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4 Seminar - Laura Neack (1995) PDF
4 Seminar - Laura Neack (1995) PDF
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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 2, 1995, pp. 181-196
This article examines whether state participation in UN peace-keeping results from a state's idealistic
commitment to the global community and international peace or whether participation is tied to the
state's national interest. With the high profile of UN peace-keeping in this post-Cold War era, the
answer to this inquiry may suggest to us whether the emerging international system will be organized on
the principles of community or self. This inquiry is conducted through an examination of the eighteen
UN peace-keeping operations fielded from 1948 until 1990. Specifically, this article examines the
incidence of state participation and the types of contributions states have made both to observer
missions and peace-keeping forces at the aggregate level. This article also explores the perception of
peace-keeping successes and failures and the perceptions of the dominant peace-keepers to determine
whether an idealist or a realist perspective better accounts for state participation in peace-keeping. The
findings provide support for the realist account. Further, the findings suggest that those states whose
interests were better served by the continuation of the international status quo - that is, the states of the
advanced industrialized West and non-Western states who have enjoyed some prestige in the
international status quo - have dominated UN peace-keeping.
munityof states are not the specificfocus ofheld to this same standard of neutrality,
this article. Instead, I addressthe more im-althoughsometimesnon-UN peace-keeping
mediate question of why states choose to is by proclamation neutral. In these in-
participate in UN peace-keeping. Specifi- stances, the political purposes and moti-
cally, I ask whether participationin peace- vations of the peace-keepers are fairly
keeping results from a state's idealistic obvious. For example,the Russianarmyhas
commitmentto the global communityand recentlyassumedthe role of 'peace-keeper'
internationalpeace or from the member's within some of the more unstablerepublics
nationalinterest. of the former USSR. The Russian govern-
The answers suggested here derive pri- ment has claimedthat it has a responsibility
marilyfrom an aggregate-levelexamination as the most stable countryin the region to
of the eighteen UN peace-keeping oper- try to containthe violent conflictwithinthe
ations fielded from 1948 until 1990. 1 also former empire. International observers
considerthe perceptionsof UN peace-keep- within and outside the region have been
ing. By way of a preliminary conclusion, I more cynical.As was reportedin The Chris-
contend that a realist interpretationbetter tian Science Monitor of 14 September 1992:
explainsstates'participation.Further,those
states whose interests are better served by [Tihe idea of Russia as peacekeeper is hard for
the continuationof the internationalstatus many to swallow, coming so soon after the collapse
of the Soviet empire. Many are suspicious of Russia
quo dominate UN peace-keeping, perhaps as a 'neutral' force, fearful that its peacekeeping is
as a meansto maintainthe statusquo. an attempt to reassume an old Russian role that of -
the right to disregard issues of sovereignty in they possessed sufficient resources together
order to protect the rights of individuals. to protect the order against aggressive
Thus, the term peace-keeping can be co- states. Middle powers could do this through
opted for particularized national political so-called 'middle power diplomacy', an
purposes in apparent contradiction to im- approach to diplomacy aimed at mitigating
portant principles of peace-keeping. Peace- interstate tensions and conflicts in order to
keeping appears to be of two radically prevent the possibility of war between the
different kinds: neutral peace-keeping sup- great powers (Hayes, 1994; Higgott &
ported by the global community and the Cooper, 1990; Holmes, 1982). Although
misleading use of the term by individual this argument failed to win the middle
states to mask intervention in the internal powers a special status in the UN, it became
affairs of another state. The distinctions be- an important element of the philosophy
tween the two are sometimes blurred and it driving the deliberations of UN Secretary
is quite possible for an individual state or a General Dag Hammarskjold and Canadian
group of states to establish a neutral, non- Lester Pearson over the Suez Crisis of
UN peace-keeping force and for UN peace- 1956.2 Out of these deliberations came the
keeping to serve the political purposes of first formal UN peace-keeping operation.
individual states. Soon after, UN peace-keeping became the
'prerogative' of middle powers (MacKay,
1969).
3. The PoliticalOriginsof UN
Peace-keeping
UN peace-keeping developed out of the 4. AlternativeExplanations
thwarted global political aspirations of a The origin of UN peace-keeping, then, has
single state. At the close of World War II, an internal contradiction that characterizes
Canadian statespersons undertook an ag- it to date. Participation in UN peace-keep-
gressive campaign to establish a special ing is supposedly an act that transcends
status for Canada and other 'middle power' narrow national interests, while in no small
states in the new United Nations. The way peace-keeping has developed as a way
Canadians wanted this special status in rec- for middle powers to demonstrate their
ognition of Canada's military and financial power in and importance to world politics.
contributions to the allied victory in the war Two competing explanations for state par-
and to solidify the rank of the middle ticipation in UN peace-keeping can be de-
powers directly below the 'Big Five' and veloped from this contradiction.
above everyone else (Holbraad, 1984; First, state participation that transcends
Holmes, 1982; MacKay, 1969). Other self- narrow national interests can be explained
identified middle powers - Australia, New from an idealist perspective. Briefly, states
Zealand, Brazil, the Netherlands, Yugosla- will participate in UN peace-keeping out of
via, Poland, Belgium, and Sweden - an obligation to protect the international
endorsed this campaign (Wood, 1988, p. 9). peace and to preserve international norms
The Canadian argument for special and values. States will do so even in the face
middle power status, although functionalist of conflicting national interests (Doxey,
in nature, quickly acquired a 'moral impera- 1989; Granatstein, 1992; Hawes, 1984). The
tive' (Holbraad, 1984 p. 58; Wood, 1988). so-called middle powers3 are the most likely
The Canadians argued that middle powers states to protect the international system,
should be given special status in the UN and thus more likely to participate in multi-
because they 'could be entrusted to use their lateral activities such as peace-keeping
power responsibly in the interest of the because of their strong commitment to in-
world community' (MacKay, 1969, p. 137). ternational peace. Indeed, early in the life
The argument continued that middle powers of the UN, the middle powers proclaimed
could not challenge the international peace themselves the only states that could be
and order - as could the great powers - but trusted to protect the UN from the great
184 LauraNeack
powers whose own commitment to inter- and intentions of the peace-keeping states
nationalism was suspect (Clarkson, 1968; suggest that states become involved in UN
Hawes, 1984; MacKay, 1969; Puchala & peace-keeping mainly to serve their own
Coate, 1989). national interests.
The realist explanation of state partici-
pation in UN peace-keeping is that states do 5.1 State Participation
whatever they can, given their power Much of what has been written about UN
resources, to protect and preserve their peace-keeping has been idiosyncratic and
national interests. If national leaders see atheoretical (Neack, 1991). The preferred
their states' interests inexorably linked to mode seems to involve single case studies of
the continuation of the international status particular operations or peace-keepers.4
quo, they will support and defend the status The only published comparative study on
quo. International organizations, particu- peace-keeping examines six cases of peace-
larly the UN, are the main beneficiaries of keeping - four UN and two multinational -
such support (Holbraad, 1984; Karns & in the Middle East (Diehl, 1988). This
Mingst, 1987, pp. 462-463). Promotion of dearth of aggregate-level research is curious
national interest through support of the in- given the data available from the UN on
ternational status quo is especially relevantpeace-keeping operations (UN, 1990).
to the middle powers because of the aggre- I have examined the UN's published
gate power they can wield. record to determine whether the pattern of
Middle power interests are served by a state participation in peace-keeping suggests
continuation of the international status quo an idealist or a realist explanation. It
because in the status quo they have achieved includes data on eighteen operations,
relative affluence and influence: this is theincluding ten observer missions and eight
case for Western middle powers especially. peace-keeping forces. All of these appear in
Non-Western middle powers or even 'small' Table I, listed in order of starting dates. The
or 'weak' powers may also support the incidence of state participation in peace-
status quo, even though the status quo is keeping is presented in Table II, which also
undeniably Western in origins. For these includes incidence of participation as disag-
states, it is unrealistic to imagine completely
gregated into observer missions and peace-
revising the world system to better serve keeping forces.5 The 'middle powers' are at
their interests. However, these states can the head of the list. This designation is mis-
attempt to find for themselves a position leading in terms of wealth and power; on
within the established order from which per capita indicators particularly, these
they can offer and defend non-status quo 'middle' countries tend towards the top of
interests. India's and Brazil's involvement in
the rankings (Neack, 1993). Moreover, this
the UN system can be understood in this view of 'middle powers' as among the
way. Thus, participation in UN peace-keep- world's powerful states is the general
ing can derive from an interest in protectingconsensus of scholars and statespersons.
the international system and the participant The single non-Western state in Table II,
state's current or desired position in that India, has a considerable reputation as a
system. regional power, as a leader among non-
aligned states, and a rising newly industrial-
izing country. Much of India's international
5. The Historical Record status comes from its activities within the
Given these alternative explanations, what UN (see, Rajan, 1962; Rana, 1970; Thakur,
does the record on UN peace-keeping 1980).
suggest? I contend that the pattern of state The USA is also on the top ten list, which
participation, the geographical distribution is hard to reconcile with the claim that UN
of operations, the various accounts of the peace-keeping disallows the participation of
failures and successes of individual oper- the Big Five countries. Other frequent
ations, and the accounts of the perceptions peace-keepers - Canada, Norway, Den-
UN Peace-keeping:Communityor Self? 185
Table I. UnitedNationsPeace-keeping,1948-90
ObserverMissions
UNTSO- UN TruceSupervisionOrganization,June 1948to date in Palestine
UNMOGIP- UN MilitaryObserverGroupin Indiaand Pakistan,January1949to date in Jammuand Kashmir,
India, and the India-Pakistanborder
UNOGIL- UN ObservationGroupin Lebanon,June to December1958on Lebanon-Syriaborder
UNYOM- UN YemenObservationMission,July 1963to September1964
DOMREP- Missionof the Representativeof the Secretary-General
in the DominicanRepublic,May 1965to
October1966
UNIPOM- UN India-PakistanObservationMission,September1965to March1966on the India-Pakistan
border
UNGOMAP- UN Good OfficesMissionin Afghanistanand Pakistan,May 1988to March1990
UNIIMOG- UN Iran-IraqMilitaryObserverGroup,August 1988to date
UNAVEM- UN AngolaVerificationMission,January1989to date
ONUCA - UN ObserverGroupin CentralAmerica,December1989to date in CostaRica, El Salvador,
Guatemala,Honduras,and Nicaragua
Peace-keepingForces
UNEF I - UN EmergencyForce, November1956to June 1967in Suez Canalareato Sinaipeninsulaand Gaza
ONUC - UN Operationsin the Congo, July 1960to June 1964in Congo/Zaire
UNSF- UN SecurityForcein WestNew Guinea(West Irian),October1962to April 1963
UNFICYP- UN Peace-keepingForcein Cyprus,March1964to date
UNEF II - SecondUN EmergencyForce, October1973to July 1979in SuezCanalareaand Sinaipeninsula
UNDOF- UN DisengagementObserverForce, June 1974to date in SyrianGolanHeights
UNIFIL- UN InterimForcein Lebanon,March1978to date in SouthernLebanon
UNTAG - UN TransitionAssistanceGroupin Namibia,April 1989to March1990in Namibiaand Angola
Source:United Nations(1990, pp. 419-449).
mark, and Italy - are NATO membersand powers - the UK and France - not at all.
therefore have similar and mutual security Observer missions do not seem to be high
concerns. priorityto great powers and superpowers,
Looking beyond the top ten peace- but they are still dominatedby the West.
keepers, seventeen, or slightly more than
half, are Western or Western-oriented 5.1.1 ContributionsMadeto Peace-keeping
states. The only members of the former Fifty-seven countries contributed in some
Easternbloc on the list are Poland and the way to the ten UN observermissionsin the
USSR. Many of the others in Table II are periodfrom 1948to 1990.Table III presents
stateswhichat varioustimes have attempted the particulartypes of contributionsmade
to establish themselves as regional and/or by the most frequent participants in
non-alignedor risingglobalpowers;such as, observermissionsandpeace-keepingforces.
India, Ghana, and Brazil. Thus, state par- Militaryobserversand/orpolice constituted
ticipationin UN peace-keepingsupportsthe the most commontype of contributionmade
view that the most likely participantsare by the top participants.All of the states in
states that benefit from the status quo, and Table III contributedobserversin three or
aspiring'powers'that seek to achieve some more missions.Canadacontributedmilitary
relativeprestigewithinthe statusquo. personnel in eight of the ten observer
This view of overall state participationin missions. The fact that states contribute
UN peace-keepingalso tallies with partici- militarypersonnelmore than anythingelse
pation in observer missions, a less costly is not too remarkable,as these operations
form of participation in peace-keeping need to be staffed to be operational. Fur-
forces. The most frequent participantsto thermore,states need only send a handfulof
observermissionsare the traditionalmiddle militaryobserversto be counted as partici-
powers. The superpowersare also on the pants in peace-keeping,and most states can
list, but not among the most frequent par- send a few troops or militarypolice fairly
ticipants; and the other Western great cheaply. Indeed, of the twenty-foursingle-
186 Laura Neack
Table II. UN Peace-keepers, 1948-90 aspects of staffing and logistics are covered
Peace- fairly evenly. Indeed, as given in Table III,
Total Observer keeping the top participants in peace-keeping forces
Country Operations Missions Forces ensured that all aspects of the operations
17 9 8
were covered fairly well. This degree of
Canada
Sweden 15 7 8 coverage suggests a high commitment to the
Ireland 13 7 6 success of the operations.
Finland 12 6 6 The pattern of state participation in and
Norway 12 7 5 contribution to UN observer missions and
Denmark 11 7 4
India 11 7 4 peace-keeping forces, then, can be sum-
Italy 11 6 5 marized as follows. Observer missions
Australia 9 5 4 have been dominated by Western AICs,
USA 9 2 7 especially those often labeled 'middle
Austria 8 3 5
Ghana 8 4 4 powers'. The contributions made to
Brazil 7 4 3 observer missions have been skewed heavily
Netherlands 7 4 3 on the side of military personnel, with
New Zealand 7 5 2 rather less attention given to the other func-
Argentina 6 5 1 tional aspects of the missions. Peace-keep-
Indonesia 6 2 4
Nigeria 6 2 4 ing forces also tend to be dominated by
Switzerland 6 2 4 Western AICs, with the USA and the UK
Yugoslavia 6 3 3 among the top peace-keepers. Finally,
Japan 5 2 3 states' contributions to peace-keeping forces
Nepal 5 3 2
5 2 3
tend to cover all functional areas of the op-
Peru
Poland 5 2 3 erations well, giving equal consideration to
UK 5 0 5 logistics, military personnel, and command
USSR 5 2 3 personnel.
Belgium 4 3 1
4 3 1
Overall, then, it does appear that UN
Burma
Chile 4 4 0 peace-keeping operations of both sorts have
Ecuador 4 4 0 been most supported by Western states.
Pakistan 4 1 3 Western participation in observer missions
Sri Lanka 4 2 2 seems more neutral than that in peace-keep-
West Germany 4 1 3
ing forces, given the lower incidence of
Includes only those countries participating in more super- and great power involvement in the
than three operations out of a total of 18. former compared to the latter. However, it
Source: United Nations (1990, pp. 419-449). may be that observer missions are con-
sidered less critical to preserving the inter-
national peace or order, thus drawing less
attention from the most powerful members
time participants in observer missions, of the West. This might also explain the
twenty-one contributed military personnel spotty and skewed contribution records of
only. participants in observer missions as com-
What is remarkable is that so few states pared to contributions to peace-keeping
contributed to the logistical end of these op- forces. On the face of it, there is nothing
erations, another area critical to the success unusual about the fact that states are willing
of the operations. Even Canada contributed to make higher and more diverse commit-
military personnel more often than it con- ments to peace-keeping forces, given the
tributed logistical support, although the level of danger inherent to these operations.
argument has been made that logistical sup- What is peculiar is that peace-keeping forces
port is Canada's most critical contribution to themselves seem so heavily dominated by
all UN peace-keeping. one group of states that are so willing to put
Examining contributions to peace-keep- considerable strength behind their partici-
ing forces, we find that the two critical pation.
UN Peace-keeping: Community or Self? 187
Observer Missions
Canada 9 3 8 5
Denmark 7 1 7
Ireland 7 2 5
Norway 7 3 7
Sweden 7 3 6 1
India 7 4 6 1
Finland 6 2 6
Italy 6 1 6 2
Argentina 5 4 1
Australia 5 2 5 1
New Zealand 5 5 1
Brazil 4 1 4
Chile 4 1 4
Ecuador 4 1 4
Netherlands 4 4 1
Ghana 4 1 3
Peace-keeping Forces
Canada 8 3 2 1 8 1
Sweden 8 4 6 1 4
USA 7 1 7 2
Finland 6 3 6 1
Ireland 6 3 6 2
Austria 5 3 4 1 1
Italy 5 1 5
Norway 5 1 3 2 4
UK 5 1 I 1 5
Denmark 4 2 2
Switzerland 4 1 3 1
India 4 4 3 1 2
Indonesia 4 1 4 I
Australia 4 1 2 1
Ghana 4 2 4 1 3
Nigeria 4 1 4 2
CMD = command personnel; MIL = non-command military personnel used as police, observers, peace-keeping
troops; MED = medical personnel and supplies; LOG = logistical support, such as transportation vehicles and
crews, communications facilities and personnel; SPL = non-medical, non-logistical supplies.
Includes only those countries participating in more than three operations out of a total of 18. Countries sometimes
make more than one type of contribution to a single peace-keeping operation.
Source: United Nations (1990, pp. 419-449).
two in Sub-Saharan Africa, and one in each arms to developing countries, and that these
of the remaining regions - Eastern Europe, countries were particularly competitive in
Central America, North Asia, Mediterra- the Middle East, is consistent with a policy
nean, and South Atlantic. In the same of self-interest.
period, there were fourteen intrastate/civil But the main peace-keeping countries
wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, twelve in North should not be expected to contribute to the
Africa/Middle East, eight each in Central spread of weapons in the world. However,
America and Southeast Asia, seven in South despite the fact that UN Under-Secretary-
America, six in South Asia, two each in General Marrack Goulding (1993) has
North Asia and East Asia, and one in the hailed the recent period as the 'second
Mediterranean region (Rothgeb, 1993, p. golden age' of peace-keeping, Table V
76). Thus there has been a considerable shows that many of the most frequent
amount of armed conflict in the Middle East peace-keepers are also ranked among the
but not enough to warrant the attention of largest arms exporters in this same period.
half of UN peace-keeping through 1990. The second column is the most telling. The
Have conflicts in the Middle East been 'middle power' states of Sweden, Italy, Bra-
deadlier than conflicts elsewhere? Middle zil, and the Netherlands are among the top
Eastern countries do possess significantly thirteen major weapons exporters to the de-
more and technologically better armaments veloping world. The non-superpower arms
and weapons of war than do other non- suppliers, a SIPRI report has concluded,
Western regions. This is apparent in the were the preferred sources of arms for com-
level of major weapons imports to the batants during the Cold War because 'the
region. For example, SIPRi reports that the two superpowers were more prone to use
Middle East accounted for 50% of all major arms transfers as a means to influence war-
weapon imports by developing countries ring parties than were other suppliers, even
from 1982 to 1986, compared to 14% for taking into account their quantitative lead in
South Asia, 11% for the Far East and Ocea- the arms market' (Pearson et al., 1992, pp.
nia, 9% for South America, 8% for North 401-402). Thus, countries whose inter-
Africa, 7% for Sub-Saharan Africa, and 3% national reputation rests, in part, on their
for Central America (SIPRI, 1987, p. 184, steady participation in peace-keeping at the
Figure 7.2). For the longer period of 1967 to same time have stimulated the global arms
1986, SIPRI reports that Middle Eastern race. This raises serious questions about
major weapons imports exceeded those of their commitment to the international
other regions sometimes by more than three peace. Indeed, the idealist explanation of
times as much (SIPRI, 1987, p. 186, Figure UN peace-keeping cannot reconcile this
7.4). inconsistency. These two acts are not incon-
The higher level of arms imports in the sistent, however, with the realist view that
Middle East was largely due to US support arms sales and peace-keeping are all tied to
for Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, as well the same mission: the pursuit of national
as to the greater 'disposable' income of interests.
countries in the Middle East compared to UN peace-keeping may be interpreted as
other developing areas. However, this a palliative administered after the self-
suggests an apparent contradiction in the in- interested act of selling arms ignites regional
ternational behavior of the AICs. On the animosities. There is, however, no particu-
one hand, the international community has lar reason to expect that states feel any par-
shown its concern for conflict in the Middle ticular twinges of guilt over arms sales. It is
East by deploying peace-keeping operations more likely that UN peace-keeping serves
in high number there, and at the same time the same interests as arms sales do. That is,
certain members of the international com- peace-keeping is self-interested action to
munity have been the primary sources of establish, preserve, or increase a state's own
militarization there. That the USSR and the position and power base in the world.
USA were the world's largest exporters of In this realist perspective, the Western
UN Peace-keeping: Community or Self? 189
states that dominate peace-keeping oper- dency all contributedto the developmentof
ations also have a firmhand in the decision local countervailingpower. Thus, Western
to field peace-keepers. These states use states wouldencourageand even requirethe
their control over the UN to keep it out of involvementof the UN to help containcon-
regions consideredto be their own spheres flicts in the MiddleEast.
of influenceand thus controllable.Thus, the This is not to imply that the Western
USA would discourage UN interest in states did not attempt to exert great power
establishingpeace-keepingoperationsin the control over the MiddleEasternstates after
Caribbeanand CentralAmericaas well as in World War II. The first formal UN peace-
East and Southeast Asia (after the depar- keepingoperation,UNEF I, was developed
ture of the West Europeanpowers) up until after the UN Secretary-Generalrejected a
the late 1980s,and Europeanpeace-keepers plan that would set up the Westernstates of
would discourage UN activities in Africa. the UK and France as 'peace-keepers'in
So, until 1989 when ONUCA was begun, the Suez area (Granatstein,1992, p. 228).
there had only been one UN peace-keeping This plan seems to have originated with
operation (an observer mission) in the Canadian (and later Nobel Peace Prize
Western Hemisphere- DOMREP, started winner)LesterPearson:
in 1966. Similarly, until early 1989 when Pearson'sinitial idea in the heartof the crisiswas
UNAVEM and UNTAG were begun, there that the Britishand the Frenchinvadersmightlay
had only been one UN peace-keepingoper- down the Union Jackand the tricolore for the blue
ation in Africa - ONUC, started in 1960. flag of the United Nations. The invaders,in other
words, could become the peacekeepers(Granat-
Furthermore,despite the considerable in- stein, 1992,p. 228).
ternational and civil warfare in Southeast
Asia (an area that has gone from the Euro- Granatstein has concluded that the
pean to the US sphereof influence)over the Canadians were surprised that the Sec-
past fourdecades, no UN peace-keepingop- retary-Generalwould reject the plan. They
eration was fielded there until 1992 with were also surprisedwhen PresidentNasser
UNTAC in Cambodia. All of these newer refused to allow Canadiantroops to be de-
peace-keeping operations, it should be ployed with the UN peace-keepersin Egyp-
noted, occur at or after the end of the Cold tian territory. Finally, and ultimately, the
War. Canadianswere surprisedand confused to
On the other hand, the Middle East has find that their special relationshipwith the
not been easily controlledby anyone in the UK could cause problems in international
post-WorldWar II period. The USA and affairs.Of course, what the British,French,
the USSR competed for allies in the area and Canadianshad not fully understoodby
and the growingawarenessof the power of 1956 was that the unrivaledleader of the
cartelizedoil and growingglobal oil depen- Westernworld, the USA, would preferand
190 Laura Neack
Table V. Comparing Most Frequent Peace-keepers with Largest Major Weapons Exporters
Total Major Weapons Exports in USD mill.
and Rank among all Exporters
Total Participation
Country PKO ObM PFo To All States To Developing States To Industrialized States
Canada 17 9 8 NA NA 38710
Sweden 15 7 8 1524 11 758 13 766 7
Italy 11 6 5 1878 8 1390 9 448 8
USA 9 2 7 59957 2 23618 2 36339 1
Brazil 7 4 3 1629 10 1622 7 NA
Netherlands 7 4 3 1758 9 1412 8 345 14
UK 5 - 5 9097 4 7599 5 1498 6
UN peace-keeping operations from 1948 to 1990. Source: United Nations (1990, pp. 419-449).
Total arms exports for the years 1987-91. Only data for the top fifteen exporters to each category provided.
Source: SIPRI (1992, p. 272, Table 8.1).
PKO = all peace-keeping operations; ObM = observer missions; PFo = peace-keeping forces.
require less obvious great power gunboat UNTAG were especially popular with the
diplomacy. peace-keepers, having 32 and 51 countries
During the renewed Cold War that char- respectively participating.
acterized the early and mid-1980s, the US The wider dispersion of these UN peace-
and its allies demonstrated little interest in keeping operations and the involvement of
managing the international system through more countries as peace-keepers does not
the UN. Correspondingly, after the ini- demonstrate that a new era in UN peace-
tiation of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon in keeping has started. Two reasons support
March 1978, no UN peace-keeping oper- this conclusion. First, it is difficult to
ation was begun until UNGOMAP in Af- extrapolate from so recent a time period.
ghanistan and Pakistan in May 1988. Furthermore, within this same time period,
Instead, the Western states attempted to the USA successfully managed the UN
manage conflict in the ever-important Security Council so as to win approval for
Middle East through non-UN multilateral the military action to drive Iraqi troops out
activities such as the Multinational Force of Kuwait in January and February 1991.
(MNF) of US, British, French, and Italian The USA also was able to gain UN support
troops deployed with less than spectacular for the continued air-policing of Northern
results in Beirut in the early 1980s (Diehl, and Southern Iraq in the year after the Iraqi
1988). troops withdrew from Kuwait.
By the end of the decade and near the end Second, and more importantly, these new
of the Cold War, five new UN peace-keep- UN operations were still dominated by
ing operations were begun. Unlike the Western peace-keepers. Indeed, much of
earlier concentration of UN peace-keeping the increase in the number of peace-keepers
within the Middle East, the five new oper- in some of these recent peace-keeping oper-
ations were widely dispersed in Afghanistan ations resulted from significantly greater
and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, in Angola, in Western, especially European, involvement.
Namibia, and Central America. These oper- This was particularly the case for UNII-
ations were unusual in that they originated MOG (Iran-Iraq) in which there were thir-
in areas characterized by protracted conflict teen European peace-keeper countries, plus
in which the UN had previously been inef- Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Simi-
fective or in areas in which the UN had been larly, in UNTAG (Namibia) the European
closed out. These operations were also countries accounted for twenty-two out of
unusual in the wide geographical range of fifty-one states, and Western interests were
the peace-keepers involved. UNIIMOG and represented further by the USA, Canada,
UN Peace-keeping: Community or Self? 191
Peace-keeping Forces
UNEFI 12 2 - 2 7 - - - -
ONUC 36 2 2 2 11 3 3 3 - 10
UNSF 9 2 - 1 2 - 3 - - 1
UNFICYP 12 2 - - 7 - 1 - 2 -
UNEF II 20 2 1 1 10 - 1 2 1 2
UNDOF 7 1 - 1 4 1 - - - -
UNIFIL 19 2 - - 9 1 1 1 2 3
UNTAG 51 2 5 2 22 1 3 6 3 9
* NAm
- North America (excl. Mexico), n = 2; CAm = Central America and the Caribbean (inc. Mexico), n =
13; SAm = South America, n = 10; Eur - Europe, n = 29; MEa = Middle East, n = 16; SAs = South Asia
(Indian subcontinent), n = 6; Asi = Asia, n = 16; Oce = Oceania, n = 4; Afr Africa, n = 45.
Source: United Nations (1990, pp. 419-449).
Australia, and New Zealand. Table VI independenceof the EC from Moscow and
presentsthis information. Washington;third, Bosnia would serve as
Since 1991, there has been a wider geo- the case on which the EC could finally
graphicaldispersion of UN peace-keeping devise a commonforeignpolicy;fourth, the
operations,much of this attributableto the various countries involved directly in the
'new world order' in which, it is offered, crisiscould, after the crisiswas resolved, be
states can finallyunite underthe blue flagof broughtinto the EC undertermsestablished
the UN without the Cold War overriding by the successfulintermediary,the EC.
issues of internationalcommunity(Gould- Despite its great expectationsfor manag-
ing, 1993). Still, some aspectsof playingfor ing the Bosnian crisis, Higginschargesthat
spheresof influenceare apparentyet in the the EC was not structuredto address the
deploymentof UN peace-keepers. Bosnian crisis (the Western European
Forexample,some have laid the responsi- Union defense arm has yet to materialize)
bility for the failureof the UN to move fast and only succeeded in buying time for the
enough on the conflictin Bosnia at the feet Serbs. When the EC finallyrealizedthat it
of the European Community (Higgins, could not manage the crisis, it allowed the
1993, pp. 473-474). Higgins contends that UN to take up the considerablyworsened
the EC blockedthe UN from actingon Bos- crisis, at which point the Europeans used
nia becausethe EC saw it as a primeoppor- theirpowerin the UN to blockeffectiveand
tunityto pursueseveralEC objectives:first, forcefulUN action.
EC action in the Bosniancrisiswould make
the EC look decisive after looking weak in 5.3 The Perceptions of the Peace-keepers
the Gulf Warof 1991;second, EC manage- The perception of the peace-keeperis the
ment of the crisis would demonstrate the most important aspect of the historical
192 LauraNeack
record, but also the most problematic.The sufferedand died because states are retain-
official pronouncementsof nationalleaders ing the right to judge what is best for their
reflect their ambitious public relations own troops within a given peace-keeping
campaignsabout their commitmentto the operation. Higgins (1993, p. 471) cites this
internationalcommunity. Still, sometimes as one of the most fundamentalflawsin the
the peace-keepers make their views and way that countrieshave interpretedthe UN
their interests very clear without rhetoric. Charter and their obligations to the UN
The self-interested motivation behind communityas enumeratedin the Charter.
states' participationin UN peace-keepingis Another recent example of a casualtyof
unmistakablein the words and actions of national self-interest is the UN operation
some key peace-keepers. in the Western Sahara (MINURSO).
The UN operationin Somalia(UNOSOM MINURSO, accordingto Durch (1993, p.
II), too recent to be included in the data 169), has yet to be fully operationalfor two
analyzedabove, providesa clear illustration reasons: first, neither party to the conflict
of the self-interested actions of peace- (Morocco and POLISARIO) has given up
keepers. On 5 September 1993, seven the idea of winning; and, second, most of
Nigerianpeace-keepingsoldierswere killed the Security Council Big Five have been
in Mogadishu.The ChristianScienceMoni- indifferentto the situation in the Western
tor (Press, 1993, p. 3) reported that 'the Sahara.The only permanentmemberswho
Nigerian deaths were directly linked to a have shown any interest in the Western
"deal" that an Italian contingent of UN Sahara are France and the USA, both of
troops had cut previously with Somalis in whom have been and continue to be pro-
the same area as the attack'. When the Moroccan.The Secretary-Generalwas able
Nigerians 'apparentlyrefused to acknowl- to get the Security Council to agree to
edge or accept such a pact' and continued MINURSO by capitalizingupon the warm
with their search operation they were glow of unity that characterizedthe prep-
ambushed. 'Somali eyewitnesses said the arationsfor and execution of the Gulf War
Italiansstood by and refusedto come to the of 1991;but otherwisethere has been little,
assistance of the Nigerians during the if any, sustained interest in it. Reviewing
attack'(Press, 1993,p. 3). The reportadded MINURSO and the typical pattern of
that considerabledivisionexisted withinthe UN peace-keeping, Durch (1993, p. 170)
peace-keeping forces over most matters, concludes: 'Peacekeepers are confidence-
with commanders calling their national builders,verifiers,and, if necessary,whistle-
governmentsfor direction before carrying blowers, but their heaviest guns are in the
out their assignmentsat every step of the presidential suites of the great powers.
UN operation. Withsome of the greatpowersdisinterested
Italy is no occasional peace-keeper; be- and others only slightly interested and
tween 1945 and 1990, Italy was the seventh biased, MINURSO will never keep the
most frequent participant. Despite this peace in the WesternSahara.
strong record, the Italians apparentlydid The views of Canadians about peace-
not considernegotiatingtheir own arrange- keeping may be the most telling, given
ment to protect Italian troops exclusivelya Canada's place in the creation of peace-
violationof the principleof actingon behalf keeping and its role as peace-keeper
of the community.Indeed, if peace-keeping extraordinaire.Granatstein(1992) reviewed
is reallysupposedto be neutral,it is difficult Canadianinvolvementin UN peace-keeping
to imagine why Italy, the former colonial and concludedthat fromthe startCanadians
master,would be includedin UNOSOM II. were reluctantsupporters.Lester Pearson's
When peace-keepers check with their initialsuggestionthat the Britishand French
governments before carrying out their would act as peace-keepers in the Suez
dutiesor cut separatedeals in the field, they Crisis followed an earlier Canadianreluc-
are not acting on behalf of the community. tance to participate in the UN observer
Indeed, membersof the unifiedforces have mission on the Indian-Pakistani border
UN Peace-keeping:Communityor Self? 193
launched in January 1949 (UNMOGIP). for domestic politics - without giving the
Granatstein (1992, p. 225) has concluded USA any concerns about Canada's real
that the general Canadian mood was to intentionsand loyalties.6
resist sending troops into wars without An editorialin a popularCanadiannews
havinga say in the decisionto go to war, not magazineeditorialearly in 1993called for a
too differentfrom the Italiandeal to protect reassessment of UN peace-keeping oper-
its troops in Somalia, and, indeed, not too ations, the key point being a Canadianclaim
differentfrom Bill Clinton'slist of prerequi- to greaterUN status, includinga place as a
sites that the UN must address before the 'permanentassociatemember'of the Secur-
USA will agree to participatein any more ity Council (Doyle, 1993, p. 4). This claim
peace-keeping operations. When Canada to specialstatusis likely once againto meet
did agree to participatein UNMOGIP, it indifference or resistance from the great
was largely because of the missionary powers. Despite the so-called 'new world
impulses of Lester Pearson and Canada's order' and despite the many states laying
presencein the SecurityCouncilat the time substantialclaim to the right to permanent
of the deployment of UN troops (Granat- membership, the Big Five seem no more
stein, 1992,p. 225). likely now to open their club to others.
Another part of Canada'spedigree as in- At a recentconferenceon 'MiddlePowers
ternational peace-keeper was outside the in the New World Order', Kim Richard
UN as part of the InternationalControl Nossal concluded that the world is seeing
Commission (ICC) organized to help me- the end, or at least the temporaryretire-
diate issues in the wakeof the Frenchdepar- ment, of 'middlepower diplomacy'(Hayes,
ture from Southeast Asia (Granatstein, 1994, p. 12). The middle power idea and
1992; Thakur, 1984, 1980). Canadawas to middle power role was dependentupon the
serve as the Western state on a three- great power tensions duringthe Cold War
countrycommissionwith Poland and India. and driven by the responsibilityto protect
The Canadians were reluctant (again) to the world from great power war. Nossal
participatein the ICC becauseof worriesof echoed other scholarswhen he posited that
offending the USA. However, membership the so-called middle powers are no more
in the ICC turned out to be a 'blessing in inclined than other states to international-
disguise' because it protectedCanadafrom ism (see, for example, Holbraad, 1984;
havingto supportthe USA in Vietnamwith Wood, 1988). The difference between
Canadiantroops. Canadadid use its place middle powers and other states duringthe
on the ICC, however, to gatherinformation Cold War was that the position of the
for the USA. As Granatstein(1992, p. 227) middle powers vis-a-vis the great powers
concluded: 'It was obviously sometimes presented the middle powers with the re-
hard to separate the peacekeeper's duty sponsibilityfor mitigatinggreat power ten-
from that of the anti-communistally.' sions (but only when they were not needed
The importanceof Canadianties to the as loyal supporters).In the absenceof great
USA was not lost on the internationalcom- power tensions, the middle powerswill pull
munity,at least that part of the community away from internationalism.Middlepowers
that made decisions regardingUN peace- are not the 'internationalcitizens'depicted
keeping. After reviewing the entire by the idealistliteratureon peace-keeping.
Canadian record on UN peace-keeping, The Canadianwithdrawalof troops from
Granatstein(1992, p. 231) determinedthat CyprusparticularlysupportsNossal's argu-
Canada was an internationalfavorite for ment. The UN peace-keeping force in
peace-keeping because of its NATO and Cyprus(UNFICYP)is no closerto complet-
USA ties, not for its inherentneutralismbut ing its mission than when it first began in
because Canadawas a NATO power. Para- March 1964, yet the Canadiansno longer
doxically, involvement in peace-keeping feel any need to support the international
gave Canada the appearance of indepen- effort. However, the Canadians are very
dence from the USA - whichwas important much involved in the UN operations in
194 LauraNeack
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LAURA NEACK, b. 1960, PhD in Political Science (University of Kentucky, 1991); Assistant
Professor, Department of Political Science, Miami University, Oxford, OH. Current interests: the
study of linkages between state type and foreign policy behavior, comparative security issues.