1) BAER vs.
TIZON 2) PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
This is a petition seeking to nullify seeking to nullify the orders of respondent Judge denying his
motion to dismiss a complaint filed against him by the private respondent, Edgardo Gener, on
the ground of sovereign immunity of a foreign power, his contention being that it was in effect
a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent.
Private respondent Edgardo Gener is engaged in logging operations and his operations were
stopped by the American Naval Base authorities. Hence, he filed a petition for preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner, Baer, from interfering with his logging operations. The
restraining order was granted by the lower court.
Counsel for petitioner, contested the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, on the ground that the
suit was against a foreign sovereign without its consent. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
reiterating such ground. It was pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or
instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being
official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in
directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base,
petitioner was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the
security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most
important duty of the Commander of the Base.
Gener opposed on motion to dismiss, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title
and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the
same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government." That was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baer, acting in its official function is immune from suit.
RULING: The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its
consent is appropriate. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule
are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite
authorities in support thereof.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. He cannot be prevented from
performing his official function which is to protect and maintain the security of the base.
Continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would
not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base.
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established
the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et.
al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It
was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service.”
HELD:The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as
counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of
whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the
metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the
“matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank
to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a
person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied
by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention
of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent
to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of
the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which
he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or
employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
3) USA v. GUINTO 182 SCRA 644
FACTS: The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. In GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in
connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis
Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents,
he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by
the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke
the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.
ISSUE: Are the petitioners immune from suit?
HELD: It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official
functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to
be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial
enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the
evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by private persons,
thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No.
80258, the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the
grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity the petitioners
were acting at the time of the incident.
4) Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949
Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila,
namely, the North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In
1945, they executed contracts for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the
war has ended and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were
used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area.
George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real
Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore, was said to be
in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of
the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on
September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached
the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to them, as
per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to continue their
occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will vacate
the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agreement.
Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the
properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals
until the premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the
US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila
granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of Manila, hence the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.
Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the
Municipal Court of Manila.
Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America,
as it was the U.S. Army who were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their
government. USA has not given their consent to be sued in this case, and any action against them
without the consent would constitue a lack of jurisdiction.
5) USA v. RUIZ GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985
FACTS: Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June
1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual
petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners
to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from
entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.
ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to governmental acts of the
state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the USA and Philippines which is,
indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of
the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US government has not given consent
to the filing of this suit.
6) USA and Bradford v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes and Montoya G.R. No. 79253
Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification (I.D.)
checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an
“activity manager”. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s
person and belongings searched in front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel
aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.
Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune
from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and
2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon
City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under
the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases
Agreement of 1947, as amended.
Montoya argued that:
(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG
store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an improper, unlawful and highly
discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b)
having exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public
petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over
the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside
the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to
determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority.
The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.
Doctrine of State Immunity:
The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals, thus:
I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI Section
3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that
we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision
merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended
to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the
rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar
in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or
officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for
this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court.
Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess
diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when
the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.
Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held that:
. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded
against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may
appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by
statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. . . . .
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from
suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no
exception to this rule. [footnotes omitted]
In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the scope and
beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail of immunity.
She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.
He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).
Disposition:
Petition was dismissed.
NOTES:
1) BAER v. Judge TIZON
Edgardo Gener- complainant and engaged in business of logging in Morong, Bataan- CFI Bataan
Donald Baer- Commander of the US NAVAL BASE in Olongapo
Baer stopped Gener's operations
NOV 17, 1964- writ of preliminary INJUNCTION restraining petitioner from INTERFERING with his
logging operations.
NOV 23, 1964- RESTRAINING ORDER was issued by Judge Tizon
DEC 12, 1964- MOTION TO DISMISS by BAER
a) contesting jurisdiction of respondent Judge- suit was one against a FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
without its consent
b) Baer is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of USA- his action are official acts for
and in behalf of USA.
c) within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval
Base and othe installations therein
DEC 14, 1964- OPPOSITION and REPLY by GENER- "a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals,
officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from
him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government."
JAN 12, 1965-WRITTEN OFFER of documentary evidence with CERTIFIED COPIES OF TELEGRAMS
of the Forestry Director to Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan by BAER
a)immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan
b)show no new renewal of timber license
or temporary extension permits
JUDGE TIZON issued an ORDER granting respondent Gener's application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary INJUNCTION
MOTIONN FOR RECON- PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:WON Doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable.
HELD: YES.
1) The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge
against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it.
2) Petitioner, as the Commander of the US Naval Base in Olongapo, DOES NOT possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his PERSONAL CAPACITY, or when the
ACTION taken by him CANNOT be imputed to the government which he represents.
3) The INFIRMITY of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring when it is
considered that private respondent-GENER had CEASED to have any right of entering within the
base area. The renewal of his license expired on July 30, 1964, and to date his license has not
been renewed by the Bureau of Forestry.
PETITION GRANTED.
2) PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
APR 7, 1986-OSG wrote the FEDERAL OFFICE OF THE POICE MATTERS in Berne, Switzerland,
requesting
ASSISTANCE for the latter office to:
(a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where and in which cantons the ill-
gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the depositors and
the banks and the amounts involved
(b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as sequestration, to freeze the assets in order
to preserve their existing value and prevent any further transfer thereof
ISSUE: WON the acts of the Swiss government is LEGAL since the SANDIGANBAYAN would
inevitably examine and review the freeze orders of SWISS OFFICIALS in resolving the case.
HELD: YES. The act of state doctrine is NOT APPLICABLE in this case.
Even assuming that international law requires the application of the act of state doctrine, it bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan will not examine and review the freeze orders of the concerned
Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164. The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss officials to
submit to its adjudication nor will it settle a dispute involving said officials. In fact, as prayed for
in the complaint, the Sandiganbayan will ONLY REVIEW and EXAMINE the PROPRIETY of
maintaining PCGG's POSITION with respect to Officeco's accounts with BTAG for the purpose of
further determining the propriety of issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG.
PETITION DISMISSED.
3) SYQUIA v. LOPEZ
undivided joint owners of 3 apartment buildings- 3 lease contracts
"for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the USA."-
for billeting and quartering officers of US ARMED FORCES
GEORGE F. MOORE- Commanding General
ERLAND A. TILLMAN- Chief Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineers
Under the theory that said leases TERMINATED 6 MONTHS after SEPT 2, 1945- MARCH 1946- The
Syquias approached the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman and requested the RETURN
of the APARTMENT blgs. to them, but they were advised thet the US ARMY WANTED TO
CONTINUE occupying the premises.
MAY 11, 1946- RENEGOTIATION, execute lease contracts for 3 years and pay HIGHER reasonable
rental than that under the old contracts.
Predecessors REFUSED but advised that "it is contemplated that
the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947."
JUNE 28, 1946- plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to CANCEL said three leases and to RELEASE
the apartment blgs.
Tillman REFUSED to comply with the request.
Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U. S. Government would vacate
the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps.
Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three
apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947,
served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army of??cers or
members of the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three
buildings, demanding:
(a) cancellation of said leases;
(b ) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty days from notice;
(c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a
de??nite term, otherwise,
(d) release of said apartment buildings within 30 days of said notice in the event of the failure to
comply with the foregoing demands.
The Syquias commenced an action for UNLAWFUL DETAINER (desahucio) in the Municipal court
of Manila.
The Municipal Court DIMISSED the ACTION.
Syquias APPEALED to CFI Manila
CFI AFFIRMED the Mun Court.
Syquias filed a PETITION FOR AA WRIT OF MANDAMUS seeking to order the Mun Court of Manila
to take JURISDICTION over the case.
The respondents filed a petition to dismiss the present case on the ground that it is moot. Kasi
naibalik na nila yung apartment.
On June 18, 1949, through a "PETITION TO AMEND COMPLAINT" counsel for the
petitioners INFORMED this court that petitioners had already RECEIVED from the U. S. Army
Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for the three apartments.
ISSUE:
HELD: The case is moot and academic.
Where the judgment in such a case
would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but
also in a CHARGE against or FINANCIAL LIABILITY to the Government, then the suit should be
regarded as one AGAINST the GOVERNMENT ITSELF, and, consequently, it CANNOT PROSPER or
be validly entertained by the courts except with the CONSENT of said Government.
The consideration or rentals was ALWAYS PAID by the U. S. GOVT'. The original action in the
municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the
opinion of this court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S.
Government not only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by
such Government but also because the premises were used by of??cers of her armed forces
during the war and immediately after the termination of hostilities.
The original request made by the petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the
supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied NOT by Moore and Tillman but by
their PREDECESSORS in office so they CANNOT be held individually responsible.
a) Tillman in assigning new of??cers to occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience
to order or direction from his superior, defendant Moore.
b) With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in
Manila, these lease agreements had ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED and EXECUTED and were in
actual operation.
c) As to the army officers, they were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in
question.
The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against
her, though not in name.
DECISION of Municipal Court of Manila is AFFIRMED.PETITION DISMISSED.
4) US v. Hon. GUINTO
consolidated cases-
1) GR 76607 (DISMISSED)-several officers of the US AIR FORCE stationed in Clark Air Base-
BARBERING SERVICES in the said base. Civil Engineering Concession not be awarded to Dizon.
The barbershops subject of the concessions
granted by the US government are COMMERCIAL enterprises operated by private persons.
The petitioners CANNOT plead any immunity from the complaint filed by
the private respondents in the court below
2) GR 79470 (GRANTED)- DISMISSAL as COOK in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City after pouring urine into the soup stock. Lamachia suspended him.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John
Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a BUSINESS ENTERPRISE undertaken by the
United States government in its PROPRIETARY capacity.
By entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
3) GR 80018 (GRANTED)- Luis Bautista was ARRESTED following a BUY-BUST OPERATION
conducted by officers of the US AIR FORCE and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators. It follows that for DISCHARGING their DUTIES as AGENTS of the US, they CANNOT
be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has NOT given its consent to
be sued.
We REJECT the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the
Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the US government to
its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v. Purisima, express waiver of immunity cannot be made
by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
4) GR 80258 (DISMISSED)- According to the plaintiffs, the defendants BEAT them up,
HANDCUFFED them and UNLEASHED dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies
and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were
arrested for THEFT and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest.
MALABO BASE SA FACTS KUNG NAGDIDISCHARGE NGA BA TALAGA NG OFFICIAL DUTIES.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES.
The rule is that if the judgment against
HELD: A contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly NOT a governmental function
altho it may partake of a public nature or character.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by
a State but the LEGAL NATURE OF THE ACT.

such officials will require the state itself to perform an AFFIRMATIVE ACT to satisfy the same, PETITION GRANTED.
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as AGAINST THE STATE ITSELF although it has not been formally
impleaded. 6) US v. Hon. REYES
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the ROYAL PREROGATIVE of DISHONESTY" because Montoya- an American citizen who, at the
of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
NON-SUABILITY.

EXPRESS CONSENT- may be embodied in a general law or a special law.

IMPLIED CONSENT- the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The GENERAL LAW WAIVING the IMMUNITY of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under
which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising FROM CONTRACT, express or implied, which could serve as a

basis of civil action between private parties."

A state has impliedly waived its non-suability if only it has entered into a contract in its
PROPRIETARY or PRIVATE CAPACITY- JURE GESTIONIS. time material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker
5) US v. RUIZ ISSUE:
United States invited the submission of bids."A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the HELD:
acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." PETITION DENIED.
The

letter said that the company DID NOT QUALIFY to receive an award for the projects because of

its previous UNSATISFACTIRY performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

the company sued the United States of

America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.

allow to perform-pay damages- restrain from entering into contracts with 3rd parties

ISSUE: