MORTERA VS PEOPLE road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law

of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of
When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal case which found
painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine
accused Benancio Mortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point
the crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas.
that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward
Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then
he together with other men were drinking tuba. They have just immediately fled.
started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted
On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the
to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran
accused guilty of murder. In rejecting the claim of self-defense,
away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of
the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was
Ramil Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer
belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here
comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of
Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed
was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile
few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from
Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his
met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the claim of self-defense.
place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn
In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
discussed with each other and later shook hands. Robelyn
modification as to the civil liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial
turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at
judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality"
the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn
required of a magistrate and added that the questions he
Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up
propounded were "substantially clarificatory."
but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the
hospital by his brother but he was pronounced DOA at the Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC.
hospital. Jovel Veñales who was drinking together with Ramil
Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony.

Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned,
during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom
he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his
account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people
drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying.
Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother,
Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main
ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an
impartial trial.
HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial
judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it
did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right
to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it
cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality.
Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking
a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was
also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as
to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not
persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did not fail to notice the
"malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by
the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense
witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission
of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the
prosecution.
Therefore, SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.
RODRIGUEZ VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal
Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the
Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a
controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy
Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor
under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and
one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of
the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson
case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled
promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-
Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said
case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion.
He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the
administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually
withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the
Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor
rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint
filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor
summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their
testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning
Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an
inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in
Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the
administrative complaint against Awayan, among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for
Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s continued
inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had
already been promulgated.
After the submission of petitioners’ respective position
papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009
Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a
fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null
and void for contravening their rights to due process of law.
They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to
confront the witnesses and present their own evidence.
According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s disregard of due
process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further
aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously
conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against
them.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due
process in conducting the suspension and contempt
proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.
Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in
conducting the suspension and contempt proceedings against
Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct
contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and
opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification
campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as
direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt,
as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt
citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3
and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings
for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order
or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the
petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition
shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of
the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe
the elementary procedure which requires written charge and
due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither
was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In
fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings
upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to
appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters
contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only
learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his
compliance to explain how he came in possession of the
administrative complaint against Awayan.
In the case at bench, there was also no prior and
separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts
constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a
specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they
should not be suspended from the practice of their profession.
Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves,
to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by
themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension
proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having
violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void
as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will
warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit,
(2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly
immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to
1Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was
for any of the foregoing grounds.
BILBAO VS PEOPLE
TUBULA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
JOSE CATACUTAN VS PEOPLE
FACTS.
Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II
while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an
Education Program Sepcialist II, both at the Surigao del Norte
School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).
CHED CAR appointed and promoted both complainants as
Vocational Instruction Supervisor III. Such promotional
appointments were duly approved and attested by the Civil
Service Commission. Their appointment letters were sent to and
received by petitioner as Officer-In-Charge/Principal of SNSAT.
Complainants were not able to assume their new position
because petitioner strongly opposed said appointments and
refuse to implement them. A complaint was filed against
petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful
orders [violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act]1 before the Office of the Ombudsman in
Mindanano.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty. His defenses were:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Existence of procedural lapses or infirmities attending the
preparation of the appointment papers. Blank forms bearing
the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office
were used.
The appointment cited the entire plantilla instead of only the
particular page on which the vacant item occurs.
He received only the duplicate copies of the appointments
contrary to the usual procedure where the original
appointments papers and other supporting documents are
returned to his office.
The transmittal letter from CHED did not specify the date of
effectivity of the appointments.
Petitioner sought the attention of the CHED Regional Director as
regards the alleged infirmities but he was told that such
appointments were regular and valid. He alleges that he was
not motivated by bad faith but just wanted to protect the
interest of the government.
RTC ruled that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment (6 years
and 1 month) and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Sandiganbayan affirmed petitioner’s conviction on appeal.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON the petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the law were violated when he was denied
the opportunity to present in evidence the CA decision entitled
“Jose Catacutan v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. (a
separate administrative case)”. NO.
[Petitioner argues that RTC’s decision is flawed and is grossly
violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He
contends that he was not able to controvert its findings since he
was not able to present the CA decision which denied the
administrative case filed against him and declared that his
intention in refusing to implement the promotions falls short of
malice or wrongful intent.]
Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. It is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.
Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.
As applied: Records show that petitioner was able to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case
vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. There is also no
denial of due process when the RTC did not allow petitioner to
introduce as evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant,
impertinent, incompetent, or immaterial to the proceeding on
hand. This is especially true when the evidence sought to be
presented in a criminal proceeding concerns an administrative
matter. As the Sandiganbayan remarked, the findings in
administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a
criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on
the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter.
Paredes v. CA: “It is indeed a fundamental principle of
administrative law that administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa.”
Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan: “The dismissal of an administrative
case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the
same of similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and
that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the
resolution of the other case and vice versa.”
TAN VS TAN
Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, and Jesse C. Tan, respondent, were
married in 1989, such marriage, thereafter, bore two sons.
Twelve years into the marriage, Chan-Tan filed a case for the
annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the parties also executed a compromise agreement governing
the issues of support, custody, visitation rights, and property
relations. The court issued a partial judgement approving the
compromise agreement. Eventually, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36of the
Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity
of the parties. Meanwhile, Chan-Tan had left the country
bringing the children with her. Thus, Tan filed an omnibus motion
seeking the main custody of the children, contending that the
act of Chan- Tan in bringing the children out of the country was
without his knowledge and consent, in addition, Tan also
alleged that Chan-Tan has failed to pay the remaining balance
for the Megaworld property, which, if forfeited would prejudice
the interest of the children; and that Chan-Tan failed to turn
over to him (Tan) documents and titles in the latter’s name. The
trial court, in a resolution, awarded to respondent custody
of the children, ordered Chan-Tan to turn over to Tan
documents and titles in the latter’s name, and allowed Tan to
stay in the family dwelling. Chan-Tan filed a motion for
reconsideration, on the ground of denial of due process, which
the trial court denied in its Resolution. Thereafter, Chan-Tan filed
a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s most recent resolution. Thus, the trial court issued
another Resolution denying both the motion to dismiss and the
motion for reconsideration. Chan-Tan again filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court, again, denied. This
prompted the trial court to issue a Certificate of Finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision and resolutions of the trial court
have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process
HELD:
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May
2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and
executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the 17 May
2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004,
filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the
alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner’s loss of the
right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court’s
judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied
due process. While she may have lost her right to present
evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she
cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show
petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the
proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to
petitioner’s allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have
reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on
petitioner’s end despite her counsel’s efforts to reach her,
petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on
respondent’s omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody
of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse
but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based
on the evidence presented by respondent .Petitioner cannot
now come to this Court crying denial of due process.
TAN VS JUDGE TABIN
Remedial Law – Summary Procedure – Warrant of Arrest –
Notice to the Accused
Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – Abuse of Authority
In 2006, a criminal case was filed against Noryn Tan for estafa in
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 4). Arraignment was
set to fall on October 10, 2006. Tan was not able to appear in
court hence the presiding judge, Judge Clarita Tabin, issued a
warrant of arrest against Tan. Tan was arrested in Quezon City,
her place of residence.
Tan posted bail. Later on, she filed an administrative case
against Judge Tabin on the ground of denial of due process.
Tan alleged that she never received notice about the said
arraignment.
In her comment, Judge Tabin said that the notice was coursed
through the Chief of Police of Quezon City and that when two
months lapsed after the issuance of said notice and no return
was made by the QC police office, Judge Tabin presumed that
Tan received the notice in the regular course of mail and that
there was presumption of regularity in favor of the police
officers. Thus, she issued the arrest warrant against Tan but such
issuance was made in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the arrest warrant was
proper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court clarified whenever a criminal
case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that
the court shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the
accused fails to appear whenever required. In this case, the
estafa case falls under the Rules on Summary procedure. Judge
Tabin is not justified in issuing the warrant of arrest and her
defense of good faith is not tenable.
The judge herself admitted that there was no proof that Tan
received the notice for her to appear in court. She merely relied
on the presumption of regularity which should not be used as
an excuse in violating the right of the accused to due process.
So basic and fundamental is a person’s right to liberty that it
should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the
presumption that the police through which the notice had
been sent, actually served the same on Tan whose address was
not even specified.
Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to her office to know and
simply apply it. The Supreme Court held that a judge commits
grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of
arrest against the accused in violation of the summary
procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the
charges against him and given the opportunity to file his
counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence. Judge Tabin
was found guilty of abuse of authority and was fined P10,000.00.
SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE LANTION
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice received a request
from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment.
The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for
said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of
the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed
to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all
the documents included in the extradition request and for him
to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in
the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by
the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like
in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights
of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure
of the information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as
Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of
Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this
petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a
breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts
should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international
law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.
DBP VS CA
Due Process – Opportunity to be Heard
In 1968 and 1969, Continental Cement Corp. entered into a
loan contract with DBP. In 1979, CCC entered into a MOA with
DBP restructuring its loans. In November 1985, DBP filed for a
foreclosure against the assets of CCC. In December 1985, CCC
petitioned before RTC Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of
Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying further that its
loan terms with DBP be restructured and that the interest rate
terms in the promissory note be declared null and void. A TRO
was issued in favor of CCC. In December 1986, PP 502 was
issued transferring nonperforming assets of the gov’t to Asset
Privatization Trust. One of those transferred was CCCs account.
DBP filed a petition to dismiss the pending case as it CCC could
no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. The trial court
denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the
proceeding pursuant to PP 502 as amended. To determine
CCCs indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated JC Laya
(former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact finding
commission. He was given 60 days to come up with a report
and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter. After several
months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties
then filed their reactions to the report and during the trial they
were given a chance to cross examine each other’s witnesses.
After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their
position papers as to their calculation of the amount of
indebtedness. CCC’s computation is at P43.6M, the
Commissioner’s computation is at P61.6M while DBP/APT’s
calculation is at P2.6B. In June 1992, 3 of CCC’s witnesses were
scheduled to be cross examined by APT’s counsel as DBP’s
counsel had already done so. APT”s counsel was not able to do
so raising the issue that he just took over the case and needs
time to prepare. The cross examination was reset to August 24-
26, 1992 but counsel for APT failed to appear due to Dengue.
The other counsel, Jaime Cruz, for DBP was likewise absent; he’s
also a witness. On Aug 25th, the RTC ordered that due to the
foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. APT filed
for a motion for reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC
ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the
calculation came up with by the Commissioner. APT appealed
before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it
was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses of CCC nor was
it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC averred that by the
failure of APT’s counsel to appear APT has waived such right.
The CA sustained the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not APT was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC sustained the CA’s ruling. Long ingrained in
jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due
process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but did not do so. The withdrawal of APT’s previous
counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable
ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such
reason necessitates a duty, nay an obligation, on the part of
the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel’s
failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows the
negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records
of the case. Mere demands are not sufficient. Counsel should
have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his
client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel.
The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers, as in this case.
Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given opportunity to
submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner
rendered his report. Contained in their position papers were
their respective comments and objections to the said report.
Furthermore, the parties were also given the chance to cross-
examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were
likewise granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of
the other party, however, like in APT’s case, they were deemed
to have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to support any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law
prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he
had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
MATUGUINA VS CA
Due Process – Not Being Party to a Case
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate
logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging
Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders.
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on.
Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI.
Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises
Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District
Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the
area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The
Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had
recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so.
MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural
Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares
from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE
guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and
Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to
comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04
m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution
against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the
Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to
enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ.
DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as
it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity). That the issuance
of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not
only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was
issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a
gross violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights under the due
process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been
violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the
principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an
execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the
issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same
was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself
and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ
of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI
was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter
requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s decision against it.
MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution
by the respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE
and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis
merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and
without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the
Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the
proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment
in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This action of the Minister
disregards the most basic tenets of due process and
elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower
the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing
all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)