Approved Egy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RQ1Y)2A001705070907 couy Fo soon (25X1A9a EIBLGL: PRORNI DUE-OPINITS IN IEE KASmTR DISHITE mt mp oF August 22, 1961 This is an intelligence report; nothing in it ig to be construed ac 4 statenent of US or Donertmental nolicy or as a recommsndation of any given policy. Revi of this document by CIA bes eterminad that Department of State Contribution duestee st Ts sw Provared byt ana mee foals sathing 0 A ttt South Astan Branch dog based $1 ols 57 Division of Rosonrch for Near “ast, South Asia and Africa stone Offico of Intelligence Rescarch SRORER State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved F gy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79ROYY2A001200020007-8 SECRET i ‘TARLE_OF CONTENTS Abetrece se eee ee eee eae what Is The Current Status of Kashmir? ss... e+ 2 Il. What Are The Objectives of India ené Pakistan in Kashmir? Waat Are India's Capsbilities and Probable Intentions?. vee te ee ee 9 IV. Pakistan's Capabilities and Probable Intentions... UN Courses of Action Likely to Affect The Situation Up to The Hnd of 1951... ees ee ee 1D WI. Conclusion -- Yhat ave the Probable Developuents 4m The Near Puture?e ss ee ee ee ee ee UT JT. What Bffect Would These Prebable Developments Have on The Usited States Security interests? ..... 19 Appendix A - Chronology of Significant Events in The Kashmir Dispute... 0 ee ee ee ee ee OD secanr Approved For Release 2001708/ST? CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Foy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP7ERO{Q12A001200020007-8 i ABSTRACT War is not Likely to be precipitated by india since India elready holds most of Kesimir. But Indien intransigeance in the face of seemingly endless UN proposéls for cclution of the Kashmir dispute hes ariven Pakistan leaders so close to frustration and desperation that if the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is convened, as it is very likely to be, arid if the Graham Mission and subsequent UN acticn fails to produce in the minds of the Pekistenis even a faint hope of successful UN action in their behalf, then there is a real’denger thet they may sttempt once egain to resort to localized military action in Kashnir. In the emotional public advance of Pakistan leaders, close to if not beyond the point of no return in their public utterances, lies, ve believe, the yreatest danger. If responsible Pokisten leaders were moved only by reason, logic end cold calculation there would probably be no war. But the degree to which their own emotional windup ney propel them is both unpredictable and the key factor in the present eituetion. Pakisten will not wish to precipitate an all-out war. However, if hope of any successful solution short of force of arms fades, it may attempt limited assaults in Keshmir, utilizing trivesmen end locel Azed (free) Keshmir forces in an effort to focus world attention on its frustration and speed world action end world opinion to force India to take @ lese edemant position. Pakistan vill hope to avoid an all-out wer by cleiming that the action in Keshmir is a spontaneous local up- rising of Muslim residents unconnected with the Pakistan Government. Tt is probable, hovever, that India would counter by attempting te nove into the West Punjab. Hostilities, in turn, vould thus likely be extended to the Bengals. A resumption of communal slaughter would un- doubtedly result. If the Grehem report, huvever, end subsequent UN action, cen succeed in even holding out the hope to Pakistan that all doors of action short of force are not closed, it may, we believe, be willing to allow tensions to relax and permit the issue to run into 1952 unresuived. ‘There ves more danger that Pakistan would resort to furce upon the con- vening of the Constituent assembly prior to the Indian movenent of troups to the frontier. Before this move Pekistan might have hoped to achieve quick and limited locel successes with effective Indian retalistion questionable. Now it must be‘clear to Pakistan that eny move Upon its pert will be strongly oppcsed and any yains will be at considerable cost. This realization, plus a UN dour still held open by Granem, ney yet avert var on the subcontinent. SECRET 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/31 :Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R0{012A001200020007-8 SECRET iat Hustilities on the subcontinent vould have a very serious impect cn US security interests. ixtended custly hostilities, if ‘they should uccur, would so weaken buth India and Pekisten es tu make the maintenance of orderly government a matter uf question. Even if the consequences of war should be something lees then a Communist take-over, political stability in the subcontinent would be gravely threatened by a prolonged conflict and the ensuing chaos and economic and finsncial pressures would severely weaken, if not destroy, those groups presently most favorably disposed to curity interests in the area. 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 Approved For Release 200410854 :Approved Fi f proved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP7ROQJ2A001200020007-6 Se NID-41 ‘FRORAWIN DOVREOPINNS IN THE ASHMTR DISPUTE TO 75% HND OF 1962 1, What ie the current status of Zaghnixt = When India and Pakistan achicved full indsvendence and Dominion stafus on August 16, 1947, there arose a series of conflicts rooted in the historical animosity between the Hindus and Sikhs, on the one hand, and the Noslena on the other, By far the greatest source of animosity between the two Dominions, however, vas tho quostion of the accession of the more than 660 princely states of the subcontinent, vhich wore not variitioned or allocated to olther Dominion by the Indian Indo- pendence Act. This Act terminated the connection between the British Crown and the vrincely states, but was silent as to the future of those states, Tho decision on accession vas left to the rulors although official Britigh statements indicated it vas emected that tho states would accede to one or the other of the Dominions and that such accession would be ‘based on the geogravhical proximity to the Dominion of choice, However, thore was no agreement on uhother vovular choice should bo consulted. Pakistan took tho position that the rulers had the final decision while India urged somo arrangoment for consulting vonular choice. All of the etates with Muslim nomulations border Palistan and most of them acceded to that Dominion, Similarly, most of the states vith Hindu or Sikh pooula~ tions acceded to India, There vere four major excovtions: a) ,Sevoral onal Hindw-vovalated states on the Kathiaver Peninsula vhose Muslim rulers acceded to Palcistan, ) the imortant state of Hyderabed in central Indie vith a Muslin rulor and a largely Hindu vovulation, c) the Musline ruled and Moalin-nowleted state of Kelat on Pakistan'c western bordor and a) the State of Jamm end Kashair vith a Mindu roler and vredomi— nantly Muslin vommlation. ‘Tho rulora of lattor threo states announced tholr intention of remaining indenendent. ov the Kay = The Stato of Jammu and Kashmir had an overvhelmingly Noslem vonulation and had close economic ties with Pakistan, The Maharageh was, hovever, a Hindu. At the ond of August 1947, Noslen inhabitants of Poonch and Mirvur districts in Janmu rose in armed revolt against the Maharajah because of their fear that Kashmir would eccede to India, State forces vere sont to the erea to restore order. Roginning in Sentembor, thore vere minor invasions of tho Kashmir border by ‘tribesmen from the Northvest Frontior Province of Pakistan. On Sentenbor 29, Sheikh Abdullah, President of the vro~Indien Rashmir National Conference, was released from vrieon vhile leaders of the Moslem Conference remained Yehind bars, Abdullah, a close friend of Nehru, favored accession of Kashmir to India. Meanvhile, the "Azad (free) Kashnir Provisional Govern- mont" vas formed in Kashair in opposition to tho Mahsrejeh’s Goverment, and sont the State's accession to Palristan. Sot Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Foy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO40}2A001200020007-8 Seer -2- Around October 22, a large mmber of armed Tribosuen from the Northwest Frontier Province crossed into Kashnir an¢ advanced toward Srinagar, the summer cavital of the Stato. Concurrently, with the at~ teck of the Tribesmon, Moslem units of the Meharajeh?s amy and nolice deserted, several rulers of votty states in the North which vere fouda~ tory to Kashmir declared their independence of tho Maharajah and accoded to Pakisten, and the rovolt in Western Kashmir enroad and was aided by infiltrating Pakistan nationals. On October 26, tho Maharajah of Kashnir addreeced a letter to Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India, stating that hely vas needed; that ho intended to set w 2 novular goverment under Sheikh abéulleh; that he would accedo to India, Mountbatten, on October 27, informed the Maharajah that tho Goverment of India would accept the acceseion of Kachmir and stated that troovs of the Indien amy would te cont to Eachmir to helo cunzort the State forces in repelling tho raidors. On October 27, Indian troons boran ontoring Kashmir, Although the Indien forces succeoded in driving back the Tribesmen so as to relieve the threet to Srinagar, fighting continued and Indien troops battled ‘Tribesnon and Azad Zaclmir forces, In Mountbatten’s lotter accepting tho Maharajahs offer to accede to India, it vas pointed out that “as soon as lav and order have been rostorod in Kashmir, and her soi] cloared of the invader, tho question of the Stato’s sccoasion ghould be settled by a reference to the ncople". On October 28, 1947 Prime Minister Nehru said in a public address that his Government wae prepared, when veace we restored in Kashair, to hold a roforondun under the ausoices of en intornational organization such as the United Nations, Following tho Waharajah's accession, the Governments of India and Pakisten made various attenots by diroct nogotiation to reach agreonont on noone of solving the Kashnir vroblen. Nogotiations between the two Govern nente during Noveuber and Decenber 1947 failed to rosolve the conflict booause of disagreement (e) vhother the Tribeaten and othor intruders from Pakistan or the Indian troops should bo the first to withdray; (b) whothor tho Moherejeh and Sheikh Abdollah should continue to administer the State until 2 nlobiecite vas hold, Acti ¥ Jem 48 = 17 December 1949) oF of the Kashmir disvute, so far as ite United Nations agnect {8 concerned, began vhen tho Sovorment of India brought tho dig7ute ‘bofore the Security Council on 1 January 1948, charging that a situation oxteted between Indie and Palcistan, tho continuance of which would be Likely to endengor the maintenance of interaationel noace and cocurity. India claimed that the situation existed because of the aid efven by tho Goverm nent of Pakistan to the invaders, both Paliston nationals and Tribemon from the Northvest Frontier territory. The Government of Pakistan denied the Indian charges and filed counter charge Storer Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : a ee ae cue nrae w DoT -3- On January 20, 1948, the Security Council established the United Nations Commission for Indie and Pakistan (UNCIP), with an initial nonbershio of three which vas subsequently increased to five: Argentina, Relgiun, Colombia, Czechoslovaicia, and the United States. The Oommission vas charged vith the functions of investigating facts in the dismte, under Article 34, and exercising any motdatory influonce, renorting how far the adviee ana directions of the Security Council had been carried out. 4 Socurity Council Rosolution of 21 Avril 1943 instructed the Com miseion to vroceed to thé cutcontinent and uso its good offices to effect a truce and a plebiscite. The Commission, after months of negotiation vas successful. in obtaining agreement to a cease-fire effective January 1, 1949 and also to nrincinles under which a truce and a vleblacite could be Drought bout. These mrincinlos were contained in UNCIP resolutions of 15 Angast 1948 and 5 January 1949 to which both wartioe subscribed. UNCIP vag unsuceesoful, however, in ite offorta to tring about and vroceed to the mejor objective of holding the plobiecite to determine the accession question, On 17 December 1049 tho Commission revorted its failure to the Security Council. It concluded that: "the issues of tho disvosal of the AvadpKoshmir forces, the withdrawal of troovs, and the defence and adminis- tration of the northern aroa, had mado of the’truco an end in itself; the aiftienlty or Aisposing of those issues to the satisfaction of both Govern monts had been out of proportion to their roal invortance, if those issues wore jadgod indeventently of othor imolications and as preliminary to a plebicctte.! the UNCIP indicated that a S-monber tody was not the most flexible and most desirable instrusent to continue in the task, and sug gested that a singlo verson be emointed ae nogotiater. 2 Me ort_(17 Decor) = 1960) ~ This chase boran on 17 Decomber 1949, when the Security Council requested the President of the Council, General Mclauchton of Canada, to meet infomally,-ith the two ~arties and to examine with then the possi= Dility of finding a mutuslly saticfactory basio for dealing with the Kashmir problem. General McNaughton continued his offorte uring the nonth of January, end revorted to the Council on February 3 that hie e! forte haa not been succogsful; that the Govermont of Pakistan had accepted his vrovosals in substance; that the Govermmont of In@4a did not agros on the imortant issues of tho withirewal of troms, the disvosal of both the Azad forces and Kashmir State Forces, and tho administration of the orthern Area of the State. Genoral McNaughton's 3 February 1950 revort ves used as the basis for the Security Council's resolution which recomended that a single ‘United Nations Rovresentative (to revlace UNGIP) should be appointed to ssaist in vrevering and to swervice the imolenentetion of a demilitariza- ion vrogram, At ite 12 Anril 1959 meeting the Security Council avpointed Sir Owon Dixon of Australia as United Nations Rovresentative, SE Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved ¢y Release 2001/08/31 : CCIA-RDP79R040}24001200020007-8 aie Think Phage ~ the Dixon Mission (Aori} 1950 = Jauuary 1951) ~ sir Oven Dixon arrived in New Dolhi on 27 May 1950 and cpent almost two months in talking sevarately to Indian and Pakistan officials on all levels as well as trevelling extensively in the Xashmir ares, Dizon found he could not obtain Indiats consent to any workable plan of demilitarization. He therefore decided to »resent other solutions such ac taking tho vlebiscite ‘by sections or areas and vartition plus a vlebiecite in the Vale of Kashmir, Pakistan egreod to discuss partition nlus a vlobiecite in tho valley at a conference with Indian officials nrovided India would agree in advance to ‘the conditions which would aseure the fairness of the plebiscite. To this, of course, the Governmont of India refused to agree. Dixon then vronosed that the UN take over the civil government of Kashmir, during a plebiscite Limited to the Vale, excluding from tho area all troons of every descrip tion, ‘India would not sccest this, ‘Dixon concluded: 1. Both varties were committed by thoir secentance of the 6 Jamary 1949 UNCIP reaolution to the yrincinlo that the sccession of Kashmir to Indie or Pakietan would be decided through the democratic mothod of a free and immartial vlebiscite. Tho vractical moasures, such as denili= tarization, not the general provositions, wore the obstacles. 2, Unless India would ogres to the details necessary to wut into effect a fair and imartial state-wide vicbiscite, thore was no hove of bringing about such a gonoral nlebiecite. 3. A stage-wide vlebiscito vas not desirable becaude it would preeivitate a vast refuges movement of tho Hindu or Noslem elonent losing the vlebiscite. 4. The only vossitie hove for settling tho dismute was partition ‘lus some meang of allocating the Vale of Kashmir, 5, Tho narties should ase the initiative in effecting a settle mont, instead of vlacing the turien won the Security Counetl or its rooresontativos. 6, The Security Council should concern itself with wressing tho varties to roiluce their military forces on tho cease-fire line, since thie ie tho nroximate danger to noace in tho aroa, ‘Tho Kashui Netlonal Confarence - On October 27, 1960 the General Council of the "All Jammm and Kashmir National Confcrence" adopted a resolu- tion which moved by Sheikh Abdullah and ondorsed by Prime Minister Nehro. This lution condemned the "prolonged failure" of the United Nations to solve the Kashnir Digoute, and called for the taking of immediate Soot ” Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA- Ww ROP79RO{0}2A001200020007-8 Lorn -65- tens to convene @ constituent assembly in the Indian-controlled ares of the State for the vuroose of detormining the future form of govern nent and affiliation of the entire State, including Pakistan-held ter ritory. Pakistan denounced thie vlan anf in the following months somo Pakistan officials in nublic addresses and in the vrees made inmliod threats of @ holy var, of 9Jehaa", if the eloctions for the Constituent Acsombly should be held. Pakistan requested that the UN Socurity Council ive urgent consideration to the Kashmir question, take measures to implo~ nent tho perties? comitmonte under the 13 Aucust 1948 and 5 January 1949 TNCIP resolutions, and call mon Indie to refrain from proceeding vith the Constituent Agsenbly, Hovevor, thus far, noithor Shefkh Abdullah nor Nehru have been deterred fron thoir intention of holding the election for the Constituent Assenbly, Daten nresently sot range fron Septonbor 10 to Sextouber 30, varying by ~rovince. The Indian Nows Chronicle of Janvary 20, 1961 stated that one-fourth of total seats in tho Assembly would de left vacant for Pakictan held varte of Kasimir, It added, how over, that "the decisions of the vroposed sovereign body would be suvlix coble to all varts of the State, including Pakisten-held areas, as thay would reflect public ovinion of an overvhelming najority of the State's vemlation = 78 cercent". 2 Ss 2. us B E prime Minister Hequat All Khen of Palcietan followed wm his Government's avpreach in the Security Council by refusing to attend the Conference of Comionvealth Prine Ministers, unless the Conforence would consider the Xaghmir disoute,, Idaquat's fim nosition forced tho Commonvoalth Ministers %o agree to discuss the Kashnir dienate at the Conference, vithout vlacing 4b on the agenda, An official statement issued at tho conclusion of those Anfornal talke indicatod that they were unsuccessful. Liaquat, in a ress confer-nee, @isclosed that three alternative vrovosale advanced by the Gomonvesith Prine Ministers to oncure the eocurity of Kashmir during the ‘olebiseite veriod, vere accerted by him but rojectod by Nehru: (c) Sone of the other Cormomvealth countries should vrovide and nay the excenses of a Commoavealth force to naintain order; (v) A Joint Indian-Pakistan foree should be sot un} (c) ‘the Flebiscite Administrator would bo authorized to reice a local foree from auong tho Kashmiris. the British Foreign and Conmonwealth Relations offices concluded, as & rogult of the failure of these diccussions end Nehru’s adamant intransi= geance, that it vas necoscary to nrese for the earliest vossible action in the Security Council. som Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : ClA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01017A001200020007-8 samt Ti South Page = Tha Graben i anton OSU ‘The UN Security Counci2 on 30 March 1951 ed a resolution snongored by the USeUK delogations, which reaffimed in its vroauble the desize of the vartics to settle Xashmir’s future through a vlebiscite conducted under UN ausoices, and provided for the aroointaent of 8 now UN roorosentative for India and Pakiotan to euacesd to the vlaco vacated ty Sir Oven Dixon, the UN revre= eontative was inetracted to oroceed to the subcontinent and, after console tation with the Govornments of India and Pakistan to offect the dentli~ tarlgation of Kashmir on the basis of the 13 Augnst 1948 and 5 January 1949 ‘UNCIP rosolutions or tn obtain the varties? agreement to a demilitarization ‘plan, The TH reoresentative was also instructed to rovort to the Security Couneil within three months fron tho date of his arrival on the subconti~ nont, If at that tine he had not effected dentlitarization or obtained the varties' agroenont to a denilitarization vlan, tho Ui representative vas to rsnort te the Security Council thoce noints of difference botwoen the vartios which ho considered must be rosolved to enable such demili~ terization to be carried out. The narties vere called tmon, in the event tholr discussions with the UN revrosentative failed in his cninion in full arroenont, to secent arbitration mon all outstanding noints of difference as rovorted by the UH renrouentative. Ne, Frank Grahan, former U, S, Senator and college nresident, vas an- pointed UI renregentativo ani arrivod in the subcontinent on June 2°, 19Fl. He te dus to rovort to the TM Socurity Council ty Scxtonber 2°, 1951, though he may, of course, roquest a delay. t = Ovor the past tuo months tension betveen Indie and Pakistan has been greatly incroased ty a sories of military moves by doth nations, which in cach case vas justified on the ground that it ima undertaken only to counter @ nrevious move by tho other, but vhich has now resulted in almost all of tho combat trams of both fscing each othor in large and threatening border concentrations, Indian armed forces totaling over 460,000 nen outnumbor by about two to one, both in nersonnel and in material, tho Pakistan armed forces vhich total over 240,000 (including Azad Kashuir units), On the Indo-Pakistan order in the Punjab 46,00%~60,000 Pakistan troms face 76,000=90,000 Indians, and hore also,all the amor of both forces ts concentrated, one Paktetan armored brigade ovnosing one Iniian armored Aivision and one Inidan armored Drigade. In Kashmir, Indian forces of 65,000 are onnosed Yy 19,00"20,000 Pakistan trooys, vio are backed w by one Pakistan infantry division of 18,000 hold in resorve at Poshavar, 100 niles vest of the front. In Tast Pakistan, Indian forees of °5,000 in two grouns, are facing Pakistan ‘trons of about 11,000, . Sat Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : GIA-RDP79RO1{Q17A001200020007-8 DUE -7- II. Ob Pak in ie Ae tngiag Tateranta tp Regt = India has a five-fold interest in Kashmir. 1)" Historically the leaders of the Congress Party, and varticu- larly Gandhi and Nebra, suovorted the develoument of a vovular movement in Kaehntr and the demand for the replacement of the Hiniu Maharajah by @ resnonsible goverment that vould reoresent tho vredominantly Muslim oovce lation of the Stato. Congress Party cuvport for Sheikh Abdullah and the local Kashaiz movement throughout the 1930's and 1940's wae vart of the vartyte general camaign in favor of the develounent of vovwlar govorments in the »rincely states during the prewvartition period vhen the Iuslin Loamue eumorted the nrincely rulers. Congress Party sumort for the nouular movement in the etatos was not confinod to moral encouragomont but involved vigorous vublicity and the personal ald and varticination of ton Congress leaders. Both Sandhi and Nehra took nart in nommlar demonstrations in Kechnir against the Hind NahareJah, notably in the Quit Keshnir camoaign launched by Sheikh Abdullah against tho ruler in 1946, which vas “mt down by widorecale volice action, Accordingly, the Congress Party Goverment, and Nehra in ~articular have strong 7oliticel ties and ve-sonal associa~ tions with Kashmir's National Confersnce Party whose avpeal for Indien aid againet the drregular invasion fron Pakistan in October 1947 was matchod ‘by the general lack of vowlar welcome for the invading forces, 2) Closely related to its historical interest in Kashmir is the Congress Party Govern~ nont's concern to deuonstrate that Indie ise secular state and that there are inmortant Muslin grouns who did not stvort the Muslim League demand for Pakistan, Again, toth Gandhi and Nohra played vzominent roles in the Congreec Party's long camaign for Hindu-luslim coopsration and in the adovtion of @ volicy of @ secular state. Those tvo interests undoubtedly account for Prine Ninistor Nohruts adamant stand on Kashmir; viz., his destro to seo his life-time sumort for the vovnlar movonent in Zachnir and for HindwMuslin unity vindicated. Jinnsh's rejection of Nehra!s cuggostion of wlebisciie at the tine of the October invasion in 1947 avocars to have convinced the Indian Prime Minister that Pakistan recognized that the invaders vere not being wel- coned in Kashnir and that it could not win a plebiscite in the state vith out additional military intimidation. \ith the progress of the dispute over Kashmir, the over-riding intorest of most of tho Congress Party and of the veovle generally, has now bocome one of national vrostige, Vie~savis Pakistan, here is general and full swmort for the govermont?s position 4m Zashnir, so that the issue doos not nlay a najor role in Indian domestic polities, There is general detemination to resist any reneval of tho fight= ing by Pakistan ant sumort for Indiete indefinite occusation of the state along the vresent ceaco-fite line, In addition to its three major interests, Indie also has an interest in vrotecting the security of tho nonluslin minority of the state end the more minor interest of oomloting her line of defense against Mbets Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8< 1/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 Approved Ror Release 200 1013 ScORET Soe Indie has virtually no oconomic interests in Kashmir, The estate hac gone valuable forestry resources but India has noither the plans nor the oreenects of exloiting these on any significant scale. Indian-occunied Kaehmir also comands certain rivers feeding into Pakistan but the engincer= ing @ifficulties of diverting these vaters avay from Pakistan make it un Ukely that India could exert any significant economic vressure on Pakistan through control of the water susply. Be stants 1 ix - Pakistan's interoste in Kachmir are as deovly grounded as those of India and pouular excitement over the issue ie noticeably more intense. Pakistan's major intorest in the state is to vindicate ite cleim to all tho Muslim-majority arcas in the subconti~ nent ~ the clain which was the basis for Pakistan's own foundation. It ie this basic claim which hag mado the Kashmir disoute a major issue of conflict with Indie, far outshadowing all other Gisvutes. As in India the dispute has also become one involving national vrestige, both because of the military trooos involved and tho long dinlomatic exchanzes before the UN. National vrestige is also involved in the Pakistan's government's continuous insistence that it would not rost until 4t hed won the entire state. Palistan also has a serious interest in assisting Pakistan's swmorters in the state, large aunbers of vhom are concentrated in Palietan-oceunied territory and are re- lated to Pahari, Punjabi and tribal grows on the Pakiston side of the border. Minally, Palcistan has a security interest in comloting its line of defense against incursions from the north through Sinkiang ty maintaining the integra~ tion which it has achieved between the Pakistan-occuied tribal territory of Glgit and che rest of the northwest frontior trital area, Meonomic interests are not a significant factor in the dismute as Kashmir has few resources which Paristan could readily exoloit. There is enthusiastic vouular suoort in Pakistan for the government's adontion of e firm nosition on the Kashnir issue. Tho announcement of the Kashnir government's intention to convene a Constituent Assembly and the imolication that this carrios of finilizing the status cuo is viewed as a challenge in Pakistan. Goverment officials have taken the initiative in announcing that Paleistan will not accent any such attemt to finslize the status quo. IMaquat Ali enjoys general vublic confidence and resect and hie demonstrated ability effoctively to. eunvress ovmosition grouns makes it une Likely that his government vould fall in the event that Sheikh Abdullah! government roceeded with the Constituont Assembly. Nevertheless the vrestige of both government and country may seen to the Pakistanis to require some dramatic action which will either seriously handicap or discredit the pro~ vosed Assenbly. O. Mintmun demands of India and Palsistan ~ Althouch both Indie and Pakistan claim the richt to the entire stete doth would orobably be vrevared to accent less. Infia hag made it cle=r that it is vrevared to accent the ~resent cease-fire line which includes the Kashmir area oecunied by the bulk 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 Approved For ReleSS@22D1/08/31 :Approved Rgy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R0{QJ2A001200020007-8 en -90 of tho National Conference Party sumorters and vortions of the Janm and Iadakh areas ocewvicd by most of the state's non-Muslim minorities. Pakistan would also probably be vrenarod to confine itself to Ladakh an@ the Muslim majority districts in the rest of the state. Both these minimun claims, however, inclute the Kashmir Valley area and ite hintor- land, tho Fuddhist mart of Indalh. While both might agree to a vartial plebiscite, confined to the disouted districts, neither side avoears vrevared to accent the vlebiscite conditions ineisted on by the other and oithor side would have difficulty in receding from any territory which it now ocewtes excent through military force. TIT. Indie’ and Probable 1 A. Indian Military Canabilitios = Although India's military forces are double those of Palcistan, Indian government leaders, and particularly Nehru, have renoatedly stated that they do not want war vith Pakistan, Fiold rovorts also indicate that India recognizes that such a war night be vrolonged and costly and would ond tho country's vrosent hoves fox economic develounent. The vresont ceasenfire Lino was achioved after a year of fiehting and although there has beon some strengthening of the forces on both sides both Indian Government and military leaders have increasingly tended to accest the ine as a nermnont one, annarently in the view that difficulties of terrain would continue to nrevent India from making any significant gains in Kashmir without invading Pakistan. India might hove to make some inmortant gains with the aid of a limited invasion of Pelistan, but tho fact that India already occunies the areas in which it is most vitally interested and the desire to avoid involvement in a goneral var with Pakistan have acted as deterronts. Although Afghanistan would vrobably attonnt to exploit Pakistan's difficulties the relative weaknoss of the Afghan military forces and the goverment'e own domestic difficulties make it unlikely that Afchan action could seriously handican Pakistan. 3. = With the convening of the Constitucnt Assembly, Sheikh Abdulleh vith Indian cusport is vrearing to convert his vrosent carotaker administration into a more representative goverment. There are four main advantages which both Abdullah and India may hove to fain from the underteking to suport a revresentative assembly and the subsoduont reorganization of the government, 1) To strengthen India’s formal ties with the state by a doclaration of a popularly elected assembly favoring accession to India, as India's ties currently rest on the acces sion of the Hindu Maharajah, now retired, and the informal anveal for aid from Shoikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference Party; 2) to dononatrate India's readiness to sumort vonular government in Kashmir as a contrast to the allegedly Limited movers exercised ty the Azad goverment in Pakictan-occunied aroas; 3) to give us vide a grown as vossible 2 stake a SECRER Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Rgy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R0{QY2A001200020007-8 merep -10- in the oresent regine, thus diverting attention fron the quoction of accession to intornal olitical develowmonte; and 4) to convert the governnont fron a tennorary to a vormanont basis and vave the vay for accenting the ~recent ceaco-fire line ag a nermanont boundary. The fact that Indie is sumorting the vlan for a state constituont assombly annears to indicate that Delhi does not oxvect that the UN or eny other outedde source 15 likely to cause Pakistan to vithdraw ite forces from the state and that India is prevared to accent the vresent vartition of the state as final. ©. Indian Intentions ~ India’s obvious interest in neaceful con @itions for the olections for the Constituent Assembly announced for Fashnis, the fact that India holds most of Kashmir including the much vrizot anf desired Yalo, India's avarenees that a vrolonged var would endanger economic stability, indicate that the country does not vartico- larly wish to become involved in var. In fact, ac the firet announce- rent of the Kachnir election clans inncdiately vrovoked belligerent threats by Pelcistan tho original movement of troons nay vell hove been designe’ as mrotection amainst any Pakistan attemts to interfore with the elections, ‘ith the mounting hostility of tho nress and of oublic officinls in Pakistan, hovever, Iniie’s Prine. Minister has announced that India will use all of its resources to resist eny military action ‘by Pakistan an@ that any attack on Kashmir will be viowec as an attack on Intia itesolf. This varning annears to havo @ two-fold vursose: 1) to goter Pakistan from any military action against Kashmir ani ?) to dtcabuse Paristen of any {dea that Indie might bo afraid of var vith Pakistan. Iast your Nohru invited Pakistan to join India in dcclering that noithor side ould attenst to settle ite mutual diswutes by resort to war. Pakistan's rejection of the offer and tho subsequont militancy in the tone of officiel Pakictan statements lod to the belief in India that Pakinten had interoreted Nohru's overture as a sign of Indian vealness and an xdmieeion that India foarea it would lose ground in Kashair if Pakisten vere to resune tho canvaign. D. Pros ané Cons of Rosortinz to liar = India is not Likely to vrocivitate var. Avart from its strong desiro to build iteclf uw in- tomally in order to play a major role in world affairs, there is the fact that it already holds the Kasheir aroas in which it is nost vitally interested, dts recomition thet an alleout var with Pakictan would not noan any autck or easy victory but would Involve heavy losses in on, money and materials, and the donger of internal commumal riots and the consecvont strain on relations vith Iucline in Keehuir. There is little ausetion, hovever, that tho Nchra govermont vould win trenenious vrestiyro and swort if it cowl? zain sono Pakistan territory end inflict sone iimortant military defcats. There vould be Little »rectige or advantace for tho fovernnont, hovevor, if the Infian amy oncvuntored he=ry lossos Approved For Release 280008731 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8‘Approved RpyRelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01QJ2A001200020007-8 et cue or got bogged down in a stalomated canmaign. Accordingly, if Pakistan should renew the attack in Kashmir it eoens prob ble that the Indian governnent would for volitical reaspns attemot to move into Vest Punjab, concentrating on sone limited objectives that Indie might hove to hold normancntly, such as the district of Sialkot which connands imortant southern avoroaches into Kashmir and norhans certain Sikh holy pleces nearest to the vresent Indo-Pakistan border. Fighting might aleo break out in Fast Pakistan. B, There has boen general vounlar support for the Iniian Govern- nont's warning to Pakistan that India is vrevared for war if Pakistan vents it, However, this has not been followed by any gonoral vress cammaicn demanding var with Pakistan, Such as avvcarod last yoar in the West Bengal vress during the communal trouble in Mast Pakisten. Further more, renorts from the field do not indicate any noticeable increase in communal tension. On tho contrary, India's interest in nromoting a good atmoenhere for the Rachnir eloctione and in bolstering its claims to the state can be exnected to result in svecial efforts to suppress militant communal elenents. Any significant increase in cormunal tension and in the ovt-flow of refugees from Hast Pakistan, however, would vrovoke inmediete reactions in Yest Rengel, reviving the denand for nilitary intorvention or a retaliatory war. F, India may be excected to continue to refuco all suggestions for a vlebisclte in Kashmir unlees the conditions incluie the comlete with- drawal of Pakistan's forces anf the disarming and disbandment of all nilitent grows in the state, effective guarantees against all religious apoeals or efforts to whip wn religious fanaticism and recognition of Abaullch's record as the leader of the vovular novenent in the state. Accordingly, there anvears to be little chance of its accepting alternative UN reconnendations. Instead India can be exected to continus vith ite present orogram of arranging for the conversion of the Kaehnir govern nont in the Iniian-occunied areas fron a tenvorary to a vermanent basis. TY. Pekistan's canabilitios and Probable Intentions ‘B. Pakisten’s Political Canabilities + Pakistan's volitical cana- ‘vilitics for obtaining a favorable solution of the Kashnir vroblom are very limited. The UN vrovides Pakistan with its vrincival non-military moans of sogicinz @ favorable sottlenent, but it avvears highly doubtful vhethor the UM can find common ground for such a cettlencnt before the end of 1951, Both India and Pakistan have agreed in vrincinle that the question of Kashnir's accession should be decided ty an impartial plobi= seite under IM ausnices but neither country is nrevared to accent the plebiscite contitions insisted on by the other. In view of this fact there seem to be little possibility of the Graham Mission's getting the tvo countries to agree on @ vrocedure for holding the vlobiscite. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved RopRelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO{0174001200020007-8 SUCREE = Pakistan leaders although far from confident of the UN's ability to solve tho Kashnir nroblen avparently have rot yet abandoned all hope that satisfactory solution may eventvally be reached. ‘Thore oven seems to be sone slizht hone that the Graham Mission may euccood in winning sufficient concessions from Nehra to break the nresent inmasse and to make some vrog- ress vosattle, At least one Pakistan Minister has expressed the onin‘on that Nohra 4s not conolotely insensitive to orld coinion regarding Keshnir ani that he might modify his Intransigent attitude 17 Graham and tho Ti exerted sufficiently strong pressure. Pakistan has not as yet been able to enlist sufficient susort fron tho Comnonveelth or eleovhero abro2d to oxert significant cressure on Indie for a settlement of the Kashnir issus. Hovever, cortain Connon~ wealth countries have made a vroposal vhich {f carriod out might make possible some nrogress tovard a solution. ‘This vrovosal contenmlates the revlecing of the Indian and Pakistan troovs now in Xashnir by Commonwealth forces. India would be unlikely to accovt such a vroposel, but Pakistan might possibly agree to having its forcos in Kashmir replaced by Connon- wealth troons even if the Indians rofused to withdray theirs, This action by Pakistan vould leave India with little excuse for then refusing to withdray te oun troove from Kashmir. C. Palsistents Probable Intentiong ~ If Pakistan's leaders wero motivated solely by rational and vrudential ensiderations there would be 14ttlo 1ikelShood of Pakisten's resorting to ars as the groun’s for such a course are far out-weighed by those for avoiding var. Unfortur tately, hovevor, there ts a dangor that Pakistan's loadors may bo carriod away by their emotions. If tho Kashmir Constituent Acsombly olections are held and go unrebuked by tho UN and the Grahan Mirsion revort 1e unsatice factory to the Pakistanis their feolings may be heightened to the extent that emotion overcones reason, As long ea UN action nolds out sone hope to the Pakistanis of their ultimately achieving their oe] in Keshnir by voaceable moans, Pakistan may rofrain fron doliberate rosort to arms. There is, how ever, always the vossibility in view of the present high state of tonsion detwoon India and Pakistan that border clashes, communal disturbancos or other untoward incidents may sot off hostilitics detwoon the two countries, In order to sustain the flagging hopes of the Patistenis for a neaceful settlomont of tho Kashnir issue in the event Grahan is unablo to work out sone sort of mutually satisfactory agrooment between India and Pakisten, tho UN would probably have to take action strongly condemning tho Conctituent Assembly eloctions and vlacing the onus for the failure of the Grehan Mix sion on India, and indicate ite intention of making further efforts to achieve & settlement of the Kachnir sroblen. It is Delieved that the ton Palistan loadors do not vant e war with, India as they realize that such a war would be economically ruinous and micht even result in ending Palcstan's existence as an indovendent stato. Approved For Release S66¥88/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8, ijApproved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RQ1012A001200020007-8 Sz -15- Novertheless if they became convinced that thore was no hove of gaining vosseasion of Kashmir (or at least the greater vart of it including the Yale) by non-military means they might as a last decvcrate exvedient or from rage and frustration resort to ams. If the situation should cone to this, the Paitstanis would vresumably attemot limited aseaults in Kashmir, utflizing trivesmen and local Azad Kashnir forces and hone to Limit the fighting to the area. Noither Paidistan’s military actions nor the volitical statements of its leaders eince the redeployment of India's troons has as yet indicated @ desire to provoke war, They have, however, shown no lack of readiness to fight should 1 become neceseary. ‘The otatoments of Pakistan nolitical leaders have moreover been fiery and far from concilivtory in tone and have in every possible vay sought to out India in the wrong. All the old charges stotming from Intia"s vast actions in Kashmir have boen reiterated grain and again. Indiats use of force to imelomont the accession of Junagadh and Hyderabad and India's recent intervontior in Nenal have boon coniemned while, with regard to the vresent, India hae been accused of using @ show of force to strengthen its hold on Kashmir and of wishing to destroy Palistan altogether. D. Prog and Go a Deliberate Resort to War stan =. There pear to be three considerations that might lead Pakistan deliberately to undertoke arted actions in Kashmir: (1) The Pakistanis might hope that by reovening hostilities in Kashnir they could succeed in focusing world attention on the Kashair issue and stimilate the UM into taking some strong action. 7 (2) Poowlar nressure to free the Muslims in Kashmir from Hindu domination. (8) Utter hovelessnese and frustration regemiing Kashmir which might couse the Pakistan loaders to orefer a financially rainous and perhape devastating var vith Indta to allow Inlia to gain Kashnir without @ fight. These three considerations are none of thon, objectively and mtionally considered, strong. Pakistan's chances of winning Kashmir by force of ams are voor. Prior to the redeployment of Indian troone in early July © basty thrust by Pakistan in Kechnir might have succeded in upsetting the statue quo and rosulted in the establishnont of a new cease-fire line with adal. tional arcas of Kashmir under Pakisten control. But conditions have now changed. Any attemt by Pakistan to take military action in Kashmir will now be vromtly net by strong Indian resistance. Tut aven if, as is dovdt= ful, Pakistan could confine hostilities to Kashmir and avoid all-out var, Approved For Relead&i8/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Foy Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R0{012A001200020007-8 SEL “ue there scems Little chance that Pakistan could groatly enlarge its vresent holdings. Moreover, it spooars likely that India, as it has threatened, would rovly to any Pakistan thrust in Kushmir by a counter thrust in tho Punjad and vossibly Hast Pakistan. Tho possibility of Pekistan vublic opinion forcing the Government of Pokistan to undertake military action in Kashmir ig not oasy to estimate. Observers in the field are agrood that vublic opinion, although aroused and quite ready to suoport the Government should it declare war on Indi is not at vresent at such viteh as to force the Governmont to take military action. The failure of the Graham Mission and the holding of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly eloctions are ovents which, if they ocour, will further erouse novular feoling but whether to the noint of forcing the Governnont to wer 1g uncertain. However, in view of the fact that the Goverment of Peldsten hag in the vast been able to exert a very coneiderable measure of control over vowular sentiment and oninion, it apoears probable that the Government of Pakistan can, if it wishes, keep popular feeling under control. The danzor of its gotting out of hand cannot, howover, be entirely dismissed and that there is @ vossibility of war from this causo cannot be denicd, That Palcistan’s leaders would be willing to risi: the very exietence of thoir young nation by going to war vith IniJa for the voseession of Feshnir is, desvite tho ovidont irrationality of such position, an evontue ality that cannot altogether be @isnissed. ‘There is no question but that virtually all Pakistan leoéere (and the great majority of shetr follovers) fool strongly that the non-inclusion of Kashmir tn Palistan vould violate tho fundanental mrincinle of Pakistan nationalien and 1s @ eituation vhich they could never willingly accept as final. It is therefore not incon- eoivable that the fanaticlen which lios in the heart of Islamic Pakistan might bocome aroused to the voint of counterbalancing reason and orudonce with the result that Paldstan would move against India regardless of the woighty reasons for avoiding such a course, Chief among the consideration which would lead Pacistan to seek to avoid war are India's greater military strength and resources and the fact that Indien amy stands roady to move against Pakistan at any time. Not only 4s Pakisten's initial position less fevorable than that of India, but what is more inmortant, ite ability to obtain additional military swplies is much inferior, Unlike India, Pakistan has virtually no munitions industry and a Ux embargo on the shinment of ams to these countrics in the event of an outbroak of hostilitics between then would affect Pakistan far nore adversely than it vould India as Vest Palcetan has but one vort (Karachi) through which militery sulies might be emaggled. In view of these facts Pakistan has little chance of wiming a war with India ang would inevitably suffer severe losses, both hunan and econonic. SECRER Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Foy Release 2001/08/31 : C1A-ROP79RO{Y}2A001200020007-8 eet -15- The difficulty of defending Mast Pakistan because of ite exposed position is doubtless a consideration that influences tho Pakistanis in the assessment of their ctrength viewa-vis India but it cannot be oxpected to act as a major deterront to var. Pakistani Jeaders orobably have no great fear of attack by Afghanistan in the event of var with India and are therefore not measurably deterred on this account. Nor are the Palcistanis sensitive in any marked degree to the fact that war betwoen India and Paldstan would woaken the area in the face of @ Soviet threat, Neither aro Pakistanis leaders soriously deterred by the nossibility of adverse world and Commonwealth opinion, B, The vossibility of the Pakistan army's getting out of control and taking uneuthorized action in Kashmir, although vrobably not great, doce exist. Considerable dissatisfaction with the government in general and with ite Kashmir volicy in varticular is known to oxist in amy circles, Indeed the anti-governmont plot nipned in the bud by the Govermnont of Pakistan last goring was vrimarily,the work of a groun of dissatisfied Pakistan army officers who’ planned the reneval of hostilities in Kashmir as vart of the basis of their coup. Some communists were involved in the plot, but the degree of conmmist varticivation is not altogether clear. ‘The Govornment of Pakistan dealt vigorously with tho conspirators and on the basis of the conmunist involvenent has lockod up most of the invortant conmunist leaders. By these actions the Governnent has lessened, although probably not entirely eliminated, the noseibility of a second attempt on the vart of the amy to take unauthorized military action. v. Wc of Nott to Affe s! 5 to tho Bnd of 1952 The vrosoects that tho Graham Mission may succecd in arranging a denili+ tarization of Kashnir or even agreenent on vlans for tho dem{litarization in accordance with the Narch 30, 1951 Security Council resolution are poor, UN revresentative Grahan has revorted a cooverative attitude in Pakistan but regards Nehru as the chief obstacle to a settlement. There is a slight chance that some anveal to the combination of vanity and idealiem in Nehra's makeup might be effective through offering to him a unique evportunity to set an exammle to the vorld as an exvonent of veace. The chance must, hovever, be reckoned @ slim one, Shovld Graham fail it is unlikely that the Security Council could ef fectively awvly fores to effoct a solution of the Kachmir imbroglio. If hostilities broke out, however, the Security Council vould orobably find it- self comvelled to issue a new cease-fire, In tho absence of hostilities efore the end of 1951 one oF more of the following steps might be taken. GREE Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R0{012A001200020007-8 SECRET -16- 1. Consideration of the findings and reconmendations of the Graham Mission's revort either by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, followed by euch action by the UN as the Graham recommendations might eug- gest. . 2. The Security Council might Ask India and Pakistan for explanations regarding troon novenents and call woon then to maintain an atmosphere favorable to the vromotion of further negotiations. 3, The Security Council might develop a detailed statement’ of the exact vay in which the Council believes the demiiitarization and vlebiscite should be carried out. The British, with whom this proposal originated, also suggested that once this sten was taken the Security Council should, at loast for the time being, make no further efforts to solve the Kashair problem, This provosal was advanced by the British orior to the develom ments of June-Tuly 1951, 4, In addition to cvolving @ detailed vlan regarding denilitariza- tion and nlebiscite, some form of continuing mediatory machinery might. be sect un by the UN. This could take the form of a UN reprosentative with an indefinite term of office who could revort vrogress to the Security Council at svecified periods. This vossibility was a US addition to the British sugrestion outlined above and vas aleo made rior to the incidents of Juno~ July 1961. 5, The Kashmir issue might be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly either in November or at the Seventh Session in 1952 and eithor with or without removing the question fron the list of oroblems with which the Security Counei1 1s concerned, Tho UK UN delegation 4s revorted to favor turning the Kashnir problom over to the General Assenbly. Underly- ing ouch an action is the hopo that India might be more sensitive to the ‘weight of vorld opinion as exorocsed by the General Acsombly than to the resolutions of the enaller Security Council which India vrobably regards as dominated by the US and UK. 6. ‘The exvansion of the UN military observer grou» and the extension of ite patrols to those vortions of the Indo-Pakistan border near which there are troo concentrations, 7, The placing of Kashmir under a UN trusteoshin. 8, The ostablichnent of @ condominium, 9, Tho creation of a UN develoment and observation authority. 10. An attenmt to got India and Pakistan to agree to administer existing territory along azreed lines, 4. e., to accent de facto narti- tion vending @ de_iure settlement. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 ‘SECRELApproved Fg Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO1912A001200020007-8 ‘Secper -17- VI Vat ore the Probable Developments in the Neer Futurag ‘Tensions have mounted dangerously particulerly in Pekistan, The Gegree to which Pakistan leaders have gone out on a limb publicly in their expressions concerning Kashuir is perhaps best exemplified by a recent epeech Of Liequat Ali Khan. On August 13 he declared that Pekistan wuld never accept Keshmir as a part of Indian territury and stated that he v.uld shed his ova blood to defend Pakisten. In this public advance of Pakistan leaders, close to if not beyond the point of no return in their public utterances, lies, we believe, the greatest danger. If responsible Pakistan leadere. vere moved only by Feeson, lvgic and cold calculation there vould probably be no ver. But the degree to which their ovn emotional windup may propel then ie both unpredictable and the key factor in the present situation. War 18 not likely to be precipitated by India since India already holds most of Keshnir. But Indian intrensigeance in the face of seen- ingly endless UH proposals for solution of the Kathmir dispute has driven Pakisten leaders so close to frustration and desperation that 4f the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is convened, as it is very likely to be, and 4f the Graham Mission and subsequent UN action fails to produce in the minds of the Pakistanis even a faint hope of successful UM action in their behalf, then there is a real denger that they may attempt once again to resort to localized military action in Keshmir. Pakistan will not wieh to precipitate an all-out var. However, if hope of amy successful solution short of force of arms fades, it nay attempt limited essaults in Kesbuir, utilizing tribesmen ond Local Azed Kashmir forces in an effort to focus world attention on ite fustration and speed world action and vorid opinion to farce ‘Indie to take a less adamant position. Pakistan will hope to avoid an ell-out war by claiming that the action in Kesbuir is a spontaneous iceal uprising cf Muslim residents unconnected wits the Pakisten Govern- went. It is probable, hovever, that India will counter by attempting %o move into the West Punjeb. Hostilities, in turn, vould thus likely be extended to the Bengals. A resumption of commual slaughter would undoubtedly result. If the Graham reyort, hovever, and subsequent US action, can suc- ceed in even holding out the hope to Pakistan that all doors of action short of force are not closed, it may, we believe, be willing to sllow ‘ensione to relex and permit the iscue to run into 1952 unresolved. ‘There was more danger that Pakistan would resort to force upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly prior to the Indien movenent of ‘troups to the frontier. Befcre this Pakistan might have huped to achieve quick and limited local successes vith effective Indien Stcasr Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Fer Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01912A001200020007-8 SECRET -B- retaliation questionable. How it must be clear to Pakisten that ‘any nove upon ita part will be strongly opposed end any gains oil) be at considerable cost. This realization, plus a UN door still ‘held open by Grahum, may yet avert war on the subcontinent. Scusr Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved FepRelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01Q12A001200020007-8 SECRET -1- Vil. Mhat Effect could These Probable Developments Have on United ““Btates Sex curity taterestep ee tes War on the subcontinent vould have @ very serious impact on US Security interests. Extended costly hostilities, if they should cceur, Would so veoken both India end Pakisten as to meke the maintenance of orderly governuent a matter of question. Particularly Severe vould be the impact on the economy of Indie of o prolonged var accompanied by vast commmeal disturbances end the zesulting increase in the severity of the refugee problem. In the four years since independence, India's basic problem of supporting e dense population with a backvard and bedly orgonized econumy hos become progressively Rore acute. Tbe strains of var on a patchvork econuay might be sufficiently dierupting t. enable the Indien Communists with the eid of their Chinese comrades, tu take over in Indie. If the Communists gained contrul uf India, neighboring states would -be exposed to military threat from the flenk. The Soviets Would ve enabled to threaten (if nut completely dominate) the prin- cipal communications routes between Europe and the Far Bast in tine of var, end Asian opinion would be driven toverd the view that Con munion represented the “wave of the future”. Suutheast Asia would probably fell completely under Communist domination. The relatively pro-Weotern governments of Pakistan and Ceylon would find it dif- ficult, if not impossible, to teke a fim position against Suviet or Chinese aggression even if strong Western military support vere forthcoming. Heutralism would be greatly encouraged in Iran, the Arab Neer East, and in the Philippines. Not only would the West be deprived of the strategic and essential materials of South Aeia such as manganese, mica, graphite; ete, but the probeble fall of Southeast Asia with ite rubver, tin, o41, and food surpluses would be an even more serivus loss. Purther- more the probable inmobilization of Pakistan vould deprive the West of excellent air bases from which to bomb Soviet Centrel Asian indus- triel facilities in the event of en all-out ver between the US and the USSR. A Ccmmmist Indie would immediately add to the military power of the Soviet bloc an army cf about 400,000 men, a navy con Sisting of a cruiser, three destroyers, and miscellancous smaller craft, and a small air force composed largely of World War II type sirereft. India 1s believed to have about 1,500,000 trained reserves and, given Soviet equipaent, might, in time, develop en army comparable ‘to thet of the Chinese Coumuniste. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Far Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01042A001200020007-8 SECRET -20- Bven if the consequences of var should be soothing 1ess than 2 Communist teke-over, political etability in the subcontinent vould be gravely threatened by ¢ prolonged conflict end the ensuing chaos and economic and fineaciel pressures would severely weaken, Af not destroy, those groups presently most favorably disposed to US security interests in the area. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Rejease 2001/08/31 CIA-RDP7SRO1012A901200020007-8 - ae APPENDIX A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT ZVEWIS IN THE KASHNIR DISPUTE. ager Octuber 20 Octuber 26 Octuber 27 Jenuery 1 January 20 April 21 guly 7 August 13 Armed tribesmen frun the Northwest Frontier Province entered Kashmir. ‘The Mobereja of Kashmir acceded te India; He ennuunced be would set up a popular yuvermment under Sheikh abdulleh. Lurd Mountbatten, um behalf of the Guvernnent cf Indie, accepted the accession of Kashmir to Indie end ordered Indian troops into Keshuir in support of the etate forces. He also stated that as soon as lew and order were established the question of accession would be finally determined by a "reference to the people”. ‘The Governnent of India protested to the Security Council of the United Nations cherging that Pakistan had aiced the Kashmir invaders and asked United Natione help in preventing any further essistance. ‘he Security Council established a United Natione Commission on India and Pakisten to investigate the facts in the dispute and to exercise a mediating influence. The Security Council passed a resolution instructing the UNCIP to proceed tu the subcontinent, tu place its yood offices st the disposal of buth governnents end to aid in the restoration of peace and the hold- ing of a plebiscite. The resolution also suggested the terms for troop vithdraval and the holding of a plebiscite. United Nations Commission on Indie and Pakistan arrived in Karachi. ‘The Commission passed a resolution esteblishing the terms for withdrawal of troops end the conditions for a plebiscite. Resolution ultimately accepted by both India and Pakistan. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08fS1-CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CA-RDP79R01012A901200020007-8 ghg January 1. January 5 July Decenber 17 December 17 February 3 March 14 April 12 Mey 27 suly 20-24 July-August August 16 ctober-January Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : ‘SECRET Se Informal preliminary cease-fire was ordered. UNCIP passed resolution regarding the conditions necessery for assuring a free and fair plebiscite. Resolution accepted by both parties. Cease-fire line demarcated. ‘The Commission reported to the Security Council ite “ailure to bring about the major objective of holding a plebiscite. It called for the appointuent of & Single negotiator to continue efforts to bring the governments together. ‘The Security Council appointed Cenade's General McWNeughton, then Council President, to meet with the ‘two parties. Discussions were carried on through January, 1950. General McNaughton reported that his efforts had been unsuccessful, that Pakistan had accepted his propusals but that India did not agree on the major iesues. ‘The Security Council passed a resolution based on General NeNaughton's Februery report, calling for the two governnents to execute « demiliterization prouren within five months. Pakistsn accepted the resolution, but India hed major reservevions. Sir Owen Dixon of Australie was appointed United Nations representative. His appointment was accepted by doth governments. Sir Oven Dixon arrived in New Delhi to begin talks. Joint talks held between the two Prine Ministers and Sir Owen Dixon. No agreement reached. Sir Oven Dixon worked out @ proposal for withéreval of troups, partition, and plebiscite in the Valley only. Nehru refuses Sir Owen's suggestions and his con- ditions for holding « plebiscite. ‘The beginning of efforts by the United States and the United Kingdom to find an equitable basis for e plebiscite. 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 ‘SECRETApproved Far Release 2001/98/31 CIA-RDP79R010424001200020007-8 1950 (continued) October 10 October 27 December 14 January 9-15 February 21 Merch 1 arch 6 varch 8 March 10 March 21. March 29 March 30 April 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : ~3- Tentative United States-United Kingdom plan propused. Generel Council uf the All-Jenmu-Keshsir Hativnal Con- ference called for the convering of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. Sir Zafrulleh Khan protested to the Security Council ection of the Kashmir National Conference. During the Comonvealth Conference in London, discus- sions were held regarding Kashmir. No avreenent vas reached, although the area of disagreement wat alle.ed to have been narrowed. ‘The US-UK draft resolution was presented to the Security Council. Sir B. N. Rau in the Security Council reasserted India's position, and reaffiraed India’s ecceptance of the August 13, 1948 and Januery 5, 1949 resolu tions. Announced that his government was opposed to the US-UK reeolution. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan voiced position of Pakisten, reaffirmed acceptability of present resolution and Pekistan willingness to accept arbitration to sclve deadlock. Ambassador Munz of Brazil put forth his propesuls for settlement. Sir B. H. Rau rejected the Brazilian proposals. A revised US-UK Graft resolution was presented to the Security Council. Sir B. N. Rau rejects the arbitretion proposals of the revised resolution alsu.. Insisted that Pakistan had no right to be consulted in matters of demili- tarization. ‘The Security Council adopted US-UK reculuticn. Sir Mshammed Zafrulieh Khan said Pakistan fully accepted the resoluticn. SECRET 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8Approved Fax Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP7ERO10{24001200020007-8 1g>1_(continued April 30 April 30 Mey 29 dune 1-6 June 26 guly 3 Suly 10-14 duly 15 ouly 16 duly 17 auly 18 duly 26 ~auly 30 SECRET ~ oh Dr. Frank Graham vas appointed United Nations representative for India and Pakisten. Kashmir Council issued 2 proclamstion calling for the convening of a Constituent assembly end pro- viding for elections. ‘The Security Council authorizes its President te write India and Pakistan regarding the Council's apprehension over the proposed Kashmir Constituent Assembly. ALL Jammu and Kashmir National Conference unani- mously endorses decision to convene « Constituent Assembly with elections set for September. An- nounced that the terms of the March 30 resolution vere "wholly unacceptable”. Dr. Graham left New York for India. Kashmir Govern- ment spokesman states Grahem would be received but ‘that he could not establish headquarters in Srinagar. Indie issued complaint to the Security Council over Pakistan violations of the cease-fire line. India moved the bulk of her combat troops near Pakistan borders. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan virea Nehru strongly protesting troop movenents. A protest was also delivered to the Security Cuuncil. Prime Minister Nehru admitted troups had been moved neer Pakistan borders, but insisted they vere there for defense purposes only. Nehru telegraphed Liaquat stating that India had no intention of taking aggressive action. Pakistan troop movements completed. Ldaquat wired Nehru offering a five point peace Propose] and extending an invitation te Nehru to visit Karachi. Nehru rejected Liaquat's invitation in a return telegram, seying that withdrawal of Indien troops an unacceptable condition. Urged a Joint "no-war" Approved For Release 2001/6H942301-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8. Approved Fey Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP7ERO10424001200020007-8 1gpi._ (Continued) August 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : SECRET -25- declaration, end invited Lisquat to Delhi “without eny pre-conditions" « Liaquet declined Nehru's invitetion to come to Delhi. Denied Nehru's cleim that Kashmir is Indian territory since accession still to ‘ve decided. Urged Nehru once again to accept five-point plan and reneved his invitation to Nehru to visit Kerachi. 1A-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8 ‘SECRET