G.R. No.

L-17169 November 30, 1963

ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, petitioner, vs. HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.

On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the
customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange.
Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any
Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the
Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator
Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to
withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres
Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote
another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have
legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment of all
charges in pesos. Please expedite action."

Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros,
submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido Law
Office for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customs house stating therein that it sees no
objection to the proposal. The Monetary Board, however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting of
October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign
exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was informed.

Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, on October 13, 1956, the counsel
of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-
Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates, but this official
seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank advised
the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had
jurisdiction over the case. In the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, of said Office, wrote a
letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating, among other things, that his office had no objection
to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates but that it could not take action on the request as "the
same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import Office within the contemplation of R.A. No.
1410." The counsel already referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs Ang-Angco who
upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release. Instead he suggested that the letter be amended in
order to remove the ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating
that the same was neither a permit nor a release. Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been
contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the letter after which the
Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-
Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized the release of
the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in
question he immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the
warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco
charging him with having committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsaysay
constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco composed of former Solicitor General
Ambrosio Padilla, as Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A. Salcedo, as members.
Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, was also investigated by the same Committee,
who was also charged in a separate complaint with serious misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from office in the latter
part of December, 1956.

After the investigation, the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending that
a suspension of 15 days, without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his
suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez,
but the decision on the administrative case against him remained pending until the death of President
Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during which period Ang-
Angco had been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority
of the President, rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and considering him resigned effective from the
date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.

Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President
Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him
from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by
the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals,
whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision is in violation of
the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against removal
or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law.

In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the
request for reconsideration. Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum
to President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which he predicated his request for
reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, in letter dated July 1, 1960,
denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the
administrative case in question inasmuch as the provisions of law that would seem to vest final
authority in subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government over administrative matters
falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power of control nor diminish the same.
Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to him to secure his reinstatement to
the office from which he was removed without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due process
of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court gave due
course to the petition, but denied the request for injunction.

The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his
case by authority of the President in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof,
violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and employees in the classified service
in that he acted in violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the
Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases
against officers and employees in the classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section
18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose decision on the matter is final, and
removed him from the service without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act which
expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or employee from the civil service shall
be accomplished only after due process, and of Section 4, Article XII of our Constitution which provides
that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by
law." Since petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential
appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he
cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil
Service Act of 1959.

Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by petitioner. They admit that if
the theory is to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may
be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law as it now stands provides that all officers and employees who
belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to said official whose decision
may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no further appeal can be
taken. They also admit that petitioner belongs to the classified civil service. But it is their theory that the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law applicable to employees in the classified service do not
apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold otherwise would be to deprive the President of
his power of control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of the government. In
other words, respondents contend that, whether the officers or employees concerned are presidential
appointees or belong to the classified service, if they are all officers and employees in the executive
department, they all come under the control of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may
be exercised over them directly without distinction. Indeed, respondents contend that, if, as held in the
case of Negado v. Castro, 55 O.G., 10534, the President may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, or the respondent employee, or may
even do so motu propio, there would be in the final analysis no logical difference between removing
petitioner by direct action of the President and separating him from the service by ultimate action by
the President should an appeal be taken from the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals to him,
or if in his discretion he may motu proprio consider it necessary to review the Board's decision. It is
contended that this ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision wrought into the law by Republic
Act 2260 which eliminated the power of review given to the President because the power of control
given by the Constitution to the President over officers and employees in the executive department can
only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so would be to
diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is tantamount to amending
the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28, 1958). Indeed this is the argument invoked by
respondent Castillo in taking direct action against petitioner instead of following the procedure outlined
in the Civil Service Act of 1959 as may be seen from the following portion of his decision.

In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your petition, it is contended that in
deciding the case directly, instead of transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original
decision, his Office deprived the respondent of his right to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
This contention overlooks the principle that the President may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals at the instance of either the office concerned or the respondent employee, or
may even do so motu proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G, No. 51, p. 10534, Dec. 21, 1959). There would
therefore be no difference in effect between direct action by the President and ultimate action by him
should an appeal be taken from the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service
Board of Appeals. The result is that the President's direct action would be the final decision that would
be reached in case an appeal takes its due course.

Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the President has the power to take direct
action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now
in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner sustains the negative contending that the contrary
view would deprive him of his office without due process of law while respondents sustain the
affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all officers and
employees, belonging to the executive department.

To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases
of all officers and employees in the classified service for in said section the following is provided: "Except
as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified
service and upon all matters relating to the employees." The only limitation to this power is that the
decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, in which case said
Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same has been submitted for decision,
whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). It should be noted that the law
as it now stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to review
the decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which
was expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision
of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be reversed or modified motu proprio by the President. It is,
therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of
the procedure laid down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may
be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.

It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the officers and employees
of the classified service are subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law" (Section
16 [i], Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any
other law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service?

The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent portion of which we quote:

(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices
held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines,
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.

The phrase "conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket
authority move any officer or employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law
that passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the procedure, cause and finality of the
removal of persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated we have such
law which governs action to be taken against officers and employees in classified civil service. This law is
binding upon President.

Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provides:

Power to appoint and remove. — The Department Head, the recommendation of the
chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees
appointment is not expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in
accordance the Civil Service Law.

The phrase "in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even granting for
administrative purposes, the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the
Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we
already know with regard to officers and employees who belong to classified service the finality of the
action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Board of Appeals.

Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the Constitution over all officers and
employees in the executive department which is now in by respondents as justification to override the
specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control couched in general terms for it does not set
in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had already
occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter,"1 to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the
power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. Apparently, the power merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent
himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a
subordinate in the performance of his duties.

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative law. Thus, the
Department Head pursuant to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his
department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or
offices", and under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over the executive department
only refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method
adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual,2 and it cannot be said that the removal of
an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.

But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set at
naught the beneficient purpose of the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction, which is
to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service, in derogation of the
provisions of our Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, Constitution).Here,
we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by the
President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the
civil service of our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and
harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner that may give to both full force and effect and the
only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do it in this decision. As
this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson v. Romero:

... To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to
removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the
whole Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old
Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so
minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color or affiliation from him,
and sweep in his Political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or
otherwise. (Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 754)

There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power
to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if
they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under
the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra),
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them
that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says
that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in
the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these
officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a
procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil
Service Act of 1959.

We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
departments it may limit and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. The
head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to officers independently of
legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments
but in all that is incident thereto. (U.S. v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483)

In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the
authority of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil
Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

SHORT DIGEST:

ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO

The power of control of the President extends to the power to “alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the [President] for that of the [subordinate officer].” This may be extended to the power to
“investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they
are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified that the
power to remove is inherent to the power to appoint.” The same cannot be done to officers or
employees who belong to the classified service. The procedure laid down in the Civil Service Act of 1959
must be followed for their removal.

Facts:

The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were
notcovered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the
releasecertificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-
Angcowhich stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take
action onthe request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance
whoexpressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally
releasedthe concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an
administrativecomplaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been
discharging theduties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President,
rendered his judgment against the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified
civilservice.

Holding:

The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil
service.

It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having beendeprived of
the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, itmay be said
that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.The Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or removeofficers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but notwith regard to those
officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherentpower cannot be
exercised.This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by
lawvest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
appointmentsare vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for
their removalprecisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of
1959.

It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the
administrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President
without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code
reading as follows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures
shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question
on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the
ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the
Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements
had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments. 2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled
Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-
88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3
However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached,
the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section
187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are
the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP
129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in
his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken
against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no
less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a
becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity,
which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence
of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first
being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second
is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control
and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in
his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing
powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it
was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only
to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He
has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of
control but of mere supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction
claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay
was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over
jurisdiction, not supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its
Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have
authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after
receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is
unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national
economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such
ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within
which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the
objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax
ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as
the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these
flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his
opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein
of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code is another matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the
proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance
published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No
minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies
of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the
Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog
and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of
the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such
compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and
present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for
the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree
with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings
are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were
published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993
issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its
validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation
will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated
and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not
been raised in issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial
Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING
its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been
observed. No pronouncement as to costs.

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

RTC’s Ruling:

1. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the
LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of
the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment
of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.)

2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure

a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code

b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog

Supreme Court’s Argument:

1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.

2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done.
Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.

3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires
provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.

The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU
not to tax ordinances.