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What numbers could not be PAUL BENACERRAF ‘he attention ofthe mathematica fess primar faces primary upon mathe matical srt, ands ill dh ares Gn pa) fom ‘in that a ven theory vb so ant sich a same, fom ‘rin how one srs model" inane, or aon ‘ome new struct an shoving Row it elas o previo sted hes. Bethe athena wate slong o be has ane “ties oF “objets” (rt or mambo Tanto of sac" “pois") 0 Work with snd edo ot ingle in their inner character or ontological status. i. The phsepica lin, on theo hand, s more serie 0 sates of ontology and wil te ep inersed the tnd or Wino ents there realy He wil ot Be ied th ‘ein tidmee tht cand ch cls et sch and such satheaticalsructire. He wil wish tongue move dee io ‘ha theese ow the rele oe ens Ao he ‘ilwishoask wheter te ent Get wih su geno her icin sone see reat (or continents oa, ethane more fundaretletes kat aac, Intention and Decision Wen bn. ou dea ony wht ey th ante opto cnt soda abet ee aon be mame st blog ote soe sneer fey et ef fies comp ase ube es Crearooonpee et ‘ther ht same flr conga af Gate sae ak. = ttc, The Foundation of Arithmete 1. The education Imagine Emie and Johnny, sons of two militant k nag Sons of two militant logicists ~ children who ‘have not been taueht in the vulgar (old-fashioned) way but for whom the Mach of be work MESheAR nah on spews one whi be aur bd «Proce and Gable at Princeton Unies. Ths pet scksowede, Lam ace m What numbers could not be pedagogical order of things has been the epistemological oder. They did hot learn straight off how to count. Instead of beginning their mathe- matical training with arithmetic as ordinary men know it, they first learned logic ~ in their case, actually set theory. Then they were told about the numbers. But (0 tell pople in their position about the num bers was an easy task ~ very much lke the one which faced Monsieur Jourdain’s tutor (who, oddly enough, was a philosopher) The parents of ‘our imagined children needed oaly to point out what aspect or part of ‘what the children already knew, under other names, was what ordinary people called “numbers.” Learning the numbers merely involved learning new names for familiar sets. Old (set-theoretic) truths took on new (number-theoreti) clothing. ‘The way in which this was done will, however, bear some scrutiny and reexamination, To facilitate the exposition, I will concentrate on Ernie fad follow his arithmetical education tots completion. 1 wil then return to Jobnny. It might have gone as follows. Ernie was told that there was a set whose members were what ordinary people refered to asthe (natural) ‘numbers, and that these were what he had Known all along as the ele- rents of the (infinite) set U. He was further told that there was relation defined on these “numbers” (henceforth I shall usually omit the shudder ‘quotes, the less-han relation, under which the numbers were well Ordered. This relation, he learned, was really the one, defined on 3, for which he had always used the letter “R."” And indeed, speaking incu tively now, Ernie could verify that every nonempty subset of BE con- tained a “least element - tha is, ne that bore R to every other member of the subset, He could also show that nothing bore R to ise, and that R was transitive, antisymmetric, irrflerive, and connected in 2. In ‘hort, the elements of 2 formed a progression, or series, under R. ‘And then there was 1, the smallest number (for reasons of future con- venience we are ignoring 0). Ernie learned that what people had been feferring to as I was realy the element aof SL the first, oF least, clement fof SU under R. Talk about "successors" (each number is said to have ‘one) was easly translated in terms of the concept of the “next” member ‘of St (under R). At this point, it was no trick to show that the assump- tions made by ordinary mortals about numbers were in Fact theorems for Ernie, For on the basis of his theory, he could establish Peano’s axioms ~ ‘an advantage which he enjoyed over ordinary mortals, who must more oF ‘o Pal Ziff for hi pl comments onan eater drat of thi paps Reprtad with tne Kind pom of the eos from the Phiosphia Reiew mise m less take them as given, or self-evident, or meaningless-but-useful, of ‘what have you." ‘There are two more things that Erie had to learn before he could truly be sad to be able to speak with the vulgar. It had to be pointed out 0 him which operations on the members of X were the ones referred 10 a8 “‘addition,”” “multiplication,” “exponentiation,” and so forth. And here again he was in a position of epistemological superiority. For where as ordinary folk had to introduce such operations by recursive definition, 4 euphemism for postulation, he was in position to show that these ‘operations could be expiicty defined. So the additional postulates assumed by the number people were also shown to be derivable in his theory, once it was seen Which set-theoretic operations addition, multi- plication, and so forth really are. ‘he last element needed to complete Ernie's education was the expla- ‘nation of the applications of these devices: counting and measurement. Fr they employ concepts beyond those as yet introduced. But forts- nately, Emie was ina position to see what it was that he was doing that corresponded to these activities (we will concentrate on counting, assum- Ing that measurement can be explained either similarly or in terms of counting). There are two kinds of counting, corresponding to transitive and intransitive uses of the verb “to count.” In one, “counting” admits of 8 direct object, asin “counting the marbles”: in the other it does not. The ‘ase have in mind is that of the preoperative patient being prepared for the operating room. The ether mask is placed over his face and he i told {0 count, as far as he can. He has not been instructed to count anything at all, He has merely been told to count. A likely story is that we norm ally learn the first few numbers in connection with sets having that ‘number of members ~ that is, in terms of transitive counting (hereby learning the use of numbers) and then learn how to generate "the rest” of the numbers. Actually, “the est” always remains relatively vague matter, Most of us simply learn that we wll never run out, that our nota- tion will extend as far as we will ever need to count. Learning these Words, and how fo repeat them in the right order, is learning intransitive counting. Learning their use as measures of sets is learning transitive ‘counting. Whether we learn one kind of counting before the other is {immaterial so far asthe initial numbers are concerned. What is certain, ‘and not immaterial, is that we will have to learn some recursive pro: ‘edure for generating the novation in the proper order before we have learned to count transitively, or to do the latter is, either directly OF "he det fhe pool ee not dein ws 24 Whar numbers could not be we sat uy Ie te stp cnn sa ence ex of ee Sete tntts ates ees Postal span nae metaphorically) its elements one by one as we say the numbers one by see ea tmnt au nan we eC etS Gon neaenenva me entices come ch cane cde teeaiecemn tite ene miata tant etch “pining osm 2h doa te machine sey stow fy eaten cr wraps as tae seen aes em cia went ad St raccoons wh a ries sol sc Sten and haa mai cn bead se eel atandin on ac mene Maas e scare anlputy en pete ean tens ray sb We crete tote peta act ct sper erin a Sara Ea oy cee htttin onener rg esa iste opisen ae eee ce petra pee tr Srececchs See towers tamer ee Sara hose, a emt, fr pepe ied Sine Decechease a ere crtltrers pedo Se cenesay ay fran fe ak oreo om te oe baie Somes cen th they frm tow ‘hos bat requesting spel ao : Sem tes ise Ma_3t wuld apc, The expand of erally ~ Le. of he ort amie cmos rae pad pa of ater ceegete tee ecaty toon anche on one estar aes ‘Shy. proved tnt our appar Ctl enough of e ay off ona & Po. ‘ee Bat wl ecu ol Ds hhave already seen that Quine denis (by implication) that this constitutes an additional requirement: “The condition upon all aeceptableexplica- tions of mumber...can be put...: any progression ~ ie., any infinite series each of whose members has only finitely many precursors ~ will do nicely” (See note 3). But suppose, for example, that one chose the pro- aression A =a),d3,43...-0,--. obtained as follows. Divide the postive integers into two sequences B and C, within each sequence letting the ele ents come in order of magnitude. Let B (that 8, Dy, sy...) Be the &- ‘quence of Godel mumbers of valid formulas of quantification theory, under some suitable numbering, and let C (that is, ¢,,c2-..) be the se- ‘quence of positive integers which are not numbers of valid formulas of ‘quantification theory under that numbering (in order of magnitude in each ease). Now in the sequence A, for each mletdsy-|=By 81 dy =Cy Clearly A, though a progression, is not recursive, much less primitive recursive. Just as clearly, this progression would be unusable as the humbers ~ and the reason is that we expect that if we know which hhumbers two expressions designate, we are able to calculate in a finite ‘number of steps which is the “greater” Gin this case, which one comes later in)? More dramatically, if told that set bhas n members, and that has m, it should be possible to determine ina finite number of steps which has more members. Yet itis precisely that whieh is not possible here. This ability (o tell in a finite number of steps which of two umber isthe greater) is connected with (both transitive and intransi= cits possibilty is equivalent co the possibility of gen- crating (“saying”) the numbers in order of magnitude (that is, in theit ‘order in A). You could not know that you were saying them in order of| ‘magnitude since, no recursive rule existing for generating its member You could not know what ther order of magnitude should be, This is, of| ‘course, avery strong claim, There are two questions here, both of which fare interesting and nether of which could conceivably receive discussion inthis paper. (1) Could « human being bea decision procedure for non Tue i of cove, fiuy withthe sation of “knowing which numbers 90 ‘SurSlow sige eo cme re by te fm ea Abra {hls of amber, sno dow neal ANahon' tbe an ome eee than now whi utes Abra’ And say wi that BR! me no os dei whch the rt, Tac te avd ower, ese ‘tember seta See ie ame hares ee a a se Si hemor hath the soca pearance is Te et rogresion of mbes rely testa othe po ate. Tse ee mee Sold the labora cicumoculos tat would res om doing eve oe hore. Ove could ge he sane eft By leg the unten be fs of ‘Sion tery, ied oh Geel mumbo and wig ifort So 216 Whar numbers could not be recursive ets ors the human organism at best a Turing machine (in the relevant respect)? If the latter, then there could not exst a human being ‘who could generate the sequence A, much less know that this is what he was doing. Even if the answer to (I), however, is that a human being ‘could be (act oF be used a3) such a decision procedure, the following ‘Question would still arise and need an answer: (2) could he know all truths of the form tation of the numbers as some particular set of ses, the two accounts _Eenerally agree on the relations defined on that set; under both, we have what is demonstrably a recursive progression and a successor function Which follows the order ofthat progression. Furthermore, the notions of cardinality are defined in terms of the progression, insuring that it ‘becomes a theorem for each m that a set has members if and only iit can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set of numbers less than or equal to n. Finally, the ordinary arithmetical operations are defined for these “numbers.” They do differ in the way in which car- linalt is defined, for in Erie's account the fact that the number had in members was exploited to define the notion of having m members. In all other respects, however, they agree. fore, if i i not the case that both 3=(6]]] and 3 = (0), (0,{II) surely is not, then at least one of the corresponding accounts incorrect as @ result of containing a condition that Is not necessary. It may be incorrect in other respects aswell, but a least that much is clear. 1 can distinguish two possibilties again: either all the conditions just ted, which both of these accounts share, are necessary for a correct and complete account, or some are not. Let us assume thatthe former is the case, although I reserve the right to discard this assumption if i ‘becomes necessary to question it all the conditions they share are necessary, then the superfluous cot~ ditions are to be found among those that are not shared. Again there are ‘wo possbilities: ether at least one of the accounts satisfying the cond tions we are assuming to be necessary but which assigns & definite set (0 cach number, is correct, or none are. Clearly no two different ones can be, since they are not even extensionally equivalent, much less inten= sionally. Therefore exacily one is correct or none is. But then the correct 280 Whar numbers could not be fone must be the one that picks out which set of sets is in fact the numbers. We are now faced witha crucial problem: if there exists such a “correct” account, do there also exist arguments which will show it to Be the correct one? Or does there exist a particular set of sets b, whichis ‘really the numbers, But such that there exists no argument one can give 10 tstablish that it, and not, say, Ernie's set SU, is really the numbers? I seems altogether too obvious that this latter possibility borders on the absurd, If the numbers constitute one particular set of sets, and not another, then there must be arguments to indicate which. In urging this fam not committing myself Co the decidability by proof of every mathe- matical question ~ Tor I consider this neither a mathematical question nor ‘one amenable to proof. The answer to the question 1 am raising will follow from an analysis of questions of the form “Is n=...” It will ‘suffie for now to point to the difference between our question and Is there a greatest prime p such that p-+2 is also prime? Does there exist an infinite set of real numbers equivalent with neither the set of integers nor with the set ofall real numbers? In awaiting enlightenment on the true identity of 3 we are not awaiting & proof of some deep theorem. Having gotten as far as we have without ‘seting the identity of 3, we can go no further. We do not know what & proof of that could look like. The notion of “correct account" is breaking loose from its moorings if we admit of the possible existence of ‘unjustifiable but correct answers to questions such as this. To take seriously the question “Is 3 ={{{0]}]?" tour cour (and not eliptically for “in Etnle’s account?" in the absence of any way of settling it, isto lose one's bearings completely. No, if such a question has an answer, there fare arguments supporting it, and if there ate no such arguments, then there is no “correc” account that discriminates amiong all the accounts satafying the conditions of which we reminded ourselves a couple of pages back. How then might one distinguish the correct account from all the pos- sible ones? Is there a set of sts that has 2 greater claim tobe the numbers than any other? Are there reasons one can offer to single out that set? Frege chose as the number 3 the extension of the concept “equivalent ‘with some 3-membered set”; that is, for Frege & number was an equi lence class - the clase of all classes equivalent with a given class. ‘Although an appealing notion, there seems litle to recommend it over, ‘say, Ernie's. thas been argued that this is a more fitting account because ‘number words are really class predicates, and that this account reveals 281 that fact. The view is that in saying that there are n F's you are pred- cating n-hood of F, just as in saying that red is a color you aze pred cating colorhood of red. do not think thsi true. And neither did Frege (41950: sex. 57. Its ertanly true that to say (There are seventeen lions in the 200 is not to predicate seventoen-hood of each individual ion, {suppose that itis also true that if there are seventeen lions inthe 200 and also sever {cen tigers in the zoo, the classes of lions-in-the-z00 and tigers-in-the-200 are ina class together, though we shall return to that. It doesnot follow ‘rom this that (1) predicates seventeen-hood of one of those classe. First of all, the grammatical evidence for this is scanty indeed. The best one ‘can conjure up by way of an example of the occurrence of a number word in predicative position is a rather artificial one lke @) The lions in the 200 are seventeen, If we do not interpre this asa statement about the ages ofthe beasts, we ‘ee that such statements do not predicate anything of any individual lon ‘One might then succumb to the temptation of analyzing (2) as the noun phrase “The lions in the 200” followed by the verb phrase “are seven- {een,"* where the analysis is parallel to that of ©) The Cherokees ate vanishing ‘where the noun phrase refers to the class and the verb phrase predicates something of that class. But the parallel is shortlived. For we #008 ‘notice that (2) probably comes inte the language by deletion from (4) The lions in the z00 are seventeen in number, which in turn probably derives from something ike (5). Seventeen lions are inthe 200. his is no place to explore in detail the grammar of number words. Su fice it to point out that they differ in many important respects from words we do no esate to cll predicates, Probably the closes thing «2 4 genuine class predicate involving number words is something on the ‘model of “seventecs-membered” or ‘*has seventeen members.” But the Step from there to “seventeen” being itself a predicate of classes is along ‘one indeed. Infact, I should think that pointing to the above two predi= ‘ales gives away the show ~ for what isto be the analysis of seventeen” ‘sit occurs in those phrases? [Not only is there scanty grammatical evidence for this view, there What numbers could not be sc to considerable viens ain a ny sera fhe sin In of uncon mong he mt wer and many” "ew" ly” “foey" any ands oth wl mesial eva The proper sty or tse mates wl huve 10 aall_anterconen bu the Sonpstcatve nna of umber rd be ater sea yo ow fret hey are rom, ora ates, which do fnstion {Spreicats We have ready sen hat here re real no occ or mime wors napa Peat poston (hal yi ae) hike only pula ese ng along the ns of @ above and itive ar mpaule The eer aomaly tat munber words sora outank if sce (oa oer aes oe wan to hss thea hin having wo apea a he etd an deve wring find not nde, Tiss vch 4 srong taking tht dean vital (6) The ve lovely gure tes fine, tay moifston ofthe postin of" ils an mera Ia ting te farther othe i he Woe” Torte son fr denying the pedestvefture of number wor comes fom the aon store ana of semences sch with whch we sare. For hat seal ana a ax clang Nba Lae ban ann A tetey ONEDo emu IER =A Tie only predicate in) which remains “ton in the 00" "vente ging ay to aera Guns, th fn a ‘bic un oturenceof =; anes ofcourse one ies cnser thes as ob rene o ser. Bt there rs rods indeed forthe vinta) or pret seetntod of hcl ons steabe. Numbe words utonomch ke operator sch al” ote" and so for tha ett make Sis tae fhe ‘hold be accompanied by eadne to make the comeing move ‘iin respen to gual herey proving don pilowophis “kath cosa eh SSeS shat arene sod Be crud ot ee ton Thee ny hone ‘yt vs tem an le ond sh Te we a ame tes oa 283 fashion) the existence ofthe one, the many, the few, the all, the some, the any, the every, the several, and the each,” But then, what support does this view have? Well, this much: if two lasses each have seventeen members, there probably exists a class which contains them both in virtue of that Fact. I say “probably” because this vaties from set theory to set theory, For example, this is not the case with type theory, since the two classes have both to be ofthe samme type. But in no consistent theory is there a class of all clases with seventeen ‘members, at least not alongside the other standard se-theoretical appa: rats. The existence of the paradoxes i itself a good reason to deny t0 “seventeen” this univocal role of designating the class of all classes with seventeen members. ‘think, therefore, that we may conclude that “seventeen” need not be considered a predicate of classes, and there is similarly no necessity 10 of all triples. This s not to deny that "isa clas having is a predicate of dasses; but that isa different mater Indeed. For that follows from all of the accounts under consideration." ‘Our present probiem isto see if there is one account which can be estab- lished to the exclusion ofall others, thereby seitling the issue of which Sets the numbers really are. And it should be clear by now that there is not. Any purpose we may have in giving an account of the notion of| rhumber and ofthe individual numbers other than the question-begaing ‘one of proving ofthe right set of sts that isthe set of numbers, wil be equally well (or badly) served by any one ofthe infinitely many accounts satisfying the conditions we set out so tediously. There is little need 10 examine all the possibilities in detail, once the traditionally favored one of Frege and Russell as been seen not to be uniquely suitable, Where does that leave us? I have argued that at most one of the in- rnitely many different accounts satisfying our conditions can be correct, ‘onthe grounds that they are not even extensionally equivalent, and thee- fore atleast all but one, and possibly al, contain conditions that are not necessary and that lead to the identification of the numbers with some Particular set of sets. If numbers are sets, then they must be particular set, for each set is some particular set. But if the number 3 is really One set rather than another, it must be possible to give some cogent reason {or thinking so; for the postion that thisisan unknowable truth is hardly enable. But there seems to be litle to choose among the accounts, Rela~ tive to our purposes in giving an account of these matters, one wil do a5 aod nee why Hot am he oe wh eve in ating forthe few gant be hin the bounds poe by consistency. 284 What numbers could not be wel as another, stylistic preferences aside. There is no way connected with the reference of number words that will allow us to choose among, them, for the accounts differ at places where tere i no connection what ‘ever between features af the accounts and our uses ofthe words in ques- tion, If all the above i cogent, then there site to conclude except that any feature of an account that identifies 3 with ast isa superfluous one and that therefore 3, and is fellow numbers, could not be sets a all. MTL. Way out In this third and final section, I shall examine and urge some considera- tions that | hope will lend plausibility to the conclusion of the previous section, if only by contrast. The issues involved are evidently so ‘numerous and complex, and cover such a broad spectrum of philosophic problems, that in this paper I ean do no more than indicate what think they are and how, in general, I think they may be resolved. I hope never- theless that a more postive account will emerge from these consid 4A: eit. Throughout the festive etn, have wate expressions Sie Tom ® an when it anunesxprnin at exrsion 4 ta yma ure fod ee an tat tas our Jobo sor he ae fom theses and tight ape tat hd onl ht al ich Sinemet wee set to damatie he Kn Fane hat 8 Freqnsmigiae tthe requr foram analy ef number = po thekin gurionFepetook fob: For lary waned he al Sst deen teh ae for eh sch ent Inf, e wae Wideominea ae fre el of eli» wth ny mame ove trpion hance (eile anes onan beled fo name a Ter cca the pono of) ven the ser an ay orden tere wee tee Kinds of Wee satising tee

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