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    2 The Framework of Essences in Spinozas Ethics

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    john
    framework spinoza ethics

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    ch Jal fo e sary of Paaopy 13) ms y.09 Ra ARTICLE ‘THE FRAMEWORK OF ESSENCES IN SPINOZA’S, ETHICS Christopher P. Martin Asi well known, Spinozs's ontology consists of the one substance and its ‘ods, 50 that individuals Such a me and my fiends, and even our pete And our cars, are modes of the oe substancs.* Modes, furthermore are fectons or qualities of substance (Ep25e)* Properly speaking, this means That my se and my friends, et are properties more so than things. Yet surely Spinoza cannot intend so easly to abrogate ou individual, and roduc ts to transient properties ofthe one thing, can he? Much thas ‘been spilt on Spinoza's conception of modes, and thew i a strong consensus that ith respect fo his conception of mode and his reduction fof mend my frends to such things, he did. However, Spinoza alo speaks ‘of modes as having esenes, and if anything grounds the idemity and individuality of a thing it probably ts having an essence think we can Dots the stats of an individual, even as a mode, in Spinoza’ thought by httr understanding the respot in which adviduals have essences, and his endeavour to do Bets Commentators ar all but universally agreed dat Spinoza understands the essences of modes (hich T will refer to ax ‘modal esences) a being ‘ungue to their mode an interpretation supported in lags poet by Spinoza’ definition ofthe esence ofa thing in FMde2. very few others have argued that modal esoness are repeated in mode ofthe same Kin ‘Arguments for this interpretation range from textual evidence in EI, Spinoca’s marks about human nature in EIV and even his discussion of| ‘Som mi a reo smn tt i a On {2 E845 opty ten bees ei me ator a God. 2A otto three gang aon sn Spin er Ep ele Bc a eft eh ing tte Be ‘gamed pep: Spina it, So Tone aot Tela ae Tre iPr tm sxe 4s Ph fr nO on: “sens pe itish Journal for the History of F the immorality of the mind in EY. 1 think that eackof thse interpretations captures some aspect of Spinova’s wow (and therefore, thatthe consensus is ‘ag to Favour the ony-unigue-esences approach), but that the fame trorkof modal estences a wok inthe Eric can only be comphended by recognizing Spinoa’s simultaneous commitment to both, and by under Sanding ow the to are zlated. My aim inthis paper i to explicate the ‘etal ofthis broader conception of Spinor's framework ofthe esences of incividaal modes. T begin by evaluating he strengts of evo competing conceptions of modal ssnces. According to the individualist interpretation, the esence of exch tmode is unique toi, whereas species hold that modes of the same kind share a craton esence. As we shall, th consnss er in thinking thal tne seading excludes the thor for I sbll argue at thes is pood evidence to sopest that Spinoza understand modal ensness as being Unigus to thee ‘modes, but that there is alo good evidence to suggest that modes of the same kind share «common esence, Spinozsfrumework of modal essences, then, s rooted ina dual commitment o unique and shared modal esses. In Sections Two ané Thre, F explicate the deal ofthis dual commitment Here we ee thatthe individualist incrpreation captures Spinozas thought with respect t0 what be calls an ‘actual essnee’, and that the species Interpretation captures Spnoca’s thought with respect what he eal “Tormal esence In Section Four t show how the two conceptions are related, With this Thope wo have exposed the Fenework of modal essences st workin the Ethics, and in doing So to have begun a resurrection of a Fobust, though novertheless modal, conception ofthe indivdual a Spinoza’ metaphysis. SECTION ONE: THE INDIVIDUALIST AND SPECIEIST INTERPRETATIONS, “Thereis a strong consensus among commentators that Spinoza understands the essence of each mode o be unique tot? This consenss is sstained in large part by consideration of two passages thought clerly to commit ‘su at nde oats Rest, 4 Sy of pwc ks [Seb] apc sce Peisag Comma 96) and 3 Yeahs Yon, Sone ond Ose ori, No | [tc ino: Pinon Uavery Pes, 199) 1 isha Dal Roca, apse ane Mind Pao Space pram (New Yor ‘tte Unteraty Pes 18) 86: Wale Maton, "Body Eowns en Mind Fin Spica in pn fs an Beton bd Cay ao Maa Laas Bi 0) 2% Sry Devens “Te Dine Ene onthe Compson of Go Sinn” [De Ese Se 1382) 398 Dow Geir on he Eins ih Huo By ac Pr te Md ta ln [aa Ionut mas) Spinoza wo this view." The rst and most explicit of thee is EUG, where Spinoza defines the essence af a thing a that which, bing ven the thing rnscesinly posed and whic, Being taken anay, the thing iy necessary taken avayor that without which the thing can nether be nor be conssved, land which ean neither be noe be concsved without the thing Propenent a the individualist view understand thi to state that the existence of an ‘sence entails the existence ofthe mode of which tithe esene, and that the cessation of the essence likewise entail the cestion of Hs mode! ‘Therefor, the existence of my essence entails that [00 exist, ad ts Son as ry esence ceases tobe 4 100 must ‘Why grant that Ede? catals a individualist coossption of modal cssenets? Well, suppose that it docs noi, spose an exsnces the eens ‘ot both mode) and mode; The essence of ode, an mode, has no inves ‘on the duration existence of ether mode, Rater, the to modes come ‘be ad perish by the dictates ofthe external order of nate that surrounds them (FIp244p28) As the esenoe doesnot determine ths tne at which the ‘modes come into and out of existence, iis posible for mode, £0 exist at Some tne during which mode doesnot (and ie versa} In other word, the fern order of nature can make it such that mode exists at some time during which modes dos not: bu if mode, exists at som time during which ‘modes Joes nt then the essence of made, a itv alo the execs of move, would ako exist at some tne during which mode, does not. Thi contradicts Elde? as it state tat an esonc cannot exit apart from the ode isthe ‘sence of, If the esence of mode; cannot exist apart fom mode then the fesenee of mode, cannot also be the exence of another mods, mode Efe? thus forbids two modes from having the same essence, The essence ‘ofeach mode, then, is unique to that mode and not share by another there cannot be to moses, Le. individuals, with the same esence, Ths oes Ellde? provide strong evidenee for the inivguaist vcw. Thdividuasts an also appeal to Spinoza's constus doctine as a second, albeit indirect, aimation of ther view According to this doctrine, each individual or mode strives to persevere in it Being. 0 preserve itself, and this stiving of a mode ie it conatue (Eilp6)? “Zee ii i oe ago sr pas ine Sh Tate ‘Rec flor othe ea Por aod oe ho Mun 1 (0 (9) od “np mst ope iter parca ats ot wh al ne RY EL oo ‘Conmigo, Ho, ‘an Rese, anim a he asin Ata Spa (geo Se on Ro nt Maced ¥ Yo ew Yor Lr ara Pa 5) {Date wanda ai. 263 [A.mo’s conats of striving, fathermor, is Mei wih it "acu cence so te atl nett of ca mode is ving to prowrve {sa CEllp?, This invdualy onentd endewour the thing to praere onaef canbe th exenes of mode ony Ifthe ene Umigus to tht modo. Thies beeaue in onder forthe exenoe of ht ode tobe its coats, 4. the der to prom it ing, cannot be the soor of tne lhow ato scing Io preserve Ot oer bing. ‘Thretor, the conatus ofeach tode i sigue fo that mode, andi 30 far asx mode’ conus it eens, so must sts eens Do ung tof ‘Neorg tothe conatus Goctne, then, the essace ofeach mods fe As te coats doce enor a set ration between mod's execs ands eaence i ad uber confirmation for the india Sading of EI10e9, The sonatu dovne holds tat mod's ring ie svn, and thats ence i unig tothe mods. Tht Spor ses 09 thi ina somewhat cave atta moles, suggests that the en of & Uniqs eens one ith which ie (and he pesmi, hit ean) sady Tama and coming as it dose fter Elle, hee i then fround 40" clim thatthe consis doctrine imply appeals 1. an Indias conception of essen tat rota, propel conse, in ENlde. Let Elle? and the constis dovtine sone, then at two indeatons of Spinoea® commitment to an iniuai conception | ial enences, ‘What ofthe ter conception of modal ens ~ th vw scoring which modes of he ame Had tive Menta) modal coeneo? The Tendency among commentator to asume tt Spinoza commited fo fone othe ot and that EI andthe consi argument ar ong indicators of an indiuat reading Tare that Spnoe scam (o a individualist consepdon of medal ‘xeon, commentators in infring that he thereto rests common or shared one. modes could tive ony ne een or an ese in only one ven ofthe tem hen this would be am understandable inference, However, i as ot for Since on docs notre Out the ther. How the tro compons of ‘dal esenses reste il be taken pip Soston Four, hat to motate {hin proj, we mas At as that Spnoen commited to both Hating inne’ the odds’ postion, we now tre os atenin to the ‘oases view Specie ol! thet modes ofthe same kind exemply a sng ees, wtih wl el the spesevessene We in ndisteviene fr ths view In sme of Spins’ remarks concerning human nature in ELV an the ‘morality ofthe mid a EV. In EIVpp Spinors appears to undead “oar atu (natra naar) a the are shar by cach man Being. THs is more expht in FIVpid where he sms that in 30 far as tn ve Seung tothe guidance of reason, hey must do oly tose hing wich fe good or hurt ate, nd ts, foreach man Doing ha gd for human nature is algo what i best foreach of only Weal somehow shar the same nature Second, in his discussion of the mind’ eternity in EV, Spinoca sharacerias the ternal essence of modes as being impersonal Ices ‘pinion, and experiences ofan individual mind, ie that which makes ‘unigue ot personal, are only part of the mind so lng asthe body endures (EEVp2H), This means tat those events which deine and partcularize us a6 Individuals pertain to our duratonal existence, but not our eternity Spinoza, then, ads that there i nevertheless, an sternal essence foreach indivdval (EVp22). If the eternal evsnce excludes those events that personalize a mode, ten the eternal esene i impersonal. What the essence ‘fan individual would be sans its personality probably the exsence of the Kind of thing tS. The eternal exence of & man sins its own Individuality, or instance is probaly humanity ial, which ithe sane i all humans” ‘More diet textual support forthe specst interpretation of modal ‘senses may beeulled fom two passages in El, the is of Which s Eph, Here Spinoza states that the detnition of 4 thing dati its mate alone, and doesnot include the numberof individuals posessing that nate Ths ‘Suggests that the nature isl isthe same in each indivi posesing it Spinoza uss wangularity and humanity as examples the sin of the ingle express nothing bu he simple are of he triangle, Dut noc any exainsumber af trailer ati the at eceilybeacose why ech ptr mam xi Ba thx cant Fe conte human ature ne the toe Shit man oe ot Savas e mane of me tht calyx cenpany” “ein te vir heel docu as propo dt ik hat Seige tah non a ok Ro Wess The Panty of Samer oct (Came tuned ney Po 2. 3H, art Kesey a Semper pa tC of i! Boy {Coie nc cen Caro Aco hk, 193) SE An Dona ‘Spins ost knoe Calm 214 Tins Raa, ne Mara Pn, Crt Cle Maser Jv Tag ay SUNY fe 00 18 ‘Spano mcs ya imine Cay Bele eae esa Gsm! Mc} Pst Pinon Uns Pe 8) #8 To ‘net Su 87 nk ms rly, Seen Red Spar Howy New Yrs ey rie ng oe eet te erro om ange wi mse and ‘era "Jah Coram Rr Sti nd vod ao Shy ea Terr Seed Pht rus (Oscars) amine Cone Uae Fron ue V6). ‘The definition of human nature tele that of tangulaity, is the same for each member ofthe kind, and ast expresses their nature or esence, $0 is this he same in each instance i may be objected that the definition is common on account of its ‘excluding whatever is unique in each particular esence, ands such this passage, on its own, fll sbort of a deine commitment to species ‘sence, When Spinoza writes tha the defitons ofthe tangle and of man ‘do not refer to any particular instances, he maybe proposing thatthe ‘efniton ofa kind s Common tall fs members But that i aesomplishs this by excluding what is unique or individual in cach instance. Like Aisle, Spinoza may hold that individual essences ae unique but understood universally, ie. comprehended only with respect to the Properties thy share with other individuals oftheir kind." The dition ‘cptires what of an individual sence is common by excluding what is Unique, With Spinoza's mention that we ae defning the "imple nature’ of the tangle itis open for an objector to claim tha although the definition of telangulariy, for example, s common, the essences it dines may nonetheless be particular and nigue- ‘As it transpires, however, Spinoz's dsfiniions must be complete representations ofthe essences they define. In Elp82 Spinoza dams hat the definition ofthe essence of the thing defined i "sue" one, and as sucht rust be complete with respect co the esence it defines. Here is why. A toe efniton is one that agress with its object (Elax6), but for the definition of ln esence to agsee ox corespon with the essence i defines, it cannot lve Dart of the essence out. The correspondence between a te defiition of an sence and the esence it define, then, does not come in depres, 50 ‘common definitions cannot define unique essences. The objector is ron, Therefore, to think that ‘simple naire” is intended to mean that the Sefton of an exsnce excludes certain individuating parts The species, Db aotiag thatthe dtnition is tre one, x able oar that the denition ‘ofan essence is complete with respect tothe essence it defines, so that i te MRSS tes Shouts tts spe i he prs i gnome ater han st sect. Th Shey wanes pf rnp alps ‘tara reo ran era Th ein ‘Span noting wher unspent gy ol ad ot ‘ana’ (hame Spun, Cane Wore sey Mvp tae yy Udinapots Hae Posing Cou 290) 20, Tiron mae a the ction ot he ou inh pu, a te won fen ahr ‘in at Sion td ato ag es pens Spinoza espouses this same commitment in a second and more dire ext in EL He claims in Flp!¥s that the agrement between exense of individual ofthe same kind is such tha ifthe existence of one Petites, the ‘other's existnce will ot thereby perish. Buti the exence of one ould be ‘extoyed, and become false, the tber'sesence woul also be destroyed, ‘and become false” (EIpI79). The ference hetwech a odes existence and ‘ssenoe tha its existonce Is unique ti, whereas it essence Is not. One ‘mod's ecsing to ext doesnot affect another us the existence of onc distinct from the existence of the other T ean eat the parplefllybean but leave the yellow one for later. The pevishing of the esonce of one of the jellybeans, on the other hand, can’ only be the pershing of them all it {he esence ofeach elybean is identical. One ely bean’ losing its exence is the same as al jellybeans losing their esences only the sane essence it ‘repeated in ech jellybcan. Spinoza snot espousing a eseblance beeen individual essences ofthe same kind, bat rater aa eatiy. The esence ot nature of one member ofa species, then, is one and the sme a that of exch other member, and 5, Spinoza it commited to spcie-esencs, ‘Where docs ths lave us? ETlde2, in coajunetion wih the indirect support this reading secivs from the conats argument and the stength the conus argument contributes on its ow, sugges thatthe individualist, Jnerpetaton captures something of Spinoras view. However we have also jst seen thatthe ease fr the specs interpretation is trong aswel, and therefore, that thy too have righlyeaptured something of Spinoz’s view, ‘The natura conclusion i that Spinoza iin fet commited to both, SECTION TWO: ACTUAL AND FORMAL ESSENCES We can tezin to: make sense of Spinoras espousl of individualist and secicit modal esences by recognizing that his remarks about tal ‘ésences may be divided into remarks about formal esences” en “actual ‘sence’. Individuaists arguing that individuals ive unigue csenes ipture Spinoz'sthouht with respect to actual estes whereas species ‘who argue that a single essence recurs in individuals of the same kind fapture Spinora’s thought with respect to formal eens, To fully Understand Spinoza's modal essentalisn, we need to comprehend both, ‘While the actual and formal essences have Been discus ia the Iierature (dhe aetual moreso than the formal), thy have yet to be distinguished and contrasted. Scholar nsead ten to relegate ne to the ether. Wallon, for Instance, understands ‘actual esence’ and “Tormal exees to refer to t60 ‘waysin which an esence exists exists dell in God's attbutes 0 also, the actual essence ofan actualy exiting mode.” Others relegate one (0 ay wna of pase 2 Ci: Hard ety {he other by characterizing the formal essence asthe nonactal possibility ‘ofan actual essence." Thnk that they are separate xen, ad argue that Spinoss's modal exentialsm cannot be comprehended without. unde. ‘ning each apart rom the other. We wil se, by parsing oat the det of ‘modal essences under each conception, that actual esences are duration fan particular to the mode of which they are the ewence, whens formal fssences ae etemal and identically exemplified in a number of modes, Actual Essence Let us begin by drawing out the detail ofthe actual essence, As we sa in the discussion of Spinon's conatus doctrine in Serton One, Spinoca introduces the notion of an “actual esence in Elllp? ax part of his ‘important conatus doctrine. The actual exence ofa thing iit tving to preserve itself, which Spinoza cals its ‘conatus’ (Ep6A7)* We also ‘iscassedthare why the actual essence i both particular to a mode end ‘durational, As the actual esence of « mode is the mode's sndewour to preserve its own being, the actual esence i unigue tothe mode, ad since the mode's stiving eases when the mode ceases, so is its actual esse ‘drational This a rohan of the conates argument examined carl, and the conclusion sagtin that actual esenoes ae both unique und durant ‘We can expand on this by. considering some aspects of Spinorss igresion on bodies Tallowing Ellpl3. After some preliminaries about all bodies, Spinoza deine an “indivi” as a mode that possess and preserves a cortin fixed ratio of motion and rest between is parts (Elfpt3ée. Inthe lersmas that follow this dentin he characterizes this ‘tio of motion and ret asthe individual ‘nature’ or form’. Am individual ‘that loses pats bat replaces them with others, for instance, ‘wil ean its "Alan Donan, Suse (Cag: Ching Unset Ms, 1) SE; RJ Dean Spine Coin: Rp Pt 1) 5956, Sh, 3578 en cca pal Crna ean i et onsite tng coments Ser Cry Geom Me 107 Bet ‘Sith 30'S" Donan Ss I'S; Micha Dar Roc Span Meeps icing in Comrie Compan Spies ee! Dare (eam Cantar ‘Unive Pos 195) 92-36 and xa Don Gare, Spee Coat Aen Spo Meghna hows sy 0 Rar Ro oot Ue sprees Gnls ence ns tie od Serre yf Ell sot pce nature. without any change of its form’ (EIIpI3H), Since the ratio of ‘motion aad rest betwoen an individual’ parts is form ot ature, this ‘what the actual estnee preserves. The actual esence ds therefore the fndeavour ofa mode (one that isan individual o preserves fined ratio of ‘motion and rs, and so Jong as this ratio is preserved, the mode including its atl essence, persists. Wii fails to maintain is rai, however, the ‘mode, including its endeavour to persist, iis actual esence, ceases to be CEIvpi59, ‘Thi isprecly what Elldl2 captures about modal essences. A bodys cual esene iss strving to preserve its rato of motion ad fest: tad-ng such rquies a body, i.e. pars to preserve the ratio between, This is what Spinoza means when he writes that the esence of a thing such hat, Being ven, the thing isnecesarly given. Furthermore, once the ati eats tobe Fetained, the essence ib destroyed, so the mode ceses tobe. This i what Spinoza means when he writes thatthe essence ofa thing is wich tat, bing taken away, the thing is accessarily taken away. El, then, is the efntion ofa mode's etal essence, ‘So cach mode hast own actual exsence, i, am essnee this partclar to the mode and comes to he and perishes with This sight a fur ask goes, but it neglects other important aspects of Spina’ conception of ‘modal esences, Just as individualist clams are vindicated with respect to ‘actual essences, s0 10, though with considerably more efor, are speielst ‘laimsvindleatd with respect to formal essences, Formal Essence Despite the above characterization of a mode's esence a pticslar and urational, Spinoza elsewhere speaks of modes of the same hind cxempliying a single essence, and of exences being eral, This is the contrast between the two coaceptions of modal esenoes — individualist hold that modal essences ave unigue and duration spits that they are ‘common and eternal In Section One I concluded that there i good evidence to entertain the idea that Spinoza is commited to both views, and | have singe shown that a mode's actual essence vindicate the indvidualiss imterpretaon. I wil now show, across Sections Two and. Three, that Spinoa's characterization ofthe Yortualesence” indicates the speciest sty, we have already seen that Spinoza understands modes ofthe same kind to posses a common essence ~ this why hoi committed to the spockist view. He also Beever that modal esences are in some sense ema. He argues, or instance, that “each idea of each ody, oof each Singular thing which actnly exit, necessarily involves an ternal and Inf sence of God (Eps), aed that tere isan des that expresses the fssence ofthis or that human body, under a species of eternity” (EVR). What inthe Ethie accounts for thew characterization of modal essences? ‘The actual esonce of a mode is unique ct and durational, soit cannot be ‘vat Spinoes i relersng to in these remarks. contend that iis the oral ‘Seence of «node that i ternal, that this esence may be exemplified or frearrent in many modes, and that a8 such ft vindicites the space Interpretation. “Tne formal esence i fist inroued in EM, wher i 6 wed to help explain the manner in which th dea ofa mhode exits apart from the ctl ‘since ofthe mode. Spinoza write that ‘the eas of singular thing, oF of ‘modes, that do aot exit mist be comprehended in God's infinite ea in the Sime way as the formal essenes of the sngslar things, or modes, ae Contained in God's attributes (Elp!). Theretore, there are ideas of 0% using modes in God, and thse ae simi, apparent wih respect t the ‘manne of their existence, to formal eens of ngular modes coma in {he atibutes. I we fip tis around, we sce thatthe formal exsnces of fingular modes are contained in God's atibutes inthe sameway tht Hess of nomexstont modes ae comprehended in God’ ntelet, To wagertand ‘what a formal essence is, we need to make sense of this analogy Normally, a analogy works by relying on something we do understand to sed light on something we do ot by noting sissies between the 0. Tl you that Titans envionment resembles Earth's early environmen, tnd yo are falar withthe conditions of Earths ealyenvsonment, for fxampk, the abundance of earbon-dioxde and sulphur, the sarc of fxygen, ete, then by analogy, you have some understanding of Titan's envionment. Aliough we can speculate that the infit intellect (as here no idea it doesnot have), has at al mes dens of ll things that have, do oF wil eit, ths does ite to elucidate the notion of a formal ensence much les explain how the two noons are analogoae. Luckily, the demonstration isof some help. This i perhaps a litle surprising as it sates only tha his Proposition is evideat ftom the preceding one, bst is understood more ler rom the preceding schoo’ Asi tans out, however, ENIpT&s ae recs what we naed fo make sense of Elis In Ellp7&s Spinezaexpicates and asus forthe claim thatthe order and ‘oanetion of ies isthe same as the order and comnetion of things ‘According to ths doctrine, there is one-o-one correspondence between the modes ofeach atribut, including thought and extension. This means ‘hat fr every mode of thought, tere a eoreesponding mode of extension, and vice vers for every mode of extension there isa corresponding mode of "ras popson hs wu my sea, Se Ein Cay, St Mea ay prea Spr upper Users 10) {S82 Cy armed Ms 4 Bm, Sy St ala Reel Repo si an St ep hy ay eS by thought As one part ofthe analogy in Eps regards ides of noneistent ‘modes, we ean understand how Ep? is thought to support Elips by ‘acknowledging that what FIIp? claims about modes also applies to thane ‘hat are non-existent. I ideus of nowaistent modes are 8 abset of al ‘mods, thea whats ru fall modes ire for eas of tom-enisten modes swell; but what could it meun to sugges that ides of non-existent modes ocrespond inthe sume manner a enting ideas and thir objets? Ifthe ‘mode does nt exist, what does the wen correspon ts ‘Remember that, according to Spinozas analogy, the formal esence of a singulc mode is contained in God's attributes in the same way athe idea of 1 non-euistent mod is comprehended in Gods intellect. By epplication of Ellpt, the formal esence as a mode of the attribute of extension - ‘2&cp.64) In Hie with immediate infinite mode, he understands these tbe manifestly pervasive throughout their respective attributes. The fist axiom of his digression on bodies, oe instance, holds that al odie ether ‘move or ae at res, signifying that the principe of moton-and-est is pervasive and manifestly so, throughout extension, The same tre for intellect-an-wil in the atibute of thought (Etps2c2). Formal eseacs, fe the other hand, ae not manietly pervasive throughout their ati, 0 they are not immediate infinite modes. None, by articulating Slightly diferent sense of being. pervasive or preent throughout an ttibat,F think we can make sens of Formal esenes as med infinite rmodas. I want to suggest that formal exencos are pervasive, just not ‘manifest s, ‘The iden Tam proposing is that mediate infinite modes are pervasive iroughout an atibutein-a manner that is dsiact Grom that ia which immediate infisite modes are pervasive throughout an attibue. To be “manifestly pervasive isto be actively expressed dyough each mode of an atibue, whereas tobe pervasive, but not manifestly 5s to be expressible by, oraplicable to cach mode fan attbute even though the infinite mode need not actualy bes expres. The ideas that meat infinite modes are ‘modications of the immediate infinite modes ofan attribute that apply (0 ‘rare tue of al the modes of that trite even if thy arent exeried ot Tnstandated by every sage mode. Curley suggests that infiite modes are S04 cuisToPHER p MAKTD like general propositions ‘which are always and everywhere valid. [My view iva fehnement of ti I contend that mediate fit modes re true thoughout an attribute even if tht tru i not expresed. by cach ‘ode, The medite infinite mode aman, Tor sastance, stipulats ondiions for @ modes being & human being, and dhese conditions are {rue ofall modes of the attebut, Le those that are and those that are not human beings. So itis by being applicable fo every mode, even if pot fctaly appt or exercised, that mete infinite modes may be sid to be infaite: When Spinoza sus that modal esences are eternal and infiite (Elfp4), | understand his we of infinite’ to mean that they ate applicable though not necessarily applied co every made of the atsbute, Ths they are pervasive, just not manifestly so, Formal essencss, being neither taniferly pervasive or fst, are infinite inthis way a8 wel 50 formal fssonces are medi innite modes.” Formal Essences ure Laws of Natare ‘Many deals and questions remain. [have ye o show, for example, how formal esencs are capable of teing simultaneously ideally exemplified in mumerous finite modes. [think we can explain the recurrence Feature of Formal esenos by constring them us lw of ature, Toda so, Til age that Spinoza’ modiateifite modes are the laws of mtu, and ts fortal csenees are mediate infinite modes, they to0 shouldbe construed 3 lw ‘With this we wil beable to see the manner in which formal eens are ‘Spinoza only ever meatios two infinite modes of exension- motion and res (6, Hlps2e2ep 68)" However, if e lok into his charaetoration of| these abi, it is fily obvious that ey are placeholders or base principles {or the more deta and specif laws of nature. Spine characterizes Ls of nature e necessities of ature and contends that "nothing. appens| in nature which is contrary to its universal laws, Nor does anything happen which doesnot aac with thse las or doesnot follow fom them Sew, spines Met 8 SESE id ss ied y ater a ney Ca wo ‘thr wae beng ona tds atx nh fale cist exh mot ofa rn 0 tout ii tess psa ae ns fo thee ape two nate make teen er aa pity, ne ac toh pia Sem Tne nee mse to nes Ts cae Spes non nt {hoe ie deerme tient he ent th ng a ‘rtm shad bet nage hg moses oy and oy 84 (TTP ¥, It; 57883), We find siilar sentiments inthe preluce to EI, ‘where Spinoza writes that tur as the same svete an power of ating are eseyte {no ad the sume, ht tbe a and Yl of Natu, cord t which al ‘hing happen, and change fom one form 19 another, ae alway nnd Wherein Spinoz's systems might we locate these laws? AS we know, Eeld was significant influence on Spina, and jst a4 Ect ld and attempted to detnonstrte thatthe various and particular lavs of eometry maybe inferred from art of hase and ntitive definitions and axioms, 50 too does Spinoza think that the various and particular laws of extended nature follow frm the more hse principles of extension, ie tion and rest Just ay the laws of geometry Uitte the propertis of al eomscl figures, 50 too do the laws of gature dictate the actions and interatons (Gehaviour ofall ite modes Therefore, just a the more specie las fof goometry manifest the Tarter details and complete of i base and inuative prisipes, s0 for Spinoza do the laws of nature manifest the determinatenest of substance and its atsibutes in consideably more Aetiled and compen ays, How ee, for instance, could they govetn the ‘contextualized or "madd? behaviour of finite modes? So characterized, laws of mare fiction as intermediaries between substance aeabute ad the order of finite modes, ad as such ae the aint modes ‘We can be more specific by recalling the distinction between immediate and mit infinite mods: immediate infsite modes are thos hat follow from the absolute nature ofa atribute, whores mediate infinite modes follow from the attsbute todd in some way (EIp23), We know tht totion and setae the two mei infinite modes of extension, and that the mate infinite modes Turher modiy thse. The further meaietions rh any a dh te i ef ae al pred {Slo ra then (ipa Sida a nd ah thot fle nse ‘trop o Thos nd xeon om snd he bt xno Fercpes hn ows tat re ee Se chcnin wn of nue ini sn ae prop. a ty Hiv Cy oe Cay, Spans Mery Set and Cooma Med 7 orl rovdns si Stns of some hee Vegas Ye To nie ‘st po a, pa utc Sa amcor Yr ey eS a Po ad of motion and rest that dictate the Behaviour of bodies by relating and Sppiying the basic principles of motion apd rest to them sre the laws of ature We can sce hi reltion n Spinoza's characterization of al bodies 38 {singe individual. He says thatthe whole of nature is one Individual, bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change ofthe hole Individual” (EIlpI3ts). The laws detrmine the behaviour of the urs, and do so such thatthe whole remains unafete. To do so, the laws Imast bei concert withthe whole, andthe best explanation of this, within Spingza'ssstem, is that the laws manifest the whole in a more modified way! Were we to poe away the veneer of motionand-ext an inguin its more specie modifications, we would find the considerably more inate las of nature." Laws of mature, therefore, are the mediate infite modes, More specify, with respect to the alsibute of extension, the Inedat infinite modes are the phystal laws governing the boaviowe ofall bodies, and these are the farther modifications of motion and rest. oct formal esences are mediate infinite modes, they too function a8 laws of mature, and with this we are able to explain the manner in which formal esences are recurrent” Consider two analogies. Newton's second law of motion» that the aseleration ofa body is equal to the fore acting fn it aivided by its mass ~ applies to all bodies. As such, i is pervasive throughout extension, ie. infite (at last so far us seventecathcenry ‘etaphysicans are concerned). Tp s fat ais claim about lf odie, he Taw applies to al bodies, and as sch is manift in each pat ofthe stibute ‘of extension. OF the hssarchy of laws, we might then say that Newton's {cond nw i closer to the jmmediateinnite mode than a lw whose spplcbity elas universal” Now consider salt We might postulate as a second example of a law of nature that salt dissolves in distilled wate. Theres such a law, itis early derivable fom other more hs aw, for i nu ata he Sa Vc, wh ih ay ‘hence nate picage pitino ne as ay {eae sat oven th con a 4 mde wade ech tba iy te pe aa hs a say SSW he mane in modes lav ile gst. hey ae tea oF Irwin hn he mies moan, a hy ae ot he seer rath em tev Ta eg a Sete ce tn ii ae erin onan hy eb example, those defining the nature of solubility and the chemical compositions of water and sll. Unlike Newton's lav. this laws tre forall extended modes despite its not being maniised in each, For ny region of spice where we do not find a combination of disiied watce and salt, {i moverthless tue of that region that were it to be 50 ‘constituted, the alt would disolve in the water. The sve is tue of Formal exsences; they too are mediate infinite modes, aa as sich ane applicable to all regions of spuce, including those whee they ate not ‘actully instantiated, This enables us to see more cleazly the sense in Which "mediate infinite modes are pervasive, but ot manifestly so Whatever modes do manifest tis lw, furthermore, manifest one and the same aw, ie the very same law is manfet in cach instance of i and this is the sense in whish laws are recurent, AS formal esences tre reat infinite modes too, and x0 vs (a, ike), they are recurrent im the sume way. With tis picture of formal essences we are able to sce that they are infinite and eternal, ie faite modes, and the nner in Which they are recurent in modes of the same Kind. This do the individuals and speciest views each capture some arpect of Spinoz's depiction of modal essences, but the broader Iramework, given the sucess of both interpretations, relies on the acknowledgement that both te true and requires, im addition, an account of how they are related, remains, then, 10 show How the two conceptions of modal esencs are related SECTION FOUR: THE RELATION BETWEEN FORMAL AND, "ACTUAL ESSENCES Having arguod that formal esences ate hws of mature think we can best understand their elation to actual essences by regarding actual esonces as Instances or exemplifeatons a these laws. We ean back ito this elation by understanding it as analogous to Plato's characterization of the ration beewoen fortreopies and ther forms. In the Phoedo Plato distinguishes heewoen tallness self and the tallness in parsclars, for example, the tales. Simms. Pato is thought to be proposing, in addition to Forms tredionally construed, individual instances of forms in paral ‘Those have boon called manent charters’ or “Torm-cupiey’. The form "Po Pha aed by M.A re iby Capea Pt: Cp Wake (Pt ndaepae Hace Poin Corgy 13788 (20. Gl Fiera ‘jor Snr Ant Pp apne) wom (98) 7137 Daal Deere ‘Serotonin Tony ms Of Ser Ace Pa) {29 ad A San, Roy ii Pn Urey pedo ope en itself i separate from particulars tha exemplify t snes, as Plo 59 its el by tcl (erro re” aco} Form-copies, on the other hand are individual and vigue instances of forms immanent in patios,” Parsiclas have the propertie they do om account of thee form-cope, and Tormeopies partiipate or partake ina certain form or other FFormcopies that participate or partake of the same form are identical wth respet to that form, but individual with respect to the parscular hey are in Therefore, not only. is there, for example, coldness ‘lf, but thew i alo the coldneseinamy-lemonade and the coldness imSunt'snose. Form

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