case of loss
11
of or damage to the cargo is
jurisprudentially upheld. However, if an insurer, in the
exercise of its subrogatory right, may
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proceed against the erring carrier and for all intents and
purposes stands in the place and in substitution of the
consignee, a fortiori such insurer is presumed to know and
is just as bound by the contractual terms under the bill of
lading as the insured.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error
for the Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed decision on
the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to
adduce any evidence in support thereof and that the bills of
lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a
claim and for instituting a court action against the carrier
were never offered in evidence. Considering that the
existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid
periods have allegedly not been established, petitioners
maintain that it is 12
inconceivable how they can possibly
comply therewith. In refutation, SLI avers that it is
standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading
for shipments entrusted to it for carriage and that it in fact
issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor
with 13proof of their existence manifest in the records of the
case. For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitionersÊ failure
to prove its direct 14responsibility for the loss of and/or
damage to the cargo.
On this point, in denying petitionerÊs motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that
although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence,
the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading
which are practically the documents or contracts sued
upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their
provisions cannot be disregarded in the 15
determination of
the relative rights of the parties thereto.
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of
prescription, since that defense was so considered and
controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be
taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively
raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly
apparent on the face of
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12 Rollo, 11.
13 Comment of SLI; Rollo, 4-5.
14 Comment of DVAPSI; ibid., 148-149.
15 Annex I, Petition; Rollo, 68.
203
16
relevant pleadings. In the case at bar, prescription as an
affirmative
17
defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its
answer, except that the bills of lading embodying the
same were not formally offered in evidence, thus reducing
the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be
maintained as such defense and, as in this case,
consequently upheld on the strength of mere references
thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLIÊs contractual
obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in
the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as
actionable documents which under the Rules must be 18
properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses,
and the genuineness and due execution of which are
deemed admitted unless19
specifically denied under oath by
the adverse party. The rules on actionable documents
cover and apply to 20both a cause of action or defense based
on said documents.
In the present case and under the aforestated
assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive
period, respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an
affirmative defense in its answer setting forth paragraph 5
of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the
stipulation thereon by parties, to wit:
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16 Vda. de Portugal, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 159 SCRA
178 (1988).
17 Original Record, 31; Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 23.
18 Sec. 7, Rule 8, Rules of Court.
19 Sec. 8, id., ibid.
20 Toribio, et al. vs. Bidin, et al., 134 SCRA 162 (1985).
204
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25 61A Am. Jur. 2d, Pleadings 172-173; Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing, 22
SCRA 48 (1968); Tamayo vs. Callejo, et al., 46 SCRA 27 (1972).
26 Exhibits H and I; Original Record, 177-178.
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VOL. 212, AUGUST 5, 1992 209
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Sweet Lines, Inc.
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xxx
„It must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time
limitation in the presentation of claim for loss or damage, is but a
restatement of the rule prescribed under Art. 366 of the Code of
Commerce which reads as follows:
ÂArt. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the
merchandise, the claim against the carrier for damage or average which
may be found therein upon opening the packages, may be made, provided
that the indications of the damage or average which gives rise to the
claim cannot be ascertained from the outside part of the packages, in
which case the claims shall be admitted only at the time of the receipt.
ÂAfter the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportation
charges have been paid, no claim shall be admitted against the carrier
with regard to the condition in which the goods transported were
delivered.Ê
212
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49 Rollo, 52-54.
50 91 SCRA 223 (1979).
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Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of
Appeals, precisely establish the stage in the course of the
shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged.
What can only be inferred from the factual findings of the
trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to
DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the
same could not have possibly occurred while the same was
in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the
observations of the trial court quoted at the start of this
opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the complaint in
the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals
in its challenged judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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VOL. 212, AUGUST 5, 1992 217
Misa vs. Court of Appeals
SCRA 119)
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