"WAR KIDS" 89).

The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
Laura Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus Yanes, et al.(grandchildren of payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes
the deadz sila) G.R. No. L-68053; May 7, 1990 or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.( Estate of
Facts: Hemady v. Luzon Surety)
Aniceto was survived by his children Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. The PRs are the children Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
of Rufino. Ani left his children lots 773 and 823. Rufino and his children left the during legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
WW2. After liberation, they found out that lot 773 was in the possession of Santiago, damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment
Fuentebella, and Alvarez. Record shows that TCTs covering lot 773-A;B were already because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
issued to Santiago. Santi sold the lots to Fuente. When Fuente died, his wife sold the lots to father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in
Rosendo Alvarez. their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear
PRs filed a complaint against Santi, Fuente, Alvarez, and the RD of Negros for the return of that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
the ownership and possession of lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of the case, Alva
sold the lots to Dr. Siason. Meanwhile, in 1962, Jesus executed a quitclaim in favor of
defendant. However, in 1963, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of PRs.(Civil case 5022
Note: pets did not file an appeal in this dec.) Decision cannot be executed coz 733 was
already registered in the name of Siason. The cadastral court initially ordered Siason to
produce his TCTs. Afterwards, the court nullified its previous order coz Siason was in GF
and without knowledge.
The PRs filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of exec. The court ruled
that the judgment cannot be enforced bec. Siason was not a party in the case.
Another action was filed by the PRs for the recov of the land plus damages and prutas. The
pets raised res judicata, prescription and estoppel in their answer.The lower court ruled in
favor of the PRs. It ruled that equity demanded that the PRs recover the actual value of the
land bec. the sale was executed without court approval. The appellate court affirmed the
TCs decision. MR also denied.
Wills Issue:
WON the obligation of deceased Alvarez(he died already) to pay the PRs could be legally
transmitted and passed down to his legitimate children and heirs.
Ruling:
*Civil Case 5022 is already the law of the case because pets failed to file an appeal. Said
decision had long become final and executory. SC is already powerless to review the
decision.
Yes. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not
altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule

Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932

“DEL MONTE”
Bienvenido Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Del Monte Development
Corporation (DELCOR) G.R. No. 77029; August 30, 1990
Facts:
DELCOR purchased a lot (lot 2476-A; 20,119 sq met) from the late Luis Lancero. As per
Deed of Absolute Sale exec in favor of DELCOR, a TCT was issued. Luis acquired the same
parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero(1952). The sale bet Luis and Ricardo waqs annotated
at the back of an OCT covering a mother lot(lot no. 2476) in the names of Ricardo, his
mother Teodorica and his siblings.
Teodorica died long before WW2. In 1966, an extra-judicial settlement and partition was
executed by the heirs of Teo. Lot 2476 was adjudicated in favor of Ricardo who was then
alive. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul
the partition made by the heirs insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired.
After trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff corporation. The appellate court
affirmed the decision.
Wills Issue:
WON the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica in one of the litigated lots is included in the
deed of sale.
Ruling:
Yezz. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), and
there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate. Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the
rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore
incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo
received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo
sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also
included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
“SALE IN PROBATE”
Natalia Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, Aladin Simundac and Miguel Olivan G.R. Mo.
125835; July 30, 1998
Facts:
PRs Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance again Natalia
Carpena Opulencia on the ground that the latter executed in their favor a 'contract to sell' of lot 2125.
The defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. The
defendant averred that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio
Carpena, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC of Binan. The court ordered
the parties to submit their evidence. Pet, instead of submitting evid, filed a demurrer. Moreover, the
pet maintained that the contract was null and void for want of approval of the probate court.
Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
appellate court set aside hte trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
Issue:
WON a contract to sell a real property involved in estate proceedings valid and binding without the
approval of the probate court.
Ruling:
Yezz naman. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract
to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her
share in the estate of her late father.
Petitioner contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate
proceedings." Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that
petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last
Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected
between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of
land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to
the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for
petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands
in the way of such administration."
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932
“FISHING PARTNERSHIP”
Emilio Emnace v. Court of Appeals and the Estate of Vicente Tabanao (plus heirs)
G.R. No. 126334; November 23, 2001
Facts:
Pets Emnace, Tabanao and Divigranacia were partners in a business known as Ma. Nelma
Fishing Industry. Sometime in January 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership
and exec an agreement of partition and distribution. Throughout the existence of the
partnership, and even after Tabanao's death, pet failed to submit to Taba's heirs any
financial statements. Pet also reneged on his promise to turn over the 1/3 share in the total
assets of the partnership to the heirs. PRs(heris) filed an action for accounting, payment of
shares, division of assets and damages.
Pet filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improp venue, lack of juris
and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabano to sue. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. The trial court held that the heirs of Tabano had a right to sue in their own names,
in view of the provision of Art. 777 of the CC.
Issue:
Legal capacity of the surviving spouse of Tabano to sue.
Ruling:
Yezz naman. petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal
capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to
be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She
and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao.
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership
was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner
were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession,
which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover,
respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can
commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death,
his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in
their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the
capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his
obligations.
Belinda Taredo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104482; January 22, 1996
Facts:
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tanedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale of “one
hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191" in favor of his eldest brother and
his wife (Ricardo and Teresita PRs). Upon hte death of his father, Lazaro executed an
"Affidavit of Conformity" to reaffirm, respect and acknowledge the sale in favor or PRs.
Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale on favor of PRs covering 1/12 of a Lot 191.
Ricardo learned taht Lazaro sold the same lot to his children. PRs recorded the deed in the
RD. Pets filed a complaint for rescission executed by Lazaro in favor of the PRs. The trial
court decided in favor of PRs. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
WON the sale of future inheritance is valid.
Ruling:
Yez syempre duh! Read Art. 1347..
A second deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's
undivided inheritance dated 1982, so nevermind the previous deed ya know. The deed of
sale in favor of respondents was executed in 1980. However, according to Art. 1544 of the
CC: “Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law,
ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of
property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the
one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed
fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at
all.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932
“BICOLANONG HACIENDERO” nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her
Mariano B. Locsin v. Court of Appeals succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she
G.R. No. 89783; February 19, 1992 had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
Facts: transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an
Mariano inherited extensive property from his father Getulio. He brought his inheritance expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
into his marriage with Catalina Jaucian. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
untitled properties which she had inherited form her parents. breached, the respondents may not invoke.
Mariano Locsin executed a last will and testament instituting his wife as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family. After Mariano's death, (1948) his will was probated without opposition from both
sides of the family. Nine years after the death of Don Mariano, Catalina began transferring,
by sale, donation or assignment, Mariano's as well as her own, props to their respective
nephews and nieces.
Catalina died in 1977. Four years before her death, she made a will affirming the transfers
she made. Six years after her demise, some of Catalina's nephews and nieces filed an action
in the RTC of Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins,
alleging that the conveyances were innoficious, without consideration, and intended solely
to circumvent the laws on succession. After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
WON the PRs are entitled to inherit the properties which Catalina had already disposed of
more than 10 yrs before her death.
Ruling:
No. The properties did not form part of her hereditaty estate. The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. 11 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which
her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her
estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were,
one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn
and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to
the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and

Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932

“CODICIL” respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
Johny Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals the complaint below.
G.R. No, 113725; June 29, 2000
Facts: Modal Institutions::*Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution
instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of a parcel of land in - the contention is without merit. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. The codicil was inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.
duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. [14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).
In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of
the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court..
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal
institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private

Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932

“BILIHAN NG LUPA”
Sps Virgilio Santos and Esperanza Lati Santos v. Sps. Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao; G.R. No. 169129; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Herein pets are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos, who died
on October 20, 195. The other pets are the daughters-in-law of Rita. The respondents are
the alleged owners of a lot, which they purportedly bought from on two occasions. On the
first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,” Before her death, Rita allegedly
informed the respondents that she could not deliver the title to the subject prop because
the entire property inherited by her had not yet been partitioned. The PRs claimed that
pets adjudicated and partitioned the subject property already sold to them. They filed a
formal demand letter but pets still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property. The
trial court denied the complaint. The CA reversed the decision. MR denied.
Issue:
WON herein pets are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" and consequently,
reconvey the subject property to herein respondents.
Ruling:
The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is
clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over
the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the
property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the
property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is
privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what
rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding
as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which
involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of
the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract. In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to
comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa,".
“SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY”
NHA v. Segunda Almeida, CA
G.R. No. 162784; June 22, 2007
Facts:
The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land in
San Pedro, Laguna. She had two children, Francisca and Beatriz(she died before her mom;
mother of PR). When Margarita passed away, Francisca executed a deed of self-
adjudication claiming that she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The deed of
was based on a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' allegedly executed by Margarita. The surviving
heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the deed. A decision was rendered and the
deed was declared null and void. During the trial, Francisca filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same lots. The NHA granted the application.
The PR appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA reso was affirmed.
When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which
they submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The heirs of
Francisca directed PR to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved, PR sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of
Francisca. She filed a complaint in the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked her 40 year
occupation of the property and re-raised the fact that Francisca's declaration is a nullity
because the other heirs were disregarded. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case for further hearing.
The RTC rendered a decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of
the Office of the President. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can
transfer property.
The NHA and the heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which were both denied.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
WON the decision of NHA is arbitrary.
Ruling:
Yes. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without
considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932
obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the
disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the
property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to
properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of
law.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent
as the next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase
price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have
put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil
Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed
therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the
interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or
intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the
lots.

Octaviano, Clarence ∑β 1932