RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001]
TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.
GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and
HON. PRUDENCIO CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon
City, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor
which seeks to set aside the decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals which
reversed the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[3]granting Idolors
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the resolution
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita
Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to
redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located at 66 Ilocos
Sur Street, Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No.
25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of
Gumersindo de Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the
Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City,
which resulted in a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which agreement is quoted in full[5]:
Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping
binabanggit sa itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming
alitan gaya ng sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00
noong September 20, 1994.
Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659)
under Registry receipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to
settle the said amount.
execute a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest within
one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-
aayos na inilahad sa itaas.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent
Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office of the Barangay captain
who subsequently issued a certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement
set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to
respondent Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on
June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino
Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging
among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a
temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining private respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation
of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. The trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial courts order dated July 28, 1998 which
granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and
annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion
for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V.
Idolor. The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the respondent Court
of Appeals erred in ruling (I) that petitioner has no more proprietary right to the
Page 1 of 46
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issuance of the writ of injunction, (2) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso
facto result in novation of the real estate mortgage, (3) that the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos is merely a promissory note of petitioner to private respondent spouses;
and (4) that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred
in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the
private and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale
and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private
respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land
was not yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year
had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriffs certificate of sale was null and void; that
petitioner and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale
conducted by respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication
of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights
and interests.[6] Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right
to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right.[7] Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite
to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right
which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the
defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has
endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground
for denying the injunction.[8]The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial
power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.[9] It is to be resorted to only
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot
be remedied under any standard of compensation.[10]
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has
no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to
the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was
sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and
the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriffs
sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June
23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for
annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show
sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of
redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the
filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party
seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate
relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. [11] The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction.[12]
Petitioners allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriffs sale dwells on
the merits of the case; We cannot rule on the same considering that the matter
should be resolved during the trial on the merits.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
dated September 21, 1996 between her and spouses de Guzman before the
Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the express and unequivocal
intention of the parties to novate or modify the real estate mortgage; that a
comparison of the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconciliable
incompatibility between them, i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due
was five hundred twenty thousand (P520,000) pesos only payable by petitioner
within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at the legal rate per annum
and non-payment of which within the stipulated period, private respondents have
the right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage while under the
second agreement, the amount due was one million two hundred thirty three
thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusive of
interest, payable within 90 days and in case of non payment of the same on or
before December 21, 1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to
repurchase within one year without interest; that the second agreement
Kasunduang Pag-aayos was a valid new contract as it was duly executed by the
parties and it changed the principal conditions of petitioners original
obligations. Petitioner insists that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos was not a mere
promissory note contrary to respondent courts conclusion since it was entered by
the parties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a final
judgment.[13]
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change
of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its
objects or principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old
one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. [14] Under the
law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree
that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. [15] Accordingly, it
was held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement
entered into between the parties was intended to give life to the old one. [16]
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A review of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does not
support petitioners contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the
will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and
the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly
recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation
where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994
which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days
grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that
upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase
without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties
to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of
the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of
the old obligation, there can be no novation. [17] We find no cogent reason to
disagree with the respondent courts pronouncement as follows:
In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the original
undertaking. The agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo)
executed by the parties on September 21, 1996 merely gave life to the March 21,
1994 mortgage contract which was then more than two years
overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the sum of
P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan which
amount she promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days or until December 21,
1996, failing which she also agreed to execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed
of sale of the mortgaged property for the same amount without interest. Evidently,
it was executed to facilitate easy compliance by respondent mortgagor with her
mortgage obligation. It (the September 21, 1996 agreement) is not incompatible
and can stand together with the mortgage contract of March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view
that he would find it easier to comply with his obligations under the Contract to
Sell does not novate said Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA
461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and
effect of a final judgment. That precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to
the foreclosure of the mortgage on March 27, 1997, after her failure to comply
with her obligation which expired on December 21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government
Code of 1991, which requires the lapse of six (6) months before the amicable
settlement may be enforced, is misplaced. The instant case deals with extra
judicial foreclosure governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended.
Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the
execution of a deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year would have
the same effect as the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
wherein petitioner was given one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale in
the Registry of property to redeem the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right
of redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is not
proper to consider an obligation novated by unimportant modifications which do
not alter its essence.[18] It bears stress that the period to pay the total amount of
petitioners indebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired
on December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right
to repurchase on the said date up to the time private respondents filed their
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The failure of
petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan to settle her obligation
effectively delayed private respondents right to extra-judicially foreclose the real
estate mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, petitioner has not
shown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250. February 28, 2001]
RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR.,
Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-
Manapla, Negros Occidental, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint[1] dated June 15, 1997, Rimeo S. Gustilo charged
respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct, gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act relative to Civil Case No. 703-M entitled Weddy C. Libo-on
v. Rimeo S. Gustilo, et al. for recounting of ballots of Precinct Nos. 27 and 27-A,
Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental.
Page 3 of 46
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Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of
Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997
elections. His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the incumbent punong
barangay and the representative of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC)
to the Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Negros Occidental. Both complainant and Libo-on garnered eight hundred
nineteen (819) votes during the elections, resulting in a tie. The breaking of the
tie by the Board of Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was proclaimed
duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.[2]
On May 20, 1997, his opponent filed an election protest case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 703-M, before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental.
Libo-on sought the recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary prohibitory
injunction, and damages.
On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the
parties and set the hearing on June 6, 1997.[3]
On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing
to May 29 and 30, 1997.
The next day, respondent granted Libo-ons motion. The hearing was
advanced to May 29 and 30, 1997 cancelling the hearing for June 6,
1997.[4] Complainant avers that he was not furnished a copy of this Order dated
May 28, 1997.
On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and annulled the proclamation of complainant as the duly elected punong
barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.[5]Complainant declares that no copy of this
Order dated May 29, 1997 was served on him. That same day, however, he was
able to secure copies of the orders of respondent dated May 28 and May 29, 1997
from the COMELEC Registrar of Manapla, Negros Occidental and the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Moreover, it was only in the
afternoon of May 29, 1997 that complainant received a copy of Libo-ons petition
in Civil Case No. 703-M and respondents Order dated May 21, 1997.
On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong
barangay.[6] That same day, he also filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69 docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.
On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared
as null and void the order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly
elected punong barangay.[7]
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially,
complainant moved for his inhibition.
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and
after hearing Libo-ons motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to
maintain the status quo between the contending parties.[8]
Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed
the order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He also claims that by
preventing him from assuming office, he was excluded by the DILG from
participating in the election of the Liga ng Mga Barangay on June 14, 1997.
In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations. He claimed that when
Libo-on filed his motion to advance the hearing of the prayer for injunction on May
27, 1997 in Civil Case No. 703-M, complainant was served a copy by registered
mail as shown by the registry receipts attached to said motion. Considering the
urgency of the matter and since there was substantial compliance with due
process, he issued the Order of May 28, 1997 which cancelled the hearing set for
June 6, 1997 and advanced it to May 29 and 30, 1997.
Respondent claims that on May 29, 1997, Libo-on and his counsel appeared
but complainant did not, despite due notice. The hearing then proceeded, with
Libo-on presenting his evidence. As a result, he issued the TRO prayed for and
annulled complainants proclamation. Respondent admits that the Order of May
29, 1997, particularly the annulment of complainants proclamation, was outside
the jurisdiction of his court. But since the COMELEC ignored Libo-ons petition for
correction of erroneous tabulation and Libo-on had no other remedy under the
law, he was constrained to annul complainants proclamation, which from the very
beginning was illegal. He justified his action by our rulings in Bince, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 312 Phil. 316 (1995) and Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 849
(1991), which held that a faulty tabulation cannot be the basis of a valid
proclamation.
Respondent also faults the RTC of Silay City for issuing the Order dated
June 5, 1997, which lifted the TRO he issued and declared void his nullification of
complainants proclamation. Respondent contends that complainant should first
have exhausted all remedies in his court before resorting to the special civil action
for certiorari with the RTC. The latter court, in turn, should have dismissed the
action for certiorari for failure to exhaust judicial remedies.
With respect to his Order of June 11, 1997, respondent explains that it was
never meant to reverse the Order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He
points out that both parties in Civil Case No. 703-M were present during the
hearing after due notice. After receiving their evidence, he found that unless a
TRO was issued, Libo-on would suffer a grave injustice and irreparable injury. He
submits that absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, his acts, even if erroneous,
are not the subject of disciplinary action.
In its evaluation and recommendation report dated November 29, 1999, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondents errors were not
honest mistakes in the performance of his duties. Rather, his actions showed a
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bias in favor of Libo-on and evinced a pattern to prevent the complainant from
assuming office as the duly elected punong barangay despite his having been
proclaimed as such by the Board of Canvassers. The OCA recommends that
respondent be fined P20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after
the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records
shall be transmitted immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied).
xxx
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-
sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with
regard to immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO.
The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed,
the court may act on the application only after all parties have been notified and
heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may not be
dispensed with.[9] In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the
injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicants evidence ex
parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first
TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice.
Worse, he compounded the infraction by annulling complainants
proclamation as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla and
prohibiting him from assuming office. Respondent admits that his court was not
vested with the power or jurisdiction to annul the proclamation, but seeks to justify
his action on the ground that the proclamation was void ab initio. In so doing,
respondent wantonly usurped a power exclusively vested by law in the
COMELEC.[10] A judge is expected to know the jurisdictional boundaries of courts
and quasi-judicial bodies like the COMELEC as mapped out by the Constitution
and statutes and to act only within said limits. A judge who wantonly arrogates
unto himself the authority and power vested in other agencies not only acts in
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process, but also creates
chaos and contributes to confusion in the administration of justice. Respondent,
in transgressing the jurisdictional demarcation lines between his court and the
COMELEC, clearly failed to realize the position that his court occupies in the
interrelation and operation of the countrys justice system. He displayed a marked
ignorance of basic laws and principles. Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. By annulling complainants proclamation as the duly elected punong
barangay, despite being aware of the fact that his court had no power to do so,
not only is respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, he also manifests
unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious conduct.
Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts
want of authority, respondent knowingly issued an unjust order.
Note that the RTC of Silay City corrected respondents errors by declaring
null and void his Order dated May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his
previous errors of judgment by proceeding to hear Libo-ons motion for permanent
injunction and issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground that
extreme urgency and grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no
injunctive remedy were granted. Respondent insists that his act did not reverse
the Order of the RTC in Special Civil Action No. 1936-69, since the second TRO
he issued satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of Circular No. 20-95.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right
to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation
of such right.[11] The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right
to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent a serious damage.[12] In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed
as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office.
Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office.
We do not see how the complainants exercise of such rights would cause an
irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo. We see no
reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the
second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of
the Liga ng mga Barangay. Respondent must be held liable for violating Rule 3.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that, In every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism.
In a similar case, a judge was fined P5,000.00 for failure to observe the
requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 when he issued a TRO
enjoining a duly proclaimed barangay captain from participating in the elections
of officers of the ABC of Taft, Eastern Samar.[13] Note, however, that in the instant
case, the respondents infractions are not limited to the mere issuance of a
restraining order without conducting the summary conference required by
Administrative Circular No. 20-95. He also annulled the proclamation of the
complainant knowing very well that he had no such authority. When his first
restraining order was set aside and nullification of complainants proclamation was
declared null and void by the RTC of Silay City, a superior court, he again issued
a TRO, which showed his partiality to complainants political rival. Respondent is
thus guilty of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
Page 5 of 46
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knowingly rendering an unjust order; gross ignorance of the law or procedure; as BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.),
well as bias and partiality. All of the foregoing are serious charges under Rule
140, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. We agree with the sanction recommended INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL.,
by the OCA, finding it to be in accord with Rule 140, Section 10 (A) of the Rules
of Court. Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, this COURT finds respondent judge GUILTY of violating

Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, knowingly rendering an
unjust order, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and bias and partiality.
Accordingly, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is hereby imposed
- versus -
upon respondent with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS and MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, Promulgated:

SECOND DIVISION Respondents.

MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, September 12, 2008

G.R. No. 168637
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioner,
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Present:
- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Before this Court are two consolidated petitions. The first petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, assails the
CARPIO MORALES,
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD Decision[1] dated January 28, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated June 23, 2005 of
JOHNSON PHIL., RICHARD SMYTH as General TINGA,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885. The second petition, docketed
Manager and FERDIE SARFATI, as Medical Sales
Director, VELASCO, JR., and as G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson

BRION, JJ. Phil., assails the Resolutions[3] dated August 12, 2005 and October 28, 2005 of
Respondents.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

The facts are undisputed.

G.R. No. 170684

Page 6 of 46
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Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.),
Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from January 6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory
Manager in its Medical Sales Force Division.[4]
On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and
Lagrosas former girlfriend, attended a district meeting of territory managers at
McDonalds Alabang Town Center. After the meeting, she dined out with her
friends. She left her car at McDonalds and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When
they returned to McDonalds, Lim saw Lagrosas car parked beside her car. Lim
told Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them and slammed
Menquitos car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosas
approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim
tried to intervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain
in writing why he should not be dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside
of business hours. While the offense is not covered by the Code of Discipline for
Territory Managers, the Code states that other infractions not provided for herein
shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner at the discretion of
management.[5] In his memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim when
she tried to intervene. He explained that he did not intend to hit her as shown by
the fact that he never left the hospital until he was assured that she was all right. [6]
In the disciplinary hearing that followed, it was established that Lagrosas
and Lim had physical confrontations prior to the incident. But Lagrosas denied
saying that he might not be able to control himself and hurt Lim and her boyfriend
if he sees them together.
On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective
immediately.[7] Lagrosas then filed a complaint[8] for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13 th month pay, attorneys fees,
damages and fair market value of his Team Share Stock Option Grant.
On February 28, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a
Decision[9] in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99, declaring the dismissal
illegal. He noted that while Lagrosas committed a misconduct, it was not connected
with his work. The incident occurred outside of company premises and office
hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not directed against a co-
employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless,
Labor Arbiter Hernandez imposed a penalty of three months suspension or
forfeiture of pay to remind Lagrosas not to be carried away by the mindless dictates
of his passion. Thus, the Arbiter ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby [rendered] finding that respondent company illegally
dismissed complainant thus, ORDERING it:
1) [t]o reinstate him to his former position without loss
of seniority rights, privileges and benefits and to pay him full
backwages reckoned from [the] date of his illegal dismissal on
23 March 2000 including the monetary value of his
vacation/sick leave of 16 days per year reckoned from July 1,
2000 until actually reinstated, less three (3) months salary as
penalty for his infraction;
2) to pay him the monetary equivalent of his accrued
and unused combined sick/vacation leaves as of June 30, 2000
of 16 days x 3 years and 4 months 10 days x P545.45 =
P23,636.16 and the present fair market value of his Team
Share stock option grant for eight hundred (800) BMS common
shares of stock listed in the New York Stock Exchange which
vested in complainant as of 01 July 1997, provisionally
computed as 90% (800 shares x US$40.00 per share x
P43.20/US$ = P1,244,160.00).
3) to pay him Attorneys fee of 10% on the entire
computable amount.
Page 7 of 46
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All other claims of complainant are dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside
the Decision of Labor Arbiter Hernandez in its Decision[11] dated September 24,
2002. It held that Lagrosas was validly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting
his co-employee and another person with a metal steering wheel lock. The gravity
and seriousness of his misconduct is clear from the fact that he deliberately waited
for Lim and Menquito to return to McDonalds. The NLRC also ruled that the
misconduct was committed in connection with his duty as Territory Manager since
it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.
Lagrosas moved for reconsideration. On May 7, 2003, the NLRC issued
a Resolution[12] reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident was not
work-related since it occurred only after the district meeting of territory
managers. It emphasized that for a serious misconduct to merit dismissal, it must
be connected with the employees work. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find this
time no reason to alter the Labor Arbiters Decision of February
28, 2002 and hereby affirm the same in toto. We vacate our
previous Decision of September 24, 2002.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied
in an Order dated February 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99
(NLRC NCR CA No. 031646-02).[14] Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ
of execution.[15] Notices of garnishment were then served upon the Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and
the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the balance of the judgment award. [16]
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it
timely filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
gave due course to Bristol-Myers petition and issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO)[17] enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and notices of
garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 17, 2004.[18]
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash
bond. It argued that since it has posted an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash
bond should be legally discharged and released.
On January 28, 2005, the appellate court rendered the following
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of May 7, 2003 and the Order of February 4, 2004 in
NLRC NCR Case No. [00-03-02821-99] (NLRC NCR CA No.
[031646-02]), are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public
respondent NLRCs Decision dated September 24, 2002 which
reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and in effect sustained the
legality of the private respondents termination and the
dismissal of his claim for the fair market value of the [Team
Share] stock option grant
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that
the petitioner shall pay the private respondent the monetary
equivalent of his accrued and unused combined sick/vacation
leave plus ten (10%) percent thereof, as attorneys fees. The
injunction bond and the TRO bond previously posted by the
petitioner are DISCHARGED.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Page 8 of 46
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The appellate court considered the misconduct as having been
committed in connection with Lagrosas duty as Territory Manager since it
occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers. It also held
that the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct cannot be denied. Lagrosas
employed such a degree of violence that caused damage not only to Menquitos
car but also physical injuries to Lim and Menquito.
Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond
and injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January 28,
2005. On August 12, 2005, the appellate court denied the motion as premature
since the decision is not yet final and executory due to Lagrosas appeal to this
Court.[20]
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005,
the appellate court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the petitioners Motion [f]or
Reconsideration dated September 6, 2005 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED and the Resolution of August 12,
2005 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order cash bond in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which was posted by the
petitioners on July 19, 2004 is
ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash
bond intended for it also expired. Thus, the discharge and release of the cash
bond for the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court disallowed the
discharge of the injunction cash bond since the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued pendente lite. Since there is a pending appeal with the Supreme Court,
the Decision dated January 28, 2005 is not yet final and executory.
Hence, the instant petitions.
In G.R. No. 168637, Lagrosas assigns the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECLARING
THAT THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS LEGAL HAD DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE AND
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS POWER OF
REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL, BEING A PENALTY TOO HARSH
IN THIS CASE, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LABOR LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO
CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS
POWER OF REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION.[22]
In G.R. No. 170684, Bristol-Myers raises the following issue:
[WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE] COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISALLOWING THE RELEASE AND DISCHARGE OF
PETITIONERS INJUNCTION BOND.[23]
Page 9 of 46
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Simply put, the basic issues in the instant petitions are: (1) Did the Court
of Appeals err in finding the dismissal of Lagrosas legal? and (2) Did the Court of
Appeals err in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond?
On the first issue, serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal
of an employee is defined simply as improper or wrong conduct. It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment of the law,
the misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. However serious such misconduct, it must, nevertheless,
be in connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for his
separation. The act complained of must be related to the performance of the
employees duties such as would show him to be unfit to continue working for the
employer.[24]
Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for
dismissal, it (a) must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the
employees duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer.[25]
Tested against the foregoing standards, it is clear that Lagrosas was not
guilty of serious misconduct. It may be that the injury sustained by Lim was serious
since it rendered her unconscious and caused her to suffer cerebral contusion
that necessitated hospitalization for several days. But we fail to see how such
misconduct could be characterized as work-related and reflective of Lagrosas
unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
Although we have recognized that fighting within company premises
may constitute serious misconduct, we have also held that not every fight within
company premises in which an employee is involved would automatically warrant
dismissal from service.[26] More so, in this case where the incident occurred
outside of company premises and office hours and not intentionally directed
against a co-employee, as hereafter explained.
First, the incident occurred outside of company premises and after office
hours since the district meeting of territory managers which Lim attended at
McDonalds had long been finished. McDonalds may be considered an extension
of Bristol-Myers office and any business conducted therein as within office hours,
but the moment the district meeting was concluded, that ceased too. When Lim
dined with her friends, it was no longer part of the district meeting and considered
official time. Thus, when Lagrosas assaulted Lim and Menquito upon their return,
it was no longer within company premises and during office hours. Second,
Bristol-Myers itself admitted that Lagrosas intended to hit Menquito only. In the
Memorandum[27] dated March 23, 2000, it was stated that You got out from your
car holding an umbrella steering wheel lock and proceeded to hit Mr.
Menquito. Dulce tried to intervene, but you accidentally hit her on the head,
knocking her unconscious.[28] Indeed, the misconduct was not directed against a
co-employee who unfortunately got hit in the process. Third, Lagrosas was not
performing official work at the time of the incident. He was not even a participant
in the district meeting. Hence, we fail to see how his action could have reflected
his unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
In light of Bristol-Myers failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove
that Lagrosas was guilty of serious misconduct, it cannot use this ground to justify
his dismissal.Thus, the dismissal of Lagrosas employment was without factual
and legal basis.
On the second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole
aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.[29]
Page 10 of 46
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A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things,
the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.[30]
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is
finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its principal
purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. [31]
only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the
labor arbiter.[33]
Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in
disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.
WHEREFORE, the two consolidated petitions are GRANTED. In G.R.
No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, the Decision dated January 28, 2005,
and the Resolution dated June 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83885 are REVERSED. The Resolution dated May 7, 2003, and the Order
dated February 4, 2004 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99
(NLRC NCR CA No. 031646-02) are REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED.

In G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead

In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment
pending final resolution of this case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the
Court.[32]
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of
the case by granting Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision
dated September 24, 2002of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for
dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash
bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.
Johnson Phil., the Resolutions dated August 12, 2005 and October 28, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885 are REVERSED. The injunction
cash bond in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000)
which was posted by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil.
on September 17, 2004 is hereby ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to it.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the SECOND DIVISION
monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the
implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly NELSON JENOSA and his son NIO G.R. No. 172138
enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any CARLO JENOSA, SOCORRO
CANTO and her son PATRICK Present:
damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended CANTO, CYNTHIA APALISOK and
to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction her daughter CYNDY CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

Page 11 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

APALISOK, EDUARDO NACHURA,

the subject matter. In its 22 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
VARGASand his son CLINT PERALTA,
EDUARD VARGAS, and NELIA ABAD, and the motion for reconsideration of petitioners Nelson Jenosa and his son Nio Carlo
DURO and her son NONELL MENDOZA, JJ.
GREGORY DURO, Jenosa, Socorro Canto and her son Patrick Canto, Cynthia Apalisok and her
Petitioners,
daughter Cyndy Apalisok, Eduardo Vargas and his son Clint Eduard Vargas, and
- versus -
Nelia Duro and her son Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioners).
REV. FR. JOSE RENE C.
DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his
capacity as the incumbent Principal The Facts
of the High School Department of the
University of San Agustin, and
theUNIVERSITY OF SAN Promulgated: On 22 November 2002, some students of the University, among them petitioners
AGUSTIN, herein represented by its
incumbent President REV. FR. September 8, 2010 Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and
MANUEL G. VERGARA, O.S.A.,
Respondents. Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were caught engaging in hazing

x--------------------------------------------------x outside the school premises. The hazing incident was entered into the blotter of

the Iloilo City Police.[4]

DECISION

Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school

CARPIO, J.:
authorities, the apprehended students and their parents. During the 28 November
2002 meeting, the parties agreed that, instead of the possibility of being charged
The Case
and found guilty of hazing, the students who participated in the hazing incident as

initiators, including petitioner students, would just transfer to another school, while
This is a petition for review[1] of the 16 June 2005 Decision[2] and 22 March
those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The
2006[3] Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78894. In its 16
parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their
June 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of respondents
signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity. [5] In view of
University of San Augustin (University), represented by its incumbent President
the agreement, the University did not anymore convene the Committee on
Rev. Fr. Manuel G. Vergara, O.S.A. (University President), and Rev. Fr. Jose
Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
Rene C. Delariarte, O.S.A. (Principal), in his capacity as the incumbent Principal
of the High School Department of the University (respondents) and ordered the
On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent
dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 for lack of jurisdiction over
a letter to the University President urging him not to implement the 28 November
Page 12 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

2002 agreement.[6] According to petitioner parents, the Principal, without Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and asked for the dissolution of

convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner the writ. The trial court denied respondents motion. Respondents complied but

students. with reservations.

On 10 December 2002, petitioner parents also wrote a letter to Mrs. Ida B. On 25 March 2003, respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Respondents alleged

Endonila, School Division Superintendent, Department of Education (DepEd), that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that

Iloilo City, seeking her intervention and prayed that petitioner students be allowed petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. On 19 May 2003, the trial court denied

to take the home study program instead of transferring to another school.[7] The respondents motion. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.

DepEd asked the University to comment on the letter. [8] The University replied

and attached the minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting. [9] On 21 April 2003, petitioners wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct the

University to release the report cards and other credentials of petitioner

On 3 January 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with students.[13] On 8 May 2003, the DepEd sent a letter to the University advising it

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Iloilo City (trial court) docketed as Civil Case to release petitioner students report cards and other credentials if there was no

No. 03-27460.[10] Petitioners assailed the Principals decision to order the valid reason to withhold the same.[14] On 14 May 2003, the DepEd sent another

immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process letter to the University to follow-up petitioners request.[15] On 20 May 2003, the

because the COSD was not convened. University replied that it could not release petitioner students report cards due to
their pending disciplinary case with the COSD.[16]

On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and

directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the pendency of the On 28 May 2003, petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction

case.[11] The 5 February 2003 Order reads: praying for the release of petitioner students report cards and other credentials

docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27646.[17]

WHEREFORE, let [a] Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
issue. The defendants are hereby directed to allow the plaintiffs
minor children to attend their classes during the pendency of
The trial court consolidated the two cases.[18]
this case, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to
which any or all of them may be liable.

SO ORDERED.[12] On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed
the University to release petitioner students report cards and other

credentials.[19]Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondents

Page 13 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

INTERFERING, pre-maturely, with the exclusive and inherent

alleged that they could not comply with the writ because of the on-going
disciplinary case against petitioner students.
On 26 June 2003, the COSD met with petitioners for a preliminary conference on
the hazing incident. On 7 July 2003, the University, through the COSD, issued its
report finding petitioner students guilty of hazing. The COSD also recommended
authority of educational institutions to discipline.
In directing herein petitioners [respondents in this case] to re-
admit herein private respondents [petitioners in this case] and
eventually, to release the report cards and other school
credentials, prior to the action of the President of USA and of the
recommendation of the COSD, the court a quo is guilty of
improper judicial intrusion by encroaching into the exclusive
prerogative of educational institutions.[21]

the exclusion of petitioner students from its rolls effective 28 November 2002.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.[22] In its 22 March 2006 Resolution,

the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.

On 14 July 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying both motions for

reconsideration.[20]
The Issues

On 1 September 2003, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with
Petitioners raise the following issues:
the Court of Appeals. Respondents insisted that the trial court had no jurisdiction

over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646. Respondents
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding that Branch 29 of
also alleged that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City in Civil Case Nos. 03-

27460 and 03-27646 did not acquire jurisdiction over the

subject matter of this case for failure of petitioners to exhaust

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
administrative remedies?

2. Was the recommendation/report/order of the Committee on

In its 16 June 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition
Student Discipline dated 7 July 2003 valid, and did it justify the
and ordered the trial court to dismiss Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 for
order of exclusion of petitioner students retroactive to 28
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of petitioners failure to exhaust
November 2002?[23]
administrative remedies or for being premature. According to the Court of
The Ruling of the Court
Appeals, petitioners should have waited for the action of the DepEd or of the

University President before resorting to judicial action. The Court of Appeals held:
The petition has no merit.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court a quo committed grave
[abuse] of discretion amounting to LACK OF JURISDICTION in
Page 14 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
Discipline in education is specifically mandated by the 1987 Constitution which
provides that all educational institutions shall teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline.[24] Schools and school administrators have the authority to
maintain school discipline[25] and the right to impose appropriate and reasonable
disciplinary measures.[26] On the other hand, students have the duty and the
responsibility to promote and maintain the peace and tranquility of the school by
observing the rules of discipline.[27]
In this case, we rule that the Principal had the authority to order the immediate
transfer of petitioner students because of the 28 November 2002
agreement.[28] Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the minutes of the 28
November 2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to
another school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro even wrote a letter to
inform the University that they would transfer their children to another school and
requested for the pertinent papers needed for the transfer. [29]In turn, the University
did not anymore convene the COSD. The University agreed that it would no longer
conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead issue the transfer credentials of
petitioner students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement without any
justifiable reason. Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction, and
injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with clean
hands. In University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr.,[30] a case involving
student misconduct, this Court ruled:
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply
for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so
because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks
equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim
which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done
inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[31]
Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable
reason, come to court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in
issue.
Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny
them relief. We uphold the validity of the 28 November 2002 agreement and rule
that the Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students based on the 28 November 2002 agreement.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 16 June 2005 Decision
and the 22 March 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
Page 15 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated April 16, 2007
and the Resolution3 dated September 18, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81968.
1. With respect to the penalties, we are requesting for a reduction in the
rates as we find it onerous considering the big amount of our loan
(₱218,540,648.00). The interest together with the penalties that you are
imposing is similar to the ones being charged by private lending
institutions, i.e., 4.5%/month total.

During the period from September 4, 1992 to March 27, 1996, China Banking
Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which
amounted to ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor
several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of
land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta,
Rizal.4
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the
mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until
such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that
there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties
without the burden of updating interests on all loans. 5
In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the
restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties and the
implementation of a dacion en pago of the New Cubao Central property. 6
The letter reads:
March 20, 2000
2. As I had discussed with you regarding Dacion en Pago, which you
categorically stated that it could be a possibility, we are considering
putting our New Cubao Central (NCC) on Dacion and restructuring our
loan with regards to our Loyola Grand Villas.
Considering that you had stated that our restructuring had not been finalized, we
find it timely to raise these urgent matters and possibly agree on a realistic and
workable scheme that we can incorporate on our final agreement.
Thank you and we strongly hope for your prompt consideration on our request.
Very truly yours,
V. BENITO R. SOLIVEN (Sgd.)
President7
In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had
been completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 in the amount of
₱218,540,646.00. On the aspect of interests and charges, CBC suggested the
updating of the obligation to avoid paying interests and charges. 8 The relevant
portion of the letter dated April 17, 2000 reads:

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION First of all, to clarify, the loan’s restructuring has been finalized and completed on
Dasmarinas cor. Juan Luna Sts. 3/01/99 with the booking of the Restructured loan of ₱218,540,646. Only two
Binondo, Manila Amendments of Real Estate Mortgages remain to be registered to date. Certain
documents that we requested from your company since last year, that could
Attn: Mr. George Yap facilitate this amendment have not yet been forwarded to us until now.
Account Officer Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the restructuring of the loan has
been done with and finalized.
Dear Mr. Yap,
This in turn is with regards to statement[s] no. 1 & 2 of your letter, referring to the
interest rates and penalties. As per our records, the rates are actually the
This is to refer to our meeting held at your office last March 10, 2000. prevailing bank interest rates. In addition, penalty charges are imposed in the
event of non-payment. To avoid experiencing having to pay more due to the
In this regard, please allow us to call your attention on the following important penalty charges, updating of obligations is necessary. Thus, we advise updating
matters we have discussed: of your obligations to avoid penalty charges. However, should you be able to
update both interest and penalty through a "one-time" payment, we shall present
your request to Senior Management for possible reduction in penalty charges.
Page 16 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

Concerning statement no. 3 containing your request for the possible Dacion en
PN NUMBER O/S BALANCE DUE DATE INTEREST
Pago of your NCC properties, as was discussed already in the meeting, it is a
concern that has to be discussed with Senior Management and approved by the
Executive Committee before we can commit to you on the matter. We suggest PN-MK-TS-342924 PHP 89,700,000.00 03/01/2004 04/13/1999
that your company, Solid Builders, exhaust all possibilities to sell the NCC
properties yourselves because, being a real estate company, Solid has better
ways and means of selling the properties.9 PN-MK-TS-342931 19,350,000.00 03/01/2004 08/05/1999

This was followed by another communication from CBC to SBI reiterating, among PN-MK-TS-342948 35,888,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------
others, that the loan has been restructured effective March 1, 1999 upon issuance
by SBI of promissory notes in favor of CBC. The relevant portion of that letter
dated May 19, 2000 reads: PN-MK-TS-342955 6,870,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------

Again, in response to your query with regards the issue of the loans restructuring, PN-MK-TS-342962 5,533,646.00 03/01/2004 07/26/1999
to reiterate, the loan restructuring has been finalized and completed on 3/01/99
with the booking of the Restructured loan of ₱231,716,646. The Restructured
Loan was effective ever since the new Promissory Note was signed on the said PN-MK-TS-342979 21,950,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------
date.

PN-MK-TS-342986 3,505,000.00 03/01/2004 08/09/1999

The interest rates for the loans are actually rates booked since the new
Promissory Notes were effective.1âwphi1 Any move of changing it or "re-pricing"
the interest is only possible every 90 days from the booking date, which PN-MK-TS-342993 19,455,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------
represents the interest amortization payment dates. No change or "re-pricing" in
interest rates is possible since interest payment/obligations have not yet been
paid. PN-MK-TS-343002 4,168,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------

With regards to the possible Dacion en Pago of your NCC properties, as was PN-MK-TS-343026 12,121,000.00 03/01/2004 ---------------
discussed already in the meeting, it is a concern that has to be discussed with
Senior Management and approved by the Executive Committee before we can
commit to you on the matter. We suggest that your company, Solid Builders, PH₱218,540,646.00
exhaust all possibilities to sell the NCC properties yourselves because, being a ================
real estate company, Solid has better ways and means of selling the properties. 10

Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle
Greetings!
its outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof. The letter dated
September 18, 2000 reads:
We refer again to the balances of the abovementioned Promissory Notes
amounting to PH₱218,540,646.00 excluding interest, penalties and other charges
September 18, 2000
signed by you jointly and severally in our favor, which remains unpaid up to this
date despite repeated demands for payment.
SOLID BUILDERS, INC.
V.V. Soliven Bldg., I
In view of the strict regulations of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on past due
EDSA, San Juan, Metro Manila
accounts, we regret that we cannot hold these accounts further in abeyance.
Accordingly, we are reiterating our request that arrangements to have these
1âwphi1
Page 17 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
accounts settled within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, otherwise, we shall be
constrained to refer the matter to our lawyers for collection.
We enclose a Statement of Account as of September 30, 2000 for your reference
and guidance.
Very truly yours,
MERCEDES E. GERMAN (Sgd.)
Manager
Loans & Discounts Department – H.O.11
On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed
by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating
foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution
of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 68105 and assigned to Branch 264.12
In support of their application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, SBI
and MFII alleged:
IV. APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITH EX- PARTE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
A. GROUNDS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1. That SBI and MFII are entitled to the reliefs demanded, among which
is enjoining/restraining the commission of the acts complained of, the
continuance of which will work injustice to the plaintiffs; that such acts
are in violation of the rights of plaintiffs and, if not enjoined/restrained,
will render the judgment sought herein ineffectual.
2. That under the circumstances, it is necessary to require, through
preliminary injunction, CBC to refrain from immediately enforcing its
letters dated April 17, 2000 and May 19, 2000 and September 18, 2000
during the pendency of this complaint, and
3. That SBI and MFII submit that they are exempt from filing of a bond
considering that the letters dated April 17, 2000, May 19, 2000 and
September 18, 2000 are a patent nullity, and in the event they are not,
they are willing to post such bond this Honorable Court may determine
and under the conditions required by Section 4, Rule 58. 13
In its Answer and Opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
CBC alleged that to implement the agreed restructuring of the loan, SBI executed
ten promissory notes stipulating that the interest rate shall be at 18.5% per
annum. For its part, MFII executed third party real estate mortgage over its
properties in favor of CBC to secure the payment of SBI’s restructured loan. As
SBI was delinquent in the payment of the principal as well as the interest thereon,
CBC demanded settlement of SBI’s account.14
After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an Order dated December 14, 2000
granting the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply
with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ:
It is well-settled that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must show that: (1)
the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the
right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The Court opines that the above-mentioned requisites have been sufficiently
shown by plaintiffs in this case, accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction is in
order.
The three subject letters, particularly the letter dated September 18, 2000,
indicate that the promissory notes executed by Benito Soliven as President of
plaintiff SBI amounted to ₱218,540,646.00, excluding interest, penalties and other
charges remained unpaid, and demand that the account be settled within ten
days, else defendant bank shall refer the latter to its lawyers for collection.
The message in the letter is clear: If the account is not settled within the grace
period, defendant bank will resort to foreclosure of mortgage on the subject
properties.
The actual or imminent damage to plaintiffs is likewise clear. Considering the
number of parcels of land and area involved, if these are foreclosed by defendant
bank, plaintiffs’ properties and source of income will be effectively diminished,
possibly to the point of closure.
The only issue remaining is whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an
injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from taking over their properties.
Page 18 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
Plaintiffs argued that the interest and penalties charged them in the subject letters
and attached statements of account increased during a seven-month period to an
amount they described as "onerous", "usurious" ad "greedy".
They likewise asserted that there were on-going talks between officers of the
corporations involved to treat or restructure the contracts to a dacion en pago, as
there was a proposed plan of action by representatives of plaintiffs during the
meetings.
Defendant, on the other hand, sought to explain the increase in the interest as
contained in the promissory notes which were voluntarily and willingly signed by
Soliven, therefore, binding on plaintiffs and that the proposed plan of action is
merely an oral contract still in the negotiation stage and not binding.
The condition on the interest payments as contained in the promissory notes are
as follows:
"Interest for the first quarter shall be @ 18.5% P.A. Thereafter, it shall be payable
quarterly in arrears based on three months average rate."
In its Memorandum, defendant bank tried to show that the questioned increase in
the interests was merely in compliance with the above condition. To this Court,
the explanation is insufficient. A more detailed rationalization is required to
convince the court of the fairness of the increase in interests and penalties.
However, the coming explanation may probably be heard only during trial on the
merits, and by then this pending incident or the entire case, may already be moot
and academic if the injunctive writ is not issued.15
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Order dated December 14, 2000 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction is GRANTED.
Defendant CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, its representatives, agents and all
persons working in its behalf are hereby enjoined from enforcing the contents of
its letters to plaintiffs dated April 17, 2000, May 19, 2000 and September 18, 2000,
particularly the bank’s legal department or other counsel commencing collection
proceedings against plaintiffs in the amount stated in the letters and statements
of account.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon plaintiffs’ posting of a bond
executed to defendant in the amount of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) to the
effect [that] the plaintiffs will pay defendant all damages which the latter may
sustain by reason of the injunction if it be ultimately decided that the injunction is
unwarranted.16
CBC sought reconsideration but the trial court denied it in an Order 17 dated
December 10, 2001.
Subsequently, CBC filed a "Motion to Dissolve Injunction Order" but this was
denied in an Order18 dated November 10, 2003. The trial court ruled that the
motion was in the nature of a mere belated second motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated December 14, 2000. It also declared that CBC failed to
substantiate its prayer for the dissolution of the injunctive writ.
Aggrieved, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81968
in the Court of Appeals where it claimed that the Orders dated December 14, 2000
(granting the application of petitioners SBI and MFII for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction), December 10, 2001 (denying reconsideration of the order
dated December 14, 2000), and November 10, 2003 (denying the CBC’s motion
to dissolve injunction order) were all issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.19
In a Decision dated April 16, 2007, the Court of Appeals found that, on its face,
the trial court’s Order dated December 14, 2000 granting the application of SBI
and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction had no basis as there
were no findings of fact or law which would indicate the existence of any of the
requisites for the grant of an injunctive writ. It appeared to the Court of Appeals
that, in ordering the issuance of a writ of injunction, the trial court simply relied on
the imposition by CBC of the interest rates to the loans obtained by SBI and MFII.
According to the Court of Appeals, however, the records do not reveal a clear and
unmistakable right on the part of SBI and MFII that would entitle them to the
protection of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition of CBC, set aside the Orders dated December 14, 2000, December
10, 2001, and November 10, 2003 and dissolved the injunctive writ issued by the
RTC of Pasig City.20
SBI and MFII filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated September 18, 2007.
Hence, this petition.
SBI and MFII assert that the Decision dated April 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
is legally infirm as its conclusions are contrary to the judicial admissions of CBC.
They allege that, in its Answer, CBC admitted paragraphs 25 and 26 of the
Complaint regarding the interests and charges amounting to ₱35,093,980.14 and
Page 19 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
₱80,614,525.15, respectively, which constituted more than 50% of the total
obligation of ₱334,249,151.29 as of February 15, 2000. For SBI and MFII, CBC’s
admission of paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Complaint is an admission that the
interest rate imposed by CBC is usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory. Thus, when
the Court of Appeals granted the petition of CBC and ordered the lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction it effectively disposed of the main case, Civil Case No.
68105, without trial on the merits and rendered moot and academic as it enabled
CBC to foreclose on the mortgages despite the usurious, exorbitant and
confiscatory interest rates.21
SBI and MFII also claim that the Court of Appeals either overlooked or
disregarded undisputed and admitted facts which, if properly considered, would
have called for the maintenance and preservation of the preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. They argue that the Court of Appeals did not even
consider Article 1229 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is
iniquitous or unconscionable.
For SBI and MFII, the failure of the Court of Appeals to take into account Article
1229 of the Civil Code and its act of lifting the preliminary injunction "would
definitely pave the way for CBC’s unbridled imposition of illegal rates of interest
and immediate foreclosure" of the properties of SBI and MFII "without the benefit
of a full blown trial."22
For its part, CBC assails the petition contending that it is not allowed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court because it simply raises issues of fact and not issues of
law. CBC further asserts that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is an exercise
of sound judicial discretion as it is in accord with the law and the applicable
provisions of this Court.23
The petition fails.
This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank 24:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from
a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a
party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal
action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency
or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of
a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that
there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater
circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in
cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right
against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain
a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted
only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court
taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the
case before it.25 In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.26
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties
shielded from foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty
charges imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and
unconscionable. In particular, SBI and MFII assert:
There is therefore an urgent necessity for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or at least a status quo [order], otherwise, respondent bank will
definitely foreclose petitioners’ properties without awaiting the trial of the main
case on the merits, with said usurious and confiscatory rates of interest as basis. 27
and
There is therefore no legal justification for the Honorable Court of Appeals to
lift/dissolve the injunction issued by the trial court, otherwise, respondent bank –
on the basis of this illegal imposition of interest – can already foreclose the
properties of petitioners and render the whole case (sans trial on the merits) moot
and academic.28
Page 20 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
On this matter, the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court enumerates
as the first argument raised by SBI and MFII in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
1. Their rights basically are for the protection of their properties put up as collateral
for the loans extended by defendant bank to them.29
As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the
creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on
the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest." 30 First,
assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity
of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover
the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.31 Thus, in a usurious loan
with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be
exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.32
Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court, which granted
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that
the parties still have to be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in
interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. 33 Thus, the basis of the right
claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or disputable as there is still
a need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various
circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest rates and
penalty charges are unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be
considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.34
The Order dated December 10, 2001 also shows the reasoning of the trial court
which betrays that its grant of the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction was not based on a clear legal right. Said the trial
court:
It was likewise shown that plaintiffs SBI and MFII had the clear right and urgency
to ask for injunction because of the issue of validity of the increase in the amount
of the loan obligation.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
At most, the above finding of the trial court that the validity of the increase in the
amount of the loan obligation is in issue simply amounted to a finding that the
rights of SBI and MFII vis-à-vis that of CBC are disputed and debatable. In such
a case where the complainant-movant’s right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance
of an injunctive writ is not proper.36
Even assuming that SBI and MFII are correct in claiming their supposed right, it
nonetheless disintegrates in the face of the ten promissory notes in the total
amount of ₱218,540,648.00, exclusive of interest and penalties, issued by SBI in
favor of CBC on March 1, 1999 which until now remain unpaid despite the maturity
of the said notes on March 1, 2004 and CBC’s repeated demands for
payment.37 Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of
mortgage indebtedness.38 As this Court held in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-
Mark Trading, Inc.39:
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right
to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction improper. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness
disqualifies them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In
particular, SBI and MFII have stated in their Complaint that they have made
various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan. 40 The trial court’s Order
dated December 14, 2000 also found that SBI wrote several letters to CBC
"requesting, among others, for a reduction of interests and penalties and
restructuring of the loan."41 A debtor’s various and constant requests for
deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the
amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his
obligation.42 SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual
obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable
remedy of preliminary injunction.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII.
The accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as
accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC
and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.
Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is
necessarily prejudiced by SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract.
Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against
them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by
the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the court that such penalty
is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court has not yet made a ruling as
to whether the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable.
Such finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and
weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence,
for SBI and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature.
Page 21 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ
has been shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for
the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any
requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within
the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down
for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.43 Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err when it granted the petition for certiorari of CBC and ordered
the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered
irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that
is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity
to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
of compensation.44
In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of
the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an
appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC. Moreover, where there is a
valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the
irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary
injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale.45 The alleged
entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as
collateral for the loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury
contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable
damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction. As this Court stated in Philippine National Bank
v. Castalloy Technology Corporation46:
All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by
creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their
property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law. Moreover,
in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in
the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the
sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but
will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. (Citation
omitted.)
The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial
or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, further stacks the odds against
SBI and MFII. Issued on February 20, 2007, or some two months before the Court
of Appeals promulgated its decision in this case, the resolution embodies the
additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure proceedings,
specifically limiting the instances, and citing the conditions, when a writ against
foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:
(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be
issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been
paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported
by evidence of payment.
(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be
issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable,
unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum
interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for
foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is
pending.
(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a
foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily
resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on
the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and above.
(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the
posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding
debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a
status quo order.47
The guidelines speak of strict exceptions and conditions. 48 To reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court will be to allow SBI and MFII to circumvent the guidelines
and conditions provided by the En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 dated
February 20, 2007 and prevent CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties
based simply on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable.
This Court will not permit such a situation. What cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly.49
All told, the relevant circumstances in this case show that there was failure to
satisfy the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
injunctive writ issued by the trial court should therefore be lifted and dissolved.
That was how the Court of Appeals decided. That is how it should be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Page 22 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

SO ORDERED. Government Code of 1991.5 As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she
could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners. Equally important, the
petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of
the petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land.
Armed with the falsified tax declaration, the petitioners, as heirs of their father,
SECOND DIVISION fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing to
redeem as the land was not sold. For these irregularities, the petitioners had no
G.R. No. 172909 March 5, 2014 right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for against them.
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA, Petitioners,
vs. THE RTC’S RULING
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY
SAYSON GOLOSENO, Respondents. In its December 14, 1999 order,6 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City,
Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier order,7 denied the prayer for a Writ of
DECISION Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the
land be returned to the respondents. The RTC found that the auction sale was
tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee disqualified in
BRION, J.:
accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The
petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad
Through a petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of faith for having falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with.
Court, the petitioners, spouses Silvestre O. Plaza and Elena Y. Plaza, seek the
reversal of the decision2 dated October 24, 2005 and the Resolution3 dated April
THE CA’S RULING
6, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59859.

Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners
THE FACTS
challenged the RTC’s order before the CA.

On August 28, 1997, the CA4 ruled that among the Plaza siblings, namely:
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the
Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the
petitioners filed an action for specific performance8 against the City Government
subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara's
of Butuan. According to the petitioners, they acquired possession and ownership
successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and Vicky
over the auctioned property when they redeemed it from Tuazon. The City
Sayson Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.
Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.9

On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a
In its October 24, 2005 decision,10 the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling, found the
Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance
petitioners guilty of forum shopping, dismissed the case, and referred the case to
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against
the Court and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the
institution of the appropriate administrative action.11 The CA, after legal analysis,
respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take
similarly concluded that for being disqualified to bid under Section 89 of the Local
possession of the subject property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the
Government Code of 1991, Tuazon never obtained ownership over the property;
land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a
much less transmit any proprietary rights to the petitioners. Clearly, the petitioners
tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996.
failed to establish any clear and unmistakable right enforceable by the injunctive
relief.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in
paying the land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been
On April 6, 2006, the CA rejected the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was
disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local
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THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari with this Court to
challenge the CA rulings. The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax
declaration in acquiring the auctioned property. Moreover, assuming that Tuazon,
the sole bidder, was indeed disqualified from participating in the public auction,
Section 18112of the Local Government Code of 1991 finds application. Applying
the law, it is as if there was no bidder, for which the City Government of Butuan
was to be considered the purchaser of the land in auction. Therefore, when the
petitioners bought the land, they bought it directly from the purchaser - City
Government of Butuan - and not from Tuazon, as redeemers.
Also, the respondents may not question the validity of the public auction for failing
to deposit with the court the amount required by Section 267 13 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Finally, the petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping, as the
reliefs prayed for in the present case and in the specific performance case are not
the same. In the present case, they merely impleaded the City Government of
Butuan as a nominal party to pay for the value of the land only if possession of
the land was awarded to the respondents. On the other hand, the complaint for
specific performance prayed that the City Government of Butuan execute the
necessary certificate of sale and other relevant documents pertaining to the
auction.
The respondents, for their part, reiterate the lower courts’ findings that there could
have been no legal redemption in favor of the petitioners as the highest bidder
was disqualified from bidding. Moreover, the CA correctly applied the law in
finding the petitioners guilty of forum shopping. Most importantly, the grant of
preliminary injunction lies in the sound discretion of the court and the petitioners
failed to show proof that they are entitled to it.
Meanwhile, on August 8, 2013, the RTC dismissed the main action and ordered
the petitioners to pay the respondents attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.14
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petitioners may not
raise factual issues
The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax declaration they
reimbursed the property with. According to them, the document already existed in
1987, way before they acquired the land in 1997. Contrary likewise to the lower
courts’ finding, they did not purchase the land from Tuazon as redemptioners;
they directly bought the property from the City Government of Butuan.
These factual contests are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. 15 The Court will not revisit, re-
examine, and re-evaluate the evidence and the factual conclusions arrived at by
the lower courts.16 In the absence of compelling reasons, the Court will not disturb
the rule that factual findings of the lower tribunals are final and binding on this
Court.17
Sections 181 and 267 of the Local Government Code of 1991 are inapplicable;
these provisions do not apply to the present case
The petitioners may not invoke Section 181 18 of the Local Government Code of
1991 to validate their alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit
to purchase the auctioned property only in instances where "there is no bidder" or
"the highest bid is xxx insufficient." A disqualified bidder is not among the
authorized grounds. The local government also never undertook steps to
purchase the property under Section 181 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
presumably because it knew the invoked provision does not apply.
Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners’ stance that the respondents’
defense — the petitioners’ defective title — must fail for want of deposit to the
court the amount required by Section 267 of the Local Government Code. The
provision states:
Section 267. Action Assailing Validity of Tax Sale. - No court shall entertain any
action assailing the validity or any sale at public auction of real property or rights
therein under this Title until the taxpayer shall have deposited with the court the
amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of two percent
(2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of the action.
The amount so deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at the auction sale if the
deed is declared invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails.
Neither shall any court declare a sale at public auction invalid by reason or
irregularities or informalities in the proceedings unless the substantive rights of
the delinquent owner of the real property or the person having legal interest
therein have been impaired. [underscores ours; italics supplied]
A simple reading of the title readily reveals that the provision relates to actions for
annulment of tax sales. The section likewise makes use of terms "entertain" and
Page 24 of 46
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"institution" to mean that the deposit requirement applies only to initiatory actions As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the
assailing the validity of tax sales. The intent of the provision to limit the deposit petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses.
requirement to actions for annulment of tax sales led to the Court’s ruling in Because they were never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish
National Housing Authority v. Iloilo City, et al.19 that the deposit requirement is entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an injunctive
jurisdictional — a condition necessary for the court to entertain the action: writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
As is apparent from a reading of the foregoing provision, a deposit equivalent to existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When
the amount of the sale at public auction plus two percent (2%) interest per month the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
from the date of the sale to the time the court action is instituted is a condition — legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."23
a "prerequisite," to borrow the term used by the acknowledged father of the Local
Government Code — which must be satisfied before the court can entertain any Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the
action assailing the validity of the public auction sale. The law, in plain and question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and
unequivocal language, prevents the court from entertaining a suit unless a deposit academic. In Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank,24 the Court ruled that a case
is made. xxx. Otherwise stated, the deposit is a jurisdictional requirement the becomes moot and academic when there is no more issue between the parties
nonpayment of which warrants the failure of the action. or object that can be served in deciding the merits of the case. Upon the dismissal
of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary
xxxx injunction automatically died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional
remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main
action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal
Clearly, the deposit precondition is an ingenious legal device to guarantee the therefrom notwithstanding.25
satisfaction of the tax delinquency, with the local government unit keeping the
payment on the bid price no matter the final outcome of the suit to nullify the tax
sale.20 The petitioners are guilty
of forum shopping
The Court would later reiterate the jurisdictional nature of the deposit in Wong v.
City of Iloilo,21 and pronounce: We agree with the CA that the petitioners committed forum shopping when they
filed the specific performance case despite the pendency of the present case
before the CA. In the recent case of Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v. Matilde
In this regard, National Housing Authority v. Iloilo City holds that the deposit S. Palicte,26 the Court laid down the three ways forum shopping may be
required under Section 267 of the Local Government Code is a jurisdictional committed: 1) through litis pendentia — filing multiple cases based on the same
requirement, the nonpayment of which warrants the dismissal of the action. cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
Because petitioners in this case did not make such deposit, the RTC never resolved yet; 2) through res judicata — filing multiple cases based on the same
acquired jurisdiction over the complaints.22 cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved; and 3) splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases based on the
These rulings clearly render inapplicable the petitioners’ insistence that the same cause of action but with different prayers — the ground to dismiss being
respondents should have made a deposit to the court. The suit filed by the either litis pendentia or res judicata. "The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
petitioners was an action for injunction and damages; the issue of nullity of the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
auction was raised by the respondents themselves merely as a defense and in no actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
way converted the action to an action for annulment of a tax sale. founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
The petitioners failed to show clear judicata in the other."27
and unmistakable rights to be protected
by the writ; the present action has been Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause
rendered moot and academic by the of action in the different cases filed. Cause of action is "the act or omission by
dismissal of the main action which a party violates the right of another."28

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The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners’
claim of ownership of the land when they bought it, either from the City
Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This ownership is the petitioners’ basis in
enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the property. On the other
hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City Government of Butuan
be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the
petitioners’ ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City
Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief
prayed for in the present injunction case is different from what was prayed for in
the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves as the basis for
the reliefs remains the same — the petitioners’ alleged ownership of the property
after its purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum
shopping of the third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As the Court has held in
the past, "there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two
cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues."29
Similarly, the CA correctly found that the petitioners and their counsel were guilty
of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were the parties in both
cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there
was also identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged. The cause of
action in the specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the
present case, although it was still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the
prayer sought in the specific performance case-for the City Government ofButuan
to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners - had been indirectly ruled
upon in the present case when the R TC declared that no certificate of sale could
be issued because there had been no valid sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari.1âwphi1 The decision dated October 24, 2005 and the resolution
dated April 6, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59859 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER,
vs.
ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR., DR. PORFIRIO C.
LIGAYA, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, JR. AND GLORIA M.
MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Resolution1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated April 7,
2006, be reversed and set aside.
The crux of the controversy is whether the Batangas State University Board of
Regents (BSU-BOR) could validly enforce the Office of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision dated February 14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12,
2005, finding herein respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties,
despite the fact that said Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution are pending
appeal before the CA.
On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman
Victor Fernandez directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution. Pursuant to said
Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, series of 2005, dated August 22,
2005, resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus,
herein respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City, Branch 4 (RTC), against the BSU-BOR. The gist of the
petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing
the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the
same are still on appeal and, therefore, are not yet final and executory.
On September 26, 2005, the RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents'
petition for injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action. Respondents filed
their notice of appeal and promptly filed a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Injunction dated December 8, 2005 with the CA. On
February 17, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting respondents' prayer for
a temporary restraining order enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its
Resolution No. 18, series of 2005.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order,
with the Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order attached thereto.
Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance
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RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On April 7, 2006, the CA issued the Resolution
subject of the present petition, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are accepting and taking cognizance
of the pleadings lodged by the Office of the Ombudsman only in so far as to afford
it with ample opportunity to comment on and oppose appellants' application for
injunctive relief, but not for the purpose of allowing the Ombudsman to formally
and actively intervene in the instant appeal. Basically, this is a regular appeal
impugning the disposition of the trial court, the pivotal issue of which is only for
the appellants and the Board of Regents of BSU to settle and contest, and which
may be completely adjudicated upon without the active participation of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
xxxx
In the final reckoning, We stand firm by Our conclusion that the administrative
penalty of dismissal from the service imposed upon herein appellants is not yet
final and immediately executory in nature in view of the appeal interposed
therefrom by the appellants before this Court, and this fact, in the end, impelled
Us to act with favor upon appellants' prayer for injunctive relief to stay the
execution of the impugned Resolution of the Board of Regents of BSU.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Ombudsman's Motion to Recall the TRO is
denied. On the other hand, appellants' Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is granted. Accordingly, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
be issued, as it is hereby issued, conditioned upon the posting by the appellants
of an Injunction Bond in the sum of Php10,000.00, enjoining the Board of Regents
of BSU, and all other persons and agents acting under its command authority,
pending the complete resolution of this appeal, from effecting the enforcement
and implementation of its Resolution No. 18, Series of 2005 issued pursuant to
the July 12, 2005 Supplemental Resolution of the Ombudsman, Central Office.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, assailing
the aforequoted CA Resolution dated April 7, 2006, alleging that:
I.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DISREGARDED THE WELL-ENTRENCHED RULE AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING WHEN, INSTEAD OF OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING
RESPONDENTS' PETITION, THE SAID COURT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED ITS RESOLUTIONS DATED 17
FEBRUARY 2006 AND 7 APRIL 2006, RESPECTIVELY;
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
OVERLOOKED THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 58 OF THE 1997 REVISED
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF
RESPONDENTS' UNVERIFIED PETITION AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED ITS
17 FEBRUARY 2006 AND 7 APRIL 2006 RESOLUTIONS;
III.
THE ISSUANCE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 17
FEBRUARY 2006 AND 7 APRIL 2006 RESOLUTIONS ENJOINING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 18, SERIES OF 2005
ISSUED BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF BATANGAS STATE UNIVERSITY
UNDULY DISREGARDS THE ESTABLISHED RULES RELATIVE TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF OMBUDSMAN DECISION PENDING APPEAL,
CONSIDERING THAT:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 18, SERIES OF 2005 WAS ISSUED BY THE
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE BATANGAS STATE UNIVERSITY PURSUANT
TO THE JOINT DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL RESOLUTION ISSUED BY
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
UNDER THE OMBUDSMAN RULES OF PROCEDURE, AN APPEAL DOES
NOT STAY THE EXECUTION OF DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS OR ORDERS
ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
IV.
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PRAYED
FOR IN THEIR UNVERIFIED MOTION FILED BEFORE THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS.3
Controverting petitioner's claims, respondents in turn allege that:
1. PETITIONER (OMBUDSMAN) HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
INSTITUTE THE INSTANT PETITION INASMUCH AS IT IS NOT A
PARTY TO THE APPEALED CASE PENDING BEFORE THE COURT
OF APPEALS;
Page 27 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
2. ASSUMING THAT THE PETITIONER HAS THE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN THE APPEALED CASE BEFORE
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT THE
PROPER RECOURSE AVAILABLE TO THE PETITIONER; AND
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.4
At the outset, the Court must clarify that a petition for review on certiorari is not
the proper remedy to question the CA Resolution dated April 7, 2006 granting the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and denying petitioner's motion for intervention. Said
Resolution did not completely dispose of the case on the merits, hence, it is
merely an interlocutory order. As such, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that no appeal may be taken therefrom. However, where the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court allows certiorari as a mode of
redress.5
In this case, the discussion below will show that the assailed Resolution is patently
erroneous, and that granting the Office of the Ombudsman the opportunity to be
heard in the case pending before the lower court is of primordial importance.
Thus, the Court resolves to relax the application of procedural rules by treating
the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the
appeal pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has been
exhaustively explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego. 6 In said case,
the CA also issued a Resolution denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion
to intervene. In resolving the issue of whether the Office of the Ombudsman has
legal interest to intervene in the appeal of its Decision, the Court expounded, thus:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people
under its jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can
quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is critical
because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is
at stake.
xxxx
The Office of the Obudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject
matter of litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the
attached motion to recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:
"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek
redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision x x x."
In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the
Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy.
In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector
of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve
administrative disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would
have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public
trust and accountability.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry
into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an
offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and
preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given the
opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration
of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without
limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not
be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have
considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the
Constitution and RA 6770.
xxxx
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge
whose decision was in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even
rather disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested
and neutral specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative
cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the
government and public interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional and
legal interest in the accountability of public officers is necessary?7
Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and
Supplemental Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the
Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment
carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's
motion for intervention.
Page 28 of 46
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A discussion of the next issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in this case would necessarily touch on the very merits of
the case, i.e., whether the concerned government agencies and instrumentalities
may execute the Office of the Ombudsman's order to dismiss a government
employee from service even if the Ombudsman's decision is pending appeal. It
would also be a great waste of time to remand the case back to the CA,
considering that the entire records of the proceedings have already been elevated
to this Court. Thus, at this point, the Court shall fully adjudicate the main issue in
the case.
Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3)
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.8 In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear
and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of
dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is
immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending
appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases. In Facura v. Court
of Appeals,9 the Court fully threshed out this matter, thus:
The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an
administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed
penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman
v. Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an
appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, to wit:
"Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of
the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision
or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course.1âwphi1 The Office of the Ombudsman shall
ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be
a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. [Emphases supplied]
The Ombudsman's decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is
immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of
an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of the DPWH, we held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural
and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal,
he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
xxxx
x x x Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision
from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection,
Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of
the Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the
effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to
amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to
issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making
powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as
the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of
Page 29 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case
is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that
prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali.
When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for
the said case must prevail over the other. [Emphases supplied]
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical
in providing that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being
executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman,
namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to more than one month's salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus
and Parungao from the government service is immediately executory pending
appeal.
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is
removal and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the removal. As explained above,
there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold
office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure.
The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of
De Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they would be considered under
preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments they did not
receive in the event that they would win their appeal.
The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has no discretion to stay
a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is governed specifically
by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an
encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13
(8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which
grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. 10
From the foregoing elaboration, there can be no cavil that respondents do not
have any right to a stay of the Ombudsman's decision dismissing them from
service. Perforce, the BSU-BOR acted properly in issuing Resolution No. 18,
series of 2005, dated August 22, 2005, pursuant to the order of the Ombudsman,
as its legally-mandated duty. The CA's Resolution granting respondents' prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction is patently erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated April 7, 2006, is SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 4, dated September 26, 2005 in Civil Case No. 7775, is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193809, March 23, 2015
SATURNINO NOVECIO, GAVINO NOVECIO, ANASTACIO GOLEZ, ABUNDIO
SOMBILON, BERTING RODRIGUEZ, MELITON
CATALAN, Petitioners, v. HON. RODRIGO F. LIM, JR., AS CHAIRMAN, HON.
LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA AS PONENTE AND AS MEMBER AND HON.
ANGELITA A. GACUTAN AS MEMBER, FORMER TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION,
COURT OF APPEALS, MINDANAO STATION, HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN
ESTRADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 9, RTC,
MALAYBALAY, BUKIDNON, MARIA CARMEN J. TUAZON, REP. BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LOPE DUROTAN, Respondents.
VERGELIO ROSALES, LUIS TEQUILIO, GREGORIO PANANGIN, JOSEPH
RODRIQUEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, v. HON. RODRIGO F. LIM, JR.,
AS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA AS PONENTE AND AS
MEMBER DESIGNATED AS ACTING CHAIRPERSON, PER SPECIAL ORDER
NO. 1955 DATED MARCH 23, 2015. DESIGNATED AS ACTING MEMBER
VICE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO, PER SPECIAL ORDER
NO. 1956 DATED MARCH 23, 2015. AND HON. ANGELITA A. GACUTAN AS
MEMBER, FORMER TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS,
MINDANAO STATION, HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN ESTRADA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 9, RTC, MALAYBALAY,
BUKIDNON, MANUEL V. NIETO, REP. BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LOPE
DUROTAN, Respondent.
DECISION
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BRION, J.:
The MTC ruled in favor the petitioners.8
We resolve the petition for certiorari1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of The MTC found that the respondents anchored their alleged prior possession on
preliminary injunction. The petition assails the resolutions2 dated January 28, the fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a certification
2010 and July 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.SP No. 02863. authorizing land survey.9 Other than this, the respondents had no evidence of
their actual and physical possession of the land. The MTC also found that they
The assailed resolutions denied the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a were not even residents of the place and never personally appeared in court
preliminary injunction pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed in the CA. during trial.
The subject of the Petition for Review was the consolidated decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, which reversed the The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed their prior possession on the fact that
decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon, Bukidnon. The MTC their livelihood as fisher folks and farmers require them to live by the riverbank
dismissed the forcible entry cases filed by the respondents against the petitioners. where the land is located. The petitioners also asserted that they have been
occupying the land for more than two (2) years when the complaints were filed.
On October 18, 2010, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining The MTC held that the certification issued by the barangay captain that the
Order (TRO) enjoining the RTC from executing its consolidated decision. 3 petitioners are residents of the place is a very strong evidence of their prior
physical possession.10
The Factual Antecedents
The MTC concluded: "[a]s between a resident and a non-resident the likelihood
is that the resident has the prior physical possession because of his accessibility
Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by their
to the area."11
attorney-in-fact, Lope Durotan (the respondents), filed complaints4 for forcible
entry with damages against petitioners Saturnino Novecio, Gavino Novecio,
The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads:
Anastacio Golez, et al. (the petitioners).5

The respondents alleged that on February 15, 2004, the petitioners, by force, WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence showing defendants' prior physical
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, unlawfully squatted and took possession possession of the land and the filing of the complaint beyond the one-year
of several portions of land with an area of eight (8) hectares, described as Project period[,] judgment is rendered in favor of the defendants DISMISSING the
No. 9, Block 1, LC Map No. 777. The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected cases.12
makeshift shelters, and continue to plant and /or improve the shelters as of the
filing of the complaints for forcible entry, all without the consent and/or against the The respondents appealed the MTC decision to the RTC.
will of the respondents.
The RTC's Ruling
The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they have already been in
possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed. The RTC reversed the MTC decision.13
They maintained that they have planted the land with corn, durian, coconut,
mango, jackfruit, rambutan, etc. for their livelihood. They also alleged that they The RTC held that the MTC ignored some pieces of evidence, warranting the
were harassed by some men armed with shotguns and pistols on February 12, reversal of the decision.
2004.6
The RTC ruled that the MTC should have given credence to the certification
The petitioners further maintained that Manuel V. Nieto, father of Maria Carmen issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Community
J. Tuazon, had previous landholding in the area but the same was covered by the Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) showing that the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and so it was subdivided in land in litigation is the subject of an application for title and claim by the
favor of the tenants.7 respondents. The RTC also took judicial notice of the request for authority to
conduct a survey over the subject property, which provides that "the parcel of land
The MTC's Ruling herein treated was an unsurveyed land and Manuel V. Nieto was the identified
occupant and tiller of the land." 14
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the respondents, is not enough. The respondents maintain that the petitioners are
In view of these, the RTC ruled that the respondents were the actual occupants not entitled to the injunctive relief since they have not established a clear legal
of the property in litigation long before the petitioners had taken possession of the right for its issuance.
same property. The RTC ordered the petitioners' ejectment.
This Court, acting on the petitioners' prayer, issued a TRO on October 18,
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: 2010, enjoining the RTC from executing its decision. The TRO remains
effective until this day.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the appeal to be with merit, the
assailed Consolidated Decision dated November 7, 2005 of the Municipal Trial Finally, it appears that the CA has yet to issue a decision on the Petition for
Court of Quezon, Bukidnon is hereby reversed and set aside, finding in favor of Review.20
plaintiff-appellants, ordering the ejectment of all defendants-appellees and "John
Does" in both cases and for them to turn over peaceful possession/occupancy of The Issue
the landholding in litigation. No pronouncement as to costs. 15
The sole issue is whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners' prayer
The Proceedings before the CA
for preliminary injunction.
The petitioners filed on April 30, 2009 a Petition for Review16 with the CA -
Mindanao Station, assailing the judgment of the RTC. The Court's Ruling

As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment, the petitioners We find the petition meritorious.
filed on May 14, 2010 an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.17 We note at the outset that the petition merely assails the interlocutory orders of
the CA. Thus, the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate as the assailed
On July 13, 2009, the CA issued a TRO effective for sixty (60) days. Meanwhile, resolutions are not appealable and there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy
the CA directed the parties to submit their memoranda and position papers. in the ordinary course of law.21

On January 28, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed resolution denying the Our decision in this case is without prejudice to the Petition for Review pending in
petitioners' application for preliminary injunction.18 The CA, without necessarily the CA. Our judgment is limited to the resolutions of the C A denying the prayer
resolving the petition on the merits, held that the petitioners were not entitled to for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
the relief demanded under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration was denied on July 16, 2010. Subject to this clarification, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners.
The Petition
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
The petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on the CA in denying their prayer
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 22
for injunction pending resolution of the Petition for Review.
We quote the assailed CA resolutions. The January 28, 2010 Resolution states:
The petitioners argue that the CA denied their prayer for preliminary injunction
despite the pressing need for it to prevent grave and irreparable injury to them.
They emphasize that the records clearly show that they were the prior possessors Without necessarily resolving the instant petition on the merits, We find [the]
of the subject lot. In fact, the lot has been their home and source of livelihood for petitioners not entitled to the relief demanded under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules
several years prior to the institution of the forcible entry cases. of Procedure. Thus, [the] petitioners' application for the issuance of [a] Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.
The respondents filed their comment19 on December 3, 2010. They argue that
grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of The July 16, 2010 Resolution reads:
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion, according to
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Upon careful evaluation of [the] petitioners' Motion, We find no cogent and
compelling reasons to warrant reversal of Our Resolution. The arguments raised
by [the] petitioners were mere reiteration and already considered and passed
upon by this Court in denying [the] petitioners' application for issuance of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that
would have justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Contrary to
established jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction
without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may
be granted when the following have been established:
i. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consist in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an
act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
ii. That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
iii. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled
to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.
As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be
conclusively established, it must be clear."23
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete
evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the
court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision
on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has
yet to be decided.24
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit
conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has
an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. 25
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a
preliminary injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the
execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land.
Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of
livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC
decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render
the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective
evidence must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the
evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief. 26
Thus, we do not understand why the CA denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction without citing any legal or factual basis for the denial. The CA resolution
provides: "[We] find [the] petitioners not entitled to the relief demanded under Rule
58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure."
Neither does the resolution denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
contain any factual and legal bases for the denial. It only provides that "[u]pon
careful evaluation of the petitioners' Motion, We find no cogent and compelling
reasons to warrant reversal of Our Resolution."
We therefore have no idea why and how the CA came to the conclusion that the
petitioners are not entitled to the injunctive relief. Hence, we are forced to go
beyond the function of a certiorari under Rule 65 and examine the factual findings
of the MTC and the RTC.
The MTC found that the petitioners have been in actual and physical possession
of the land for more than two (2) years prior to the institution of the complaints for
forcible entry.27 The MTC also found that the respondents were not even sure
how the petitioners entered the land. In their complaints, they alleged that
petitioners entered the land by means of "force, intimidation, threat, stealth and
strategy," a shotgun allegation which shows that respondents' lack knowledge of
how the petitioners entered the disputed property.
We quote the MTC decision with approval, viz:
xxx Force, intimidation[,] and threat usually connote actual knowledge of
dispossession. One cannot force, intimidate or threaten another who is not
around. In stealth and strategy[,] the actual entry is usually done without the
knowledge of the plaintiff. If they are not sure how [the] defendants entered the
land[,] the likelihood is that they also do not know when [the] defendants] entered
the land. The court is apt to believe that [the] defendants have been in possession
Page 33 of 46
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of the land for more than 2 years. And under Rule 70[,] the action of forcible entry
must be filed within one year from dispossession. The filing of these cases was Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
beyond the one-year period.28 Brion,*J., (Acting Chairperson)

The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request for authority to conduct a
land survey, allegedly showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the occupant
and tiller of the land.
EN BANC
However, this document does not prove prior possession of the subject land. It
only points to the fact that there was an application for a land title in the name of G.R. No. 205875, June 30, 2015
one of the respondents, which application was not even shown to have been
granted. This document merely authorized the survey of the land; the declaration
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., NOW KNOWN AS WI-TRIBE
regarding possession was just incidental to the application for land survey.
TELECOMS, INC., Petitioner, v. ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM,
INC., Respondent.
Between the clear findings of the MTC, which conducted the trial of the forcible
entry cases, and the RTC acting as an appellate court, which relied on
[G.R. No. 208916]
documentary evidence but without sufficiently explaining how such evidence
would prove prior possession, we are inclined to give weight to the MTC's ruling.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. ATLOCOM
WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.
This Court has held:

xxx The Court generally recognizes the profundity of conclusions and findings of
facts reached by the trial court and hence sustains them on appeal except for
strong and cogent reasons inasmuch as the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses in a case. No
clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the respondent appellate court to
justify the reversal of the lower court's findings. Thus, in this case, between the
factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court, those of the trial court
must prevail over that of the latter.29
Under this factual backdrop, we conclude that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without explanation
and justification.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The consolidated petitions before us assail the Decision 1 dated June 29, 2012
and Resolution2 dated February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 119868. The CA reversed and set aside the Orders3 dated December 9,
2010 and March 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 95 denying the application for a writ of prohibitory or mandatory injunction
in Civil Case No. Q-09-65566.
Antecedent Facts

We ought to remember that the grant of preliminary injunction would have only Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a legislative franchise
been provisional and would not be conclusively determinative of the principal under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8605.4 On October 8, 2003, the National
action. The issuance of the writ would have served its purpose, i.e., to preserve Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order 5 in NTC Case No. 98-
the status quo or to prevent future wrongs in order to preserve and protect the 158 relative to the application of Atlocom for a Certificate of Public Convenience
interests of the petitioners during the pendency of the action. 30 (CPC), as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it appearing that applicant is financially and technically capable of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we GRANT the writ of certiorari and undertaking the proposed project and that the operation thereof will promote the
accordingly SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, interest of the people in Metro Manila, in a proper and suitable manner, the
2010 and July 16, 2010 for grave abuse of discretion. Commission hereby grants to herein applicant ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM,
INC. a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate and maintain a Multi-Point
SO ORDERED. Multi-Channel Distribution System [MMDS] in METRO MANILA, subject to the

Page 34 of 46
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assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division of this (R.A. No. 1553, as amended by R.A. No. 4154) for radio and television
Commission and to the following - broadcasting, as well as radio stations for international and domestic
communications of all types and services, and holder of a Certificate of Public
CONDITIONS Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to operate a radio communications network,
was allowed to intervene in the case, joining the defendant NTC in opposing
x x x x6 Atlocom's claims. Pursuant to MC 06-08-2005, frequency bands 2535-2545 MHz
and 2565-2595 MHz were re-allocated and assigned to LBNI, which covered the
As stated in the above order, the PA shall be valid for a period of eighteen (18) 2572-2596 MHz being claimed by Atlocom as allegedly assigned to it.
months, or until April 8, 2005. In a letter7 dated April 5, 2004, Atlocom thru its
counsel requested for "an extension of time of the allocation of the above- Per Certification14 dated October 22, 2003 issued by Alvin N. Blanco, Chief,
enumerated frequencies and for the period for the construction and installation of Broadcast Services Division of NTC, the following frequencies were "identified"
the radio stations in the condition no. 2 of the Order." Earlier, Atlocom filed an for Atlocom's MMDS (Metro Manila) system:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Application for Permit to Import8 the necessary equipment. Atlocom followed up C3 2572 - 2578 Mhz
its application for extension of PA through a letter9 dated June 2, 2005 addressed D3 2578 - 2584 Mhz
to Deputy Commissioner Jorge V. Sarmiento. Subsequently, Atlocom filed a C4 2584 - 2590 Mhz
Motion for Extension of Provisional Authority10 in NTC Case No. 98-158 on March D4 2590 - 2596 Mhz
3, 2005.
On December 9, 2010, the RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order denying
On August 23, 2005, NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. (MC) 06-08- Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction.
200511 re-allocating the following bands for broadband wireless access for fixed, Atlocom filed a motion for reconsideration but it was likewise denied by the RTC
nomadic and mobile networks: under Order dated March 21, 2011.

In a petition for certiorari filed before the CA, Atlocom questioned the validity of
 450 - 470 Mhz the aforesaid orders of the RTC.
 1900-1910 MHz
 1980-1990 MHz In its Resolution15 dated August 12, 2011, the CA denied Atlocom's prayer for the
 2400-2483 MHz issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and its alternative prayer
 2500-2700 MHz for a provisional mandatory injunction.
 3400-3600 MHz
However, in its Decision dated June 29, 2012, the CA ruled in favor of Atlocom
 5150-5350 MHz and reversed the RTC's denial of application for preliminary injunction. The fallo of
 5470-5850 MHz the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 10150-10650 MHz WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders dated December 9, 2010 and March 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
On December 23, 2008, NTC denied Atlocom's motion for extension of PA, citing (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
the re-allocation of MMDS frequencies for Broadband Wireless Access in plea for the issuance of a Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction is GRANTED. Let
accordance with MC 06-08-2005 and the unavailability of other alternative therefore a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue enjoining Respondent
frequencies.12chanrobleslaw NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 06-08-2005, insofar as the
frequencies ranging from 2572-2596 Mhz are concerned and for its Co-
On September 8, 2009, Atlocom filed in the RTC a Petition 13 to enjoin the Respondent LBNI from using the said frequencies during the pendency of Civil
implementation of MC 06-08-2005 and reinstate the frequencies of Atlocom. It Case No. Q-09-65566 pending before Branch 95 of the Regional Trial Court of
was further prayed that after hearing the court render judgment declaring the said Quezon City upon the posting of a bond in the amount of Php 200,000.00 to
issuance as null and void because NTC unlawfully deprived Atlocom of the right answer for all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the
to its assigned frequencies without notice and hearing. The case was docketed RTC should finally decide that petitioner is not entitled thereto. The alternative
as Civil Case No. Q-09-65566. plea for a writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is DENIED.

Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee of a legislative franchise SO ORDERED.16
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LBNI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Ad Cautelam Offer to File Counter-
Bond and Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration with Ad Cautelam Offer to
File Counter-Bond. NTC also filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied these motions.
LBNI filed its petition (G.R. No. 205875) in this Court on April 22, 2013. Acting on
LBNI's motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, we issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA, conditioned upon LBNI's posting
of a cash bond in the sum of P300,000.00.
On April 18, 2013, NTC filed its separate petition (G.R. No. 208916) for review
from the same CA Decision and Resolution. We ordered the consolidation of the
two cases as they arose from the same factual setting, involve the same parties
and raise identical issues.
Issues
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether Atlocom complied with the
requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and (2) whether LBNI's
motion to file counter-bond was correctly denied by the CA.
Specifically, LBNI asserts that the CA erred: (1) in finding that the NTC did not
observe due process when it issued MC 06-08-2005 and basing such conclusion
on a mistaken notion that the grant of PA is tantamount to a frequency
assignment; (2) in failing to recognize that Atlocom has not sufficiently established
its claim that it had been assigned the 2572-2596 frequency bands by the NTC;
(3) in granting the provisional injunctive writ that in effect pre-judged the civil case
pending in the RTC; and (4) in denying LBNI's motion to file counter-bond on the
basis of a technical conclusion it is not qualified to make in the first place.
NTC faults the CA in finding that Atlocom's right to due process was violated
because it was not notified of the hearing prior to the issuance of MC 06-08-2005,
and concluding that Atlocom has a clear and unmistakable property right over the
2572-2596 frequency range.
Our Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
A preliminary injunction is defined as "[a]n order granted at any stage of an action
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular actor acts."17It may be a prohibitory injunction, which
requires a party to refrain from doing a particular act, or a mandatory injunction,
which commands a party to perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the
past.18 It is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an
action.19chanrobleslaw
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction
may be granted when it is established:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will
issue: (1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is, a right in esse; (2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such
right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 20chanrobleslaw
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial
court because the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. For
this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be
disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction.21chanrobleslaw
In denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the RTC held
that Atlocom failed to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable legal right thereto,
as evidence showed Atlocom has no more right to be protected considering that
its PA had already expired and its application for extension was subsequently
denied by the NTC. As to the claim of violation of right to due process, the RTC
found that prior to the issuance of MC 06-08-2005, NTC published a notice of
public hearing in The Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation, and at
the said hearing the participants were given opportunity to be heard through oral
arguments and submission of position papers. Atlocom's alternative plea for a writ
of mandatory injunction was likewise denied. According to the RTC, ordering the
NTC to reinstate Atlocom's frequencies would create an impression that the court
had pre-judged the main case by nullifying MC 06-08-2005 as prayed for by
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RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

Atlocom in its petition. x x x x

However, the CA rendered a contrary ruling. The CA underscored the fact that SEC. 6. Right of Government. x x x
NTC failed to act upon Atlocom's motion for extension for more than three years,
and concluded that because of NTC's inordinate delay or refusal to renew the PA The radio spectrum is a finite resource that is a part of the national patrimony and
granted to Atlocom, the latter was deprived of its right to use the frequencies the use thereof is a privilege conferred upon the grantee by the State and may be
"granted to it by" the PA. The CA thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary withdrawn anytime, after due process. (Italics supplied)
In deciding whether to grant an injunction, a court must consider established
On the withdrawal of the frequencies previously identified for Atlocom, the CA
principles of equity and all the circumstances of the test for issuing an injunction
insisted that NTC did not observe due process, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
is whether the facts show a necessity for the intervention of equity in order to
x x x While it is true that there was a publication of a Notice of Public Hearing on
protect rights cognizable in equity. Here, there are factual and legal justification
June 21, 2005 before the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 06-08-2005 on
for issuance of the writ of injunction. To reiterate to the point of being pedantic,
August 23, 2005, the fact is, the publication or notice was a general one and was
petitioner's right to its frequencies is covered by a provisional authority. The
not meant to dispose of petitioner's previous requests for an extension of its
provisional authority was withdrawn by MC No. 06-08-2005 without the
provisional authority and/or application for permit to purchase equipment. The
Respondent NTC acting on petitioner's plea for previous extensions. The
order which dealt with these requests was the Order dated December 23, 2008,
propriety for the issuance of MC No. 06-08-2005 is placed in issue on the ground
which was issued almost four (4) years after the filing of the first request on April
of fairness. Petitioner as the rightful grantee thereof has the right, in the meantime,
5, 2004 and almost three (3) years from the issuance of Memorandum Circular
to enjoin its implementation.
No. 06-08-2005. Withal and subject to whatever proof it may submit to the RTC
regarding the delay, the Respondent NTC should have first acted on petitioner's
We are not unaware of Our Resolution promulgated on August 12, 2011 denying
requests for extension before setting for public hearing the re-allocation of the
petitioner's plea for the ancillary remedy of both prohibitory and/or mandatory
frequencies.23
injunction. Indeed, as of said date, the denial of petitioner's prayer is appropriate.
We have now the complete facts of the case and, as the legal consequence of We do not concur with the CA in holding that NTC's inaction or delay on Atlocom's
Our declaration that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the application for extension of PA had violated the latter's right to due process
assailed orders, We consider it proper to enjoin the Respondent NTC from because it resulted in depriving Atlocom of the use of frequencies which were re-
implementing Memorandum Circular No. 06-08-2005, but insofar as the allocated through the issuance of MC 06-08-2005. Such declaration rather
frequencies ranging from 2572-2596 Mhz are involved and for its Co-Respondent conveys an inaccurate picture of the regulatory process for public broadcasting
LBNI from using the aforestated frequencies. This is not to preempt the RTC of and telecommunications services.
whatever judgment it may thereafter issue with respect to the merits of the case
before it but is issued in order to maintain the status quo in view of petitioner's Under existing laws and regulations, it is clear that a frequency assignment is not
claim of a breach of due process and a continuing violation of its right over the automatically included in the PA granted by the NTC to an applicant for a CPC.
aforestated frequencies.22 Thus, the Order dated October 8, 2003 expressly provided that the PA granted to
Atlocom, valid for 18 months, is subject to several conditions, foremost of which
The CA explained that since it is only through a frequency that Atlocom can
is the assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division (FMD).
provide adequate broadcast service to the public, the withdrawal of frequency
assignment without observance of due process defeats its legislative grant and
While Atlocom presented a Certification24 dated October 22, 2003 issued by Alvin
reduces Atlocom to a mere repository of transmitters and equipment devoid of
N. Blanco, Chief of NTC's Broadcast Division, stating that certain frequencies
any purpose or value. It cited the following provisions of R.A. No.
were "identified" for Atlocom's MMDS (Metro Manila) covering 2572-2596
8605:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
frequency bands, there is no document evidencing that these frequencies were
SEC. 3. Prior Approval of the National Telecommunications Commission. - The
actually assigned to Atlocom by the FMD. There is likewise nothing in the records
grantee shall secure from the National Telecommunications Commission,
to suggest that NTC "unreasonably" withheld or delayed authority to use such
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, the appropriate permits and licenses
frequencies identified for Atlocom.
for the construction and operation of its stations, transmitters or facilities and shall
not use any frequency in the radio and television spectrum without having been
Atlocom blamed NTC's three-year delay in resolving the motion for extension of
authorized by the Commission. The Commission, however, shall not
PA for its inability to use the frequencies identified for its MMDS, as these were
unreasonably withhold or delay the grant of any such authority.
eventually re-allocated in 2005 under MC 06-08-2005. But as Atlocom was fully
aware, Section 6 of R.A. No. 8605 provides that the Government may at anytime
Page 37 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

withdraw the frequency after due process. Records showed that a notice was duly SEC. 15. Radio Frequency Spectrum. - The radio frequency spectrum allocation
published and a public hearing was actually conducted on July 12, 2005 by NTC and assignment shall be subject to periodic review. The use thereof shall be
on the proposed Memo Circular: Frequency Band Allocations for Broadcast subject to reasonable spectrum user fees. Where demand for specific frequencies
Wireless Access. Said event was attended by representatives of the different exceed availability, the Commission shall hold open tenders for the same and
broadcasting and telecommunication companies, including Atlocom. 25 The ensure wider access to this limited resource.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
position papers and feedback submitted by various companies in connection with
As a grantee of PA, Atlocom can only invoke the condition in MC 06-08-2005 that
the proposed memorandum circular on wireless broadband access were all
"[t]he transfer of previously authorized persons or entities operating radio stations
presented as evidence in the RTC.26 We have held that the essence of due
within the above listed radio frequency bands shall be governed by Rule 603 of
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
MC 3-3-96."28 Said rule states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. 27 The requirements of due
603. TRANSFER OF AFFECTED AUTHORIZED RADIO FREQUENCY USER
process were thus satisfied by the NTC in the re-allocation of frequency.
a. The commission shall allocate available radio frequencies for assignment to
Contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the re-allocation of frequency cannot be
those affected by the reallocation as a result of the review of the radio spectrum
conditioned on resolution of any pending request for extension of PA previously
pursuant to Rule 601.
granted. Even entities with unexpired PA cannot claim a vested right on a specific
frequency assignment. This proceeds from the nature of its franchise which is not
b. The cost of the transfer to new radio frequencies of affected authorized users
solely for commercial purposes but one imbued with public interest. As earlier
shall be borne by the new assignees to the radio frequency channel/band where
quoted, Atlocom's franchise (R.A. No. 8605) declared the use of radio spectrum
the radio frequencies of the previously authorized users fall within.
as a mere privilege conferred upon the grantee by the State that may be
withdrawn anytime provided that due process is observed. It further emphasized
c. When the transfer to a new set of radio frequencies would require additional
that the radio spectrum is a finite resource and its use and distribution should be
radio links, the cost of these links shall also be taken into consideration.
aligned with existing laws and policies.
d. The manner and the cost of the transfer shall be negotiated in good faith
R.A. No. 7925 likewise recognizes the vital role of telecommunications to national
between the affected authorized users and the assignees within 90 days from
development and security and provides that the radio frequency shall be managed
receipt of notice of relocation.
and directed to serve the public interest. Being a limited resource, the law
mandates a periodic review of frequency allocation.
e. The Commission shall extend all the necessary assistance to all affected
SEC. 4. Declaration of National Policy. - Telecommunications is essential to the
authorized users and shall mandate settlement if the parties fail to come to an
economic development, integrity and security of the Philippines, and as such shall
agreement within 90 days from receipt of notice of relocation or when warranted
be developed and administered as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the
under the circumstances.
economic, cultural, social and political fabric of the Philippines. The growth and
development of telecommunications services shall be pursued in accordance with
f. Other means/mode of transmission comparable in quality to the existing facility
the following policies:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
shall be taken into consideration in the negotiation for the transfer.
x x x x
g. Transfer of radio frequency assignment shall only take effect upon activation of
service by relocated party using its newly assigned or relocated frequency as
c) The radio frequency spectrum is a scarce public resource that shall be
agreed or mandated.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
administered in the public interest and in accordance with international
agreements and conventions to which the Philippines is a party and granted to Considering that Atlocom has not even launched its MMDS network nor
the best qualified. The government shall allocate the spectrum to service constructed radio stations, it is doubtful whether Atlocom can exercise the
providers who will use it efficiently and effectively to meet public demand for foregoing rights of an affected frequency user. Neither can Atlocom attribute its
telecommunications service and may avail of new and cost effective technologies non-operational state to the delayed action on its motion for extension of PA.
in the use of methods for its utilization; Among the conditions of its PA is the commencement of the construction and
installation of its station within six months from issuance of the order granting it
x x x x the provisional authority and its complete three months thereafter. Perusal of the
motion for extension reveals that Atlocom at the time was still in the process of
identifying and finalizing arrangements with its potential investors for the
Page 38 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
establishment of a nationwide MMDS network coverage.
Based on its evaluation, the NTC found that: (1) Atlocom filed an application for
Permit to Purchase MMDS transmitter on February 9, 2005, but no permit of any
kind was issued to it; (2) In the clarificatory hearing held on September 4, 2006,
concerns were raised regarding reports of foreign equity on Atlocom's capital
structure and status of band allocated for MMDS within the 2.5-2.7 Ghz band; and
(3) On June 21, 2008, Atlocom is requesting for an allocation of a Digital
Terrestrial TV frequency (Ch 14-20 & Ch 21-51) in replacement for their MMDS
frequency, but the NTC thru FMD denied such request because the proposed
frequency band for DTT service is not yet approved/allocated. With the re-
allocation of MMDS frequency bands for the Broadband Wireless Access under
MC 06-8-2005, and the aforesaid findings, the NTC en banc decided not to grant
the extension sought by Atlocom.
A right to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.29 An injunction is not a remedy to
protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect
a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does
not give rise to a cause of action. 30chanrobleslaw
From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject
frequencies or to the extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly,
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC in denying Atlocom's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of MC
06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the reallocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom.
The CA thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was
entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its right by the NTC.
A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a
strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face
of actual and existing substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and where
facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its
issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.31chanrobleslaw
Pursuant to Section 6,32 Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although
the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or
continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the
party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the
court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by
the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions
must concur: first, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while
the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second,
the defendant files a counterbond.33chanrobleslaw
In denying LBNI's offer to file counterbond, the CA relied on the
Affidavit34 executed by Rene Rosales, Atlocom's technical consultant, to refute
the earlier Affidavit35 submitted by LBNI, which was executed by its Director for
Network Engineering, Edwin C. Mabitazan. Mabitazan stated that the injunction
issued by the CA will result in reducing LBNI's usable bandwidth from 40 Mhz to
only 15 Mhz, which is inadequate to serve LBNI's thousands of subscribers.
Mabitazan's opinion should have been given more weight in view of his intimate
knowledge of LBNI's operations and technical requirements. Moreover, it should
be stressed that LBNI's business projections were based on its existing technical
capability which stands to be greatly diminished once the frequency bands re-
assigned to it will be reduced as a result of the CA's injunction order. The
possibility of irreparable damage is indeed present, not only in terms of financial
losses -the total investment by LBNI has already reached billions of pesos - but
on the reputation of LBNI as a new player in the telecommunications industry for
reliability and dependability of its services. In contrast, whatever damage Atlocom
stands to suffer should the injunction be dissolved, can be fully compensated
considering that it has not constructed stations nor launched any network service.
No single document was submitted by Atlocom to show it had actually complied
with the conditions of its PA and invested in the establishment of MMDS network,
which never materialized.
In gross abuse of discretion, the CA brushed aside evidence presented by LBNI
in support of its offer to file counter-bond, stating that these were submitted only
after the appellate court had rendered its decision granting Atlocom's prayer for
preliminary injunction. The CA failed to consider the fact that it was Atlocom which
misled the courts and the NTC in claiming that the subject frequencies had been
assigned to it. The matter was raised by NTC and LBNI only in their motions for
reconsideration because it was only at that time when their inquiry from FMD
disclosed that said office had not actually granted a frequency assignment to
Atlocom. Thus, NTC in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, submitted a
Certification36 dated August 2, 2012 issued by the FMD Chief, Pricilla F. Demition,
together with attached documents, setting forth the same facts relative to
Atlocom's non-operational state. Atlocom countered that said evidence was just
an afterthought because the absence of frequency assignment was not
mentioned by Engr. Demition when she testified before the RTC on January 14,
2009 during the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction.
Atlocom, however, never disputed the findings of the FMD.
The pertinent portions of the FMD Certification are herein
reproduced:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. In a memo addressed to the Chief, Broadcast Services Division
dated January 10, 2006 (copy attached as Annex "B"); signed
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RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
by then Deputy Commissioner Jorge V. Sarmiento, an inquiry
was made to the Broadcast Services Division (BSD) regarding
the status of usage of the frequency assignments granted to
broadcast companies for MMDS use and to provide information
thru the FMD of the latest related information to include among
others permits/licenses issued to their favor; such information
was needed in view of the re-allocation of the band in use for
BWA (MC No. 06-08-2005);
3. In a memo dated January 12, 2006 (copy attached as Annex
"C") in compliance to the January 10, 2006 Memo, BSD's report
shows under the column Latest Permits/License issued, that
the latest permit or license issued for ATLOCOM was only its
PA dated 10.08.03;
4. In a memo addressed to the Records Verification Committee
dated 06 September 2006 (copy attached as Annex "D") signed
by then Commissioner Ronald Olivar Solis, citing a memo
dated 21 September 2005 from then DOTC Secretary
Leonardo R. Mendoza and Office Order No. 71-08-2006, the
Records Verification Committee was directed to verify the
status of several radio frequency bands therein listed, and to
submit its report to include, among others, SUF payments,
latest permits, and licenses issued and photocopies of the
same;
5. The Records Verification Committee reported in a memo dated
08 September 2006 (copy attached as Annex "E"), that with
respect to Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., no record on file
was found as to station location, frequency, license/permit
no., radio station license or permit to purchase and
possess;
6. In a memo addressed to the Acting Chief BSD dated 07
January 2008 by then FMD Acting Chief Engr. Joselito C.
Leynes (copy attached as Annex "F") [w]ith reference to the 03
January 2008 indorsement letter from BSD (copy attached as
Annex "G) regarding the request of Atlocom Wireless System,
Inc. for an allocation of a Digital Television (DTT) frequency
(copy attached as Annex "H"), the BSD was informed of the
following for guidance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"that the proposed frequency band from Channel 14-
20 and Channel 21-51 is not yet been finally
allocated/approved for the purpose of DTT operation.
Further, in the event that said frequency band re-
allocation is approved, only broadcasting company
with existing TV station/s and/or authority to operate
is entitled for application/issuance of a DTT frequency
channel."
7. A Memo addressed to the Chief, Frequency Management
Division dated 27 July 2012 (copy attached as Annex "I") Chief,
BSD in connection with the "certification" issued to Atlocom
Wireless System, Inc. clarifies the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"that the frequencies stated in the subject
certification were simply identified as candidate
frequencies for the MMDS service under NTC
Case No. 98-158, subject to final frequency
assignment by the Frequency Management
Division (FMD) of this Commission." and
"Furthermore inasmuch as frequency assignments
covering the band 2500-2700 Mhz are issued by the
Frequency Management Division (FMD), the
undersigned is of the view that the determination of
the assignment of the subject frequencies to Atlocom
Wireless, or to any other entity, can best be certified
by the Frequency Management Division (FMD)"
8. As per NTC Office Order No. 59-07-2003 dated July 30, 2003
(copy attached as Annex "J), all requests, applications requiring
clearance and/or new radio frequency assignments, except for
frequencies that have been pre-allocated and/or decentralized,
shall be cleared with the Office of the Commissioner thru the
Frequency Management Division:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Henceforth, except for frequencies that have been
pre-allocated and/or decentralized, all requests
applications requiring clearance and/or new radio
frequency assignment shall be cleared with the Office
of the Commissioner thru the Frequency Management
Division."
9. No records/documents were however found at the
Frequency Management Division showing frequency
assignment clearance for the use of ATLOCOM's MMDS
system. (Emphasis supplied)
Page 40 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases

In light of all the foregoing established facts, we hold that the CA gravely abused
its discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, Mendoza,
implementation of MC 06-08-2005 in the absence of a clear legal right on the part and Leonen, JJ., concur.
of Atlocom, and subsequently denying LBNFs offer to file counter-bond despite Carpio, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
compliance with the requisites provided in Section 6 of Rule 58. However, with Velasco, Jr., Brion, and Reyes, JJ., on leave.
our ruling that the writ of preliminary injunction was improperly issued, hence, null
and void, the matter of allowing LBNI to post a counter-bond has been rendered
moot.

A final note. In its Memorandum,37 Atlocom argues that LBNI is part of mass SECOND DIVISION
media and its franchise violates Article XVI, Section 11 (1) of the
Constitution38 because it is not wholly-owned by Filipino citizens.39chanrobleslaw G.R. No. 197472, September 07, 2015

Unless properly raised and the very lis mota of the case, we do not pass upon
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COMMANDER
constitutional issues. The resolution of the constitutional issues must be
RAYMOND ALPUERTO OF THE NAVAL BASE CAMILLLO OSIAS, PORT SAN
absolutely necessary for the determination of the case.40In the spirit of deference
VICENTE, STA. ANA, CAGAYAN, Petitioner, v. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ,
to the acts of other constitutional departments and organs, issues before this
SR., Respondent.
Court should address only the narrowest issues necessary to determine whether
the reliefs prayed for can be granted. As in this case, reliefs can be determined
on procedural issues. DECISION

The main issue presented in this case is the validity of Atlocom's application for a DEL CASTILLO, J.:
writ of preliminary injunction against the NTC. This issue can be resolved without
passing upon the constitutionality of LBNI's franchise. The resolution of the issue
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper
on LBNI's eligibility thus has no bearing on whether Atlocom has the right to be
object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's
granted a frequency allocation for Broadband Wireless Access by the NTC. The
alleged right of possession over the same.
constitutional issue raised by the respondent may be raised and resolved in
proper cases when necessary in the future.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the June 29, 2011 Decision2 of the
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29, 2012 Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 89968, which dismissed the appeal
therewith and affirmed the July 3, 2007 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and Resolution dated February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 119868 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. 11-2403.

Factual Antecedents
Consequently, the writ of preliminary injunction issued in said case, if any, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation
engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and
The Orders dated December 9, 2010 and March 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial
school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He
Court of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Q-09-65566 are
hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD. claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares
of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care,
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on April 30, 2013 is hereby
made PERMANENT. cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable,
humanitarian and missionary works.4
No pronouncement as to costs.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui
Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui
Page 41 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the
Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters
situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. Again subject
to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of
7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.
On June 13,2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 5 against Rogelio C. Biñas
(Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command
in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him, some members of the
Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful
possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15,
2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and
intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the
Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened
with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men
were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said
Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to
restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said
preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction6 and the parties' submission of their respective memoranda,7 the RTC
issued an Order8 dated February 21, 2002 granting the application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares
(subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied
by Rev. Cortez, viz.:cralawlawlibrary
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area of 50 hectares
more or less located at the western portion of Palaui Island which is within the
Naval reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented what he called as a survey map (Exh.
"H") indicating the location of the area claimed by the Church of the Living God
and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an approximate area of 50 hectares identified as
Exh. "H-4". However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a] DENR personnel
is only a sketch map[,] not a survey map as claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. Likewise,
the exact boundaries of the area [are] not specifically indicated. The sketch only
shows some lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50 hectares
claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. As such, the identification of the area and its exact
boundaries have not been clearly defined and delineated in the sketch map.
Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that [Rev. Cortez] claimed to have peacefully
and lawfully possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined or
accurately identified.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas] that [Rev. Cortez]' claim
to the 50 hectares of land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It
is a settled jurisprudence that mandatory injunction is the strong arm of equity that
never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in damages. The right
must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the
protecting preventive process of injunction. The reason for this doctrine is that
before the issue of ownership is determined in the light of the evidence presented,
justice and equity demand that the [status quo be maintained] so that no
advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. And so it was ruled
that unless there is a clear pronouncement regarding ownership and possession
of the land, or unless the land is covered by the torrens title pointing to one of the
parties as the undisputed owner, a writ of preliminary injunction should not issue
to take the property out of possession of one party to place it in the hands of
another x x x.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended only to show that
[he] has a pending application of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez]
failed to present in evidence the application for patent allegedly filed by [him]
showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land which he
possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Under the circumstances,
therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains
unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May 22, 1967,
[Rev. Cortez] has not perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired
any vested right thereto considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by
him in 1962 or barely five (5) years before the issuance of the Presidential
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of removing Palaui Island from
the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain and therefore the island,
as of the date of [the] Issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to be disposable
public land. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has lawfully possessed and
occupied at least five (5) hectares of land situated at the western portion of the
Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4". During the hearing, Cmdr. Rogelio Biñas
admitted that when he was assigned as Commanding Officer in December 1999,
he went to Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families tilling the land
consisting of five (5) hectares. Therefore, it cannot be seriously disputed that
[Rev. Cortez] and his baluga tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of land for
planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western portion identified as Exhibit "H-
4". The Philippine Navy also admitted that they have no objection to settlers of
the land prior to the Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had been
identified as one of the early settlers of the area before the Presidential
Page 42 of 46
RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
Proclamation. The DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an
application for patent on the western area and that he must be allowed to pursue
his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev. Cortez] that he has
already acquired vested rights over the area claimed by him, the court must
recognize that [Rev. Cortez] may have acquired some propriety rights over the
area considering the directive of the DENR to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his
application for patent. However, the court wants to make clear that the application
for patent by [Rev. Cortez] should be limited to an area not to exceed five (5)
hectares situated at the western portion of x x x Palaui Island identified in the
sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the portion where [Rev. Cortez]
has clearly established his right or title by reason of his long possession and
occupation of the land.9chanrobleslaw
In his Answer,10 Biñas countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez has not proven that he has
been in exclusive, open, continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land
in the concept of an owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has not shown the exact boundaries
and identification of the entire lot claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has not
substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation No. 201; (4) under
Proclamation No. 447, the entire Palaui Island, which includes the land allegedly
possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was reserved as a marine protected
area; and, (4) injunction is not a mode to wrest possession of a property from one
person by another.
Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision 11 making the injunction final and
permanent. In so ruling, the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples'
[Fight] Act (EPRA) as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Indigenous [Peoples' Right] Act should be given effect in this case. The
affected community belongs to the group of indigenous people which are
protected by the State of their rights to continue in their possession of the lands
they have been tilling since time immemorial. No subsequent passage of law or
presidential decrees can alienate them from the land they are tilling. 12
Ultimately, the RTC held, thus:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
x x x x
SO DECIDED.13chanrobleslaw
Representing Biñas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Notice of
Appeal14 which was given due course by the RTC in an Order15 dated August 6,
2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its brief,16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortez admitted during trial that he
filed the Petition for injunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communities in
Palaui Island and not in his capacity as pastor or missionary of the Church of the
Living God. He also claimed that he has no interest over the land. Based on these
admissions, the OSG argued that the Petition should have been dismissed
outright on the grounds that it did not include the name of the indigenous cultural
communities that Rev. Cortez is supposedly representing and that the latter is not
the real party-in-interest. In any case, the OSG averred that Rev. Cortez failed to
show that he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of injunction. Moreover, the
OSG questioned the RTC's reference to the EPRA and argued that it is not
applicable to the present case since Rev. Cortez neither alleged in his Petition
that he is claiming rights under the said act nor was there any showing that he is
a member of the Indigenous Cultural Communities and/or the Indigenous Peoples
as defined under the IPRA.
In its Decision17 dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC's issuance of a final
injunction based on the following ratiocination:cralawlawlibrary
The requisites necesary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Here,
[Rev. Cortez] has shown the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. Records reveal that [Rev. Cortez] has been in peaceful
possession and occupation of the western portion of Palaui Island, Sitio
Siwangag, San Vicente, Sta. Ana[J Cagayan since 1962 or prior to the issuance
of Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 in 1967 and 1994, respectively. There he built
an orphanage and a school for the benefit of the members of the Dumagat Tribe,
in furtherance of his missionary and charitable works. There exists a clear and
unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez] since he has been in open, continuous
and notorious possession of a portion of Palaui island. To deny the issuance of a
writ of injunction would cause grave and irreparable injury to [Rev. Cortez] since
he will be displaced from the said area which he has occupied since 1962. It must
be emphasized that Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 stated that the same are
subject to private rights, if there be [any]. Though Palaui Island has been declared
to be part of the naval reservation and the whole [i]sland as a marine protected
area, both recognized the existence of private rights prior to the issuance of the
same.
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From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err when it made permanent
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court provides that if after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is
entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court
shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined
from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction.18chanrobleslaw
Anent the issue of Rev. Cortez not being a real party-in-interest, the CA noted
that this was not raised before the RTC and therefore cannot be considered by it.
Finally, with respect to the RTC's mention of the IPRA, the CA found the same to
be a mere obiter dictum.
Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of the OSG pertaining to
ownership are all immaterial as his Petition for injunction does not involve the
right to possess based on ownership but on the right of possession which is a
right independent from ownership. Rev. Cortez avers that since he has been in
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he
has the right of possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts
that based on this right, the writ of injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in
his favor and aptly affirmed by the CA. On the technical side, Rev. Cortez avers
that the Republic has no legal personality to assail the CA Decision through the
present Petition since it was not a party in the appeal before the CA.
The Court's Ruling

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:cralawlawlibrary

We grant the Petition.
WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final
assailed 3 July 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
injunction.
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 11-2403 is AFFIRMED.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed
SO ORDERED.19
either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as
chanrobleslaw
in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a
prohibitory injunction."20 "It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy
Hence, this Petition brought by the OSG on behalf of the Republic of the for and as an incident in the main action." 21
Philippines (the Republic).
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy
The Issue of preliminary injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits
of a case or decide controverted facts.23 Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it
only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or
The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to injustice until the rights of the parties are settled.24 "It is usually granted when it is
a final writ of mandatory injunction. made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an
The Parties' Arguments act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case." 25 A preliminary
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or
failed to prove his clear and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui final order.26 For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively,
Island covered by the same. This is considering that by his own admission, Rev. that he has a right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
Cortez started to occupy the said area only in 1962. Hence, when the property contradiction.27 Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the
was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in possession of the 5- ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.28 On the other hand,
hectare area only for five years or short of the 30-year possession requirement the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final
for a bona fide claim of ownership under the law. The OSG thus argues that the injunction.29 A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or
phrase "subject to private rights" as contained in Proclamation No. 201 and person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
Proclamation No. 447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those who have mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary mandatory
already complied with the requirements for perfection of title over the land prior to injuction.30 It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that
the issuance of the said proclamations. the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently
enjoined.31 Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite

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RemRev 2 – Rule 58 Cases
pronouncement respecting an applicant's right and of the act violative of such
right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction
is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant injunction, the right and the act
violative thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute certainty. 32
What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007
Decision is whether a final injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to
realize this as it in fact made the injunction permanent, the Court, however, finds
the same to be wanting in basis.
Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a
preliminary injunction and a final injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently
confused itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision were jurisprudence relating
to preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not
as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based
on the evidence presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established
his claimed right (as opposed to preliminary injunction where an applicant only
needs to at least tentatively show that he has a right) over the subject area. This
is considering that the existence of such right plays an important part in
determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be
confirmed. Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the trial court's
factual findings on the matter as well as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis
applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement
of the parties' respective allegations in the Complaint and the Answer, followed
by a narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence
submitted by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary
injunction and/or specifically, to mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short
reference to the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a
conclusion that a final and permanent injunction should issue. No discussion
whatsoever was made with respect to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish
with absolute certainty his claimed right over the subject area.cralawlawlibrary
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision,
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued
on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make
complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to
generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.33
chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated
guidelines.
In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a
quo for compliance with the form and substance of a Decision as required by the
Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further delay, the Court deems it proper
to resolve the case based on the merits.34
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be
protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary that the Court initially determine
whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is
necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute
certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the
right of possession (jus possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous
possession of the subject area since 1962. He avers that as this right is protected
by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already
dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory
injunctive writ was correctly issued in his favor.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one of the two
concepts of possession provided under Article 525 37 of the Civil Code. Also
referred to as adverse possession,38 this kind of possession is one which can
ripen into ownership by prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a
possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that
he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. In the
same manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be respected in
his possession.41
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession.42 The following cannot be
appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public
dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.43
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right
of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which
he has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper
object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.44 Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons." 45 To prove that a land is
alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
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of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the

land as alienable and disposable must be established.46 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively
establish his claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui him to the issuance of a final injunction.
Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to
occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Anent the technical issue raised by Rev. Cortez, i.e, that the Republic has no
Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of personality to bring this Petition since it was not a party before the CA, the Court
possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' deems it prudent to set aside this procedural barrier. After all, "a party's standing
claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject before [the] Court is a [mere] procedural technicality which may, in the exercise
area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, of [its] discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised." 49
cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully
possessed in the first place. We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so that he could
continue his humanitarian works. However, considering that inalienable public
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No. 447 were land was involved, this Court is constrained to rule in accordance with the
made subject to private rights. The Court stated in Republic v. aforementioned.
Bacas,47viz.:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting 'private rights.' Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 89968 denying the appeal and affirming the
In Republic v. Estonilo, where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was July 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan-Branch 08
part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, in Spl. Civil Action Case No. 11-2403, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
it noted the proviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation Accordingly, the final injunction issued in this case is ordered DISSOLVED and
to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the the Petition for Injunction in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403, DISMISSED.
reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the
said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether x x x the SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
Carpio, Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been
segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to prove that
the subject properties were alienable or disposable land of the public
domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for
military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is
primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject
to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens
system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all
other requirements such as length and nature of possession and
occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of
possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the
proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on
such 'recognition' of possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that
at the time of their application, they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years
and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or
showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement,
or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.48chanrobleslaw

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