US

v. Dorr
The defendants charged with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel
against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902,
under the caption of "A few hard facts."

ARTICLE:
"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent
office holders, and by its continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the military
rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who
should be in jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of one Tecson as justice
of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Islands,
reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the
risk of their lives, aided the Americans."

ISSUE: whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292, above cited.

DECISION: NO
The article in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of Act No. 292
we are unable to discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with
a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

ISSUE #2: what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is made an offense
to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing,
uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the Government with
intent to defame the said Government, or to excite against them or either or any of them the hatred of
the good people of the United States," etc.

DECISION:
The term "government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing political
system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress
and the Executive — which are also specially mentioned.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system. The form of government by
a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute
by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the
wisdom of their policy.


US v. Abad
• The defendant was convicted of the violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, the law defining and
punishing treason and sedition. He is the author of the Tagalog drama "Tanikalang Guinto"
(The Chain of Gold).

STORY:
The heroine, Liwanag, is promised in marriage to the hero, K. Ulayaw. Maimbot, who has given
consent to this promise of marriage. During the progress of the play he withdraws his consent,

1
forbids K. Ulayaw to come to his house, and by Liwanag to abandon her lover. He takes into his
employ Nagtapon, a brother of K. Ulayaw, whom he directs to act as a spy upon the movements of
Ulayaw. Another of the characters in the play is Dalita, the mother of K. Ulayaw and Nagtapon.
Nagtapon disowns her, and she dies in the first act. The gifts of Maimbot to Liwanag not producing
any result, her resorts to harsher measures, binds her to a tree, and places Nagtapon as a watch over
her. K. Ulayaw, searching for her, finds her in this condition, and is killed by Nagtapon. The play ends
with the translation of Liwanag to the heavens.

• It is claimed by the Government, however, that it was intended to represent the relations
between the Government of the United States and the Philippines
• The word "independence" or "independent" occurs five times in the course of the play, but
always in connection with the marriage of Liwanag and K

DECISION: ACQUITTED
That the public did not understand the play as meaning what the Government claims it means is
apparent from the testimony of some of the Government’s own witnesses.

The defendant, the author, he had read in a newspapers that all plays should be submitted for
examination to the division of information. He thereupon took his play to the office of John F. Green.
It was returned to him the next day, with authority to present it. However it may be, it is apparent
that the play was not considered seditious by the authorities of Manila.


US v. Apurado

The appellants in this case were convicted of the crime of sedition as defined in section 5 of Act No.
292 of the Philippine Commission
•
"All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal
methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition
•
"2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any
public official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or
administrative order.

Some 500 residents crowded into the municipal council chamber and demanded the dismissal from
office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police, and the substitution
of new officials.
The council acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its
action, which was signed by the councilors present and by several of the leaders of the crowd;
Petitioner: desiring the dismissal of the above-mentioned officials because they believed that they
should not be permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to
one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided.

DECISION: ACQUITTED
Not only were the individual members of the crowd wholly unarmed, the assembly merely desired to
petition for the removal of several municipal officials; and in proof of the fact that they had no
intention of committing a breach of the peace, the members of the crowd raised their jackets to prove
that they were carrying no weapons.

If the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct as an excuse
to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble would become a delusion and the attempt to exercise it in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited

2
punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities.








US v. Cabola
Charged with the crime of violating section 4 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, enacted
for the purpose of punishing those who should enter into a conspiracy to destroy the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands.

Celedonio Ramos and Inocencio Torio appealed to this court

Pedro Cabola and others organized a Katipunan Society, which had for its object the destruction by
force of the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the establishment of
another government in the form of a military organization.

DECISION: GUILTY

Pedro Cabola made revolutionary and seditious speeches; and that many of the defendants signed a
document or documents seditious in character, their clearly indicated purpose being the destruction
of the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. Several of the defendants confessed
their guilt to the public officials.

Celedonio Ramos, he was present at a meeting at which Pedro Cabola made an inflammatory and
seditious speech and resolved to construct in an isolated place a shelter for soldiers who should be
furnished with guns and ammunition. Ramos was elected to the office of military president.

Inocencio Torio was a member of the Katipunan Society and knew of its seditious and revolutionary
character; he was present at the said meeting when Pedro Cabola pronounced the seditious
discourse; that he was a captain in the organization; and that he signed a document admittedly of a
revolutionary and seditious character.


US v. Perfecto
Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents had
disappeared from his office. Philippine Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of
the steps taken to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening, newspaper La Nacion,
edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto said:

“there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the
investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their
undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of official concealment.

It was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant
Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

3
Appellant's main proposition was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force
because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
because inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

ISSUE: W/N Art. 256 is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

DECISION: NO, ACQUITTED
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the principles of the American character and
system of government. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States
established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of proportion to the gravity of the
offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception, as opposed to the American conception of
the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated.
Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles.
The American system of government never does it place around the individual who happens
to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
.


Espuelas v. People
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was convicted for a violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
which punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community.

Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when he was merely standing on a
barrel. Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers throughout the Philippines and abroad,
for their publication with a suicide note or letter:
“My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not
pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in
Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas”

DECISION: GUILTY
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the
confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction
of the very government itself

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit
his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.

4

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President
Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government
but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof."

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to
the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than
those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.


People v. Nabong
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance Ignacio Nabong,
guilty of the offense of sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692

The appellant had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against a charge of sedition that had been
preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija,
and was related by marriage to the appellant.

Nabong, had refused to accompany Major Gallardo and his companions on their trip to Santa Rosa,
arrived in time to participate in the meeting of communists. At this meeting the red flag was
displayed, contrary to the promise that Feleo had made to Major Gallardo; and upon learning of this
fact, Major Gallardo, and several Constabulary officers, repaired to the place where the meeting was,
and upon arrival they found Feleo making a speech seditious nature. Major Gallardo caused him to be
arrested and removed from the place. At the same time the red flag which was being displayed on the
platform was removed.

Seeing Nabong present, Major Gallardo told him that the disturbance would have been avoided if he
(Nabong) had followed the suggestion made to him at Cabanatuan by Major Gallardo not to display
the flag.

Nabong who delivered a speech and criticized the members of the Constabulary, using words
substantially to the following effect:
“They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because
they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. — In view of this, we ought to be united to
suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the
government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides.”

DECISION: GUILTY
The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence.
The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the
exercise of the elective franchise.

It was the purpose of the speaker to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by
unlawful means. The words also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities and the order of the Government, in violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

It is suggested in the appellant's brief that incompatible with that portion of section 3 of the Jones
Law which declares that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. It is a
fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured
by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,

5
whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.

The act which is the subject of this prosecution was committed prior to the coming into effect of the
Revised Penal Code; but the penalty provided for this offense in article 142 in relation with article
139 of said Code is greater than that imposed by the trial court, and by this court, under section 8 of
Act No. 292. It results that nothing beneficial to the appellant is revealed in the new Code.





People v. Evangelista
Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292

A parade was to be held, but as the permit for the parade had been revoked, a Constabulary officer
appeared with his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding of the parade.

The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista held a conversation with the Constabulary officer about the
permit and its revocation, after which Evangelista was allowed by the Constabulary officer to say a
few words to the people for the purpose of informing them that the parade could not be held.

But instead of telling the people to retire, he raised his fist, which the people approved by shouting
"mabuhay", and then said:

"Comrades or brethren, the municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold the parade, but
for reason unknown to me, the permit has been revoked. This shows that the big ones are
persecuting and oppressing us, who are small, which they have no right to do." Then shouts were
heard from the audience saying, "Let us fight them".

Soldiers made use of a water pump and dispersed them. There were found on the body of Crisanto
Evangelista the permit issued by the municipal president and its revocation.

They further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the facts as above
stated, and the appellant's brief does not point out any data or reason why the finding of the trial
court should not be upheld.

DECISION: GUILTY
It must be noted that the disorder took place several months after the inauguration of the Communist
Party and after the communists had already filled the minds of their followers with their revolting
ideas in several meetings.

That the said utterances were really inciting is shown by the fact that the mass did actually advance
against them, and the latter had to use force in order to enforce the law. In the instant case, there was
an inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and resistance against the authorities. It
was simply the practical expression and repetition of the previous instigations to overthrow the
government, made by the communist leaders before.





Schenck v. US

6
This is an indictment in three counts to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, by causing and
attempting to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces and to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the German
Empire.

Defendants willfully conspired to have printed and circulated a document to cause such
insubordination and obstruction.

It is argued that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant Schenck was concerned
in sending the documents. According to the testimony, Schenck said he was general secretary of the
Socialist party, and had charge of the Socialist headquarters from which the documents were sent. He
identified a book found there as the minutes of the Executive Committee of the party. The book
showed a resolution that 15,000 leaflets should be printed on the other side of one of them in use, to
be mailed to men who had passed exemption boards, and for distribution. Schenck personally
attended to the printing.

It intimated that enlistment was exercise of oppressive power in its worst form. It said "Do not
submit to intimidation," The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed "Assert Your
Rights." It stated reasons for alleging that anyone violated the Constitution when he refused to
recognize "your right to assert your opposition to the draft,"

"If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is
the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain."

ISSUE: whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.

DECISION: GUILTY
We do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.

When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that, if an actual obstruction of
the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced.

The statute of 1917, in § 4, punishes conspiracies to obstruct, as well as actual obstruction. If the act
(speaking, or circulating a paper), its tendency, and the intent with which it is done are the same, we
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
Abrams v. US
The first of these leaflets says that the President's cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia
reveals the hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington. It intimates that "German militarism
combined with allied capitalism to crush the Russian evolution " -- goes on that the tyrants of the
world fight each other until they see a common enemy -- working class enlightenment, militarism
and capitalism combined, to crush the Russian revolution. It says that there is only one enemy of the
workers of the world: capitalism;

The other leaflet says that America together with the Allies will march for Russia to help the Czecko-
Slovaks in their struggle against the Bolsheviki, and that this time the hypocrites shall not fool the
Russian emigrants and friends of Russia in America. It tells the Russian emigrants that they now must
spit in the face of the false military propaganda by which their sympathy and help to the prosecution
of the war have been called forth, and says that, with the money they have lent or are going to lend,
"they will make bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia,"

7
It then appeals to the same Russian emigrants at some length not to consent to the "inquisitionary
expedition to Russia," and says that the destruction of the Russian revolution is "the politics of the
march to Russia."

OPINION:
But, as against dangers peculiar to war, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It
is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.

I do not see how anyone can find the intent required by the statute in any of the defendants' words.
The second leaflet is the only one that affords even a foundation for the charge.The only object of the
paper is to help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular government -- not
to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on.

resistance to the United States means some forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the
United States in pursuance of the war. intent must be the specific intent that I have described. No
such intent was proved or existed in fact.

We should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country. I wholly disagree with the argument of the
Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History
seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States, through many years, had
shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed

8
Gitlow v. New York
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the statutory
crime of criminal anarchy.

LAW
The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and as applied in this case, is repugnant to the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its material provisions are:
• "§ 160. Criminal anarchy defined. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive
head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means. The
advocacy of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony."
• "§ 161. Advocacy of criminal anarchy. Any person who:"
• "1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or
propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force or violence, or by
assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by
any unlawful means; or,"
• "2. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly
displays any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter in any
• Page 268 U. S. 655
• form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means"
• "Is guilty of a felony and punishable"
• by imprisonment or fine, or both.

The first charged that the defendant had advocated overthrowing government by force, violence and
unlawful means by writings entitled "The Left Wing Manifesto"; the second, that he had printed,
published and distributed a certain paper called "The Revolutionary Age," containing the writings

The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or
faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of "moderate Socialism."

Extracts from the Manifesto condemned the dominant "moderate Socialism" for its recognition of the
necessity of the democratic parliamentary state and advocated the necessity of accomplishing the
"Communist Revolution" by a militant and "revolutionary Socialism", based on "the class struggle"

DEFENDANT: "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of speech and
of the press, and 2nd, that while liberty of expression "is not absolute," it may be restrained "only in
circumstances where its exercise bears a causal relation with some substantive evil, consummated,
attempted or likely," and as the statute "takes no account of circumstances," it unduly restrains this
liberty and is therefore unconstitutional.

ISSUE: whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by the state courts, deprived the
defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

DECISION:
The Manifesto, plainly, is neither the statement of abstract doctrine nor, as suggested by counsel,
mere prediction. It advocates mass action which shall foment industrial disturbances and, through
political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action, overthrow and destroy organized
parliamentary government. It concludes with a call to action. It is the language of direct incitement.

Freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility.

9
"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended
to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the
success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger
became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the
overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the
enforcement of the law."

We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power
of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press, and we must and do sustain its
constitutionality.


Whitney v. California
Miss Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in organizing, in the year 1919, the Communist
Labor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of assembling with it. These acts are held to
constitute a crime because the party was formed to teach criminal syndicalism. The claim is that the
statute, as applied, denied to Miss Whitney the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

LAW:
• Criminal Syndicalism Act are:
• "Section 1. The term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act is hereby defined as any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission
• Page 274 U. S. 360
• of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning willful and malicious physical
damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or
control, or effecting any political change."
• "Sec. 2. Any person who: . . . 4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes
a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or
assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism"
• "Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment."


The mere act of assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it,
or of assembling with, is given the dynamic quality of crime. The accused is to be punished not for
contempt, incitement, or conspiracy, but for a step in preparation, which, if it threatens the public
order at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims,
at association with those who propose to preach it.

But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not absolute. Their
exercise is subject to restriction required in order to protect the State from destruction or from
serious injury. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech
would produce a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State may seek to
prevent.

The legislature must obviously decide whether a danger exists which calls for a protective measure.
But where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the enactment of the statute cannot
alone establish the facts which are essential to its validity. Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly
been held invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty involved was that of engaging in a
particular business.

To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result, that the danger apprehended is imminent, that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one.

10

Only an emergency can justify repression. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It
is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by
showing that there was no emergency justifying it.

. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State.

I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the Court that assembling with a
political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action
at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the present case, however, there was other testimony which tended to establish the
existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to
commit present serious crimes, and likewise to show that such a conspiracy would be furthered by
the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member. Under these circumstances, the
judgment of the state court cannot be disturbed.


Dennis v. US
Petitioners were indicted in July, 1948, for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act

LAW
• Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 10, 11 (see present 18
U.S.C. § 2385), provide as follows:
• "SEC. 2.(a) It shall be unlawful for any person --"
• "(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability,
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government;"
• "(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United
States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written
or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence;"
• "(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States
by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof."
• "(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'government in the United States' means the
Government of the United States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, the government of the District of Columbia, or the
• Page 341 U. S. 497
• government of any political subdivision of any of them."
• "SEC. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit,
any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title."

The indictment charged the petitioners with willfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the
Communist Party of the United States of America a society, group and assembly of persons who teach
and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and
violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence.

ISSUE: whether the means which it has employed conflict with the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution

11

DECISION: NO
Certainly those who recruit and combine for the purpose of advocating overthrow intend to bring
about that overthrow. We hold that the statute requires as an essential element of the crime proof of
the intent of those who are charged with its violation to overthrow the Government by force and
violence. An intent to overthrow the Government by advocacy thereof is equally susceptible of proof.

We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which
principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the Government by force and
violence

The very language of the Smith Act negates the interpretation which petitioners would have us
impose on that Act. Congress did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories,
rather Congress was concerned with the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these
petitioners engaged.

Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in
those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis
rationale.

In this case, we are squarely presented with the application of the "clear and present danger" test.
We first note that many of the cases in which this Court has reversed convictions by use of this or
similar tests have been based on the fact that the interest which the State was attempting to protect
was itself too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech.

Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as follows:
"In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."

We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive
as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances

It is thus clear that he reserved the question of the existence of the danger for his own determination,
and the question becomes whether the issue is of such a nature that it should have been submitted to
the jury.

We hold that the statute may be applied where there is a "clear and present danger" of the
substantive evil which the legislature had the right to prevent. Bearing, as it does, the marks of a
"question of law," the issue is properly one for the judge to decide.

We hold that §§ 2(a)(1), 2(a)(3) and 3 of the Smith Act do not inherently, or as construed or
applied in the instant case, violate the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
or the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. Petitioners intended to overthrow the
Government of the United States as speedily as the circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy to
organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence created a "clear and present danger" of an attempt to overthrow
the Government by force and violence. They were properly and constitutionally convicted for
violation of the Smith Act.

12

Brandenburg v. Ohio
The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism."

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First (
(congress pass now law abridging free speech) and Fourteenth Amendments (EPC) to the United
States Constitution, but the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction without
opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal "for the reason that no substantial
constitutional question exists herein." It did not file an opinion or explain its conclusions. Appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction.

The appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan "rally"
reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events broadcast on the local station
and on a national network.

One film showed 12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms. They were gathered around a
large wooden cross, which they burned. Scattered phrases could be understood that were derogatory
of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews.

Another scene on the same film showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making a speech. The speech,
in full, was as follows:
• " We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be
some revengeance taken."

The second film showed six hooded figures one of whom, appellant, repeated a speech, the possibility
of "revengeance" was omitted, and one sentence was added: "Personally, I believe the nigger should
be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel."

ISSUE: W/N the Ohio statute goes against the consti

DECISION: YES

The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid the use of
force or of law violation except where directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.

• "the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to
force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
such action."
•
A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our
Constitution has immunized from governmental control.

Measured by this test, Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act punishes
persons who "advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety" of violence "as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform"; or who publish or circulate or display any book or
paper containing such advocacy; or who "justify" the commission of violent acts "with intent to
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism"; or who

13
"voluntarily assemble" with a group formed "to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism."

Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports
to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely
to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be
supported, and that decision is therefore overruled.
Reversed.


PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties instituted an action of
mandamus against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a
permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitutions of democratic countries. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power". This sovereign police power is exercised
by the legislative branch by the enactment of laws, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions.

Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119. Section of the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibits "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb
the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and
the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or
regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the
celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron
saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the
Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where such
athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of
any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit
therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or
specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or
procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be
submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade
or procession."


After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that the provisions of the said
ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.

We can not construe the ordinance as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant
the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and
other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction
would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations.

As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public
places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means

14
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed as synonimous
with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit"

Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other
public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of
the City, it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not conferred upon the Mayor the same power,
specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same
power by the Municipal Board.

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was
for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it
was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any
consideration

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable
objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is
ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.


REYES V. BAGATSING
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on starting from the Luneta, to the gates of the
United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away.

A short program would be held. It was stated that a petition based on the resolution adopted on the
last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of
All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or
any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador.

There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and
rally."

The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports. Reference was made to
intelligence reports of the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." Respondent Mayor
suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit
may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured."


COURT’S EXPLANATION:
Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as 's the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.

1) The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

15
2) It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is
dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth
hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas.
- There are, of course, well-defined limits. One may not advocate disorder in the name of
protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. Resort to force is ruled out
and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.
- It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided, To give free rein to one's destructive urges
is to call for condemnation.

3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start
- Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.

4) Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy,
- Primicias v. Fugoso: the authority of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public
highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the
means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. Where a
restriction is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances
would be entitled to protection.

5) Hence, as notedthis Court issued the minute resolution allowing the proposed march and rally
scheduled for the next day.
- That conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive,
evil to a legitimate public interest.
- There was no justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of tree
speech and peaceable assembly.
- These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.

6) The presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

7). Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500)
feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
- There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy
gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied, it does
not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial
of the permit sought could still be challenged.


COX V. LOUISIANA
(Picket: 1 a person or group of people who stand outside a workplace or other venue as a protest or to
try to persuade others not to enter during a strike.)

23 students of a Negro college, were arrested in Louisiana, for picketing stores that maintained
segregated lunch counters. This picketing, urging a boycott of those stores, was part of a general
protest movement against racial segregation

16
The appellant, an ordained Congregational minister was an advisor to this movement.

The students resolved to demonstrate in front of the courthouse in protest of segregation and the
arrest and imprisonment of the picketers who were being held in the parish jail located on the upper
floor of the courthouse building.

As Cox approached the vicinity of the courthouse, he was stopped by Captain Font and Inspector
Trigg and brought to Police Chief Wingate White. The Chief then inquired as to the purpose of the
demonstration.

Cox outlined his program to White, stating that it would include a singing of the Star Spangled Banner
and a "freedom song," recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, and a short speech.
White testified that he told Cox that "he must confine" the demonstration "to the west side of the
street."

Authorities said afterwards: "Now, you have been allowed to demonstrate. Up until now, your
demonstration has been more or less peaceful, but what you are doing now is a direct violation of the
law, a disturbance of the peace, and it has got to be broken up immediately."

Cox and the demonstrators did not then and there break up the demonstration.

Almost immediately thereafter one of the policemen exploded a tear gas shell at the crowd. This was
followed by several other shells. The demonstrators quickly dispersed, running back towards the
State Capitol and the downtown area; Cox tried to calm them as they ran and was himself one of the
last to leave.

The next day, appellant was arrested.

Appellant was convicted of violating a Louisiana "disturbing the peace" statute, which provides:

"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a
breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby . . . crowds or congregates with others . . . in
or upon . . . a public street or public highway, or upon a public sidewalk, or any other public
place or building . . . and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on . . . when ordered so to
do by any law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in which such act or acts
are committed, or by any law enforcement officer of the state of Louisiana, or any other
authorized person . . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace."

DECISION: AQUITTED, statute is UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BROAD IN SCOPE.

1) A reading of the record reveals agreement on the part of the State's witnesses that Cox had the
demonstration "very well controlled," and, until the end of Cox's speech, the group was perfectly
"orderly."
- The State argues, however, that, while the demonstrators started out to be orderly, the loud
cheering and clapping by the students in response to the singing from the jail converted the
peaceful assembly into a riotous one.
- Our conclusion that the entire meeting, from the beginning until its dispersal by tear gas
was, orderly [Footnote 10] and not riotous is confirmed by a film of the events taken by a
television news photographer, which was offered in evidence as a state exhibit.

2) State contends that the conviction should be sustained because of fear expressed by some of the
state witnesses that "violence was about to erupt" because of the demonstration.
- It is virtually undisputed, however, that the students themselves were not violent, and
threatened no violence.

17
 - The fear of violence seems to have been based upon the reaction of the group of white
citizens looking on from across the street.

3) The statute is unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope.
- Consists of two elements:
o (1) congregating with others "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned," and
o (2) a refusal to move on after having been ordered to do so by a law enforcement
officer.
- While the second part of this offense is narrow and specific, the first element is not.

4) The Louisiana statute is at least as likely to allow conviction for innocent speech as was the charge
of the trial judge in Terminiello. Therefore, as in Terminiello and Edwards, the conviction under this
statute must be reversed, as the statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps within its broad scope
activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly.

5) Validity of appellant's conviction for violating the Louisiana statute which provides:

"Obstructing Public Passages"
"No person shall willfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any public
sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other passageway, or the entrance, corridor
or passage of any public building, structure, watercraft or ferry, by impeding, hindering,
stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon or therein."

- We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by
conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these
amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.
- Although the statute here involved on its face precludes all street assemblies and parades, it
has not been so applied and enforced by the Baton Rouge authorities.
- It appears that the authorities in Baton Rouge permit or prohibit parades or street meetings
in their completely uncontrolled discretion.
- The situation is thus the same as if the statute itself expressly provided that there could only
be peaceful parades or demonstrations in the unbridled discretion of the local officials.


The statute itself provides no standards for the determination of local officials as to which assemblies
to permit or which to prohibit. This Court has recognized that such broad discretion in a public
official allows him to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not. This
thus sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to
act as a censor.

The practice in Baton Rouge allowing unfettered discretion is an unwarranted abridgment of
appellant's freedom of speech and assembly secured to him by the First Amendment, as applied to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

It follows, therefore, that appellant's conviction for violating the statute as so applied and enforced
must be reversed.

18
IBP v. ATIENZA

Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) appeal the Decision of the Court of Appeals that
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito Atienza, the then mayor of
Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the IBP.

IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot
of Mendiola Bridge.

Respondent issued a permit indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead
of Mendiola Bridge.

The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt.
Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners
from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the
peaceful conduct of the program.

MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action against Cadiz (IBP Pres.) for violating
the Public Assembly Act.

ISSUE: whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally
permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

DECISION: The Court finds for petitioners.

Petition is moot, yet the question of legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time
the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, the
susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.

Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within
twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.

19
 (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring
supplied)


The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified
the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.

The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It
smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that
was slated for a specific public place.


BAYAN v. ERMITA
3 groups of P:
1st: citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

2nd: 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., allege that they were injured, arrested and
detained when a peaceful mass action was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. a group
they participated in marched to Malacañang was likewise dispersed violently and many among them
were arrested and suffered injuries.

3rd: Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their
rights, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880. They claim that at a rally at Mendiola bridge police
blocked and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further
allege that on police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from
proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.

20
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition
of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that
the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-
based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts
a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly
and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming
that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing
the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events
require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

DECISION:
1) Standing - Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s
streets and parks.

2) Sec 4 Art III of Consti: Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
- There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations
for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
- Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
o The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.

3) Provisions of BP 880 was enacted after the court rendered decision in Reyes v. Bagatsing. B.P. No.
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies.
- A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places.
- The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection.
- Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided.
- Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
- Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a

21
 recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

4) Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
"Public" does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
- Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

5) Neither is the law overbroad.
- It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to
prevent.

6) no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
- As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard.

7) Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through
the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at
any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located
within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without
the need of any prior permit.

- Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system
of regulation of the people’s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the
Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no
prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a
city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the
law.

8) At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated should be that
mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
x x x
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same.

9) Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do
not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, rallyists who can show the police
an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with
their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed
under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the
application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum
tolerance prescribed by the law.

22
SUMMARY:
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided
under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15
of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed
freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The
only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.



GSIS v. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
A four-day demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the GSIS main office.

Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, and the public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.

The mass actions target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style.
While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS
employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.

GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. They filed
administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in granting the petition for prohibition
absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their part.

ISSUE: whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of
a strike or prohibited concerted mass action.

DECISION: We resolve to GRANT the petition.
1) Civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the
GSIS,[9] or those created by special law.
2) Appellate courts position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 021316
3) What respondents members launched or participated in was a prohibited concerted activity.
a. prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass
leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature
b. for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged
a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the
very doorstep of the GSIS main office building.
c. 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the
main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.

23
 d. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538
participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
4) To place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to
trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism
exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
a. They provoked work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought
to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
b. To petitioner Garcia, rests the authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline GSIS personnel for cause. He merely performed a duty expected of him
and enjoined by law.
5) We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court
would likely pave the way to the legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants,
regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have sworn to serve
with loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where
public sector workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it, immune from the minimum
reckoning for acts that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful.



PENERA v. COMELEC
We grant (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision

The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of
the COMELEC En Banc. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended
by Section 13 of RA 9369.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in
premature election campaigning.

From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the
Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as
the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for
premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision
considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of
the campaign period.

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March
2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider

24
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera
prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election
campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of
expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section
80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified
or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law
says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when
partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts.
Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that
"any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither
can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."


MUTUC V. COMELEC
Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, assails the validity of a
ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes.

Petitioner alleged that respondent Commission on Elections informed him that his certificate of
candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his]
constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."

COMELEC: The justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the
like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was its contention that the jingle was a tangible
propaganda material subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit.

It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution
of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the
words "and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an
order.

DECISION: What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the
Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against
which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be

25
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission,
then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly
done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.

It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent
Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no
higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely
inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free,
orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which
would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious
from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.


ADIONG V. COMELEC

The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code on lawful election propaganda which provides:
Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size
not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public
meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not
exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers
may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it
shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission
may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the
interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the
Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation
throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been
granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
(a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster
areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's
own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2)
feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a
public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet
by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or
rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . .
(Emphasis supplied)

26
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like
cars and other moving vehicles

. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to
suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars
and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992
(the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."

DECISION: P IMPRESSED WITH MERIT.
First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined
in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
kind of restriction involved in this case.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom
to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and
free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.

The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of
election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not
limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or
one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the
regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned
objective.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled

A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is
void for overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2)
inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether
public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the

27
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
property,

In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the
decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the
citizen of his right to free speech and information

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity
to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article
XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the
State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are
of marginal significance.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution:


OSMENA V COMELEC
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections.[1] Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio
M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor
of Cebu Province, seeking reelection

petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the
undesirable effects of the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the
playing field, [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s][5] by depriving
them of a medium which they can afford to pay for

DECISION: DENIED
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up their claim, however.
Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They
do not complain that they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media
advertising.

The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as
11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates
the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.

The laws concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media equality
between candidates with deep pockets

Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of
the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich
candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental
interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4

The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or
donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space
and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the

28
election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time
of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates.

What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed
in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.

The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech
problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was originally
formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal
law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty
conspiracy or attempt begins.[39]

Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be like
using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.

The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-
based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because
of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral
regulations


SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORP V. COMELEC
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:

Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an
election.
The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards
a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to
the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey).

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes
a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results
of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election
day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians
from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing
articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that
there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are
relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the
prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral
process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of

29
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the
national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit
election survey results but only require timeliness.

DECISION: we hold that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such
a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.[2] Indeed, any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity

The grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time,
space, and the right to reply as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities for public information campaigns and forums among candidates.

What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4? The United States
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. OBrien:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.[8]

This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral
regulations and is said to have become canonical in the review of such laws.

Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of
the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression.

The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
absolute, and substantial.

Second. 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. The goals cannot be attained at
the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the
danger of such evils.

To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

30
 DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205278, 21 July 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark, or “(Pro- RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whetherornotthesizelimitationanditsreasonablenessofthetarpaulinisapoliticalquestion,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whetherornotthepetitionersviolatedtheprincipleofexhaustionofadministrativeremediesas
the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

RULING:
1. No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that
this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.

31
2. No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in
their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

3. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case.

4. Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it,
holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech “both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the
content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

5. It is content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
“based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome

32
the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the
right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

6. Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be
posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.

7. No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis.

The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”



CITIES UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary
(hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party's Presidential
nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television through video-on-
demand within 30 days of primary elections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on
broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating
§441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as
applied to Hillary; and (2) BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements, BCRA §§201
and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads.

1. Because the question whether §441b applies to Hillary cannot be resolved on other, narrower
grounds without chilling political speech, this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech
suppression upheld in Austin.

33
 • this case cannot be resolved on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech
that is central to the First Amendment's meaning and purpose.
• Because Citizen United's narrower arguments are not sustainable, this Court must, in an
exercise of its judicial responsibility, consider §441b's facial validity. Any other course would
prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by §441b's corporate expenditure
ban. This conclusion is further supported by the following: (1) the uncertainty caused by the
Government's litigating position; (2) substantial time would be required to clarify §441b's
application on the points raised by the Government's position in order to avoid any chilling
effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because speech itself is of primary
importance to the integrity of the election process, any speech arguably within the reach of
rules created for regulating political speech is chilled.
• 2. Austin is overruled, and thus provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit
corporate independent expenditures. Hence, §441b's restrictions on such expenditures are
invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary. Given this conclusion, the part of McConnell that
upheld BCRA §203's extension of §441b's restrictions on independent corporate
expenditures is also overruled. Pp. 20-51.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech," §441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban
on speech, backed by criminal sanctions.
• The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
preferred speakers.

(b) The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies to corporations
• Differential treatment of media corporations and other corporations cannot be squared with
the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amendment's original
meaning would permit suppressing media corporations' political speech.
• this Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.

3) The statute is underinclusive; it only protects a dissenting shareholder's interests in certain media
for 30 or 60 days before an election when such interests would be implicated in any media at any
time. It is also overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including those with one shareholder.

4) Because §441b is not limited to corporations or associations created in foreign countries or
funded predominately by foreign shareholders, it would be overbroad even if the Court were to
recognize a compelling governmental interest in limiting foreign influence over the Nation's political
process.

(d) The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare decisis, beyond workability--the
precedent's antiquity, the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned
• The Court returns to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government
may not suppress political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.
• The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can be justified by a governmental interest in
providing "the electorate with information" about election-related spending sources.
• he Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if a group could show
a " 'reasonable probability' " that disclosing its contributors' names would " 'subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.'
• The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied to Citizens United's ads.
They fall within BCRA's "electioneering communication" definition: They referred to then-
Senator Clinton by name shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her
candidacy.
• This Court also rejects their contention that §201's disclosure requirements must be
confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy under WRTL's test

34
 for restrictions on independent expenditures, 551 U. S., at 469-476 (opinion of ROBERTS,
C.J.). Disclosure is the less-restrictive alternative to more comprehensive speech regulations.
Such requirements have been upheld in Buckley and McConnell. Citizens United's argument
that no informational interest justifies applying §201 to its ads is similar to the argument
this Court rejected with regard to disclaimers.


TEST: Specifically, the Court echoed Bellotti's rejection of categories based on a corporation's
purpose. The majority argued that to grant Freedom of the Press protections to media corporations,
but not others, presented a host of problems; and so all corporations should be equally protected
from expenditure restrictions.

The Court found that BCRA §§201 and 311, provisions requiring disclosure of the funder, were valid
as applied to the movie advertisements and to the movie itself.[28] The majority ruled for the
disclosure of the sources of campaign contributions, saying that

... prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters.
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s
interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are "in the pocket" of so-
called moneyed interests... This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.

J. Stevens dissent:
• "A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are
being bought and sold."
• Stevens also argued that the Court addressed a question not raised by the litigants when it
found BCRA §203 to be facially unconstitutional, and that the majority "changed the case to
give themselves an opportunity to change the law".
• Second, Stevens argued that the majority did not place enough emphasis on the need to
prevent the "appearance of corruption" in elections.
• Third, Stevens argued that the majority's decision failed to recognize the dangers of the
corporate form.
• The First Amendment, he argued, protects individual self-expression, self-realization and the
communication of ideas. Corporate spending is the "furthest from the core of political
expression" protected by the Constitution
• Stevens concluded his dissent by writing:
o At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the
American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from
undermining self government since the founding, and who have fought against the
distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of
Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While
American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have
thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.[29]


UNITED STATES V. O’BRIEN
• David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration
certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.
• members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his companions.
• For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

35
 • "willfully and knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning . . . [his] Registration
Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50, App. United States
Code, Section 462(b)."
• O'Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation
of certificates was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech, and
because it served no legitimate legislative purpose.
• We hold that the 1965 Amendment is constitutional both as enacted and as applied. We
therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment and
sentence of the District Court without reaching the issue raised by O'Brien in No. 233.

1) . Amended § 12(b)(3), on its face, deals with conduct having no connection with speech. It
prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is
nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct.

2) O'Brien first argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him because his
act of burning his registration certificate was protected "symbolic speech" within the First
Amendment.
• We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
"speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.
• when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
• Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong.
• regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
• The many functions performed by Selective Service certificates establish beyond doubt that
Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing their wanton and
unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who
knowingly and willfully destroy or mutilate them.
• In other words, both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment
are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct.
• because the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his registration certificate
frustrated the Government's interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to
justify O'Brien's conviction.
3) O'Brien finally argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because what he
calls the "purpose" of Congress was "to suppress freedom of
• Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive. As the Court long ago stated:
• We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had
the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or
another legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.

TEST: The O'Brien test is not meant to be the absolute deciding factor in cases involving non-verbal
speech, but an additional tool to invoke against prohibitions.
: The law in question must
• be within the constitutional power of the government to enact.
• further an important or substantial government interest.
• That interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech (or "content neutral",
as phrased in later cases)
• Prohibit no more speech than is essential to further that interest.

36
TEXAS V. JOHNSON
After publicly burning an American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was
convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. This case presents the question whether his
conviction is consistent with the First Amendment. We hold that it is not.
• While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, respondent
Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the "Republican War Chest Tour."
• purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain
Dallas-based corporations.
• Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only
criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in
violation of Tex.Penal Code
• To justify Johnson's conviction for engaging in symbolic speech, the State asserted two
interests: preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and preventing breaches of the
peace.

1) We have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is
expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered
the context in which it occurred.
• In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication,
• Thus, although we have recognized that, where
• "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms,"
• The State offers two separate interests to justify this conviction: preventing breaches of the
peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. We hold that the
first interest is not implicated on this record, and that the second is related to the
suppression of expression.
2) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson's burning
of the flag.
• To accept Texas' arguments that it need only demonstrate "the potential for a breach of the
peace," Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning necessarily possesses that
potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This we decline to do.
• The Texas law is thus not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would
cause serious offense to others.
• If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.
• In short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag
by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.

Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. The State's interest in preventing
breaches of the peace does not support his conviction, because Johnson's conduct did not threaten to
disturb the peace. Nor does the State's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political expression.

TEST: t, "Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct,
permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. "the government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word," it may not
"proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements."
the key question considered by the Court was "whether Texas has asserted an interest in support of
Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression."

37
The Court rejected Texas's claim that flag burning is punishable on the basis that it "tends to incite"
breaches of the peace, citing the test from the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) that the
state may only punish speech that would incite "imminent lawless action," finding that flag burning
does not always pose an imminent threat of lawless action.

NATIONAL UNINON OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER V. CA

The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel
Nikko (Hotel)

Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As
negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions.
Unionheld a general assembly at its office located in the Hotels basement, where some members
sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads.
The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the
Hotels Grooming Standards.
Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises.
For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily
cease operations in three restaurants.
Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members; and
suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4)
employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a
strike.

DECISION:
1) The Union maintains that the mass picket conducted by its officers and members did not
constitute a strike and was merely an expression of their grievance resulting from the lockout
effected by the Hotel management.
• On the other hand, the Hotel argues that the Unions deliberate defiance of the company rules
and regulations was a concerted effort to paralyze the operations of the Hotel, as the Union
officers and members knew pretty well that they would not be allowed to work in their bald
or cropped hair style.
• We rule for the Hotel.
• First, the Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and
concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was,
therefore, not a protected action.
o The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and
beverage outlets of the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to
work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is amiss
and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the
Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its clients.
o This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union was not merely an
expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated
act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotels finances or its reputation.
• Second, the Unions concerted action which disrupted the Hotels operations clearly violated
the CBAs No Strike, No Lockoutprovision
o The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted no
strike/work stoppage and lockout prohibition is squarely applicable and legally
binding
• Third, the Union officers and members concerted action to shave their heads and crop their
hair not only violated the Hotels Grooming Standards but also violated the Unions duty and
responsibility to bargain in good faith.

38
 • Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and
the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC
correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or
holding a strike.
• Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the
strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures[21] presented by the Hotel, the Union
officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.
• we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal strike but were not
identified to have committed illegal acts are entitled to be reinstated to their former
positions but without backwages.

NEAR V. MINNESOTA
County Attorney of Hennepin County brought this action to enjoin the publication of what was
described as a " malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine and periodical"
known as " The Saturday Press,"

Without attempting to summarize the contents of the voluminous exhibits attached to the
complaint, we deem it sufficient to say that the articles charged in substance that a Jewish
gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law
enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing their duties. Most of the
charges were directed against the Chief of Police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty,
illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The County Attorney was charged
with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to remedy
them. The Mayor was accused of inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand jury was
stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a special prosecutor were
demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular, to investigate an attempt to
assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it appears from the articles, was
shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had been published. There is no question
but that the articles made serious accusations against the public officers named and others in
connection with the prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish them.

1) Third. The object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression of
the offending newspaper or periodical.
2) Fourth. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, but
to put the publisher under an effective censorship.
• Thus, where a newspaper or periodical has been suppressed because of the circulation of
charges against public officers of official misconduct, it would seem to be clear that the
renewal of the publication of such charges would constitute a contempt, and that the
judgment would lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must
satisfy the court as to the character of a new publication.
• The fact that, for approximately one hundred and fifty years, there has been almost an
entire absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to
the malfeasance of public officers is significant of the deep-seated conviction that such
restraints would violate constitutional right
• There is nothing new in the fact that charges of reprehensible conduct may create
resentment and the disposition to resort to violent means of redress, but this well
understood tendency did not alter the determination to protect the press against
censorship and restraint upon publication.
• For these reasons we hold the statute, so far as it authorized the proceedings in this action
under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement of the liberty of the press
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We should add that this decision rests upon
the operation and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the truth of the
charges contained in the particular periodical. The fact that the public officers named in
this case, and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to

39
 be impeccable cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an unconstitutional
restraint upon publication.

WIKIPEDIA:
• The U.S. Supreme Court held that, except in rare cases, censorship is unconstitutional
• so far as it authorized the proceedings in this action under clause (b) [723] of section one,
to be an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. We should add that this decision rests upon the operation and effect of the
statute, without regard to the question of the truth of the charges contained in the
particular periodical. The fact that the public officers named in this case, and those
associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to be impeccable
cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an unconstitutional restraint upon
publication.
• ...the fact that liberty of press may be abused does not make any less necessary the
immunity of the press from prior restraint...a more serious evil would result if officials
could determine which stories can be published..."

NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. US
We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times
and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy."
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."
the government “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint”. This reinforced the idea that it was the Nixon Administration's responsibility to show
sufficient evidence that the newspapers’ actions would cause a “grave and irreparable” danger

• New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)[1], was a landmark decision by
the United States Supreme Court on the First Amendment. The ruling made it possible
for The New York Times and The Washington Postnewspapers to publish the then-
classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government censorship or punishment.[1]
• President Richard Nixon had claimed executive authority to force the Times to suspend
publication of classified information in its possession. The question before the court was
whether the constitutional freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was
subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of government to maintain the
secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did protect the
right of The New York Times to print the materials.[1]

• BACKGROUND: By 1971, the United States had been overtly at war with North Vietnam for
six years. At this point, 59,000 American soldiers had died and the government was facing
widespread dissent from large portions of the American public. In 1967 Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamaracommissioned a “massive top-secret history of the United
States role in Indochina”. Daniel Ellsberg, who had helped to produce the report, leaked 43
volumes of the 47-volume, 7,000-page report to reporter Neil Sheehanof The New York
Times in March 1971 and the paper began publishing articles outlining the findings.

Justice Hugo Black wrote an opinion that elaborated on his view of the absolute superiority of the
First Amendment:
[T]he injunction against The New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when
the cases were first presented... . [E]very moment's continuance of the injunctions...amounts to a
flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. ... The Government's power
to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And

40
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell. ... [W]e are asked to hold that...the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the
Judiciary can make laws...abridging freedom of the press in the name of 'national security.' ... To find
that the President has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of news...would wipe out the First
Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government
hopes to make 'secure.' ... The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not
be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of
military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no
real security... . The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new
nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this new society
strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not
be abridged.[13]

Justice William O. Douglas largely concurred with Black, arguing that the need for a free press as a
check on government prevents any governmental restraint on the press.[14]
Like Black, Douglas held an expansive view of the First Amendment that would have prohibited
virtually any government restraint on speech, no matter how significant the interest cited

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., wrote separately to explain that the publication of the documents did
not qualify as one of the three exceptions to the freedom of expression established in
Brennan pointed out that the government's action would be valid only if the speech fell within one of
the categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. The Pentagon Papers did not, since they
did not contain military secrets, obscenities, or fighting words that would be likely to directly induce
unrest. (One could disagree on the first point, but the information was several years old and thus did
not relate to the details of any ongoing military operations such that publication would jeopardize
their success.)





SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA
29 april 2009
petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana
lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito

before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),[2] against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.

Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan

1) It is petitioners threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the
relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize
the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
• Petitioners contention is untenable.

41
 • A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension.
• Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant,
deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures,
programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance
with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.
• And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively
suspend the person subject of the complaint
2) But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would
not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension.
• Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary
or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x.Indeed, the
power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB.
3) Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law,
arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms
coming from the INC ministers.
• Petitioners position does not persuade.
• If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains
temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of
the equal protection guarantee.
4) Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was
religious speech
• The argument has no merit.
• Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of
religious speech.
5) Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive
suspension order, being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and
expression and an impermissible prior restraint.
• We are not persuaded
• A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
• The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech
• Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the
young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.
6) Petitioners invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of
speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the
premises.
• To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to
follow.
• the courts function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on
the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one
against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed.
• the Court rules that the governments interest to protect and promote the interests and
welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint
on petitioners prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension
period.
7) government regulations through the MTRCB became a necessary evil with the government taking
the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters.

42
 • the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10,
2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.
• petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech
to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers,
and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.
• The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel
permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction.
• The suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and
uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts
obtaining call for.


RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECON:
The motion has no merit.
• Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not,
under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of
subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the
broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004
• , the interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioners
invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry.
• Petitioners invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo to support his hands-off thesis is
erroneous. Obviously, he fails to appreciate what the Court stated in that particular case
when it rejected the argument that a religious program is beyond MTRCBs review and
regulatory authority.

MTRCB V. ABS-CBN
• respondent ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the television (TV) program The
Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students
moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the
program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were
interviewed. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of
the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously
served as the background of the episode.
• MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee,
alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit The Inside Story to petitioner for
its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7[4] of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986[5] and Section 3,[6] Chapter III and Section 7,[7] Chapter IV
of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
• respondents explained that the The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press.

1) The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986, partly
reproduced as follows:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
x x x x x x
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs,
• This Court, through Justice Reynato Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing the
phrase all television programs,

43
 • Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception,
courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in
the law to justify it.[28] Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos
2) Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the termtelevision programs on the
ground that the The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political
editorial protected under Section 4
• The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in
Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the
Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels
• pparently, newsreels are straight presentation of events. They are depiction of
actualities. Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations[35] implementing P. D. No.
1986 define newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses,
commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered
newsreels.[36] Clearly, the The Inside Story cannot be considered a newsreel.
3) sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review The Inside Story. Clearly, we
are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression
or the press.
• Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel
respondents permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to
petitioner The Inside Story for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve
whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified
by respondents contravene the Constitution.
• we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and
Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is
settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

VALMONTE V. BELMONTE
DOCTRINE: Before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. It
cannot also be argued that policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. Respondents failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. This position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy, and not of law, hence untenable.
• Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
• Sir:
• As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may
we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.
• If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
• We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution
of the present regime.
• The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

44

• apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to
do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
• Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

1) The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
• Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
• Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee
2) public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
3) A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
• respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition.
• When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen,
a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the
above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the
individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS.
• Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature
4) Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only
• Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the
Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
5) Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.


AKBAYAN V. AQUINO
DOCTRINE: As a matter of public interest, while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same.

45

• Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via
the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text
of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments
and annexes thereto.
• House Committee requested herein respondent Undersecretary
Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating Committee created
under Executive Order No. 213 (CREATION OF A PHILIPPINE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF THE JAPAN-PHILIPPINES ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT)[1] to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee
with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquinodid not heed the request, however.
Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government within
December 2005, the present petition was filed on December 9, 2005
• The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of
origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation,
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of
the business environment, and general and final provisions
• While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public
since September 11, 2006,[6] respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was
filed up to the filing of petitioners Reply when the JPEPA was still being negotiated the initial
drafts thereof were kept from public view.

1) Standing
• As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing
in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the
House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing
of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
2) Mootness
• The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely
the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the
negotiations
3) Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on
the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern
• From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern.This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an
exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
4) The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction.
• It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that historic confidentiality[27] would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.
• Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be
jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones.
• privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from
the privileged character of the deliberative process.
5) , there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into account. One is the
presumed public interest in favor of keeping the subject information confidential, which is the

46
reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public interest in favor of disclosure,
the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for information.
• Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need referred to in the
immediately cited cases. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the
subject documents fall short of this standard.
6) The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that
they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the
initial offers are also published.
• the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided
under P.D. 1464[58] may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent
in its office.
• petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a sufficient showing of
need that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress,
functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

ROSALES V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where
the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are
not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of
the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.

• Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of
manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-
list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.
• Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified
since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees
• Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and
marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated March
29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of
that groups’ nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this
time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject
request.
• Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE
PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not
personality oriented."
• Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en
bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.

1) While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the
nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding
the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating
groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in
said certified list.
• petitions are impressed with merit.

47
 • The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or
the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is
the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.
• By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of
his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every
citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on
ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing
2) no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups
subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
• there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision
as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
• In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions.

GUINGONA V. COMELEC
• Smartmatic-Total Information Management Corporation supplied the wrong ultraviolet ink
used in the printing of the ballots for the May 2010 elections. The security marks were
unreadable by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. This prompted Comelec to
disable the ultraviolet light detector in the PCOS machines, and to buy ultraviolet lamps
for P30 million.
• Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. then disclosed that election officials bought
nearly two million ballot secrecy folders for the May 2010 elections at an overpriced rate
of P380 each without any public bidding.
• The ink easily washed off and the mark left by it only appeared after the lapse of a few hours.
Undeterred by the failed test, Comelec still used the ink supplied by Texas Resources
Corporation.
• Comelec subsequently approved a resolution awarding Smartmatic a contract amounting
to P500 million for the tracking and delivery services of official ballots. No bidding was held
for the contract, which Comelec claimed to be an emergency procurement.
• In light of the foregoing alarming developments, petitioners pray that the Court order
respondent Comelec to explain the complete details of its preparations for the impending 10
May 2010 elections
• Comelec contends petitioners have no legal standing to file the present special civil action for
mandamus. Respondent insists petitioners have no valid cause of action against it.

1) The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the governments constitutional
duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
• There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 elections is a matter of great public
concern.
2) It is not enough, however, that the information petitioners seek in a writ of mandamus is a matter
of public concern.
• For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.[8]In this case,
respondent Comelec failed to cite any provision of law exempting the information sought by
petitioners from the coverage of the governments constitutional duty to disclose fully
information of public concern.

48
3) petitioners prayer to compel Comelec to explain fully its preparations for the coming 10 May 2010
elections finds overwhelming support in the Constitution, specifically under Section 7 of Article III
and Section 28 of Article II on the peoples right to information and the States corresponding duty of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
• However, due to the proximity of the 10 May 2010 elections which is less than five days
away, we shall grant only the specific reliefs prayed for by petitioners which by necessity
must be disclosed before the 10 May 2010 elections or are expressly mandated by law to be
disclosed or performed in connection with the holding of the 10 May 2010
elections.Petitioners can press Comelec for the other reliefs after the 10 May 2010 elections,
and if they still fail to secure such reliefs, they may take such actions as may be allowed
under the law.

HILADO V. JUDGE REYES
DOCTRINE: The importance of this right to access to court records is predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate
interest. It was further explained that while the public officers in custody of control of public records
have the discretion to regulate the manner in which such records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such
access, inspection, examination or copying.
Hilbay note: General rule: The public has access unless there is some greater justification for
classifying the information.

• Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation filed a
verified Complaint[1] dated November 17, 2003 charging Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 21, with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency,
dereliction of duty, serious misconduct, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct relative to Special Proceedings No. 00-97505 for issuance of letters of
administration entitled Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto.
• She, thereafter, appointed Julita Campos Benedicto as the administratrix of the estate
• According to the complainants, the appointed administratrix acknowledged their claims
against the estate of the deceased as major liabilities thereof in an Inventory
• The complainants further alleged that the respondent Judge had, likewise, approved the sale
of substantial and valuable assets of the estate without serving notice to them and other
persons interested, in violation of Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Despite this, the
respondent Judge failed to issue any order directing the administratrix to comply with the
rules.
• complainants, through counsel, filed a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abudanti Cautela[6] dated
September 24, 2001 identifying themselves as among the major creditors in the inventory
prepared by the appointed administratrix, and prayed that the Branch Clerk of Court be
required to furnish the petitioners, through their counsel, copies of all the processes and
orders issued by the court, and to require the administratrix to serve copies of all the
proceedings to their counsel
• They also claimed that they were again denied participation in the proceedings of the
settlement of the estate, and access to the court records which are considered public.
• Investigating Justice opined that the respondent Judge arbitrarily denied the complainants
access to the case records of Sp. Proc. No. 00-97505 by refusing requests for photocopying of
the same

1) The Court holds that the respondent Judge erred in denying the complainants access to the court
records of Sp. Proc. No. 00-97505. Admittedly, the complainants could not demand that they be
furnished with the courts orders and the pleadings filed by the parties, in as much as the respondent
Judge had already ruled that they were not parties-in-interest. However, the Court finds that the
respondent Judge should not have prohibited the complainants from going over the records of the
case and securing copies of pertinent orders and pleadings.

49
 • relevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent
jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies
• the publics right to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby ensuring quality, honesty
and respect for our legal system.
• According to the Court, the importance of this right to access to court records is predicated
on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern in which the
public has a legitimate interest.
2) The Court thus rules that for denying the complainants access to court records, the respondent
Judge must be reprimanded.
• no bad faith can be attributed to the respondent Judge for relying on the ruling of this Court
in Lantaco v. Llamas,[30] albeit erroneously.
• REPRIMANDED. She is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.



NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN

DOCTRINE: The First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about
the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge
that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). A public official may not
successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice By this standard, it was concluded
that factual errors aside, actual malice was not proven to sustain the convictions for libel. Moreover,
leeway was allowed even if the challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made.

• Respondent L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of
Montgomery, Alabama.
• He brought this civil libel action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and
Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company, a New York
corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily newspaper.
• The text concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student
movement, "the struggle for the right to vote," and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery.
• Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name, he contended that the
word "police" in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who
supervised the Police Department, so that he was being accused of "ringing" the campus with
police.

1) The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public
issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is
whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent.
• A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions -- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount -- leads to
a comparable "self-censorship."
• The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
• The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not
2) Applying these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the
convincing

50
 • clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not
constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law. The case
of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming that they could
constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on the advertisement,
there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or were
in any way reckless in that regard. The judgment against them is thus without constitutional
support.
• As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual
malice. The statement by the Times' Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation, he
thought the advertisement was "substantially correct," affords no constitutional warrant for
the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that it was a
• "cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement [from which] the jury could not have
but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its maliciousness inferable
therefrom."
3) There was testimony that the persons handling the advertisement saw nothing in it that would
render it unacceptable under the Times' policy of rejecting advertisements containing "attacks of a
personal character"; [Footnote 27] their failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable.
• the evidence against the Times supports, at most, a finding of negligence in failing to
discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that
is required for a finding of actual malice
4) Raising as it does the possibility that a good faith critic of government will be penalized for his
criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the
constitutionally protected area of free expression.
• Since it was relied on exclusively here, and there was no other evidence to connect the
statements with respondent, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a
finding that the statements referred to respondent.

HUSTLER V. FALWELL
The State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny First
Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury
when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public
figure involved.

Hilbay note: The implication is that if respondent had been a private individual, arguably, his right of
privacy would have allowed him to recover for emotional distress. Because Respondent was a public
figure, he could not prevail in defamation, nor could he claim emotional distress

• Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry
Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and
public affairs, sued petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to recover damages
for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
• The inside front cover of the November, 1983, issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody"
of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and picture of respondent
and was entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time."
• Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler's editors chose respondent as the
featured celebrity and drafted an alleged "interview" with him in which he states that his
"first time" was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse

1) a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an
undoubted "chilling" effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value.
• "Freedoms of expression require "breathing space."
• his breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for
libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the
statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.

51
 • [T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.
Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.
2) We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing, in addition, that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
"actual malice," i.e.,with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true. This is not merely a "blind application" of the New York Times standard, it
reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate "breathing
space" to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
• The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury's finding to be that the ad parody "was not
reasonably believable," 797 F.2d at 1278, and, in accordance with our custom, we accept this
finding.




VASQUEZ V. CA
DOCTRINE: Adopted the doctrine established in New York Times Co. v Sullivan. In proving “actual
malice,” it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner
were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether they were false or not.

Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice.

• The question for determination in this case is the liability for libel of a citizen who
denounces a barangay official for misconduct in office.
• After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions
were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their
complaint.
• the following news article[2] appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:
• Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging
that the latters statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
• The prosecution presented Barangay Chairman Olmedo and his neighbor, Florentina
Calayag, as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Ciriaco Cabuhat, Nicasio
Agustin, Estrelita Felix, Fernando Rodriguez all residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area and
petitioner as its witnesses.


1) First. Petitioner claims he was unfairly singled out as the source of the statements in the article
when any member of the 38 complainant-families could have been the source of the alleged libelous
statements
• Petitioner cannot claim to have been the source of only a few statements in the article in
question and point to the other parties as the source of the rest, when he admits that he was
correctly identified as the spokesperson of the families during the interview.
2) Second. Petitioner points out that the information did not set out the entire news article as
published. In fact, the second statement attributed to petitioner was not included in the information
• In this case, the article was presented in evidence, but petitioner failed to object to its
introduction. Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire article, not only of the portions
quoted in the information, and sought to prove it to be true. In doing so, he waived objection
based on the defect in the information.Consequently, he cannot raise this issue at this late
stage

52
3) Third. On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that what he said
was true and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.
• To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence
of malice.
• An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime,
the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead
• There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person.
• What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a mans
reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of
himself
• it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the
object of the defamatory statement.
• malice or ill will must be present.
• Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown
4) petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation
that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the
Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter[20] of NHA Inspector General
• In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the
Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the
performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by
those on whom such duty is incumbent.
5) For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to
official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual
malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,
• There is here a manifest effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in
accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed special privilegesand perhaps also
immunitiesduring those oppressive times. The non-inclusion of the periodicals was a
transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for
freedom of expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past
despotism

NEWSWEEK V. IAC
DOCTRINE: To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable. Defamatory remarks
directed at a group of persons are not actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or
sufficiently specific for victim to be identifiable. An action for libel allegedly directed against a group
of sugar planters cannot be done by resort to filing a class suit as each victim has his specific
reputation to protect. In this case, each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the
community.

• Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines
• The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against
them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of
petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek
• The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the
impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed
them with imprunity.

53
 • First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action
because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained
of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents;
that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel
is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel
can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group
member's reputation

1) We agree with petitioner. We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of
all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the
absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf
of the aforesaid sugar planters.
• The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be
libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated
that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area
by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official
act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
• Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no
need of a trial in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not
libelous. The specific allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to
the sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out
by a perusal of the actual text.


MVRS PUBLICATIONS V. ISLAAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE: An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question
of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the
interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any
other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. The rules
require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all concerned. Petitioners' assertion of the interests not only of the
Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well cannot be sustained. They lack the
sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate
the identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can
be a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit,
given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing

• ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than
seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T.
LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and
IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in
their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS,
JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
• The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings
• MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that
the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not
entitled to damages

54
1) Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.[5] It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff
• Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in
the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff
• Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to
a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action[11] without at all
impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression
2) If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no
application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind.
3) as the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages
on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public
policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader
would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and second, the
limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of
the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in
libel cases.
• In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit.
• Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global
group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those
they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those
absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in
this instance, would be unavailing

55