Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No.

113630 May 5, 1994

Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named Escolastico
Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto Mendoza
who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them as the brains
behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Based
on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of
Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search
warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as
the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
cause for him to issue the warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.

Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for
lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding in the case on
the ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various
reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION,
respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the innate
value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.

Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him."
1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel pleading the
cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve (12) years
ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is
recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the existence of
which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a warrant for
his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before an information is filed and a warrant of
arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person
consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated allegations that only feign probable cause.
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the
Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession,
and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the
heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered
arrested without bail by respondent judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of
Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains
behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. 2 In that
extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and
in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant
of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal,
Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted Van
Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They
brought him to a "safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry.
After four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and
SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending
it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the
chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned
his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the
incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along Amalingan Street, both
in Green Heights Subdivision, Parañaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms
and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that
day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and
Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC
Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings
against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando
Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation
of authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that —
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law Offices . . .
planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct and kill the German national Alexander Van
Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign several documents transferring
ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and caused the withdrawal of
P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.
Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to
petitioners informing them that a complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their counter-affidavits.
Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the team who raided
the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of
other documents for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense and to submit an
intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested in (a) the "several documents
transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M
deposits from the victim's bank account," as stated in the complaint; (b) the complete records of the PACC's
investigation, including investigations on other suspects and their disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992
and early 1993; and, (c) such other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other
documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the
panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were
members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with impartiality.
In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito
R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed that the motion
for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8
October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of petitioner
Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task
Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted only copies of the request for verification of the firearms
seized from the accused, the result of the request for verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article on the
case with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National Police
directing the submission of a report and summary of actions taken thereon.
Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective
counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them. 9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation
stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counter- affidavit, 10 and "in the greater
interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the admissions of his counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation
in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January
1994, however, before petitioners could refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground
that it was extracted through intimidation and duress.
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over
the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an information
had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of Justice, however, petitioners were
informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that afternoon they were able to secure a
copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page undated resolution under
the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force
recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8 February 1994 to
submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused. 14 On 7 February 1994,
petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The following day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review and reversal of
the undated resolution of the panel
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of
his appeal before the Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge issued the assailed
warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners filed with us the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for hearing on 28
February 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting further proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate
the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily surrendered at the Headquarters of
the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila,
and on 29 February 1994, they were released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause
against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even
stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that
probable cause exists when the certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary
investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to justify
the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and
impartiality (sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman
Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief,
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in
recent cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And as a protection against false
prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable
man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting the accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause. While it appears in
that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the
existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing procedure that they can base their
findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be
interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the determination of the existence of
probable cause, a delicate legal question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty of the
person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said —
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term
does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there
is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
 Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same was
done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by proper and sufficient
testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on
sufficient proof. 28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that
"[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and
therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at
such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On
the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a
finding of probable cause against petitioners.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who
supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is
serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his
remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of
gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly
improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of
gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is
subjected to intense heat. 30 Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground
to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of
his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the government investigators did to the
place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they did not go at all because they knew that there
would not be any as no burning ever took place? To allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely
burned to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his behalf a petition for review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993, a memorandum before the Securities
and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel again
manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death
is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties and responsibilities as
counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest
doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise his
obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of such
death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van Twest who is
reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is
a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard, we are reminded of the leading case
of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is
wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is
not sufficiently proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, he said
that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct
Van Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that he was not part of the actual meeting
as he only waited outside in the car for his companions who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel.
37

Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who
thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning,
however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe house" at the time Van
Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why Umbal had to
be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of the
prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that
was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest? These and more remain
unanswered.
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by Umbal's
confession of 16 September 1993, the application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in
the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September 1993,
a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that
Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he was said to be already
under their custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the security
barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing the charges
against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The records show
that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after the panel had considered the case
submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the
same on the ground that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its
inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More
importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated
petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded
the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove
petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed,
much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the
meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their
arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a
crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it
appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses
in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that
probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various
cases we have already decided.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence
of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination
of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the
judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not
bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to
follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of
probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination
of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is a
function of the prosecutor.
In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said —
[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as
detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he
has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective
one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a
belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge,
after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must
either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no
probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their
discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with
facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have presented
sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the
government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary
investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the
arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden with
inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the
opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the
determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears
the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then
petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the
future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges and the
prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the
respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest
warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable
cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors
are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Paño 47 finds application —
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from
the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right
to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process (People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense
of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of
freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in the country. It is therefore imperative
upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
thru a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or
that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis
supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of government power
which when unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of
Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on occasion, for one reason or
another, the State transcends this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case
before us, if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government
agents is not reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and
prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which endanger the
proper administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law.
This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer a license for pointless
assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy
and disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a
price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor
balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the
people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see
probable cause to order the detention of petitioners. 48
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political
power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and
security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy
of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against
each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported
enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the
dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would not
have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are lawyers who are vigilant of
their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise available to those who cower in fear and
subjection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked with the
enforcement of the law that in the performance of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their
thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office and maim their countrymen they are
sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to be more
prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law.
While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness
violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized community.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we
issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is
made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C.
Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
SO ORDERED

http://docslide.us/documents/4-allado-vs-diokno.html - digest
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, G.R. No. 168081
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent. October 17, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.

He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was
illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall
under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the
company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated
against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of
dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an
act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine

Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration
Manual[1] of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go
on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his
weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys weight standards,
prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But
petitioners weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October
17, 1988 to February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In
line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to
July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for
weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the
company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be
evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he
gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds
beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner
at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed
217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made
a commitment[3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager
Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from
today until .
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal
weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for
my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him
to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month
to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight
check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending
satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.[5]

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his
passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check
dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On
June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.
[7]

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly,
he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case
requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August
20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting
evidence.[8]

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he did not deny
being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already
been condoned by PAL since no action has been taken by the company regarding his
case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because the
company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated.

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that
he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week
so as to attain his ideal weight.[10]

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered
terminated effective immediately.[11]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was
illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainants
dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially
equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on until reinstated, which for purposes of
appeal is hereby set from up to at P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner.[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied
with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions where
his weight would not be a negative factor.[17] Notably, other overweight employees, i.e.,
Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.[18]

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[19]

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.[20]

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution[22] of PAL.

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.[23]

On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as
modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said
decision concerning complainants entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants
entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality
hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of
complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the
same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-
payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.[25]
According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in itself.[26] As a consequence,
there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful
order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable.
However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not
remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite being overweight.
According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of
whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of
the weight standards of PAL.[28]

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.[30]

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is
declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because
it looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations[33] in evaluating the evidence of the
parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a
continuing qualification for an employees position.[34] The failure to adhere to the
weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as
the NLRC seemed to suggest.[35] Said the CA, the element of willfulness that the
NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether
the dismissal is legally proper.[36] In other words, the relevant question to ask is not one
of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee
qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard.[37]

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL
are reasonable.[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed
to meet the prescribed weight standards.[39] It is obvious that the issue of discrimination
was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for
being overweight.[40]

On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[41] Elaborating
on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide
occupational qualification which, in case of violation, justifies an employees separation
from the service.[42]

Issues

In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF
ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED
WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING
DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the
Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the
prescribed weights that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position
in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an
employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article
282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal.
The failure to meet the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall
under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other causes analogous
to the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired.
They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in
order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards
while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for
which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be
dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to
qualify was willful or intentional. x x x[45]
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a
physical abnormality and/or illness.[46] Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes
enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says
that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that,
as the trial court said, illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination.
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly
enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras illness
could be considered as analogous to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or
pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.[48]
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially
different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The
law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight
safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura,
the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma.
Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He
was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the
dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on
the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of
PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was
accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the
weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity
is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that
it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-
discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner
himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which
is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.[49]
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of expenses.[50]
However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the
suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight
checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates
absence of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation and Hospitals,[52] decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First
Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an
institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being
operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record.
Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations.
In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, she stood 52 tall and
weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at
greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of
a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,[53] which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a
handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a
mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant
disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on perceived
disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological
disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological
appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within
the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated
that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing
from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes those conditions that an
individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration.
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 at least one
hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height. According to
the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case
here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).[54]
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion,
or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In the United States, there are a few federal and
many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to
engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is
based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.[56]

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no
statute providing for it.[57] Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify
his dismissal.[58]

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons[62] contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The

British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),[63] the
Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called Meiorin Test in determining whether an
employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
[64] (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary[65] to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that
the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order
to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[67]

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to
BFOQ.[68] BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary
for satisfactory job performance.[69]

In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[70]

the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits
its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that the
company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the
interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and
procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no
supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in
holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.[74] It is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[75]

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus,
it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with
the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards
for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain
agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the
passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline
companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety
records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies
transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser
performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending
to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin
crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an
emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant.
Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency
doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina
to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors
to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow
aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that [w]hether the airlines flight
attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards has nothing to do with
airworthiness of respondents airlines, must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply
to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied
reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who
was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60
retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight
cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly
have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That
an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact
which courts can judicially recognize without introduction of evidence.[77] It would
also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen
the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like
petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding
passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a
cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft
safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency
situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost
seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a
wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not
remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were
made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit
that he must maintain at all times.[78] In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL
when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod
convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao
ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on
height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive
discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to
meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the
commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by
PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to
discriminate against him.[79] We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree
with the CA that [t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as a
secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of
dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that
impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable
standard and the private respondents failure to comply.[80] It is a basic rule in evidence
that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[81]
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation,
petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records
which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish
discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly
similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are
similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the
similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants,
petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their
ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the
particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory
treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of
discrimination to meet.[82]
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.[83] The reason is simple:
administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized
jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the
findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a
conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual
findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when
they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus
annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty[86] of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.[87] Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.[88] Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which
is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal
protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection
guarantee.[91]
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have
not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time
he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.[92]
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and
does not require a writ of execution,[93] the option to exercise actual reinstatement or
payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the
labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to frustrate
his immediate return to his previous position,[94] there is evidence that PAL opted to
physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance with the
order of the Labor
Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23,
2001, as shown by his signature.[96]
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case[97] that [t]he
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to
payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him
despite the issuance of a writ of execution[98] and even if the order of reinstatement of
the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by
the higher court.[99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of
PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from
the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight,
petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to
comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not exact
compliance with the impossible.[100]
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be
deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that [a]n employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Luckily for petitioner,
this is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social
justice,[101] or based on equity.[102] In both instances, it is required that the dismissal
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the
employee.[103]
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for
every year of service.[104] It should include regular allowances which he might have
been receiving.[105] We are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any
serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also
recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an
amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which should
include his regular allowances.

SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/yrasuegui-v-pal-569-scra-467-2008.html – digest

http://lalagyanngkaso.blogspot.com/2010/09/labors.html – digest
Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870
Petitioner,
- versus -
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner,
- versus -
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 3, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is
put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall
be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively
which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution

No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality
of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED
to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of
mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10,
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On , in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first
list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test
and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-
election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

 Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f),
and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For
one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be
used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165
be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the
standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert,
SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the
constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a
bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even
with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise
judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having
the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or
she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt
that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections,
possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of
the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this
Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental
importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of
RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out
that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only
to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards,
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter
or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it

is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries
of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within
the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as
are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and
the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are
chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC

resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument
may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular
section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals
with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of
public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is

no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004
synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless,
to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby
rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random
and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard
in the process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of
the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as
those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should
the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are
clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A
drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through
his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the
drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall
order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the
certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo
treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall
be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young
are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency.
Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec.
2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its
own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or
intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to

random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both
fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of
governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug
menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by
school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug
testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied
participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug
testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the schools drug testing policy violated,
inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia,

considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2)
school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have
less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the
former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the
sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students
privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy
constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma

required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities.
Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined
to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-
athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who
routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms,
non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing
even among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and
authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an
athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar
interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the
school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect
to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of
their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that
the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country
that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school
children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method
is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and
tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and
interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are
to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our
Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations
laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by
the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in
this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to
drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2
of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without
elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy
and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic
function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines
for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
[29]

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In the
criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for
that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was
referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus
on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the
backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office
is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a
possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing.
The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in
Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x
x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that
the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering
and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH
provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the
drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received
as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country
and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among
others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing
to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace
cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to
state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market,
would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any
of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back
stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a
mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use
among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being
higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]

Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of
undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its
position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled
options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36
expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the
persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning
that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality
of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation

with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of
Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR
necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in
the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore,
incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how
often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
 Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to
PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned
agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/105436780/Social-Justice-Society-v-Dangerous-Drugs-Board-Digest –
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THIRD DIVISION
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO,

Petitioner,
G.R. No. 164815
Present:
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
COURT OF APPEALS and
Chairperson,
PEOPLE OF THE ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents.
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 3, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal[1] of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso
(Valeroso) praying that our Decision[2] and June 30, 2008 Resolution[3] be set aside and
a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

The facts are briefly stated as follows:

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and
under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five
(5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded not guilty.[5] Trial on the merits ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the
Firearms and Explosives Division in . Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the
desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.[6]

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his
hideouts in , , and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated
National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, , where they saw Valeroso about
to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a
Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live
ammunition, tucked in his waist.[7]

Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the
Firearms and Explosives Division in , Deriquito presented a certification[8] that the
subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain
Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, .[9]

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson
testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On , Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at
Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, . He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men
in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room.[10] The
raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of
the room and exclaimed, Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob![11]

Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However,
the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.[12]

Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt[13] dated July 1,

1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of
Col. Angelito Moreno.[14]

On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted
Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The
gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.[15]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed[16] the RTC decision but the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.

On petition for review, we affirmed[17] in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[18] which was denied with finality[19] on .

Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal[20] imploring this Court to once
more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his
breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.[21]

Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valerosos Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in
Lieu of Comment.[22]

In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends
Valerosos acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers
the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with
Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of
Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm
was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he
was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt
issued by his superiors.

After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with
the OSGs position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial
rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.[23]

The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it
is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with
prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.[24]

This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[25]
despite the denial of De Guzmans motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his
Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for
reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In that case, we said that if we would
not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have
committed after all.[26] Also in Astorga v. People,[27] on a second motion for
reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case,
then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground
of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[28]
by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special
First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondents
second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a
re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.

Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.

We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts
in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn
of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.[29]

Now on the substantive aspect.

The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is
different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was
arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about
to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the
other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After
serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police
officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.

After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for
acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the
version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if
so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.[30]

To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in
Article III, Section 3(2), that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[31]

The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in plain view. The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[32]
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations.[33]
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.[34]

In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down
above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?

We answer in the negative.

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without
limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,[35] People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,[36] and People v.
Estella,[37] we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.[38]
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latters reach.[39] Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested
or within the area of his immediate control.[40] The phrase within the area of his
immediate control means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.[41] A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing
of the person arrested.[42]

In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house
of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed.
They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.[43] The other police officers
remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet[44] where they found the
subject firearm and ammunition.[45] With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers
served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of
the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an area within his immediate control because
there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.

The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as
well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be
used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself.[46]

It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident
to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained
beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.[47] In the case before us, search was made
in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident
to a lawful arrest.[48]

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the plain view doctrine.

The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.[49]

As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.[50] and People v. Leangsiri:[51]

What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.[52]
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valerosos children, because
they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words,
the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence
that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this
case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.

Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.
[53]

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers

who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.[54]

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article
III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above
the articles on governmental power.[55]

Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply
no sufficient evidence to convict him.[56] All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men
who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for
a crime he did not commit.[57]
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised
by Valeroso.

One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of
basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative
and prosecutory powers of the government.[58]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30,
2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is
hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

SO ORDERED.

https://ivansalanguitcpa.wordpress.com/2015/07/19/valeroso-vs-court-of-appeals-g-r-no-164815/ -
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE
LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4
P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts
of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the
regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were:
for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio
Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of
March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article
XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered
that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969,
the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first
shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent
Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13
and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge
was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed,
dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of
the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm
(Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found
herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and
the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22,
1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their
which held among others, that a
motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,
1
motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the
C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-
2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials,
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the
individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses
it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights
are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14
believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners
are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic
society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it
was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it
securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference
between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a
stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local
police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like
rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet
as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working
hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45,
rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and
that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work
in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as
their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their
cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over
the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the
rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity
in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the
Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have
made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees
who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received
by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a
ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on
March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted
action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the
Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests.
24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief).
Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's
pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their
one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and
to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action
with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to
a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not
make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected
profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers
whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a
sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that
day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by
reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with
the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes
upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that
"the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State
is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the
working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional
patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law
"to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and
economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its
avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities
of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the
aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public
offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence
and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten
(10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September
22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed
it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal
in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer
should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be
affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was
pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for
the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground
that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the
arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long
after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion
for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969
dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable.
But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made.
30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right.
In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise
yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor
practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except
a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself
about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without
further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We
can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine
that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If
there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses,
this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
 now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for
the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would
an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic
human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual
material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and
shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that
the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the
human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed
by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the
Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for
the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts,
We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section
20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or
procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as
it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the
rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary
or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply
Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample
enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing
that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion
for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28,
1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for
the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
[1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961,
2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
 from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice
Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws
are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have
remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of
substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v.
Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the
Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-
20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that
not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen
(13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were
so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as
that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy
our system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment
of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that
preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in
our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because
we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights
is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be
observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as
well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance
of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot.,
6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents'
libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of
employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right
of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is
directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self
organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as
an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as
a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings
case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company
nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15
and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/philippine-blooming-mills-employees.html - digest

http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.weebly.com/case-digests.html – digest
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-
stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than
2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged
that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as
Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional
and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee
per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel,
motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle
name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified,
with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration
forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the
portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal
of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in
the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel
del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the
 capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive
of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting
City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections
661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila
besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15,
1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity
to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments
advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ
of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring
to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to
file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious
then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity
on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and
came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued
against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question."
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of
the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the
due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if
it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however,
the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom?
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It
exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state
of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be
found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of
such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it
lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on
due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels
being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the
settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in the
above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases
than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of
privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors.
In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred
by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide
range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and
uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. 26 The discussion of this particular
matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on
behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it
appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the
city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning
a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to
pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police
power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal
exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between
the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover,
petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which
as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The
liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation
of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. 31 What may be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. 32 How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific
rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view
of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same
time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt
as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners
or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's
rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed
with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It
was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave
problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An
earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully
acquired by any public officer or employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of
his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every
other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had
once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due
process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from sustained
plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement of
periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of
the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For
in this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31,
1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for employment that a
public officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it
possible thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his position in the public service, he
accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the herein plaintiff [having] filed
within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn
statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on
the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an
officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive
and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as
may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination
were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and
derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical
submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and expenses, they cannot be trusted
to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no
need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which
can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of
proportion to his reported income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of
Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous
conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That when a government
official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the
obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office
but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be
segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure and
maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs
plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks
to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his
material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties
thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was deemed
submitted for decision the lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the
defendants [having admitted] all the material allegations of the complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null
and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government
after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding
of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail." In the present case
likewise there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could
be based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the above
Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly
affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive
order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should
not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution,
Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is
freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers'
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
process clause. 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process
clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an
enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law. They include persuading, inducing, or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself
to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense; requesting or receiving
directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or
for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help
given or to be given; accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or
for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby; having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests;
becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which
exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in such
action; approving or granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person
not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging valuable information
of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and
prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets and
liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The other sections of
the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23
penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as the
competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any resignation or retirement
pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension and loss of
benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value as well as
recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause,
30 and its effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal
to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such
character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and
explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that,
an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug
loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those
disposed to take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the statute
requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously
done so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid
Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary
power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public
interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to
prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules
of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due
process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first used by Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually
has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of private
individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given
by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of
liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State? They are
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish
courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its
own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the
power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and
Burdick were of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality
in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming to be
adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof? The
answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in
public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process
which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by
due process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with
the then pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in the form of an investigation at
which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself must be observed before a
civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even
stronger language when this Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even
without express provision of law, "it is established by the great weight of authority that the power of
removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without
notice and hearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement
directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate administrative action as the
behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due process."
To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure provision
to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations entrusted with governmental functions
when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or
feeling of security that they would hold their office or employment during good behavior and would
not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to
be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded them, would bring about such a
desirable condition." Reference was there made to promoting honesty and efficiency through an
assurance of stability in their employment relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice
Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of
petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process guaranty to
be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court
contained the following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be
pretended that the constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has
not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus
compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential in
nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in them. The
inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or
removal, except for cause specified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision,
Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the
constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an
employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules." Equally emphatic
is this observation from the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is
condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it would
appear trite to make citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is analogous to property, could he
not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an
infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the
affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to freedom the government must respect. To the
extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process mandate
is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the question raised
cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as
guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens
to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. This
Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not
license. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good,
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every
man must renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is
freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual."
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social
organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations
and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a
society is to sacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the
society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton however, should be understood in
the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of general welfare, in other
words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The individual thought, as
Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot be touched by
government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him or generally against him and
others." 55
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had
filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly without
the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then
that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however
that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That leads us to
an inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts
fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such
sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office.
The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of
a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is
much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more
than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." 57 As a matter
of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly
stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation,
are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations
are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his
will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be master
of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is in any real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of
communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or
when public safety and order" 60 may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and seizure clause,
61 and the liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been rendered by this
Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various
American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the
right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to
privacy has come into its own.1äwphï1.ñët
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language
of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls
for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied
that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes
very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by
virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in
subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion
into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision requires the
periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it would be violative of the guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted
under an information charging him with unlawfully having in his possession a number of gasoline
ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68
He was convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that
there was an unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial
was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a finding that he
consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding although
expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however under the view that such seized coupons were
properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, and therefore
reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that
the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers or documents, but with gasoline ration
coupons which never became the private property of the holder but remained at all times the property
of the government and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was
not to be understood as suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim government property may proceed
lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to inspect under the
regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has
any coupons subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as
indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined,
critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation" which in this particular case gave
approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and expressing the regret that the Court might be "in
danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications
every man is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only under judicial
sanctions which are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the
duty to make documents available for litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or
fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except under responsible judicial
compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision offends
against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so
in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief
Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with,
and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain
statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been
shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition as set
forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused immunity
from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish
the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit
certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the prosecution is
powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary.
Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute
evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or
effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-incrimination
is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to
[prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords
will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they
criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the
validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What
was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any
person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop
and give his name, residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer was
sustained against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as evidence to establish
his connection with the injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the
opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although in
itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all
police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. We are not
aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid
him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to
invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional privilege
justified the refusal to give the information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the
defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this
proceeding." 81
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its
being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice
Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 83 There can be
no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate
any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not
they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override
legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86
that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the
main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a
sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the
rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and
void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements
of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had
once submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/98846134/Morfe-v-Mutuc – digest

https://maroon5partnersandassociates.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/morfe-v-mutuc/ - digest
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206020 April 14, 2015
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It
includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate.
The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free
speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate
carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by 1-United
Transport Koalisyon (petitioner), a party-list organization, assailing Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 96152 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The Facts
On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act",
was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials.– The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list
groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as
plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet
or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster
areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet
or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.– During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of
the owner thereof.
 (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports,
docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6]under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service
and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.3
In its letter4 dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought
clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility
vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the
aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of
the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election
campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals. On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en
banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,5 which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
The COMELEC en banc, adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim,
opined that:
From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration here is actually whether 1-UTAK or any
other [PUV] owners in the same position do in fact possess a franchise and/or certificate of public
convenience and operate as a public utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies squarely. If
it does, then its operations, pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, will be placed
directly under the supervision and regulation of the Commission for the duration of the election period
so as to ensure equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the placement of political
advertisements. Having placed their property for use by the general public and having secured a license
or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other PUV owners, as well as transport terminal owners, cannot now
complain that their property is subject to regulation by the State. Securing a franchise or a certificate of
public convenience in their favor does not exempt them from the burdens imposed by the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9006 x x x, and other related statutes. It must be stressed that the Constitution itself,
under Section 6, Article XII, commands that the use of property bears a social function and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good; and there is no higher common good than that
as espoused in R.A. No. 9006 – the equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political office
during elections – a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the O’Brien standards, the prohibition furthers two
important and substantial governmental interests – equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all
candidates, and putting to a stop excessive campaign spending. The regulation bears a clear and
reasonable nexus with these Constitutionally- and statutorily-sanctioned objectives, and the
infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited as to time. The Commission has not taken
away all avenues of expression available to PUV and transport terminal owners. They may express
their political preferences elsewhere.
The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport terminals is exactly
because it is public and can be seen by all; and although it is true that private vehicles ply the same
route as public vehicles, the exposure of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more
compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and transport terminals as ‘public places’ under
Section 7 (f) of Reso. No. 9615 is therefore logical. The same reasoning for limiting political
advertisements in print media, in radio, and in television therefore holds true for political
advertisements in PUVs and transport terminals.6
Hence, the instant petition.
Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioner maintains that Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615 violate the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that the
prohibition curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public. The petitioner also claims that
there is no substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political advertisements on PUVs and
transport terminals to warrant the prohibition imposed by the COMELEC. Further, the petitioner posits
that the ownership of the PUVs per se, as well as the transport terminals, remains private and, hence,
the owners thereof could not be prohibited by the COMELEC from expressing their political opinion
lest their property rights be unduly intruded upon.
Further, assuming that substantial public interest exists in the said prohibition imposed under
Resolution No. 9615, the petitioner claims that the curtailment of the right to free speech of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals is much greater than is necessary to achieve the desired governmental
purpose, i.e., ensuring equality of opportunity to all candidates in elective office.
Arguments of COMELEC
On the other hand, the COMELEC posits that privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public
spaces that are subject to its regulation. It explains that under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
including the power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the
operation of transportation utilities.
The COMELEC points out that PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience – the
commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. Thus, the
COMELEC avers, it is within its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs and
transport terminals from concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience that they
transport.
The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus,
does not impinge on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is
within the constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. The COMELEC alleges that the regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign
opportunity, time, and space for all candidates – an important and substantial governmental interest,
which is totally unrelated to the suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free speech is
merely incidental and is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the said governmental interest.
The Issue
The petitioner presents the following issues for the Court’s resolution:
I. [WHETHER] RESOLUTIONNO. 9615 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH OF
THE OWNERS OF [PUVs] AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.
II. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 IS VOID AS A RESTRAINT TO FREE SPEECH
 AND EXPRESSION FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY THE O’BRIEN TEST.
III. [WHETHER] THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE TO GIVE AN EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE ELECTORATE IS NOT IMPAIRED BY POSTING
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS ON PUVs AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.
IV. [WHETHER] THE OWNERSHIP OF FACILITIES IS DIFFERENT AND INDEPENDENT
FROM THE FRANCHISE OR OPERATION OFTHE PUBLIC UTILITY, THE FORMER
BEING BEYOND THE POWER OF REGULATION BYTHE COMELEC.7
In sum, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f),of Resolution No. 9615, which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or
propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Resolution No. 9615, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution
and the provisions of R.A. No. 9006, lays down the administrative rules relative to the COMELEC’s
exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers over all franchises and permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, and all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government.
Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run
counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In this regard, an
administrative regulation, even if it purports to advance a legitimate governmental interest, may not be
permitted to run roughshod over the cherished rights of the people enshrined in the Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech.
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.9 Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by
the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.10 Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.11
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material
during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of
the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for
an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a
preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends
on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press.12 It has been our constant holding that
this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.13
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,14 the Court struck down the COMELEC’s prohibition against the
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that:
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of
the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the
National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspaper or
radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for
advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or
decal on his private property.15 (Emphases ours)
The assailed prohibition on posting
election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation
repugnant to the free speech clause.
The COMELEC claims that while Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 may
incidentally restrict the right to free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals, the same is
nevertheless constitutionally permissible since it is a valid content-neutral regulation.
The Court does not agree.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,16 is constitutionally
permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.17
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely
control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important
and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among
candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further
conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free
speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate
the franchise or permit to operate
and not the ownership per se of
PUVs and transport terminals.
The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615is not within the COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated power of supervision or regulation. It is
not disputed that the COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation utilities during an election period. Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Nevertheless, the constitutional grant of supervisory
and regulatory powers to the COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly
unrestrained, has its limits. Notwithstanding the ostensibly broad supervisory and regulatory powers
granted to the COMELEC during an election period under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the Court had previously set out the limitations thereon. In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that
the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-à-vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the
very freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.
In National Press Club v. COMELEC,18 while the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition
on the selling or giving free of charge, except to the COMELEC, of advertising space and commercial
time during an election period, it was emphasized that the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers
to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among candidates. Further, in Social Weather Stations,
Inc. v. COMELEC,19 the Court, notwithstanding the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, declared unconstitutional a regulation
prohibiting the release of election surveys prior to the election since it "actually suppresses a whole
class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and [television (TV)] commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion
makers."20
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
utilization "of all franchises or permits for the operation," inter alia, of transportation and other public
utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not
extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to
operate the same.1âwphi1
There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate transportation for the use of the
public and the ownership per se of the vehicles used for public transport. Thus, in Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.,21
the Court explained that:
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals
and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve
the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not
their ownership but their use to serve the public x x x.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public
utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
xxxx
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the
facilities and equipment used to serve the public.
xxxx
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely,
one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of
property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not
necessarily be the owner thereof.
This dichotomy between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities used to
serve the public can be very well appreciated when we consider the transportation industry.
Enfranchised airline and shipping companies may lease their aircraft and vessels instead of owning
them themselves.22 (Emphases ours)
The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege granted to certain persons to
engage in the business of transporting people or goods; it does not refer to the ownership of the vehicle
per se. Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the
rights of another.23 Thus, the owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law.24
One such limitation established by law, as regards PUVs, is the franchise or permit to operate.
However, a franchise or permit to operate a PUV is a limitation only on certain aspects of the
ownership of the vehicle pertinent to the franchise or permit granted, but not on the totality of the rights
of the owner over the vehicle. Otherwise stated, a restriction on the franchise or permit to operate
transportation utilities is necessarily a limitation on ownership, but a limitation on the rights of
ownership over the PUV is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate the same.
A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation
of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the
vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality.25 Thus, a
government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to
the considerations affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not
on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public transport.
The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election campaign
materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Surely,
posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any manner affect
the operation of the PUV as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the
posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to
operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.
The dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or permit to operate of a PUV and that of the
very ownership thereof is better exemplified in the case of commercial advertisements posted on the
vehicle. A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a
regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of
the vehicle does not have any relation to its operation as a PUV.
On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses,
because it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation
on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV,
i.e., the safety of the passengers.
In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport
terminals owned by private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for
use by the public commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals
may be required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to
circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to
operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A
regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the
posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport
terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same.
Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport
or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has
nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
The rulings in National Press Club
and Osmeña v. COMELEC26 find no
application to this case.
The COMELEC pointed out that the issue presented in the instant case is akin to the Court’s rulings in
National Press Club and Osmeña. It explained that in both cases, the Court sustained Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of1997, which prohibits newspapers, radio broadcasting
or TV stations, and other mass media from selling or giving print space or airtime for campaign or
other political purposes, except to the COMELEC, during the election campaign. The COMELEC
averred that if the legislature can empower it to impose an advertising ban on mass media, it could
likewise empower it to impose a similar ban on PUVs and transport terminals.
The Court does not agree.
The restriction imposed under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has a direct relation to the enjoyment
and utilization of the franchise or permit to operate of newspapers, radio broadcasting and TV stations,
and other mass media, which the COMELEC has the power to regulate pursuant to Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. The print space or airtime is an integral part of the franchise or permit to
operate of mass media utilities. Thus, the restriction under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is within the
confines of the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
On the other hand, the prohibition on the posting of election campaign materials under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, as already explained, does not have any relation to the
franchise or permit of PUVs and transport terminals to operate as such and, hence, is beyond the power
of the COMELEC under Section 4,Article IX-C of the Constitution.
The restriction on free speech of
owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to further
the stated governmental interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 likewise failed to satisfy the fourth requisite of a
valid content-neutral regulation, i.e., the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals to free speech to further the governmental interest.
While ensuring equality of time, space, and opportunity to candidates is an important and substantial
governmental interest and is essential to the conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may be
achieved sans any intrusion on the fundamental right of expression.
First, while Resolution No. 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 9006, the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein.
Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal
time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 mandates that "all
registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space" and
outlines the guidelines to be observed in the implementation thereof, viz: Section 6. Equal Access to
Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to
media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:
6.1 Print advertisements shall not exceed one-fourth (1/4) page in broad sheet and one-half (1/2) page
in tabloids thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications, during the campaign period.
6.2 a. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to
not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety(90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the
COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification
of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political
party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising,
promoting or opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five
(5) days after its signing. In every case, it shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by
the duly authorized representative of the political party.
6.4 No franchise or permit to operate a radio or television station shall be granted or issued, suspended
or cancelled during the election period. In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and
employment of press, radio and television facilities insofar as the placement of political advertisements
is concerned to ensure that candidates are given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make
known their qualifications and their stand on public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus
Election Code and Republic Act No. 7l66 on election spending.
The COMELEC shall ensure that radio or television or cable television broadcasting entities shall not
allow the scheduling of any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate
or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party
in such program respecting, however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts
of significant news or news worthy events and views on matters of public interest.
6.5 All members of media, television, radio or print, shall scrupulously report and interpret the news,
taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by omission or improper emphasis.
They shall recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly.
6.6 Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained
in any capacity by any candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by their
employer, or shall take a leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period:
Provided, That any media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the
campaign staff of a candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any
candidate or political party.
6.7 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be
publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or any public forum during the campaign period.
6.8 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media personality who is
himself a candidate shall likewise be publicly exhibited in a theater or any public forum during the
campaign period.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 9006 authorizes political parties and party-list groups and independent
candidates to erect common poster areas and candidates to post lawful election campaign materials in
private places, with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property, which are
allocated equitably and impartially.
Further, Section 1327 of R.A. No. 716628 provides for the authorized expenses of registered political
parties and candidates for every voter; it affords candidates equal opportunity in their election
campaign by regulating the amount that should be spent for each voter.
Likewise, Section 1429 of R.A. No. 7166 requires all candidates and treasurers of registered political
parties to submit a statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
Section 14 is a post-audit measure that aims to ensure that the candidates did not overspend in their
election campaign, thereby enforcing the grant of equal opportunity to candidates under Section 13.
A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve the governmental
interest of ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections. There is thus no
necessity of still curtailing the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals by
prohibiting them from posting election campaign materials on their properties.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience
doctrine.
The COMELEC further points out that PUVs and transport terminals hold a "captive audience" –
commuters who have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. The COMELEC
further claims that while owners of privately owned PUVs and transport terminals have a right to
express their views to those who wish to listen, they have no right to force their message upon an
audience incapable of declining to receive it.
The COMELEC’s claim is untenable.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from
intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.30 The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a
listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided.31
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy
of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.32
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the Supreme Court of the United States
of America (U.S. Supreme Court) struck down the order of New York Public Service Commission,
which prohibits public utility companies from including inserts in monthly bills discussing
controversial issues of public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he prohibition cannot be
justified as being necessary to avoid forcing appellant’s views on a captive audience, since customers
may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by throwing the bill insert into a wastebasket."34
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,35 the U.S. Supreme Court nullified a city ordinance,
which made it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place. The U.S. Supreme Court
opined that the degree of captivity is not so great as to make it impracticable for an unwilling viewer to
avoid exposure, thus:
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content. Its effect is to
deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or even
educational. This discrimination cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant intrusions on
privacy. The ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places
where the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in theater is not "so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." x x x Thus, we
conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship
of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.36 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience
doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in
the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive.
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials
on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,37 a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements
on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, "although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture."38 In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer
of advertising from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of
advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas opined that while Lehman, a candidate for state office
who sought to avail himself of advertising space on government-run buses, "clearly has a right to
express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience
incapable of declining to receive it."39 Justice Douglas concluded: "the right of the commuters to be
free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience."40
The COMELEC’s reliance on Lehman is utterly misplaced.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be
placed on its buses. The U.S. Supreme Court gave primacy to the city government’s exercise of its
managerial decision, viz:
Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that
short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and
sticky administrative problems might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these
circumstances, the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial
commercial and service-oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of First Amendment violation.
Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military
compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would be
pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.41 (Emphasis ours)
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on
their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and
transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates
the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause,
but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.42 "Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."43
"The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken."44
Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean their
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.45
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the class.46
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and
is not germane to the purpose of the law.
A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in
that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a
permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals;
the prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and
transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners
of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by
posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same
preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is
merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.47
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any
election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by
many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against
posting of election campaign materials.
Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and
other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items(5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in elections. To stress, PUVs
and transport terminals are private properties. Indeed, the nexus between the restriction on the freedom
of expression of owners of PUVs and transport terminals and the government’s interest in ensuring
equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the COMELEC.
In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the
free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power
of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s
and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a
violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.48 WHEREFORE, in light of the
foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission on Elections are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act 8171
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
associatEon for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau
of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Signed: October 23, 1995
 Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO

ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in

the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held

unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain
valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
 Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was
finally passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and
August 26, 2003, respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: August 29, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY,
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY,
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T.
GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),
et al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la
Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners
from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of
respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners
from proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit
respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et
al., over his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition.
The Court considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and
petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago
Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian,
Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2",
counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them
Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a
cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the
immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review
motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board
of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had
in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962
was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now
become final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962
or July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532)
wherein this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having
been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case
against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the
recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and
recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of
Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in
relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the
Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex
"18", counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and
was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990,
denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong
Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged,
among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation
proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against
William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction
being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction,
they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the
process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in
ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction
of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put
finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a
Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on
record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with
the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2)
petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the
deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for
which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or
commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in
equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or
commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the
third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to
the Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court
of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus,
under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the
Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We
ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-
judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434
insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order,
or decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor
under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the
"Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the
Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics
Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law,
or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided
 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts,
jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding
amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor
Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court
through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en
consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the
Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative
bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial
Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter . (Emphasis
supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are
directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides
appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions
or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond
the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by
law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its
decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus
modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be
subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review
by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of
Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC
except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not
of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special
civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi
vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest
the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation
Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is
satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of
citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665
[1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the
unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus
or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time,
to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative
officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only
after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name
before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation
proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs.
Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where
the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in
a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA
107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We
shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings
instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of
Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for
prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the
pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence
presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action
is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73
Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where
the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
 occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the
case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703;
Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit &
Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety &
Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case
(cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is
that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and
US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See
also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before
Us in the form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor
Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before
the Bureau of Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of
the deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in
Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need
for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking
admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua
Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in the
Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein
was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e.,
whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure
(date) "20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall
within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed.
This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who
was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule
that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one
thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission
on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478
[1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner
of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
 therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a
full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other
case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of
citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding,
unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following
must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and
Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in
said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and
Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of
1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act
insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of
arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in
the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338
[1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs.
Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang,
10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not
indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass
the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-
petition) issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only
for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the
mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for
violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial
interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to
counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no
mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which
petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of
respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing,
submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-
petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the
"very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to
the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The
Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their
Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the
Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are
citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition)
which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent
Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on
the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen
to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William
Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino
citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6,
1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of
said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one
Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
 in an Order dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that
they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as
a Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being
the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961
(Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine
citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a
Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No.
28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his
affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on
February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where
it is not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino
citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not
even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight
(28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]),
We laid down the consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the
resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she
admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese
resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no
longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years
had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the
mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous admission before the
immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor
on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities.
And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to
another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines
valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then
must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they
decided to land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D).
We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the immigration officials would reverse
their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the
mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into
the Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian,
to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of
 validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to
elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him to live
separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity
resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part
of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should
be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in
1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on
August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent
William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and
the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the
then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the
BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha
should be applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case.
They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is
applicable only where the deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses 2,
7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation
proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal
sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and
imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely
appears in the name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under
an assumed name; fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by
law to receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration
officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or
wilful concealment of a material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in
order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or
representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration
clearance certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an
offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and
 imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code);
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six
years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in
the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act
being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant
of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides
for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to
prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or
forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable
to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate
action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on
judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec.
37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962
before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in
1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive
and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil
Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously
resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with
whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino
(Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-
petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised
his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973
and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a
Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the
companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino
citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation
proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment
to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in
its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at
least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners
point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by
any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of
China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were
contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered
valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having
been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having
been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam
Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more
on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records
indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China
relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate
was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's
testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies
of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration
authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters
of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in
substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil
Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial
unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of
the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in
mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship
of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a
Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino
citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated
July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners.
The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the
parties therein testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not
among those authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7,
Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523
for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-
54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.

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