163546-2009-Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic20160919-3445-1e0yuxs PDF

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN , petitioner, vs . REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.
DECISION
TINGA , J : p
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered.
This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many
consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia
to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to
do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin
America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of
proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers,
their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which
are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business
transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk
by eld after eld — in each eld a different dog is going to bark at you. Even
dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it
is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal
law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
de nitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the
Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil
Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands,
as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been
treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own
circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily
to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that
have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from
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casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan led an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identi ed as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, 2
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raf ed to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay
City, Branch 18. The Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. 4
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness,
Aristedes Velazco, testi ed at the hearing. Velazco testi ed that the property was
originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather,
Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban — the
fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I af rm
the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic of the Philippines
likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certi cation
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was "veri ed to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classi cation Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982 ." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known
as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot
9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes nal and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in nding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classi cation of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certi cation had veri ed that the
property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of
possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 1 0 hence,
it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before
this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 1 1 which was handed down just four
months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by
the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the rst place
since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands,
any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 1 2 and on 11 November 2008, the
case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the
oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it suf cient that such classi cation occur at
any time prior to the ling of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona de claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a

parcel of land classi ed as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court
in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since
the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of
the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 1 4
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the land
should have been classi ed as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart
from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,
1 5 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic 1 6 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation, 1 7 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 1 8 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more
than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the
coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land
sought to be registered was previously classi ed as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been
"converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 1 9
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property", while Section 14
(2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-
year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against
public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classi cation and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. 2 0 Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are further classi ed according to their uses into
(a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for
town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 2 1

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of
"by con rmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization". 2 2
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for con rmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona de claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the ling of the application for con rmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when
the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two signi cant amendments were introduced
by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. 2 3 This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of
"lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
"thirty (30) years immediately preceding the ling of the application" to possession
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was rst promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona de claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually
the same as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codi ed
the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public
domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona de claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

inclusion of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the
other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for con rmation of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. — The following
persons may le in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature
of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing
the right itself for the rst time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the
right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or
complete his title by applying with the proper court for the con rmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the

Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may
be disposed of by con rmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion
that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b). Section 47
of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons speci ed in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of
the bene ts of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period xed by the
President. 2 4
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position
that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certi ed as alienable and
disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character

of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945", as used in the provision, quali es its antecedent phrase "under a bona de
claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. 2 5 Ad proximum antecedents at relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is led. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classi ed as alienable and disposable,
as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that which
was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility
since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12
June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona de claim of ownership long before
that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona de
claim of ownership to avail of judicial con rmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is signi cant, especially
considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio
in the rst place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.
There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suf ces that the Court's
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 2 6 the Court, citing
Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classi ed as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. . ." That
statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application
therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to
1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from
the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona de claim of ownership for over fty (50) years, but not before 12 June
1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit
is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the
applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona de claim of ownership prior
to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to
the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides
the final word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals 2 7 since in the latter, the application for registration had been led before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell
as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 2 8
which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain
land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certi cation dated November 25,
1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Of cer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Of ce in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classi cation Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is suf cient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents' application. Further,
the certi cation enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was led by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest
the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part
of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land. . . .
IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a con rmation of
imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the
rst requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they
were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of
their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove
their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land
even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual ndings of the
Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this
is one of them. 2 9
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty- ve (35) years and 180 days after 12 June
1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was led
nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in
Bracewell, the application was led nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable . That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14
(2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may le in the proper
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14 (2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.
No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [ 3 0
] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classi ed as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [ 3 1 ] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public
land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence de nitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It
is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2). Speci cally,
it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other
hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands. caTESD

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of
real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 3 2 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty
(30) years. 3 3 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, 3 4 as
well as just title. 3 5
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for
the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that speci cally allows
the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property
belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs af rmation is whether
Section 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding
that properties classi ed as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years . 3 6 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule .
The rst source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty
years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for con rmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certi cate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the ling of
the application for con rmation of title , except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 3 7
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the rst time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration led prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as
it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
Code — ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . .
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the rst source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year
period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14
(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not
refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set
forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application
for con rmation of title, without any quali cation as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty
(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement, 3 8 similar to our earlier nding with respect to
the present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as
basis for original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the
entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with
respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law
concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14
(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical quali cation under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription". The identi cation what consists of patrimonial property is
provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the
commerce of man. 3 9 Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government of cer of alienability and disposability of
lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be
converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative de nition, alienable and disposable lands may be the
object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classi ed
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classi ed as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona de
possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The
remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress
can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of
Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is more commonly known as the
BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air
Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) 4 0 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. 4 1
The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. 4 2
Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
"alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties." 4 3
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as
the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and
Subic. 4 4 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of
national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of
the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or
entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as
such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the
period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in
the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period
of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according
to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classi ed as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and
Section 14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on
the basis of possession , while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription . Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code .
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-
year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a
thirty-year period of possession , while the period under the latter concerns a
thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription . Registration under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on
thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should
not apply as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil
Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other
statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound
to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent
legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed
under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113,
which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The rst is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil
Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through
ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a
rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites — good faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as
well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, 4 5 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clari cation. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and
which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment. 4 6
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could not
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession". 4 7 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange,
donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights. SIEHcA

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classi cation of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing
prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of
prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been
completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted
into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the
Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property
under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not
a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of con rmation of ownership.
48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil
Code. What the system accommodated was the con rmation of imperfect title brought
about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act
(either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No.
1073).
The Land Registration Act 4 9 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable
public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration. 5 0 Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial
property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The
gap was nally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977,
with Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and con rms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it
is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. 5 1
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act is further con rmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property
for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insuf cient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence — the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular — is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classi cation of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420
(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A nal word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discom ture over the implications of today's
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and
the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we
simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain
lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to
limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties.
5 2 Judicial con rmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the
most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more
have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been
regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law
owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states.
Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to
Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize
the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before
the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial con rmation of imperfect title, or amending the
Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property
into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being
not only of that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED . No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta
and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
Separate Opinions

CHICO-NAZARIO , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a

piece of land originally led by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant Petition, being alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree
governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only identify which titles,
already existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens system; but it cannot
be the source of any title to land. It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the land they
are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the public domain , a
fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly
refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
except that the land was already private when the applicant for registration acquired
ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription therein was not the means by
which the public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant
acquired title to what is already private land, from another person previously holding
title to the same. 2 The provision in question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-
settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no question that the same
can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, because,
precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows :
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis

ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be
disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do so
by the modes identi ed in the same provision. Thus, the intent of the legislature to
make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by which agricultural public land may be
disposed of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only
readily apparent, but explicit . And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for
acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include prescription, in
the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome the
express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which
the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law speci cally applying to lands
of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as
amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should
prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same
cannot confer title to land and can only con rm title that already exists or has vested.
As has already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests or
is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
as amended. TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times,
changing the period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to
agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial con rmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894 . Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22,
1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later
enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years .
On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A.
No. 141, extending the period for ling applications for judicial con rmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the
provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona de claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 ." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the
public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential
Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for acquiring
imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer
determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from
a xed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should have
commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus
acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would be
sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain by possession would again be
made to depend on a xed term ( i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for
extraordinary prescription), rather than being reckoned from the xed date presently
stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public
agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion
concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial con rmation of an imperfect title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and disposable
at the time of ling of the application for judicial con rmation and/or registration of
title. On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person must establish that
he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was likewise
already declared alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier . The
majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the
matter in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my
elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
A n obiter dictum has been de ned as an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the
way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced
by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of
certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1) the
applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject parcels of
land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for registration suffers from
fatal in rmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land
individually and separately owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue rst, and held that the
alleged in rmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which
did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the misjoined causes of
action so that they could be heard by the court separately. The Court though took note
of the belated publication of the notice of hearing on the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the
same was published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was
fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in
Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of
land they wish to register in their names for the period required by law. The Court ruled
in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial
con rmation of imperfect title, requires possession of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought to be
registered was declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period
of possession prior to such declaration should not be counted in favor of the
applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be deemed to
have possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite period as to acquire
imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the subject of judicial
con rmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It was not a mere
remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the way", or only incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon a question before the Court; or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and

disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto and discussed
extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David
Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of the
notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the
other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the
application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack
of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in light of the absence
of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the
application given that the applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial
con rmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and
completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and
issues between the parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on
the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they
could re- le their respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply
with the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does not constitute obiter
dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by
the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all
pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the
nal conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is
predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a
precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on
some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the
result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular
point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not
regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional
reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one
ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more
points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every
point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a
dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other
propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and lead up to the nal conclusion, and to any statement in
the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point
expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the
case is or might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of
other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had
held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 1 0
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and
established jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the
acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for con rmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the ling of the applications for
con rmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus
acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may le in the proper
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona de claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier .
(Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the
applicant for registration prior to the reclassi cation of the land as alienable and
disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 1 1
Given the foregoing, judicial con rmation and registration of an imperfect title,
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino
citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of
the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June
1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable
and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which would not run
afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or binding judicial
precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect
title to a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945,
which could be judicially con rmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the
intention of the law is to dispose of agricultural public land to quali ed individuals
and not simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and
application of both law and jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an
absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, is well justi ed by the signi cant consequences arising from a
finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public domain. Not
just any lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect
title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of
the land by a person and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required
and considered by law suf cient as to have segregated the land from the
mass of public land. When a person is said to have acquired an imperfect
title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a grant, a government grant to
the land, without the necessity of a certi cate of title being issued. As such,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the
authority of the State to dispose of. An application for con rmation of title,
therefore, is but a mere formality. 1 2 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as

amended, has identi ed several ways by which agricultural lands of the public domain
may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of agricultural public land has its own
speci c requirements which must be complied with. If a person is not quali ed for a
judicial con rmation of an imperfect title, because the land in question was declared
alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for
he could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the afore-
quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the af rmation by the majority of the ruling in Naguit
on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, to DENY the Petition at
bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners'
application for registration of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
BRION , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur with the ponencia's modi ed positions on the application of

prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD), and on the
denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classi cation of a public
land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in accordance with
this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit (Naguit) . 1 Effectively,
what results from this decision is a new law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what
the Constitution ordains and beyond the law that the Legislature passed. Because the
majority has not used the standards set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act
(PLA), 2 its conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought to be — an
exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the order
these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy of laws
that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution,
whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony) establishes and fully
embraces the regalian doctrine as a rst and overriding principle. 3 This doctrine
postulates that all lands belong to the State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classi cation, grant, and disposition
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the Constitution,
is the country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the
President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8
sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that
they should be of cially delimited and classi ed and, when practicable, surveyed.
Section 11, a very significant section, states that —
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows and not otherwise :
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers con rmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to the
qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This section provides: cHAIES
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for con rmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of
grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then
in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part, or for any other
cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their
heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the ling
of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
de claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government,
since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Signi cantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been
amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona de claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various laws
relating to property registration. It governs the registration of lands under the Torrens
System, as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section 14 of the
PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may le in the proper
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona de
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned

river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.SEDIaH
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from, Section
48 (b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on
the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a substantive law that
classi es and provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the public
domain. The PRD, on the other hand, speci cally refers to the manner of
bringing registerable lands, among them alienable public lands, within the
coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the rst is a substantive law, while the other
is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive content, the PLA should
prevail. 7
Signi cantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and its
provisions on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance
because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on the other hand, is a
mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of disposition
mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation to the
Person to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classi es property to be
property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 proceeds to further
classify property of public dominion into those intended for public use, for public
service, and for the development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all other
properties of the State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial property of the
State, and Article 422 adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Under Article 425, property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private
persons, either individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of the
modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Signi cantly, the PLA — under
its Section 48 — provides for its system of how possession can ripen into ownership;
the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription but as basis for con rmation
of title.) Section 14 (2) of the PRD, however, speci es that "[t]hose who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as
among those who may apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was
introduced into the land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the
special law governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is Article
1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run against the State
and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides that "all things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided; property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may
also come into play in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy
of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public
domain should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands
belong to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden of
proving his claim. 1 0 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the
terms of the grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public
domain, and the PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are
special laws supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and
prescription and should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete
terms, where alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
involved, the PLA is the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code
provisions on property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 1 1
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration of the
first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. 1 2 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain. 1 3 We should never lose sight of the impact of this rst principle
where a private ownership claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting from the
rst PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed, Act No. 2874; and the
present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described in the following
terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed
rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions
to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands",
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or con rmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the government's title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain
and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands. 1 4
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to the
present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement for open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable public land under a bona de claim of ownership also never changed. Still
another consistent public land feature is the concept that once a person has complied
with the requisite possession and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is
automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State ownership; the
land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land. 1 5 The application for judicial
con rmation of imperfect title shall then follow, based on the procedure for land
registration. 1 6 It is in this manner that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the
required occupation or possession. In the rst PLA, the required
occupation/possession to qualify for judicial con rmation of imperfect title was 10
years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926 — July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or
earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until this law was amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 1 7 which provided for a simple 30-year
prescriptive period for judicial con rmation of imperfect title. This period did not last;
on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) 1 8 changed the required
30-year possession and occupation period provision, to possession and occupation of
the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier . PD 1073 likewise changed the
lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the public domain to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for
applications for free patents and judicial con rmation of imperfect titles to December
31, 1987.
The signi cance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to history.
A major concern raised against this date is that the country was at this time under
Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the uncertainties
and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one could
possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession requirement
of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the bene t of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a
Presidential Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers under a
regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the
possible impact of the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law. When PD
1073 was enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the law would affect
the application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year possession period.
Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD
1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it
provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired
under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession
period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized this legal
dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 1 9 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942
ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977,
the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should
have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the
Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by
operation of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this
law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This
follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as
a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves
or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 " may apply for
judicial con rmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and
not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The
reconciliation, as properly de ned by jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has
satis ed the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior
to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if
possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of
the present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose signi cance and import cannot be minimized
nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns; the full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not
con ned to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented by
Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892) 2 0 — issued on February 16, 1976 — which
limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings. 2 1 Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. Section
3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial con rmation of incomplete titles to public
land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 2 2 extended the period for ling applications for free
patent and judicial con rmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now
also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares
and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for ling applications for judicial
con rmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to
December 31, 2020. 2 3
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which de nes the

administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and
RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the
Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978 to
codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14 describes the
applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree, among them —
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona de claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately discussed
below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June 12,
1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to be January 24,
1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14 (1)
of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until December
31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in 2002, 2 4 limiting the ling of an
application for judicial con rmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The
amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a
mode of registration. Where ownership right or title has already vested in the
possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by operation of
law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of registration of a
"private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the PLA vests title to the
occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Of ce of the Solicitor
General that the public land to be registered must have been classi ed as alienable and
disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in Section 48 (b) — June 12,
1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that held: 2 5
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character
of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945", as used in the provision, quali es its antecedent phrase "under a bona de
claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents at relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classi ed as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
xxx xxx xxx

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,
wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession
since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were
classi ed as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had led his
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was
made years after the property had been certi ed as alienable and
disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does the
same with Republic v. Herbieto 2 6 that came after Naguit and should have therefore
overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with approval the ruling
in Republic v. Ceniza, 2 7 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however completely
misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of public lands classi ed
as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for purposes of a
grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the
PRD. These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration
on the basis of whether the public land has been classi ed as alienable and disposable
at the time the petition for registration was led. Thus, except for Naguit, these cases
can be cited only as instances when registration was denied or granted despite the
classification of the land as alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above, this is
one case that explained why possession prior to the classi cation of public land as
alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who led his or her application
for registration after the classi cation of the land as alienable and disposable, but
where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its
statutory construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its
reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classi es
public lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can
be alienated. 2 8 Without the requisite classi cation, there can be no basis to determine
which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not; hence, classification
is a constitutionally-required step whose importance should be given full
legal recognition and effect . Otherwise stated, without classi cation into
disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass of the public domain that,
not being agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that are completely inalienable
and as such cannot be possessed with legal effects. To allow effective possession is
to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership and control that the doctrine
denotes will be less than full if the possession that should be with the State as owner,
but is elsewhere without any authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed
under its Section 48 (b), it is very important to note that this law does not
apply until a classi cation into alienable and disposable land of the public
domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a public land's classi cation as
alienable and disposable, how can possession under its Section 48 (b) be claimed prior
such classi cation? There can simply be no imperfect title to be con rmed over lands
not yet classi ed as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such
classi cation, the land remains unclassi ed public land that fully belongs to the State.
This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141. 2 9 If the land is either
mineral or timber and can never be the subject of administration and disposition, it
de es legal logic to allow the possession of these unclassi ed lands to produce legal
effect. Thus, the classi cation of public land as alienable and disposable is inextricably
linked to effective possession that can ripen into a claim under Section 48 (b) of the
PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason . Possession is essentially a civil law term that
can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any speci c
de nition in the PLA other than in terms of time of possession. 3 0 Article 530 of the
Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a
land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully complements what has been said
above under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It con rms, too, that the critical
difference the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit situations does not really exist.
Whether an application for registration is led before or after the declaration of
alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be
recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945 . The
ponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from June 12,
1945 and that it suf ces if the land has been classi ed as alienable at the time of
application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was
painstakingly set by law and should be given full signi cance. Its full import appears
from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona de claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state
what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms
of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b). But under the PD 1073
formulation, the intent to count the alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The
provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that is
described in terms of the character of the possession required since June 12, 1945.
This intent — seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of the
Decree — is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA . Naguit's
absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real,
since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of alienability will not
render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach. The acquisition of ownership and
title may still be obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940 ,
mentioned above, now allows the use of free patents. 3 1 It was approved on March 28,
1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April 1960 or
thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The administrative
modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open, particularly, homestead
settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — the absurdity — of the law . This Court
acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording.
Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is
to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has absurd effects because of
the passage of time, our role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give
the law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We
thereby dip into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the Constitution to the
Legislature. If only for this reason, we should avoid expanding — through Naguit and the
present ponencia — the plain meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD
1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in Herbieto; it
is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to legal correctness,
Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated above; hence, it cannot be
dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective
legal possession prior to the classi cation of a public land as alienable and disposable
cannot strictly be obiter because it responded to an issue directly raised by the parties.
Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the case, but it
cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the merits of the claim of
effective possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the ponencia
passes off as the established and de nitive rule on possession under Section 14 (1) of
the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no de nitive ruling touching
on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been established in the present
case since the applicant Heirs could only prove possession up to 1948. For
this reason, the ponencia falls back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the
PRD. In short, if there is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary
for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's ruling
that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus,
on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the coverage of
Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law provisions on prescription
on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To quote the obiter dictum in
Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the de nitive rule and leading case on
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 3 2
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classi ed as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered in the
interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully applies
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code
fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore "private property"; and
(3) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these properties are within the
commerce of men and can be acquired through prescription.
I nd the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions
and its direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once the
ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests in
the occupant or possessor pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of the
PLA, with or without judicial con rmation of title, so that the land has
become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes fully
operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from
Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself
provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under Section 3,
the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state
that only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid
down the terms under which lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations
and individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to classify
agricultural lands of the public domain according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of the lands of the public
domain that may be acquired, developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act,
speci cally, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning, acted through the
medium of a special law, speci cally, through the Public Land Act that by its terms
"shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be
governed by special laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall
be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of
the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which
administration and disposition shall be governed by laws at present in force or which
may hereafter be enacted." 3 3 Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very
speci c act whose coverage extends only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it
is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the effect
and application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and obligations and
contracts. 3 4 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides
that: "In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws , their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the latter's
special focus — land registration — and fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as
they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to
apply is in the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of
prescription under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own speci c
purposes and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the higher
Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when the
matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State
property. It classi es property as either of public dominion or of private ownership, 3 5
and property for public use, public service and those for the development of the
national wealth as property of the public dominion. 3 6 All property not so characterized
are patrimonial property of the State 3 7 which are susceptible to private ownership, 3 8
against which prescription will run. 3 9
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to the
properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable properties. 4 0
Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone, much
less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the special governing law and,
under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case
of deficiency. 4 1
This conclusion gives rise to the question — can alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the State because
they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on the
other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or
disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has been made,
then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only suppletorily. The
possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its Section 48 (b) and,
until the requirements of this Section are satis ed, the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain remains a State property that can be disposed only under the terms
of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether — for
purposes of prescription — an alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and disposable,
is State property and prescription does not run against the State. 4 2 In other words,
there is no room for any hairsplitting that would allow the inapplicable
concept of prescription under the Civil Code to be directly applied to an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain before this land satis es
the terms of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of
alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is rendered
moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration invoking Section 14
(2) of the PRD to support his claim must rst clearly show that the land has been
withdrawn from the public domain through an express and positive act of the
government. 4 3
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land from the
mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing Public Land
Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the required possession of
agricultural public land (under the rst and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable
land of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration
provided by law is equivalent to a government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes
private land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of Section 14 (2)
materializes. 4 4
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed ordinary
acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone unturned in rejecting
the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription directly applies to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to
note that the present ponencia has adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my
original academic discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly on the
subjects of patrimonial property of the State and prescription.
Specifically, I posited — assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies — that the
classi cation of a public land as alienable and disposable does not per se signify that
the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be patrimonial, must not
be for public use, for public purpose or for the development of national wealth.
Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of classi cation. The
p onencia now concedes that "[T]here must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
use or the development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has
become private by the government's own declaration so that prescription under the
Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this
conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on.
To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and primary law when a public land
is classi ed as alienable and disposable, and remains fully and exclusively
applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land now quali es
as a patrimonial property. At that point, the application of the Civil Code and
its law on prescription are triggered. The application of Section 14 (2) of the
PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in
considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the
Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the consideration of
applicable special laws — the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands
of the public domain. The Civil Code and other general laws apply to the extent
expressly called for by the primary laws or to supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classi cation of public
lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the
latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classi cation is a required
step whose full import should be given full effect and recognition;
giving legal effect to possession prior to classi cation runs counter
to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is
classi ed as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of this law
and the possession it requires cannot be recognized prior to any
classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the
classi cation of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of
the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under the Public Land Act; this legal reality renders
the ponencia's absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and
is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-
awed premises and for being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the
very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective
possession prior to classi cation since this ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is
not necessary for the resolution of the present case.
Footnotes
1. "Hernando de Soto Interview" by Reason Magazine dated 30 November 1999, at

http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last visited, 21 April 2009).
2. More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD-04-017123. Records, p. 161.
3. But see note 5.
4. Id.
5. The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the property,
notwithstanding the original allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased the
same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent pleadings, including those
before this Court, Malabanan or his heirs stated that the property was purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the appellate court made this
observation:
"More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his
application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the subject lot
from Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testified that he
purchased the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco, which was corroborated by his witness,
Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who stated that Eduardo was a brother of
his grandfather. As aptly observed by the Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering
Lot 9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was
marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision, the court a quo mentioned of
a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of Malabanan which was
allegedly marked as Exhibit "I". It appears, however, that what was provisionally marked
as Exhibit "I" was a photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor
of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer
is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus,
Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-
interest." Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6. Rollo, p. 74.
7. Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied.

8. Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals Fifth Division, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
9. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
10. See rollo, p. 11.
11. G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

12. Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See rollo, p. 141.
13. Id. at 186-187.
14. G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
15. G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.

16. G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
17. G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.
18. G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.

19. G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.
20. Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

23. OSG Memorandum, p. 13.
24. Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.
25. R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995) at 182.

26. See note 3.
27. 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
28. Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).
29. Id. at 710-712.
30. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
31. See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576;
Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275
(2002).
32. See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.

33. See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.
34. See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also Articles 526, 527, 528 &
529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith required.
35. See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.

36. Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576;
Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275
(2002).
37. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its amendment by Rep. Act
No. 1942, reads as follows:
"Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as
against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter".
38. Again, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, was
superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning point, and
which was then incorporated in Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
39. See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
40. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

41. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4 (a).
42. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
43. Id.
44. Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
45. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.
46. A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at 26; citing 2 Castan
175.
47. Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.

48. See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).
49. Act No. 496.
50. See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application for registration of title
by "person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate in fee
simple".
51. See note 24.

52. See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
"Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before
twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds".
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 21 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576.
2. As in the case where the land was already the subject of a grant by the State to a private
person, but the latter failed to immediately register his title, thus, allowing another person
to acquire title to the land by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code.
3. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048, 1052 (1996).
4. See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408 (1998).
5. Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, 909-910 (2000).
6. G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
7. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
8. Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 173, 186 (1997).
9. 429 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2002).
10. 1 C.J.S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of Tuason, J., in Primicias v.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125 (1948).
11. See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476; Vallarta
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696 (1987); Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457 (1987), cited in Republic v. Herbieto, supra note 7. See also
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238 Phil. 475, 486-487 (1987); Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No.
73261, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
38810, 7 May 1992; 208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898,
904 (1998); Republic v. De Guzman, 383 Phil. 479, 485 (2000).
12. See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45664, 29 January 1993,
218 SCRA 41, 54.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.

2. Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141) .
3. See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
4. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
5. See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 182.
6. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496 that originally brought the
Torrens system into the Philippines in 1903.
7. Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, that part of the law which
courts are established to administer, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasion (Primicias
v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and the purpose of the law which determines
whether it is substantive or procedural, and not its place in the statute, or its inclusion in
a code (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19).
Note that Section 55 of the PLA refers to the Land Registration Act (the predecessor law
of the PRD) on how the Torrens title may be obtained.
8. CIVIL CODE, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications), Articles 415-711.
9. CIVIL CODE, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Articles 1106-1155.
10. See the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay v. The Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 173775, jointly decided on
October 8, 2008 (the Boracay cases).
11. CIVIL CODE, Article 18.

12. Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court
and J. Antonio Araneta, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
13. See the Boracay cases, supra note 8.
14. See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice) in Cruz v. Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000, 347 SCRA 128) quoted in Collado (supra note 2).
15. Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424 (1925);
See Abejaron v. Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.
16. PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) should
now be understood to mean the PRD which repealed Act 496.
17. An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty Eight of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Forty One, otherwise known as the The Public Land Act.
18. Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation (Free Patent)
and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and
Disposable Lands in the Public Domain Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years Commencing January
1, 1977.
19. G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
20. Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of
Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings.
21. Section 1 of PD 892 states:
SEC. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued,
and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act. 3344.
22. An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing Applications for Free
Patent and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title to Alienable and Disposable Lands
of the Public Domain under Chapters VII and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as
amended).
23. R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.
24. See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.

25. Supra note 1.
26. G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.
27. 440 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
28. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
29. SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their administration and disposition .
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable
or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or
which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or
may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again
declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of
the National Assembly.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any
time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
SEC. 10. The words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used in
this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the
acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than
timber or mineral lands.
30. See: Article 18, Civil Code.
31. See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.
32. See p. 20 of the ponencia.
33. CA 141, Section 2.
34. These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil Code.
36. Id., Article 420.
40. Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable property, while Article 416 defines
movable property.
43. Supra note 10, Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
44. At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the occupant/possessor who now
owns the land in his private capacity, but against the new owner by whomsoever shall
then occupy the land and comply with the ordinary or extraordinary prescription that the
Civil Code ordains. This assumes that the new owner has not placed the land under the
Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility would set in.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN , petitioner, vs . REPUBLIC OF THE

xxx xxx xxx

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a

With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,

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(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the

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Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

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xxx xxx xxx

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xxx xxx xxx

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

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WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals

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I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a

(1) For homestead settlement;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis

It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and

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(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as

BRION , J., concurring and dissenting :

I concur with the ponencia's modi ed positions on the application of

(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which de nes the

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

xxx xxx xxx

1. "Hernando de Soto Interview" by Reason Magazine dated 30 November 1999, at

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11. G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

15. G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.

18. G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.

21. Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

25. R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995) at 182.

32. See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.

35. See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.

40. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

47. Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.

51. See note 24.

1. G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.

11. CIVIL CODE, Article 18.

24. See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

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