G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.

NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Raul R. Estrella for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 649; REORGANIZED LAND REGISTRATION

COMMISSION TO NALTDRA; EXPRESSLY PROVIDED THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. — Executive
Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now
defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. The
question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be
no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. A closer examination of
Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in
express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions. Thus, without need of any interpretation,
the law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and
that one is merely separated therefrom. (Arao vs. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]) After abolition, there is in
law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. (De la Llana vs. Alba, 112
SCRA 294 [1982])

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION, VALID WHEN PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH; CASE AT BAR. — Nothing
is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition
carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith? There is no dispute over the
authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government. Under Section
9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held
in Dario vs. Mison that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced that if the newly created office has substantially new,
different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office
different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it
will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is
true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or
office. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot
hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from
office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED IN A REORGANIZED

OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position which private respondent
Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid
reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not
being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position
without violating the express mandate of the law.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the bar, which is the
qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or
applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.

The facts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution ** of the Civil Service Commission, are as follows:

"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil
service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was
later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was
also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less,
designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No.
649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration
Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices
of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on
October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to
the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her
motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her
temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the
then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of
Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency
Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia on the ground that
since the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her
separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on similar ground." 1

However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that private
respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the
NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify
for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said Executive
Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer
positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect." 3 A fortiori, since
private respondent Garcia had been holding the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to
September 1984, she should not be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order
No. 649.

Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing
positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said
Executive Order, which newly created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified
office holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not being a
member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.

We find merit in the petition.

Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into
the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions
in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.

The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there
can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. 4 A closer
examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA),
reveals that said law in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions, to wit:

Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission . . .

All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds, and all Positions
therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the
President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable appropriations,
records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created.
(Emphasis Supplied.)

Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an implementing
order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This,
however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the
reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. 5 After
abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. 6

Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the
abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith?

There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the
Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at that time:

Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the
Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister
shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualifications of their successors.

The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison 7 that
reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
This court has pronounced 8 that if the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one
abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an
abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is
abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of
the Land Registration Commission. 9 A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 10 To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to
qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new
development of the times. 11 Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy
Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position
in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a
criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission. There is no
such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 12 None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining
in this case.

To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished
pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to
be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to
qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she
cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the questioned
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission reinstating private respondent to her former position as
Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002]

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner, vs.

ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the validity of Memorandum
Order No. 96-735, dated 19 February 1996, and Department Order No. 97-1025, dated 29 January 1997,
both issued by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

The facts are uncontested.

On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735
addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin, viz:

In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of regional functions of that
office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.

Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity subject to
the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,[1] against petitioner and LTFRB Chairman
Lantin, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81,[2] praying among others that
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and without effect.

On 20 March 1996, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. On 08 April 1996, the lower court, upon filing of a bond
by respondent, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On 25 April 1996, then DOTC Secretary Amado
Lagdameo, Jr. filed his answer to the petition.

Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025,
to wit:

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for purposes of economy and
more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the
DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby
established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in
the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.

The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until such time that its
appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act.

After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the hearing in the lower court for
the purpose of enabling petitioner to present Department Order No. 97-1025. In an Order dated 18
February 1997, the lower court granted the motion.

On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition assailing the validity
of Department Order No. 97-1025. On 14 May 1997, the OSG presented Department Order No. 97-1025
after which petitioner filed a formal offer of exhibits.

In an Order dated 09 June 1997, the lower court admitted petitioners documentary exhibits over the
objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower court admitted the supplemental petition filed by
respondent to which petitioner filed an answer thereto.

On 31 March 1999, the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733[3] dated
February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997 of the respondent DOTC Secretary null and void
and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment
on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from
holding any other office or employment in the Government.

The preliminary injunction issued on May 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.

No pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of validity of the
subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.

In his Memorandum[4], respondent Mabalot principally argues that a transfer of the powers and
functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as an
LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power. To this end,
respondent quoted heavily the lower courts rationale on this matter, to wit:

With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of powers and functions, specially
those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be effected through legislative fiat. Not even the President of
the Philippines can do so. And much less by the DOTC Secretary who is only a mere extension of the
Presidency. Among the powers of the LTFRB are to issue injunctions, whether prohibitory (or)
mandatory, punish for contempt and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. These powers
devolve by extension on the LTFRB regional offices in the performance of their functions. They cannot be
transferred to another agency of government without congressional approval embodied in a duty
enacted law. (Emphasis ours)

We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity
attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and
Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through his duly constituted political agent
and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization
of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and
responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public
officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by the
Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.
[5]

Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled by decisions of the
Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, abolish or
merge offices in the executive department.[6] Thus, at various times, Congress has vested power in the
President to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute functions, and particular transfers under
such statutes have been held to be within the authority of the President.[7]

In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to
the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order
(E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service
Commission[8] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code
of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department
Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President,[9] dated 23 September 1987, Section 1
of which explicitly provides:

Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various departments and other agencies of
the National Government that are currently authorized to maintain regional offices are hereby directed
to establish forthwith their respective regional offices In the Cordillera Administrative Region with
territorial coverage as defined under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, with
regional headquarters at Baguio City.

Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize but directed,
in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake
the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To us, Administrative Order No. 36 is
a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than from the Chief Executive - ordering the
heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the establishment of their respective regional
offices in the CAR.

By the Chief Executives unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering his alter ego -
the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, the
President, in effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to act and exercise his authority,
albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to put into place the organizational structure
and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise in any significant way the performance of public
functions and delivery of basic government services in the Cordillera Administrative Region.

Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, directly and merely
sought to implement the Chief Executives Administrative Order.

To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates:

The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.[10] It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or
to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.[11]

From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition
of the President since they are merely his alter ego.[12] As this Court enunciated in Villena vs. Secretary
of the Interior,[13] without minimizing the importance of the heads of various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Thus, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower courts pronouncement - that the transfer of
powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, may
not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter ago and could only be properly
effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the least, erroneous.

In Larin vs. Executive Secretary,[14] this Court through the ponencia of Mr. Justice Justo Torres, inked an
extensive disquisition on the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the National
Government, which power includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices. Thus in Larin,
we held that Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) evidently
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices
in the department or agency concerned:

Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations
by this act.

Petitioners contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were riders, deserved scant
consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional,
the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[15]

Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar provisions as embodied in Section
72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled Organizational Changes and Section 73 (General Provisions)
thereof entitled Implementation of Reorganization. Likewise, R.A. 8250 (G.A.A. for FY 1997) has Section
76 (General Provisions) entitled Organizational Changes and Section 77 (General Provisions) entitled
Implementation of Reorganization.

In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executives authority to reorganize the National
Government, viz:

Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are
not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
(Emphasis ours)

This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives
him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.[16] So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.

The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772,
reads:

1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the National
Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles
of good government and responsive national development, including but not limited to the following
guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental
framework:

xxx

b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those
which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and activities;

c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one
department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another;

d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;

e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;

f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units
of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers,
functions, and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations,
their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. (As added by P.D. 1772)

g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this
decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis supplied.)

In fine, the designation[17] and subsequent establishment[18] of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of
LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of
functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing
authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and
Communications.

Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed in the
interest of the service[19] and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC
functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region.[20] In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as
valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[21] To our mind, the
reorganization pursued in the case at bar bears the earmark of good faith. As petitioner points out,[22]
tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the eventual creation of the LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms
of manpower and resource requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the
government.

Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O. 292[23] and Section 4 of E.O. 202,
[24] the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, through his duly designated Undersecretary,
shall exercise administrative supervision and control[25] over the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (Board).

Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order No. 97-1025, the LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office is subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office. Under the law,[26]
the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Franchising and Regulatory Offices shall be
appealable to the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision; the decision, order or
resolution of the Board shall be appealable to the DOTC Secretary. With this appellate set-up and mode
of appeal clearly established and in place, no conflict or absurd circumstance would arise in such manner
that a decision of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.

As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, we hold that the assailed
Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the aforementioned constitutional provisions considering
that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in
effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office
subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular
LTFRB Regional Office.

As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:[27]

To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he
performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer may be designated to a
position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a
Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.

Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall be holding more than
one office or employment at the same time as a result of the establishment of such agency as the LTFRB-
CAR pursuant to Department Order No. 97-1025, this Court is of the firm view that such fact still does
not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. On this matter, it must
be stressed that under the aforementioned constitutional provision, an office or employment held in the
exercise of the primary functions of ones principal office is an exception to, or not within the
contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.
Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that the appointive
officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or indirect compensation, in
violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. In the absence of any clear and convincing
evidence to show any breach or violation of said constitutional prohibitions, this Court finds no cogent
reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged orders.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the
decision dated 31 March 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City-Branch 81 in Special Civil Action
Case No. Q-96-26868 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995

ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner,

vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information
against him read as follows:

That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime prior thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Project
Manager/ Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute,
Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute (ITDI for
brevity) which is an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the
Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction of the building in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, with a total cost of SEVENTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P17,695,000.00) jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments, and while the said
construction has not yet been finally completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for
himself or for another, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed as part of
the expected profit of FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P460,000.00) in connection with the
construction of that government building wherein the accused had to intervene under the law in his
capacity as Project Manager/Consultant of said construction — said offense having been committed in
relation to the performance of his official duties.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.

On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Claro Preclaro y Jambalos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, perpetual disqualification from public office and to pay the
costs of this action.

SO ORDERED.2

The antecedent facts are largely undisputed.

On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute
(ITDI), a component of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a
written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA)
Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.3

The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction period
unless sooner terminated.4 Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from counter-part funds
duly financed by foreign-assisted projects and government funds duly released by the Department of
Budget and Management.5

In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST contracted the services of the
Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer.
6

How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act is narrated in the
Comment of the Solicitor General and amply supported by the records. The material portions are
hereunder reproduced:

xxx xxx xxx

3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander Resoso, Project Engineer of the Sta. Maria Construction
Company, was in the process of evaluating a Change Order for some electricals in the building
construction when petitioner approached him at the project site (p. 11, 25, Ibid.).

4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be
deductive (meaning, charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive
(meaning, charged to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided
he gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit which he roughly estimated to be around
P460,000.00 (pp. 12-13, 22, Ibid.).
5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of Sta. Maria Construction
Company, Resoso thereafter asked petitioner if he wanted a rendezvous for him to receive the money.
Petitioner chose Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and Camias Street, on June 6, 1990
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (p. 14, Ibid.).

6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until the 8th of June, perceiving financial
constraints (Ibid.).

7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with me because we are not in a hurry." (p. 15, Ibid.)
Petitioner was thereafter asked to bring along the result of the punch list (meaning, the list of defective
or correctible works to be done by the contractor) (p. 15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct. 1991).

8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to report the incident (p. 15, 35, Ibid.).

9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr. signified his conformity (p. 16,
TSN, 12 Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta. Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the amount of P50,000.00 in
P500.00 denomination to represent the grease money (p. 37, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money to the NBI. Thereafter, the money
was dusted with flourescent powder and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17, Ibid.). Resoso got the
attache case and was instructed not to open it. Similarly, he was advised to proceed at the Wendy's
Restaurant earlier than the designated time where a group of NBI men awaited him and his companion,
Sta. Maria, Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.).

11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley Restaurant in Timog, Quezon City, to
fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).

12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the Wendy's Restaurant. They were led
by the NBI men to a table previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a table occupied
by them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).

13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived. Supposedly, the following conversation took place, to
wit:

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

q. When Dave Preclaro arrived, what did he do?

a. We asked him his order and we talked about the punch list.

q. What was his comment about the punch list?

a. He told us that it is harder to produce small items than big ones.

q. How long did you converse with Engr. Claro Preclaro?

a. I think thirty minutes or so.

q. Was Preclaro alone when he came?

a. Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. CAOILI:

q. When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did you talk about anything else?

a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were conversing with Dave Preclaro and he told [him], "O, paano
na."

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

q. Who said "Paano na?"

a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And then Preclaro told [him], "Paano, How will the money be arranged
and can I bring it?" he said.

And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. told him it was arranged on two bundles on two envelopes.

And then Dave Preclaro told, "Puede" and he asked Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is express teller and
could he deposit during night time but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr. told him, "I do not have any knowledge or
I do not have any express teller you can deposit. I only know credit card."

PROS. CAOILI:

q. When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and interviewed him that way, was there anything that
happened?

a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed two envelopes to Preclaro.

q. Did Claro Preclaro receive these two envelopes from Engineer Sta. Maria?

a. Yes, sir. (pp. 19-21, Ibid., See also pp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)

14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his right hand, thereafter placing
them under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).

15. A camera flashed to record the event. Petitioner instinctively docked to avoid the taking of
pictures. In such manner, the two envelopes fell (p. 23, Ibid.).

16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two envelopes. Petitioner refused. Hence, one of
the NBI men picked up the envelopes and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p. 27, Ibid.)

17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the NBI for examination (p. 28; Ibid.).
18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, petitioner's right palmar hand was tested positive of
flourescent powder. The same flourescent powder, however, cannot be detected in petitioner's T-shirt
and pants (p. 5, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990).7

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, as brought out at the outset, an information was filed against petitioner which, after due hearing,
resulted in his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner instituted the
present petition for review, ascribing to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, THE [PETITIONER] NOT BEING A PUBLIC OFFICER; and

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE GUILT OF THE
[PETITIONER] HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

We find the petition unmeritorious.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft
& Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended), because he was neither elected nor appointed to a
public office. Rather, petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on
contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period8 as evidenced by the contract of
services9 he entered into with the ITDI. Petitioner, to further support his "theory," alleged that he was
not issued any appointment paper separate from the abovementioned contract. He was not required to
use the bundy clock to record his hours of work and neither did he take an oath of office. 10

We are not convinced by petitioner's arguments.

Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b)
thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. . . ."

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions
in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service 11 by PD 807
providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code of
1987. 13

Non-career service in particular is characterized by —

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal
or confidential staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a
special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis ours.) 14

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career service
category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public
officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not
take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of
law clearly including petitioner within the definition of a public officer.

Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act because his intervention "was not required by law but in the performance of a contract of services
entered into by him as a private individual contractor," 15 is erroneous. As discussed above, petitioner
falls within the definition of a public officer and as such, his duties delineated in Annex "B" of the
contract of services 16 are subsumed under the phrase "wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law." 17 Petitioner's allegation, to borrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere
splitting of hairs.

Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment

reports/billings 18 hence, as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to
make a favorable recommendation and act favorably in behalf of the government," signing acceptance
papers and approving deductives and additives are some examples. 19 All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore, present.

Anent the second issue, we likewise find Petitioner's allegations completely bereft of merit.
Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
the charges against him should be rejected for being improbable, unbelievable and contrary to human
nature.

We disagree.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." 20
We have extensively reviewed the records of this case and we find no reason to overturn the findings of
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner enumerates the alleged improbabilities and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. We shall examine the testimonies referred to with meticulousness.

Petitioner asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso,
when he could have just talked directly to the contractor himself. It is quite irrelevant from whom
petitioner demanded his percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the contractor's project
engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly from the contractor himself Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That
petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has
been sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr. Resoso, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said when you were computing your Change Order Mr. Preclaro or Dave Preclaro whom you
identified approached you, what did you talk about?

A He mentioned to me that we are deductive in our Change Order three and four so after our
conversation I told this conversation to my boss that we are deductible in the Change Order three and
four and then my boss told me to ask why it is deductive.

Q Did you ask the accused here, Dave Preclaro why it is considered deductive?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was his answer if any?

A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive when my
computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your company already and then he
picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our alleged profit amounting to One Hundred Sixty
Thousand Pesos and then he told me that he used to use some percentage in projects maximum and
minimum and in our case he would use a minimum percentage and multiply to 60 and . . .

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q What is 460?

A P460,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get two Hundred Thousand Pesos.
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

What is the translation now?

WITNESS:

A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00. (Emphasis ours.)

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What does he mean by that if you know?

A I do not know sir.

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

Q What is P200,000.00?

A It is Two Hundred Thousand Pesos.

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What did you answer him when he told you that?

A He told me to forget the deductive and electrical and after that I told my boss what he told me.

Q Who is your boss?

A Santa Maria Sr.

Q What was the reaction of your boss when you relayed the message to Mr. Preclaro?

A The next day he told me to ask Dave where and when to pick up the money so the next day I
asked Dave "Where do you intend to get the money, the Boss wanted to know."

Q What was the answer of Dave?

A And he told me, Wendy's Restaurant at 3:00 o'clock.

Q When?

A June 6 Wednesday.

Q When he told you that did you comply with June 6 appointment?

A I told my boss what he told me again that the meeting will take place at Wendy's Restaurant
corner Edsa and Camias Street at around 8:00 o'clock p.m. June 6, Wednesday.
Q What did your boss tell you?

A The next day he told me to ask Dave.

Q What did your boss tell you?

A My boss told me to ask Dave to postpone the meeting on June 6 to be postponed on June 8 at
the same place and same time because my boss is having financial problem.

Q Did you relay the postponement to Dave Preclaro?

A Yes sir. I told what my boss told me.

Q What was his reaction?

A Dave told me "O.K. lang with me" because we are not in a hurry. Any way we are the ones to sign
the acceptance papers and my boss instructed me that on Friday to ask Dave to bring along the result of
the punch list and if possible also to bring along the acceptance papers to be signed by Dave, Lydia Mejia
and Dr. Lirag the director.

Q What happened next after meeting with Preclaro to relay the postponement if any?

A Nothing happened. The next day, Thursday the boss instructed me to go with him to the NBI to
give a statement.

Q Did you go to the NBI and report to the incident to the NBI?

A Yes sir.

Q Did you give a statement before any of the agents of the of the NBI?

A Yes sir. 21

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange
meetings with him regarding his demand 22 does not weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at
all prove that petitioner did not ask for money. Conceivably petitioner did not muster enough courage to
ask money directly from the contractor himself. Getting the amount through the project engineer would
be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had refused to give money, petitioner could always deny having
made the demand.

Petitioner contends that the percentage demanded in the amount of P200,000.00 is too high considering
that the estimated profit of the contractor from the CMD project is only P460,000.00. In petitioner's
words, this would "scare the goose that lays the golden egg." 23 We reject this argument. The
aforementioned contractor's profit is petitioner's own computation as testified to by Engr. Resoso:

xxx xxx xxx

A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive when my
computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your company already and then he
picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our alleged profit amounting to One Hundred Sixty
Thousand Pesos and then he told me that he used to use some percentage in projects maximum and
minimum and in our case he would use a minimum percentage and multiply to 460 and . . . (Emphasis
ours.)

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q What is 460?

A P460,000.00 and it ended to P215 thousand or P20,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get
the Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

What is the translation now?

WITNESS:

A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00.

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What does he mean by that if you know?

A I do not know sir.

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss. 24

xxx xxx xxx

The records, however, do not show the true and actual amount that the Sta. Maria Construction will
earn as profit. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's contention as the actual profit may be lower
or higher than his estimation.

Besides, as related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper
compensation since he has allegedly done so much for the Sta. Maria construction company. 25

Petitioner also argues that:

According to STA. MARIA, SR., they were deductive by P280,000.00 (Id., pp. 34-35).

If STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION was deductive in the amount of P280,000.00, why would the petitioner
still demand P200,000.00 which would increase the contractor's loss to P480,000.00!

It might have been different if the changes were additive where STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION would have
earned more, thereby providing motive for the petitioner to ask for a percentage! 26
But this is precisely what petitioner was bargaining for — P200,000.00 in exchange for forgetting about
the deductive 27 and thus prevent the Sta. Maria Construction from incurring losses.

Petitioner's contention that it was impossible for him to make any demands because the final decision
regarding accomplishments and billing lies with the DOST technical committee is unacceptable.
Petitioner is part of the abovementioned technical committee as the ITDI representative consultant. This
is part of his duties under the contract of services in connection with which he was employed by the
ITDI. Even, assuming arguendo that petitioner does not make the final decision, as
supervisor/consultant, his recommendations will necessarily carry much weight. Engr. Resoso testified
thus:

PROS. CAOILI:

Q As a Project Engineer to whom do you present your billing papers accomplishment report or
purchase order?

A The billing paper was being taken cared of by the, of our office. I personally do my job as
supervision in the construction.

Q Do you have any counterpart to supervise the project from the government side?

A Yes, we have.

Yes, the DOST have a technical Committee Infra-Structure Committee and also the ITDI as its own
representative.

Q Who composed the Technical Committee of the DOST?

A A certain Engineer Velasco, Engineer Sande Banez and Engineer Mejia.

Q How about the ITDI?

A The ITDI representative composed of Dave Preclaro.

Q Who is this Dave Preclaro?

A He is the consultant of ITDI. (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CAOILI:

Q As Project Engineer do you consult to any body regarding your job?

A First if there is any problem in the site I consult my boss.

PROS. CAOILI:
Q How about with the other consultants representing the ITDI and DOST?

A In the construction site we have meeting every Monday to discuss any problem.

Q With whom do you discuss this problem?

A The Infra-structure Committee of DOST and the Infra-structure Committee of ITDI, the architect
and the contractor. We had weekly meetings.

Q What matters if any do you consult with Mr. Claro Preclaro?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

No basis.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

They met on problems on Mondays.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

With the representative of DOST and Preclaro

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Does that also mean that Preclaro is also among the representatives he is going to consult with?

Well any way. . .

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Witness may answer the question.

Read back the question.

COURT STENOGRAPHER:

Reading back the question as ordered by the Court.

WITNESS:

A Every Monday meeting we tackle with accomplishment report the billing papers. 28 (Emphasis
ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner also claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the entrapment itself
are conflicting, doubtful or improbable:

(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4) P500 bills were dusted with flourescent powder and used in
the alleged entrapment.

Contradicting RESOSO, STA. MARIA, SR. said that he gave fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos in P500
denomination to the NBI. 29

There is no such inconsistency. Said witnesses were testifying on two different subjects. Engr. Sta. Maria,
Sr.'s testimony touched on the amount he gave the NBI for use in the entrapment while Engr. Resoso's
declaration referred only to the number of bills dusted with flourescent powder.

Petitioner, likewise, misappreciated the following testimony of Resoso:

PROS. CAOILI:

Q What did he do with the two envelopes upon receiving the same?

A Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is bank teller express, if he could deposit the money
but Mr. Sta. Maria said, "I do not have, I only have credit cards." 30

Petitioner intended to deposit the money in his own account not that of Mr. Sta. Maria, Jr. He was
merely inquiring from the latter if there was an express teller nearby where he could make the deposit.
Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. himself testified as follows:

A He asked me if there was express teller. I told him I do not know then he asked me whether it is
possible to deposit at the Express Teller at that time. I told him I don't know because I have no express
teller card and he asked me how am I going to arrange, how was it arranged if I will bring it, can I bring it.
Then I told him that it was placed in two envelopes consisting of 500 Peso bills and then he said "Okay na
yan." 31

The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is not fatal
to the People's cause. The transaction was witnessed by several people, among whom were Engr.
Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. and the NBI agents whose testimonies on the circumstances before, during and
after the turn-over are consistent, logical and credible.

According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no photographs of the actual turn-
over so as not to alert and scare off the petitioner. During cross-examination Agent Balanban Jr. stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, of course, this entrapment operation, you made certain preparation to make sure that you
would be able to gather evidence in support of the entrapment?

A Yes sir.
Q As a matter of fact you even brought photographer for the purpose?

A That is right sir.

Q And that photographer was precisely brought along to record the entrapment?

A Yes sir.

Q From the beginning to the end, that was the purpose?

A At the time of the arrest sir.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

From the time of the handing over of the envelopes until the entrapment would have been terminated?

A No sir we plan to take the photograph only during the arrest because if we take photographs he
would be alerted during the handing of the envelopes. (Emphasis ours.)

Q So you did not intend to take photographs of the act of handing of the envelopes to the suspect?

A We intended but during that time we cannot take photographs at the time of the handling
because the flash will alert the suspect. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Why did you not position the photographer to a far distance place with camera with telescopic lens?

A We did not Your Honor.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

So was it your intention to take photographs only at the time that he is already being arrested?

A Yes sir. 32

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed under ultra-violet light, both were found negative for
flourescent powder. This is petitioner's own conclusion which is not supported by evidence. Such self-
serving statement will not prevail over the clear and competent testimony and the report 33 submitted
by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms. Demelen R. dela Cruz, who was the one who conducted the test
and found petitioner's right palmar hand positive for flourescent powder, the same hand he used,
according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria Jr., to get the money from the latter.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been a Forensic Chemist at NBI?
A Since 1981 sir.

Q JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q By the way, is the defense willing to admit that the witness is a competent as . . . .

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Admitted Your Honor.

PROS. CAOILI:

Madam Witness did you conduct a forensic examination in the person of one Dave Preclaro y Jambalos?

A Yes sir.

Q If that person whom you examined is here in court would you be able to recognize him?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

We admit that the accused is the one examined by the witness.

ATTY. CAOILI:

Did you prepare the result of the examination in writing?

A Yes sir.

PROS. CAOILI:

Showing to you Physic Examination No. 90-961 which for purposes of identification has already been
marked as Exh. H what relation has this have with the report that you mentioned a while ago?

A This is the same report that I prepared sir.

Q How did you conduct such flourescent examination?

A The left and right hands of the accused were placed under the ultra violet lamp sir.

Q What was the result?

A It gave a . . . under the ultra violent lamp the palmer hands of the suspect gave positive result for
the presence of flourescent powder.

Q What palmar hands?

A Right hand sir.

Q What other examination did you conduct?

A And also the clothing, consisting of the t-shirts and the pants were examined. Under the ultra
violet lamp the presence of the flourescent powder of the t-shirts and pants cannot be seen or
distinguished because the fibers or the material of the cloth under the ultra violet lamp was flouresce.

Q Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and pants under the ultra violent lamp was flouresce?

A The materials or the fibers of the clothings it could have been dyed with flourescent dyes sir. 34

xxx xxx xxx

What we find improbable and contrary to human experience is petitioner's claim that he was set up by
Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for no other purpose but revenge on account, for petitioner's failure
to recommend the Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical works. 35

The Sandiganbayan has aptly ruled on this matter, thus:

For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of the construction company is hardly
plausible. It is highly improbable for the company to embark on a malicious prosecution of an innocent
person for the simple reason that such person had recommended the services of another construction
firm. And it is extremely impossible for such company to enlist the cooperation and employ the services
of the government's chief investigative agency for such an anomalous undertaking. It is more in accord
with reason and logic to presuppose that there was some sort of a mischievous demand made by the
accused in exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as, favorable recommendation on the
completeness of the project, hassle-free release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the
rationale for the occurrence of the meeting and the demand for money is infinite and boundless. 36

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in the
construction of another DOST building, would not risk his business or livelihood just to exact revenge
which is neither profitable nor logical. As we aptly stated in Maleg v. Sandiganbayan: 37

It is hard to believe that the complainant who is a contractor would jeopardize and prejudice his business
interests and risk being blacklisted in government infrastructure projects, knowing that with the
institution of the case, he may find it no longer advisable nor profitable to continue in his construction
ventures. It is hardly probable that the complainant would weave out of the blue a serious accusation
just to retaliate and take revenge on the accused.

From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that on the basis of the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented during the trial, the guilt of petitioner has been established beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951

FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Llorente and Yumul for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of a violation of article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal, insisting upon purely legal points.

The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:

That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer, had been placed in charge of
issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the
Municipal Court of the City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony of Clerk of Court
Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic violations, that the accused had
been permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without
counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular clerk. On the
day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared and inquired from the accused about a
subpoena that he received. He was informed that it was in connection with a traffic violation for which
said Rabia had been detained and given traffic summons by an American MP. The accused after a short
conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and informed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed.
The Fiscal having found such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no
lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the party concerned. This was done
by the accused and after the signing by Felix Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted
the petition for dismissal.

According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National Bureau of Investigation, the
accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the
same could be reduced because he had no money, and that the accused informed Rabia that he could fix
the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed. This charged was
denied by the accused.

The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such
officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods and fine of not lees than the value to the penalty corresponding to the
crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph. . . .

As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of the offense are: (1) the the
accused is a public officer within the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused
received by himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promises has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime or any act not constituting a
crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the functions of the public officer.

There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of article 203, which
includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official or any rank or class." That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public
servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee".

Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding him as a public officer,
expounded and discussed several grounds arranged under the following hearings:

a. The doctrine of "the temporary performance of public functions by a laborer" should not apply in
defendant's case.

b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance by which he may be
considered a public official.

c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation and delimitation of the
functions of his appointment came from another source.

After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are unconvinced. The law is clear,
and we perceive no valid reason to deny validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court
that, for the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient
to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it must be stated, was followed and applied by the
Court of Appeals because the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of summons and
subpoenas, had been allowed in some instance to prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases.

And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it opined1 that a laborer in the
Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer of money orders was a public officer within the meaning of
article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe money
is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent
officials.

The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of Appeals said this petitioner
received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed the money) in consideration of his "fixing" Rabia's case,
and thereafter he "fixed" it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was approved in due course.

In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated that our pronouncements
under the first sufficiently answer petitioner's propositions elaborated in several parts of his brief,
revolving around the thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he may not be convicted,
because the preparation of motions for dismissal is not surely the official function of a laborer. Enough to
recall that although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on several occasions
designated or given the work to prepare motions for dismissal. He was consequently temporarily
discharging such public functions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited,
monetary reward, he certainly guilty as charged.

Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in toto. With costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951

FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Llorente and Yumul for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of a violation of article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal, insisting upon purely legal points.

The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:
That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer, had been placed in charge of
issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the
Municipal Court of the City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony of Clerk of Court
Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic violations, that the accused had
been permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without
counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular clerk. On the
day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared and inquired from the accused about a
subpoena that he received. He was informed that it was in connection with a traffic violation for which
said Rabia had been detained and given traffic summons by an American MP. The accused after a short
conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and informed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed.
The Fiscal having found such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no
lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the party concerned. This was done
by the accused and after the signing by Felix Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted
the petition for dismissal.

According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National Bureau of Investigation, the
accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the
same could be reduced because he had no money, and that the accused informed Rabia that he could fix
the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed. This charged was
denied by the accused.

The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such
officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods and fine of not lees than the value to the penalty corresponding to the
crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph. . . .

As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of the offense are: (1) the the
accused is a public officer within the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused
received by himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promises has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime or any act not constituting a
crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the functions of the public officer.

There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of article 203, which
includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official or any rank or class." That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public
servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee".

Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding him as a public officer,
expounded and discussed several grounds arranged under the following hearings:

a. The doctrine of "the temporary performance of public functions by a laborer" should not apply in
defendant's case.

b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance by which he may be
considered a public official.

c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation and delimitation of the
functions of his appointment came from another source.

After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are unconvinced. The law is clear,
and we perceive no valid reason to deny validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court
that, for the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient
to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it must be stated, was followed and applied by the
Court of Appeals because the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of summons and
subpoenas, had been allowed in some instance to prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases.

And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it opined1 that a laborer in the
Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer of money orders was a public officer within the meaning of
article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe money
is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent
officials.

The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of Appeals said this petitioner
received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed the money) in consideration of his "fixing" Rabia's case,
and thereafter he "fixed" it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was approved in due course.

In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated that our pronouncements
under the first sufficiently answer petitioner's propositions elaborated in several parts of his brief,
revolving around the thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he may not be convicted,
because the preparation of motions for dismissal is not surely the official function of a laborer. Enough to
recall that although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on several occasions
designated or given the work to prepare motions for dismissal. He was consequently temporarily
discharging such public functions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited,
monetary reward, he certainly guilty as charged.

Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in toto. With costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002]

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
respondent.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was
mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
[1]

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for
the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the
National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.[2]

Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the completion
of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.[3] Like its predecessor Committee, the
Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of
the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress.

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to
prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six
(6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat
to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall
be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of
Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and
approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of
the Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at
the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue
Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc
and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was
appointed to chair the Committee.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was
the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for
violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia
Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has
caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law.[5]

Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further
investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, among others, NCC Chair Salvador
H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the
Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau
issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP
chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H.
Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA
Rules and Regulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.[6]

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning
the jurisdiction of said office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was
denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding
probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act
No. 1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against
Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but
dismissed the charge against Pea.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding
respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against
petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because:

A.

EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM
RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

B.

THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C.

PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER AS
DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.[7]

In addition, petitioner in his reply[8] invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] where it
was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as
Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction
over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is the prosecutor, not
the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial
and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section
15 (1) of R.A. 6770 (An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which
emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated
references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special
Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]

The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in
the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001.
The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal
act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer
or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)
giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the
scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The grant of
this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate
and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed
that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the
lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his
office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows
him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability
in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in
the original.]

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies.
We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.

The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:

SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on
complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases;

x x x.

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:

SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[12]

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence[13] is that provided by Mechem, a recognized
authority on the subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[14]

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties, and the designation of the position as an office.[15]

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as
[t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that
the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.[16]

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law
did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the
functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation
of the policies as set forth by law.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)
thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial
presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values;

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning
and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of
harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as
effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;

x x x.

E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of
the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private
organizations. It also referred to the need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:

(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of programs and
projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic
endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino
in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National
Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the
Centennial;

(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about the
plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;

(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and
projects;

(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the
Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and
similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures;

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private
individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the
status of the preparations for the Celebration.[18]

It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,[19] created the NCC by
executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the
nature of executive orders:

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders. [Underscoring ours.]

Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in
Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:

MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task of the
centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of the
zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:

I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of material
time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be
in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is
suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery
in that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also
mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and
employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people
who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would
have really calibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to
that because they had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the
original plan.

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
fundamental state policy.[20]

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a municipality of
a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the holding of a
nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta
which involved only the exercise of the national governments proprietary function.[22] In Torio, we held:

[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives
authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the
town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed,
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town,
nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails,
and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking
may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in
character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town
fiesta.

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned
that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or
function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and
will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the
surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds could produce a
conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political,
social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of
New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July
fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged
in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for
negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by
the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public
governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.

A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a
public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to
explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator,
was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:

July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day,
by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States
statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have
recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country
it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct
the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently
take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution,
accompanied by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon
and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their
promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial
Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our
former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power.
1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an
occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a vehicle
for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. The significance of the Celebrations could not have been
lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for
freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a
Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair,
is a public officer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is
annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted
merely for the public good.[23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary,
compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said
commission less of a public office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is
merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if
a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract,
which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his
station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who
performs the duties from an officer.

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if
the other elements are present it can make no difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one
act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be
held for years or during good behavior.[25]

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission
is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President.
(Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)

x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust
under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and
Vice-President of the United States.

The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute
provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures,
under the auspices of the government of the United States, and for the constitution of a commission, to
consist of more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose
functions shall continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and
superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the commissioners
are appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and
Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute
provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should
announce, by proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of
Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased
and defined. That act created a corporation, called The Centennial Board of Finance, to cooperate with
the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the
commission. The seventh section of the act provides that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared
and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by
the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation, governing
rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the
exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the United States Centennial Commission;
and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings,
or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States
Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such
grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums. The tenth section of the act
provides that it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up
of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the
United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition.

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission
were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large
experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in
the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons
performing such duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority,
are not to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly
speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were
originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares,
section 7, that no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers,
provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States. The only other officers provided for were
the alternates appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public
office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions
as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.[27]
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his services
as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term

xxx

(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the
Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best
resolved at trial.

To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.
[28] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers. Article
203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or
performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,[29] on the other hand,
states:

Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or
manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular person in the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any government employee,
agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not
one receives compensation, thus:

Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term compensation, which
is not defined by said law, has many meanings.

Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance for personal
expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for
services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.[30]

How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive any
salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of
compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and
compensation.[31] Would such fact bear any significance?

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial court
from resolving them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts Resolution dated
September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995

SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,
petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of
the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA")
while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at
the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners
were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon
Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.1
Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:

RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to streamline its
operations and improve delivery of public service;

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization of the
Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions which were
transferred to the Regional Offices;

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect the following
changes in its organization, specifically in the Central Offices:

1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and
Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and Development Office
(RDO).

2. The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed Human Resource Development
Office (HRDO).

3. The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions are
hereby transferred to HRDO:

a. Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;

b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and

c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.

4. The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed Management Information Office
(MIO).

5. The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit are
transferred to MIO.

6. The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said
functions are hereby transferred to the Office of the Executive Director:

a. Financial Audit and Evaluation;

b. Internal Management and Improvement;

c. Research and Statistics; and

d. Planning and Programming.

7. The library service and its personnel under OCPR are transferred to the Central Administrative
Office.

8. The budget allocated for the various functions shall be transferred to the Offices where the
functions are transferred. Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the functions shall be moved to
where the functions are transferred.

Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the OCES.

The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place before end of July 1994.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.

(Signed)

Patricia A. Sto. Tomas

Chairman

(Signed) Did not participate

Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., Thelma P. Gaminde

Commissioner Commissioner

Attested by:

(Signed)
Carmencita Giselle B. Dayson

Board Secretary V 2

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the morning of 28 July
1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the determination of
the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority.

Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required public
respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office
Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de
Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from
enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion
and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then moved to
lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a separate Comment dated
28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the
Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to these Comments. The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder
(denominated "Comment [on] the Reply").

The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following:

(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710
to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office]; and

(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of
tenure.

I.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the Commission in the following
terms:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission — The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive Director — . . .

(2) The Merit System Protection Board — . . .

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs — . . .

(4) The Office of Planning and Management — . . .

(5) The Central Administrative Office — . . .

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records — . . .

(7) The Office of Position Classification and

Compensation — . . .

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and

Placement — . . .

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the
formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit
promotion and employee incentive benefits and awards.

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development — . . .

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and
regulations for the effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management
programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service
Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and
evaluation systems.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees
in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems,
position classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefits,
discipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(13) The Office of the Corporate Affairs — . . .

(14) The Office of Retirement Administration — . . .

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — . . . (Emphases in the original)

Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective functions, the
1987 Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at
least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their
respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect chances in the
organization as the need arises.

xxx xxx xxx 3

(Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each
of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which
Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group of
positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more
or less definable function or functions. These functions are related to one another, each of them being
embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is an internal department or
organizational unit within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all
the other Offices within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little
differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows
that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the
Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new
grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same Resolution renamed some of
the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) was renamed
Human Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was
renamed Management Information Office (MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions
moving some functions from one Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM
(Office of Planning and Management) was transferred to the newly named Management Information
Office (MIO). This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the
budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the
personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were
moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that
Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's]
operations and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal organization were rendered
necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions
effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the
Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer
physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had
been centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service
employees all over the country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel
transactions. Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional
Offices and the Field Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes
possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan
Manila.

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was
precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus generating a
need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to that Regional Office while
the incumbent Regional Director was still there to facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of
the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her
assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector unions have been very active. Petitioner
Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by
the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and needed to be
transferred immediately to the Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee
for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the functions previously assigned to him had been
substantially devolved to the Regional Offices such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would
result in the least disruption of the operations of the Central Office.4

It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate considerations of
administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710
and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in
Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San
Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear to

the Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 — re-naming of
existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices;
re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices —
are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in the organization" of
the Commission.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which
may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first
place.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is
frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual
for the benefit of the public.5 We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public
office as that term is used in the law of public officers.6 It is essential to note that none of the "changes
in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the
termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers
and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having
mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those
Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might
please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil
Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to
carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." 7 Assuming, for purposes
of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes
contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary),
such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The
legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out
not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil
Service Commission

as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a

career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . .
. and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the
departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasis
supplied)

II.

We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the
respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their
positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot,
without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed
to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the
position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each
appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The
same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the
Commission.

Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:

Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall
be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel
actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the
Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the
same agency, Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary.
(Emphasis supplied)

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in
OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority
and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not
involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they
retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at
their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the
Commission's Head Office.

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in the instant
case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different agencies or offices of
government.

In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,8 this Court held that a person who had been appointed as "Secondary School
Principal II" in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had
been stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years,
could lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in Quezon City,
without demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court held:

The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides that
except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his consent
from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory
that the teacher concerned is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Thus:

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as

the appointed indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure
cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's
demand to remain — even as public service dictates that a transfer be made — in a particular station.
Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement in Ibañez, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No.

L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);

That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System,
is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but
also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciatEd, are tantamount to removals which
are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure
necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121
Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the
security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely
assigned — to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et
al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963]). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]

The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she
could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school.
(Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not
have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment
would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the
exigencies of public service require even without consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138,

143 —

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge
behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She
proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by
appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a
Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education", without
mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary
School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service
requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice.9 (Emphasis supplied; citation
omitted)

In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et

a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital
Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the Secretary of
Labor. The Court said:

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were not, however,
appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National Capital
Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another of the same agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their services may be used
more effectively. As such they can neither claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned
nor to security of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners'
reassignment is not a transfer for they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were
not given new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum
Order No. 4 ordering their reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order.11 (Emphases
supplied)

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:

After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private
respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be assigned to any station and she is no
entitled to stay permanently at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974];
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals [G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing
Brillantes v. Guevarra [27 SCRA 138 [1969]). 13

Again, in Ibañez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the Court had before it petitioners' appointments as
"Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city, municipality or
municipal district they had been appointed as such. 15 The Court held that since petitioners "were not
appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific
station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as the exigencies of the service required,"
and that they had no right to complain against any change in assignment. The Court further held that
assignment to a particular station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete such
appointment:

. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a particular station, in the light of the
terms of the appointments in question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The approval
thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those appointments the stamp of finality. With the
view that the respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and the demand of the
mission it set out to accomplish with the appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely
meant to be complete as then issued. The subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder that the
said respondent Commission held in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did
not in any way detract from the perfection attained by the appointments beforehand. And the respective
appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually
conferred — not in that of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things
stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure
can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A
contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between
appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers. 16 (Emphases
supplied)

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge, Division of
Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She was assigned as Social
Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an office order of the Administrator, Social Welfare
Administration. After a little more than a year; petitioner was assigned elsewhere and respondent
Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to remain in her first station, In Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18 petitioner Dr. Jaro had been
appointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first
assigned to the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding
clinic in Saug, Davao and then to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of Padada, also
of Davao Province. He resisted his last assignment and brought mandamus against the Secretary of
Health to compel the latter to return him to his station in Catil, Davao as Municipal Health Officer
thereof. The Court, applying Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holding that his appointment not
being to any specific station but as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of
Hospitals, he could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Health, his services may be utilized more effectively. 19

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as
"Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred by the
President of the University of the Philippines to the Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in
rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student activists who were boycotting their classes in
the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as an illegal and unconstitutional
removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:

4. Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfer can be
effected without the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and even without the
consent of the employee.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the appointment
does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer
affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau
of Public Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of
another school.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a rule does not prescribe
a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of approved
techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote
optimum public service cannot-be objected to. . . .

5. The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of
validity vis-a-vis the principles just enunciated.

xxx xxx xxx

To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of
Education, University of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university." His appointment is
to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases
supplied)

For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO
to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not
constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925

VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.

Provincial Fiscal Diaz for appellant.

Del Rosario and Del Rosario for appellee.

Vicente Zacarias as amicus curiae.

MALCOLM, J.:

The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty- five years, should be given retroactive or prospective effect.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He
continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by the
Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice
of the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.

Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance to the
occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted friendly
quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to
occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as
justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground
that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was
constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice
of the peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by Honorable
Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor of petitioner and against
respondent.

Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its simplest factors, it will first be noted
that the petitioner abandons the untenable position, assumed by him in one portion of his complaint, to
the effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the
petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded as the
property of the incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.

It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant assigns three errors in this court, the first
two relating to preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in order that there may be an
authoritative decision on the main issue. The third error specified and argued with ability by the
provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in declaring that the limitation regarding the age of
justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went into effect.

Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original provision pertinent to the appointment and
term of office of justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein it was provided that justices
of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when
Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law
by making the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first
Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's appointment, however, the
law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices
of the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later
amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the
Administrative Code.

Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of
the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and for
each municipality, township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests
shall so require, for any other minor political division or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this
section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the following proviso:
"Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of
office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office
during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other
justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of
the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and
putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,
unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute
to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not
have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16
Pac., 843; Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs.
Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re
will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)

The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New York decision
held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the
incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms
should be clear in which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In
another case, a new constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the
incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to
persons in office at the time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)

The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that case,
the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration not only
provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it
further provided "that the present judges of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the
taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance ... ." There the intention
of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.

The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication
of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights. A proviso was merely
tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code
which permits justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions
expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of
provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the
law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.

Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added to section
203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices
of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be
given prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the
trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its disposition of the case.

Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner, vs.

HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their
respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary,
respondents.

The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several months. It does so out of
ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a consequence of the government reorganization
and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of the bureaucracy. The Court is
apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rules are settled, the issue will fester,
and likely foment on the constitutional crisis for the nation, itself biset with grave and serious problems.

The facts are not in dispute.

On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC
RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO
A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:

SECTION 1. ...

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:

(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime; 1

...

Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:

SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to promote
economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the organization
effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement
and other benefits accruing thereunder.

SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all government
offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is abolished or reorganized pursuant to this
Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the office or body to which its powers,
functions and responsibilities substantially pertain. 2

Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first
act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning
with the members of the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa4 and the
positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973 Constitution.

Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various
other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged
in this Court, 6 and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise been
questioned herein. 7

On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION."
Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving
officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated, and prescribed as
"grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel," the following:

SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation replacement of personnel:

1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;

2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
determined by the Mnistry Head concerned;

3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.8

On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.

Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.

On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:

1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace period
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:

a) informed of their re-appointment, or

b) offered another position in the same department or agency or

c) informed of their termination. 13

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as follows:

Sir:

Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the Reorganization Program
under Executive Order No. 127.

Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the Department of
Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose positions are not carried in the
new reorganization pattern, or who are not re- appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service.

In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as of February 28,
1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to which you may be
entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.

In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service
Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with the Government as the need
arises.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON

Commissioner15

As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:

1. CESAR DARIO

2. VICENTE FERIA, JR.

3. ADOLFO CASARENO

4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA

5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU

6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA

7. RENATO DE JESUS

8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA
9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES

10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ

11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA

12. SUBAER PACASUM

13. ZENAIDA LANARIA

14. JOSE B. ORTIZ

15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR

16. CORNELIO NAPA

17. PABLO B. SANTOS

18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ

19. DALISAY BAUTISTA

20. LEONARDO JOSE

21. ALBERTO LONTOK

22. PORFIRIO TABINO

23. JOSE BARREDO

24. ROBERTO ARNALDO

25. ESTER TAN

26. PEDRO BAKAL

27. ROSARIO DAVID

28. RODOLFO AFUANG

29. LORENZO CATRE

30. LEONCIA CATRE

31. ROBERTO ABADA

32. ABACA, SISINIO T.

33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.

34. ABADIANO, JOSE P

35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.

36. ABIOG, ELY F.

37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.

38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.

39. AGRES, ANICETO

40. AGUILAR, FLOR

41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.

42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.

43. ALANO, ALEX P.

44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.

45. ALBANO, ROBERT B.

46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.

47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.

48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.

49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.

50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.

51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.

52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.

53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.

54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.

55. ARABE, MELINDA M.

56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR.

57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.

58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR.

59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P.

60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.

61. ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T.

62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.

63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.

64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.

65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.

66. BACAL URSULINO C.

67. BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE Z.

68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.

69. BARROS, VICTOR C.

70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.

71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.

72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.

73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.

74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.

75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.

76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.

77. BULEG, BALILIS R.

78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M.

79. CALVO, HONESTO G.

80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V.

81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.

82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.

83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z.

84. CARLOS, LORENZO B.

85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U.

86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M.

87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J.

88. CATELO, ROGELIO B.

89. CATURLA, MANUEL B.

90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F.

91. CINCO, LUISITO

92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR.

93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S.

94. CORNETA, VICENTE S.

95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.

96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.

97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,

98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.

99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.

100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.

101. DABON, NORMA M.

102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.

103. DANDAL, EDEN F.

104. DATUHARON, SATA A.

105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.

106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA

107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.

108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.

109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.

110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.

111. DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO

112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO

113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.

114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.

115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.

116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.

117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.

118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.

119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.

120. DUAY, JUANA G.

121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.

122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.

123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A

124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.

125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.

126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.

127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.

128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.

129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.

130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.

131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.

132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.

133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.

134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR.

135. FUENTES, RUDY L.

136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.

137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.

138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.

139. GAN, ALBERTO P

140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.

141. GARCIA, EDNA V.

142. GARCIA, JUAN L.

143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.

144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.

145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.

146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.

147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.

148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.

149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.

150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.

151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.

152. HONRALES, LORETO N.

153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.

154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E.

155. IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C.

156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C.

157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C.

158. ISAIS, RAY C.

159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.

160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M.

161. JAVIER, AMADOR L.

162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S.

163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R.

164. JOVEN, MEMIA A.

165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V.

166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.

167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.

168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.

169. KOH, NANIE G.

170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.

171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.

172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.

173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.

174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.

175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.

176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.

177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.

178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.

179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.

180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.

181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L.

182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.

183. MACAISA, BENITO T.

184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.

185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO

186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.

187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.

188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.

189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.

190. MALLI, JAVIER M.

191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.

192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.

193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.

194. MARCELO, GIL C.

195. MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.

196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.

197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.

198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.

199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.

200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.

201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.

202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.

203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.

204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.

205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.

206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO

207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.

208. MIL, RAY M.

209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.

210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.

211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.

212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III

213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.

214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L

215. MORALES, NESTOR P.

216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.

217. MUNAR, JUANITA L.

218. MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R.

219. MURILLO, MANUEL M.

220. NACION, PEDRO R.

221. NAGAL, HENRY N.

222. NAVARRO, HENRY L.

223. NEJAL FREDRICK E.

224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.

225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.

226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.

227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.

228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R.

229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.

230. OSORIO, ABNER S.

231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II

232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.

233. PASTOR, ROSARIO

234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.

235. PEÑ;A, AIDA C.

236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.

237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.

238. PRE, ISIDRO A.

239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.

240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.

241. PURA, ARNOLD T.

242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.

243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.

244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.

245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.

246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.

247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.

248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V.

249. RAZAL, BETTY R.

250. REGALA, PONCE F.

251. REYES, LIBERATO R.

252. REYES, MANUEL E.

253. REYES, NORMA Z.

254. REYES, TELESPORO F.

255. RIVERA, ROSITA L.

256. ROCES, ROBERTO V.

257. ROQUE, TERESITA S.

258. ROSANES, MARILOU M.

259. ROSETE, ADAN I.

260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR.

261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G.

262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.

263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.

264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.

265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.

266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.

267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.

268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.

269. SIMON, RAMON P.

270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.

271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.

272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.

273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .

274. TABIJE, EMMA B.

275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE

276. TAN, ESTER S.

277. TAN, JULITA S.

278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.

279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.

280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.

281. UMPA, ALI A.

282. VALIC, LUCIO E.

283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.

284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.

285. VERA, AVELINO A.

286. VERAME, OSCAR E.

287. VIADO, LILIAN T.

288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K

289. VILLALON, DENNIS A.

290. VILLAR, LUZ L.

291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.

292. VILLAR, LUZ L.

293. ZATA, ANGELA JR.

294. ACHARON, CRISTETO

295. ALBA, RENATO B.

296. AMON, JULITA C.

297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.

298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.

299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.

300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.

301. DONATO, FELIPE S

302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.

303. GALAROSA, RENATO

304. MALAWI, MAUYAG

305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.

306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.

307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.

308. TEMPLO, CELSO

309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.

310. VALDEZ, NORA M.

Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967;
Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga Renato de Jesus, Nicasio
C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R. Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca,
Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B.
Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino
Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang,
Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279
16 individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.

As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of
Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with
the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirty-one
mentioned above came directly to this Court.

On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the

Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights;

2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the dates of their illegal termination based
on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former salaries.

This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the appellants
from any accusation of wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice to:

1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, and where
investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;

2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellants with derogatory reports or
information if evidence so warrants.

SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied
reconsideration. 19

On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court, docketed, as
above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court.

On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of
the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the

Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights; and

2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from the date of their illegal termination
based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former salaries.

This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the herein
appellants from any accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments are without
prejudice to:

1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, if any, and where
investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions; and

2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellant with derogatory reports or
information, if any, and if evidence so warrants.

SO ORDERED. 20

On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution in this
Court; his petitioner has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to be
reinstated are Senen Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio Reyes, and Romulo Badillo.
21

On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL
SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22
was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:

Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been
separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case
may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless also
separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who have
been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation
pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the
effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the
case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be
paid a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the
department or agency concerned. 23

On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned
the Court to contest the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.

On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had ordered
reinstated by its June 30,1988 Resolution filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of
Customs to comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 85335.

On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.

On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said hearing,
the parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino
Patajo. (c) former Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar (e) Atty. Faustino Tugade and (f) Atty.
Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of the
Commissioner of Customs (except in G.R. 85335, in which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the
Civil Service Commission).lâwphî1.ñèt Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and argued as
amicus curiae Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
which they did in due time.

There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization —
insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not
only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief
Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It
should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions. 24

The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a reorganization per se the only
question being, as shall be later seen: What is the nature and extent of this government reorganization?

The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of
the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service,"26 and because of
the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights
of public servants.

The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service Commission's Resolution dated June 30,
1988 had attained a character of finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial review or
ask for reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential Decree No. 807, 27 or under Republic Act No.
6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected. The records show that the Bureau of
Customs had until July 15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39
of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records likewise show that the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution denying
reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on
September 23, 1988.31 Hence the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari
to this Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed on time.

We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional
questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. 33 We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are,
indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do with "an
indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations,
a decision arrived at without rational deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions that require
"digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other hand, of
review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service
Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has
implications not only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the Provisional
Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude
that it cannot be said that — assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred — the Commission
committed a plain "error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc — as regards recourse to this
Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which is that judgments of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

In Aratuc we declared:

It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency
to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional
body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new
Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'. And since instead of
maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the
remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial
law.36

We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service
Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave
the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to the
former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with
respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" 37 of all election cases, so is
the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.

It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc
tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore,
our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack
or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and executory"40 and
hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. 41

Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil
Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not
have so stated in explicit terms.

As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that it has been filed
seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days from September 23, 1988 (the
date the Resolution, dated September 20,1988, of the Civil Service Commission, denying
reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated, under the
Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to challenge "any decision, order, or ruling"
42 of the Commission. To say that the period should be counted from the Solicitor's receipt of the main
Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked for reconsideration But to say
that is to deny him the right to contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main
decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives him such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win"
situation because if he did not move for a reconsideration, he would have been faulted for demanding
certiorari too early, under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration should preface a resort to a
special civil action. 43 Hence, we must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of denial.

We come to the merits of these cases.

G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:

The Case for the Employees

The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of
Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions
the legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive Order No.
127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59.New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of
the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities
and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from
government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution.

The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the
Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the
authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments by him or by the
President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are
not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall
receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of service, or the
equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no
case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.

No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to
enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this Executive Order.44

a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could not have
been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not included therein or who [is] not
reappointed"45 to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither the Executive Order
(under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance 46 abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. 47
Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" 48 (under the second
paragraph of the section) because "[[r]eappointment therein presupposes that the position to which it
refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed
that which has been abolished." 49 He claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power
to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987,50 and that thereafter, public
officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.51

Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau
until his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the 1987
Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section 59
of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 — during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs has the power
"[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," 53 and that his position,
which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of
reorganization.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the Philippines, say, on the
other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and that
since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly dismissed from the
service.

The Case for Commissioner Mison

In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose v. Arroyo54 in which the
following statement appears in the last paragraph thereof:

The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987
Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of
Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the removal of career civil
service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of
said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue
even after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service employees may be separated from
the service without cause as a result of such reorganization.55

For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He
further states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56 which allows a
reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo.
Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is
applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the Executive
Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the
incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered
legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The Solicitor General
denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that case supposedly involved a
mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17
and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was meant to implement the Provisional
Constitution, 59 had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and
that, under Executive Order No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations
now under question were "not for cause" and were a result of government reorganize organization
decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security of tenure)
since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.

G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241

The Position of Commissioner Mison

Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Commission: (1)
the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the
Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated
November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's arguments are as follows:

1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive" 60 reorganization

"impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy" 61 following the people power
revolution of 1986;

2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the President, in
particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under the new staffing pattern;

3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on mere
holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62

4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;

5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.

The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission

The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:

1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or redundancy of

functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in question has been carried out for either
purpose — on the contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of notices;

2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to Malacañ;ang guidelines;
information on file with the Commission shows that Commissioner Mison has been appointing
unqualified personnel;

3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance illegal removals;

4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of reorganizations.

The Court's ruling

Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of. —

I.

The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:

Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following
the ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and
other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieul thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in
the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers
whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted. 63

The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision — in so far as
it mentions removals not for cause — that would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere
notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987 Charter,
except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988. [Nota been Executive Orders
No. 116 (covering the Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119
(Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare & Development), 124 (Public Works & Highways), 125
transportation & Communications), 126 (Labor & Employment), 127 (Finance), 128 (Science &
Technology), 129 (Agrarian Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade &
Industry) were all promulgated on January 30,1987, prior to the adoption of the Constitution on
February 2, 1987].64

It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past
Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the Government to
reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution:

Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue
in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective office(s) upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date
of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:

Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the
Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister
shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66

The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.67

Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there is no
provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated
by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due
process and security of tenure.

At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by
virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith.68 In case of
removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not
hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.

Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of
a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.

As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the
Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.

What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it
should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.

The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to continue the
reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter
provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself,
however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of reorganization — the first, to its
conferment or authorization under Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its
implementation on its effectivity date (February 2, 1987).lâwphî1.ñèt But as we asserted, if the intent of
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganize tion under
the Freedom Constitution, it should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two
phases of reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.

Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for victims" of constitutional
revamps — whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution — and only secondarily and impliedly,
to allow reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:

INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA

On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific reference to Proclamation No. 3 and
not merely state "result of the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution', Mr. Suarez,
on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as there are two stages of
reorganization covered by the Section.

Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the Commission on Government Reorganization have
not been implemented yet, it would be better to use the phrase "reorganization before or after the
ratification of the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez instead suggested the phrase "as a
result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution' on the
understanding that the provision would apply to employees terminated because of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and even those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos regime.
Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it is also for this reason that the Committee specified the two
Constitutions the Freedom Constitution — and the 1986 [1987] Constitution. 69

Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of
career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The
phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service
employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other
positive, must concur, to wit:

1. the separation must not be for cause, and

2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.

By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily,
upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started.
We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution — the first stage. We are on the
second stage — that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic
document.

This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but is apparent
from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in which
we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired
security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against separation by reorganization under the quondam
fundamental law.

Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like the
execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the democratic character of
the Charter itself.

Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the reorganization is open-
ended ("progressive"), had it been a reorganization under the revolutionary authority, specifically of the
Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government employees would have been truly
wide ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3 permitted it, but because of the nature
of revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies, and the monopoly of power in the men and
women who wield it.

What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers, the
President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17,
which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompanies
reorganizations — notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in
spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief
Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank and file
that reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she said on
May 28, 1986:

WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations
for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications
and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to ensure that
only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the government service; 71

Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the
basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*

The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote, in
part:

Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will
be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the government reorganization. 72

Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have
been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the
Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left
and right. Hence, even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to
come to terms with the Chief Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's
plenary power to separate government officials and employees.

Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified.
—

The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended the effects of government
reorganization under the Provisional Constitution to the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v.
Arroyo73 is said to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so ruled, Arroyo would
be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the later holding of Palma-Fernandez.
The question, however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects of reorganization under the
revolutionary Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed therein that
"[b]y virtue of said provision the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127
may continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career civil service employees may be
separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an
obiter dictum. We dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily because it was "clearly premature, speculative,
and purely anticipatory, based merely on newspaper reports which do not show any direct or threatened
injury," 76 it appearing that the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in
motion. Jose therefore had no cause for complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The
remark anent separation "without cause" was therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In
Morales v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an adjudication and should
not ordinarily be regarded as such."78

Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma Fernandez is a full-blown decision, although both
are en banc cases. While a resolution of the Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter has a
special weight.

Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promulgated on
August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-established that a
later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.

As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the
reorganization, the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 — which had already
been consummated — the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions themselves
— which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after the effectivity of the new
Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be said to
have carried over reorganization under the Freedom Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.

Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra).

As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as
reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed
constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization inferred under the
new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But
even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-
removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79
which may possibly justify removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because,
while the former Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does
not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not obviously
required under the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in
democratic societies and in this government under a democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it is done in good faith.
Otherwise, security of tenure would be an insuperable implement. 80

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
81 As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not
be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal,
is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid
"abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied
by the existence of ample funds. 83

It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in
good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for
disciplinary action.**

Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of
each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:

SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after
due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a
position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence
of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions
in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by
those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84

It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack of it.

Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,

Lack of Good Faith in. —

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy —
except for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have justified (an things being equal)
the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which would have
furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of
Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has
not been successfully contradicted 85 There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been
made — or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can
therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a
revamp of personnel pure and simple.

The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but
replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of
Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a
consequence of reorganization. 87 Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid
down by Executive Order No. 17.

We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While
the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is not. 88

Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of. —

With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof,
"[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be
deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not
been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing
power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the
Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President."
89

Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner
Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.

Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to our holding in
Palma-Fernandez.

That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover
status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in
no uncertain terms:

The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987
and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be
transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a
position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25
February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31
August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern. 90

It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization
under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a reorganization should be subject to
the criterion of good faith.

Resume. —

In resume, we restate as follows:

1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed, without
cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra,
supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on non-reappointment of
incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for termination;

2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or upon
their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656,
sec. 9);

3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government resulting
in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a
reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)

G.R. No. 83737

This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the
validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of
tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs counter to the transitory provisions of
the new Constitution on removals not for cause.

It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated without "a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing" 93 is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new
Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory provisions mention separations
"not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and
which do not come about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can
be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the
possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this
reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.

We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain. We also commisserate with
them. But our concern is the greater wrong inflicted on the dismissed employees on account of their
regal separation from the civil service.

WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988,
SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND
MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.

THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R.
NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT

OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.

THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE
ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.

NO COSTS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124374. December 15, 1999]

ISMAEL A. MATHAY JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EDUARDO A. TAN, LOURDES M. DE GUZMAN, MANUEL CHUA, ANSELMO
MATEO, CHRISTOPHER SANTOS, BUENAVENTURA PUNAY, ENRICO BANDILLA, FELINO CAMACHO, DANTE
E. DEOQUINO, JAIME P. URCIA, JESUS B. REGONDOLA, ROMUALDO LIBERATO, CESAR FRANCISCO,
WILLIAM PANTI, JR., MICHAEL A. JACINTO and CESAR DACIO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 126354. December 15, 1999]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR.,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 126366. December 15, 1999]

ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and SANDY C. MARQUEZ, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before this Court are three consolidated petitions[1] filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The facts behind the consolidated petitions are undisputed.

During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private respondents[2] to
positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local government of Quezon City. Civil Service Units were
created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or
16, 1972.

On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that Presidential Decree
No. 51 was never published in the Official Gazette. Therefore, conformably with our ruling in Tanada vs.
Tuvera[3] the presidential decree is deemed never in force or effect and therefore cannot at present, be
a basis for establishment of the CSUs . . . .[4]

On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil
Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from issuance of the
said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the
ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the revocation of appointments are
private respondents in these three petitions.

For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by the
enactment of City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of Public
Order and Safety (DPOS).

At the heart of these petitions is Section 3 of the Ordinance which provides:

Sec. 3. The present personnel of the Civil Security Unit, Traffic Management Unit, Anti-Squatting and
Surveillance and Enforcement Team, and Disaster Coordinating Council are hereby absorbed into the
department of public order and safety established under Section one hereof to be given appropriate
position titles without reduction in salary, seniority rights and other benefits. Funds provided for in the
1990 Budget for the absorbed offices shall be used as the initial budgetary allocation of the Department.
(Underscoring ours).

Despite the provision on absorption, the regular and permanent positions in the DPOS were not filled
due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of regular and permanent positions created.

Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents contractual
appointments for the period of June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The appointments were renewed by
Mayor Simon for the period of January 1, 1992 to June 30, 1992.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1, 1992,
Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents effective July 1 to
July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer renewed.

The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents appointments
became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated petitions grew.

We discuss the merits of the petitions of Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. jointly.

G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No. 126366

After the non-renewal of their appointments, private respondents in these two petitions appealed to the
Civil Service Commission. The CSC issued separate resolutions holding that the reappointment of private
respondents to the DPOS was automatic, pursuant to the provision on absorption in Quezon City
Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990,[5] and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions in
the DPOS.[6] Petitioner brought petitions for certiorari to this Court,[7] to annul the resolutions but, in
accordance with Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the petition were referred to the Court of
Appeals. As stated, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for certiorari.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that
respondent Civil Service Commission has the authority to direct him to reinstate private respondents in
the DPOS.

We agree with petitioner.

The law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old Local Government Code and not the Local Government Code of
1992 which became effective only on January 1, 1992, when the material events in this case transpired.

Applying the said law, we find that the Civil Service Commission erred when it applied the directives of
Ordinance NC-140 and in so doing ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondents to positions in the
DPOS. Section 3 of the said Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with B.P. 337. We note that Section
3 of the questioned Ordinance directs the absorption of the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new
DPOS. The Ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. Hence, the city council or sanggunian,
through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions.
However, a review of the provisions of B.P. 337 shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with
the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council or sanggunian through the
simple expedient of enacting ordinances that provide for the absorption of specific persons to certain
positions.

In upholding the provisions of the Ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel of the CSU
into the DPOS without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the City Mayor, the Court of
Appeals makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine of separation of powers is not applicable to
local governments.[8] We are unable to agree. The powers of the city council and the city mayor are
expressly enumerated separately and delineated by B.P. 337.

The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is vested in the local chief
executive.[9] The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating,
consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has
no power to appoint. This is clear from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the powers of the sanggunian.
The power to appoint is not one of them. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[10] Had Congress
intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would
have said so in no uncertain terms.
By ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Civil
Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be done.
In a long line of cases,[11] we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commissions power is limited
to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an
appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the
person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends.
The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The Civil Service Commission argues that it is not substituting its judgment for that of the appointing
power and that it is merely implementing Section 3 of Ordinance NC-140.

The Ordinance refers to the personnel of the CSU, the identities of which could not be mistaken. The
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission likewise call for the reinstatement of named individuals.
There being no issue as to who are to sit in the newly created DPOS, there is therefore no room left for
the exercise of discretion. In Farinas vs. Barba,[12] we held that the appointing authority is not bound to
appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian concerned, since the power of appointment is a
discretionary power.

When the Civil Service Commission ordered the reinstatement of private respondents, it technically
issued a new appointment.[13] This task, i.e. of appointment, is essentially discretionary and cannot be
controlled even by the courts as long as it is properly and not arbitrarily exercised by the appointing
authority.

In Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that appointment is essentially a discretionary power
and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested.[14]

The above premises considered, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no power to order
petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. to reinstate private respondents.

Petitioner similarly assails as error the Court of Appeals ruling that private respondents should be
automatically absorbed in the DPOS pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance.

In its decision of March 21, 1996 the Court of Appeals held:

It is clear however, that Ordinance No. NC-140, absorbing the present personnel of the Civil Security
Agent Unit in the DPOS was earlier enacted, particularly on March 27, 1990, thus, private respondents
were still holders of de jure appointments as permanent regular employees at the time, and therefore,
by operation of said Ordinance private respondents were automatically absorbed in the DPOS effectively
as of March 27, 1990.[15] (Underscoring ours.)

The decision is based on the wrong premise.

Even assuming the validity of Section 3 of the Ordinance, the absorption contemplated therein is not
possible. Since the CSU never legally came into existence, the private respondents never held permanent
positions. Accordingly, as petitioner correctly points out,[16] the private respondents appointments in
the defunct CSU - - -

were invalid ab initio. Their seniority rights and permanent status did not arise since they have no valid
appointment. For them to enter the Civil Service after the revocation and cancellation of their invalid
appointment, they have to be extended an original appointment, subject again to the attesting power of
the Civil Service Commission.

Being then not members of the Civil Service as of June 4, 1991, they cannot be automatically
absorbed/reappointed/appointed/reinstated into the newly created DPOS. (Underscoring ours)

It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a
law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.[17] Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU
never became law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford
any protection. It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never passed.

In Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission[18] we held that a void appointment cannot give rise to
security of tenure on the part of the holder of the appointment.

While the Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that the abolition of an office does not mean the
invalidity of appointments thereto,[19] this cannot apply to the case at bar. In this case, the CSU was not
abolished. It simply did not come into existence as the Presidential Decree creating it never became law.
At the most, private respondents held temporary and contractual appointments. The non-renewal of
these appointments cannot therefore be taken against petitioner. In Romualdez III vs. Civil Service
Commission[20] we treated temporary appointments as follows:

The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment resulted in the termination of official
relationship with his former permanent position. When the temporary appointment was not renewed,
the petitioner had no cause to demand reinstatement thereto. (Underscoring ours.)

Another argument against the concept of automatic absorption is the physical and legal impossibility
given the number of available positions in the DPOS and the number of personnel to be absorbed.[21]
We note that Section 1 of Ordinance NC-140 provides:

There is hereby established in the Quezon City Government the Department of Public Order and Safety
whose organization, structure, duties, functions and responsibilities are as provided or defined in the
attached supporting documents consisting of eighteen (18) pages which are made integral parts of this
Ordinance.

A review of the supporting documents shows that Ordinance No. NC-140 allowed only two slots for the
position of Security Officer II with a monthly salary of P4,418.00 and four slots for the position of
Security Agent with a monthly salary of P3,102.00. The limited number of slots provided in the
Ordinance renders automatic absorption unattainable, considering that in the defunct CSU there are
twenty Security Officers with a monthly salary of P4,418.00 and six Security Agents with a monthly salary
of P3,102.00. Clearly, the positions created in the DPOS are not sufficient to accommodate the personnel
of the defunct CSU, making automatic absorption impossible.

Considering that private respondents did not legally hold valid positions in the CSU, for lack of a law
creating it, or the DPOS, for lack of a permanent appointment to the said agency, it becomes
unnecessary to discuss whether their acceptance of the contractual appointments constitutes an
abandonment or waiver of such positions. It escapes us how one can relinquish or renounce a right one
never possessed. A person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing.

G.R. 126354

In this case, petitioner, Civil Service Commission seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of July 5, 1996, which overturned CSC Resolution Nos. 955040 and 932732 and held that the
Civil Service Commission has no authority to compel the mayor of Quezon City to reinstate Jovito C.
Labajo to the DPOS.

The standing of petitioner Civil Service Commission to bring this present appeal is questionable.

We note that the person adversely affected by the Court of Appeals decision, Jovito C. Labajo has opted
not to appeal.

Basic is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.[22] A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

In Ralla vs. Ralla we defined interest as material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or mere incidental interest.[23] As
a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a
party-plaintiff in an action.

In the case at bar, it is evident that Jovito C. Labajo, not the Civil Service Commission, is the real party in
interest. It is Jovito C. Labajo who will be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement.

We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Pedro
Dacoycoy[24] which overturned our rulings in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission,[25] Mendez vs. Civil
Service Commission[26] and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission.[27] In Dacoycoy, we affirmed the
right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the aggrieved party affected by a ruling which
may seriously prejudice the civil service system.

The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at bar. Dacoycoy was an administrative
case involving nepotism whose deleterious effect on government cannot be overemphasized. The
subject of the present case, on the other hand, is reinstatement.
We fail to see how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or non-reinstatement of
one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the effectiveness of government. Accordingly, the ruling in
Dacoycoy does not apply.

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the
Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review.[28]

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and agencies,[29] not to litigate.

Therefore, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no legal standing to prosecute G.R. No. 126354.

WHEREFORE, the petitions of Ismael A. Mathay in G.R. No.124374 and G.R. No. 126366 are GRANTED
and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 1996 and January 15, 1996 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

The petition of the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 126354 is DISMISSED for lack of legal standing to
sue. The assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated July 5, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.