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    © All Rights Reserved
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    14 views18 pages

    Contemporary US - Latin American Relations

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    Andres Gaort
    Contemporary US - Latin American Relations

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Contemporary U.S.—Latin American Relations Cooperation or Conflict in the 21st Century? Second edition Edited by Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro RE Routledge | Secood eon published 2016 by Rowrledge TL Third Avenue, New Yook, NY 10017 nd by Rowtedge "Pak Sqr, Mion Pack, Abingdon, Oxon OXL4 ARN Reap i n imprint of be Teor & Frais Gras, a informa bins (© 2016 Taylor & Francis “The sight of the eins ro be identified as eho autoss ofthe ial ‘materia, and ofthe shor for thee individual chaps, bas been ‘tered in acordance with secins 77 aad 78 of tbe Copyright, Baigne and Brent Ace 1988, All igh reserved. No par ofthis oak maybe repeated oe ‘Zprosnced oe uslied ia any form or by any electronic, mechani, oe ‘ihe means, now known o hereafer vee, incuding phorcopying a receding in any information soage o& recieva te, ‘without permission in wring fom ce publishes “Tradmart notice: Produc o egpeate names may be endemacks ot ‘aid dan nd we oly reno sod ‘Srpanation without intent ninge Fit edi publ by Rowledge 2010 Library of Congres Catalog in Plain Date ‘A cuog record for thir bok bs been segueted ISBN: 978-1-138-78631-8 blo ISBN: $78-1.138-78652°5 Gb) ISBN: 978:1315-73171-1 @R) ‘Typeset in Garand Ey Taylor a Francs Books ‘Printed and bound inthe United States of America by Publishers Graphics, LLCon sstainably sourced paper Contents Lise of illustrations Acknowledgement Lis of contributors ‘The Changes in the International System since 2000 JORGE £ DOMINGUEZ 2. US.-Mexican Relations: Coping with Domestic and International Crises JORGE L DOMINGUEZ AND RAFAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO 3 ‘The United States and Cube: Intimate Neighbors? ‘MARIFEL PEREZ STABLE 4 USAggentine Relations: The Yeats of Cristina and Obama ‘ROBERTO GUILLERMO RUSSELL 5. The Unsecled Nature of U.S.-Brazilian Relations MONICA HIRST AND LIA BAKER VALS PEREIRA 6 Chile and the United States: A Cooperative Friendship [CLAUDIA FUENTES JULIO AND FRANCISCO ROJAS ARAVENA 7 Colombia and the United Stares: The Path to Strategic Partnership (CYNTHIA J. ARNSON AND ARLENE 8, TICKNER 8 US—Peruvian Relations: Cooperation within the International System of the Twenty-First Centusy omnia mecumiTOcK 9 US.-Venezuelan Relations sfter Hugo Chives: Why ‘Normalization Has Been Impossible JAVIER CORLALES AND CARLOS A. ROMERO 30 @ 83 106 128 150 183 24 2 U.S.—Mexican Relations Coping with Domestic and International Crises Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Ferndndex de Castro ‘Once per yeat, dusing each of the frst three years of Mexican President Felipe Calderéa’s six-year teem (exevo, 2006-2012), the world seemed to be coming to an end. Within 11 days of the start of his presidency, Cal- derén ordered the Mexican army to enter the State of Michoscéin, ac the request of Governor Lézaro Cérdenas Batel, co combat the drug-trafficking ‘gangs that were posing a severe threat to public order and citizen security; in 2007, Calderén would send the Mexican military to enter combat, for a similar purpose, in the States of Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa. Calderén’s predecessor, President Vicente Fox (2000-2000), had already deployed Mexican troops to secure public order in eighe cities in ‘Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, and Baje California. These criminal gangs were nested in eruasnatiogal criminal organizations that threatened citizens and alarmed the goveraments of Mexico and the United Stares. Criminal vio- Tence would constitute the core copic between the two governments during che Calderén sexerio. The crises and policies associated wich this severe secusity challenge marked the bilateral relationship also into che serena of President Enrique Pefia Nieto (2012-2018). ‘The next two seemingly world-erminating events were felt in Mexico as exogenous shocks whose causes at first were pootly understood and for ‘which remedies seemed elusive. The second event was the financial col- lapse in the Uniced States in lave 2008, which would launch the deepest and longest worldwide economic downeurn since the 1930s. In mid criss, the USS. Federal Reserve Board, che agency most directly responsible for oversight ofehe U.S. financial system, noted in ies anmwal report to the US. Congress: ‘The second half of 2008 saw an incensifcation of the financial and economic strains ... The ensuing curmoil in global credit markecs affected asset values, credit conditions, and business and consumer confidence around the world. Over che summer, a weakening US. economy and continued financial turbulence led co a broad loss of confidence in che financial sector. In September, the government- sponsored enterpcises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into US.—Mexicen Relations 31 conservatorship by their cegulacor, and Lehman Brothers Holdings filed for bankruptcy. The insurance company Americen International Group, Ine,, or AIG, also came under severe pressure, and che Federal Reserve, with the full suppore of the Treasury, agreed to provide substantial liquidity to che company. In addition, « oumber of other nancial institucions failed or were acquited by competicors.” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, nocwithstanding their whimsical names, were major US. federal government financial institutions in che housing and commercial financial businesses. Lehman Brothers had been one of the ‘most important US. invesement banks for over a century and the AIG was the largese privace insurer in che Unived States. U.S. government inter vention to bail out financial institutions was itself an extraordinary step. ‘The USS. financial syseem would transmit this shock to the word, resem bling a transnational disease pandemic. President Barack Obama (2009- 2017) led his country our of this economic disister, but the undertaking ‘commanded much of his time and political capital during his presidency. From the 1970s through the 1990s, even a mild U.S. economic crisis ‘would shock Mexico, generating severe hardship there. This time was diferent. Mexico had adopeed sounder macroeconomic policies in response to its major economic criss in 1994-1995, and with slight variations these more effective policies were sustained through the presidencies of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Fox, and Calder6n. Thus, Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) dropped in 20089 by 4.7 percent bac ic rebounded in 2010 by 5.2 percent; GDP grew about ewice the US. growth rate in 2010-2012, ‘outpacing also the growth rates of the Burczone and Japan.” "The third consecutive plague to aflice Mexico was a type of influenza called HIINL, which broke ouc virulenely in central Mexico in early 2009. Tes disease epicenter was Mexico City. At ist, little was known about it; it seemed a first-order killer, generating widespread panic in Mexico and beyond. International tourist and business visits to Mexico, notably fom the United States, dropped precipitously. Upon advice from specialists, Caldetén gambled with his popularity and authority. He went on national television, invoking che majesty of the presidency, to ask Mexicans in the capital city co stay home from work and to keep their children home from School. This approach worked. The citizens of Mexico City were heroes in addressing this health-care isis. HINI stopped spreading in Mexico City, breaking the epidemic. ‘Unbowed by criminal violence and the effects of the worldwide financial crisis, Mexico had demonstrated its competence in overcoming a health- care emergency. In the words of the Director-General of the World Healeh Organization: Mexico was the first country to experience a widespread outbreak “Mexico bore the bruae of these consequences at a time when the new 52. Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafsel Fernénder de Castro virus had not yee been identified and nothing was known about the disease it causes. Mexico gave the world an early warning, and i also «gave he world a model of rapid and transparent ceporting, aggressive ‘control measures, and generous sharing of data and samples. Canada and the United States supported the early control measures in Mexico, and then followed chis model of transparent reporting and generous collaboration as their own outbreaks began to spread. ‘Mexico led, but Canada and the Unived States proved to be good pactners in Noxth America, asisting Mexico in the early stages of the crisis and then learning from Mexico. The successful management of this third cae- astrophe buile domestic and international confidence that Mexico's pre- sident and goverment were competent. This helped to ward off che perception, fanned by the criminal violence crisis, that Mexico was a failed state.” The defeat of HIN1 implied that the stare could indeed protect its people or the United States, as noted above, the economic crisis chat broke out jin 2008-2009 consumed time, attention, and vast resources for much of ‘the Obama presidency. Obama also inherited the contiauation of wars in req and Afghanistan. Although he downsized the U.S. commitment to both wars, the enduring warfare in Afghanistan, its renewal in Iraq, and its spread so Syria demanded a sustained U'S. focus on Middle Bast mili- tary conflicts and sapped the capacity of the U.S. government and the (Obama administration for other purposes. During the Calderén and the Obama years, the ardor of each govern mene for cooperation with the other did not abate, but the opportunities ‘0 cooperate were constrained by the pressures of domestic circumstances ‘on Los Pinos and the White House. The 2008-2009 economic criss befell both Mexico and the Uniced States, but che maladies thar otherwise affected both countries were rather different in the first decade and @ half of the cwenry-first century. This made cooperation possible but also inter- ‘mittent and more diffcule to sustain, not out of lack of interest or con- currence but because there weze other more pressing matters pulling each government along a different path. In this chaptec, we argue that international factors were the key expla- ations for the patterns in U.S.-Mexican relations during che first decade of the ewenty-fist ceneury but that domestic considerations in both countries and transnational relationships (migration, criminality) acquited ‘greater explanatory salience during the centusy’s second decade. Second, ‘we argue that the effectiveness in the management of bilateral U.S.-Mexican relations depended on the presence or absence of institutions and proce dures, Where institutions had beea established and their procedures were implemented, bilateral relations were not coaflictfree but the patterns were generally constructive and stable and the conflicts were managed well within existing frameworks, preventing damages to other issues. US—Mecican Relations 33 NAFTA — the Nosh American Free Taide Agreement ~ is the best ‘example of such an insticurion; ies procedures now work routinely. Where there were no such well-established institutions and where unilateral inicia- tives prevailed over established bilaceral procedures, bilateral relations were ‘much more contentious, and even small incidents could rapidly escalate ue of control to generate bilateral conflce. Transnational migration and criminal violence and drug trafficking ace the pertinent examples; in these issue areas, the unilateral actions of U.S. or Mexicen governments, some- times coordinated but often not, were pervasive bur frequently ineffective Both countries can do better. ‘The International System's Effects on Bilateral Relations: Between the Domestic and the Transnational By the end of the frst decade of the cwenty-firse century, crises at the intersection between the domestic and the transnational shaped U.S— “Mexican relations, reorienting them away from the issues that had seemed. dominane only a decade earlier. First, at che stare of the ceneury, the changes in the struccure of che international system ~ sketched in Chapter 1 of this volume — deeply shaped U.S.Mexican relations. The U.S. govern~ ‘ment hed come t0 look at the world through the prism of international terrorism (none of which had hit che United Seates from Mexico), severely constraining its willingness co contemplate the freer movement of people across North America and contributing to killing a decade's worth of cffons at changing U.S. immigration policy. The outbreak of severe ctiminal violence in Mexico focused both governments on security but ‘with special attention to the violence originating in Mexico, aot in the ‘Middle East, Security remained ar the core of the bilateral relationship but the problem was domestic and bilateral, not global, insecucities. Because the embryonic bilateral secucity inscirutions, built in the lace 1990s, to counter criminal violence had been allowed to atrophy, the United States and ‘Mexico had to invene new inseruments for cooperation over security topics. Second, at the start of the cencury another change in the international system, also noted in Chapter 1, was the rise of China and the displace iment of Mexican exports by Chinese exports in the U.S. markec. Wich the slowdown in China's economic growth in the century's second decade and the increase in its domestic costs of production, che growth of U.S—Mexican trade facilirared by NAFTA, of which Canada is also a founding member, became an engine for joint USS. and Mexican economic growth. Mexico pulled its economy out of che 2009 econamic decline, and Mexican businesses learned. ‘to compete more efecively with Chinese exports. NAFTA thus mitigated some of the adverse eects for Mexico of the rise of China in woeld markers. ‘Third, specific international events and processes, far from Norch Amex- ica, distracted the U.S. government from attentioa to Mexico or to South and Central America. The 2008-2009 economic crisis had longer-lasting 34. Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Ferninder de Castro impact on the European Union (EU) and oa Japan, requiring U.S. atten tiveness as well. Russia's seimure of Crimes from Ukraine in 2014, China's new territorial assertiveness toward islets and maritime zones (0 its east and south ia 2013-2014, and renewed violent confict in the Middle East refocused U.S. attention to classic inter-state issues far from the Western ‘Hemisphere. These events exacerbated U.S. policy inattention co Mexico. ‘The effect of the domestic political context on bilateral relations also changed during the first 15 years of the twenty-first century. At frst, domestic politics had only a modest impact on the conduct of bilateral relations. However, execucive-legislative gridlock became severe in ‘Washington as the century unfolded. Mexico's interest in obtaining US. cooperntion on transborder gun control measures made zero progress in the halls of the U.S. Congress, for example. In contrast, the Mexican Congress approved the federal budget each and. every yeat on schedule, Moreover, of Calderén's 122 bills submicred to Congress, only two were sejected, although 25 remained “pending,” and ‘these included some of the president's more important bills seeking structural change. Executive-legislative cooperation in Mexico improved dramatically in the frst 20 months of the Pefia Nieto sezmio chanks to an agreement between the thtee largest partes, called the Pacto por Méxio, ‘which facilitated approval of 11 significant bills left pending under Cal- deréa.? For the furure of US.Mexican relations, the most significant outcome from the renewed capacity 9 approve major structural reforms ‘was the change in Mexico's domestic energy regime to permit the engagement of private domestic and international companies in aspects of petroleum exploration and production, Tn general, explanations anchored in che invernational syscem were per- suasive at the start of che century. As the decade progressed, the specifics of transnational relations rose in salience, including criminal violence, che US-originated economic crisis, the proper functioning of NAFTA, and cach president's challenges ac home and in relations wich the respective federal congresses, In this chapter, we examine the ongoing positive trend of bilateral economic relations including but not limited to the workings ‘of NAFTA, and chen look at security and migration issues, caking note of the domestic context for foreign policy decision making.® ‘The Economic Context and NAFTA’s Continuing Impact NAFTA is at the heart of U.S.~Mexican economic relations and itis also the core of the wider architecture for cross-country lations in North “America, For NAFTA to setve the three partner countries, Mexico must hhold its side of che bargain and, in this century, it hus. Mexico, as noted, ‘weathered the 2008-2009 global economic crisis more effectively than the United States, the European Union, or Japan. Its economy fell only in 2009 and rebounded over che following three years, co decelerate only in US.-Mexican Relations 35 2013 and 2014. Two keys co chis success were the prudent managemenc of Mesico's macroeconomic policy and NAFTA’s continued effectiveness. ‘Mexico's good economic record ~ a competent and increasingly prosperous ‘eighbor ~ and NAPTA's good record serve U‘S. interests as well ‘Merico’s international reserve assets doubled ftom 2001 to 2008 (see ‘Table 1.3) ~ that is, the eve of the world’s international financial crisis. ‘The accumulation of such sesecves was testimony to Mexico's sound mac- roeconomic policy during the Fox presidency. It prepared Mexico for the 2008-2009 financial crisis and che sharp downturn of Mexico's GDP in 2009. By 2011, Mexico's international reserve assets had climbed to $144 billion. In September 2014, as Presiden Pefia Nieto presented his annual state of the natioa repore, Mexico's internacional reserve assets had reached $193 billion, eestimony to the sustained good macroeconomic policies of consecutive presidential administrations.” “Above all, a key to Mexico's continued success is chat NAFTA has continued co wok. As evident in Tables 2.1 and 2.3, U.S. exports to, and ‘US. impores ftom, Mexico (and Mexican exporss to, and Mexican imports from, che United States) had cisen in the years preceding the 2008-2009 ctsis bug fell sharply in 2009. Both expores and imports soon recovered, however.” From 2009 to 2014, US. exports to, and imports ftom, Mexico increased uninterraptedly and impressively. Also from 2009 co 2013, ‘Mexican exports to, and imports from, the United States increased com- parably uninterruptedly and impressively. This growch of trade greatly outpaced the growth sates of the Mexican and U.S. economies, helping to lead both countries oue of recession, NAFTA had not been imagined as a recession-fighter when fist conceived in the late 1980s, but ic played exactly that role in both nations in che aftermath of the 2009 crisis. Mexican exports to the United States increased more than sixfold from 1994, che year NAFTA came in effect. Ac over $318 billion dollars in Mexican exports in 2014, NABTA contributed to Mexico's prosperity NAFTA also illustrates the workings of open trade liberalism. Even as ‘Mexican imports from the United States climbed during the ewo decades following NAFTA’s implementation, the U.S. share of Mexican imports fell during the early ewenty-first century co settle at about half of Mexican imports. China became a principal beneficiary of this growth in Mexico's economy and ade; the cise in China's share of Mexico's imports nearly matched the decline in the U.S. share. NAFTA fostered trade connected- ress wichout basting imports from outside North America ~ this openness isthe essence of a liberal erade regime. ‘Thus, the significent uptick in Sino-Mexican crade (Tables 1.1 and 1.2) reflected North American economic recovery as well, now in part in cooperation with Chinese trade. The United States exports moze to Mexico than it does to China, and Mexico is the third most important source of U.S. imports after China and Canada. As evident in Table 2.2, between 2011 and 2014 the increment in the value of U.S. exports to Mexico exceeded surge unworn 702 “Lt al poss oopaRE BEN CT =p He solo wang 2p qBEaING ORI IOS e we ze & o zz se yo em ett 69 kk Tost cet pioe _€toz_ ‘tz ~—oroe~—=«O0’_~—~=C«OOE—CSCOOE=—SCUK_CCO Geng Hamand § TOP Gong) FTOZ-GOGI “OORT SIU SHOT 3 tap sree: sampmde, posoaoe Jeangpe 3p sapine suobeuodus, pu ng opmaiog ap wmannngg ‘02g 9p MIDIS ow oO oe ar + we Oo «u (eset ecm erser) ay rcl| = evr eyctl = etc Ceri oes) | eZ ‘$1 Woy sued] 08 wwe oe ok “8 @ Psa sarop vor were 66oe ust Hee caer SaL See veHT TSS sna suodeg yioeel0e—-eioz~—«ttoz ~—=oroe ~—«ooe~—=«tOO == SSCL ‘Garey Sewoned Fi Pw HOP WORT) pTOZ COST SMG PMU ay woy Huo pow 'a sor MONON EZ HL won sapayperefanyrof sara 'c102 ‘ct Am posaoe spe, using “eam sNsAD 7 sAEND Jo auRNdeCL ST H!0§ Pete onal oect ccc gop at ooo) ‘odof lop vor = weer eee LOOT. be ct Tw LEST ray, yor one HZ_SCwGTZS CSET vo eRGL TST LTE onan me gee SLE «SORE ret gos tee IST YL spre iT eee a Je cea Oe ee Fe eg ore Mart 1102 eal 000 pe OO) ‘aod uta SD ‘GEmTOP woHTEG) POZ-0002 ‘SHOU por srocy smUeg MET FOL SA CT aL synoF ede eau yo mound, Po prs, 1 a pandod omg ssogep, {VHLO) SHAM anton por ape, DO "vopENERPY a a a Z«86t~SCOT Ma ny seo ow geek wet SYST Tat cone 0 suing plz etoz _cioz ‘tide _—oroe ~—«00e_~—«swOO_—«—«LOO~—«OUE_—«S UE (GTP WTA) FOECOOe “ORE WOH HOKU PORTO ODS Ce AAPL 38 Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandes de Castro the incremeat in the value of US exports to China. China's share of Mexican {imports did noe yet reach I percent in 1994 when NAFTA came ino effect, and it had not yet reached 2 percent on the eve of China's joining the ‘World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Ie had ssen co 10 percent of ‘Mexican import in 2007 and to 16.6 percen of such impons in 2014, at a value exceeding $66 billion, Since 2009, Mexico impored far more from China chan fom the entize Euzopean Union (the EU's share of Mexican impor was 11.6 percent in 1994 and 11.1 percent in 2014; a fre cade agreement beeween Mexico and the EU had come inc effect in July 2000). ‘portion of Mexico's low-cost imports fom Chia became inputs to Mexican engagement in ede within NAFTA. Eatly in this century, Mexico and che United States came to function more a economic partners than as competitors. For many busineses in these two countries, “export” and “impor” ate aot “oreign products”; insead, chey are inputs that move within the same fim. In che cycle of joint produc- tion, materials and pars often cross che US—Mesican border numerous times as U.S. and Mexican fceories work together to manufaceure a product Approximately 40 percent ofthe value of U.S. “impots” from Mexico con- sist of content produced in che United States che comparable input percentage for che res ofthe world is 4 percent). Inua-industry trade, an indicator of production sharing, represents over 40 percent of U.S Mexico rade." ‘Think no loagec ofa U.S. cae ~ ehiake forevermore bout a NAFTA car. NAFTA facilitated cross-border private diece investment. Let us high- light « novelty. Consider iconic USS. brands: Sare Lee, Weight Watchers, Thomas’ English Muffins, Entenmana’s, Mission Foods, and TracFone cell phones. All aze now owned by Mexican companies. Mexican direct invest- iments in che United States had been negligible when NAFTA negotia- tions began. They increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching $176 billion in 2013. The more familia story is, of couse, chat of US. dliceceinvestmen's in Mexico, which quadrupled from NAPTA’s imple- ‘mentation in 1994 to 2013 when they reached $177 billon.™? Except during the financial crisis and the Mexican economic slowdown in 2014, US. dizec investment flows into Mexico have exceeded $10 billion pet year; the United States characteristially accounts for a third of these ‘annual flows into Mexico (see Table 2.4)."? "NAFTA was also designed to facilitate the resolution of rade disputes. Given the age volume of tade, such dispuces were to be expected Doing the 20 years following NAFTA’s start on January 1, 1994, Mexico requested the establishment of 36 binaional panels under NAFTA Chap~ fer 19 in complaines it filed agains the United Staes; during the same time period, the United Staes fled 12 complaints against Mexico (che United Staves and Canada accounted for 65 of the 113 NAFTA panel dispuces)!* NAFTA’s Chapter 19 enables signatory counties 10 use binational panels challenge Snal anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures issued by the adminisuative authorities of other NAFTA US.~Mexican Relations 39 countries. These panels ace as a substicue for judicial review by the national courts of the eee countries and thus constitute NABTA'S most powerful ool againse unilateral protecioaise measures US.-Mexico NAFTA panel trade disputes accounted for 42 percent of the rorl of empaneled NAFTA dispuces. Considering trade values berween the United States and its ewo ncighbors (Table 2.2), Mexico's US. tide ranged berween 38 and 45 percent of total NAFTA tsade. There is, therefore, a reasonable correspondence berween trade value and the fc- quency of empaneled dispuces. The cheonological distibution of dispuces also reveals a fairly normal process. Of the 36 Mexican complaints agaiase the United States, 13 rook place during Calderén’s presidency and the firse half of Peia Nicto's; cha is, 36 percent of che dspures rook place during 40 percent of the time period. The NAFTA dispute seelement mechanism under Chapter 19 served che United Seates and Mexico well. Mexico and che United Scares were also members of the WTO, which came into effect on 1 January 1995. The WTO provides a supplemeneary mechanism for disp resolution. Between 1995 and 2014, Mexico fled ine complaines against the Unieed Sauces atthe WTO (Mexico fled a worldwide total of 23 WTO complaints during those years). Mexico also joined a larger geoup of countries as an allected third pasty ia complaints againse the Unived States in 33 instances (Mexico was a thitd pary in a worldwide coal of 74 cases). The United States filed a complaine againse Mexico six times (Mexico was a respondent in a roral of 14 cases). The WTO cases mirrored the NAFTA cases and, together, NAFTA and WTO provided means for the wo countries co consul, discuss, negodate, and settle their trade disputes” This proces has worked well tothe benefit of hoch countries. In general, relative o the respective participation in world trade, Mexico was much less likely co fle a complaint with the WTO, or to be the target of a complaint filed by some other WTO member, then svas the case for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, or Peru.”? ‘Mexico won in several rade dispute cases with the United States thanks to the NAFTA and WTO processes. Mexico challenged U'S. protectionist ‘measures before the WTO regasding tuna trade end ehe labeling of bovine beef, the WTO process found for Mexico atid the United States complied. NAFTA and WTO proceduzes also set the stage for U'S-Mexican nego- tiations regarding shrimp and comato trade, with an outcome favorable £0 Mexico ia both instances.” ‘Ac times, when theze was a clear judgment ageinst one of the councries and no compliance by che other, retaliation was authorized. The most nowosious case of a violation of NAFTA obligations has bea the US. refusal to open its roads to Mexican trucks. These erucks were supposed co be able to operate in the four souchwestern US. staces by December 1995 and then throughout che continental United States by January 1, 2000, Hiowever, 15 yeas afer ehe larter provision, che vast majotcy of Mexican srucks are still noe allowed on US. roads, Mexico has won clear panel 40. Jorge 1. Doménguer and Rafuel Fernénder de Castro judgments via NAFTA and WTO, which authorized ic co retaliate, blocking the movement of US. tracks within is borders and lawfully introducing retaliatory tariffs vo be applied on a yearly rorating basis co various USS. imports. The US. retionalization for the delay has been safery. The USS. government has developed several piloe programs, which consistently demonstrated that participating Mexican drivers and trucks hhad equal or better safety records than their U.S. counterparts. The oppo- sition to Mexican erucks has been, simply, political ~ the U.S. ceamsters tunion has exercised its clout. In 2014, only 45 Mexican erucks were authorized to travel US. roads out of 14,000 erucks thar cross the border from Mexico daly. As a result, Mexican tracks drive to the border, unload their goods on the Mexican side, to be picked up by a shoreshaul truck. ‘That truck moves the goods to a warehouse on the US. side, where they are unloaded again, to be packed onto a third eruck for delivery to a final US. destnation.!® This is a costly and illegal U.S. violation of NAFTA. NAFTA worked mainly, however, asa self-executing and selimplementing agreement to liberalize trade and investment, which is why the tracking cee, albeit important, is the only one of its kind. NAFTA’s language is precise; it avoids ambiguities that may create the need for intespretation or adjudication. The obligations on member states are binding, clearly applied, And on a posted schedule for application. There is little room in NAFTA for

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