12)NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILI Industries, Inc.
Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and coremaker
as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from May 28,
1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage. On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass
which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was
treated at a nearby hospital. Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises
which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without
authority and in the process injured his left thumb. The following day he was asked to resign.
Three days after, , private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary
benefits.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid
and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee
of Nitto Enterprises and not an apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of
Execution ordering for the reinstatement of Capili and to collect his back wages.
Petitioner, Nitto Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of
Nitto Enterprises?
LAW: Article 280 of the Labor Code
RULING: Yes. The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was
executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
maker/molder. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7,
1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment,
the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. The act of filing the
proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an
employer-apprentice relationship.
Nitto Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only
in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect; and Capili is
considered to be a regular employee of the company.
13) Atlanta Industries vs Sebolino
Facts: Complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, et.al., filed several complaints for illegal dismissal,
regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as
claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners Atlanta
a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes.
The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work
with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship
agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed
when the second apprenticeship agreement expired and that they were actually already
employees of Atlanta before they we put in the apprenticeship program.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and
to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-
approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in
the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had
trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master
List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.
Subsequently a compromise agreement was entered into by the respondent with Atlanta, but
the remaining respondents had refused to sign.
Issues: Whether or not the termination of the employees after the expiration of the
apprenticeship agreement was valid cause for dismissal
Held: No.
Ratio: Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite,
Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they
were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents’ status
through relevant operational records.
The Master List (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their position
that the respondents were not Atlanta’s employees, at the time they were engaged as
apprentices, is unreliable and does not inspire belief.
The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence)
renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. The
respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator -
tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the four
as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed
without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard,
their dismissal was illegal under the law.
Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we
can only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of
the first agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and
purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular
employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill
which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Code’s
implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least.
14) CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, vs COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD
15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as fish
cleaner at petitioners tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an
apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75
daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship
program. According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November
1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating ofN.I. or needs improvement since she scored
only27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the
performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence,
petitioner issued a termination notice dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her
termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997. Palad then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th
month pay for the year 1997.
ISSUES:
1)WHETHER OR NOT THE APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND BINDING BETWEEN
THE PARTIES
2)WHETHER OR NOT PALAD WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY THE PETITIONER
HELD:
1)The Court held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and
binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved
petitioners apprenticeship program.
The Court cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission, where it was held
that an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice
may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee. It is mandated
that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the
proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an
apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. The Labor Code defines an apprentice
as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an employer.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed
a regular employee performing the job of a fish cleaner. Clearly, the job of a fish cleaner is
necessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor
Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer.
2)Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee
for just causes or for authorized causes. under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer
must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for
termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the
dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation
on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies
any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner
likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination because Palad allegedly
stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever
gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid
dismissal are lacking in this case.
15) Bernardo vs NLRC
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a
uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers.
Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as
money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.
They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article
280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special
workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held: The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be
trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not
they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer
may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in
writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993.
Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead
to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important,
these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to
them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-
bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to
opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined
by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job
for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the
necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is
considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993.
Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead
to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important,
these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to
them. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed
these tasks for more than six months. Petition granted.
16) MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE
LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and Employment
judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.
Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a
general utility worker on January 10, 1979. After 6 months, he was informed that his work was
unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards. To give him another chance, and
with Dequila’s written consent, Mariwasa extended Dequila’s probationary period for another
three months: from July 10 to October 9, 1979. Dequila’s performance, however, did not
improve and Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period.
Dequila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Mariwasa and its VP for Administration,
Angel T. Dazo, and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389.
DIRECTOR OF MINISTRY OF LABOR: Complaint is dismissed. Termination is justified. Thus,
Dequila appeals to the Minister of Labor.
MINISTER OF LABOR: Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a
regular employee at the time of his dismissal, thus, he was illegally dismissed. (Initial order:
Reinstatement with full backwages. Later amended to direct payment of Dequila’s backwages
from the date of his dismissal to December 20, 1982 only.)
ISSUE: WON employer and employee may, by agreement, extend the probationary period of
RULING: YES, agreements stipulating longer probationary periods may constitute lawful
exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months.
The SC in its decision in Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. (1984) said that “Generally, the probationary
period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when
the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is
established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be
performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of
managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in
the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from
May, 1980 to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular
kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills experience
or training.” In this case, the extension given to Dequila could not have been pre-arranged to
avoid the legal consequences of a probationary period satisfactorily completed. In fact, it was
ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make
good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now
unjustly be turned against said employer’s account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who
could not perform according to its work standards. By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of
the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of
said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. By reasonably
extending the period of probation, the questioned agreement actually improved the
probationary employee’s prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.
Petition granted. Order of Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed.
1) NITTO ENTERPRISES v. NLRC
Apprenticeship agreemet
Roberto Capili
a) accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary
b) injured his left thumb after entering a workshop which was not his work station and
operating one of the power press machines without authority.
Capili filed for ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and payment of other monetary benefits
LABOR ARBITER:The termination of private respondent is valid and money claim for lack of
merit shall be dismissed.
NLRC: reversed decision of Labor Arbiter. Directed to reinstate complainant to his work last
performed with backwages. Capili was found to be a regular employee.
Petitioner filed a MOTION for RECON but was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
1) ART 61 of the LABOR CODE- Appreneticeship agreements may be entered into only in
accordance with appretinceship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment.
In the case, the agreement was executed on May 28, 1990 and submitted to DOLE on the same
dat but it was filed only on June 6, 1990.
2) ART 280- REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT- The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be REGULAR where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
DECISION AFFIRMED. There is NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION committed by NLRC.
2) ATLANTA INDUSTRIES INC. v. APRILITO SEBOLINO ET AL
manufacturer of steel pipes
Sebolino et al filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment,
nonpayment of wages and other money claims from Atlanta.
The complainants (Sebolino) alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed
to work with Atlanta for MORE THAN 6 MONTHS from the start of a purported apprenticeship
agreement. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship
agreement expired.
CA:
1) The respondents were ALREADY EMPLOYEES of the company before they entered into the
first and second apprenticeship agreements.
2) The first and second apprenticeship agreements were DEFECTIVE as they were executed in
violation of the law and the rules.
a) no indication of the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be trained.
b) not approved by TESDA
3) The POSITIONS occupied by the respondents are usually necessary and desirable in the
manufacture of plastic building materials, and the company's business.
4) The COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WAS NOT BINDING on Costales and Almoite because they
DID NOT SIGN the agreement. They admitted that they were initially planned to be a part of
the compromise agreement, but their employment has been REGULARIZED as early as January
11, 2006.
PETITION DENIED.
3)CENTURY CANNING CORP V. CA
Gloria Palad- fish cleaner at Petitioner's tuna and sardines factory
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION- NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
a) she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator
b) incurred numerous tardiness and absences
Petition issued a TERMINATION NOTICE
Palad filed for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th
month pay for 1997.
LABOR ARBITER: DISMISSED
1,632- last salary
7,228- prorated 13th month pay
NLRC: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the LABOR ARBITER'S DECISION. additional backwages
for 2 months - 7176
CA: 1) the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was NOT VALID and BINDING because
it was executed more than 2 months BEFORE the TESDA APPROVED petitioner's apprenticeship
program.
NITTO ENT V. NLRC- where it was held that PRIOR APPROVAL by the DOLE of the proposed
apprenticeship program is a CONDITION sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can
be validly entered into.
2) Petitioner ILLEGALLY DISMISSED Palad.
a) no showing that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard of performance
b) no due process - no notice and hearing.
SC:
1) REGISTRATION and APPROVAAL by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before
Hiring of Apprentices
SEC 60- EMPLOYMENT OF APPRENTICES
ART 61- CONTENTS OF APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENTS
RA 7796- TESDA has transferred the authority over apprenticeship programs from Bureau of
Local Employment of DOLE to TESDA
The apprenticeship program was only apprioved on Sept 26, 1996 but the apprenticeship
started on
It is to ensure that only EMPLOYERS in the HIGHLY TECHNICAL INDUSTRIES may employ
apprentices and only in APPRENTICEABLE OCCUPATIONS.
ART 280- an employment is deemed RGEULAR where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer.
2) ILLEGAL TERMINATION OF PALAD
ART 279- an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes or for
authorized causes.
ART 277 (b)- two requisites for VALID DISMISSAL:
1) the dismissal must be for a JUST or AUTHORIZED CAUSE
2) the employee must be afforded an OPPORTUNITY to BE HEARD and to DEFEND himself.
NO CLEAR and SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice during the
agreed period.
a) absence of any written warnings
b) indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance evaluation
* It was made belatedly, specifically, after the filing of the case and during the progress in the
Arbitral level.
ART 227- the EMPLOYER has the BURDEN of PROVING that the termination was for a VALID or
AUTHORIZED CAUSE.
c) Palad had NO KNOWLEDGE of the performance evaluation
d) Palad NOT INFORMED of the RESULT of the alleged performance evaluation
e) Palad did not receive a NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
f) Palad NOT GIVEN the CHANCE TO EXPLAIN
DECISION of CA AFFIRMED.
15) BERNARDO V. NLRC
deaf-mutes hired bt Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through
Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers
NLRC: Herein petitioners could NOT be deemed REGULAR EMPLOYEES under ART 280 of the
Labor Code.
SC: -ARE PETITIONERS REGULAR EMPLOYEES?
1) The RENEWEAL OF THE CONTRACTS of the handicapped workers and the HIRING of others
lead to the conclusion that their TASKS were BENEFICIAL and NECESSARY to the bank.
SEC 5 of MAGNA CARTA for DISABLED PERSONS- a QUALIFIED DISABLED EMPLOYEE should be
given the SAME TERMS and CONDITIONS of employment as a QUALIFIED ABLE-BODIED
PERSON as provided by ART 280- REGULAR and CASUAL EMPLOYMENT
The PRIMARY STANDARD of DETERMINING REGULAR EMPLOYMENT is the REASONABLE
CONNECTION between the PARTICULAR ACTIVITY performed by the EMPLOYEE in relation to
the USUAL TRADE or BUSINESS of the EMPLOYER.
With the exception of 16 of the petitioners, they performed these tasks for MORE THAN 6
MONTHS.
When the bank RENEWED the contract after the lapse of the 6-month probationary period, the
employees thereby became REGULAR employees who are entitled to SECURITY of TENURE-
services may be terminated only for a JUST or AUTHORIZED CAUSE.
They are entitled to BACK WAGES and REINSTATEMENT without LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS
and OTHER PRIVILEGES. They are also awarded SEPARATION PAY because the job was no long
available after it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged.
-BRENT RULING- upheld the validity of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that
the parties entered into the contract on EQUAL FOOTING.
Parties are NOT AT LIBERTY to INSULATE themselves and their relationships from the impact
of LABOR LAWS and REGULATIONS by simply CONTRACTING with each other.
The NIGHTTIME sorting and counting of money is NOT a justification for the termination
because it involves RISKS TO HANDICAPPED and ABLE-BODIED PERSONS alike.
-OTHER GROUNDS:
1) An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because
of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.

2) The character of employment is determined NOT by the stipulations in the contract, but by
the nature of the work performed.

* The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disable Persons are NOT based merely on charity or
aaccommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not.

PETITION GRANTED.* Only the employees, who WORKED for MORE THAN 6 MONTHS and
whose CONTRACTS were RENEWED are deemed REGULAR.

16) MARIWASA v. HON. LEOAGARDO, JR.

Joaaquin Dequila was HIRED ON PROBATION by Mariwasa as "general utility worker"

He was informed that his work had proved UNSATISFACTORY and had FAILED to meet the
required standards.

Mariwasa extended his probation period for ANOTHER 3 months. His performance, however,
did NOR IMPROVE and on that account Mariwasa TERMINATED his employment at the end of
the extended period.

MINISTRY OF LABOR: complaint for illegal dismissal DISMISSED.

Appeal to the OFFICE of the MINISTER: REVERSED decision of ML. Deputy Minister Vicente
Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was ALREADY A REGULAR EMPLOYEE at the time of his
dismissal, therefore, could not have been lawfully dismissed for failure to meet company
standards as a probationary worker.

SC: ART 282- PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT- Generally, the probationary period of

employment is limited to 6 motnhs. The exception is when the parties to an EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT may AGREE OTHERWISE, such as when the same is established by company policy
or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee.

Dequila's probation was EX GRATIA, an act of liberality on the part of his employer to give him
a second chance to prove his worth. Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the
commpletion of said period if he still failed to maake the frade during the period of extension.

PETITION GRANTED.